_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
  11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
  12 //! by hand.
  13
  14 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  15 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
  17 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{Decodable, Encodable};
  18 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  19 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  20
  21 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
  22 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  23 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
  24 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
  25
  26 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
  27 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
  28 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
  29 use util::byte_utils;
  30
  31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
  32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
  33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
  34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  35
  36 use std::{cmp, mem};
  37
  38 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
  39
  40 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
  41 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
  42
  43 #[derive(PartialEq)]
  44 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
  45         AcceptedHTLC,
  46         OfferedHTLC
  47 }
  48
  49 impl HTLCType {
  50         /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
  51         pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) ->  Option<HTLCType> {
  52                 if witness_script_len == 133 {
  53                         Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
  54                 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
  55                         Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
  56                 } else {
  57                         None
  58                 }
  59         }
  60 }
  61
  62 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
  63 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
  64
  65 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
  66 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
  67         let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
  68         for i in 0..48 {
  69                 let bitpos = 47 - i;
  70                 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
  71                         res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
  72                         res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
  73                 }
  74         }
  75         res
  76 }
  77
  78 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
  79 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
  80 ///
  81 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
  82 /// or so.
  83 #[derive(Clone)]
  84 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  85         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
  86 }
  87
  88 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  89         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
  90                 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
  91                         if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
  92                                 return false
  93                         }
  94                 }
  95                 true
  96         }
  97 }
  98
  99 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 100         pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
 101                 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
 102         }
 103
 104         #[inline]
 105         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 106                 for i in 0..48 {
 107                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 108                                 return i
 109                         }
 110                 }
 111                 48
 112         }
 113
 114         pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 115                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 116                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 117                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 118                         if idx < min {
 119                                 min = idx;
 120                         }
 121                 }
 122                 min
 123         }
 124
 125         #[inline]
 126         pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 127                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 128                 for i in 0..bits {
 129                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 130                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 131                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 132                                 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
 133                         }
 134                 }
 135                 res
 136         }
 137
 138         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
 139                 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
 140                 for i in 0..pos {
 141                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 142                         if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 143                                 return Err(());
 144                         }
 145                 }
 146                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
 147                         return Ok(());
 148                 }
 149                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 150                 Ok(())
 151         }
 152
 153         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 154         pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 155                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 156                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 157                                 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 158                         }
 159                 }
 160                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 161                 None
 162         }
 163 }
 164
 165 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 166         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 167                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 168                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 169                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 170                 }
 171                 Ok(())
 172         }
 173 }
 174 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 175         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 176                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
 177                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
 178                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
 179                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
 180                 }
 181
 182                 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
 183         }
 184 }
 185
 186 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
 187 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
 188 ///
 189 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 190 /// generated (ie our own).
 191 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
 192         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 193         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 194         sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
 195         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 196
 197         let mut key = base_secret.clone();
 198         key.add_assign(&res)?;
 199         Ok(key)
 200 }
 201
 202 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
 203 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
 204 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
 205 ///
 206 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 207 /// generated (ie our own).
 208 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
 209         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 210         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 211         sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
 212         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 213
 214         let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
 215         base_point.combine(&hashkey)
 216 }
 217
 218 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
 219 ///
 220 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 221 /// generated (ie our own).
 222 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, SecpError> {
 223         let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
 224         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
 225
 226         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 227                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 228                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 229                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 230
 231                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 232         };
 233         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 234                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 235                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 236                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 237
 238                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 239         };
 240
 241         // Only the transaction broadcaster owns a valid witness to propagate
 242         // a revoked commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_secret always
 243         // come from broadcaster and revocation_base_secret always come
 244         // from countersignatory of the transaction.
 245         let mut countersignatory_contrib = revocation_base_secret.clone();
 246         countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 247         let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_secret.clone();
 248         broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 249         countersignatory_contrib.add_assign(&broadcaster_contrib[..])?;
 250         Ok(countersignatory_contrib)
 251 }
 252
 253 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
 254 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
 255 /// public key instead of private keys.
 256 ///
 257 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 258 /// generated (ie our own).
 259 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, SecpError> {
 260         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 261                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 262                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 263                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 264
 265                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 266         };
 267         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 268                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 269                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 270                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 271
 272                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 273         };
 274
 275         // Only the transaction broadcaster owns a valid witness to propagate
 276         // a revoked commitment transaction, thus per_commitment_point always
 277         // come from broadcaster and revocation_base_point always come
 278         // from countersignatory of the transaction.
 279         let mut countersignatory_contrib = revocation_base_point.clone();
 280         countersignatory_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 281         let mut broadcaster_contrib = per_commitment_point.clone();
 282         broadcaster_contrib.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 283         countersignatory_contrib.combine(&broadcaster_contrib)
 284 }
 285
 286 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
 287 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
 288 ///
 289 /// A broadcaster key is provided from potential broadcaster of the computed transaction.
 290 /// A countersignatory key is coming from a protocol participant unable to broadcast the
 291 /// transaction.
 292 ///
 293 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
 294 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
 295 /// PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys.trust_key_derivation because we trusted the source of the
 296 /// pre-calculated keys.
 297 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
 298 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
 299         /// The broadcaster's per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
 300         pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 301         /// The broadcaster's revocation key which is used to allow the broadcaster of the commitment
 302         /// transaction to provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast
 303         /// an old state.
 304         pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
 305         /// Broadcaster's HTLC Key
 306         pub broadcaster_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 307         /// Countersignatory's HTLC Key
 308         pub countersignatory_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 309         /// Broadcaster's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
 310         pub delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 311 }
 312 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
 313         { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, broadcaster_htlc_key, countersignatory_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key });
 314
 315 /// The per-commitment point and a set of pre-calculated public keys used for transaction creation
 316 /// in the signer.
 317 /// The pre-calculated keys are an optimization, because ChannelKeys has enough
 318 /// information to re-derive them.
 319 pub struct PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(TxCreationKeys);
 320
 321 impl PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys {
 322         /// Create a new PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys from TxCreationKeys
 323         pub fn new(keys: TxCreationKeys) -> Self {
 324                 PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(keys)
 325         }
 326
 327         /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
 328         /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
 329         pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
 330                 &self.0
 331         }
 332
 333         /// The transaction per-commitment point
 334         pub fn per_commitment_point(&self) -> &PublicKey {
 335                 &self.0.per_commitment_point
 336         }
 337 }
 338
 339 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
 340 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 341 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
 342         /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
 343         /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
 344         pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
 345         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
 346         /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
 347         /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
 348         /// states.
 349         pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
 350         /// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
 351         /// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
 352         /// transaction.
 353         pub payment_point: PublicKey,
 354         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
 355         /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
 356         /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
 357         pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
 358         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
 359         /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
 360         pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
 361 }
 362
 363 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
 364         funding_pubkey,
 365         revocation_basepoint,
 366         payment_point,
 367         delayed_payment_basepoint,
 368         htlc_basepoint
 369 });
 370
 371
 372 impl TxCreationKeys {
 373         /// Create a new TxCreationKeys from channel base points and the per-commitment point
 374         pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, broadcaster_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, broadcaster_htlc_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_revocation_base: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
 375                 Ok(TxCreationKeys {
 376                         per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
 377                         revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_revocation_base)?,
 378                         broadcaster_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_htlc_base)?,
 379                         countersignatory_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &countersignatory_htlc_base)?,
 380                         delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &broadcaster_delayed_payment_base)?,
 381                 })
 382         }
 383 }
 384
 385 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
 386 /// key or the delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
 387 /// Encumbering a `to_local` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
 388 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 389         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 390                       .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
 391                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 392                       .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
 393                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
 394                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 395                       .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
 396                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 397                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 398                       .into_script()
 399 }
 400
 401 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 402 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
 403 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 404         /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
 405         /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
 406         /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
 407         /// the remote party or our own.
 408         pub offered: bool,
 409         /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
 410         /// this divided by 1000.
 411         pub amount_msat: u64,
 412         /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
 413         pub cltv_expiry: u32,
 414         /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
 415         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 416         /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
 417         /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
 418         /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
 419         pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
 420 }
 421
 422 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
 423         offered,
 424         amount_msat,
 425         cltv_expiry,
 426         payment_hash,
 427         transaction_output_index
 428 });
 429
 430 #[inline]
 431 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, broadcaster_htlc_key: &PublicKey, countersignatory_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 432         let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
 433         if htlc.offered {
 434                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 435                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 436                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 437                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 438                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 439                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 440                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 441                               .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 442                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 443                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 444                               .push_int(32)
 445                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 446                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
 447                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 448                               .push_int(2)
 449                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 450                               .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 451                               .push_int(2)
 452                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 453                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 454                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 455                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 456                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 457                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 458                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 459                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 460                               .into_script()
 461         } else {
 462                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 463                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 464                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 465                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 466                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 467                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 468                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 469                               .push_slice(&countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 470                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 471                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 472                               .push_int(32)
 473                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 474                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 475                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 476                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 477                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 478                               .push_int(2)
 479                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 480                               .push_slice(&broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 481                               .push_int(2)
 482                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 483                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 484                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 485                               .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
 486                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
 487                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 488                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 489                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 490                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 491                               .into_script()
 492         }
 493 }
 494
 495 /// note here that 'revocation_key' is generated using countersignatory_revocation_basepoint and broadcaster's
 496 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
 497 #[inline]
 498 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
 499         get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
 500 }
 501
 502 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
 503 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
 504 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(broadcaster: &PublicKey, countersignatory: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 505         let broadcaster_funding_key = broadcaster.serialize();
 506         let countersignatory_funding_key = countersignatory.serialize();
 507
 508         let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
 509         if broadcaster_funding_key[..] < countersignatory_funding_key[..] {
 510                 builder.push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
 511                         .push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
 512         } else {
 513                 builder.push_slice(&countersignatory_funding_key)
 514                         .push_slice(&broadcaster_funding_key)
 515         }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
 516 }
 517
 518 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
 519 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
 520         let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 521         txins.push(TxIn {
 522                 previous_output: OutPoint {
 523                         txid: prev_hash.clone(),
 524                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
 525                 },
 526                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 527                 sequence: 0,
 528                 witness: Vec::new(),
 529         });
 530
 531         let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
 532                         feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 533                 } else {
 534                         feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 535                 };
 536
 537         let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
 538         txouts.push(TxOut {
 539                 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
 540                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
 541         });
 542
 543         Transaction {
 544                 version: 2,
 545                 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
 546                 input: txins,
 547                 output: txouts,
 548         }
 549 }
 550
 551 #[derive(Clone)]
 552 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
 553 /// to broadcast. This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature
 554 /// given the relevant secret key.
 555 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 556         // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
 557         // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
 558         // so we're probably most of the way there.
 559         /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
 560         pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
 561         /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
 562         pub their_sig: Signature,
 563         // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
 564         // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
 565         our_sig_first: bool,
 566         pub(crate) local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
 567         /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
 568         /// controlled by the channel initiator.
 569         pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
 570         /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
 571         ///
 572         /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
 573         /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
 574         /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
 575         ///
 576         /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
 577         /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
 578         pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
 579 }
 580 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 581         #[cfg(test)]
 582         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 583                 let dummy_input = TxIn {
 584                         previous_output: OutPoint {
 585                                 txid: Default::default(),
 586                                 vout: 0,
 587                         },
 588                         script_sig: Default::default(),
 589                         sequence: 0,
 590                         witness: vec![]
 591                 };
 592                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 593                 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 594                 Self {
 595                         unsigned_tx: Transaction {
 596                                 version: 2,
 597                                 input: vec![dummy_input],
 598                                 output: Vec::new(),
 599                                 lock_time: 0,
 600                         },
 601                         their_sig: dummy_sig,
 602                         our_sig_first: false,
 603                         local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
 604                                         per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
 605                                         revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 606                                         broadcaster_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 607                                         countersignatory_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 608                                         delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 609                                 },
 610                         feerate_per_kw: 0,
 611                         per_htlc: Vec::new()
 612                 }
 613         }
 614
 615         /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
 616         /// remote signature and both parties keys.
 617         ///
 618         /// The unsigned transaction outputs must be consistent with htlc_data.  This function
 619         /// only checks that the shape and amounts are consistent, but does not check the scriptPubkey.
 620         pub fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 621                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
 622                 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
 623
 624                 for htlc in &htlc_data {
 625                         if let Some(index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 626                                 let out = &unsigned_tx.output[index as usize];
 627                                 if out.value != htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000 {
 628                                         panic!("HTLC at index {} has incorrect amount", index);
 629                                 }
 630                                 if !out.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 631                                         panic!("HTLC at index {} doesn't have p2wsh scriptPubkey", index);
 632                                 }
 633                         }
 634                 }
 635
 636                 Self {
 637                         unsigned_tx,
 638                         their_sig,
 639                         our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
 640                         local_keys,
 641                         feerate_per_kw,
 642                         per_htlc: htlc_data,
 643                 }
 644         }
 645
 646         /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
 647         /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
 648         pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
 649                 &self.local_keys
 650         }
 651
 652         /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
 653         /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
 654         pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
 655                 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
 656         }
 657
 658         /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
 659         ///
 660         /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
 661         /// by your ChannelKeys.
 662         /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
 663         /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
 664         /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
 665         /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
 666         pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
 667                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
 668                         .signature_hash(0, funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis, SigHashType::All)[..]);
 669                 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
 670         }
 671
 672         pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
 673                 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
 674                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 675                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 676
 677                 if self.our_sig_first {
 678                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 679                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 680                 } else {
 681                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 682                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 683                 }
 684                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 685                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 686
 687                 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 688                 tx
 689         }
 690
 691         /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
 692         /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
 693         ///
 694         /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
 695         /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
 696         /// included.
 697         pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
 698                 let txid = self.txid();
 699                 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
 700                 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
 701
 702                 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 703                         if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
 704                                 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 705
 706                                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 707
 708                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SigHashCache::new(&htlc_tx).signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000, SigHashType::All)[..]);
 709                                 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
 710                         } else {
 711                                 ret.push(None);
 712                         }
 713                 }
 714                 Ok(ret)
 715         }
 716
 717         /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
 718         pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
 719                 let txid = self.txid();
 720                 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
 721                 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
 722                 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
 723                 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
 724                 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
 725                 if  this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
 726
 727                 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 728                 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
 729                 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
 730                 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
 731
 732                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.countersignatory_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 733
 734                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 735                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 736
 737                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
 738                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
 739                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 740                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 741
 742                 if this_htlc.0.offered {
 743                         // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
 744                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 745                 } else {
 746                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
 747                 }
 748
 749                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 750                 htlc_tx
 751         }
 752 }
 753 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 754         // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
 755         fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
 756                 self.txid() == o.txid()
 757         }
 758 }
 759 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 760         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 761                 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
 762                         match e {
 763                                 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
 764                                 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
 765                         }
 766                 }
 767                 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
 768                 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
 769                 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
 770                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
 771                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
 772                 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 773                         htlc.write(writer)?;
 774                         sig.write(writer)?;
 775                 }
 776                 Ok(())
 777         }
 778 }
 779 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 780         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 781                 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
 782                         Ok(tx) => tx,
 783                         Err(e) => match e {
 784                                 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
 785                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 786                         },
 787                 };
 788                 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
 789                 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
 790                 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
 791                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
 792                 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 793                 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
 794                 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
 795                         let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
 796                         let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
 797                         per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
 798                 }
 799
 800                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
 801                         // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
 802                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 803                 }
 804                 Ok(Self {
 805                         unsigned_tx,
 806                         their_sig,
 807                         our_sig_first,
 808                         local_keys,
 809                         feerate_per_kw,
 810                         per_htlc,
 811                 })
 812         }
 813 }
 814
 815 #[cfg(test)]
 816 mod tests {
 817         use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
 818         use hex;
 819
 820         #[test]
 821         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 822                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 823                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 824                 let mut monitor;
 825
 826                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 827                         () => {
 828                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 829                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 830                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 831                                         idx -= 1;
 832                                 }
 833                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 834                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
 835                         };
 836                 }
 837
 838                 {
 839                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 840                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 841                         secrets.clear();
 842
 843                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 844                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 845                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 846                         test_secrets!();
 847
 848                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 849                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 850                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 851                         test_secrets!();
 852
 853                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 854                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 855                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 856                         test_secrets!();
 857
 858                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 859                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 860                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 861                         test_secrets!();
 862
 863                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 864                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 865                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 866                         test_secrets!();
 867
 868                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 869                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 870                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 871                         test_secrets!();
 872
 873                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 874                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 875                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 876                         test_secrets!();
 877
 878                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 879                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 880                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 881                         test_secrets!();
 882                 }
 883
 884                 {
 885                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 886                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 887                         secrets.clear();
 888
 889                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 890                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 891                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 892                         test_secrets!();
 893
 894                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 895                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 896                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 897                 }
 898
 899                 {
 900                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 901                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 902                         secrets.clear();
 903
 904                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 905                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 906                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 907                         test_secrets!();
 908
 909                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 910                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 911                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 912                         test_secrets!();
 913
 914                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 915                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 916                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 917                         test_secrets!();
 918
 919                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 920                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 921                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 922                 }
 923
 924                 {
 925                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 926                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 927                         secrets.clear();
 928
 929                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 930                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 931                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 932                         test_secrets!();
 933
 934                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 935                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 936                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 937                         test_secrets!();
 938
 939                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 940                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 941                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 942                         test_secrets!();
 943
 944                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 945                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 946                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 947                 }
 948
 949                 {
 950                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 951                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 952                         secrets.clear();
 953
 954                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 955                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 956                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 957                         test_secrets!();
 958
 959                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 960                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 961                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 962                         test_secrets!();
 963
 964                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 965                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 966                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 967                         test_secrets!();
 968
 969                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 970                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
 971                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 972                         test_secrets!();
 973
 974                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 975                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 976                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 977                         test_secrets!();
 978
 979                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 980                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 981                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 982                         test_secrets!();
 983
 984                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 985                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 986                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 987                         test_secrets!();
 988
 989                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 990                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 991                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 992                 }
 993
 994                 {
 995                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
 996                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 997                         secrets.clear();
 998
 999                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1000                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1001                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1002                         test_secrets!();
1003
1004                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1005                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1006                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1007                         test_secrets!();
1008
1009                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1010                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1011                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1012                         test_secrets!();
1013
1014                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1015                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1016                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1017                         test_secrets!();
1018
1019                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1020                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1021                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1022                         test_secrets!();
1023
1024                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1025                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1026                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1027                 }
1028
1029                 {
1030                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1031                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1032                         secrets.clear();
1033
1034                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1035                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1036                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1037                         test_secrets!();
1038
1039                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1040                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1041                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1042                         test_secrets!();
1043
1044                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1045                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1046                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1047                         test_secrets!();
1048
1049                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1050                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1051                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1052                         test_secrets!();
1053
1054                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1055                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1056                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1057                         test_secrets!();
1058
1059                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1060                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1061                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1062                         test_secrets!();
1063
1064                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1065                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1066                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1067                         test_secrets!();
1068
1069                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1070                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1071                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1072                 }
1073
1074                 {
1075                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1076                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1077                         secrets.clear();
1078
1079                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1080                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1081                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1082                         test_secrets!();
1083
1084                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1085                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1086                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1087                         test_secrets!();
1088
1089                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1090                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1091                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1092                         test_secrets!();
1093
1094                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1095                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1096                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1097                         test_secrets!();
1098
1099                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1100                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1101                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1102                         test_secrets!();
1103
1104                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1105                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1106                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1107                         test_secrets!();
1108
1109                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1110                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1111                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1112                         test_secrets!();
1113
1114                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1115                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1116                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1117                 }
1118
1119                 {
1120                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1121                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1122                         secrets.clear();
1123
1124                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1125                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1126                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1127                         test_secrets!();
1128
1129                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1130                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1131                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1132                         test_secrets!();
1133
1134                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1135                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1136                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1137                         test_secrets!();
1138
1139                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1140                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1141                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1142                         test_secrets!();
1143
1144                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1145                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1146                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1147                         test_secrets!();
1148
1149                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1150                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1151                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1152                         test_secrets!();
1153
1154                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1155                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1156                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1157                         test_secrets!();
1158
1159                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1160                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1161                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1162                 }
1163         }
1164 }