_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs

   1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
   2 // history.
   3 //
   4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
   5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
   6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
   7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
   8 // licenses.
   9
  10 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
  11 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
  12 //! by hand.
  13
  14 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
  15 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
  16 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
  17 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{Decodable, Encodable};
  18 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  19 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  20
  21 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
  22 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  23 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
  24 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
  25
  26 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
  27 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
  28 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
  29 use util::byte_utils;
  30
  31 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
  32 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
  33 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Error as SecpError;
  34 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  35
  36 use std::{cmp, mem};
  37
  38 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
  39
  40 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
  41 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
  42
  43 #[derive(PartialEq)]
  44 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
  45         AcceptedHTLC,
  46         OfferedHTLC
  47 }
  48
  49 impl HTLCType {
  50         /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
  51         pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) ->  Option<HTLCType> {
  52                 if witness_script_len == 133 {
  53                         Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
  54                 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
  55                         Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
  56                 } else {
  57                         None
  58                 }
  59         }
  60 }
  61
  62 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
  63 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
  64
  65 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
  66 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
  67         let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
  68         for i in 0..48 {
  69                 let bitpos = 47 - i;
  70                 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
  71                         res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
  72                         res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
  73                 }
  74         }
  75         res
  76 }
  77
  78 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
  79 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
  80 ///
  81 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
  82 /// or so.
  83 #[derive(Clone)]
  84 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  85         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
  86 }
  87
  88 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  89         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
  90                 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
  91                         if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
  92                                 return false
  93                         }
  94                 }
  95                 true
  96         }
  97 }
  98
  99 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 100         pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
 101                 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
 102         }
 103
 104         #[inline]
 105         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
 106                 for i in 0..48 {
 107                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
 108                                 return i
 109                         }
 110                 }
 111                 48
 112         }
 113
 114         pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 115                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 116                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 117                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 118                         if idx < min {
 119                                 min = idx;
 120                         }
 121                 }
 122                 min
 123         }
 124
 125         #[inline]
 126         pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 127                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 128                 for i in 0..bits {
 129                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 130                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 131                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 132                                 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
 133                         }
 134                 }
 135                 res
 136         }
 137
 138         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
 139                 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
 140                 for i in 0..pos {
 141                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 142                         if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 143                                 return Err(());
 144                         }
 145                 }
 146                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
 147                         return Ok(());
 148                 }
 149                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 150                 Ok(())
 151         }
 152
 153         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 154         pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 155                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 156                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 157                                 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 158                         }
 159                 }
 160                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 161                 None
 162         }
 163 }
 164
 165 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 166         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 167                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 168                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 169                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 170                 }
 171                 Ok(())
 172         }
 173 }
 174 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 175         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 176                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
 177                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
 178                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
 179                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
 180                 }
 181
 182                 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
 183         }
 184 }
 185
 186 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
 187 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
 188 ///
 189 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 190 /// generated (ie our own).
 191 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 192         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 193         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 194         sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
 195         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 196
 197         let mut key = base_secret.clone();
 198         key.add_assign(&res)?;
 199         Ok(key)
 200 }
 201
 202 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
 203 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
 204 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
 205 ///
 206 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 207 /// generated (ie our own).
 208 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 209         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 210         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 211         sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
 212         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 213
 214         let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
 215         base_point.combine(&hashkey)
 216 }
 217
 218 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
 219 ///
 220 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 221 /// generated (ie our own).
 222 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 223         let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
 224         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
 225
 226         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 227                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 228                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 229                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 230
 231                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 232         };
 233         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 234                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 235                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 236                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 237
 238                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 239         };
 240
 241         let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
 242         part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 243         let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
 244         part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 245         part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
 246         Ok(part_a)
 247 }
 248
 249 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
 250 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
 251 /// public key instead of private keys.
 252 ///
 253 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 254 /// generated (ie our own).
 255 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 256         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 257                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 258                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 259                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 260
 261                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 262         };
 263         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 264                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 265                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 266                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 267
 268                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 269         };
 270
 271         let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
 272         part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 273         let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
 274         part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 275         part_a.combine(&part_b)
 276 }
 277
 278 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
 279 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
 280 ///
 281 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
 282 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
 283 /// PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys.trust_key_derivation because we trusted the source of the
 284 /// pre-calculated keys.
 285 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
 286 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
 287         /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
 288         pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 289         /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
 290         /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
 291         pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
 292         /// A's HTLC Key
 293         pub a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 294         /// B's HTLC Key
 295         pub b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 296         /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
 297         pub a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 298 }
 299 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
 300         { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key });
 301
 302 /// The per-commitment point and a set of pre-calculated public keys used for transaction creation
 303 /// in the signer.
 304 /// The pre-calculated keys are an optimization, because ChannelKeys has enough
 305 /// information to re-derive them.
 306 pub struct PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(TxCreationKeys);
 307
 308 impl PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys {
 309         /// Create a new PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys from TxCreationKeys
 310         pub fn new(keys: TxCreationKeys) -> Self {
 311                 PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(keys)
 312         }
 313
 314         /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
 315         /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
 316         pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
 317                 &self.0
 318         }
 319
 320         /// The transaction per-commitment point
 321         pub fn per_commitment_point(&self) -> &PublicKey {
 322                 &self.0.per_commitment_point
 323         }
 324 }
 325
 326 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
 327 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 328 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
 329         /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
 330         /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
 331         pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
 332         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
 333         /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
 334         /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
 335         /// states.
 336         pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
 337         /// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
 338         /// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
 339         /// transaction.
 340         pub payment_point: PublicKey,
 341         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
 342         /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
 343         /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
 344         pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
 345         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
 346         /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
 347         pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
 348 }
 349
 350 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
 351         funding_pubkey,
 352         revocation_basepoint,
 353         payment_point,
 354         delayed_payment_basepoint,
 355         htlc_basepoint
 356 });
 357
 358
 359 impl TxCreationKeys {
 360         /// Create a new TxCreationKeys from channel base points and the per-commitment point
 361         pub fn derive_new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, SecpError> {
 362                 Ok(TxCreationKeys {
 363                         per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
 364                         revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
 365                         a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
 366                         b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
 367                         a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
 368                 })
 369         }
 370 }
 371
 372 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
 373 /// key or the delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
 374 /// Encumbering a `to_local` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
 375 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 376         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 377                       .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
 378                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 379                       .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
 380                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
 381                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 382                       .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
 383                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 384                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 385                       .into_script()
 386 }
 387
 388 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 389 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
 390 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 391         /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
 392         /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
 393         /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
 394         /// the remote party or our own.
 395         pub offered: bool,
 396         /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
 397         /// this divided by 1000.
 398         pub amount_msat: u64,
 399         /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
 400         pub cltv_expiry: u32,
 401         /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
 402         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 403         /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
 404         /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
 405         /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
 406         pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
 407 }
 408
 409 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
 410         offered,
 411         amount_msat,
 412         cltv_expiry,
 413         payment_hash,
 414         transaction_output_index
 415 });
 416
 417 #[inline]
 418 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 419         let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
 420         if htlc.offered {
 421                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 422                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 423                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 424                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 425                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 426                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 427                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 428                               .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 429                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 430                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 431                               .push_int(32)
 432                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 433                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
 434                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 435                               .push_int(2)
 436                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 437                               .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 438                               .push_int(2)
 439                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 440                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 441                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 442                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 443                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 444                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 445                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 446                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 447                               .into_script()
 448         } else {
 449                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 450                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 451                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 452                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 453                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 454                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 455                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 456                               .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 457                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 458                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 459                               .push_int(32)
 460                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 461                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 462                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 463                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 464                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 465                               .push_int(2)
 466                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 467                               .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 468                               .push_int(2)
 469                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 470                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 471                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 472                               .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
 473                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
 474                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 475                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 476                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 477                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 478                               .into_script()
 479         }
 480 }
 481
 482 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
 483 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
 484 #[inline]
 485 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
 486         get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
 487 }
 488
 489 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
 490 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
 491 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 492         let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
 493         let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
 494
 495         let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
 496         if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
 497                 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 498                         .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
 499         } else {
 500                 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
 501                         .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 502         }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
 503 }
 504
 505 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
 506 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
 507         let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 508         txins.push(TxIn {
 509                 previous_output: OutPoint {
 510                         txid: prev_hash.clone(),
 511                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
 512                 },
 513                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 514                 sequence: 0,
 515                 witness: Vec::new(),
 516         });
 517
 518         let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
 519                         feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 520                 } else {
 521                         feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 522                 };
 523
 524         let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
 525         txouts.push(TxOut {
 526                 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
 527                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
 528         });
 529
 530         Transaction {
 531                 version: 2,
 532                 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
 533                 input: txins,
 534                 output: txouts,
 535         }
 536 }
 537
 538 #[derive(Clone)]
 539 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
 540 /// to broadcast. This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature
 541 /// given the relevant secret key.
 542 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 543         // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
 544         // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
 545         // so we're probably most of the way there.
 546         /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
 547         pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
 548         /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
 549         pub their_sig: Signature,
 550         // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
 551         // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
 552         our_sig_first: bool,
 553         pub(crate) local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
 554         /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
 555         /// controlled by the channel initiator.
 556         pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
 557         /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
 558         ///
 559         /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
 560         /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
 561         /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
 562         ///
 563         /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
 564         /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
 565         pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
 566 }
 567 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 568         #[cfg(test)]
 569         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 570                 let dummy_input = TxIn {
 571                         previous_output: OutPoint {
 572                                 txid: Default::default(),
 573                                 vout: 0,
 574                         },
 575                         script_sig: Default::default(),
 576                         sequence: 0,
 577                         witness: vec![]
 578                 };
 579                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 580                 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 581                 Self {
 582                         unsigned_tx: Transaction {
 583                                 version: 2,
 584                                 input: vec![dummy_input],
 585                                 output: Vec::new(),
 586                                 lock_time: 0,
 587                         },
 588                         their_sig: dummy_sig,
 589                         our_sig_first: false,
 590                         local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
 591                                         per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
 592                                         revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 593                                         a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 594                                         b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 595                                         a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 596                                 },
 597                         feerate_per_kw: 0,
 598                         per_htlc: Vec::new()
 599                 }
 600         }
 601
 602         /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
 603         /// remote signature and both parties keys.
 604         ///
 605         /// The unsigned transaction outputs must be consistent with htlc_data.  This function
 606         /// only checks that the shape and amounts are consistent, but does not check the scriptPubkey.
 607         pub fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 608                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
 609                 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
 610
 611                 for htlc in &htlc_data {
 612                         if let Some(index) = htlc.0.transaction_output_index {
 613                                 let out = &unsigned_tx.output[index as usize];
 614                                 if out.value != htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000 {
 615                                         panic!("HTLC at index {} has incorrect amount", index);
 616                                 }
 617                                 if !out.script_pubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
 618                                         panic!("HTLC at index {} doesn't have p2wsh scriptPubkey", index);
 619                                 }
 620                         }
 621                 }
 622
 623                 Self {
 624                         unsigned_tx,
 625                         their_sig,
 626                         our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
 627                         local_keys,
 628                         feerate_per_kw,
 629                         per_htlc: htlc_data,
 630                 }
 631         }
 632
 633         /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
 634         /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
 635         pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
 636                 &self.local_keys
 637         }
 638
 639         /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
 640         /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
 641         pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
 642                 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
 643         }
 644
 645         /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
 646         ///
 647         /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
 648         /// by your ChannelKeys.
 649         /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
 650         /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
 651         /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
 652         /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
 653         pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
 654                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
 655                         .sighash_all(&self.unsigned_tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
 656                 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
 657         }
 658
 659         pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
 660                 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
 661                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 662                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 663
 664                 if self.our_sig_first {
 665                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 666                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 667                 } else {
 668                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 669                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 670                 }
 671                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 672                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 673
 674                 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 675                 tx
 676         }
 677
 678         /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
 679         /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
 680         ///
 681         /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
 682         /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
 683         /// included.
 684         pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
 685                 let txid = self.txid();
 686                 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
 687                 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
 688
 689                 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 690                         if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
 691                                 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 692
 693                                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 694
 695                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
 696                                 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
 697                         } else {
 698                                 ret.push(None);
 699                         }
 700                 }
 701                 Ok(ret)
 702         }
 703
 704         /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
 705         pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
 706                 let txid = self.txid();
 707                 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
 708                 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
 709                 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
 710                 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
 711                 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
 712                 if  this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
 713
 714                 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 715                 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
 716                 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
 717                 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
 718
 719                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 720
 721                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 722                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 723
 724                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
 725                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
 726                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 727                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 728
 729                 if this_htlc.0.offered {
 730                         // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
 731                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 732                 } else {
 733                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
 734                 }
 735
 736                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 737                 htlc_tx
 738         }
 739 }
 740 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 741         // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
 742         fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
 743                 self.txid() == o.txid()
 744         }
 745 }
 746 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 747         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 748                 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
 749                         match e {
 750                                 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
 751                                 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
 752                         }
 753                 }
 754                 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
 755                 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
 756                 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
 757                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
 758                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
 759                 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 760                         htlc.write(writer)?;
 761                         sig.write(writer)?;
 762                 }
 763                 Ok(())
 764         }
 765 }
 766 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 767         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 768                 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
 769                         Ok(tx) => tx,
 770                         Err(e) => match e {
 771                                 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
 772                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 773                         },
 774                 };
 775                 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
 776                 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
 777                 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
 778                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
 779                 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 780                 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
 781                 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
 782                         let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
 783                         let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
 784                         per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
 785                 }
 786
 787                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
 788                         // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
 789                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 790                 }
 791                 Ok(Self {
 792                         unsigned_tx,
 793                         their_sig,
 794                         our_sig_first,
 795                         local_keys,
 796                         feerate_per_kw,
 797                         per_htlc,
 798                 })
 799         }
 800 }
 801
 802 #[cfg(test)]
 803 mod tests {
 804         use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
 805         use hex;
 806
 807         #[test]
 808         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 809                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 810                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 811                 let mut monitor;
 812
 813                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 814                         () => {
 815                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 816                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 817                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 818                                         idx -= 1;
 819                                 }
 820                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 821                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
 822                         };
 823                 }
 824
 825                 {
 826                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 827                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 828                         secrets.clear();
 829
 830                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 831                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 832                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 833                         test_secrets!();
 834
 835                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 836                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 837                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 838                         test_secrets!();
 839
 840                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 841                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 842                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 843                         test_secrets!();
 844
 845                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 846                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 847                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 848                         test_secrets!();
 849
 850                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 851                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 852                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 853                         test_secrets!();
 854
 855                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 856                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 857                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 858                         test_secrets!();
 859
 860                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 861                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 862                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 863                         test_secrets!();
 864
 865                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 866                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 867                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 868                         test_secrets!();
 869                 }
 870
 871                 {
 872                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 873                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 874                         secrets.clear();
 875
 876                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 877                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 878                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 879                         test_secrets!();
 880
 881                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 882                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 883                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 884                 }
 885
 886                 {
 887                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 888                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 889                         secrets.clear();
 890
 891                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 892                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 893                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 894                         test_secrets!();
 895
 896                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 897                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 898                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 899                         test_secrets!();
 900
 901                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 902                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 903                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 904                         test_secrets!();
 905
 906                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 907                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 908                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 909                 }
 910
 911                 {
 912                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 913                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 914                         secrets.clear();
 915
 916                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 917                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 918                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 919                         test_secrets!();
 920
 921                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 922                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 923                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 924                         test_secrets!();
 925
 926                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 927                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 928                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 929                         test_secrets!();
 930
 931                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 932                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 933                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 934                 }
 935
 936                 {
 937                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 938                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 939                         secrets.clear();
 940
 941                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 942                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 943                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 944                         test_secrets!();
 945
 946                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 947                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 948                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 949                         test_secrets!();
 950
 951                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 952                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 953                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 954                         test_secrets!();
 955
 956                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 957                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
 958                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 959                         test_secrets!();
 960
 961                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 962                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 963                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 964                         test_secrets!();
 965
 966                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 967                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 968                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 969                         test_secrets!();
 970
 971                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 972                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 973                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 974                         test_secrets!();
 975
 976                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 977                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 978                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 979                 }
 980
 981                 {
 982                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
 983                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 984                         secrets.clear();
 985
 986                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 987                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 988                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 989                         test_secrets!();
 990
 991                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 992                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 993                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 994                         test_secrets!();
 995
 996                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 997                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 998                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 999                         test_secrets!();
1000
1001                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1002                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1003                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1004                         test_secrets!();
1005
1006                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1007                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1008                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1009                         test_secrets!();
1010
1011                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1012                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1013                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1014                 }
1015
1016                 {
1017                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
1018                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1019                         secrets.clear();
1020
1021                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1022                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1023                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1024                         test_secrets!();
1025
1026                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1027                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1028                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1029                         test_secrets!();
1030
1031                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1032                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1033                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1034                         test_secrets!();
1035
1036                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1037                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1038                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1039                         test_secrets!();
1040
1041                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1042                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1043                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1044                         test_secrets!();
1045
1046                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1047                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1048                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1049                         test_secrets!();
1050
1051                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1052                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1053                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1054                         test_secrets!();
1055
1056                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1057                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1058                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1059                 }
1060
1061                 {
1062                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1063                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1064                         secrets.clear();
1065
1066                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1067                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1068                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1069                         test_secrets!();
1070
1071                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1072                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1073                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1074                         test_secrets!();
1075
1076                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1077                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1078                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1079                         test_secrets!();
1080
1081                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1082                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1083                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1084                         test_secrets!();
1085
1086                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1087                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1088                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1089                         test_secrets!();
1090
1091                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1092                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1093                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1094                         test_secrets!();
1095
1096                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1097                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1098                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1099                         test_secrets!();
1100
1101                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1102                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1103                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1104                 }
1105
1106                 {
1107                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1108                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1109                         secrets.clear();
1110
1111                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1112                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1113                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1114                         test_secrets!();
1115
1116                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1117                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1118                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1119                         test_secrets!();
1120
1121                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1122                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1123                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1124                         test_secrets!();
1125
1126                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1127                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1128                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1129                         test_secrets!();
1130
1131                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1132                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1133                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1134                         test_secrets!();
1135
1136                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1137                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1138                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1139                         test_secrets!();
1140
1141                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1142                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1143                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1144                         test_secrets!();
1145
1146                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1147                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1148                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1149                 }
1150         }
1151 }