1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
264 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
265 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
266 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
267 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
268 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
269 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
270 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
272 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
273 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
274 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
275 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
276 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
277 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
278 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
280 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
281 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
282 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
284 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
285 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
286 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
287 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
288 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
289 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
291 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
292 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
294 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
295 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
296 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
297 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
298 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
299 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
300 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
301 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
302 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
304 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
305 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
306 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
307 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
308 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
309 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
310 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
311 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
312 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
313 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
314 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
315 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
316 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
317 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
318 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
319 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
321 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
322 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
323 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
324 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
325 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
326 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
327 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
328 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
330 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
331 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
332 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
333 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
335 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
337 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
339 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
340 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
341 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
342 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
346 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
348 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
350 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
352 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
353 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
354 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
355 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
356 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
358 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
359 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
361 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
363 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
364 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
366 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
367 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
368 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
369 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
370 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
371 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
373 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
374 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
376 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
377 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
378 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
379 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
380 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
382 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
383 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
385 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
386 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
388 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
389 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
390 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
391 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
397 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
407 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
408 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
410 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
411 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
412 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
417 macro_rules! secp_check {
418 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
421 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
426 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
427 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
428 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
429 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
430 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
431 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
432 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
433 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
435 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
437 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
439 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
443 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
445 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
446 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
447 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
449 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
450 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
452 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
453 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
454 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
455 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
456 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
458 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
459 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
463 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
469 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
472 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
473 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
474 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
475 holding_cell_msat: u64,
476 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
479 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
480 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
481 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
482 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
483 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
484 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
485 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
486 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
487 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
488 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
491 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
492 struct HTLCCandidate {
494 origin: HTLCInitiator,
498 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
506 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
508 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
510 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
511 htlc_value_msat: u64,
512 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
517 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
518 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
519 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
520 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
521 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
523 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
524 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
525 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
526 htlc_value_msat: u64,
528 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
529 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
533 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
534 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
535 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
536 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
537 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
538 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
539 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
540 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
541 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
542 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
543 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
546 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
548 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
549 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
550 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
551 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
552 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
555 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
556 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
557 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
558 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
559 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
560 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
561 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
562 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
565 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
567 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
568 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
569 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
570 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
571 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
572 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
573 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
574 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
577 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
578 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
579 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
580 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
581 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
582 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
583 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
584 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
585 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
586 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
587 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
588 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
589 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
590 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
591 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
593 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
594 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
595 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
596 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
598 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
599 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
600 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
601 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
603 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
604 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
605 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
606 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
607 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
609 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
610 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
611 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
612 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
614 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
615 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
616 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
618 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
619 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
620 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
621 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
622 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
624 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
625 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
628 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
629 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
631 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
632 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
633 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
634 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
636 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
637 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
639 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
640 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
643 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
644 (0, update, required),
647 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
648 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
649 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
650 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
651 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
655 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
656 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
657 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
659 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
661 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
662 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
663 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
667 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
669 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
670 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
671 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
676 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
677 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
678 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
679 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
680 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
682 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
683 /// in a timely manner.
684 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
687 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
688 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
689 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
691 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
692 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
693 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
694 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
698 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
699 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
700 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
702 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
703 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
704 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
705 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
707 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
711 /// The current channel ID.
712 channel_id: ChannelId,
713 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
714 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
715 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
718 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
719 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
721 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
722 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
723 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
725 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
726 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
727 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
728 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
730 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
731 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
733 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
735 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
736 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
737 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
739 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
740 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
741 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
743 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
744 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
745 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
746 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
747 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
748 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
750 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
751 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
752 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
753 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
754 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
755 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
757 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
759 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
760 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
761 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
763 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
764 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
765 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
766 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
767 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
768 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
769 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
771 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
772 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
773 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
775 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
776 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
777 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
778 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
779 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
780 /// outbound or inbound.
781 signer_pending_funding: bool,
783 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
785 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
786 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
787 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
788 // HTLCs with similar state.
789 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
790 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
791 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
792 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
793 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
794 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
795 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
796 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
797 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
800 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
801 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
802 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
804 update_time_counter: u32,
806 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
807 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
808 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
809 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
810 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
811 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
813 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
814 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
816 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
817 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
818 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
819 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
821 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
822 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
824 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
826 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
828 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
829 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
830 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
831 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
832 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
834 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
835 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
837 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
838 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
839 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
841 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
842 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
843 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
844 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
845 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
846 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
847 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
848 channel_creation_height: u32,
850 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
853 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
855 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
858 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
860 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
863 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
865 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
867 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
868 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
871 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
873 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
875 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
876 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
878 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
880 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
881 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
882 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
884 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
886 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
887 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
888 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
890 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
891 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
892 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
894 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
896 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
898 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
899 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
900 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
901 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
903 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
904 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
905 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
907 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
908 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
909 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
911 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
912 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
913 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
914 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
915 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
916 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
917 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
918 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
920 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
921 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
922 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
923 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
924 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
926 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
927 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
929 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
930 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
931 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
932 /// unblock the state machine.
934 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
935 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
936 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
938 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
939 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
940 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
942 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
943 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
944 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
945 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
946 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
947 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
948 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
949 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
951 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
952 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
954 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
955 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
956 // the channel's funding UTXO.
958 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
959 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
960 // associated channel mapping.
962 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
963 // to store all of them.
964 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
966 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
967 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
968 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
969 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
970 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
972 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
973 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
975 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
976 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
978 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
979 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
980 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
982 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
983 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
984 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
987 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
988 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
989 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
990 self.update_time_counter
993 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
994 self.latest_monitor_update_id
997 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
998 self.config.announced_channel
1001 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1002 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1005 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1006 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1007 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1008 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1011 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1012 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1013 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
1016 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1017 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1018 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1019 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
1020 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1023 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1024 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1025 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1026 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1028 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1029 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1031 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1032 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1034 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1035 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1037 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1040 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1041 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1042 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1043 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1044 self.channel_state &
1045 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1046 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1047 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1048 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1051 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1052 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1053 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1054 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1055 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1058 // Public utilities:
1060 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1064 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1066 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1067 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1068 self.temporary_channel_id
1071 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1075 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1076 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1077 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1081 /// Gets the channel's type
1082 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1086 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1088 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1089 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1090 self.short_channel_id
1093 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1094 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1095 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1098 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1099 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1100 self.outbound_scid_alias
1103 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1105 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1106 return &self.holder_signer
1109 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1110 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1111 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1112 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1113 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1114 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1117 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1118 /// get_funding_created.
1119 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1120 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1123 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1124 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1125 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1126 if conf_height > 0 {
1133 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1134 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1135 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1138 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1139 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1140 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1141 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1145 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1148 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1149 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1152 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1153 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1156 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1157 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1158 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1161 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1162 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1165 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1166 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1167 self.counterparty_node_id
1170 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1171 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1172 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1175 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1176 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1177 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1180 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1181 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1183 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1184 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1185 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1186 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1188 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1192 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1193 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1194 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1197 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1198 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1199 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1202 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1203 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1204 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1206 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1207 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1212 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1213 self.channel_value_satoshis
1216 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1217 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1220 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1221 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1224 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1225 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1226 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1228 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1229 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1230 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1231 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1232 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1234 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1238 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1239 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1240 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1243 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1244 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1245 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1248 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1249 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1250 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1253 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1254 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1255 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1258 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1259 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1260 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1263 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1264 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1265 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1268 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1269 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1270 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1271 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1272 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1275 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1277 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1278 self.prev_config = None;
1282 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1283 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1287 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1288 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1289 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1290 let did_channel_update =
1291 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1292 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1293 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1294 if did_channel_update {
1295 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1296 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1297 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1298 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1300 self.config.options = *config;
1304 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1305 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1306 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1307 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1308 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1311 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1312 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1313 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1314 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1315 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1317 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1318 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1319 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1320 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1321 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1322 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1323 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1325 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1326 where L::Target: Logger
1328 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1329 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1330 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1332 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1333 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1334 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1335 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1337 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1338 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1339 if match update_state {
1340 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1341 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1342 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1343 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1344 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1346 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1350 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1351 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1352 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1354 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1356 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1357 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1358 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1360 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1361 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1362 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1363 transaction_output_index: None
1368 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1369 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1370 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1371 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1372 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1375 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1377 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1378 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1379 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1381 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1382 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1385 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1386 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1389 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1391 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1392 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1393 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1395 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1396 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1402 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1403 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1404 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1405 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1406 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1407 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1408 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1412 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1413 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1415 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1417 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1418 if generated_by_local {
1419 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1420 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1429 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1431 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1432 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1433 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1434 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1435 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1436 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1437 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1440 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1441 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1442 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1443 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1447 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1448 preimages.push(preimage);
1452 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1453 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1455 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1457 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1458 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1460 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1461 if !generated_by_local {
1462 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1470 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1471 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1472 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1473 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1474 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1475 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1476 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1477 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1479 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1481 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1482 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1483 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1484 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1486 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1488 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1489 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1490 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1491 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1494 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1495 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1496 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1497 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1499 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1502 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1503 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1504 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1505 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1507 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1510 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1511 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1516 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1517 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1522 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1524 let channel_parameters =
1525 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1526 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1527 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1534 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1537 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1538 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1539 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1540 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1542 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1543 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1544 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1552 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1553 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1559 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1560 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1561 /// our counterparty!)
1562 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1563 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1564 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1565 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1566 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1567 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1568 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1570 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1574 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1575 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1576 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1577 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1578 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1579 //may see payments to it!
1580 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1581 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1582 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1584 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1587 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1588 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1589 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1590 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1591 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1594 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1595 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1598 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1602 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1603 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1604 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1605 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1606 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1607 // which are near the dust limit.
1608 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1609 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1610 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1611 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1612 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1614 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1615 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1617 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1620 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1621 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1622 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1625 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1626 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1628 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1629 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1630 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1631 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1632 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1633 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1634 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1637 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1640 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1641 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1642 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1644 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1645 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1646 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1647 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1648 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1649 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1651 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1652 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1658 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1659 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1661 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1662 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1663 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1664 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1665 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1666 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1667 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1670 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1673 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1674 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1675 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1677 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1678 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1679 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1680 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1681 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1682 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1684 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1685 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1689 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1690 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1691 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1692 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1693 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1694 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1695 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1697 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1698 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1700 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1707 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1708 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1709 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1710 /// corner case properly.
1711 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1712 -> AvailableBalances
1713 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1715 let context = &self;
1716 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1717 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1718 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1720 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1721 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1722 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1723 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1726 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1728 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1729 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1731 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1733 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1735 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1736 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1740 if context.is_outbound() {
1741 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1742 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1744 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1745 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1747 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1748 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1749 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1750 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1753 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1754 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1755 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1756 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1757 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1758 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1759 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1762 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1763 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1764 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1765 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1766 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1767 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1768 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1769 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1770 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1771 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1772 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1774 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1777 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1778 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1779 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1780 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1781 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1784 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1785 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1787 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1788 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1789 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1791 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1792 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1793 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1794 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1798 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1800 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1801 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1802 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1803 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1804 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1805 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1806 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1808 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1809 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1811 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1812 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1813 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1815 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1816 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1817 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1818 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1819 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1822 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1823 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1824 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1825 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1826 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1827 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1830 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1831 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1832 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1834 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1838 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1839 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1841 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1842 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1846 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1847 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1848 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1849 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1851 outbound_capacity_msat,
1852 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1853 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1858 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1859 let context = &self;
1860 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1863 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1864 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1866 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1867 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1869 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1870 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1872 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1873 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1874 let context = &self;
1875 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1877 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1880 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1881 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1883 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1884 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1886 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1887 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1889 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1890 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1894 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1895 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1901 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1902 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1903 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1906 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1907 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1908 included_htlcs += 1;
1911 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1912 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1916 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1917 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1918 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1919 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1920 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1921 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1926 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1928 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1929 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1934 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1935 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1939 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1940 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1941 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1944 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1945 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1947 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1948 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1949 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1951 total_pending_htlcs,
1952 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1953 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1954 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1956 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1957 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1958 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1960 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1962 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1967 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1968 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1970 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1971 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1973 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1974 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1976 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1977 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1978 let context = &self;
1979 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1981 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1984 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1985 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1987 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1988 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1990 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1991 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1993 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1994 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1998 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1999 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2005 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2006 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2007 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2008 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2009 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2010 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2013 included_htlcs += 1;
2016 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2017 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2020 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2021 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2023 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2024 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2025 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2030 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2031 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2032 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2035 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2036 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2038 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2039 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2041 total_pending_htlcs,
2042 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2043 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2044 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2046 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2047 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2048 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2050 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2052 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2057 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2058 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2059 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2060 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2067 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2069 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2070 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2073 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2075 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2076 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2077 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2081 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2082 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2083 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2086 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2088 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2089 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2092 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2093 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2094 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2095 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2096 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2097 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2098 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2099 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2100 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2101 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2102 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2104 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2105 // return them to fail the payment.
2106 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2107 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2108 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2110 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2111 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2116 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2117 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2118 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2119 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2120 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2121 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2122 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2123 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2124 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2125 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2126 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2127 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2128 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2132 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2134 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2135 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2138 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2139 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2143 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2144 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2145 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2146 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2147 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2148 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2149 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2150 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2151 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2153 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2158 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2159 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2160 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2163 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2164 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2165 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2166 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2169 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2171 next_local_nonce: None,
2175 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2176 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2177 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2178 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2180 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2181 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2182 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2183 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2185 match &self.holder_signer {
2186 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2187 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2188 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2189 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2190 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2193 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2197 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2198 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2199 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2200 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2201 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2202 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2205 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2206 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2208 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2215 // Internal utility functions for channels
2217 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2218 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2219 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2221 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2223 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2224 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2225 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2227 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2230 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2232 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2235 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2236 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2237 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2239 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2241 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2242 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2243 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2244 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2245 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2248 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2249 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2250 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2251 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2252 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2253 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2254 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2257 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2258 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2260 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2261 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2264 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2265 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2266 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2267 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2268 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2269 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2272 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2273 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2274 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2275 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2278 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2279 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2281 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2282 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2283 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2287 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2288 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2289 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2291 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2292 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2293 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2294 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2296 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2297 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2299 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2301 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2302 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2303 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2304 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2306 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2307 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2311 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2317 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2318 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2319 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2320 // outside of those situations will fail.
2321 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2325 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2330 1 + // script length (0)
2334 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2335 2 + // witness marker and flag
2336 1 + // witness element count
2337 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2338 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2339 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2340 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2341 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2342 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2344 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2345 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2346 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2352 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2353 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2354 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2355 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2357 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2358 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2359 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2361 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2362 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2363 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2364 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2365 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2366 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2369 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2370 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2373 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2374 value_to_holder = 0;
2377 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2378 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2379 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2380 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2382 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2383 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2386 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2387 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2390 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2393 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2394 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2396 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2398 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2399 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2400 where L::Target: Logger {
2401 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2402 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2403 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2404 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2405 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2406 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2407 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2408 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2412 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2413 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2414 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2415 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2417 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2418 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2420 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2422 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2423 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2424 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2426 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2427 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2428 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2429 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2430 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2431 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2432 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2434 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2435 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2436 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2438 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2439 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2441 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2444 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2445 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2449 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2453 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2454 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2455 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2456 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2457 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2458 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2461 // Now update local state:
2463 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2464 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2465 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2466 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2467 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2468 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2469 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2473 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2474 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2475 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2476 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2477 // do not not get into this branch.
2478 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2479 match pending_update {
2480 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2481 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2482 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2483 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2484 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2485 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2486 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2489 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2490 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2491 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2492 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2493 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2494 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2495 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2501 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2502 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2503 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2505 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2506 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2507 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2509 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2510 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2513 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2514 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2516 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2517 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2519 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2520 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2523 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2526 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2527 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2528 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2529 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2534 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2535 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2536 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2537 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2538 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2539 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2540 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2541 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2542 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2543 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2544 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2545 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2546 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2547 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2548 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2550 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2551 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2552 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2553 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2554 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2557 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2558 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2559 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2565 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2566 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2568 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2572 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2573 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2574 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2575 /// before we fail backwards.
2577 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2578 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2579 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2580 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2581 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2582 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2583 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2586 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2587 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2588 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2589 /// before we fail backwards.
2591 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2592 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2593 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2594 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2595 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2596 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2597 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2599 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2601 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2602 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2603 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2605 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2606 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2607 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2609 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2610 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2611 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2613 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2618 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2619 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2625 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2626 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2627 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2628 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2629 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2633 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2634 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2635 force_holding_cell = true;
2638 // Now update local state:
2639 if force_holding_cell {
2640 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2641 match pending_update {
2642 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2643 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2644 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2645 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2649 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2650 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2651 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2652 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2658 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2659 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2660 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2666 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2668 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2669 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2672 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2673 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2674 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2679 // Message handlers:
2681 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2682 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2683 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2684 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2685 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>, ChannelError>
2689 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2690 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2692 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2693 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2695 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2696 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2697 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2698 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2701 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2703 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2704 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2705 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2706 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2708 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2709 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2711 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2712 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2714 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2715 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2716 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2717 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2718 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2719 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2723 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2724 initial_commitment_tx,
2727 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2728 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2731 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2732 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2735 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2736 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2737 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2738 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2739 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2740 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2741 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2742 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2743 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2744 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2745 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2746 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2748 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2750 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2751 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2752 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2753 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2754 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2755 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2756 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2758 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2759 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2760 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2762 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2764 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2765 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2767 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2769 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2770 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2774 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2775 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2776 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2777 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2778 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2779 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2780 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2783 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2784 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2786 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2787 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2788 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2789 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2791 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2794 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2795 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2796 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2799 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2800 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2801 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2802 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2803 // when routing outbound payments.
2804 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2808 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2810 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2811 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2813 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2814 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2816 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2817 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2818 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2819 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2820 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2821 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2822 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2823 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2824 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2826 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2827 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2828 let expected_point =
2829 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2830 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2832 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2833 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2834 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2835 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2836 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2837 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2839 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2840 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2841 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2842 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2843 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2845 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2850 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2853 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2854 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2856 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2858 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2861 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2862 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2863 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2864 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2865 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2866 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2868 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2869 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2870 if local_sent_shutdown {
2871 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2873 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2874 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2875 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2878 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2879 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2881 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2882 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2884 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2885 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2887 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2888 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2891 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2892 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2893 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2894 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2896 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2897 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2900 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2901 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2902 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2903 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2904 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2905 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2906 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2907 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2908 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2909 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2910 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2912 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2913 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2914 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2915 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2916 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2917 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2921 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2922 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2925 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2926 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2927 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2929 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2930 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2931 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2932 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2933 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2934 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2935 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2939 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2940 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2941 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2942 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2943 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2944 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2945 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2949 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2950 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2951 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2952 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2953 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2954 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2957 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2958 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2960 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2961 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2962 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2964 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2965 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2969 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2970 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2972 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2977 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2978 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2982 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2983 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2984 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2985 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2986 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2987 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2988 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2989 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2990 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2992 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2993 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2994 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2995 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2996 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2999 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3000 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3001 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3002 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3003 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3006 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3007 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3009 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3010 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3013 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3014 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3015 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3019 // Now update local state:
3020 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3021 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3022 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3023 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3024 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3025 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3026 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3031 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3033 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3034 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3035 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3036 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3037 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3038 None => fail_reason.into(),
3039 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3040 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3041 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3044 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3048 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3049 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3050 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3051 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3053 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3054 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3059 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3062 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3063 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3064 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3066 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3070 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3073 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3074 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3077 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3081 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3085 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3086 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3087 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3089 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3090 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3093 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3097 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3098 where L::Target: Logger
3100 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3101 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3103 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3106 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3107 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3110 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3112 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3114 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3115 let commitment_txid = {
3116 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3117 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3118 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3120 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3121 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3122 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3123 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3124 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3125 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3129 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3131 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3132 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3133 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3134 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3137 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3138 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3139 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3140 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3143 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3145 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3146 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3147 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3148 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3149 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3150 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3151 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3152 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3153 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3154 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3155 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3161 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3162 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3165 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3166 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3167 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3168 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3169 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3170 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3171 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3172 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3173 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3174 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3175 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3176 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3177 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3180 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3181 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3182 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3183 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3184 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3185 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3186 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3188 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3189 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3190 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3191 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3192 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3193 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3194 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3197 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3198 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3201 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3203 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3204 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3205 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3208 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3211 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3212 commitment_stats.tx,
3214 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3215 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3216 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3219 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3220 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3222 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3223 let mut need_commitment = false;
3224 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3225 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3226 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3227 need_commitment = true;
3231 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3232 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3233 Some(forward_info.clone())
3235 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3236 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3237 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3238 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3239 need_commitment = true;
3242 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3243 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3244 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3245 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3246 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3247 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3248 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3249 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3250 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3251 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3252 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3253 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3254 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3255 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3257 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3259 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3260 need_commitment = true;
3264 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3265 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3266 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3267 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3268 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3269 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3271 nondust_htlc_sources,
3275 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3276 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3277 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3278 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3279 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3281 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3282 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3283 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3284 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3285 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3286 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3287 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3288 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3289 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3290 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3291 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3292 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3293 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3294 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3296 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3297 &self.context.channel_id);
3298 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3301 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3302 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3303 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3304 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3305 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3306 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3307 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3308 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3309 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3313 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3314 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3315 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3316 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3319 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3320 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3321 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3322 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3323 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3324 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3325 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3327 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3328 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3329 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3330 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3333 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3334 /// for our counterparty.
3335 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3336 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3337 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3338 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3340 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3341 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3342 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3343 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3345 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3346 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3347 updates: Vec::new(),
3350 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3351 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3352 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3353 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3354 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3355 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3356 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3357 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3358 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3359 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3360 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3361 // to rebalance channels.
3362 match &htlc_update {
3363 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3364 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3365 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3367 match self.send_htlc(
3368 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3369 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3371 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3374 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3375 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3376 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3377 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3378 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3379 // into the holding cell without ever being
3380 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3381 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3382 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3385 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3391 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3392 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3393 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3394 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3395 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3396 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3397 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3398 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3399 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3400 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3401 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3402 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3404 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3405 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3406 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3407 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3408 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3409 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3410 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3411 // for a full revocation before failing.
3412 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3413 update_fail_count += 1;
3416 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3418 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3425 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3426 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3428 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3429 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3434 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3435 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3436 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3437 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3438 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3440 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3441 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3442 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3444 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3445 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3451 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3452 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3453 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3454 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3455 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3456 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3457 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3458 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3459 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3461 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3462 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3464 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3465 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3467 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3468 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3471 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3473 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3474 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3475 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3479 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3480 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3481 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3482 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3483 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3484 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3485 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3486 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3487 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3490 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3492 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3493 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3496 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3497 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3498 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3499 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3501 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3503 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3508 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3509 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3510 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3511 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3512 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3513 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3514 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3515 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3519 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3520 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3521 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3522 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3523 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3524 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3525 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3526 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3527 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3529 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3530 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3533 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3534 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3535 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3536 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3537 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3538 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3539 let mut require_commitment = false;
3540 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3543 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3544 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3545 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3546 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3548 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3549 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3550 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3551 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3552 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3553 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3555 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3559 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3560 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3561 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3562 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3563 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3565 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3566 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3567 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3572 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3573 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3575 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3579 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3580 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3582 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3583 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3584 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3585 require_commitment = true;
3586 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3587 match forward_info {
3588 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3589 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3590 require_commitment = true;
3592 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3593 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3594 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3596 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3597 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3598 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3602 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3603 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3604 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3605 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3611 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3612 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3613 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3614 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3615 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3617 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3618 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3619 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3620 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3621 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3622 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3623 require_commitment = true;
3627 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3629 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3630 match update_state {
3631 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3632 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3633 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3634 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3635 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3636 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3638 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3639 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3640 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3641 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3642 require_commitment = true;
3643 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3644 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3649 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3650 let release_state_str =
3651 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3652 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3653 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3654 if !release_monitor {
3655 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3656 update: monitor_update,
3658 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3660 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3665 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3666 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3667 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3668 if require_commitment {
3669 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3670 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3671 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3672 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3674 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3675 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3676 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3677 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3678 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3680 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3681 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3682 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3683 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3684 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3687 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3688 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3689 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3690 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3691 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3692 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3694 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3695 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3697 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3698 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3700 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3701 if require_commitment {
3702 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3704 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3705 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3706 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3707 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3709 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3710 &self.context.channel_id(),
3711 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3714 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3715 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3717 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3718 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3720 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3721 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3727 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3728 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3729 /// commitment update.
3730 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3731 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3732 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3734 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3735 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3738 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3739 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3740 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3741 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3743 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3744 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3745 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3746 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3747 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3748 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3749 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3751 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3752 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3754 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3755 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3757 if !self.context.is_live() {
3758 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3761 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3762 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3763 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3764 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3765 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3766 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3767 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3768 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3769 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3770 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3774 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3775 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3776 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3777 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3778 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3779 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3782 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3783 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3787 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3788 force_holding_cell = true;
3791 if force_holding_cell {
3792 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3796 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3797 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3799 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3800 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3805 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3806 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3808 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3810 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3811 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3812 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3813 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3817 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3818 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3819 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3823 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3824 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3827 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3828 // will be retransmitted.
3829 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3830 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3831 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3833 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3834 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3836 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3837 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3838 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3839 // this HTLC accordingly
3840 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3843 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3844 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3845 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3846 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3849 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3850 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3851 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3852 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3853 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3854 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3859 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3861 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3862 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3863 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3864 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3868 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3869 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3870 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3871 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3872 // the update upon reconnection.
3873 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3877 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3879 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3880 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3884 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3885 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3886 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3887 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3888 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3889 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3890 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3892 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3893 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3894 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3895 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3896 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3897 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3898 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3900 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3901 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3902 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3903 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3904 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3905 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3906 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3909 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3910 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3911 /// to the remote side.
3912 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3913 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3914 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3915 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3918 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3920 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3921 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3923 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3924 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3925 // first received the funding_signed.
3926 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3927 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3928 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3930 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3931 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3932 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3933 funding_broadcastable = None;
3936 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3937 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3938 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3939 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3940 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3941 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3942 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3943 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3944 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3945 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3946 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3947 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3948 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3949 next_per_commitment_point,
3950 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3954 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3956 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3957 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3958 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3959 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3960 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3961 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3963 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3964 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3965 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3966 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3967 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3968 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3972 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3973 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3975 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3976 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3978 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3979 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3982 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3983 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3984 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3985 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3986 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3987 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3988 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3989 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3990 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3994 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3995 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3997 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3998 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4000 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4001 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4003 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4005 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4006 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4007 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4008 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4009 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4010 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4011 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4012 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4013 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4014 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4016 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4018 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4020 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4026 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4029 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4030 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4031 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4033 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4034 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4036 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4037 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4039 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4040 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4043 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4044 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4045 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4046 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4047 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4049 SignerResumeUpdates {
4057 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4058 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4059 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4060 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4061 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4062 per_commitment_secret,
4063 next_per_commitment_point,
4065 next_local_nonce: None,
4069 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4070 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4071 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4072 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4073 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4074 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4076 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4077 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4078 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4079 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4080 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4081 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4082 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4083 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4084 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4085 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4086 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4091 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4092 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4094 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4095 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4096 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4097 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4098 reason: err_packet.clone()
4101 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4102 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4103 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4104 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4105 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4106 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4109 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4110 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4111 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4112 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4113 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4120 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4121 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4122 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4123 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4127 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4128 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4129 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4130 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4131 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4132 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4133 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4137 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4138 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4139 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4143 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4144 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4149 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4150 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4151 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4152 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4153 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4154 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4155 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4160 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4161 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4163 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4164 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4165 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4166 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4167 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4168 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4169 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4170 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4173 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4175 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4176 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4177 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4178 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4182 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4183 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4187 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4188 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4189 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4190 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4191 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4192 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4195 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4196 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4197 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4198 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4199 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4202 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4203 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4204 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4205 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4206 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4207 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4208 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4209 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4213 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4214 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4215 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4216 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4217 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4218 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4219 our_commitment_transaction
4223 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4224 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4225 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4226 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4228 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4230 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4232 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4233 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4234 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4235 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4236 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4239 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4240 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4241 channel_ready: None,
4242 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4243 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4244 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4248 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4249 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4250 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4251 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4252 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4253 next_per_commitment_point,
4254 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4256 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4257 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4258 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4262 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4263 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4264 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4266 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4267 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4268 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4271 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4274 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4276 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4277 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4278 our_commitment_transaction
4282 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4283 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4284 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4285 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4286 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4287 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4288 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4290 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4292 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4293 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4294 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4295 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4296 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4297 next_per_commitment_point,
4298 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4302 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4303 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4304 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4306 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4309 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4310 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4311 raa: required_revoke,
4312 commitment_update: None,
4313 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4315 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4316 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4317 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4319 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4322 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4323 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4324 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4325 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4326 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4327 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4330 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4331 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4332 raa: required_revoke,
4333 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4334 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4337 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4338 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4339 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4340 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4341 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4344 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4345 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4346 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4347 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4352 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4353 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4354 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4355 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4357 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4359 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4361 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4362 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4363 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4364 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4365 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4366 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4367 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4368 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4370 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4371 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4372 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4373 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4374 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4376 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4377 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4378 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4379 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4382 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4383 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4384 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4385 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4386 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4387 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4388 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4389 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4390 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4391 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4392 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4393 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4394 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4395 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4396 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4398 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4401 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4402 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4405 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4406 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4407 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4408 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4409 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4410 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4413 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4414 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4415 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4416 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4417 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4418 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4419 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4421 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4427 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4428 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4429 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4430 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4432 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4433 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4434 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4435 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4436 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4437 return Ok((None, None, None));
4440 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4441 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4442 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4444 return Ok((None, None, None));
4447 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4448 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4449 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4450 return Ok((None, None, None));
4453 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4455 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4456 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4457 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4458 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4460 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4461 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4463 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4464 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4466 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4467 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4468 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4469 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4471 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4472 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4473 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4477 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4483 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4484 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4486 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4487 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4490 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4491 /// within our expected timeframe.
4493 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4494 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4495 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4498 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4501 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4502 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4506 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4507 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4509 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4510 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4512 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4513 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4514 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4515 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4516 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4518 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4519 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4520 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4523 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4525 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4526 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4529 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4530 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4531 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4534 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4537 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4538 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4539 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4540 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4542 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4545 assert!(send_shutdown);
4546 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4547 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4548 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4550 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4551 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4553 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4558 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4560 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4561 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4563 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4564 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4565 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4566 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4567 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4568 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4571 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4572 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4574 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4575 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4576 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4577 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4581 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4582 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4583 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4584 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4585 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4586 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4588 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4589 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4596 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4597 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4599 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4602 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4603 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4605 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4607 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4608 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4609 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4610 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4611 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4612 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4613 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4614 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4615 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4617 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4618 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4621 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4625 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4626 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4627 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4628 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4630 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4631 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4633 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4634 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4636 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4637 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4639 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4640 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4643 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4647 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4648 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4649 return Ok((None, None, None));
4652 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4653 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4654 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4655 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4657 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4659 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4662 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4663 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4664 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4665 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4666 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4670 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4671 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4672 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4676 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4677 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4678 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4679 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4680 monitor_update: None,
4681 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4682 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4684 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4685 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4686 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4687 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4691 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4693 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4694 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4695 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4696 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4698 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4701 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4702 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4704 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4705 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4706 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4707 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4708 monitor_update: None,
4709 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4710 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4712 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4713 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4714 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4715 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4720 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4721 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4722 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4723 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4725 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4726 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4727 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4729 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4731 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4738 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4739 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4740 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4742 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4743 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4745 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4746 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4749 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4750 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4751 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4752 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4753 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4755 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4756 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4757 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4759 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4760 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4763 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4764 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4765 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4766 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4767 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4768 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4769 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4770 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4772 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4775 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4776 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4777 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4778 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4780 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4784 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4785 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4786 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4787 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4789 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4795 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4796 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4797 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4798 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4799 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4800 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4801 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4803 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4804 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4807 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4809 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4810 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4816 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4817 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4818 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4819 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4820 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4821 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4822 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4824 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4825 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4832 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4833 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4836 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4837 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4840 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4841 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4845 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
4846 &self.context.holder_signer
4850 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4852 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4853 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4854 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4855 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4856 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4857 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4859 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4861 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4869 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4870 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4874 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4875 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4876 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4877 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4880 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4881 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4882 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4883 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4886 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4887 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4888 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4889 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4890 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4891 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4894 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4895 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4896 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4897 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4898 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4899 if !release_monitor {
4900 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4909 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4910 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4913 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4914 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4915 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4917 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4918 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4919 if self.context.channel_state &
4920 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4921 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4922 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4923 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4924 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4927 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4928 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4929 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4930 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4931 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4932 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4934 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4935 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4936 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4938 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4939 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4940 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4941 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4942 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4943 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4949 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4950 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4951 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4954 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4955 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4956 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4959 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4960 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4961 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4964 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4965 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4966 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4967 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4968 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4969 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4974 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4975 self.context.channel_update_status
4978 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4979 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4980 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4983 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4985 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4986 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4987 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4991 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4992 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4993 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4996 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5000 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5001 // channel_ready yet.
5002 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5006 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5007 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5008 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5009 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5010 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5012 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5013 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5014 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5016 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5017 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5020 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5021 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5022 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5023 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5024 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5025 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5026 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5027 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5028 self.context.channel_state);
5030 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5034 if need_commitment_update {
5035 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5036 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5037 let next_per_commitment_point =
5038 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5039 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5040 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5041 next_per_commitment_point,
5042 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5046 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5052 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5053 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5054 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5055 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5056 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5057 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5058 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5060 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5063 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5064 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5065 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5066 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5067 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5068 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5069 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5070 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5071 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5072 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5073 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5074 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5075 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5076 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5077 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5078 // channel and move on.
5079 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5080 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5082 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5083 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5084 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5086 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5087 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5088 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5089 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5090 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5091 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5092 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5093 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5098 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5099 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5100 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5101 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5102 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5105 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5106 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5107 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5108 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5109 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5110 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5113 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5114 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5115 // may have already happened for this block).
5116 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5117 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5118 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5119 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5122 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5123 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5124 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5125 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5133 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5134 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5135 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5136 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5138 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5139 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5142 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5144 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5145 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5146 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5147 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5149 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5152 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5155 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5156 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5157 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5158 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5160 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5163 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5164 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5165 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5167 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5168 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5170 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5171 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5172 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5180 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5182 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5183 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5184 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5186 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5187 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5190 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5191 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5192 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5193 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5194 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5195 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5196 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5197 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5198 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5201 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5202 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5203 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5204 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5206 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5207 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5208 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5210 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5211 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5212 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5213 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5215 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5216 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5217 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5218 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5219 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5220 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5221 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5224 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5225 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5227 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5230 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5231 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5232 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5233 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5234 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5235 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5236 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5237 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5238 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5239 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5240 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5241 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5242 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5243 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5244 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5245 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5246 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5252 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5257 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5258 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5260 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5261 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5262 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5263 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5265 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5268 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5270 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5271 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5272 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5273 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5274 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5275 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5277 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5278 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5281 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5282 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5283 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5284 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5285 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5286 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5288 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5289 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5292 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5293 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5294 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5295 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5296 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5302 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5303 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5304 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5305 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5307 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5310 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5314 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5318 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5319 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5323 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5327 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5328 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5331 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5335 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5337 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5342 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5343 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5344 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5346 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5351 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5353 None => return None,
5356 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5358 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5359 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5361 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5362 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5365 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5371 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5373 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5374 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5375 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5376 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5377 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5378 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5379 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5381 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5382 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5383 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5384 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5385 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5386 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5387 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5388 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5389 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5390 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5391 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5392 contents: announcement,
5395 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5400 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5404 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5405 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5406 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5407 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5408 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5409 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5410 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5411 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5413 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5415 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5416 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5417 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5418 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5420 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5421 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5422 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5423 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5426 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5427 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5428 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5429 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5432 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5435 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5436 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5437 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5438 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5439 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5440 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5443 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5445 Err(_) => return None,
5447 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5448 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5453 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5454 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5455 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5456 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5457 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5458 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5459 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5460 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5461 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5462 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5463 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5464 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5465 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5466 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5467 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5468 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5471 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5474 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5475 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5476 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5477 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5478 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5479 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5480 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5481 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5482 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5484 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5485 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5486 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5487 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5488 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5489 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5490 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5491 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5492 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5494 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5495 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5496 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5497 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5498 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5499 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5500 next_funding_txid: None,
5505 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5507 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5508 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5509 /// commitment update.
5511 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5512 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5513 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5514 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5515 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5516 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5517 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5520 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5521 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5522 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5524 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5525 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5530 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5531 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5533 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5535 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5536 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5538 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5539 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5540 /// regenerate them.
5542 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5543 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5545 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5546 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5547 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5548 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5549 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5550 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5551 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5552 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5554 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5555 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5557 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5558 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5559 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5562 if amount_msat == 0 {
5563 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5566 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5567 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5568 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5569 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5572 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5573 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5574 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5577 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5578 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5579 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5580 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5581 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5582 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5583 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5584 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5587 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5588 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5589 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5590 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5591 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5592 else { "to peer" });
5594 if need_holding_cell {
5595 force_holding_cell = true;
5598 // Now update local state:
5599 if force_holding_cell {
5600 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5605 onion_routing_packet,
5612 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5613 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5615 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5617 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5623 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5624 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5625 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5629 onion_routing_packet,
5633 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5638 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5639 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5640 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5641 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5643 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5644 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5645 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5647 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5648 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5652 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5653 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5654 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5655 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5656 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5657 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5658 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5661 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5662 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5663 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5664 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5665 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5666 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5669 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5671 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5672 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5673 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5674 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5675 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5677 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5678 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5681 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5682 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5683 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5684 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5685 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5686 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5687 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5688 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5689 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5690 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5691 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5694 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5698 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5699 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5700 where L::Target: Logger
5702 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5703 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5704 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5708 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5709 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5710 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5711 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5712 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5713 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5714 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5715 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5716 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5717 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5718 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5724 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5727 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5728 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5729 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5730 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5731 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5732 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5734 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5735 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5736 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5738 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5739 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5740 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5743 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5744 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5748 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5749 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5751 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5753 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5754 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5755 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5756 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5758 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5759 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5760 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5761 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5762 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
5763 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5767 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5768 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5772 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5773 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5775 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5781 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5782 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5784 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5785 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5786 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5787 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5788 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5789 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5790 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5791 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5793 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5794 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
5795 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5798 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5799 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5800 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5806 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5808 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5809 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5810 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5811 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5812 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5814 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5816 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5822 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5823 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5825 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5826 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5827 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5828 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5829 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5831 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5832 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5833 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5836 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5837 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5838 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5840 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5841 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5844 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5845 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5847 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5848 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5849 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5852 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5853 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5854 let mut chan_closed = false;
5855 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5859 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5861 None if !chan_closed => {
5862 // use override shutdown script if provided
5863 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5864 Some(script) => script,
5866 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5867 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5868 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5869 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5873 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5874 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5876 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5882 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5883 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5884 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5885 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5886 monitor_update: None,
5887 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5888 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5890 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5891 Some(shutdown_result)
5893 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5896 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5898 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5899 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5900 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5901 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5902 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5903 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5906 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5907 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5909 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5910 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5911 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5914 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5915 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5916 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5917 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5918 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5920 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5921 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5928 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5929 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5931 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5934 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5935 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5936 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5938 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5939 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5943 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5947 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5948 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5949 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5950 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5953 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5954 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5955 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5956 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5957 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
5958 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5959 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5960 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5962 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5963 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5964 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5965 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5967 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5968 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5970 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5971 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5973 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5974 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5975 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5977 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5978 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5980 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5981 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5982 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5983 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5984 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5987 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5988 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5990 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5991 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5993 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5995 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5997 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5998 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5999 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6000 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6003 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6004 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6006 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6007 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6008 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6009 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6013 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6014 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6015 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6019 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6020 Ok(script) => script,
6021 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6024 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6027 context: ChannelContext {
6030 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6031 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6032 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6033 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6038 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6040 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6041 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6042 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
6043 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6045 channel_value_satoshis,
6047 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6049 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6050 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6053 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6054 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6057 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6058 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6059 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6060 pending_update_fee: None,
6061 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6062 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6063 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6064 update_time_counter: 1,
6066 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6068 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6069 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6070 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6071 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6072 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6073 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6075 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6076 signer_pending_funding: false,
6078 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6079 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6080 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6081 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6083 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6084 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6085 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6086 closing_fee_limits: None,
6087 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6089 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6090 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6091 short_channel_id: None,
6092 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6094 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6095 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6096 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6097 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6098 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6099 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6100 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6101 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6102 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6103 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6104 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6105 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6107 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6109 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6110 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6111 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6112 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6113 counterparty_parameters: None,
6114 funding_outpoint: None,
6115 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6117 funding_transaction: None,
6118 is_batch_funding: None,
6120 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6121 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6122 counterparty_node_id,
6124 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6126 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6128 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6129 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6131 announcement_sigs: None,
6133 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6134 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6135 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6136 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6138 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6139 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6141 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6142 outbound_scid_alias,
6144 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6145 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6147 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6148 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6153 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6155 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6159 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6160 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6161 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6162 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6163 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6164 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6165 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6166 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6167 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6168 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6169 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6171 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6172 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6174 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6175 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6176 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6177 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6180 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6181 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6183 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6185 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6186 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6188 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6189 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6190 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6191 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6192 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6193 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6196 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6197 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6199 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6200 if funding_created.is_none() {
6201 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6202 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6203 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6207 let channel = Channel {
6208 context: self.context,
6211 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6214 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6215 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6216 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6217 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6218 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6219 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6220 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6221 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6222 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6223 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6226 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6227 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6228 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6229 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6230 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6231 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6237 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6238 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6239 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6240 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6241 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6242 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6244 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6246 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6247 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6248 // We've exhausted our options
6251 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6252 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6255 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6256 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6257 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6258 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6260 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6261 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6262 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6263 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6264 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6265 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6267 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6269 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6270 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6273 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6274 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6275 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6277 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6278 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6281 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6282 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6285 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6286 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6290 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6291 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6292 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6293 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6294 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6295 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6296 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6297 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6298 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6299 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6300 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6301 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6302 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6303 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6304 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6305 first_per_commitment_point,
6306 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6307 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6308 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6309 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6311 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6316 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6317 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6319 // Check sanity of message fields:
6320 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6323 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6324 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6326 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6327 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6329 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6330 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6332 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6333 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6335 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6336 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6337 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6339 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6340 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6341 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6343 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6344 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6345 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6347 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6350 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6351 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6354 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6355 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6356 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6358 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6359 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6361 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6362 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6364 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6365 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6367 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6368 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6370 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6371 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6373 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6377 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6378 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6381 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6382 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6384 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6385 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6388 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6389 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6392 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6393 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6394 &Some(ref script) => {
6395 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6396 if script.len() == 0 {
6399 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6400 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6402 Some(script.clone())
6405 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6407 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6412 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6413 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6414 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6415 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6416 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6418 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6419 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6421 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6424 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6425 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6426 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6427 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6428 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6429 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6432 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6433 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6434 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6437 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6438 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6440 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6441 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6447 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6448 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6449 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6450 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6453 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6454 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6455 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6456 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6457 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6458 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6459 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6460 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6461 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6462 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6463 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6466 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6468 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6469 // support this channel type.
6470 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6471 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6472 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6475 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6476 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6477 // `static_remote_key`.
6478 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6479 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6481 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6482 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6485 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6486 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6488 channel_type.clone()
6490 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6491 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6492 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6497 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6498 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6499 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6500 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6501 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6502 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6503 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6504 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6505 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6508 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6509 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6512 // Check sanity of message fields:
6513 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6514 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6516 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6517 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6519 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6520 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6522 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6523 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6524 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6526 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6527 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6529 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6530 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6532 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6534 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6535 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6536 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6538 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6539 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6541 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6542 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6545 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6546 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6547 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6549 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6550 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6552 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6553 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6555 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6556 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6558 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6559 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6561 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6562 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6564 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6565 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6568 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6570 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6571 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6576 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6577 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6578 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6579 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6580 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6582 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6583 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6585 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6586 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6587 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6589 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6590 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6593 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6594 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6595 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6596 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6600 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6601 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6602 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6603 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6606 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6607 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6608 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6609 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6610 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6613 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6614 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6615 &Some(ref script) => {
6616 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6617 if script.len() == 0 {
6620 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6621 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6623 Some(script.clone())
6626 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6628 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6633 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6634 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6635 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6636 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6640 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6641 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6642 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6646 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6647 Ok(script) => script,
6648 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6651 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6652 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6654 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6657 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6661 context: ChannelContext {
6664 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6665 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6667 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6672 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6674 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6675 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6676 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6677 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6680 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6682 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6683 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6686 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6687 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6688 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6690 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6691 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6692 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6693 pending_update_fee: None,
6694 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6695 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6696 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6697 update_time_counter: 1,
6699 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6701 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6702 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6703 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6704 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6705 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6706 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6708 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6709 signer_pending_funding: false,
6711 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6712 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6713 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6714 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6716 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6717 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6718 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6719 closing_fee_limits: None,
6720 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6722 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6723 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6724 short_channel_id: None,
6725 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6727 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6728 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6729 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6730 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6731 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6732 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6733 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6734 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6735 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6736 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6737 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6738 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6741 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6743 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6744 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6745 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6746 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6747 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6748 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6749 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6751 funding_outpoint: None,
6752 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6754 funding_transaction: None,
6755 is_batch_funding: None,
6757 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6758 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6759 counterparty_node_id,
6761 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6763 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6765 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6766 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6768 announcement_sigs: None,
6770 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6771 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6772 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6773 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6775 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6776 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6778 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6779 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6781 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6782 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6784 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6785 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6790 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6792 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6798 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6799 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6801 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6802 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6803 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6804 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6806 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6807 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6809 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6810 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6813 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6816 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6817 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6818 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6820 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6821 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6822 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6823 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6825 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6826 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6827 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6828 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6829 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6830 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6831 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6832 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6833 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6834 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6835 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6836 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6837 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6838 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6839 first_per_commitment_point,
6840 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6841 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6842 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6844 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6846 next_local_nonce: None,
6850 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6851 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6853 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6855 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6856 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6859 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6860 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6862 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6863 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6864 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6865 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6866 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6867 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6868 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6869 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6870 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6871 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6872 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6874 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6877 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6878 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6879 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6883 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6884 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6886 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6887 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6888 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6890 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6892 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6893 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6894 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6895 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6898 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6899 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6900 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6901 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6902 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6904 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6906 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6907 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6908 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6911 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6912 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6913 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6917 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6918 initial_commitment_tx,
6921 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6922 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6925 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6926 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6929 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6931 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6932 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6933 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6934 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6936 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6938 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6939 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6940 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6941 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6942 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6943 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6944 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6945 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6946 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6947 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6948 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6950 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6952 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6953 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6954 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6955 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6956 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6957 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6959 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6960 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6962 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6963 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6964 let mut channel = Channel {
6965 context: self.context,
6967 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6968 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6970 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6974 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6975 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6977 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6983 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6984 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6985 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6986 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6987 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6989 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6990 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6991 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6992 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6998 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6999 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7000 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7001 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7002 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7003 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7008 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7009 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7010 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7011 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7013 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7014 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7015 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7016 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7021 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7022 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7023 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7024 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7025 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7026 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7031 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7032 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7033 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7036 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7038 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7039 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7040 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7041 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7042 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7044 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7045 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7046 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7047 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7049 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7050 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
7051 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7053 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7055 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7056 // deserialized from that format.
7057 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7058 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7059 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7061 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7063 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7064 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7065 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7067 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7068 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7069 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7070 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7073 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7074 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7075 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7078 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7079 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7080 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7081 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7083 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7084 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7086 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7088 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7090 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7092 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7095 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7097 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7102 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7103 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7104 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7106 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7107 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7108 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7109 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7110 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7111 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7112 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7114 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7116 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7118 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7121 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7122 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7123 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7126 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7128 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7129 preimages.push(preimage);
7131 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7132 reason.write(writer)?;
7134 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7136 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7137 preimages.push(preimage);
7139 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7140 reason.write(writer)?;
7143 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7144 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7145 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7147 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7148 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7149 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7151 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7154 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7155 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7156 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7157 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7159 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7160 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7161 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7164 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7165 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7166 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7167 source.write(writer)?;
7168 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7170 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7171 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7172 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7174 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7175 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7177 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7179 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7181 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7182 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7184 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7186 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7187 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7192 match self.context.resend_order {
7193 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7194 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7197 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7198 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7199 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7201 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7202 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7203 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7204 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7207 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7208 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7209 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7210 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7211 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7214 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7215 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7216 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7217 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7219 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7220 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7221 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7223 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7225 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7226 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7227 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7228 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7230 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7231 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7232 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7233 // consider the stale state on reload.
7236 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7237 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7238 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7240 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7241 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7242 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7244 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7245 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7247 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7248 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7249 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7251 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7252 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7254 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7257 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7258 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7259 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7261 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7264 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7265 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7267 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7268 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7269 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7271 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7273 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7275 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7277 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7278 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7279 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7280 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7281 htlc.write(writer)?;
7284 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7285 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7286 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7288 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7289 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7291 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7292 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7293 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7294 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7295 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7296 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7297 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7299 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7300 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7301 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7302 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7303 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7305 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7306 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7308 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7309 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7310 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7311 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7313 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7315 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7316 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7317 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7318 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7319 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7320 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7321 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7323 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7324 (2, chan_type, option),
7325 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7326 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7327 (5, self.context.config, required),
7328 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7329 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7330 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7331 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7332 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7333 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7334 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7335 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7336 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7337 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7338 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7339 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7340 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7341 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7342 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7343 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7344 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7345 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7346 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7347 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7348 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7355 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7356 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7358 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7359 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7361 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7362 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7363 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7365 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7366 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7367 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7368 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7370 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7372 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7373 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7374 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7375 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7376 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7378 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7379 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7382 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7383 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7384 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7386 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7388 let mut keys_data = None;
7390 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7391 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7392 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7393 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7394 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7395 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7396 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7397 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7398 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7399 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7403 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7404 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7405 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7408 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7410 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7411 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7412 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7414 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7416 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7417 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7418 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7419 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7420 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7421 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7422 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7423 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7424 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7425 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7426 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7427 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7428 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7433 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7434 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7435 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7436 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7437 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7438 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7439 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7440 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7441 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7442 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7443 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7444 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7446 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7447 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7450 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7454 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7455 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7457 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7459 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7460 blinding_point: None,
7464 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7465 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7466 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7467 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7468 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7469 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7470 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7471 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7472 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7473 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7474 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7475 blinding_point: None,
7477 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7478 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7479 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7481 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7482 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7483 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7485 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7489 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7490 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7491 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7492 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7495 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7496 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7497 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7499 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7500 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7501 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7502 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7505 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7506 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7507 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7508 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7511 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7513 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7515 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7516 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7517 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7518 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7520 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7521 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7522 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7523 // consider the stale state on reload.
7524 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7527 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7528 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7529 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7531 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7534 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7535 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7536 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7538 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7539 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7540 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7541 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7543 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7544 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7546 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7547 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7549 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7550 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7551 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7553 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7555 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7556 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7558 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7559 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7562 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7564 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7565 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7566 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7567 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7569 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7572 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7573 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7575 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7577 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7578 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7580 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7581 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7583 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7585 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7586 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7587 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7589 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7590 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7591 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7595 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7596 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7597 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7599 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7605 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7606 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7607 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7608 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7609 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7610 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7611 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7612 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7613 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7614 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7616 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7617 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7618 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7619 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7620 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7621 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7622 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7624 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7625 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7626 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7627 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7629 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7631 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7632 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7634 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7636 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
7637 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
7639 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7640 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7641 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7642 (2, channel_type, option),
7643 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7644 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7645 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7646 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7647 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7648 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7649 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7650 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7651 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7652 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7653 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7654 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7655 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7656 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7657 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7658 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7659 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7660 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7661 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7662 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7663 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7664 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7665 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
7666 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
7669 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7670 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7671 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7672 // required channel parameters.
7673 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7674 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7675 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7677 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7679 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7680 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7681 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7682 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7685 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7686 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7687 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7689 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7690 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7692 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7693 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7698 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7699 if iter.next().is_some() {
7700 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7704 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7705 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7706 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7707 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7708 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7711 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7712 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7713 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7715 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7716 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7718 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7719 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7720 // separate u64 values.
7721 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7723 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7725 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7726 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7727 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7728 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7730 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7731 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7733 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7734 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7735 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7736 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7737 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7740 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7741 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7743 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
7744 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
7745 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7746 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7748 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
7749 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7751 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
7752 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
7753 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7754 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
7755 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7758 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
7759 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7763 context: ChannelContext {
7766 config: config.unwrap(),
7770 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7771 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7772 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7775 temporary_channel_id,
7777 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7779 channel_value_satoshis,
7781 latest_monitor_update_id,
7783 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7784 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7787 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7788 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7791 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7792 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7793 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7794 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7798 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7799 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7800 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7801 monitor_pending_forwards,
7802 monitor_pending_failures,
7803 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7805 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7806 signer_pending_funding: false,
7809 holding_cell_update_fee,
7810 next_holder_htlc_id,
7811 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7812 update_time_counter,
7815 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7816 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7817 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7818 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7820 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7821 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7822 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7823 closing_fee_limits: None,
7824 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7826 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7827 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7829 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7831 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7832 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7833 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7834 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7835 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7836 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7837 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7838 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7839 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7842 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7844 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7845 funding_transaction,
7848 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7849 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7850 counterparty_node_id,
7852 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7856 channel_update_status,
7857 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7861 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7862 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7863 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7864 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7866 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7867 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7869 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7870 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7871 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7873 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7874 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7876 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7877 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7879 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7882 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7891 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7892 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
7893 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7894 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7895 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7896 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
7897 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
7898 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7899 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7900 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7901 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7902 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
7903 use crate::ln::msgs;
7904 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7905 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7906 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7907 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7908 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7909 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7910 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7911 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
7912 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7913 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7914 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
7915 use crate::util::test_utils;
7916 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7917 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7918 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7919 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7920 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7921 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7922 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7923 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7924 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
7925 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
7926 use crate::prelude::*;
7928 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7931 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7932 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7938 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7939 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7940 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7941 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7945 signer: InMemorySigner,
7948 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7949 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7952 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7953 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
7955 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
7957 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7958 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7961 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
7965 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7967 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
7968 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7969 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7970 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7971 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
7974 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7975 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7976 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7977 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7981 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7982 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7983 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7987 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7988 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7989 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
7990 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
7993 let seed = [42; 32];
7994 let network = Network::Testnet;
7995 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7996 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7997 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8000 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8001 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8002 let config = UserConfig::default();
8003 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8004 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8005 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8007 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8008 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8012 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8013 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8015 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8016 let original_fee = 253;
8017 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8018 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8019 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8020 let seed = [42; 32];
8021 let network = Network::Testnet;
8022 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8024 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8025 let config = UserConfig::default();
8026 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8028 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8029 // same as the old fee.
8030 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8031 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8032 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8036 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8037 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8038 // dust limits are used.
8039 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8040 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8041 let seed = [42; 32];
8042 let network = Network::Testnet;
8043 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8044 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8045 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8047 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8048 // they have different dust limits.
8050 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8051 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8052 let config = UserConfig::default();
8053 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8055 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8056 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8057 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8058 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8059 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8061 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8062 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8063 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8064 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8065 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8067 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8068 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8069 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8070 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8072 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8073 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8074 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8076 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8077 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8079 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8080 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8081 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8083 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8084 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8085 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8086 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8089 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8091 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8092 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8093 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8094 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8095 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8096 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8097 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8098 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8099 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8101 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8102 blinding_point: None,
8105 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8106 // the dust limit check.
8107 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8108 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8109 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8110 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8112 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8113 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8114 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8115 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8116 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8117 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8118 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8122 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8123 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8124 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8125 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8126 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8127 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8128 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8129 let seed = [42; 32];
8130 let network = Network::Testnet;
8131 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8133 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8134 let config = UserConfig::default();
8135 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8137 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8138 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8140 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8141 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8142 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8143 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8144 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8145 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8147 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8148 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8149 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8150 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8151 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8153 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8155 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8156 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8157 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8158 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8159 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8161 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8162 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8163 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8164 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8165 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8169 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8170 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8171 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8172 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8173 let seed = [42; 32];
8174 let network = Network::Testnet;
8175 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8176 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8177 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8179 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8181 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8182 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8183 let config = UserConfig::default();
8184 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8186 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8187 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8188 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8189 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8191 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8192 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8193 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8195 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8196 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8197 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8198 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8200 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8201 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8202 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8204 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8205 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8207 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8208 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8209 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8210 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8211 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8212 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8213 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8215 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8217 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8218 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8219 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8220 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8221 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8225 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8226 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8227 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8228 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8229 let seed = [42; 32];
8230 let network = Network::Testnet;
8231 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8232 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8233 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8235 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8236 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8237 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8238 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8239 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8240 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8241 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8242 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8244 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8245 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8246 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8247 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8248 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8249 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8251 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8252 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8253 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8254 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8256 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8258 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8259 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8260 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8261 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8262 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8263 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8265 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8266 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8267 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8268 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8270 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8271 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8272 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8273 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8274 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8276 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8277 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8279 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8280 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8281 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8283 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8284 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8285 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8286 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8287 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8289 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8290 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8292 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8293 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8294 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8298 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8300 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8301 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8302 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8304 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8305 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8306 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8307 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8309 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8310 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8311 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8313 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8315 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8316 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8319 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8320 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8321 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8322 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8323 let seed = [42; 32];
8324 let network = Network::Testnet;
8325 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8326 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8327 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8330 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8331 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8332 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8334 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8335 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8337 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8338 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8339 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8341 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8342 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8344 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8346 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8347 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8349 // Channel Negotiations failed
8350 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8351 assert!(result.is_err());
8356 fn channel_update() {
8357 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8358 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8359 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8360 let seed = [42; 32];
8361 let network = Network::Testnet;
8362 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8363 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8364 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8366 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8367 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8368 let config = UserConfig::default();
8369 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8371 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8372 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8373 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8374 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8375 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8377 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8378 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8379 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8380 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8381 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8383 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8384 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8385 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8386 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8388 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8389 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8390 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8392 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8393 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8395 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8396 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8397 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8399 short_channel_id: 0,
8402 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8403 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8404 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8406 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8407 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8409 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8411 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8413 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8414 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8415 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8416 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8418 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8419 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8420 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8422 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8425 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8429 fn blinding_point_ser() {
8430 // Ensure that channel blinding points are (de)serialized properly.
8431 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8432 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8433 let seed = [42; 32];
8434 let network = Network::Testnet;
8435 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8437 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8438 let config = UserConfig::default();
8439 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8440 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8441 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8443 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8445 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8446 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8447 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8448 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8452 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8453 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8454 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8456 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8459 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8461 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8462 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8463 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8464 blinding_point: None,
8466 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8467 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8469 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8472 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8474 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8477 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8478 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8479 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8481 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8482 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8485 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8486 blinding_point: None,
8488 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8489 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8492 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(10);
8495 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8496 } else if i % 3 == 1 {
8497 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8499 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8500 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = &mut dummy_add {
8501 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8503 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8506 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8508 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8509 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8510 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8511 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8512 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8513 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8514 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8515 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8518 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8520 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8521 use bitcoin::sighash;
8522 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8523 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8524 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8525 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8526 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8527 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
8528 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8529 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8530 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8531 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8532 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8533 use crate::sync::Arc;
8534 use core::str::FromStr;
8535 use hex::DisplayHex;
8537 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8538 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8539 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8540 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8542 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8544 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8545 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8546 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8547 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8548 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8550 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8551 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8557 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8558 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8559 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8561 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8562 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8563 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8564 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8565 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8566 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8568 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8570 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8571 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8572 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
8573 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8574 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
8575 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
8577 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8578 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8579 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8580 selected_contest_delay: 144
8582 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8583 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8585 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8586 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8588 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8589 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8591 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
8592 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8594 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8595 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8596 // build_commitment_transaction.
8597 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8598 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8599 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8600 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8601 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8603 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8604 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8605 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8606 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8610 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8611 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8612 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8613 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8617 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8618 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8619 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8621 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8622 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8624 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8625 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8627 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8629 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8630 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8631 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8632 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8633 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8634 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
8635 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8637 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8638 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8639 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8640 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8642 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8643 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8644 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8646 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8648 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8649 commitment_tx.clone(),
8650 counterparty_signature,
8651 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8652 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8653 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8655 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8656 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8658 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8659 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8660 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8662 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8663 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8666 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8667 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8669 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8670 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8671 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8672 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8673 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8674 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8675 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8676 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8678 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8681 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
8682 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8683 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8687 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8690 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8691 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8692 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8693 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8694 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8695 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8697 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8698 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8699 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8700 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8702 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8703 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8704 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8705 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8706 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8708 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8709 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8710 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8711 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8712 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
8713 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8715 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8719 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8720 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8721 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8722 "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", {});
8724 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8725 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8727 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8728 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8729 "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", {});
8731 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8732 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8733 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8734 "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", {});
8736 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8737 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8739 amount_msat: 1000000,
8741 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8742 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8744 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8747 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8748 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8750 amount_msat: 2000000,
8752 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8753 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8755 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8758 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8759 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8761 amount_msat: 2000000,
8763 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8764 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8765 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8766 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8767 blinding_point: None,
8769 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8772 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8773 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8775 amount_msat: 3000000,
8777 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8778 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8779 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8780 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8781 blinding_point: None,
8783 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8786 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8787 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8789 amount_msat: 4000000,
8791 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8792 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8794 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8798 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8799 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8800 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8802 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8803 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8804 "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", {
8807 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8808 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8809 "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" },
8812 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8813 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8814 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8817 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8818 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8819 "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" },
8822 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8823 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8824 "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" },
8827 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8828 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8829 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8832 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8833 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8834 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8836 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8837 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8838 "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", {
8841 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8842 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8843 "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" },
8846 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8847 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8848 "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" },
8851 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8852 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8853 "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" },
8856 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8857 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8858 "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" },
8861 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8862 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8863 "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" }
8866 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8867 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8868 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8870 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8871 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8872 "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", {
8875 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8876 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8877 "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" },
8880 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8881 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8882 "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" },
8885 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8886 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8887 "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" },
8890 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8891 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8892 "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" }
8895 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8896 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8897 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8898 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8900 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8901 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8902 "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", {
8905 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8906 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8907 "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" },
8910 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8911 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8912 "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" },
8915 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8916 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8917 "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" },
8920 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8921 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8922 "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" }
8925 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8926 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8927 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8928 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8930 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8931 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8932 "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", {
8935 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8936 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8937 "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" },
8940 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8941 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8942 "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" },
8945 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8946 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8947 "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" },
8950 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8951 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8952 "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" }
8955 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8956 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8957 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8959 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8960 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8961 "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", {
8964 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8965 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8966 "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" },
8969 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8970 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8971 "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" },
8974 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8975 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8976 "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" }
8979 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8980 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8981 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8983 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8984 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8985 "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", {
8988 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8989 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8990 "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" },
8993 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8994 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8995 "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" },
8998 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8999 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9000 "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" }
9003 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9004 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9005 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9007 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9008 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9009 "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", {
9012 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9013 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9014 "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" },
9017 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9018 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9019 "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" }
9022 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9023 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9024 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9025 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9026 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9027 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9029 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9030 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9031 "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", {
9034 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9035 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9036 "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" },
9039 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9040 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9041 "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" }
9044 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9045 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9046 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9047 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9048 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9050 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9051 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9052 "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", {
9055 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9056 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9057 "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" },
9060 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9061 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9062 "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" }
9065 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9066 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9067 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9069 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9070 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9071 "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", {
9074 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9075 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9076 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9079 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9080 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9081 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9082 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9083 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9085 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9086 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9087 "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", {
9090 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9091 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9092 "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" }
9095 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9096 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9097 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9098 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9099 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9101 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9102 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9103 "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", {
9106 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9107 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9108 "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" }
9111 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9112 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9113 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9114 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9116 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9117 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9118 "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", {});
9120 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9121 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9122 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9123 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9124 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9126 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9127 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9128 "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", {});
9130 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9131 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9132 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9133 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9134 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9136 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9137 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9138 "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", {});
9140 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9141 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9142 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9144 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9145 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9146 "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", {});
9148 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9149 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9150 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9151 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9152 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9154 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9155 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9156 "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", {});
9158 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9159 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9160 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9161 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9162 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9164 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9165 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9166 "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", {});
9168 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9169 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9170 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9171 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9172 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9173 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9175 amount_msat: 2000000,
9177 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9178 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9180 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9183 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9184 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9185 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9187 amount_msat: 5000001,
9189 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9190 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9191 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9192 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9193 blinding_point: None,
9195 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9198 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9199 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9201 amount_msat: 5000000,
9203 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9204 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9205 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9206 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9207 blinding_point: None,
9209 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9213 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9214 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9215 "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", {
9218 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9219 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9220 "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" },
9222 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9223 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9224 "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" },
9226 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9227 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9228 "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" }
9231 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9232 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9233 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9234 "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", {
9237 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9238 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9239 "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" },
9241 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9242 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9243 "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" },
9245 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9246 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9247 "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" }
9252 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9253 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9255 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9256 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9257 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9258 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9260 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9261 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9262 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9264 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9265 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9267 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9268 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9270 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9271 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9272 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9276 fn test_key_derivation() {
9277 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9278 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9280 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9281 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9283 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9284 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9286 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9287 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9289 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9290 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9292 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9293 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9295 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9296 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9300 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9301 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9302 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9303 let seed = [42; 32];
9304 let network = Network::Testnet;
9305 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9306 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9308 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9309 let config = UserConfig::default();
9310 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9311 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9313 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9314 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9316 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9317 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9318 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9319 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9320 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9321 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9322 assert!(res.is_ok());
9326 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9327 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9328 // resulting `channel_type`.
9329 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9330 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9331 let network = Network::Testnet;
9332 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9333 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9335 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9336 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9338 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9339 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9341 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9342 // need to signal it.
9343 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9344 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9345 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9346 &config, 0, 42, None
9348 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9350 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9351 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9352 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9354 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9355 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9356 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9360 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9361 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9362 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9363 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9364 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9367 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9368 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9372 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9373 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9374 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9375 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9376 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9377 let network = Network::Testnet;
9378 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9379 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9381 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9382 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9384 let config = UserConfig::default();
9386 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9387 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9388 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9389 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9390 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9392 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9393 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9394 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9398 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9399 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9400 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9402 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9403 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9404 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9405 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9406 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9407 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9409 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9413 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9414 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9416 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9417 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9418 let network = Network::Testnet;
9419 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9420 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9422 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9423 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9425 let config = UserConfig::default();
9427 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9428 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9429 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9430 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9431 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9432 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9433 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9434 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9436 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9437 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9438 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9439 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9440 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9441 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9445 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9446 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9448 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9449 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9450 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9451 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9453 assert!(res.is_err());
9455 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9456 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9457 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9459 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9460 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9461 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9464 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9466 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9467 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9468 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9469 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9472 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9473 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9475 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9476 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9478 assert!(res.is_err());
9482 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9483 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9484 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9485 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9486 let seed = [42; 32];
9487 let network = Network::Testnet;
9488 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9489 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9490 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9492 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9493 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9494 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9495 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9497 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9498 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9499 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9504 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9514 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9515 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9516 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9521 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9522 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9528 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9531 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9532 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9533 &accept_channel_msg,
9534 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9535 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9538 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9539 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9540 let tx = Transaction {
9542 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9546 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9549 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9552 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9553 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9558 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9559 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9560 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9564 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9565 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9573 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9574 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9575 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9576 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9581 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9588 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9589 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9590 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9591 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9593 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9594 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9595 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9598 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9599 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9600 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9608 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9609 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9610 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9611 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9614 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9615 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9617 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9618 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9619 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9621 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());