1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::Sign message signing by hand.
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
14 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
15 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
16 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
23 use ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
24 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
25 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer};
26 use util::{byte_utils, transaction_utils};
28 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
29 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey, PublicKey, Scalar};
30 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Message};
31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
32 use bitcoin::{PackedLockTime, secp256k1, Sequence, Witness};
38 use util::transaction_utils::sort_outputs;
39 use ln::channel::{INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI};
42 use util::crypto::sign;
44 pub(crate) const MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 483;
46 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Success transaction.
48 pub fn htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
49 const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
50 const HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 706;
51 if opt_anchors { HTLC_SUCCESS_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT }
54 /// Gets the weight for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
56 pub fn htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
57 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
58 const HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 666;
59 if opt_anchors { HTLC_TIMEOUT_ANCHOR_TX_WEIGHT } else { HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT }
63 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
69 /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
70 pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
71 if witness_script_len == 133 {
72 Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
73 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
74 Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
81 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
82 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
84 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
85 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
86 let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
89 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
90 res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
91 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
97 /// Build a closing transaction
98 pub fn build_closing_transaction(to_holder_value_sat: u64, to_counterparty_value_sat: u64, to_holder_script: Script, to_counterparty_script: Script, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Transaction {
100 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
102 previous_output: funding_outpoint,
103 script_sig: Script::new(),
104 sequence: Sequence::MAX,
105 witness: Witness::new(),
110 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
112 if to_counterparty_value_sat > 0 {
114 script_pubkey: to_counterparty_script,
115 value: to_counterparty_value_sat
119 if to_holder_value_sat > 0 {
121 script_pubkey: to_holder_script,
122 value: to_holder_value_sat
126 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
128 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
129 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
135 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
141 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
142 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
144 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of our counterparty in just 50*32 bytes
147 pub struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
148 old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
151 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
152 fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
153 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
154 if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
162 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
163 /// Creates a new empty `CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets` structure.
164 pub fn new() -> Self {
165 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
169 fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
171 if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
178 /// Returns the minimum index of all stored secrets. Note that indexes start
179 /// at 1 << 48 and get decremented by one for each new secret.
180 pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
181 //TODO This can be optimized?
182 let mut min = 1 << 48;
183 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
192 fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
193 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
195 let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
196 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
197 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
198 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
204 /// Inserts the `secret` at `idx`. Returns `Ok(())` if the secret
205 /// was generated in accordance with BOLT 3 and is consistent with previous secrets.
206 pub fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
207 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
209 let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
210 if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
214 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
217 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
221 /// Returns the secret at `idx`.
222 /// Returns `None` if `idx` is < [`CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::get_min_seen_secret`].
223 pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
224 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
225 if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
226 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
229 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
234 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
235 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
236 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
237 writer.write_all(secret)?;
238 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
240 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {});
244 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
245 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
246 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
247 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
248 *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
249 *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
251 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {});
252 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
256 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
257 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
259 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
260 /// generated (ie our own).
261 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
262 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
263 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
264 sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
265 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
267 base_secret.clone().add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(res).unwrap())
270 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
271 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
272 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
274 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
275 /// generated (ie our own).
276 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
277 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
278 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
279 sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
280 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
282 let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
283 base_point.combine(&hashkey)
286 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
288 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
289 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always come from cheater
290 /// and revocation_base_secret always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
291 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
293 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
294 /// generated (ie our own).
295 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
296 let countersignatory_revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &countersignatory_revocation_base_secret);
297 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
299 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
300 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
301 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
302 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
304 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
306 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
307 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
308 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
309 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
311 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
314 let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())?;
315 let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone().mul_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())?;
316 countersignatory_contrib.add_tweak(&Scalar::from_be_bytes(broadcaster_contrib.secret_bytes()).unwrap())
319 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
320 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
321 /// public key instead of private keys.
323 /// Only the cheating participant owns a valid witness to propagate a revoked
324 /// commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always come from cheater
325 /// and revocation_base_point always come from punisher, which is the broadcaster
326 /// of the transaction spending with this key knowledge.
328 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
329 /// generated (ie our own).
330 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
331 let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
332 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
333 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
334 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
336 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
338 let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
339 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
340 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
341 sha.input(&countersignatory_revocation_base_point.serialize());
343 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
346 let countersignatory_contrib = countersignatory_revocation_base_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(rev_append_commit_hash_key).unwrap())?;
347 let broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone().mul_tweak(&secp_ctx, &Scalar::from_be_bytes(commit_append_rev_hash_key).unwrap())?;
348 countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
351 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
352 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
354 /// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
355 /// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
358 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
359 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
360 /// CommitmentTransaction.trust().keys() because we trusted the source of the
361 /// pre-calculated keys.
362 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
363 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
364 /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
365 pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
366 /// The revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
367 /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
369 pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
370 /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
371 pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
372 /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
373 pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
374 /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
375 pub broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
378 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(TxCreationKeys, {
379 (0, per_commitment_point, required),
380 (2, revocation_key, required),
381 (4, broadcaster_htlc_key, required),
382 (6, countersignatory_htlc_key, required),
383 (8, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, required),
386 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
387 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
388 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
389 /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
390 /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
391 pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
392 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
393 /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
394 /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
396 pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
397 /// The public key on which the non-broadcaster (ie the countersignatory) receives an immediately
398 /// spendable primary channel balance on the broadcaster's commitment transaction. This key is
399 /// static across every commitment transaction.
400 pub payment_point: PublicKey,
401 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
402 /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
403 /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
404 pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
405 /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
406 /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
407 pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
410 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelPublicKeys, {
411 (0, funding_pubkey, required),
412 (2, revocation_basepoint, required),
413 (4, payment_point, required),
414 (6, delayed_payment_basepoint, required),
415 (8, htlc_basepoint, required),
418 impl TxCreationKeys {
419 /// Create per-state keys from channel base points and the per-commitment point.
420 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
421 pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
423 per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
424 revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
425 broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
426 countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
427 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
431 /// Generate per-state keys from channel static keys.
432 /// Key set is asymmetric and can't be used as part of counter-signatory set of transactions.
433 pub fn from_channel_static_keys<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
434 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(
436 &per_commitment_point,
437 &broadcaster_keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
438 &broadcaster_keys.htlc_basepoint,
439 &countersignatory_keys.revocation_basepoint,
440 &countersignatory_keys.htlc_basepoint,
445 /// The maximum length of a script returned by get_revokeable_redeemscript.
446 // Calculated as 6 bytes of opcodes, 1 byte push plus 2 bytes for contest_delay, and two public
447 // keys of 33 bytes (+ 1 push).
448 pub const REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH: usize = 6 + 3 + 34*2;
450 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
451 /// key or the broadcaster_delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
452 /// Encumbering a `to_holder` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
453 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, contest_delay: u16, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
454 let res = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
455 .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
456 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
457 .push_int(contest_delay as i64)
458 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
459 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
460 .push_slice(&broadcaster_delayed_payment_key.serialize())
461 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
462 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
464 debug_assert!(res.len() <= REVOKEABLE_REDEEMSCRIPT_MAX_LENGTH);
468 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
469 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
470 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
471 /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
472 /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
473 /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
474 /// the counterparty or our own.
476 /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
477 /// this divided by 1000.
478 pub amount_msat: u64,
479 /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
480 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
481 /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
482 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
483 /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
484 /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
485 /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
486 pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
489 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, {
490 (0, offered, required),
491 (2, amount_msat, required),
492 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
493 (6, payment_hash, required),
494 (8, transaction_output_index, option),
498 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
499 let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
501 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
502 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
503 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
504 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
505 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
506 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
507 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
508 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
509 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
510 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
512 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
513 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
514 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
516 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
517 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
519 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
520 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
521 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
522 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
523 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
524 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
525 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
527 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
528 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
529 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
531 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
534 let mut bldr = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
535 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
536 .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
537 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
538 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
539 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
540 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
541 .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
542 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
543 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
545 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
546 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
547 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
548 .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
549 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
551 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
552 .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
554 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
555 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
556 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
557 .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
558 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
559 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
560 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
561 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF);
563 bldr = bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_1)
564 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
565 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP);
567 bldr.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
572 /// Gets the witness redeemscript for an HTLC output in a commitment transaction. Note that htlc
573 /// does not need to have its previous_output_index filled.
575 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
576 get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
579 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
580 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
581 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
582 let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
583 let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
585 let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
586 if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
587 builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
588 .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
590 builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
591 .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
592 }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
595 /// Builds an unsigned HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transaction from the given channel and HTLC
596 /// parameters. This is used by [`TrustedCommitmentTransaction::get_htlc_sigs`] to fetch the
597 /// transaction which needs signing, and can be used to construct an HTLC transaction which is
598 /// broadcastable given a counterparty HTLC signature.
600 /// Panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none() (as such HTLCs do not appear in the
601 /// commitment transaction).
602 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(commitment_txid: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, contest_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
603 let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
605 previous_output: OutPoint {
606 txid: commitment_txid.clone(),
607 vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
609 script_sig: Script::new(),
610 sequence: Sequence(if opt_anchors { 1 } else { 0 }),
611 witness: Witness::new(),
614 let weight = if htlc.offered {
615 htlc_timeout_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
617 htlc_success_tx_weight(opt_anchors)
619 let total_fee = feerate_per_kw as u64 * weight / 1000;
621 let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
623 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, contest_delay, broadcaster_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
624 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
629 lock_time: PackedLockTime(if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 }),
635 /// Gets the witnessScript for the to_remote output when anchors are enabled.
637 pub(crate) fn get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(payment_point: &PublicKey) -> Script {
639 .push_slice(&payment_point.serialize()[..])
640 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY)
642 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
646 /// Gets the witnessScript for an anchor output from the funding public key.
647 /// The witness in the spending input must be:
648 /// <BIP 143 funding_signature>
649 /// After 16 blocks of confirmation, an alternative satisfying witness could be:
651 /// (empty vector required to satisfy compliance with MINIMALIF-standard rule)
653 pub fn get_anchor_redeemscript(funding_pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Script {
654 Builder::new().push_slice(&funding_pubkey.serialize()[..])
655 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
656 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IFDUP)
657 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
659 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
660 .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
664 /// Per-channel data used to build transactions in conjunction with the per-commitment data (CommitmentTransaction).
665 /// The fields are organized by holder/counterparty.
667 /// Normally, this is converted to the broadcaster/countersignatory-organized DirectedChannelTransactionParameters
668 /// before use, via the as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
670 pub struct ChannelTransactionParameters {
671 /// Holder public keys
672 pub holder_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
673 /// The contest delay selected by the holder, which applies to counterparty-broadcast transactions
674 pub holder_selected_contest_delay: u16,
675 /// Whether the holder is the initiator of this channel.
676 /// This is an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
677 pub is_outbound_from_holder: bool,
678 /// The late-bound counterparty channel transaction parameters.
679 /// These parameters are populated at the point in the protocol where the counterparty provides them.
680 pub counterparty_parameters: Option<CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters>,
681 /// The late-bound funding outpoint
682 pub funding_outpoint: Option<chain::transaction::OutPoint>,
683 /// Are anchors used for this channel. Boolean is serialization backwards-compatible
684 pub opt_anchors: Option<()>
687 /// Late-bound per-channel counterparty data used to build transactions.
689 pub struct CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
690 /// Counter-party public keys
691 pub pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
692 /// The contest delay selected by the counterparty, which applies to holder-broadcast transactions
693 pub selected_contest_delay: u16,
696 impl ChannelTransactionParameters {
697 /// Whether the late bound parameters are populated.
698 pub fn is_populated(&self) -> bool {
699 self.counterparty_parameters.is_some() && self.funding_outpoint.is_some()
702 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
703 /// given that the holder is the broadcaster.
705 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
706 pub fn as_holder_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
707 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_holder_broadcastable");
708 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
710 holder_is_broadcaster: true
714 /// Convert the holder/counterparty parameters to broadcaster/countersignatory-organized parameters,
715 /// given that the counterparty is the broadcaster.
717 /// self.is_populated() must be true before calling this function.
718 pub fn as_counterparty_broadcastable(&self) -> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
719 assert!(self.is_populated(), "self.late_parameters must be set before using as_counterparty_broadcastable");
720 DirectedChannelTransactionParameters {
722 holder_is_broadcaster: false
727 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, {
728 (0, pubkeys, required),
729 (2, selected_contest_delay, required),
732 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(ChannelTransactionParameters, {
733 (0, holder_pubkeys, required),
734 (2, holder_selected_contest_delay, required),
735 (4, is_outbound_from_holder, required),
736 (6, counterparty_parameters, option),
737 (8, funding_outpoint, option),
738 (10, opt_anchors, option),
741 /// Static channel fields used to build transactions given per-commitment fields, organized by
742 /// broadcaster/countersignatory.
744 /// This is derived from the holder/counterparty-organized ChannelTransactionParameters via the
745 /// as_holder_broadcastable and as_counterparty_broadcastable functions.
746 pub struct DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
747 /// The holder's channel static parameters
748 inner: &'a ChannelTransactionParameters,
749 /// Whether the holder is the broadcaster
750 holder_is_broadcaster: bool,
753 impl<'a> DirectedChannelTransactionParameters<'a> {
754 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the broadcaster
755 pub fn broadcaster_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
756 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
757 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
759 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
763 /// Get the channel pubkeys for the countersignatory
764 pub fn countersignatory_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
765 if self.holder_is_broadcaster {
766 &self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
768 &self.inner.holder_pubkeys
772 /// Get the contest delay applicable to the transactions.
773 /// Note that the contest delay was selected by the countersignatory.
774 pub fn contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
775 let counterparty_parameters = self.inner.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap();
776 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { counterparty_parameters.selected_contest_delay } else { self.inner.holder_selected_contest_delay }
779 /// Whether the channel is outbound from the broadcaster.
781 /// The boolean representing the side that initiated the channel is
782 /// an input to the commitment number obscure factor computation.
783 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
784 if self.holder_is_broadcaster { self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder } else { !self.inner.is_outbound_from_holder }
787 /// The funding outpoint
788 pub fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
789 self.inner.funding_outpoint.unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint()
792 /// Whether to use anchors for this channel
793 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
794 self.inner.opt_anchors.is_some()
798 /// Information needed to build and sign a holder's commitment transaction.
800 /// The transaction is only signed once we are ready to broadcast.
802 pub struct HolderCommitmentTransaction {
803 inner: CommitmentTransaction,
804 /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction
805 pub counterparty_sig: Signature,
806 /// All non-dust counterparty HTLC signatures, in the order they appear in the transaction
807 pub counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>,
808 // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
809 // The user should be able to reconstruct this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
810 holder_sig_first: bool,
813 impl Deref for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
814 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
816 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { &self.inner }
819 impl PartialEq for HolderCommitmentTransaction {
820 // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
821 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
822 self.inner == o.inner
826 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(HolderCommitmentTransaction, {
827 (0, inner, required),
828 (2, counterparty_sig, required),
829 (4, holder_sig_first, required),
830 (6, counterparty_htlc_sigs, vec_type),
833 impl HolderCommitmentTransaction {
835 pub fn dummy() -> Self {
836 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
837 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
838 let dummy_sig = sign(&secp_ctx, &secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
840 let keys = TxCreationKeys {
841 per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
842 revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
843 broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
844 countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
845 broadcaster_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
847 let channel_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
848 funding_pubkey: dummy_key.clone(),
849 revocation_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
850 payment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
851 delayed_payment_basepoint: dummy_key.clone(),
852 htlc_basepoint: dummy_key.clone()
854 let channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
855 holder_pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(),
856 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
857 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
858 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: channel_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
859 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
862 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
863 let inner = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(0, 0, 0, false, dummy_key.clone(), dummy_key.clone(), keys, 0, &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable());
864 HolderCommitmentTransaction {
866 counterparty_sig: dummy_sig,
867 counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec::new(),
868 holder_sig_first: false
872 /// Create a new holder transaction with the given counterparty signatures.
873 /// The funding keys are used to figure out which signature should go first when building the transaction for broadcast.
874 pub fn new(commitment_tx: CommitmentTransaction, counterparty_sig: Signature, counterparty_htlc_sigs: Vec<Signature>, holder_funding_key: &PublicKey, counterparty_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Self {
876 inner: commitment_tx,
878 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
879 holder_sig_first: holder_funding_key.serialize()[..] < counterparty_funding_key.serialize()[..],
883 pub(crate) fn add_holder_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, holder_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
884 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
885 let mut tx = self.inner.built.transaction.clone();
886 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
887 let mut ser_holder_sig = holder_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
888 ser_holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
889 let mut ser_cp_sig = self.counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
890 ser_cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
892 if self.holder_sig_first {
893 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
894 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
896 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_cp_sig);
897 tx.input[0].witness.push(ser_holder_sig);
900 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
905 /// A pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction and its txid.
907 pub struct BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
908 /// The commitment transaction
909 pub transaction: Transaction,
910 /// The txid for the commitment transaction.
912 /// This is provided as a performance optimization, instead of calling transaction.txid()
917 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(BuiltCommitmentTransaction, {
918 (0, transaction, required),
922 impl BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
923 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
925 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
926 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
927 let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.transaction).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
928 hash_to_message!(sighash)
931 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
932 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
933 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
934 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
935 sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
939 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a closing transaction and will
940 /// actually build it and sign.
942 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
944 #[derive(Clone, Hash, PartialEq)]
945 pub struct ClosingTransaction {
946 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
947 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
948 to_holder_script: Script,
949 to_counterparty_script: Script,
953 impl ClosingTransaction {
954 /// Construct an object of the class
956 to_holder_value_sat: u64,
957 to_counterparty_value_sat: u64,
958 to_holder_script: Script,
959 to_counterparty_script: Script,
960 funding_outpoint: OutPoint,
962 let built = build_closing_transaction(
963 to_holder_value_sat, to_counterparty_value_sat,
964 to_holder_script.clone(), to_counterparty_script.clone(),
969 to_counterparty_value_sat,
971 to_counterparty_script,
976 /// Trust our pre-built transaction.
978 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
980 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
981 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
982 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedClosingTransaction {
983 TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self }
986 /// Verify our pre-built transaction.
988 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to the transaction.
990 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
991 /// or using the built transaction.
992 pub fn verify(&self, funding_outpoint: OutPoint) -> Result<TrustedClosingTransaction, ()> {
993 let built = build_closing_transaction(
994 self.to_holder_value_sat, self.to_counterparty_value_sat,
995 self.to_holder_script.clone(), self.to_counterparty_script.clone(),
998 if self.built != built {
1001 Ok(TrustedClosingTransaction { inner: self })
1004 /// The value to be sent to the holder, or zero if the output will be omitted
1005 pub fn to_holder_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1006 self.to_holder_value_sat
1009 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty, or zero if the output will be omitted
1010 pub fn to_counterparty_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1011 self.to_counterparty_value_sat
1014 /// The destination of the holder's output
1015 pub fn to_holder_script(&self) -> &Script {
1016 &self.to_holder_script
1019 /// The destination of the counterparty's output
1020 pub fn to_counterparty_script(&self) -> &Script {
1021 &self.to_counterparty_script
1025 /// A wrapper on ClosingTransaction indicating that the built bitcoin
1026 /// transaction is trusted.
1028 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1030 /// This structure implements Deref.
1031 pub struct TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1032 inner: &'a ClosingTransaction,
1035 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1036 type Target = ClosingTransaction;
1038 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1041 impl<'a> TrustedClosingTransaction<'a> {
1042 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1043 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &Transaction {
1047 /// Get the SIGHASH_ALL sighash value of the transaction.
1049 /// This can be used to verify a signature.
1050 pub fn get_sighash_all(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> Message {
1051 let sighash = &sighash::SighashCache::new(&self.inner.built).segwit_signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..];
1052 hash_to_message!(sighash)
1055 /// Sign a transaction, either because we are counter-signing the counterparty's transaction or
1056 /// because we are about to broadcast a holder transaction.
1057 pub fn sign<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
1058 let sighash = self.get_sighash_all(funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis);
1059 sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, funding_key)
1063 /// This class tracks the per-transaction information needed to build a commitment transaction and will
1064 /// actually build it and sign. It is used for holder transactions that we sign only when needed
1065 /// and for transactions we sign for the counterparty.
1067 /// This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature given the relevant
1070 pub struct CommitmentTransaction {
1071 commitment_number: u64,
1072 to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64,
1073 to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64,
1074 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1075 htlcs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>,
1076 // A boolean that is serialization backwards-compatible
1077 opt_anchors: Option<()>,
1078 // A cache of the parties' pubkeys required to construct the transaction, see doc for trust()
1079 keys: TxCreationKeys,
1080 // For access to the pre-built transaction, see doc for trust()
1081 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction,
1084 impl PartialEq for CommitmentTransaction {
1085 fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
1086 let eq = self.commitment_number == o.commitment_number &&
1087 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat == o.to_broadcaster_value_sat &&
1088 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat == o.to_countersignatory_value_sat &&
1089 self.feerate_per_kw == o.feerate_per_kw &&
1090 self.htlcs == o.htlcs &&
1091 self.opt_anchors == o.opt_anchors &&
1092 self.keys == o.keys;
1094 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.transaction, o.built.transaction);
1095 debug_assert_eq!(self.built.txid, o.built.txid);
1101 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(CommitmentTransaction, {
1102 (0, commitment_number, required),
1103 (2, to_broadcaster_value_sat, required),
1104 (4, to_countersignatory_value_sat, required),
1105 (6, feerate_per_kw, required),
1106 (8, keys, required),
1107 (10, built, required),
1108 (12, htlcs, vec_type),
1109 (14, opt_anchors, option),
1112 impl CommitmentTransaction {
1113 /// Construct an object of the class while assigning transaction output indices to HTLCs.
1115 /// Populates HTLCOutputInCommitment.transaction_output_index in htlcs_with_aux.
1117 /// The generic T allows the caller to match the HTLC output index with auxiliary data.
1118 /// This auxiliary data is not stored in this object.
1120 /// Only include HTLCs that are above the dust limit for the channel.
1122 /// (C-not exported) due to the generic though we likely should expose a version without
1123 pub fn new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data<T>(commitment_number: u64, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: PublicKey, keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> CommitmentTransaction {
1124 // Sort outputs and populate output indices while keeping track of the auxiliary data
1125 let (outputs, htlcs) = Self::internal_build_outputs(&keys, to_broadcaster_value_sat, to_countersignatory_value_sat, htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, opt_anchors, &broadcaster_funding_key, &countersignatory_funding_key).unwrap();
1127 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1128 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1129 let txid = transaction.txid();
1130 CommitmentTransaction {
1132 to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1133 to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1136 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1138 built: BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1145 fn internal_rebuild_transaction(&self, keys: &TxCreationKeys, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<BuiltCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1146 let (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins) = Self::internal_build_inputs(self.commitment_number, channel_parameters);
1148 let mut htlcs_with_aux = self.htlcs.iter().map(|h| (h.clone(), ())).collect();
1149 let (outputs, _) = Self::internal_build_outputs(keys, self.to_broadcaster_value_sat, self.to_countersignatory_value_sat, &mut htlcs_with_aux, channel_parameters, self.opt_anchors.is_some(), broadcaster_funding_key, countersignatory_funding_key)?;
1151 let transaction = Self::make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins, outputs);
1152 let txid = transaction.txid();
1153 let built_transaction = BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1157 Ok(built_transaction)
1160 fn make_transaction(obscured_commitment_transaction_number: u64, txins: Vec<TxIn>, outputs: Vec<TxOut>) -> Transaction {
1163 lock_time: PackedLockTime(((0x20 as u32) << 8 * 3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32)),
1169 // This is used in two cases:
1170 // - initial sorting of outputs / HTLCs in the constructor, in which case T is auxiliary data the
1171 // caller needs to have sorted together with the HTLCs so it can keep track of the output index
1172 // - building of a bitcoin transaction during a verify() call, in which case T is just ()
1173 fn internal_build_outputs<T>(keys: &TxCreationKeys, to_broadcaster_value_sat: u64, to_countersignatory_value_sat: u64, htlcs_with_aux: &mut Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, T)>, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, opt_anchors: bool, broadcaster_funding_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_funding_key: &PublicKey) -> Result<(Vec<TxOut>, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>), ()> {
1174 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1175 let contest_delay = channel_parameters.contest_delay();
1177 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<&mut HTLCOutputInCommitment>)> = Vec::new();
1179 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 {
1180 let script = if opt_anchors {
1181 get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh()
1183 get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point)
1187 script_pubkey: script.clone(),
1188 value: to_countersignatory_value_sat,
1194 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 {
1195 let redeem_script = get_revokeable_redeemscript(
1196 &keys.revocation_key,
1198 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key,
1202 script_pubkey: redeem_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1203 value: to_broadcaster_value_sat,
1210 if to_broadcaster_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1211 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(broadcaster_funding_key);
1214 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1215 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1221 if to_countersignatory_value_sat > 0 || !htlcs_with_aux.is_empty() {
1222 let anchor_script = get_anchor_redeemscript(countersignatory_funding_key);
1225 script_pubkey: anchor_script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1226 value: ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI,
1233 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_with_aux.len());
1234 for (htlc, _) in htlcs_with_aux {
1235 let script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, opt_anchors, &keys);
1237 script_pubkey: script.to_v0_p2wsh(),
1238 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000,
1240 txouts.push((txout, Some(htlc)));
1243 // Sort output in BIP-69 order (amount, scriptPubkey). Tie-breaks based on HTLC
1244 // CLTV expiration height.
1245 sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
1246 if let &Some(ref a_htlcout) = a {
1247 if let &Some(ref b_htlcout) = b {
1248 a_htlcout.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlcout.cltv_expiry)
1249 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
1250 // here for fuzzing mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
1252 .then(a_htlcout.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlcout.payment_hash.0))
1253 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
1254 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
1255 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1256 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
1259 let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
1260 for (idx, out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
1261 if let Some(htlc) = out.1 {
1262 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
1263 htlcs.push(htlc.clone());
1265 outputs.push(out.0);
1267 Ok((outputs, htlcs))
1270 fn internal_build_inputs(commitment_number: u64, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters) -> (u64, Vec<TxIn>) {
1271 let broadcaster_pubkeys = channel_parameters.broadcaster_pubkeys();
1272 let countersignatory_pubkeys = channel_parameters.countersignatory_pubkeys();
1273 let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1274 &broadcaster_pubkeys.payment_point,
1275 &countersignatory_pubkeys.payment_point,
1276 channel_parameters.is_outbound(),
1279 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number =
1280 commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
1283 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1285 previous_output: channel_parameters.funding_outpoint(),
1286 script_sig: Script::new(),
1287 sequence: Sequence(((0x80 as u32) << 8 * 3)
1288 | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3 * 8) as u32)),
1289 witness: Witness::new(),
1293 (obscured_commitment_transaction_number, txins)
1296 /// The backwards-counting commitment number
1297 pub fn commitment_number(&self) -> u64 {
1298 self.commitment_number
1301 /// The value to be sent to the broadcaster
1302 pub fn to_broadcaster_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1303 self.to_broadcaster_value_sat
1306 /// The value to be sent to the counterparty
1307 pub fn to_countersignatory_value_sat(&self) -> u64 {
1308 self.to_countersignatory_value_sat
1311 /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction.
1312 pub fn feerate_per_kw(&self) -> u32 {
1316 /// The non-dust HTLCs (direction, amt, height expiration, hash, transaction output index)
1317 /// which were included in this commitment transaction in output order.
1318 /// The transaction index is always populated.
1320 /// (C-not exported) as we cannot currently convert Vec references to/from C, though we should
1321 /// expose a less effecient version which creates a Vec of references in the future.
1322 pub fn htlcs(&self) -> &Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment> {
1326 /// Trust our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1328 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1330 /// This should only be used if you fully trust the builder of this object. It should not
1331 /// be used by an external signer - instead use the verify function.
1332 pub fn trust(&self) -> TrustedCommitmentTransaction {
1333 TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self }
1336 /// Verify our pre-built transaction and derived transaction creation public keys.
1338 /// Applies a wrapper which allows access to these fields.
1340 /// An external validating signer must call this method before signing
1341 /// or using the built transaction.
1342 pub fn verify<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, broadcaster_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, countersignatory_keys: &ChannelPublicKeys, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<TrustedCommitmentTransaction, ()> {
1343 // This is the only field of the key cache that we trust
1344 let per_commitment_point = self.keys.per_commitment_point;
1345 let keys = TxCreationKeys::from_channel_static_keys(&per_commitment_point, broadcaster_keys, countersignatory_keys, secp_ctx).unwrap();
1346 if keys != self.keys {
1349 let tx = self.internal_rebuild_transaction(&keys, channel_parameters, &broadcaster_keys.funding_pubkey, &countersignatory_keys.funding_pubkey)?;
1350 if self.built.transaction != tx.transaction || self.built.txid != tx.txid {
1353 Ok(TrustedCommitmentTransaction { inner: self })
1357 /// A wrapper on CommitmentTransaction indicating that the derived fields (the built bitcoin
1358 /// transaction and the transaction creation keys) are trusted.
1360 /// See trust() and verify() functions on CommitmentTransaction.
1362 /// This structure implements Deref.
1363 pub struct TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1364 inner: &'a CommitmentTransaction,
1367 impl<'a> Deref for TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1368 type Target = CommitmentTransaction;
1370 fn deref(&self) -> &Self::Target { self.inner }
1373 impl<'a> TrustedCommitmentTransaction<'a> {
1374 /// The transaction ID of the built Bitcoin transaction
1375 pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
1376 self.inner.built.txid
1379 /// The pre-built Bitcoin commitment transaction
1380 pub fn built_transaction(&self) -> &BuiltCommitmentTransaction {
1384 /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
1385 pub fn keys(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
1389 /// Should anchors be used.
1390 pub fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
1391 self.opt_anchors.is_some()
1394 /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
1395 /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
1397 /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order.
1399 /// This function is only valid in the holder commitment context, it always uses EcdsaSighashType::All.
1400 pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Signature>, ()> {
1401 let inner = self.inner;
1402 let keys = &inner.keys;
1403 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1404 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(inner.htlcs.len());
1405 let holder_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &inner.keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
1407 for this_htlc in inner.htlcs.iter() {
1408 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1409 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1411 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1413 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.amount_msat / 1000, EcdsaSighashType::All).unwrap()[..]);
1414 ret.push(sign(secp_ctx, &sighash, &holder_htlc_key));
1419 /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the holder HTLC transaction signature.
1420 pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, channel_parameters: &DirectedChannelTransactionParameters, htlc_index: usize, counterparty_signature: &Signature, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>) -> Transaction {
1421 let inner = self.inner;
1422 let keys = &inner.keys;
1423 let txid = inner.built.txid;
1424 let this_htlc = &inner.htlcs[htlc_index];
1425 assert!(this_htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some());
1426 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
1427 if !this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
1428 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
1429 if this_htlc.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
1431 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, inner.feerate_per_kw, channel_parameters.contest_delay(), &this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1433 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key);
1435 let sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
1437 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
1438 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1440 let mut cp_sig_ser = counterparty_signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
1441 cp_sig_ser.push(sighashtype as u8);
1442 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig_ser);
1443 let mut holder_sig_ser = signature.serialize_der().to_vec();
1444 holder_sig_ser.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
1445 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig_ser);
1447 if this_htlc.offered {
1448 // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
1449 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
1451 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
1454 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
1459 /// Commitment transaction numbers which appear in the transactions themselves are XOR'd with a
1460 /// shared secret first. This prevents on-chain observers from discovering how many commitment
1461 /// transactions occurred in a channel before it was closed.
1463 /// This function gets the shared secret from relevant channel public keys and can be used to
1464 /// "decrypt" the commitment transaction number given a commitment transaction on-chain.
1465 pub fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(
1466 broadcaster_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1467 countersignatory_payment_basepoint: &PublicKey,
1468 outbound_from_broadcaster: bool,
1470 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
1472 if outbound_from_broadcaster {
1473 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1474 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1476 sha.input(&countersignatory_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1477 sha.input(&broadcaster_payment_basepoint.serialize());
1479 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
1481 ((res[26] as u64) << 5 * 8)
1482 | ((res[27] as u64) << 4 * 8)
1483 | ((res[28] as u64) << 3 * 8)
1484 | ((res[29] as u64) << 2 * 8)
1485 | ((res[30] as u64) << 1 * 8)
1486 | ((res[31] as u64) << 0 * 8)
1489 fn get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
1490 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
1491 .push_slice(&WPubkeyHash::hash(&key.serialize())[..])
1497 use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
1500 use ln::chan_utils::{get_htlc_redeemscript, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript, CommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, HTLCOutputInCommitment};
1501 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey, SecretKey, Secp256k1};
1502 use util::test_utils;
1503 use chain::keysinterface::{KeysInterface, BaseSign};
1504 use bitcoin::{Network, Txid};
1505 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
1506 use ln::PaymentHash;
1507 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
1511 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1513 let seed = [42; 32];
1514 let network = Network::Testnet;
1515 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
1516 let signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
1517 let counterparty_signer = keys_provider.get_channel_signer(false, 3000);
1518 let delayed_payment_base = &signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1519 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
1520 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
1521 let htlc_basepoint = &signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1522 let holder_pubkeys = signer.pubkeys();
1523 let counterparty_pubkeys = counterparty_signer.pubkeys();
1524 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
1525 let mut channel_parameters = ChannelTransactionParameters {
1526 holder_pubkeys: holder_pubkeys.clone(),
1527 holder_selected_contest_delay: 0,
1528 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1529 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters { pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(), selected_contest_delay: 0 }),
1530 funding_outpoint: Some(chain::transaction::OutPoint { txid: Txid::all_zeros(), index: 0 }),
1534 let mut htlcs_with_aux: Vec<(_, ())> = Vec::new();
1536 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs
1537 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1540 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1541 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1543 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1545 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1546 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_p2wpkh_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point));
1548 // Generate broadcaster and counterparty outputs as well as two anchors
1549 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1552 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1553 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1555 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1557 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 4);
1558 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_to_countersignatory_with_anchors_redeemscript(&counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point).to_v0_p2wsh());
1560 // Generate broadcaster output and anchor
1561 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1564 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1565 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1567 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1569 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1571 // Generate counterparty output and anchor
1572 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1575 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1576 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1578 &mut htlcs_with_aux, &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1580 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 2);
1582 let received_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1584 amount_msat: 400000,
1586 payment_hash: PaymentHash([42; 32]),
1587 transaction_output_index: None,
1590 let offered_htlc = HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1592 amount_msat: 600000,
1594 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
1595 transaction_output_index: None,
1598 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, w/o anchors
1599 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1602 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1603 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1605 &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
1606 &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1608 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 3);
1609 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[0].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1610 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[1].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1611 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1612 "002085cf52e41ba7c099a39df504e7b61f6de122971ceb53b06731876eaeb85e8dc5");
1613 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, false, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1614 "002049f0736bb335c61a04d2623a24df878a7592a3c51fa7258d41b2c85318265e73");
1616 // Generate broadcaster output and received and offered HTLC outputs, with anchors
1617 channel_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
1618 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(
1621 holder_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1622 counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey,
1624 &mut vec![(received_htlc.clone(), ()), (offered_htlc.clone(), ())],
1625 &channel_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable()
1627 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output.len(), 5);
1628 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[2].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1629 assert_eq!(tx.built.transaction.output[3].script_pubkey, get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh());
1630 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&received_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1631 "002067114123af3f95405bae4fd930fc95de03e3c86baaee8b2dd29b43dd26cf613c");
1632 assert_eq!(get_htlc_redeemscript(&offered_htlc, true, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh().to_hex(),
1633 "0020a06e3b0d4fcf704f2b9c41e16a70099e39989466c3142b8573a1154542f28f57");
1637 fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
1638 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
1639 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
1642 macro_rules! test_secrets {
1644 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
1645 for secret in secrets.iter() {
1646 assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
1649 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
1650 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
1655 // insert_secret correct sequence
1656 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1659 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1660 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1661 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1664 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1665 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1666 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1669 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1670 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1671 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1674 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1675 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1676 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1679 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1680 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1681 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1684 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1685 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1686 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1689 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1690 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1691 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1694 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1695 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1696 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1701 // insert_secret #1 incorrect
1702 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1705 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1706 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1707 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1710 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1711 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1712 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1716 // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
1717 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1720 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1721 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1722 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1725 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1726 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1727 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1730 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1731 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1732 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1735 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1736 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1737 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1741 // insert_secret #3 incorrect
1742 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1745 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1746 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1747 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1750 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1751 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1752 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1755 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1756 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1757 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1760 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1761 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1762 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1766 // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
1767 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1770 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1771 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
1772 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1775 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1776 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
1777 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1780 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1781 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
1782 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1785 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1786 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
1787 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1790 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1791 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1792 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1795 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1796 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1797 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1800 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1801 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1802 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1805 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1806 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1807 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1811 // insert_secret #5 incorrect
1812 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1815 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1816 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1817 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1820 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1821 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1822 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1825 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1826 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1827 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1830 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1831 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1832 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1835 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1836 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1837 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1840 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1841 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1842 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1846 // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1847 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1850 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1851 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1852 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1855 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1856 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1857 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1860 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1861 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1862 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1865 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1866 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1867 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1870 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1871 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1872 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1875 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1876 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1877 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1880 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1881 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1882 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1885 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1886 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1887 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1891 // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1892 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1895 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1896 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1897 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1900 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1901 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1902 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1905 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1906 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1907 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1910 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1911 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1912 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1915 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1916 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1917 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1920 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1921 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1922 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1925 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1926 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1927 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1930 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1931 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1932 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1936 // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1937 monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1940 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1941 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1942 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1945 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1946 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1947 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1950 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1951 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1952 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1955 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1956 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1957 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1960 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1961 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1962 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1965 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1966 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1967 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1970 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1971 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1972 monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1975 secrets.push([0; 32]);
1976 secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1977 assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());