_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs

   1 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
   2 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
   3 //! by hand.
   4
   5 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
   6 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
   7 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
   8 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
   9 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  10
  11 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
  12 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  13 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
  14 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
  15
  16 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
  17 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
  18 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
  19 use util::byte_utils;
  20
  21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  24
  25 use std::{cmp, mem};
  26
  27 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
  28
  29 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
  30 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
  31
  32 #[derive(PartialEq)]
  33 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
  34         AcceptedHTLC,
  35         OfferedHTLC
  36 }
  37
  38 impl HTLCType {
  39         /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
  40         pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) ->  Option<HTLCType> {
  41                 if witness_script_len == 133 {
  42                         Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
  43                 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
  44                         Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
  45                 } else {
  46                         None
  47                 }
  48         }
  49 }
  50
  51 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
  52 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
  53
  54 pub(super) fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
  55         let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
  56         for i in 0..48 {
  57                 let bitpos = 47 - i;
  58                 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
  59                         res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
  60                         res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
  61                 }
  62         }
  63         res
  64 }
  65
  66 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
  67 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
  68 ///
  69 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
  70 /// or so.
  71 #[derive(Clone)]
  72 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  73         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
  74 }
  75
  76 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  77         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
  78                 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
  79                         if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
  80                                 return false
  81                         }
  82                 }
  83                 true
  84         }
  85 }
  86
  87 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  88         pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
  89                 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
  90         }
  91
  92         #[inline]
  93         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
  94                 for i in 0..48 {
  95                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
  96                                 return i
  97                         }
  98                 }
  99                 48
 100         }
 101
 102         pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 103                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 104                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 105                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 106                         if idx < min {
 107                                 min = idx;
 108                         }
 109                 }
 110                 min
 111         }
 112
 113         #[inline]
 114         pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 115                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 116                 for i in 0..bits {
 117                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 118                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 119                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 120                                 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
 121                         }
 122                 }
 123                 res
 124         }
 125
 126         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
 127                 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
 128                 for i in 0..pos {
 129                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 130                         if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 131                                 return Err(());
 132                         }
 133                 }
 134                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
 135                         return Ok(());
 136                 }
 137                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 138                 Ok(())
 139         }
 140
 141         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 142         pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 143                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 144                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 145                                 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 146                         }
 147                 }
 148                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 149                 None
 150         }
 151 }
 152
 153 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 154         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 155                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 156                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 157                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 158                 }
 159                 Ok(())
 160         }
 161 }
 162 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 163         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 164                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
 165                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
 166                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
 167                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
 168                 }
 169
 170                 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
 171         }
 172 }
 173
 174 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
 175 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
 176 ///
 177 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 178 /// generated (ie our own).
 179 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 180         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 181         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 182         sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
 183         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 184
 185         let mut key = base_secret.clone();
 186         key.add_assign(&res)?;
 187         Ok(key)
 188 }
 189
 190 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
 191 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
 192 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
 193 ///
 194 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 195 /// generated (ie our own).
 196 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 197         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 198         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 199         sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
 200         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 201
 202         let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
 203         base_point.combine(&hashkey)
 204 }
 205
 206 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
 207 ///
 208 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 209 /// generated (ie our own).
 210 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 211         let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
 212         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
 213
 214         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 215                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 216                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 217                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 218
 219                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 220         };
 221         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 222                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 223                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 224                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 225
 226                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 227         };
 228
 229         let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
 230         part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 231         let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
 232         part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 233         part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
 234         Ok(part_a)
 235 }
 236
 237 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
 238 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
 239 /// public key instead of private keys.
 240 ///
 241 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 242 /// generated (ie our own).
 243 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 244         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 245                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 246                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 247                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 248
 249                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 250         };
 251         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 252                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 253                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 254                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 255
 256                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 257         };
 258
 259         let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
 260         part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 261         let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
 262         part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 263         part_a.combine(&part_b)
 264 }
 265
 266 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
 267 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
 268 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
 269 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
 270         /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
 271         pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 272         /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
 273         /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
 274         pub(crate) revocation_key: PublicKey,
 275         /// A's HTLC Key
 276         pub(crate) a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 277         /// B's HTLC Key
 278         pub(crate) b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 279         /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
 280         pub(crate) a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 281 }
 282 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
 283         { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key });
 284
 285 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
 286 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 287 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
 288         /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
 289         /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
 290         pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
 291         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
 292         /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
 293         /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
 294         /// states.
 295         pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
 296         /// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
 297         /// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
 298         /// transaction.
 299         pub payment_point: PublicKey,
 300         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
 301         /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
 302         /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
 303         pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
 304         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
 305         /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
 306         pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
 307 }
 308
 309 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
 310         funding_pubkey,
 311         revocation_basepoint,
 312         payment_point,
 313         delayed_payment_basepoint,
 314         htlc_basepoint
 315 });
 316
 317
 318 impl TxCreationKeys {
 319         pub(crate) fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
 320                 Ok(TxCreationKeys {
 321                         per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
 322                         revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
 323                         a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
 324                         b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
 325                         a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
 326                 })
 327         }
 328 }
 329
 330 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
 331 /// key or the delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
 332 /// Encumbering a `to_local` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
 333 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 334         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 335                       .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
 336                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 337                       .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
 338                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
 339                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 340                       .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
 341                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 342                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 343                       .into_script()
 344 }
 345
 346 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 347 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
 348 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 349         /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
 350         /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
 351         /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
 352         /// the remote party or our own.
 353         pub offered: bool,
 354         /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
 355         /// this divided by 1000.
 356         pub amount_msat: u64,
 357         /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
 358         pub cltv_expiry: u32,
 359         /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
 360         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 361         /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
 362         /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
 363         /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
 364         pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
 365 }
 366
 367 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
 368         offered,
 369         amount_msat,
 370         cltv_expiry,
 371         payment_hash,
 372         transaction_output_index
 373 });
 374
 375 #[inline]
 376 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 377         let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
 378         if htlc.offered {
 379                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 380                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 381                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 382                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 383                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 384                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 385                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 386                               .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 387                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 388                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 389                               .push_int(32)
 390                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 391                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
 392                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 393                               .push_int(2)
 394                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 395                               .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 396                               .push_int(2)
 397                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 398                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 399                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 400                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 401                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 402                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 403                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 404                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 405                               .into_script()
 406         } else {
 407                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 408                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 409                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 410                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 411                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 412                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 413                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 414                               .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 415                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 416                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 417                               .push_int(32)
 418                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 419                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 420                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 421                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 422                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 423                               .push_int(2)
 424                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 425                               .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 426                               .push_int(2)
 427                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 428                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 429                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 430                               .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
 431                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
 432                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 433                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 434                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 435                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 436                               .into_script()
 437         }
 438 }
 439
 440 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
 441 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
 442 #[inline]
 443 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
 444         get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
 445 }
 446
 447 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
 448 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
 449 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 450         let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
 451         let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
 452
 453         let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
 454         if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
 455                 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 456                         .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
 457         } else {
 458                 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
 459                         .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 460         }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
 461 }
 462
 463 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
 464 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u64, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
 465         let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 466         txins.push(TxIn {
 467                 previous_output: OutPoint {
 468                         txid: prev_hash.clone(),
 469                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
 470                 },
 471                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 472                 sequence: 0,
 473                 witness: Vec::new(),
 474         });
 475
 476         let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
 477                         feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 478                 } else {
 479                         feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 480                 };
 481
 482         let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
 483         txouts.push(TxOut {
 484                 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
 485                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
 486         });
 487
 488         Transaction {
 489                 version: 2,
 490                 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
 491                 input: txins,
 492                 output: txouts,
 493         }
 494 }
 495
 496 #[derive(Clone)]
 497 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
 498 /// to broadcast. Eventually this will require a signer which is possibly external, but for now we
 499 /// just pass in the SecretKeys required.
 500 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 501         // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
 502         // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
 503         // so we're probably most of the way there.
 504         /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
 505         pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
 506         /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
 507         pub their_sig: Signature,
 508         // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
 509         // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
 510         our_sig_first: bool,
 511         /// The key derivation parameters for this commitment transaction
 512         pub local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
 513         /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
 514         /// controlled by the channel initiator.
 515         pub feerate_per_kw: u64,
 516         /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
 517         ///
 518         /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
 519         /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
 520         /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
 521         ///
 522         /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
 523         /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
 524         pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
 525 }
 526 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 527         #[cfg(test)]
 528         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 529                 let dummy_input = TxIn {
 530                         previous_output: OutPoint {
 531                                 txid: Default::default(),
 532                                 vout: 0,
 533                         },
 534                         script_sig: Default::default(),
 535                         sequence: 0,
 536                         witness: vec![]
 537                 };
 538                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 539                 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 540                 Self {
 541                         unsigned_tx: Transaction {
 542                                 version: 2,
 543                                 input: vec![dummy_input],
 544                                 output: Vec::new(),
 545                                 lock_time: 0,
 546                         },
 547                         their_sig: dummy_sig,
 548                         our_sig_first: false,
 549                         local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
 550                                         per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
 551                                         revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 552                                         a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 553                                         b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 554                                         a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 555                                 },
 556                         feerate_per_kw: 0,
 557                         per_htlc: Vec::new()
 558                 }
 559         }
 560
 561         /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
 562         /// remote signature and both parties keys
 563         pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 564                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
 565                 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
 566
 567                 Self {
 568                         unsigned_tx,
 569                         their_sig,
 570                         our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
 571                         local_keys,
 572                         feerate_per_kw,
 573                         per_htlc: htlc_data,
 574                 }
 575         }
 576
 577         /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
 578         /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
 579         pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
 580                 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
 581         }
 582
 583         /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
 584         ///
 585         /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
 586         /// by your ChannelKeys.
 587         /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
 588         /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
 589         /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
 590         /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
 591         pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
 592                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
 593                         .sighash_all(&self.unsigned_tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
 594                 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
 595         }
 596
 597         pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
 598                 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
 599                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 600                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 601
 602                 if self.our_sig_first {
 603                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 604                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 605                 } else {
 606                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 607                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 608                 }
 609                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 610                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 611
 612                 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 613                 tx
 614         }
 615
 616         /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
 617         /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
 618         ///
 619         /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
 620         /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
 621         /// included.
 622         pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
 623                 let txid = self.txid();
 624                 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
 625                 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
 626
 627                 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 628                         if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
 629                                 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 630
 631                                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 632
 633                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
 634                                 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
 635                         } else {
 636                                 ret.push(None);
 637                         }
 638                 }
 639                 Ok(ret)
 640         }
 641
 642         /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
 643         pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
 644                 let txid = self.txid();
 645                 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
 646                 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
 647                 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
 648                 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
 649                 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
 650                 if  this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
 651
 652                 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 653                 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
 654                 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
 655                 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
 656
 657                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 658
 659                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 660                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 661
 662                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
 663                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
 664                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 665                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 666
 667                 if this_htlc.0.offered {
 668                         // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
 669                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 670                 } else {
 671                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
 672                 }
 673
 674                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 675                 htlc_tx
 676         }
 677 }
 678 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 679         // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
 680         fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
 681                 self.txid() == o.txid()
 682         }
 683 }
 684 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 685         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 686                 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
 687                         match e {
 688                                 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
 689                                 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
 690                         }
 691                 }
 692                 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
 693                 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
 694                 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
 695                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
 696                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
 697                 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 698                         htlc.write(writer)?;
 699                         sig.write(writer)?;
 700                 }
 701                 Ok(())
 702         }
 703 }
 704 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 705         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 706                 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
 707                         Ok(tx) => tx,
 708                         Err(e) => match e {
 709                                 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
 710                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 711                         },
 712                 };
 713                 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
 714                 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
 715                 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
 716                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
 717                 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 718                 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
 719                 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
 720                         let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
 721                         let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
 722                         per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
 723                 }
 724
 725                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
 726                         // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
 727                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 728                 }
 729                 Ok(Self {
 730                         unsigned_tx,
 731                         their_sig,
 732                         our_sig_first,
 733                         local_keys,
 734                         feerate_per_kw,
 735                         per_htlc,
 736                 })
 737         }
 738 }
 739
 740 #[cfg(test)]
 741 mod tests {
 742         use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
 743         use hex;
 744
 745         #[test]
 746         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 747                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 748                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 749                 let mut monitor;
 750
 751                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 752                         () => {
 753                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 754                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 755                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 756                                         idx -= 1;
 757                                 }
 758                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 759                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
 760                         };
 761                 }
 762
 763                 {
 764                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 765                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 766                         secrets.clear();
 767
 768                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 769                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 770                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 771                         test_secrets!();
 772
 773                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 774                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 775                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 776                         test_secrets!();
 777
 778                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 779                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 780                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 781                         test_secrets!();
 782
 783                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 784                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 785                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 786                         test_secrets!();
 787
 788                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 789                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 790                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 791                         test_secrets!();
 792
 793                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 794                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 795                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 796                         test_secrets!();
 797
 798                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 799                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 800                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 801                         test_secrets!();
 802
 803                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 804                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 805                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 806                         test_secrets!();
 807                 }
 808
 809                 {
 810                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 811                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 812                         secrets.clear();
 813
 814                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 815                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 816                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 817                         test_secrets!();
 818
 819                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 820                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 821                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 822                 }
 823
 824                 {
 825                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 826                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 827                         secrets.clear();
 828
 829                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 830                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 831                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 832                         test_secrets!();
 833
 834                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 835                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 836                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 837                         test_secrets!();
 838
 839                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 840                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 841                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 842                         test_secrets!();
 843
 844                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 845                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 846                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 847                 }
 848
 849                 {
 850                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 851                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 852                         secrets.clear();
 853
 854                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 855                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 856                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 857                         test_secrets!();
 858
 859                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 860                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 861                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 862                         test_secrets!();
 863
 864                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 865                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 866                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 867                         test_secrets!();
 868
 869                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 870                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 871                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 872                 }
 873
 874                 {
 875                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 876                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 877                         secrets.clear();
 878
 879                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 880                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 881                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 882                         test_secrets!();
 883
 884                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 885                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 886                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 887                         test_secrets!();
 888
 889                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 890                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 891                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 892                         test_secrets!();
 893
 894                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 895                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
 896                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 897                         test_secrets!();
 898
 899                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 900                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 901                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 902                         test_secrets!();
 903
 904                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 905                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 906                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 907                         test_secrets!();
 908
 909                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 910                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 911                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 912                         test_secrets!();
 913
 914                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 915                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 916                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 917                 }
 918
 919                 {
 920                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
 921                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 922                         secrets.clear();
 923
 924                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 925                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 926                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 927                         test_secrets!();
 928
 929                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 930                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 931                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 932                         test_secrets!();
 933
 934                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 935                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 936                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 937                         test_secrets!();
 938
 939                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 940                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 941                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 942                         test_secrets!();
 943
 944                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 945                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 946                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 947                         test_secrets!();
 948
 949                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 950                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 951                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 952                 }
 953
 954                 {
 955                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
 956                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 957                         secrets.clear();
 958
 959                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 960                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 961                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 962                         test_secrets!();
 963
 964                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 965                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 966                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 967                         test_secrets!();
 968
 969                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 970                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 971                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 972                         test_secrets!();
 973
 974                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 975                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 976                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 977                         test_secrets!();
 978
 979                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 980                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 981                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 982                         test_secrets!();
 983
 984                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 985                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
 986                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 987                         test_secrets!();
 988
 989                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 990                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 991                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 992                         test_secrets!();
 993
 994                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 995                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 996                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 997                 }
 998
 999                 {
1000                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1001                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1002                         secrets.clear();
1003
1004                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1005                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1006                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1007                         test_secrets!();
1008
1009                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1010                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1011                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1012                         test_secrets!();
1013
1014                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1015                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1016                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1017                         test_secrets!();
1018
1019                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1020                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1021                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1022                         test_secrets!();
1023
1024                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1025                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1026                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1027                         test_secrets!();
1028
1029                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1030                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1031                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1032                         test_secrets!();
1033
1034                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1035                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1036                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1037                         test_secrets!();
1038
1039                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1040                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1041                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1042                 }
1043
1044                 {
1045                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1046                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1047                         secrets.clear();
1048
1049                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1050                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1051                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1052                         test_secrets!();
1053
1054                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1055                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1056                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1057                         test_secrets!();
1058
1059                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1060                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1061                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1062                         test_secrets!();
1063
1064                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1065                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1066                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1067                         test_secrets!();
1068
1069                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1070                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1071                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1072                         test_secrets!();
1073
1074                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1075                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1076                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1077                         test_secrets!();
1078
1079                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1080                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1081                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1082                         test_secrets!();
1083
1084                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1085                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1086                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1087                 }
1088         }
1089 }