1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
75 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
79 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
81 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
83 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
84 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
85 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
86 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
87 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
88 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
90 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
94 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
95 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
96 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
97 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
100 enum InboundHTLCState {
101 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
102 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
103 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
104 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
105 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
106 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
107 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
108 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
109 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
110 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
111 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
112 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
113 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
114 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
115 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
117 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
118 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
121 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
122 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
123 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
125 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
126 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
127 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
128 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
129 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
130 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
132 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
133 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
134 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
135 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
136 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
137 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
138 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
142 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
144 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
145 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
146 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
147 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
148 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
149 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
150 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
151 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
154 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
158 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
159 state: InboundHTLCState,
162 enum OutboundHTLCState {
163 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
164 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
165 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
166 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
167 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
168 /// money back (though we won't), and,
169 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
170 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
171 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
172 /// we'll never get out of sync).
173 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
174 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
175 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
177 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
178 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
179 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
180 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
181 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
182 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
183 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
184 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
185 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
190 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
191 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
195 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
197 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
198 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
201 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
204 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
205 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
210 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
219 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
223 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
224 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
239 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
247 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
251 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
252 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
253 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
254 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
255 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
256 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
257 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
259 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
260 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
261 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
262 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
263 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
264 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
265 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
267 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
268 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
269 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
271 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
272 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
273 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
278 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
279 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
281 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
283 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
284 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
285 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
286 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
287 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
288 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
289 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
291 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
292 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
293 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
294 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
295 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
296 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
298 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
299 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
300 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
301 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
302 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
304 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
305 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
307 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
309 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
311 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
314 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
318 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
322 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
324 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
325 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
326 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
327 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
328 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
330 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
331 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
333 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
335 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
336 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
338 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
339 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
340 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
341 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
342 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
343 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
345 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
346 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
348 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
349 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
350 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
351 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
352 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
354 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
355 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
357 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
358 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
360 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
361 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
362 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
363 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
369 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
370 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
372 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
379 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
380 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
382 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
389 macro_rules! secp_check {
390 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
398 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
399 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
400 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
401 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
402 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
403 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
404 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
405 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
407 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
409 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
411 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
415 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
417 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
418 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
419 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
421 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
422 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
424 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
425 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
426 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
427 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
428 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
430 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
431 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
435 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
441 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
444 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
445 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 holding_cell_msat: u64,
448 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
451 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
452 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
453 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
454 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
455 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
456 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
457 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
458 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
463 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
464 struct HTLCCandidate {
466 origin: HTLCInitiator,
470 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
478 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
480 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
482 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
483 htlc_value_msat: u64,
484 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
489 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
490 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
491 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
492 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
493 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
495 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
496 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
497 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
498 htlc_value_msat: u64,
500 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
501 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
505 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
506 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
507 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
508 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
509 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
510 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
511 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
512 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
513 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
514 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
515 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
518 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
519 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
520 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
521 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
522 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
523 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
524 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
525 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
528 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
531 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
532 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
533 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
534 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
535 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>
538 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
539 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
540 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
541 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
542 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
543 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
544 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
545 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
546 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
547 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
548 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
549 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
550 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
552 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
554 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
555 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
556 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
557 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
559 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
560 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
561 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
562 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
564 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
565 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
566 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
567 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
568 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
570 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
571 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
572 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
573 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
575 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
576 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
577 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
579 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
580 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
581 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
582 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
583 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
585 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
586 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
589 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
590 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
592 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
593 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
594 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
595 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
597 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
598 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
600 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
601 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
604 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
605 (0, update, required),
608 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
609 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
610 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
611 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
612 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
614 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
615 /// in a timely manner.
616 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
619 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
620 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
621 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
623 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
624 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
625 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
626 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
630 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
631 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
632 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
634 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
635 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
636 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
637 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
639 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
643 /// The current channel ID.
644 channel_id: ChannelId,
645 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
646 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
647 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
650 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
651 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
653 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
654 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
655 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
657 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
658 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
659 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
660 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
662 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
663 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
665 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
667 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
668 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
669 destination_script: Script,
671 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
672 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
673 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
675 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
676 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
677 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
678 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
679 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
680 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
682 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
683 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
684 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
685 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
686 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
687 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
689 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
691 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
692 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
693 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
695 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
696 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
697 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
698 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
699 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
700 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
701 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
703 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
705 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
706 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
707 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
708 // HTLCs with similar state.
709 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
710 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
711 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
712 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
713 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
714 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
715 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
716 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
717 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
720 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
721 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
722 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
724 update_time_counter: u32,
726 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
727 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
728 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
729 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
730 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
731 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
733 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
734 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
736 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
737 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
738 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
739 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
741 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
742 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
744 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
746 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
748 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
749 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
750 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
751 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
752 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
753 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
754 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
755 channel_creation_height: u32,
757 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
760 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
762 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
765 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
767 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
770 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
772 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
774 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
775 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
778 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
780 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
782 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
783 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
785 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
787 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
788 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
789 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
791 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
793 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
794 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
796 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
797 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
798 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
800 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
802 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
804 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
805 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
806 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
807 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
809 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
810 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
811 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
813 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
814 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
815 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
817 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
818 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
819 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
820 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
821 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
822 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
823 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
824 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
826 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
827 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
828 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
829 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
830 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
832 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
833 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
835 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
836 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
837 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
838 /// unblock the state machine.
840 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
841 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
842 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
844 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
845 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
846 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
848 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
849 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
850 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
851 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
852 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
853 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
854 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
855 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
857 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
858 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
860 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
861 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
862 // the channel's funding UTXO.
864 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
865 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
866 // associated channel mapping.
868 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
869 // to store all of them.
870 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
872 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
873 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
874 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
875 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
876 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
878 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
879 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
881 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
882 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
884 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
885 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
886 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
888 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
889 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
890 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
893 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
894 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
895 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
896 self.update_time_counter
899 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
900 self.latest_monitor_update_id
903 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
904 self.config.announced_channel
907 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
908 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
911 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
912 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
913 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
914 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
917 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
918 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
919 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
922 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
923 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
924 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
925 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
926 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
929 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
930 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
931 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
932 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
934 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
935 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
937 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
938 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
940 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
941 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
943 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
946 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
947 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
948 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
949 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
951 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
952 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
953 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
954 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
957 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
958 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
959 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
960 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
961 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
966 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
970 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
972 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
973 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
974 self.temporary_channel_id
977 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
981 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
982 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
983 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
987 /// Gets the channel's type
988 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
992 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
994 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
995 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
996 self.short_channel_id
999 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1000 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1001 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1004 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1005 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1006 self.outbound_scid_alias
1009 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1010 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1011 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1012 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1013 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1014 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1017 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1018 /// get_funding_created.
1019 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1020 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1023 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1024 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1025 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1028 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1029 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1030 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1031 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1035 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1038 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1039 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1042 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1043 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1046 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1047 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1048 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1051 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1052 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1055 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1056 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1057 self.counterparty_node_id
1060 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1061 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1062 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1065 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1066 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1067 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1070 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1071 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1073 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1074 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1075 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1076 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1078 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1082 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1083 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1084 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1087 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1088 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1089 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1092 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1093 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1094 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1096 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1097 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1102 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1103 self.channel_value_satoshis
1106 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1107 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1110 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1111 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1114 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1115 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1116 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1118 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1119 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1120 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1121 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1122 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1124 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1128 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1129 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1130 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1133 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1134 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1135 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1138 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1139 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1140 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1143 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1144 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1145 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1148 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1149 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1150 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1153 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1154 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1155 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1158 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1159 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1160 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1161 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1162 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1165 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1167 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1168 self.prev_config = None;
1172 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1173 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1177 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1178 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1179 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1180 let did_channel_update =
1181 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1182 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1183 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1184 if did_channel_update {
1185 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1186 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1187 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1188 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1190 self.config.options = *config;
1194 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1195 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1196 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1199 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1200 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1201 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1202 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1203 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1205 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1206 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1207 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1208 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1209 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1210 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1211 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1213 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1214 where L::Target: Logger
1216 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1217 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1218 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1220 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1221 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1222 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1223 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1225 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1226 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1227 if match update_state {
1228 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1229 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1230 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1231 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1232 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1234 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1238 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1239 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1240 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1242 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1244 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1245 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1246 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1248 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1249 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1250 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1251 transaction_output_index: None
1256 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1257 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1258 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1259 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1260 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1263 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1265 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1266 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1267 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1269 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1270 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1273 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1274 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1277 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1279 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1280 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1281 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1283 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1284 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1290 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1291 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1292 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1293 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1294 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1295 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1296 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1300 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1301 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1303 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1305 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1306 if generated_by_local {
1307 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1308 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1317 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1319 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1320 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1321 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1322 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1323 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1324 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1325 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1328 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1329 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1330 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1331 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1335 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1336 preimages.push(preimage);
1340 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1341 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1343 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1345 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1346 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1348 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1349 if !generated_by_local {
1350 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1358 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1359 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1360 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1361 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1362 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1363 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1364 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1365 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1367 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1369 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1370 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1371 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1372 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1374 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1376 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1377 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1378 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1379 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1382 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1383 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1384 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1385 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1387 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1390 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1391 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1392 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1393 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1395 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1398 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1399 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1404 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1405 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1410 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1412 let channel_parameters =
1413 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1414 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1415 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1422 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1425 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1426 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1427 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1428 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1430 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1431 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1432 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1440 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1441 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1447 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1448 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1449 /// our counterparty!)
1450 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1451 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1452 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1453 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1454 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1455 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1456 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1458 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1462 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1463 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1464 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1465 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1466 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1467 //may see payments to it!
1468 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1469 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1470 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1472 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1475 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1476 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1477 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1478 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1479 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1482 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1483 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1486 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1490 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1491 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1492 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1493 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1494 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1495 // which are near the dust limit.
1496 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1497 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1498 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1499 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1500 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1502 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1503 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1505 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1508 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1509 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1510 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1513 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1514 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1516 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1517 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1518 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1519 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1520 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1521 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1522 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1525 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1528 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1529 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1530 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1532 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1533 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1534 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1535 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1536 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1537 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1539 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1540 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1546 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1547 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1549 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1550 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1551 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1552 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1553 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1554 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1555 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1558 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1561 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1562 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1563 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1565 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1566 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1567 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1568 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1569 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1570 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1572 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1573 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1577 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1578 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1579 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1580 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1581 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1582 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1583 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1585 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1586 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1588 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1595 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1596 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1597 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1598 /// corner case properly.
1599 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1600 -> AvailableBalances
1601 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1603 let context = &self;
1604 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1605 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1606 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1608 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1609 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1611 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1613 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1615 if context.is_outbound() {
1616 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1617 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1619 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1620 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1622 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1623 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1624 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1625 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1628 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1629 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1630 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1631 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1633 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1634 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1635 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1636 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1637 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1638 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1639 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1640 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1641 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1642 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1644 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1647 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1648 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1649 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1650 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1651 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1654 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1655 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1657 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1658 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1659 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1661 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1662 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1663 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1664 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1668 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1670 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1671 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1672 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1673 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1674 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1675 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1676 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1678 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1679 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1681 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1682 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1683 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1685 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1686 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1687 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1688 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1689 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1692 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1693 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1694 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1695 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1696 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1697 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1700 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1701 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1702 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1704 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1708 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1709 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1711 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1712 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1716 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1717 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1718 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1719 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1721 outbound_capacity_msat,
1722 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1723 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1727 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1728 let context = &self;
1729 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1732 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1733 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1735 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1736 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1738 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1739 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1741 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1742 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1743 let context = &self;
1744 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1746 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1749 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1750 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1752 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1753 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1755 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1756 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1758 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1759 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1763 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1764 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1770 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1771 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1772 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1775 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1776 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1777 included_htlcs += 1;
1780 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1781 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1785 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1786 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1787 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1788 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1789 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1790 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1795 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1797 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1798 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1803 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1804 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1808 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1809 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1810 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1813 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1814 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1816 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1817 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1818 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1820 total_pending_htlcs,
1821 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1822 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1823 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1825 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1826 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1827 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1829 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1831 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1836 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1837 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1839 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1840 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1842 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1843 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1845 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1846 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1847 let context = &self;
1848 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1850 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1853 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1854 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1856 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1857 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1859 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1860 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1862 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1863 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1867 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1868 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1874 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1875 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1876 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1877 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1878 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1879 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1882 included_htlcs += 1;
1885 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1886 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1889 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1890 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1892 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1893 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1894 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1899 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1900 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1901 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1904 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1905 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1907 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1908 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1910 total_pending_htlcs,
1911 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1912 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1913 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1915 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1916 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1917 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1919 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1921 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1926 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1927 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1928 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1929 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1935 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1936 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1937 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1938 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1939 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1940 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1941 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1942 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1943 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1944 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1945 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1947 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1948 // return them to fail the payment.
1949 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1950 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1951 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1953 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1954 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1959 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1960 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1961 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1962 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1963 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1964 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1965 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1966 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1967 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1968 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1969 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1970 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1971 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1976 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1977 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1978 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1982 // Internal utility functions for channels
1984 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1985 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1986 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1988 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1990 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1991 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1992 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1994 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1997 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1999 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2002 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2003 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2004 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2006 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2008 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2009 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2010 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2011 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2012 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2015 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2016 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2017 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2018 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2019 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2020 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2021 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2024 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2025 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2027 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2028 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2031 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2032 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2033 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2034 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2035 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2036 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2039 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2040 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2041 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2044 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2045 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2046 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2047 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2050 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2051 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2053 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2054 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2055 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2059 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2060 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2061 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2063 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2064 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2065 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2066 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2068 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2069 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2070 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2071 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2072 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2073 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2074 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2075 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2076 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2077 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2078 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2082 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2083 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2084 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2085 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2086 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2087 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2089 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2091 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2092 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2093 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2094 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2095 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2096 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2097 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2098 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2100 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2101 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2111 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2112 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2113 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2114 // outside of those situations will fail.
2115 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2119 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2124 1 + // script length (0)
2128 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2129 2 + // witness marker and flag
2130 1 + // witness element count
2131 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2132 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2133 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2134 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2135 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2136 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2138 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2139 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2140 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2146 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2147 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2148 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2149 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2151 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2152 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2153 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2155 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2156 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2157 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2158 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2159 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2160 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2163 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2164 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2167 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2168 value_to_holder = 0;
2171 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2172 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2173 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2174 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2176 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2177 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2180 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2181 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2184 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2187 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2188 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2190 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2192 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2193 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2194 where L::Target: Logger {
2195 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2196 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2197 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2198 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2199 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2200 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2201 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2202 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2206 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2207 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2208 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2209 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2211 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2212 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2214 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2216 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2217 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2218 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2220 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2221 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2222 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2223 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2224 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2225 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2226 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2228 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2229 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2230 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2232 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2233 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2235 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2238 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2239 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2243 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2247 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2248 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2249 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2250 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2251 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2252 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2255 // Now update local state:
2257 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2258 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2259 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2260 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2261 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2262 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2263 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2267 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2268 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2269 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2270 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2271 // do not not get into this branch.
2272 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2273 match pending_update {
2274 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2275 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2276 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2277 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2278 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2279 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2280 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2283 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2284 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2285 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2286 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2287 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2288 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2289 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2295 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2296 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2297 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2299 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2300 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2301 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2303 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2304 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2307 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2308 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2310 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2311 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2313 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2314 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2317 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2320 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2321 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2322 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2323 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2328 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2329 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2330 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2331 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2332 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2333 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2334 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2335 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2336 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2337 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2338 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2339 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2340 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2341 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2342 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2344 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2345 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2346 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2347 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2348 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2351 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2352 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2353 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2359 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2360 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2362 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2366 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2367 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2368 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2369 /// before we fail backwards.
2371 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2372 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2373 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2374 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2375 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2376 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2377 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2380 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2381 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2382 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2383 /// before we fail backwards.
2385 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2386 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2387 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2388 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2389 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2390 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2391 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2393 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2395 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2396 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2397 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2399 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2400 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2401 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2403 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2404 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2405 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2407 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2412 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2413 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2419 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2420 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2421 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2422 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2423 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2427 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2428 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2429 force_holding_cell = true;
2432 // Now update local state:
2433 if force_holding_cell {
2434 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2435 match pending_update {
2436 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2437 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2438 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2439 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2443 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2444 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2445 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2446 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2452 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2453 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2454 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2460 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2462 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2463 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2466 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2467 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2468 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2473 // Message handlers:
2475 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2476 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2477 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2478 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2479 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2483 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2484 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2486 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2487 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2489 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2490 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2491 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2492 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2495 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2497 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2498 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2499 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2500 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2502 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2503 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2505 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2506 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2508 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2509 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2510 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2511 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2512 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2513 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2517 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2518 initial_commitment_tx,
2521 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2522 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2525 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2526 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2529 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2530 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2531 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2532 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2533 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2534 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2535 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2536 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2537 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2538 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2539 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2540 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2542 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2544 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2545 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2546 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2547 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2548 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2549 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2550 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2552 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2553 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2554 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2555 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2557 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2559 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2560 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2564 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2565 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2567 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2568 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2569 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2570 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2572 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2575 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2576 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2577 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2580 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2581 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2582 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2583 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2584 // when routing outbound payments.
2585 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2589 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2591 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2592 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2593 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2594 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2595 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2596 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2597 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2598 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2599 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2601 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2602 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2603 let expected_point =
2604 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2605 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2607 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2608 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2609 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2610 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2611 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2612 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2614 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2615 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2616 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2617 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2618 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2620 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2621 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2625 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2628 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2629 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2631 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2633 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2636 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2637 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2638 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2639 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2640 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2641 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2643 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2644 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2645 if local_sent_shutdown {
2646 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2648 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2649 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2650 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2651 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2653 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2654 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2656 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2657 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2659 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2660 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2662 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2663 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2666 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2667 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2668 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2669 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2671 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2672 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2674 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2675 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2676 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2677 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2678 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2679 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2680 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2681 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2682 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2683 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2684 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2686 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2687 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2688 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2689 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2690 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2691 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2695 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2696 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2699 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2700 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2701 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2703 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2704 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2705 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2706 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2707 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2708 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2709 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2713 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2714 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2715 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2716 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2717 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2718 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2719 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2723 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2724 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2725 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2726 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2727 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2731 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2732 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2733 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2734 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2735 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2737 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2738 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2741 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2742 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2745 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2746 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2747 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2748 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2749 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2750 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2751 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2752 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2753 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2754 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2755 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2756 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2757 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2758 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2759 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2760 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2763 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2764 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2765 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2766 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2767 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2770 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2773 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2774 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2777 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2778 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2779 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2783 // Now update local state:
2784 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2785 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2786 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2787 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2788 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2789 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2790 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2795 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2797 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2798 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2799 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2800 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2801 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2802 None => fail_reason.into(),
2803 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2804 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2805 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2806 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2808 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2812 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2813 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2814 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2815 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2817 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2818 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2823 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2826 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2827 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2828 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2830 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2831 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2834 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2837 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2838 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2839 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2841 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2842 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2845 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2849 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2850 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2853 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2857 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2861 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2862 where L::Target: Logger
2864 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2867 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2868 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2870 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2871 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2874 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2876 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2878 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2879 let commitment_txid = {
2880 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2881 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2882 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2884 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2885 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2886 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2887 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
2888 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2889 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2893 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2895 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2896 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2897 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2898 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2901 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2902 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2903 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2904 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2907 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2909 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2910 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2911 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2912 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2913 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2914 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2915 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2916 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2917 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2918 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2919 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2925 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2926 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2929 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2930 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2931 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2932 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2933 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2934 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2935 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2936 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2937 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2938 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2939 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2940 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2941 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2944 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2945 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2946 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2947 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2948 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2949 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2950 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2952 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2953 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2954 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2955 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2956 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2957 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
2958 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2959 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2961 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2962 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2965 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2967 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2968 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2969 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2972 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2975 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2976 commitment_stats.tx,
2978 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2979 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2980 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2983 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2984 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2986 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2987 let mut need_commitment = false;
2988 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2989 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2990 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2991 need_commitment = true;
2995 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2996 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2997 Some(forward_info.clone())
2999 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3000 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3001 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3002 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3003 need_commitment = true;
3006 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3007 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3008 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3009 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3010 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3011 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3012 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3013 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3014 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3015 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3016 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3017 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3018 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3019 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3021 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3023 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3024 need_commitment = true;
3028 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3029 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3030 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3031 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3032 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3033 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3035 nondust_htlc_sources,
3039 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3040 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3041 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3042 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3044 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3045 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3046 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3047 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3048 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3049 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3050 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3051 // includes the right HTLCs.
3052 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3053 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3054 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3055 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3056 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3057 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3059 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3060 &self.context.channel_id);
3061 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3064 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3065 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3066 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3067 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3068 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3069 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3070 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3071 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3072 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3076 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3077 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3078 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3079 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3082 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3083 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3084 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3085 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3086 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3087 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3088 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3090 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3091 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3092 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3093 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3096 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3097 /// for our counterparty.
3098 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3099 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3100 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3101 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3103 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3104 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3105 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3106 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3108 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3109 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3110 updates: Vec::new(),
3113 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3114 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3115 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3116 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3117 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3118 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3119 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3120 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3121 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3122 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3123 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3124 // to rebalance channels.
3125 match &htlc_update {
3126 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3127 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3128 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3130 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3131 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3133 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3136 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3137 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3138 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3139 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3140 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3141 // into the holding cell without ever being
3142 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3143 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3144 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3147 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3153 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3154 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3155 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3156 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3157 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3158 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3159 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3160 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3161 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3162 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3163 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3164 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3166 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3167 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3168 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3169 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3170 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3171 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3172 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3173 // for a full revocation before failing.
3174 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3175 update_fail_count += 1;
3178 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3180 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3187 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3188 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3190 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3191 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3196 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3197 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3198 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3199 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3200 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3202 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3203 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3204 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3206 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3207 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3213 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3214 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3215 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3216 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3217 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3218 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3219 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3220 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3221 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3223 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3224 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3226 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3227 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3229 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3230 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3233 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3235 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3236 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3241 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3242 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3243 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3244 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3245 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3246 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3247 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3248 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3249 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3252 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3254 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3255 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3258 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3259 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3260 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3261 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3263 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3267 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3268 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3269 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3270 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3271 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3272 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3273 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3274 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3278 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3279 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3280 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3281 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3282 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3283 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3284 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3285 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3286 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3288 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3289 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3292 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3293 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3294 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3295 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3296 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3297 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3298 let mut require_commitment = false;
3299 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3302 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3303 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3304 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3306 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3307 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3308 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3309 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3310 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3311 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3316 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3317 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3318 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3319 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3320 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3322 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3323 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3324 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3329 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3330 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3332 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3336 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3337 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3339 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3340 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3341 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3342 require_commitment = true;
3343 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3344 match forward_info {
3345 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3346 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3347 require_commitment = true;
3349 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3350 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3351 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3353 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3354 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3355 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3359 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3360 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3361 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3362 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3368 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3369 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3370 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3371 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3373 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3374 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3375 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3376 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3377 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3378 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3379 require_commitment = true;
3383 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3385 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3386 match update_state {
3387 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3388 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3389 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3390 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3391 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3393 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3394 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3395 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3396 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3397 require_commitment = true;
3398 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3399 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3404 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3405 let release_state_str =
3406 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3407 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3408 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3409 if !release_monitor {
3410 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3411 update: monitor_update,
3413 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3415 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3420 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3421 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3422 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3423 if require_commitment {
3424 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3425 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3426 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3427 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3428 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3429 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3430 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3431 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3432 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3434 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3435 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3436 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3437 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3438 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3441 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3442 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3443 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3444 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3445 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3446 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3448 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3449 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3451 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3452 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3454 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3455 if require_commitment {
3456 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3458 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3459 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3460 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3461 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3463 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3464 &self.context.channel_id(),
3465 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3468 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3469 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3471 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3472 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3474 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3475 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3481 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3482 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3483 /// commitment update.
3484 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3485 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3486 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3488 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3489 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3492 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3493 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3494 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3495 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3497 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3498 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3499 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3500 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3501 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3502 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3503 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3505 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3506 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3508 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3509 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3511 if !self.context.is_live() {
3512 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3515 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3516 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3517 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3518 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3519 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3520 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3521 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3522 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3523 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3524 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3528 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3529 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3530 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3531 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3532 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3533 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3536 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3537 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3541 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3542 force_holding_cell = true;
3545 if force_holding_cell {
3546 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3550 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3551 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3553 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3554 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3559 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3560 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3562 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3564 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3565 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3566 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3567 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3571 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3572 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3573 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3577 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3578 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3581 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3582 // will be retransmitted.
3583 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3584 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3585 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3587 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3588 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3590 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3591 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3592 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3593 // this HTLC accordingly
3594 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3597 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3598 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3599 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3600 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3603 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3604 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3605 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3606 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3607 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3608 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3613 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3615 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3616 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3617 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3618 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3622 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3623 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3624 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3625 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3626 // the update upon reconnection.
3627 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3631 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3633 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3634 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3637 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3638 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3639 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3640 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3641 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3642 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3643 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3645 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3646 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3647 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3648 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3649 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3650 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3651 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3653 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3654 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3655 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3656 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3657 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3658 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3659 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3662 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3663 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3664 /// to the remote side.
3665 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3666 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3667 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3668 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3671 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3673 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3674 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3676 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3677 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3678 // first received the funding_signed.
3679 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3680 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3681 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3683 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3684 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3685 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3686 funding_broadcastable = None;
3689 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3690 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3691 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3692 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3693 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3694 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3695 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3696 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3697 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3698 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3699 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3700 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3701 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3702 next_per_commitment_point,
3703 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3707 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3709 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3710 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3711 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3712 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3713 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3714 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3716 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3717 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3718 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3719 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3720 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3721 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3725 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3726 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3728 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3729 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3730 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3733 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3734 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3735 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3736 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3737 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3738 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3739 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3740 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3741 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3745 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3746 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3748 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3749 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3751 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3752 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3754 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3755 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3757 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3758 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3759 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3760 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3761 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3762 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3763 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3764 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3765 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3766 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3767 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3768 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3769 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3770 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3772 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3773 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3774 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3780 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3781 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3782 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3783 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3784 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3785 per_commitment_secret,
3786 next_per_commitment_point,
3788 next_local_nonce: None,
3792 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3793 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3794 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3795 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3796 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3798 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3799 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3800 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3801 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3802 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3803 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3804 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3805 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3806 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3807 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3812 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3813 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3815 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3816 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3817 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3818 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3819 reason: err_packet.clone()
3822 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3823 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3824 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3825 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3826 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3827 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3830 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3831 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3832 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3833 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3834 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3841 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3842 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3843 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3844 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3848 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3849 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3850 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3851 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3852 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3853 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3857 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3858 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3859 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3860 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3861 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3862 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3863 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3868 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3869 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3871 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3872 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3873 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3874 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3875 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3876 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3877 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3878 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3881 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3883 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3884 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3885 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3886 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3887 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3890 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3891 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3895 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3896 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3897 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3898 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3899 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3900 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3902 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3903 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3904 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3905 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3906 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3909 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3910 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3911 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3912 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3913 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3914 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3915 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3916 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3920 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3921 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3922 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3923 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3925 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3929 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3930 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3931 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3932 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3934 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
3936 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3938 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3939 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3940 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3941 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3942 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3945 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3946 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3947 channel_ready: None,
3948 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3949 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3950 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3954 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3955 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3956 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3957 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3958 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3959 next_per_commitment_point,
3960 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3962 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3963 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3964 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3968 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3969 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3970 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3972 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3973 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3974 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3977 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3980 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3983 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3984 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3985 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3986 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3987 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3988 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3989 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3991 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3993 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3994 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3995 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3996 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3997 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3998 next_per_commitment_point,
3999 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4003 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4004 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4005 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4007 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4010 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4011 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4012 raa: required_revoke,
4013 commitment_update: None,
4014 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4016 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4017 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4018 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4020 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4023 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4024 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4025 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4026 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4027 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4028 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4031 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4032 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4033 raa: required_revoke,
4034 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4035 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4039 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4043 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4044 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4045 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4046 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4048 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4050 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4052 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4053 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4054 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4055 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4056 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4057 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4059 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4060 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4061 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4062 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4063 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4065 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4066 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4067 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4068 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4071 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4072 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4073 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4074 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4075 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4076 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4077 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4078 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4079 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4080 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4081 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4082 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4083 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4084 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4085 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4087 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4090 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4091 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4094 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4095 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4096 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4097 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4098 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4099 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4102 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4103 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4104 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4105 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4106 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4107 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4108 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4110 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4116 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4117 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4118 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4119 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4121 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4122 return Ok((None, None));
4125 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4126 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4127 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4129 return Ok((None, None));
4132 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4134 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4135 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4136 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4137 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4139 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4140 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4142 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4143 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4145 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4146 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4147 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4148 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4150 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4151 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4152 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4159 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4160 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4162 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4163 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4166 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4167 /// within our expected timeframe.
4169 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4170 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4171 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4174 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4177 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4178 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4182 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4183 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4185 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4186 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4188 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4189 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4190 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4191 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4192 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4194 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4195 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4199 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4201 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4202 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4205 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4206 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4207 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4210 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4213 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4214 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4215 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4216 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4218 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4221 assert!(send_shutdown);
4222 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4223 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4224 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4226 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4229 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4234 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4236 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4237 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4239 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4240 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4241 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4242 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4243 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4244 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4247 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4248 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4250 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4251 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4252 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4253 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4257 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4258 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4259 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4260 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4261 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4262 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4264 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4265 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4272 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4273 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4275 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4278 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4279 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4281 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4283 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4284 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4285 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4286 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4287 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4288 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4289 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4290 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4291 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4293 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4294 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4297 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4301 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4302 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4303 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4304 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4306 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4309 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4310 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4312 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4313 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4315 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4316 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4319 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4323 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4324 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4325 return Ok((None, None));
4328 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4329 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4330 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4333 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4335 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4338 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4339 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4340 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4341 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4342 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4346 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4347 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4352 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4353 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4354 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4355 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4356 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4357 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4358 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4362 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4364 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4365 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4366 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4367 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4369 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4372 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4373 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4375 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4376 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4378 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4379 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4380 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4381 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4385 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4386 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4387 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4388 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4390 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4391 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4392 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4400 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4401 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4404 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4405 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4407 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4408 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4411 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4412 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4413 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4414 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4415 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4417 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4418 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4419 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4421 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4422 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4425 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4426 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4427 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4428 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4429 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4430 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4431 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4432 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4434 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4437 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4438 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4439 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4440 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4442 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4446 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4447 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4448 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4449 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4451 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4457 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4458 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4459 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4460 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4461 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4462 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4463 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4465 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4466 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4469 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4471 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4472 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4478 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4479 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4480 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4481 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4482 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4483 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4484 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4486 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4487 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4494 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4495 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4498 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4499 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4502 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4503 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4507 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4508 &self.context.holder_signer
4512 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4514 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4515 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4516 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4517 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4518 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4519 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4521 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4523 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4531 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4532 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4536 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4537 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4538 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4539 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4542 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4543 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4544 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4545 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4548 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4549 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4550 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4551 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4552 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4553 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4556 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4557 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4558 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4559 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4560 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4561 if !release_monitor {
4562 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4571 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4572 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4575 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4576 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4577 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4579 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4580 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4581 if self.context.channel_state &
4582 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4583 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4584 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4585 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4586 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4589 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4590 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4591 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4592 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4593 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4594 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4596 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4597 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4598 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4600 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4601 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4602 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4603 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4604 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4605 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4611 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4612 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4613 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4616 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4617 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4618 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4621 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4622 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4623 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4626 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4627 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4628 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4629 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4630 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4631 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4636 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4637 self.context.channel_update_status
4640 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4641 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4642 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4645 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4647 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4648 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4649 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4653 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4654 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4655 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4658 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4662 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4663 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4664 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4666 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4667 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4668 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4670 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4671 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4674 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4675 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4676 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4677 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4678 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4679 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4680 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4681 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4682 self.context.channel_state);
4684 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4688 if need_commitment_update {
4689 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4690 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4691 let next_per_commitment_point =
4692 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4693 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4694 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4695 next_per_commitment_point,
4696 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4700 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4706 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4707 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4708 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4709 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4710 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4711 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4712 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4714 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4717 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4718 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4719 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4720 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4721 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4722 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4723 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4724 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4725 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4726 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4727 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4728 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4729 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4730 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4731 // channel and move on.
4732 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4733 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4735 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4736 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4737 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4739 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4740 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4741 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4742 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4743 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4744 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4745 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4746 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4751 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4752 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4753 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4754 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4755 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4758 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4759 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4760 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4761 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4762 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4763 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
4766 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4767 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4768 // may have already happened for this block).
4769 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4770 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4771 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4772 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4775 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4776 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4777 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
4778 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4786 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4787 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4788 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4789 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4791 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4792 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4795 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4797 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4798 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4799 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4800 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4802 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4805 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4808 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4809 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4810 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4811 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4813 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4816 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4817 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4818 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4820 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4821 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4823 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4824 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4825 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4833 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4835 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4836 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4837 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4839 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
4840 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4843 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4844 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4845 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4846 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4847 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4848 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4849 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4850 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4851 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4854 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4855 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4856 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4857 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4859 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4860 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4861 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4863 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4864 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4865 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4866 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4868 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4869 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4870 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
4871 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4872 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4873 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4874 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4877 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4878 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4880 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4883 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4884 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4885 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4886 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4887 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4888 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4889 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4890 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4891 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4892 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4893 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4894 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4895 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4896 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4897 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4898 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4899 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4905 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4910 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4911 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4913 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4914 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4915 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4916 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4918 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4921 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4923 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4924 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4925 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4926 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4927 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4928 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4930 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4931 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4934 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4935 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4936 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4937 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4938 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4939 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4941 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4942 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4945 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4946 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4947 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4948 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4949 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4955 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4956 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4957 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4958 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4960 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4963 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4967 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4971 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4972 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4976 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4980 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4981 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4984 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4988 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4990 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4995 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4996 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4997 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4999 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5004 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5006 None => return None,
5009 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5011 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5012 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5014 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5015 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5021 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5023 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5024 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5025 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5026 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5027 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5028 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5029 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5031 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5032 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5033 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5034 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5035 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5036 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5037 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5038 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5039 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5040 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5041 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5042 contents: announcement,
5047 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5051 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5052 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5053 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5054 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5055 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5056 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5057 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5058 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5060 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5062 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5063 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5064 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5065 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5067 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5068 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5069 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5070 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5073 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5074 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5075 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5076 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5079 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5082 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5083 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5084 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5085 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5086 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5087 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5090 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5092 Err(_) => return None,
5094 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5095 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5100 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5101 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5102 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5103 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5104 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5105 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5106 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5107 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5108 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5109 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5110 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5111 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5112 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5113 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5114 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5115 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5118 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5121 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5122 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5123 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5124 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5125 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5126 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5127 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5128 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5129 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5131 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5132 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5133 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5134 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5135 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5136 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5137 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5138 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5139 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5141 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5142 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5143 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5144 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5145 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5146 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5147 next_funding_txid: None,
5152 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5154 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5155 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5156 /// commitment update.
5158 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5159 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5160 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5161 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5162 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5163 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5164 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5167 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5168 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5169 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5171 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5172 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5177 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5178 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5180 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5182 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5183 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5185 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5186 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5187 /// regenerate them.
5189 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5190 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5192 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5193 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5194 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5195 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5196 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5197 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5198 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5200 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5201 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5203 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5204 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5205 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5208 if amount_msat == 0 {
5209 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5212 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5213 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5214 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5215 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5218 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5219 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5220 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5223 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5224 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5225 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5226 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5227 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5228 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5229 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5230 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5233 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5234 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5235 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5236 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5237 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5238 else { "to peer" });
5240 if need_holding_cell {
5241 force_holding_cell = true;
5244 // Now update local state:
5245 if force_holding_cell {
5246 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5251 onion_routing_packet,
5257 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5258 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5260 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5262 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5267 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5268 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5269 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5273 onion_routing_packet,
5276 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5281 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5282 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5283 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5284 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5286 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5287 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5288 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5290 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5291 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5295 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5296 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5297 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5298 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5299 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5300 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5301 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5304 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5305 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5306 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5307 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5308 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5309 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5312 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5314 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5315 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5316 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5317 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5318 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5320 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5321 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5324 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5325 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5326 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5327 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5328 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5329 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5330 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5331 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5332 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5333 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5334 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5337 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5341 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5342 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5343 where L::Target: Logger
5345 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5346 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5347 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5349 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5351 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5352 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5353 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5354 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5355 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5356 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5357 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5358 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5359 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5360 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5361 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5367 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5370 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5371 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5372 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5373 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5374 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5375 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5377 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5378 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5379 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5381 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5382 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5383 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5386 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5387 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5391 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5392 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5394 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5396 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5397 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5398 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5399 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5401 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5402 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5403 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5404 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5405 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5406 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5410 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5411 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5415 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5416 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5421 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5422 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5424 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5425 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5426 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5427 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5428 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5429 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5430 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5431 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5433 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5434 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5435 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5438 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5439 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5440 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5446 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5447 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5448 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5450 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5451 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5452 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5453 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5459 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5460 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5462 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5463 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5464 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5465 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5466 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5468 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5469 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5470 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5473 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5474 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5475 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5477 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5478 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5481 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5482 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5484 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5485 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5486 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5489 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5490 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5491 let mut chan_closed = false;
5492 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5496 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5498 None if !chan_closed => {
5499 // use override shutdown script if provided
5500 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5501 Some(script) => script,
5503 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5504 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5505 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5506 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5510 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5511 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5513 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5519 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5520 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5521 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5522 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5524 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5526 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5528 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5529 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5530 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5531 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5532 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5533 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5536 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5537 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5539 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5540 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5541 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5544 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5545 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5546 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5547 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5548 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5550 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5551 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5558 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5559 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5561 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5564 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5565 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5566 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5568 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5569 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5573 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5577 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5578 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5579 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5580 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5583 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5584 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5585 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5586 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5587 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5588 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5589 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5590 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5592 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5593 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5594 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5595 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5597 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5598 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5600 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5601 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5603 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5604 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5605 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5607 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5608 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5610 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5611 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5612 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5613 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5614 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5617 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5618 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5620 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5621 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5623 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5625 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5627 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5628 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5629 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5630 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5633 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5634 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5636 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5637 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5638 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5639 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5643 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5644 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5645 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5649 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5650 Ok(script) => script,
5651 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5654 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5657 context: ChannelContext {
5660 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5661 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5662 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5663 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5668 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5670 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5671 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5672 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5673 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5675 channel_value_satoshis,
5677 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5679 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5680 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5683 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5684 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5687 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5688 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5689 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5690 pending_update_fee: None,
5691 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5692 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5693 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5694 update_time_counter: 1,
5696 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5698 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5699 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5700 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5701 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5702 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5703 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5705 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5706 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5707 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5708 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5710 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5711 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5712 closing_fee_limits: None,
5713 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5715 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5716 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5717 short_channel_id: None,
5718 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5720 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5721 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5722 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5723 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5724 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5725 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5726 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5727 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5728 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5729 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5730 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5731 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5733 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5735 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5736 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5737 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5738 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5739 counterparty_parameters: None,
5740 funding_outpoint: None,
5741 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5743 funding_transaction: None,
5745 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5746 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5747 counterparty_node_id,
5749 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5751 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5753 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5754 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5756 announcement_sigs: None,
5758 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5759 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5760 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5761 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5763 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5764 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5766 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5767 outbound_scid_alias,
5769 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5770 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5772 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5773 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5778 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5780 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5784 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5785 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5786 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5787 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5788 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5789 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5790 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5791 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5792 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5797 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5798 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5799 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5800 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5801 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5802 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5803 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5804 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5805 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5806 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5807 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5809 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5810 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5812 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5813 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5814 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5815 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5818 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5819 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5821 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5824 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5825 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5826 return Err((self, e));
5830 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5832 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5834 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5835 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5837 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
5838 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
5839 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
5840 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5841 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5842 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5845 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5847 let channel = Channel {
5848 context: self.context,
5851 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5852 temporary_channel_id,
5853 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5854 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5857 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5859 next_local_nonce: None,
5863 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5864 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5865 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5866 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5867 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5868 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5869 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5870 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5871 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5872 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5875 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5876 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5877 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5878 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5879 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5880 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5886 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5887 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5888 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5889 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5890 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5891 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5893 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5895 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5896 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5897 // We've exhausted our options
5900 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5901 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5904 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5905 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5906 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5907 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5909 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5910 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5911 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5912 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5913 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5914 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5916 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5918 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5919 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5922 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5923 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5924 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5926 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5927 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5930 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5931 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5934 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5935 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5939 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5940 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5941 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5942 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5943 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5944 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5945 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5946 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5947 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5948 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5949 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5950 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5951 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5952 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5953 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5954 first_per_commitment_point,
5955 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5956 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5957 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5958 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5960 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5965 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5966 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5968 // Check sanity of message fields:
5969 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5970 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5972 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5975 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5976 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5978 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5979 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5981 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5984 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5985 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5986 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5988 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5989 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5990 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5992 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5993 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5996 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5999 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6003 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6004 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6007 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6008 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6010 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6011 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6013 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6014 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6016 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6019 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6022 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6023 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6026 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6027 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6028 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6030 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6031 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6033 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6034 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6035 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6037 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6038 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6041 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6042 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6043 &Some(ref script) => {
6044 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6045 if script.len() == 0 {
6048 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6049 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6051 Some(script.clone())
6054 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6056 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6061 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6062 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6063 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6064 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6065 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6067 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6068 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6070 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6073 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6074 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6075 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6076 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6077 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6078 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6081 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6082 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6083 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6086 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6087 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6089 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6090 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6096 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6097 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6098 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6099 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6102 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6103 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6104 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6105 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6106 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6107 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6108 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6109 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6110 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6111 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6112 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6115 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6117 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6118 // support this channel type.
6119 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6120 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6124 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6125 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6126 // `static_remote_key`.
6127 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6130 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6131 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6132 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6134 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6135 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6137 channel_type.clone()
6139 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6140 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6146 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6147 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6148 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6149 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6150 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6151 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6152 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6153 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6154 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6157 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6158 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6161 // Check sanity of message fields:
6162 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6165 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6166 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6168 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6169 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6171 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6172 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6173 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6175 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6176 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6178 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6181 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6183 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6184 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6187 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6190 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6191 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6194 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6195 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6196 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6198 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6199 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6201 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6202 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6204 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6205 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6207 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6210 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6213 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6217 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6219 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6220 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6221 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6225 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6226 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6227 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6228 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6231 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6232 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6234 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6235 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6236 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6238 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6242 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6243 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6244 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6245 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6246 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6250 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6251 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6252 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6253 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6257 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6258 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6259 &Some(ref script) => {
6260 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6261 if script.len() == 0 {
6264 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6265 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6267 Some(script.clone())
6270 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6272 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6277 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6278 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6279 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6280 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6284 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6285 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6290 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6291 Ok(script) => script,
6292 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6295 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6296 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6298 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6301 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6305 context: ChannelContext {
6308 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6309 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6311 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6316 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6318 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6319 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6320 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6321 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6324 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6326 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6327 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6330 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6331 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6332 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6334 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6335 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6336 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6337 pending_update_fee: None,
6338 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6339 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6340 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6341 update_time_counter: 1,
6343 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6345 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6346 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6347 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6348 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6349 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6350 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6352 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6353 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6354 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6355 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6357 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6358 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6359 closing_fee_limits: None,
6360 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6362 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6363 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6364 short_channel_id: None,
6365 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6367 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6368 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6369 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6370 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6371 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6372 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6373 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6374 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6375 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6376 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6377 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6378 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6381 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6383 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6384 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6385 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6386 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6387 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6388 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6389 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6391 funding_outpoint: None,
6392 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6394 funding_transaction: None,
6396 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6397 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6398 counterparty_node_id,
6400 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6402 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6404 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6405 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6407 announcement_sigs: None,
6409 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6410 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6411 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6412 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6414 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6415 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6417 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6418 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6420 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6421 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6423 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6424 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6429 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6431 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6437 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6438 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6440 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6441 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6442 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6443 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6445 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6446 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6448 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6449 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6452 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6455 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6456 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6457 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6459 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6460 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6461 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6462 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6464 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6465 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6466 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6467 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6468 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6469 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6470 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6471 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6472 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6473 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6474 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6475 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6476 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6477 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6478 first_per_commitment_point,
6479 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6480 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6481 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6483 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6485 next_local_nonce: None,
6489 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6490 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6492 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6494 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6495 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6498 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6499 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6501 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6502 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6504 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6505 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6506 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6507 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6508 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6509 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6510 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6511 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6512 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6515 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6516 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6518 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6519 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6520 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6521 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6523 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6524 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6525 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6526 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6527 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6529 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6530 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6535 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6536 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6537 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6541 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6542 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6544 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6545 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6546 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6548 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6550 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6551 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6552 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6553 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6556 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6557 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6558 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6559 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6560 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6562 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6564 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6565 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6566 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6569 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6570 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6571 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6575 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6576 initial_commitment_tx,
6579 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6580 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6583 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6584 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6587 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6589 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6590 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6591 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6592 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6593 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6594 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6595 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6596 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6597 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6598 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6599 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6601 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6603 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6604 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6605 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6606 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6607 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6608 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6610 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6611 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6612 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6613 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6615 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6617 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6618 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6619 let mut channel = Channel {
6620 context: self.context,
6622 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6623 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6624 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6626 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6630 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6631 }, channel_monitor))
6635 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6636 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6638 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6644 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6645 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6646 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6647 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6648 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6650 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6651 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6652 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6653 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6659 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6660 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6661 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6662 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6663 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6664 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6669 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6670 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6671 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6672 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6674 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6675 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6676 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6677 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6682 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6683 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6684 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6685 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6686 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6687 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6692 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6693 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6694 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6697 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6699 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6700 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6701 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6702 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6703 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6705 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6706 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6707 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6708 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6710 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6711 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6712 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6714 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6716 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6717 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6718 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6719 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6720 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6721 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6722 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6724 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6725 // deserialized from that format.
6726 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6727 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6728 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6730 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6732 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6733 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6734 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6736 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6737 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6738 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6739 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6742 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6743 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6744 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6747 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6748 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6749 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6750 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6752 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6753 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6755 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6757 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6759 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6761 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6764 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6766 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6771 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6772 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6774 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6775 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6776 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6777 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6778 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6779 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6780 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6782 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6784 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6786 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6789 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6790 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6791 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6794 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6796 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6797 preimages.push(preimage);
6799 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6800 reason.write(writer)?;
6802 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6804 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6805 preimages.push(preimage);
6807 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6808 reason.write(writer)?;
6811 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6812 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6813 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6815 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6816 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6817 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6821 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6822 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6823 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6825 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6826 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6830 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6831 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6832 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6833 source.write(writer)?;
6834 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6836 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6837 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6838 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6840 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6841 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6843 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6845 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6846 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6848 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6850 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6851 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6856 match self.context.resend_order {
6857 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6858 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6861 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6862 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6863 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6865 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6866 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6867 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6868 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6871 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6872 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6873 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6874 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6875 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6878 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6879 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6880 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6881 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6883 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6884 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6885 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6887 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6889 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6890 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6891 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6892 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6894 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6895 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6896 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6897 // consider the stale state on reload.
6900 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6901 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6902 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6904 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6905 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6906 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6908 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6909 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6911 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6912 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6913 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6915 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6916 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6918 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6921 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6922 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6923 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6925 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6928 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6929 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6931 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6932 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6933 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6935 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6937 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6939 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6941 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6942 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6943 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6944 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6945 htlc.write(writer)?;
6948 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6949 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6950 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6952 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6953 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6955 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6956 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6957 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6958 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6959 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6960 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6961 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6963 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6964 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6965 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6966 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6967 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6969 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6970 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6972 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6973 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6974 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6975 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6977 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6979 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6980 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6981 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6982 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6983 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6984 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6985 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6987 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6988 (2, chan_type, option),
6989 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6990 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6991 (5, self.context.config, required),
6992 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6993 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6994 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6995 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6996 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6997 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6998 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6999 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7000 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7001 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7002 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7003 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7004 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7005 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7006 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7007 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7008 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7009 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7016 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7017 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7019 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7020 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7022 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7023 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7024 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7026 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7027 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7028 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7029 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7031 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7033 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7034 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7035 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7036 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7037 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7039 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7040 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7043 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7044 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7045 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7047 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7049 let mut keys_data = None;
7051 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7052 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7053 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7054 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7055 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7056 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7057 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7058 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7059 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7060 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7064 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7065 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7066 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7069 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7071 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7072 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7073 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7075 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7077 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7078 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7079 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7080 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7081 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7082 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7083 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7084 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7085 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7086 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7087 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7088 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7089 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7094 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7095 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7096 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7097 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7098 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7099 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7100 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7101 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7102 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7103 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7104 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7105 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7107 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7108 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7111 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7112 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7115 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7116 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7118 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7120 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7124 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7125 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7126 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7127 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7128 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7129 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7130 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7131 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7132 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7133 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7134 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7136 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7137 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7138 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7140 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7141 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7142 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7144 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7148 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7149 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7150 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7151 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7154 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7155 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7156 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7158 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7159 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7160 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7161 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7164 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7165 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7166 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7167 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7170 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7172 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7174 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7175 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7176 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7177 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7179 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7180 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7181 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7182 // consider the stale state on reload.
7183 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7186 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7187 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7188 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7190 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7193 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7194 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7195 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7197 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7198 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7199 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7200 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7202 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7203 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7205 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7206 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7208 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7209 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7210 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7212 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7214 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7215 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7217 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7218 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7221 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7223 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7224 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7225 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7226 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7228 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7231 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7232 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7234 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7236 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7237 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7239 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7240 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7242 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7244 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7245 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7246 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7248 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7249 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7250 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7254 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7255 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7256 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7258 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7264 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7265 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7266 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7267 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7268 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7269 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7270 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7271 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7272 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7273 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7275 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7276 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7277 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7278 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7279 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7280 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7281 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7283 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7284 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7285 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7286 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7288 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7290 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7291 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7293 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7294 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7295 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7296 (2, channel_type, option),
7297 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7298 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7299 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7300 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7301 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7302 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7303 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7304 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7305 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7306 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7307 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7308 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7309 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7310 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7311 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7312 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7313 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7314 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7315 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7316 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7317 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7320 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7321 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7322 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7323 // required channel parameters.
7324 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7325 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7326 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7328 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7330 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7331 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7332 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7333 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7336 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7337 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7338 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7340 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7341 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7343 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7344 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7349 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7350 if iter.next().is_some() {
7351 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7355 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7356 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7357 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7358 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7359 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7362 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7363 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7364 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7366 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7367 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7369 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7370 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7371 // separate u64 values.
7372 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7374 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7376 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7377 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7378 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7379 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7381 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7382 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7384 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7385 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7386 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7387 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7388 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7391 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7392 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7396 context: ChannelContext {
7399 config: config.unwrap(),
7403 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7404 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7405 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7408 temporary_channel_id,
7410 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7412 channel_value_satoshis,
7414 latest_monitor_update_id,
7416 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7417 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7420 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7421 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7424 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7425 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7426 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7427 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7431 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7432 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7433 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7434 monitor_pending_forwards,
7435 monitor_pending_failures,
7436 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7439 holding_cell_update_fee,
7440 next_holder_htlc_id,
7441 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7442 update_time_counter,
7445 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7446 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7447 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7448 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7450 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7451 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7452 closing_fee_limits: None,
7453 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7455 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7456 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7458 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7460 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7461 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7462 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7463 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7464 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7465 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7466 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7467 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7468 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7471 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7473 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7474 funding_transaction,
7476 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7477 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7478 counterparty_node_id,
7480 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7484 channel_update_status,
7485 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7489 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7490 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7491 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7492 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7494 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7495 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7497 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7498 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7499 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7501 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7502 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7504 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7505 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7507 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7510 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7519 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7520 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7521 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7522 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7523 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7525 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7526 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7527 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7528 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7529 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7530 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7531 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7532 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7533 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7534 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7535 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7536 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7537 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7538 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7539 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7540 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7541 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7542 use crate::util::test_utils;
7543 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7544 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7545 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7546 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7547 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7548 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7549 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7550 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7551 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7552 use crate::prelude::*;
7554 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7557 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7558 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7564 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7565 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7566 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7567 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7571 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7572 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7573 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7574 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7575 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7576 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7577 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7578 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7582 signer: InMemorySigner,
7585 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7586 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7589 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7590 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7592 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7593 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7596 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7600 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7602 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7603 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7604 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7605 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7606 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7609 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7610 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7611 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7612 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7616 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7617 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7618 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7622 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7623 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7624 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7625 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7627 let seed = [42; 32];
7628 let network = Network::Testnet;
7629 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7630 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7631 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7634 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7635 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7636 let config = UserConfig::default();
7637 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7638 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7639 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7641 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7642 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7646 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7647 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7649 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7650 let original_fee = 253;
7651 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7652 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7653 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7654 let seed = [42; 32];
7655 let network = Network::Testnet;
7656 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7658 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7659 let config = UserConfig::default();
7660 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7662 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7663 // same as the old fee.
7664 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7665 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7666 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7670 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7671 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7672 // dust limits are used.
7673 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7674 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7675 let seed = [42; 32];
7676 let network = Network::Testnet;
7677 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7678 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7679 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7681 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7682 // they have different dust limits.
7684 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7685 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7686 let config = UserConfig::default();
7687 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7689 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7690 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7691 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7692 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7693 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7695 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7696 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7697 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7698 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7699 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7701 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7702 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7703 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7704 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7706 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7707 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7708 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7710 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7711 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7713 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7714 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7715 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7717 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7718 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7719 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7720 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7723 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7725 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7726 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7727 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7728 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7729 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7730 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7731 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7732 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7733 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7735 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7738 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7739 // the dust limit check.
7740 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7741 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7742 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7743 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7745 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7746 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7747 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7748 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7749 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7750 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7751 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7755 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7756 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7757 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7758 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7759 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7760 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7761 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7762 let seed = [42; 32];
7763 let network = Network::Testnet;
7764 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7766 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7767 let config = UserConfig::default();
7768 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7770 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7771 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7773 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7774 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7775 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7776 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7777 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7778 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7780 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7781 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7782 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7783 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7784 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7786 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7788 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7789 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7790 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7791 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7792 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7794 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7795 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7796 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7797 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7798 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7802 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7803 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7804 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7805 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7806 let seed = [42; 32];
7807 let network = Network::Testnet;
7808 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7809 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7810 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7812 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7814 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7815 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7816 let config = UserConfig::default();
7817 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7819 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7820 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7821 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7822 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7824 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7825 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7826 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7828 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7829 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7830 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7831 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7833 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7834 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7835 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7837 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7838 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7840 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7841 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7842 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7843 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7844 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7845 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7846 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7848 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7850 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7851 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7852 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7853 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7854 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7858 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7859 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7860 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7861 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7862 let seed = [42; 32];
7863 let network = Network::Testnet;
7864 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7865 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7866 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7868 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7869 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7870 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7871 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7872 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7873 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7874 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7875 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7877 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7878 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7879 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7880 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7881 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7882 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7884 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7885 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7886 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7887 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7889 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7891 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7892 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7893 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7894 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7895 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7896 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7898 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7899 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7900 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7901 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7903 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7904 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7905 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7906 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7907 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7909 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7910 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7912 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7913 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7914 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7916 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7917 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7918 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7919 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7920 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7922 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7923 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7925 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7926 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7927 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7931 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7933 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7934 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7935 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7937 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7938 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7939 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7940 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7942 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7943 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7944 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7946 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7948 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7949 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7952 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7953 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7954 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7955 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7956 let seed = [42; 32];
7957 let network = Network::Testnet;
7958 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7959 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7960 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7963 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7964 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7965 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7967 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7968 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7970 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7971 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7972 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7974 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7975 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7977 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7979 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7980 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7982 // Channel Negotiations failed
7983 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
7984 assert!(result.is_err());
7989 fn channel_update() {
7990 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7991 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7992 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7993 let seed = [42; 32];
7994 let network = Network::Testnet;
7995 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7996 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7997 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7999 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8000 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8001 let config = UserConfig::default();
8002 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8004 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8005 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8006 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8007 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8008 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8010 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8011 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8012 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8013 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8014 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8016 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8017 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8018 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8019 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8021 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8022 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8023 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8025 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8026 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8028 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8029 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8030 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8032 short_channel_id: 0,
8035 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8036 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8037 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8039 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8040 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8042 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8044 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
8046 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8047 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8048 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8049 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8051 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8052 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8053 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8055 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8059 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8061 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8062 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8063 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8064 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8065 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8066 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8067 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8068 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8069 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8070 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8071 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8072 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8073 use crate::sync::Arc;
8075 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8076 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8077 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8078 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8080 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8082 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8083 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8084 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8085 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8086 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8088 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8089 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8095 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8096 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8097 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8099 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8100 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8101 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8102 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8103 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8104 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8106 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8108 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8109 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8110 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8111 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8112 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8113 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8115 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8116 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8117 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8118 selected_contest_delay: 144
8120 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8121 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8123 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8124 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8126 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8127 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8129 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8130 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8132 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8133 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8134 // build_commitment_transaction.
8135 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8136 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8137 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8138 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8139 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8141 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8142 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8143 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8144 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8148 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8149 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8150 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8151 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8155 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8156 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8157 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8159 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8160 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8162 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8163 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8165 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8167 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8168 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8169 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8170 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8171 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8172 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8173 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8175 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8176 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8177 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8178 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8180 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8181 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8182 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8184 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8186 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8187 commitment_tx.clone(),
8188 counterparty_signature,
8189 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8190 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8191 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8193 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8194 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8196 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8197 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8198 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8200 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8201 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8204 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8205 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8207 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8208 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8209 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8210 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8211 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8212 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8213 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8214 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8216 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8219 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8220 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8221 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8225 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8228 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8229 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8230 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8232 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8233 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8234 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8235 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8236 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8237 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8238 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8239 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8241 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8245 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8246 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8247 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8248 "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", {});
8250 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8251 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8253 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8254 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8255 "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", {});
8257 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8258 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8259 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8260 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8262 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8263 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8265 amount_msat: 1000000,
8267 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8268 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8270 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8273 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8274 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8276 amount_msat: 2000000,
8278 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8279 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8281 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8284 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8285 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8287 amount_msat: 2000000,
8289 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8290 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8291 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8292 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8294 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8297 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8298 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8300 amount_msat: 3000000,
8302 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8303 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8304 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8305 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8307 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8310 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8311 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8313 amount_msat: 4000000,
8315 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8316 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8318 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8322 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8323 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8324 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8326 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8327 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8328 "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", {
8331 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8332 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8333 "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" },
8336 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8337 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8338 "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" },
8341 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8342 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8343 "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" },
8346 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8347 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8348 "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" },
8351 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8352 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8353 "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" }
8356 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8357 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8358 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8360 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8361 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8362 "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", {
8365 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8366 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8367 "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" },
8370 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8371 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8372 "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" },
8375 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8376 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8377 "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" },
8380 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8381 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8382 "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" },
8385 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8386 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8387 "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" }
8390 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8391 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8392 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8394 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8395 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8396 "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", {
8399 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8400 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8401 "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" },
8404 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8405 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8406 "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" },
8409 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8410 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8411 "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" },
8414 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8415 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8416 "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" }
8419 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8420 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8421 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8422 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8424 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8425 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8426 "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", {
8429 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8430 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8431 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320002000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc28283483045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef0901008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6851b27568f6010000" },
8434 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8435 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8436 "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" },
8439 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8440 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8441 "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" },
8444 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8445 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8446 "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" }
8449 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8450 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8451 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8452 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8454 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8455 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8456 "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", {
8459 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8460 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8461 "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" },
8464 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8465 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8466 "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" },
8469 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8470 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8471 "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" },
8474 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8475 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8476 "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" }
8479 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8480 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8481 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8483 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8484 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8485 "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", {
8488 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8489 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8490 "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" },
8493 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8494 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8495 "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" },
8498 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8499 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8500 "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" }
8503 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8504 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8505 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8507 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8508 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8509 "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", {
8512 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8513 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8514 "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" },
8517 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8518 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8519 "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" },
8522 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8523 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8524 "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" }
8527 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8528 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8529 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8531 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8532 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8533 "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", {
8536 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8537 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8538 "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" },
8541 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8542 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8543 "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" }
8546 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8547 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8548 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8549 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8550 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8551 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8553 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8554 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8555 "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", {
8558 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8559 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8560 "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" },
8563 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8564 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8565 "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" }
8568 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8569 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8570 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8571 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8572 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8574 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8575 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8576 "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", {
8579 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8580 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8581 "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" },
8584 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8585 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8586 "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" }
8589 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8590 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8591 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8593 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8594 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8595 "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", {
8598 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8599 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8600 "0200000000010120060e4a29579d429f0f27c17ee5f1ee282f20d706d6f90b63d35946d8f3029a0000000000000000000175050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a01483045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8603 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8604 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8605 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8606 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8607 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8609 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8610 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8611 "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", {
8614 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8615 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8616 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8619 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8620 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8621 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8622 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8623 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8625 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8626 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8627 "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", {
8630 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8631 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8632 "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" }
8635 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8636 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8637 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8638 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8640 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8641 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8642 "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", {});
8644 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8645 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8646 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8647 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8648 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8650 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8651 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8652 "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", {});
8654 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8655 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8656 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8657 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8658 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8660 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8661 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8662 "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", {});
8664 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8665 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8666 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8668 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8669 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8670 "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", {});
8672 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8673 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8674 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8675 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8676 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8678 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8679 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8680 "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", {});
8682 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8683 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8684 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8685 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8686 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8688 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8689 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8690 "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", {});
8692 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8693 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8694 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8695 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8696 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8697 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8699 amount_msat: 2000000,
8701 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8702 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8704 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8707 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8708 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8709 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8711 amount_msat: 5000001,
8713 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8714 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8715 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8716 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8718 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8721 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8722 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8724 amount_msat: 5000000,
8726 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8727 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8728 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8729 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8731 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8735 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8736 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8737 "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", {
8740 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8741 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8742 "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" },
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8746 "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" },
8748 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8749 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8750 "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" }
8753 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8754 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8755 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8756 "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", {
8759 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8760 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8761 "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" },
8763 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8764 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8765 "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" },
8767 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8768 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8769 "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" }
8774 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8775 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8777 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8778 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8779 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8780 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8782 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8783 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8784 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8786 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8787 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8789 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8790 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8792 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8793 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8794 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8798 fn test_key_derivation() {
8799 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8800 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8802 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8803 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8805 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8806 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8808 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8809 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8811 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8812 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8814 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8815 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8817 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8818 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8820 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8821 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8825 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8826 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8827 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8828 let seed = [42; 32];
8829 let network = Network::Testnet;
8830 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8831 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8833 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8834 let config = UserConfig::default();
8835 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8836 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8838 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8839 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8841 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8842 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8843 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8844 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8845 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8846 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8847 assert!(res.is_ok());
8851 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8852 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8853 // resulting `channel_type`.
8854 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8855 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8856 let network = Network::Testnet;
8857 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8858 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8860 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8861 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8863 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8864 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8866 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8867 // need to signal it.
8868 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8869 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8870 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8873 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8875 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8876 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8877 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8879 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8880 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8881 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8884 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8885 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8886 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8887 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8888 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8891 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8892 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8896 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8897 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8898 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8899 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8900 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8901 let network = Network::Testnet;
8902 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8903 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8905 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8906 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8908 let config = UserConfig::default();
8910 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8911 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8912 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8913 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8914 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8916 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8917 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8918 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8921 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8922 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8923 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8925 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8926 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8927 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8928 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8929 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8930 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8932 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8936 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8937 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8939 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8940 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8941 let network = Network::Testnet;
8942 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8943 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8945 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8946 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8948 let config = UserConfig::default();
8950 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8951 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8952 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8953 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8954 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8955 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8956 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8957 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8959 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8960 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8961 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8962 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8963 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8964 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8967 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8968 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8970 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8971 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8972 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8973 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8975 assert!(res.is_err());
8977 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8978 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8979 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8981 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8982 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8983 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8986 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8988 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8989 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8990 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8991 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8994 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8995 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8997 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8998 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9000 assert!(res.is_err());