_ Git - rust-lightning/blob - lightning/src/ln/chan_utils.rs

   1 //! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
   2 //! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
   3 //! by hand.
   4
   5 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
   6 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
   7 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
   8 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{Decodable, Encodable};
   9 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
  10 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
  11
  12 use bitcoin::hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
  13 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
  14 use bitcoin::hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
  15 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, PubkeyHash};
  16
  17 use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
  18 use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
  19 use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
  20 use util::byte_utils;
  21
  22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
  23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
  24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
  25
  26 use std::{cmp, mem};
  27
  28 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
  29
  30 pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
  31 pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
  32
  33 #[derive(PartialEq)]
  34 pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
  35         AcceptedHTLC,
  36         OfferedHTLC
  37 }
  38
  39 impl HTLCType {
  40         /// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
  41         pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) ->  Option<HTLCType> {
  42                 if witness_script_len == 133 {
  43                         Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
  44                 } else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
  45                         Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
  46                 } else {
  47                         None
  48                 }
  49         }
  50 }
  51
  52 // Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
  53 // used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
  54
  55 /// Build the commitment secret from the seed and the commitment number
  56 pub fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
  57         let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
  58         for i in 0..48 {
  59                 let bitpos = 47 - i;
  60                 if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
  61                         res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
  62                         res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
  63                 }
  64         }
  65         res
  66 }
  67
  68 /// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
  69 /// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
  70 ///
  71 /// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
  72 /// or so.
  73 #[derive(Clone)]
  74 pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  75         old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
  76 }
  77
  78 impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  79         fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
  80                 for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
  81                         if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
  82                                 return false
  83                         }
  84                 }
  85                 true
  86         }
  87 }
  88
  89 impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
  90         pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
  91                 Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
  92         }
  93
  94         #[inline]
  95         fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
  96                 for i in 0..48 {
  97                         if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
  98                                 return i
  99                         }
 100                 }
 101                 48
 102         }
 103
 104         pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
 105                 //TODO This can be optimized?
 106                 let mut min = 1 << 48;
 107                 for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 108                         if idx < min {
 109                                 min = idx;
 110                         }
 111                 }
 112                 min
 113         }
 114
 115         #[inline]
 116         pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
 117                 let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
 118                 for i in 0..bits {
 119                         let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
 120                         if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
 121                                 res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
 122                                 res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
 123                         }
 124                 }
 125                 res
 126         }
 127
 128         pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
 129                 let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
 130                 for i in 0..pos {
 131                         let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
 132                         if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
 133                                 return Err(());
 134                         }
 135                 }
 136                 if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
 137                         return Ok(());
 138                 }
 139                 self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
 140                 Ok(())
 141         }
 142
 143         /// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
 144         pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
 145                 for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
 146                         if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
 147                                 return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
 148                         }
 149                 }
 150                 assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
 151                 None
 152         }
 153 }
 154
 155 impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 156         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 157                 for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
 158                         writer.write_all(secret)?;
 159                         writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
 160                 }
 161                 Ok(())
 162         }
 163 }
 164 impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
 165         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 166                 let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
 167                 for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
 168                         *secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
 169                         *idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
 170                 }
 171
 172                 Ok(Self { old_secrets })
 173         }
 174 }
 175
 176 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or delayed_payment key)
 177 /// from the base secret and the per_commitment_point.
 178 ///
 179 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 180 /// generated (ie our own).
 181 pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 182         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 183         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 184         sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
 185         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 186
 187         let mut key = base_secret.clone();
 188         key.add_assign(&res)?;
 189         Ok(key)
 190 }
 191
 192 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction public key (eg an htlc key or a delayed_payment key)
 193 /// from the base point and the per_commitment_key. This is the public equivalent of
 194 /// derive_private_key - using only public keys to derive a public key instead of private keys.
 195 ///
 196 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 197 /// generated (ie our own).
 198 pub fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 199         let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 200         sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 201         sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
 202         let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
 203
 204         let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
 205         base_point.combine(&hashkey)
 206 }
 207
 208 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation key from its constituent parts.
 209 ///
 210 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 211 /// generated (ie our own).
 212 pub fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 213         let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
 214         let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
 215
 216         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 217                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 218                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 219                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 220
 221                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 222         };
 223         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 224                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 225                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 226                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 227
 228                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 229         };
 230
 231         let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
 232         part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 233         let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
 234         part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 235         part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
 236         Ok(part_a)
 237 }
 238
 239 /// Derives a per-commitment-transaction revocation public key from its constituent parts. This is
 240 /// the public equivalend of derive_private_revocation_key - using only public keys to derive a
 241 /// public key instead of private keys.
 242 ///
 243 /// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
 244 /// generated (ie our own).
 245 pub fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
 246         let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
 247                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 248                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 249                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 250
 251                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 252         };
 253         let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
 254                 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
 255                 sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
 256                 sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
 257
 258                 Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
 259         };
 260
 261         let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
 262         part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
 263         let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
 264         part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
 265         part_a.combine(&part_b)
 266 }
 267
 268 /// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
 269 /// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
 270 ///
 271 /// These keys are assumed to be good, either because the code derived them from
 272 /// channel basepoints via the new function, or they were obtained via
 273 /// PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys.trust_key_derivation because we trusted the source of the
 274 /// pre-calculated keys.
 275 #[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
 276 pub struct TxCreationKeys {
 277         /// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
 278         pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
 279         /// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
 280         /// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
 281         pub revocation_key: PublicKey,
 282         /// A's HTLC Key
 283         pub a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 284         /// B's HTLC Key
 285         pub b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
 286         /// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
 287         pub a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
 288 }
 289 impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
 290         { per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key });
 291
 292 /// The per-commitment point and a set of pre-calculated public keys used for transaction creation
 293 /// in the signer.
 294 /// The pre-calculated keys are an optimization, because ChannelKeys has enough
 295 /// information to re-derive them.
 296 pub struct PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(TxCreationKeys);
 297
 298 impl PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys {
 299         /// Create a new PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys from TxCreationKeys
 300         pub fn new(keys: TxCreationKeys) -> Self {
 301                 PreCalculatedTxCreationKeys(keys)
 302         }
 303
 304         /// The pre-calculated transaction creation public keys.
 305         /// An external validating signer should not trust these keys.
 306         pub fn trust_key_derivation(&self) -> &TxCreationKeys {
 307                 &self.0
 308         }
 309
 310         /// The transaction per-commitment point
 311         pub fn per_comitment_point(&self) -> &PublicKey {
 312                 &self.0.per_commitment_point
 313         }
 314 }
 315
 316 /// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
 317 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 318 pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
 319         /// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
 320         /// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
 321         pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
 322         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
 323         /// revocation keys. This is combined with the per-commitment-secret generated by the
 324         /// counterparty to create a secret which the counterparty can reveal to revoke previous
 325         /// states.
 326         pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
 327         /// The public key which receives our immediately spendable primary channel balance in
 328         /// remote-broadcasted commitment transactions. This key is static across every commitment
 329         /// transaction.
 330         pub payment_point: PublicKey,
 331         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
 332         /// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
 333         /// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
 334         pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
 335         /// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
 336         /// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
 337         pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
 338 }
 339
 340 impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
 341         funding_pubkey,
 342         revocation_basepoint,
 343         payment_point,
 344         delayed_payment_basepoint,
 345         htlc_basepoint
 346 });
 347
 348
 349 impl TxCreationKeys {
 350         /// Create a new TxCreationKeys from channel base points and the per-commitment point
 351         pub fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
 352                 Ok(TxCreationKeys {
 353                         per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
 354                         revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
 355                         a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
 356                         b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
 357                         a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
 358                 })
 359         }
 360 }
 361
 362 /// A script either spendable by the revocation
 363 /// key or the delayed_payment_key and satisfying the relative-locktime OP_CSV constrain.
 364 /// Encumbering a `to_local` output on a commitment transaction or 2nd-stage HTLC transactions.
 365 pub fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 366         Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 367                       .push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
 368                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 369                       .push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
 370                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
 371                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 372                       .push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
 373                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 374                       .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 375                       .into_script()
 376 }
 377
 378 #[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
 379 /// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
 380 pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
 381         /// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
 382         /// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
 383         /// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
 384         /// the remote party or our own.
 385         pub offered: bool,
 386         /// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
 387         /// this divided by 1000.
 388         pub amount_msat: u64,
 389         /// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
 390         pub cltv_expiry: u32,
 391         /// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
 392         pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
 393         /// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
 394         /// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
 395         /// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
 396         pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
 397 }
 398
 399 impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
 400         offered,
 401         amount_msat,
 402         cltv_expiry,
 403         payment_hash,
 404         transaction_output_index
 405 });
 406
 407 #[inline]
 408 pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 409         let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
 410         if htlc.offered {
 411                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 412                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 413                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 414                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 415                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 416                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 417                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 418                               .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 419                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 420                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 421                               .push_int(32)
 422                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 423                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
 424                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 425                               .push_int(2)
 426                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 427                               .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 428                               .push_int(2)
 429                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 430                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 431                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 432                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 433                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 434                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 435                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 436                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 437                               .into_script()
 438         } else {
 439                 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
 440                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 441                               .push_slice(&PubkeyHash::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
 442                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 443                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 444                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 445                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 446                               .push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 447                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 448                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
 449                               .push_int(32)
 450                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
 451                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
 452                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
 453                               .push_slice(&payment_hash160)
 454                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
 455                               .push_int(2)
 456                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
 457                               .push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
 458                               .push_int(2)
 459                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
 460                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
 461                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 462                               .push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
 463                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
 464                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
 465                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
 466                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 467                               .push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
 468                               .into_script()
 469         }
 470 }
 471
 472 /// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
 473 /// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
 474 #[inline]
 475 pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
 476         get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
 477 }
 478
 479 /// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
 480 /// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
 481 pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
 482         let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
 483         let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
 484
 485         let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
 486         if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
 487                 builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 488                         .push_slice(&their_funding_key)
 489         } else {
 490                 builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
 491                         .push_slice(&our_funding_key)
 492         }.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
 493 }
 494
 495 /// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
 496 pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Txid, feerate_per_kw: u32, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
 497         let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
 498         txins.push(TxIn {
 499                 previous_output: OutPoint {
 500                         txid: prev_hash.clone(),
 501                         vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
 502                 },
 503                 script_sig: Script::new(),
 504                 sequence: 0,
 505                 witness: Vec::new(),
 506         });
 507
 508         let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
 509                         feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 510                 } else {
 511                         feerate_per_kw as u64 * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
 512                 };
 513
 514         let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
 515         txouts.push(TxOut {
 516                 script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
 517                 value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
 518         });
 519
 520         Transaction {
 521                 version: 2,
 522                 lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
 523                 input: txins,
 524                 output: txouts,
 525         }
 526 }
 527
 528 #[derive(Clone)]
 529 /// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
 530 /// to broadcast. This class can be used inside a signer implementation to generate a signature
 531 /// given the relevant secret key.
 532 pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 533         // TODO: We should migrate away from providing the transaction, instead providing enough to
 534         // allow the ChannelKeys to construct it from scratch. Luckily we already have HTLC data here,
 535         // so we're probably most of the way there.
 536         /// The commitment transaction itself, in unsigned form.
 537         pub unsigned_tx: Transaction,
 538         /// Our counterparty's signature for the transaction, above.
 539         pub their_sig: Signature,
 540         // Which order the signatures should go in when constructing the final commitment tx witness.
 541         // The user should be able to reconstruc this themselves, so we don't bother to expose it.
 542         our_sig_first: bool,
 543         /// The key derivation parameters for this commitment transaction
 544         pub local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
 545         /// The feerate paid per 1000-weight-unit in this commitment transaction. This value is
 546         /// controlled by the channel initiator.
 547         pub feerate_per_kw: u32,
 548         /// The HTLCs and remote htlc signatures which were included in this commitment transaction.
 549         ///
 550         /// Note that this includes all HTLCs, including ones which were considered dust and not
 551         /// actually included in the transaction as it appears on-chain, but who's value is burned as
 552         /// fees and not included in the to_local or to_remote outputs.
 553         ///
 554         /// The remote HTLC signatures in the second element will always be set for non-dust HTLCs, ie
 555         /// those for which transaction_output_index.is_some().
 556         pub per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>,
 557 }
 558 impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 559         #[cfg(test)]
 560         pub fn dummy() -> Self {
 561                 let dummy_input = TxIn {
 562                         previous_output: OutPoint {
 563                                 txid: Default::default(),
 564                                 vout: 0,
 565                         },
 566                         script_sig: Default::default(),
 567                         sequence: 0,
 568                         witness: vec![]
 569                 };
 570                 let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 571                 let dummy_sig = Secp256k1::new().sign(&secp256k1::Message::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
 572                 Self {
 573                         unsigned_tx: Transaction {
 574                                 version: 2,
 575                                 input: vec![dummy_input],
 576                                 output: Vec::new(),
 577                                 lock_time: 0,
 578                         },
 579                         their_sig: dummy_sig,
 580                         our_sig_first: false,
 581                         local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
 582                                         per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
 583                                         revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 584                                         a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 585                                         b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 586                                         a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
 587                                 },
 588                         feerate_per_kw: 0,
 589                         per_htlc: Vec::new()
 590                 }
 591         }
 592
 593         /// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
 594         /// remote signature and both parties keys
 595         pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx: Transaction, their_sig: Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u32, htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 596                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
 597                 if unsigned_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
 598
 599                 Self {
 600                         unsigned_tx,
 601                         their_sig,
 602                         our_sig_first: our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..],
 603                         local_keys,
 604                         feerate_per_kw,
 605                         per_htlc: htlc_data,
 606                 }
 607         }
 608
 609         /// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
 610         /// LocalCommitmentTransaction
 611         pub fn txid(&self) -> Txid {
 612                 self.unsigned_tx.txid()
 613         }
 614
 615         /// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
 616         ///
 617         /// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
 618         /// by your ChannelKeys.
 619         /// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
 620         /// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
 621         /// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
 622         /// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
 623         pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
 624                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.unsigned_tx)
 625                         .sighash_all(&self.unsigned_tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
 626                 secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
 627         }
 628
 629         pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) -> Transaction {
 630                 let mut tx = self.unsigned_tx.clone();
 631                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 632                 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 633
 634                 if self.our_sig_first {
 635                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 636                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 637                 } else {
 638                         tx.input[0].witness.push(self.their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 639                         tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
 640                 }
 641                 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 642                 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 643
 644                 tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 645                 tx
 646         }
 647
 648         /// Get a signature for each HTLC which was included in the commitment transaction (ie for
 649         /// which HTLCOutputInCommitment::transaction_output_index.is_some()).
 650         ///
 651         /// The returned Vec has one entry for each HTLC, and in the same order. For HTLCs which were
 652         /// considered dust and not included, a None entry exists, for all others a signature is
 653         /// included.
 654         pub fn get_htlc_sigs<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(&self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Result<Vec<Option<Signature>>, ()> {
 655                 let txid = self.txid();
 656                 let mut ret = Vec::with_capacity(self.per_htlc.len());
 657                 let our_htlc_key = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key).map_err(|_| ())?;
 658
 659                 for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 660                         if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some() {
 661                                 let htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 662
 663                                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 664
 665                                 let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
 666                                 ret.push(Some(secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key)));
 667                         } else {
 668                                 ret.push(None);
 669                         }
 670                 }
 671                 Ok(ret)
 672         }
 673
 674         /// Gets a signed HTLC transaction given a preimage (for !htlc.offered) and the local HTLC transaction signature.
 675         pub(crate) fn get_signed_htlc_tx(&self, htlc_index: usize, signature: &Signature, preimage: &Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16) -> Transaction {
 676                 let txid = self.txid();
 677                 let this_htlc = &self.per_htlc[htlc_index];
 678                 assert!(this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.is_some());
 679                 // if we don't have preimage for an HTLC-Success, we can't generate an HTLC transaction.
 680                 if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { unreachable!(); }
 681                 // Further, we should never be provided the preimage for an HTLC-Timeout transaction.
 682                 if  this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_some() { unreachable!(); }
 683
 684                 let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 685                 // Channel should have checked that we have a remote signature for this HTLC at
 686                 // creation, and we should have a sensible htlc transaction:
 687                 assert!(this_htlc.1.is_some());
 688
 689                 let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
 690
 691                 // First push the multisig dummy, note that due to BIP147 (NULLDUMMY) it must be a zero-length element.
 692                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 693
 694                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
 695                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(signature.serialize_der().to_vec());
 696                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 697                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
 698
 699                 if this_htlc.0.offered {
 700                         // Due to BIP146 (MINIMALIF) this must be a zero-length element to relay.
 701                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
 702                 } else {
 703                         htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(preimage.unwrap().0.to_vec());
 704                 }
 705
 706                 htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
 707                 htlc_tx
 708         }
 709 }
 710 impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 711         // We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
 712         fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
 713                 self.txid() == o.txid()
 714         }
 715 }
 716 impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 717         fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
 718                 if let Err(e) = self.unsigned_tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
 719                         match e {
 720                                 encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
 721                                 _ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
 722                         }
 723                 }
 724                 self.their_sig.write(writer)?;
 725                 self.our_sig_first.write(writer)?;
 726                 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
 727                 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
 728                 writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
 729                 for &(ref htlc, ref sig) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
 730                         htlc.write(writer)?;
 731                         sig.write(writer)?;
 732                 }
 733                 Ok(())
 734         }
 735 }
 736 impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
 737         fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
 738                 let unsigned_tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
 739                         Ok(tx) => tx,
 740                         Err(e) => match e {
 741                                 encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
 742                                 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
 743                         },
 744                 };
 745                 let their_sig = Readable::read(reader)?;
 746                 let our_sig_first = Readable::read(reader)?;
 747                 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
 748                 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
 749                 let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
 750                 let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>()));
 751                 for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
 752                         let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
 753                         let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
 754                         per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs));
 755                 }
 756
 757                 if unsigned_tx.input.len() != 1 {
 758                         // Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
 759                         return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
 760                 }
 761                 Ok(Self {
 762                         unsigned_tx,
 763                         their_sig,
 764                         our_sig_first,
 765                         local_keys,
 766                         feerate_per_kw,
 767                         per_htlc,
 768                 })
 769         }
 770 }
 771
 772 #[cfg(test)]
 773 mod tests {
 774         use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
 775         use hex;
 776
 777         #[test]
 778         fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
 779                 // Test vectors from BOLT 3:
 780                 let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
 781                 let mut monitor;
 782
 783                 macro_rules! test_secrets {
 784                         () => {
 785                                 let mut idx = 281474976710655;
 786                                 for secret in secrets.iter() {
 787                                         assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
 788                                         idx -= 1;
 789                                 }
 790                                 assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
 791                                 assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
 792                         };
 793                 }
 794
 795                 {
 796                         // insert_secret correct sequence
 797                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 798                         secrets.clear();
 799
 800                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 801                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 802                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 803                         test_secrets!();
 804
 805                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 806                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 807                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 808                         test_secrets!();
 809
 810                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 811                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 812                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 813                         test_secrets!();
 814
 815                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 816                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 817                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 818                         test_secrets!();
 819
 820                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 821                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 822                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 823                         test_secrets!();
 824
 825                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 826                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 827                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 828                         test_secrets!();
 829
 830                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 831                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 832                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 833                         test_secrets!();
 834
 835                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 836                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 837                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 838                         test_secrets!();
 839                 }
 840
 841                 {
 842                         // insert_secret #1 incorrect
 843                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 844                         secrets.clear();
 845
 846                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 847                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 848                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 849                         test_secrets!();
 850
 851                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 852                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 853                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 854                 }
 855
 856                 {
 857                         // insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
 858                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 859                         secrets.clear();
 860
 861                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 862                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 863                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 864                         test_secrets!();
 865
 866                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 867                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 868                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 869                         test_secrets!();
 870
 871                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 872                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 873                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 874                         test_secrets!();
 875
 876                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 877                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 878                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 879                 }
 880
 881                 {
 882                         // insert_secret #3 incorrect
 883                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 884                         secrets.clear();
 885
 886                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 887                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 888                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 889                         test_secrets!();
 890
 891                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 892                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 893                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 894                         test_secrets!();
 895
 896                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 897                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 898                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 899                         test_secrets!();
 900
 901                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 902                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 903                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 904                 }
 905
 906                 {
 907                         // insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
 908                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 909                         secrets.clear();
 910
 911                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 912                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
 913                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 914                         test_secrets!();
 915
 916                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 917                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
 918                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 919                         test_secrets!();
 920
 921                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 922                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
 923                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 924                         test_secrets!();
 925
 926                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 927                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
 928                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 929                         test_secrets!();
 930
 931                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 932                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
 933                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 934                         test_secrets!();
 935
 936                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 937                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 938                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 939                         test_secrets!();
 940
 941                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 942                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
 943                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 944                         test_secrets!();
 945
 946                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 947                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
 948                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 949                 }
 950
 951                 {
 952                         // insert_secret #5 incorrect
 953                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 954                         secrets.clear();
 955
 956                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 957                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 958                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 959                         test_secrets!();
 960
 961                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 962                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 963                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 964                         test_secrets!();
 965
 966                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 967                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
 968                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 969                         test_secrets!();
 970
 971                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 972                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
 973                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 974                         test_secrets!();
 975
 976                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 977                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
 978                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 979                         test_secrets!();
 980
 981                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 982                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
 983                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
 984                 }
 985
 986                 {
 987                         // insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
 988                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
 989                         secrets.clear();
 990
 991                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 992                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
 993                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 994                         test_secrets!();
 995
 996                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
 997                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
 998                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
 999                         test_secrets!();
1000
1001                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1002                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1003                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1004                         test_secrets!();
1005
1006                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1007                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1008                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1009                         test_secrets!();
1010
1011                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1012                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
1013                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1014                         test_secrets!();
1015
1016                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1017                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
1018                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1019                         test_secrets!();
1020
1021                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1022                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1023                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1024                         test_secrets!();
1025
1026                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1027                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1028                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1029                 }
1030
1031                 {
1032                         // insert_secret #7 incorrect
1033                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1034                         secrets.clear();
1035
1036                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1037                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1038                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1039                         test_secrets!();
1040
1041                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1042                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1043                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1044                         test_secrets!();
1045
1046                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1047                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1048                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1049                         test_secrets!();
1050
1051                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1052                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1053                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1054                         test_secrets!();
1055
1056                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1057                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1058                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1059                         test_secrets!();
1060
1061                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1062                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1063                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1064                         test_secrets!();
1065
1066                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1067                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
1068                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1069                         test_secrets!();
1070
1071                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1072                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
1073                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1074                 }
1075
1076                 {
1077                         // insert_secret #8 incorrect
1078                         monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
1079                         secrets.clear();
1080
1081                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1082                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
1083                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1084                         test_secrets!();
1085
1086                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1087                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
1088                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1089                         test_secrets!();
1090
1091                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1092                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
1093                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1094                         test_secrets!();
1095
1096                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1097                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
1098                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1099                         test_secrets!();
1100
1101                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1102                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
1103                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1104                         test_secrets!();
1105
1106                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1107                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
1108                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1109                         test_secrets!();
1110
1111                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1112                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
1113                         monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
1114                         test_secrets!();
1115
1116                         secrets.push([0; 32]);
1117                         secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
1118                         assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
1119                 }
1120         }
1121 }