_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs

   1 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
   2 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
   3 //! by hand.
   4
   5 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
   6 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
   7 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
   8 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{Decodable, Encodable};
   9 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  10 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  11
  12 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
  13 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  14 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
  15 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
  16
  17 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
  18 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
  19 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
  20 use util::byte_utils;
  21
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
  24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  25
  26 use std::{cmp, mem};
  27
  28 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
  29
  30 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
  31 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
  32
  33 #[derive(PartialEq)]
  34 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
  35         AcceptedHTLC,
  36         OfferedHTLC
  37 }
  38
  39 impl HTLCType {
  40         /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
  41         pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) ->  Option<HTLCType> {
  42                 if witness_script_len == 133 {
  43                         Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
  44                 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
  45                         Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
  46                 } else {
  47                         None
  48                 }
  49         }
  50 }
  51
  52 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
  53 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
  54
  55 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
  56 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
  57         let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
  58         for i in 0..48 {
  59                 let bitpos = 47 - i;
  60                 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
  61                         res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
  62                         res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
  63                 }
  64         }
  65         res
  66 }
  67
  68 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
  69 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
  70 ///
  71 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
  72 /// or so.
  73 #[derive(Clone)]
  74 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  75         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
  76 }
  77
  78 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  79         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
  80                 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
  81                         if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
  82                                 return false
  83                         }
  84                 }
  85                 true
  86         }
  87 }
  88
  89 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  90         pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
  91                 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
  92         }
  93
  94         #[inline]
  95         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
  96                 for i in 0..48 {
  97                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
  98                                 return i
  99                         }
 100                 }
 101                 48
 102         }
 103
 104         pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 105                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 106                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 107                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 108                         if idx < min {
 109                                 min = idx;
 110                         }
 111                 }
 112                 min
 113         }
 114
 115         #[inline]
 116         pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 117                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 118                 for i in 0..bits {
 119                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 120                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 121                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 122                                 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
 123                         }
 124                 }
 125                 res
 126         }
 127
 128         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
 129                 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
 130                 for i in 0..pos {
 131                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 132                         if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 133                                 return Err(());
 134                         }
 135                 }
 136                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
 137                         return Ok(());
 138                 }
 139                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 140                 Ok(())
 141         }
 142
 143         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 144         pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 145                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 146                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 147                                 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 148                         }
 149                 }
 150                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 151                 None
 152         }
 153 }
 154
 155 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 156         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 157                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 158                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 159                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 160                 }
 161                 Ok(())
 162         }
 163 }
 164 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 165         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 166                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
 167                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
 168                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
 169                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
 170                 }
 171
 172                 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
 173         }
 174 }
 175
 176 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
 177 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
 178 ///
 179 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 180 /// generated (ie our own).
 181 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 182         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 183         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 184         sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
 185         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 186
 187         let mut key = base_secret.clone();
 188         key.add_assign(&res)?;
 189         Ok(key)
 190 }
 191
 192 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
 193 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
 194 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
 195 ///
 196 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 197 /// generated (ie our own).
 198 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 199         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 200         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 201         sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
 202         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 203
 204         let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
 205         base_point.combine(&hashkey)
 206 }
 207
 208 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
 209 ///
 210 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 211 /// generated (ie our own).
 212 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 213         let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
 214         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
 215
 216         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 217                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 218                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 219                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 220
 221                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 222         };
 223         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 224                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 225                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 226                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 227
 228                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 229         };
 230
 231         let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
 232         part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 233         let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
 234         part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 235         part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
 236         Ok(part_a)
 237 }
 238
 239 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
 240 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
 241 /// public key instead of private keys.
 242 ///
 243 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 244 /// generated (ie our own).
 245 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 246         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 247                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 248                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 249                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 250
 251                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 252         };
 253         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 254                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 255                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 256                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 257
 258                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 259         };
 260
 261         let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
 262         part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 263         let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
 264         part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 265         part_a.combine(&part_b)
 266 }
 267
 268 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
 269 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
 270 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
 271 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
 272         /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
 273         pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 274         /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
 275         /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
 276         pub(crate) revocation_key: PublicKey,
 277         /// A's HTLC Key
 278         pub(crate) a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 279         /// B's HTLC Key
 280         pub(crate) b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 281         /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
 282         pub(crate) a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 283 }
 284 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
 285         { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key });
 286
 287 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
 288 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 289 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
 290         /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
 291         /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
 292         pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
 293         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
 294         /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
 295         /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
 296         /// states.
 297         pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
 298         /// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
 299         /// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
 300         /// transaction.
 301         pub payment_point: PublicKey,
 302         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
 303         /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
 304         /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
 305         pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
 306         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
 307         /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
 308         pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
 309 }
 310
 311 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
 312         funding_pubkey,
 313         revocation_basepoint,
 314         payment_point,
 315         delayed_payment_basepoint,
 316         htlc_basepoint
 317 });
 318
 319
 320 impl TxCreationKeys {
 321         pub(crate) fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
 322                 Ok(TxCreationKeys {
 323                         per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
 324                         revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
 325                         a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
 326                         b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
 327                         a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
 328                 })
 329         }
 330 }
 331
 332 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
 333 /// key or the delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
 334 /// Encumbering a `to_local` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
 335 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 336         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 337                       .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
 338                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 339                       .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
 340                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
 341                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 342                       .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
 343                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 344                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 345                       .into_script()
 346 }
 347
 348 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 349 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
 350 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 351         /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
 352         /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
 353         /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
 354         /// the remote party or our own.
 355         pub offered: bool,
 356         /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
 357         /// this divided by 1000.
 358         pub amount_msat: u64,
 359         /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
 360         pub cltv_expiry: u32,
 361         /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
 362         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 363         /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
 364         /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
 365         /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
 366         pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
 367 }
 368
 369 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
 370         offered,
 371         amount_msat,
 372         cltv_expiry,
 373         payment_hash,
 374         transaction_output_index
 375 });
 376
 377 #[inline]
 378 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 379         let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
 380         if htlc.offered {
 381                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 382                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 383                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 384                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 385                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 386                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 387                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 388                               .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 389                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 390                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 391                               .push_int(32)
 392                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 393                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
 394                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 395                               .push_int(2)
 396                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 397                               .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 398                               .push_int(2)
 399                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 400                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 401                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 402                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 403                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 404                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 405                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 406                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 407                               .into_script()
 408         } else {
 409                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 410                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 411                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 412                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 413                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 414                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 415                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 416                               .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 417                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 418                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 419                               .push_int(32)
 420                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 421                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 422                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 423                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 424                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 425                               .push_int(2)
 426                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 427                               .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 428                               .push_int(2)
 429                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 430                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 431                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 432                               .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
 433                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
 434                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 435                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 436                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 437                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 438                               .into_script()
 439         }
 440 }
 441
 442 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
 443 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
 444 #[inline]
 445 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
 446         get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
 447 }
 448
 449 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
 450 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
 451 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 452         let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
 453         let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
 454
 455         let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
 456         if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
 457                 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 458                         .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
 459         } else {
 460                 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
 461                         .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 462         }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
 463 }
 464
 465 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
 466 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
 467         let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 468         txins.push(TxIn {
 469                 previous_output: OutPoint {
 470                         txid: prev_hash.clone(),
 471                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
 472                 },
 473                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 474                 sequence: 0,
 475                 witness: Vec::new(),
 476         });
 477
 478         let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
 479                         feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 480                 } else {
 481                         feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 482                 };
 483
 484         let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
 485         txouts.push(TxOut {
 486                 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
 487                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
 488         });
 489
 490         Transaction {
 491                 version: 2,
 492                 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
 493                 input: txins,
 494                 output: txouts,
 495         }
 496 }
 497
 498 #[derive(Clone)]
 499 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
 500 /// to broadcast. Eventually this will require a signer which is possibly external, but for now we
 501 /// just pass in the SecretKeys required.
 502 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 503         // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
 504         // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
 505         // so we're probably most of the way there.
 506         /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
 507         pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
 508         /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
 509         pub their_sig: Signature,
 510         // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
 511         // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
 512         our_sig_first: bool,
 513         /// The key derivation parameters for this commitment transaction
 514         pub local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
 515         /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
 516         /// controlled by the channel initiator.
 517         pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
 518         /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
 519         ///
 520         /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
 521         /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
 522         /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
 523         ///
 524         /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
 525         /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
 526         pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
 527 }
 528 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 529         #[cfg(test)]
 530         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 531                 let dummy_input = TxIn {
 532                         previous_output: OutPoint {
 533                                 txid: Default::default(),
 534                                 vout: 0,
 535                         },
 536                         script_sig: Default::default(),
 537                         sequence: 0,
 538                         witness: vec![]
 539                 };
 540                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 541                 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 542                 Self {
 543                         unsigned_tx: Transaction {
 544                                 version: 2,
 545                                 input: vec![dummy_input],
 546                                 output: Vec::new(),
 547                                 lock_time: 0,
 548                         },
 549                         their_sig: dummy_sig,
 550                         our_sig_first: false,
 551                         local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
 552                                         per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
 553                                         revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 554                                         a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 555                                         b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 556                                         a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 557                                 },
 558                         feerate_per_kw: 0,
 559                         per_htlc: Vec::new()
 560                 }
 561         }
 562
 563         /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
 564         /// remote signature and both parties keys
 565         pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 566                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
 567                 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
 568
 569                 Self {
 570                         unsigned_tx,
 571                         their_sig,
 572                         our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
 573                         local_keys,
 574                         feerate_per_kw,
 575                         per_htlc: htlc_data,
 576                 }
 577         }
 578
 579         /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
 580         /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
 581         pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
 582                 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
 583         }
 584
 585         /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
 586         ///
 587         /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
 588         /// by your ChannelKeys.
 589         /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
 590         /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
 591         /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
 592         /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
 593         pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
 594                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
 595                         .sighash_all(&self.unsigned_tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
 596                 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
 597         }
 598
 599         pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
 600                 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
 601                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 602                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 603
 604                 if self.our_sig_first {
 605                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 606                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 607                 } else {
 608                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 609                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 610                 }
 611                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 612                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 613
 614                 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 615                 tx
 616         }
 617
 618         /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
 619         /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
 620         ///
 621         /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
 622         /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
 623         /// included.
 624         pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
 625                 let txid = self.txid();
 626                 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
 627                 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
 628
 629                 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 630                         if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
 631                                 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 632
 633                                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 634
 635                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
 636                                 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
 637                         } else {
 638                                 ret.push(None);
 639                         }
 640                 }
 641                 Ok(ret)
 642         }
 643
 644         /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
 645         pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
 646                 let txid = self.txid();
 647                 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
 648                 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
 649                 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
 650                 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
 651                 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
 652                 if  this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
 653
 654                 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 655                 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
 656                 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
 657                 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
 658
 659                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 660
 661                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 662                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 663
 664                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
 665                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
 666                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 667                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 668
 669                 if this_htlc.0.offered {
 670                         // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
 671                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 672                 } else {
 673                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
 674                 }
 675
 676                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 677                 htlc_tx
 678         }
 679 }
 680 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 681         // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
 682         fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
 683                 self.txid() == o.txid()
 684         }
 685 }
 686 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 687         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 688                 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
 689                         match e {
 690                                 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
 691                                 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
 692                         }
 693                 }
 694                 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
 695                 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
 696                 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
 697                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
 698                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
 699                 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 700                         htlc.write(writer)?;
 701                         sig.write(writer)?;
 702                 }
 703                 Ok(())
 704         }
 705 }
 706 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 707         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 708                 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
 709                         Ok(tx) => tx,
 710                         Err(e) => match e {
 711                                 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
 712                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 713                         },
 714                 };
 715                 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
 716                 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
 717                 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
 718                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
 719                 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 720                 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
 721                 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
 722                         let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
 723                         let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
 724                         per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
 725                 }
 726
 727                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
 728                         // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
 729                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 730                 }
 731                 Ok(Self {
 732                         unsigned_tx,
 733                         their_sig,
 734                         our_sig_first,
 735                         local_keys,
 736                         feerate_per_kw,
 737                         per_htlc,
 738                 })
 739         }
 740 }
 741
 742 #[cfg(test)]
 743 mod tests {
 744         use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
 745         use hex;
 746
 747         #[test]
 748         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 749                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 750                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 751                 let mut monitor;
 752
 753                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 754                         () => {
 755                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 756                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 757                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 758                                         idx -= 1;
 759                                 }
 760                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 761                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
 762                         };
 763                 }
 764
 765                 {
 766                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 767                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 768                         secrets.clear();
 769
 770                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 771                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 772                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 773                         test_secrets!();
 774
 775                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 776                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 777                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 778                         test_secrets!();
 779
 780                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 781                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 782                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 783                         test_secrets!();
 784
 785                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 786                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 787                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 788                         test_secrets!();
 789
 790                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 791                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 792                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 793                         test_secrets!();
 794
 795                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 796                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 797                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 798                         test_secrets!();
 799
 800                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 801                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 802                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 803                         test_secrets!();
 804
 805                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 806                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 807                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 808                         test_secrets!();
 809                 }
 810
 811                 {
 812                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 813                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 814                         secrets.clear();
 815
 816                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 817                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 818                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 819                         test_secrets!();
 820
 821                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 822                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 823                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 824                 }
 825
 826                 {
 827                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 828                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 829                         secrets.clear();
 830
 831                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 832                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 833                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 834                         test_secrets!();
 835
 836                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 837                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 838                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 839                         test_secrets!();
 840
 841                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 842                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 843                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 844                         test_secrets!();
 845
 846                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 847                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 848                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 849                 }
 850
 851                 {
 852                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 853                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 854                         secrets.clear();
 855
 856                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 857                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 858                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 859                         test_secrets!();
 860
 861                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 862                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 863                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 864                         test_secrets!();
 865
 866                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 867                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 868                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 869                         test_secrets!();
 870
 871                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 872                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 873                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 874                 }
 875
 876                 {
 877                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 878                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 879                         secrets.clear();
 880
 881                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 882                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 883                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 884                         test_secrets!();
 885
 886                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 887                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 888                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 889                         test_secrets!();
 890
 891                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 892                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 893                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 894                         test_secrets!();
 895
 896                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 897                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
 898                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 899                         test_secrets!();
 900
 901                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 902                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 903                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 904                         test_secrets!();
 905
 906                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 907                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 908                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 909                         test_secrets!();
 910
 911                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 912                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 913                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 914                         test_secrets!();
 915
 916                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 917                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 918                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 919                 }
 920
 921                 {
 922                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
 923                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 924                         secrets.clear();
 925
 926                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 927                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 928                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 929                         test_secrets!();
 930
 931                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 932                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 933                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 934                         test_secrets!();
 935
 936                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 937                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 938                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 939                         test_secrets!();
 940
 941                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 942                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 943                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 944                         test_secrets!();
 945
 946                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 947                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 948                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 949                         test_secrets!();
 950
 951                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 952                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 953                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 954                 }
 955
 956                 {
 957                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
 958                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 959                         secrets.clear();
 960
 961                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 962                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 963                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 964                         test_secrets!();
 965
 966                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 967                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 968                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 969                         test_secrets!();
 970
 971                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 972                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 973                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 974                         test_secrets!();
 975
 976                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 977                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 978                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 979                         test_secrets!();
 980
 981                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 982                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 983                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 984                         test_secrets!();
 985
 986                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 987                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
 988                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 989                         test_secrets!();
 990
 991                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 992                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 993                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 994                         test_secrets!();
 995
 996                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 997                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 998                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 999                 }
1000
1001                 {
1002                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1003                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1004                         secrets.clear();
1005
1006                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1007                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1008                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1009                         test_secrets!();
1010
1011                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1012                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1013                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1014                         test_secrets!();
1015
1016                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1017                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1018                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1019                         test_secrets!();
1020
1021                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1022                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1023                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1024                         test_secrets!();
1025
1026                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1027                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1028                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1029                         test_secrets!();
1030
1031                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1032                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1033                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1034                         test_secrets!();
1035
1036                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1037                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1038                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1039                         test_secrets!();
1040
1041                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1042                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1043                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1044                 }
1045
1046                 {
1047                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1048                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1049                         secrets.clear();
1050
1051                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1052                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1053                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1054                         test_secrets!();
1055
1056                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1057                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1058                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1059                         test_secrets!();
1060
1061                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1062                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1063                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1064                         test_secrets!();
1065
1066                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1067                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1068                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1069                         test_secrets!();
1070
1071                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1072                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1073                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1074                         test_secrets!();
1075
1076                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1077                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1078                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1079                         test_secrets!();
1080
1081                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1082                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1083                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1084                         test_secrets!();
1085
1086                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1087                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1088                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1089                 }
1090         }
1091 }