1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
265 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
269 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
270 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
271 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
273 struct $flag_type(u32);
278 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
281 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
283 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
286 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
289 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
290 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
293 Ok($flag_type(flags))
298 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
301 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
304 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
306 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
308 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
310 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
312 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
313 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
315 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
317 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
319 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
320 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
323 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
324 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
326 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
327 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
328 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
330 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
332 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
333 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
335 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
337 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
339 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
340 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
342 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
343 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
345 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
346 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
351 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
354 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
355 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
356 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
357 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
358 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
359 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
360 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
361 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
362 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
363 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
364 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
365 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
366 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
367 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
371 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
373 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
374 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
375 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
376 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
377 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
378 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
379 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
380 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
381 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
382 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
387 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
388 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
389 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
390 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
391 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
392 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
397 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
398 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
399 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
400 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
401 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
402 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
403 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
404 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
405 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
406 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
407 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
412 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
413 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
414 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
415 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
416 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
417 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
418 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
422 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
424 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
425 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
426 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
427 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
428 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
430 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
431 /// funding transaction to confirm.
432 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
433 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
435 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
436 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
437 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
441 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
442 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
444 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
447 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
456 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
458 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
462 fn $clear(&mut self) {
465 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
467 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
471 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
472 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
474 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
475 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
480 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
482 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
483 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
485 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
486 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
487 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
488 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
489 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
490 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
491 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
492 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
500 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
502 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
503 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
504 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
505 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
506 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
510 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
511 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
514 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
515 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
518 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
520 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
521 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
522 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
526 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
528 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
529 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
530 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
531 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
533 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
539 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
540 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
541 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
542 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
543 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
544 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
545 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
546 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
547 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
548 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
549 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
550 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
551 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
552 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady);
553 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
554 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
557 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
559 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
561 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
562 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
564 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
568 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
570 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
572 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
574 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
575 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
576 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
577 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
578 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
580 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
581 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
583 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
585 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
586 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
588 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
589 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
590 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
591 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
592 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
593 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
595 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
596 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
598 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
599 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
600 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
601 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
602 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
604 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
605 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
607 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
608 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
610 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
611 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
612 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
613 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
619 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
620 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
622 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
623 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
624 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
629 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
630 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
632 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
633 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
639 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
641 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
642 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
645 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
646 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
647 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
648 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
649 self.logger.log(record)
653 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
654 where L::Target: Logger {
655 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
656 where S::Target: SignerProvider
660 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
661 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
666 macro_rules! secp_check {
667 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
675 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
676 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
677 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
678 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
679 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
680 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
681 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
682 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
684 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
686 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
688 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
692 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
694 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
695 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
696 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
698 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
699 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
701 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
702 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
703 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
704 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
705 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
707 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
708 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
712 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
718 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
721 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
722 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
723 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
724 holding_cell_msat: u64,
725 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
728 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
729 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
730 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
731 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
732 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
733 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
734 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
735 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
736 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
737 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
738 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
741 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
742 struct HTLCCandidate {
744 origin: HTLCInitiator,
748 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
756 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
758 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
760 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
761 htlc_value_msat: u64,
762 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
767 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
768 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
769 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
770 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
771 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
773 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
774 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
775 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
776 htlc_value_msat: u64,
778 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
779 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
783 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
784 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
785 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
786 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
787 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
788 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
789 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
790 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
791 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
792 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
793 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
796 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
798 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
799 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
800 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
801 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
804 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
805 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
806 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
807 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
808 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
809 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
810 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
811 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
814 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
816 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
817 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
818 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
819 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
820 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
821 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
822 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
823 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
824 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
825 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
826 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
827 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
828 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
829 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
830 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
833 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
834 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
835 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
836 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
837 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
838 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
839 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
840 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
841 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
842 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
843 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
844 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
845 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
846 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
847 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
849 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
850 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
851 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
852 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
854 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
855 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
856 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
857 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
859 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
860 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
861 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
862 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
863 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
865 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
866 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
867 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
868 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
870 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
871 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
872 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
874 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
875 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
876 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
877 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
878 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
880 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
881 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
884 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
885 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
887 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
888 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
889 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
890 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
892 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
893 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
895 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
896 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
899 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
900 (0, update, required),
903 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
904 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
905 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
906 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
907 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
911 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
912 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
913 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
915 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
917 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
918 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
919 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
923 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
925 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
926 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
927 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
932 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
933 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
934 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
935 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
936 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
938 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
939 /// in a timely manner.
940 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
943 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
944 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
945 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
947 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
948 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
949 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
950 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
954 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
955 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
956 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
958 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
959 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
960 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
961 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
963 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
967 /// The current channel ID.
968 channel_id: ChannelId,
969 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
970 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
971 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
972 channel_state: ChannelState,
974 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
975 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
977 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
978 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
979 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
981 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
982 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
983 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
984 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
986 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
987 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
989 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
991 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
992 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
993 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
995 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
996 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
997 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
999 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1000 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1001 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1002 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1003 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1004 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1006 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1007 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1008 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1009 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1010 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1011 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1013 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1015 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1016 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1017 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1019 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1020 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1021 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1022 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1023 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1024 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1025 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1027 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1028 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1029 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1031 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1032 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1033 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1034 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1035 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1036 /// outbound or inbound.
1037 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1039 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1041 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1042 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1043 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1044 // HTLCs with similar state.
1045 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1046 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1047 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1048 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1049 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1050 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1051 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1052 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1053 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1054 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1056 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1057 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1058 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1060 update_time_counter: u32,
1062 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1063 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1064 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1065 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1066 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1067 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1069 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1070 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1072 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1073 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1074 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1075 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1077 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1078 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1080 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1082 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1084 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1085 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1086 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1087 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1088 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1090 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1091 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1093 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1094 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1095 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1097 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1098 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1099 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1100 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1101 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1102 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1103 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1104 channel_creation_height: u32,
1106 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1109 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1111 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1114 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1116 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1119 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1121 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1123 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1124 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1127 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1129 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1131 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1132 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1134 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1136 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1137 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1138 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1140 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1142 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1143 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1144 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1146 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1147 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1148 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1150 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1152 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1154 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1155 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1156 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1157 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1159 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1160 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1161 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1163 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1164 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1165 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1167 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1168 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1169 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1170 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1171 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1172 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1173 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1174 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1176 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1177 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1178 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1179 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1180 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1182 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1183 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1185 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1186 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1187 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1188 /// unblock the state machine.
1190 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1191 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1192 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1194 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1195 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1196 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1198 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1199 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1200 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1201 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1202 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1203 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1204 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1205 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1207 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1208 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1210 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1211 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1212 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1214 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1215 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1216 // associated channel mapping.
1218 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1219 // to store all of them.
1220 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1222 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1223 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1224 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1225 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1226 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1228 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1229 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1231 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1232 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1234 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1235 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1236 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1238 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1239 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1240 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1243 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1244 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1245 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1246 self.update_time_counter
1249 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1250 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1253 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1254 self.config.announced_channel
1257 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1258 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1261 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1262 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1263 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1264 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1267 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1268 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1269 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1272 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1273 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1274 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1275 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1276 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1277 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1278 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1281 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1282 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1283 match self.channel_state {
1284 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1285 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1286 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1287 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1288 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1289 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1290 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1292 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1294 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1295 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1299 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1300 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1301 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1302 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1303 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1304 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1307 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1308 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1309 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1313 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1314 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1315 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1316 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1317 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1320 // Public utilities:
1322 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1326 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1328 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1329 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1330 self.temporary_channel_id
1333 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1337 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1338 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1339 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1343 /// Gets the channel's type
1344 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1348 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1350 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1351 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1352 self.short_channel_id
1355 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1356 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1357 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1360 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1361 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1362 self.outbound_scid_alias
1365 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1367 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1368 return &self.holder_signer
1371 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1372 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1373 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1374 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1375 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1376 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1379 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1380 /// get_funding_created.
1381 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1382 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1385 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1386 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1387 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1388 if conf_height > 0 {
1395 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1396 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1397 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1400 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1401 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1402 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1403 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1407 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1410 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1411 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1414 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1415 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1418 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1419 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1420 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1423 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1424 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1427 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1428 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1429 self.counterparty_node_id
1432 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1433 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1434 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1437 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1438 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1439 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1442 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1443 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1445 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1446 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1447 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1448 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1450 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1454 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1455 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1456 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1459 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1460 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1461 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1464 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1465 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1466 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1468 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1469 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1474 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1475 self.channel_value_satoshis
1478 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1479 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1482 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1483 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1486 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1487 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1488 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1490 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1491 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1492 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1493 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1494 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1496 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1500 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1501 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1502 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1505 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1506 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1507 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1510 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1511 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1512 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1515 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1516 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1517 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1520 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1521 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1522 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1525 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1526 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1527 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1530 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1531 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1532 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1533 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1534 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1537 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1539 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1540 self.prev_config = None;
1544 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1545 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1549 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1550 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1551 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1552 let did_channel_update =
1553 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1554 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1555 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1556 if did_channel_update {
1557 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1558 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1559 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1560 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1562 self.config.options = *config;
1566 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1567 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1568 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1569 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1570 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1573 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1574 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1575 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1576 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1577 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1579 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1580 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1581 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1582 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1583 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1584 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1585 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1587 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1588 where L::Target: Logger
1590 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1591 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1592 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1594 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1595 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1596 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1597 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1599 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1600 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1601 if match update_state {
1602 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1603 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1604 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1605 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1606 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1608 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1612 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1613 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1614 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1616 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1618 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1619 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1620 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1622 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1623 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1624 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1625 transaction_output_index: None
1630 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1631 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1632 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1633 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1634 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1637 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1639 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1640 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1641 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1643 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1644 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1647 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1648 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1651 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1653 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1654 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1655 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1657 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1658 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1664 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1666 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1667 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1668 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1669 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1670 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1671 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1672 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1676 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1677 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1679 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1681 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1682 if generated_by_local {
1683 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1684 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1685 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1695 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1697 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1698 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1699 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1700 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1701 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1702 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1703 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1706 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1707 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1708 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1709 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1713 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1714 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1718 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1719 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1721 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1723 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1724 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1726 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1727 if !generated_by_local {
1728 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1736 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1737 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1738 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1739 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1740 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1741 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1742 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1743 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1745 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1747 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1748 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1749 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1750 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1752 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1754 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1755 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1756 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1757 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1760 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1761 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1762 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1763 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1765 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1768 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1769 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1770 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1771 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1773 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1776 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1777 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1782 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1783 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1788 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1790 let channel_parameters =
1791 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1792 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1793 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1800 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1803 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1804 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1805 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1806 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1814 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1815 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1816 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1817 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1822 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1823 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1824 /// our counterparty!)
1825 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1826 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1827 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1828 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1829 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1830 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1831 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1833 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1837 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1838 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1839 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1840 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1841 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1842 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1843 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1845 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1848 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1849 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1850 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1851 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1852 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1855 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1856 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1859 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1863 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1864 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1865 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1866 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1867 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1868 // which are near the dust limit.
1869 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1870 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1871 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1872 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1873 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1875 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1876 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1878 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
1879 cmp::max(2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
1882 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1883 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1884 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1887 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1888 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1890 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1891 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1892 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1893 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1894 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1895 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1896 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1899 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1902 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1903 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1904 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1906 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1907 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1908 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1909 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1910 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1911 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1913 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1914 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1920 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1921 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1923 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1924 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1925 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1926 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1927 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1928 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1929 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1932 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1935 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1936 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1937 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1939 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1940 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1941 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1942 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1943 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1944 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1946 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1947 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1951 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1952 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1953 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1954 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1955 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1956 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1957 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1959 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1960 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1962 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1969 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1970 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1971 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1972 /// corner case properly.
1973 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1974 -> AvailableBalances
1975 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1977 let context = &self;
1978 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1979 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1980 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1982 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1983 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1984 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1985 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1988 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1990 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1991 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1993 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1995 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1997 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1998 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2002 if context.is_outbound() {
2003 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2004 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2006 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2007 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2009 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2010 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2011 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2012 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2015 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2016 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2017 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2018 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2019 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2020 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2021 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2024 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2025 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2026 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2027 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2028 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2029 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2030 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2031 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2032 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2033 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2034 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2036 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2039 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2040 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2041 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2042 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2043 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2046 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2047 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2049 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2050 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2051 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2053 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2054 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2055 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2056 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2060 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2062 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2063 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2064 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2065 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2066 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2067 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2068 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2070 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2071 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2073 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2074 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2075 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2077 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2078 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2079 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2080 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2081 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2084 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2085 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2086 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2087 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2088 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2089 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2092 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2093 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2094 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2096 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2100 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2101 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2103 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2104 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2108 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2109 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2110 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2111 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2113 outbound_capacity_msat,
2114 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2115 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2120 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2121 let context = &self;
2122 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2125 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2126 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2128 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2129 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2131 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2132 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2134 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2135 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2136 let context = &self;
2137 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2139 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2142 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2143 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2145 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2146 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2148 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2149 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2151 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2152 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2156 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2157 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2163 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2164 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2165 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2168 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2169 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2170 included_htlcs += 1;
2173 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2174 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2178 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2179 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2180 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2181 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2182 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2183 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2188 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2190 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2191 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2196 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2197 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2201 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2202 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2203 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2206 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2207 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2209 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2210 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2211 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2213 total_pending_htlcs,
2214 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2215 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2216 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2218 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2219 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2220 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2222 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2224 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2229 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2230 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2232 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2233 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2235 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2236 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2238 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2239 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2240 let context = &self;
2241 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2243 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2246 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2247 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2249 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2250 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2252 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2253 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2255 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2256 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2260 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2261 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2267 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2268 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2269 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2270 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2271 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2272 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2275 included_htlcs += 1;
2278 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2279 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2282 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2283 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2285 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2286 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2287 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2292 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2293 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2294 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2298 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2300 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2301 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2303 total_pending_htlcs,
2304 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2305 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2306 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2308 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2309 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2310 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2312 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2314 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2319 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2320 match self.channel_state {
2321 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2322 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2323 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
2324 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
2334 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2336 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2337 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2340 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2342 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2343 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2344 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2348 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2349 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2350 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2353 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2355 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2356 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2359 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2360 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2361 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2362 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2363 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2364 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
2365 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2366 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2367 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2368 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2369 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2371 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2372 // return them to fail the payment.
2373 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2374 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2375 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2377 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2378 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2383 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2384 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2385 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2386 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2387 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2388 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2389 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2390 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2391 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2392 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2395 if generate_monitor_update {
2396 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2397 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2398 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2399 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2400 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2404 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2405 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
2407 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2408 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2412 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2413 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2414 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2415 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
2416 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
2417 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2418 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
2419 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
2423 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2424 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2425 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2426 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2428 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2429 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2430 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2431 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2433 match &self.holder_signer {
2434 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2435 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2436 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2437 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2438 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2441 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2445 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2446 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
2447 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
2449 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
2450 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2451 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2453 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2454 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2455 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2458 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2459 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2461 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2468 // Internal utility functions for channels
2470 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2471 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2472 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2474 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2476 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2477 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2478 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2480 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2483 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2485 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2488 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2489 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2490 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2492 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2494 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2495 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2496 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2497 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2498 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2501 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2502 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2503 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2504 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2505 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2506 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2507 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2510 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2511 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2513 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2514 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2517 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2518 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2519 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2520 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2521 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2522 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2525 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2526 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2527 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2528 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2531 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2532 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2534 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2535 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2536 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2540 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2541 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2542 trait FailHTLCContents {
2543 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2544 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2545 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2546 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2548 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2549 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2550 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2551 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2553 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2554 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2556 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2557 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2560 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
2561 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
2562 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2563 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2566 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2567 failure_code: self.1
2570 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2571 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
2573 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2574 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2576 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
2577 failure_code: self.1
2582 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2583 fn name() -> &'static str;
2585 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2586 fn name() -> &'static str {
2590 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2591 fn name() -> &'static str {
2592 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2596 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2597 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2598 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2600 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2601 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2602 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2603 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2605 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2606 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2608 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2610 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2611 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2612 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2613 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2615 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2616 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2626 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2627 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2628 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2629 // outside of those situations will fail.
2630 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2634 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2639 1 + // script length (0)
2643 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2644 2 + // witness marker and flag
2645 1 + // witness element count
2646 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2647 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2648 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2649 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2650 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2651 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2653 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2654 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2655 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2661 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2662 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2663 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2664 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2666 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2667 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2668 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2670 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2671 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2672 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2673 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2674 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2675 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2678 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2679 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2682 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2683 value_to_holder = 0;
2686 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2687 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2688 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2689 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2691 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2692 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2695 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2696 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2699 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2702 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2703 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2705 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2707 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2708 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2709 where L::Target: Logger {
2710 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2711 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2712 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2713 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2714 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2715 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2716 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2717 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2721 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2722 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2723 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2724 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2726 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2727 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2730 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2731 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2732 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2734 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2735 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2736 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2737 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2738 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2739 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2740 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2742 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2743 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2744 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2746 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2747 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2749 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2752 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2753 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2757 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2761 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2762 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2763 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2764 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2765 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2766 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2769 // Now update local state:
2771 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2772 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2773 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2774 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2775 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2776 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
2777 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2778 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2782 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2783 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2784 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2785 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2786 // do not not get into this branch.
2787 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2788 match pending_update {
2789 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2790 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2791 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2792 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2793 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2794 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2795 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2798 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2799 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2801 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2802 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2803 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2804 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2805 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2806 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2812 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2813 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2814 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2816 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2817 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2818 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2820 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2821 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2824 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2825 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2827 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2828 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2830 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2831 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2834 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2837 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2838 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2839 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2840 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2845 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2846 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2847 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2848 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2849 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2850 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2851 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2852 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2853 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2854 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2855 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2856 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2857 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2858 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2859 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2861 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2862 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2863 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2864 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2865 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2868 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2869 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2870 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2876 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2877 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2879 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2883 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2884 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2885 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2886 /// before we fail backwards.
2888 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2889 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2890 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2891 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2892 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2893 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2894 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2897 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
2898 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
2900 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
2901 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
2902 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
2903 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2904 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
2905 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2908 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2909 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2910 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2911 /// before we fail backwards.
2913 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2914 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2915 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2916 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
2917 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
2919 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2920 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2921 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2924 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2925 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2926 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2928 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2929 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2930 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2932 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2933 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2934 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2936 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2941 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2948 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2949 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2950 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2951 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2952 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2956 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2957 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2958 force_holding_cell = true;
2961 // Now update local state:
2962 if force_holding_cell {
2963 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2964 match pending_update {
2965 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2966 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2967 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2968 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2972 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2973 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2975 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2976 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2977 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2983 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2984 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
2988 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
2989 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
2991 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2992 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
2995 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
2998 // Message handlers:
2999 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3000 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3001 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3002 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3003 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3004 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3005 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3008 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3010 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3012 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3013 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3014 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3015 debug_assert!(matches!(
3016 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3018 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3019 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3022 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3023 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3025 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3026 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3027 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3028 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3030 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3033 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3034 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3035 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3038 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3039 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3040 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3041 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3042 // when routing outbound payments.
3043 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3047 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3048 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3049 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3050 match &self.context.channel_state {
3051 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3052 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
3053 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3054 if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3055 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3056 check_reconnection = true;
3057 } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3058 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3059 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3060 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3061 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3063 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3064 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3067 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3068 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3069 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3071 if check_reconnection {
3072 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3073 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3074 let expected_point =
3075 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3076 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3078 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3079 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3080 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3081 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3082 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3083 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3085 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3086 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3087 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3088 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3089 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3091 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3092 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3097 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3098 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3100 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3102 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3105 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3106 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3107 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3108 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3109 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3110 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3112 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3113 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3115 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3116 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3117 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3119 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3120 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3123 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3124 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3126 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3129 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3132 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3136 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3137 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3138 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3141 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3145 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3146 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3147 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3148 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3149 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3150 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3151 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3152 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3153 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3154 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3155 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3157 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3158 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3159 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3160 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3161 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3162 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3166 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3167 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3170 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3171 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3172 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3174 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3175 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3176 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3177 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3178 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3179 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3180 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3184 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3185 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3186 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3187 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3188 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3189 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3190 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3194 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3195 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3196 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3197 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3198 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3202 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3203 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3205 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3206 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3207 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3209 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3210 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3214 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3217 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3222 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3223 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3227 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3228 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3229 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3230 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3231 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3232 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3233 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3234 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3235 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3237 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3238 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3239 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3240 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3241 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3244 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3245 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3246 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3247 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3251 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3254 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3255 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3258 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3259 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3260 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3264 // Now update local state:
3265 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3266 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3267 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3268 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3269 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3270 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3271 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3276 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3278 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3279 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3280 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3281 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3282 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3283 None => fail_reason.into(),
3284 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3285 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3286 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3289 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3293 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3295 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3296 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3298 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3304 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3307 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3308 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3309 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3311 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3312 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3315 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3318 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3319 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3322 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3326 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3330 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3331 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3332 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3334 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3335 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3338 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3342 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3343 where L::Target: Logger
3345 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3348 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3351 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3355 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3357 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3359 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3360 let commitment_txid = {
3361 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3362 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3363 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3365 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3366 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3367 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3368 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3369 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3370 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3374 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3376 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3377 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3378 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3379 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3382 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3383 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3384 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3385 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3388 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3390 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3391 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3392 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3393 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3394 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3395 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3396 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3397 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3398 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3399 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3400 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3406 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3407 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3410 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3411 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3412 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3413 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3414 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3415 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3416 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3417 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3418 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3419 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3420 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3421 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3422 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3425 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3426 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3427 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3428 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3429 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3430 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3431 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3433 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3434 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3435 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3436 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3437 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3438 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3439 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3442 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3443 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3446 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3448 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3449 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3450 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3453 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3456 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3457 commitment_stats.tx,
3459 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3460 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3461 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3464 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3465 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3467 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3468 let mut need_commitment = false;
3469 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3470 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3471 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3472 need_commitment = true;
3476 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3477 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3478 Some(forward_info.clone())
3480 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3481 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3482 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3483 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3484 need_commitment = true;
3487 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3488 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3489 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3490 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3491 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3492 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3493 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3494 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3495 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3496 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3497 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3498 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3499 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3500 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3502 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3504 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3505 need_commitment = true;
3509 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3510 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3511 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3512 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3513 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3514 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3515 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3517 nondust_htlc_sources,
3521 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3522 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3523 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3524 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3525 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3527 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3528 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3529 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3530 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3531 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3532 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3533 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3534 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3535 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3536 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3537 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3538 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3539 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3540 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3542 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3543 &self.context.channel_id);
3544 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3547 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3548 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3549 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3550 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3551 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3552 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3553 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3554 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3555 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3559 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3560 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3561 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3562 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3565 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3566 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3567 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3568 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3569 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3570 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3571 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3573 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3574 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3575 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3578 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3579 /// for our counterparty.
3580 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3581 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3582 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3583 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3585 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3586 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3587 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3588 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3590 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3591 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3592 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3593 updates: Vec::new(),
3596 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3597 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3598 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3599 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3600 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3601 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3602 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3603 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3604 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3605 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3606 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3607 // to rebalance channels.
3608 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
3609 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3610 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3611 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3613 match self.send_htlc(
3614 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3615 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3617 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3620 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3621 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3622 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3623 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3624 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3625 // into the holding cell without ever being
3626 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3627 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3628 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3631 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3638 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3639 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3640 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3641 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3642 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3643 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3644 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3645 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3646 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3647 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3648 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3649 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3652 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3653 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
3654 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3656 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
3657 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
3658 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
3661 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
3663 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
3664 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3665 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3666 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3667 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3668 // for a full revocation before failing.
3669 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
3670 update_fail_count += 1;
3672 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
3674 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3679 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3680 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3682 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3683 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3688 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3689 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3690 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3691 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3692 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3694 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3695 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3696 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3698 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3699 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3705 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3706 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3707 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3708 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3709 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3710 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3711 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3712 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3713 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3715 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3716 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3718 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3719 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3721 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3725 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3727 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3728 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3729 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3733 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3734 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3735 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3736 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3737 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3738 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3739 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3740 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3741 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3744 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3746 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3747 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3750 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3751 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3752 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3753 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3755 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3757 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3762 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3763 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3764 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3765 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3766 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3767 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3768 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3769 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3770 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3774 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3775 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3776 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3777 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3778 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3779 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3780 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3781 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3782 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3784 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3785 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3788 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3789 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3790 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3791 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3792 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3793 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3794 let mut require_commitment = false;
3795 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3798 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3799 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3800 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3801 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3803 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3804 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3805 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3806 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3807 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3808 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3810 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3814 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3815 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3816 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3817 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3818 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3820 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3821 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3822 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3827 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3828 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3830 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3834 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3835 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3837 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3838 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3839 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3840 require_commitment = true;
3841 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3842 match forward_info {
3843 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3844 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3845 require_commitment = true;
3847 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3848 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3849 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3851 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3852 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3853 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3857 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3858 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3859 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3860 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3866 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3867 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3868 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3869 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3870 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3872 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3873 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3874 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3875 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3876 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3877 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3878 require_commitment = true;
3882 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3884 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3885 match update_state {
3886 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3887 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3888 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3889 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3890 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3891 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3893 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3894 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3895 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3896 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3897 require_commitment = true;
3898 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3899 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3904 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3905 let release_state_str =
3906 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3907 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3908 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3909 if !release_monitor {
3910 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3911 update: monitor_update,
3913 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3915 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3920 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3921 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3922 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3923 if require_commitment {
3924 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3925 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3926 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3927 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3929 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3930 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3931 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3932 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3933 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3935 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3936 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3937 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3938 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3939 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3942 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3943 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3944 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3945 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3946 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3947 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3949 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3950 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3952 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3953 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3955 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3956 if require_commitment {
3957 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3959 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3960 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3961 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3962 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3964 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3965 &self.context.channel_id(),
3966 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3969 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3970 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3972 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3973 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3975 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3976 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3982 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3983 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3984 /// commitment update.
3985 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3986 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3987 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3989 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3990 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3993 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3994 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3995 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3996 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3998 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3999 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4000 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4001 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4002 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4003 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4004 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4006 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4007 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4009 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4010 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4012 if !self.context.is_live() {
4013 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4016 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4017 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4018 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4019 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4020 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4021 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4022 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4023 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4024 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4025 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4029 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4030 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4031 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4032 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4033 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4034 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4037 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4038 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4042 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4043 force_holding_cell = true;
4046 if force_holding_cell {
4047 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4051 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4052 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4054 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4055 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4060 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4061 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4063 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4065 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4066 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4067 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4068 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4072 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4073 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4074 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4078 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4079 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4082 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4083 // will be retransmitted.
4084 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4085 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4086 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4088 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4089 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4091 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4092 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4093 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4094 // this HTLC accordingly
4095 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4098 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4099 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4100 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4101 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4104 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4105 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4106 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4107 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4108 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4109 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4114 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4116 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4117 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4118 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4119 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4123 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4124 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4125 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4126 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4127 // the update upon reconnection.
4128 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4132 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4134 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4135 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4139 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4140 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4141 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4142 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4143 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4144 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4145 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4147 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4148 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4149 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4150 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4151 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4152 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4153 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4155 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4156 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4157 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4158 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4159 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4160 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4161 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4164 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4165 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4166 /// to the remote side.
4167 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4168 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4169 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4170 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4173 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4175 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4176 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4178 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4179 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4180 // first received the funding_signed.
4181 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4182 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4183 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4184 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4186 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4188 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4189 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4190 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4191 funding_broadcastable = None;
4194 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4195 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4196 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4197 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4198 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4199 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4200 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4201 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4202 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4203 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4204 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4205 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4206 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4207 next_per_commitment_point,
4208 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4212 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4214 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4215 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4216 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4217 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4218 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4219 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4221 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4222 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4223 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4224 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4225 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4226 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4230 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4231 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4233 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4234 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4236 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4237 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4240 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4241 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4242 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4243 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4244 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4245 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4246 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4247 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4248 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4252 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4253 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4255 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4258 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4261 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4263 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4264 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4265 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4266 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4267 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4268 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4269 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4270 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4271 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4272 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4273 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4274 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4276 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4278 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4284 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4286 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4287 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4288 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4289 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4291 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4292 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4294 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4295 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4298 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4299 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4300 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4301 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4303 SignerResumeUpdates {
4310 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4311 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4312 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4313 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4314 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4315 per_commitment_secret,
4316 next_per_commitment_point,
4318 next_local_nonce: None,
4322 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4323 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4324 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4325 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4326 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4327 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4329 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4330 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4331 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4332 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4333 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4334 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4335 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4336 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4337 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4338 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4339 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4344 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4345 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4347 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4348 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4349 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4350 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4351 reason: err_packet.clone()
4354 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4355 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4356 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4357 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4358 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4359 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4362 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4363 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4364 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4365 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4366 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4373 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4374 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4375 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4376 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4380 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4381 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4382 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4383 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4384 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4385 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4386 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4390 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
4391 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
4393 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
4394 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4395 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4396 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4401 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4402 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4407 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4408 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4409 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4410 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4411 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4412 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4413 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4418 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4419 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4421 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4422 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4423 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4424 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4425 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4426 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4427 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4428 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4431 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4433 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4434 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4435 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4436 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4440 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4441 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4445 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4446 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4447 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4448 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4449 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4450 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4453 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4454 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4455 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4456 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4457 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4460 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4461 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4462 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4463 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4464 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4465 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4466 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4467 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4471 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4472 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4473 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4474 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4475 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4476 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4477 our_commitment_transaction
4481 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4482 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4483 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4484 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4486 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4488 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4490 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4491 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4492 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4493 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4494 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4495 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4497 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4498 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4499 channel_ready: None,
4500 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4501 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4502 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4506 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4507 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4508 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4509 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4510 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4511 next_per_commitment_point,
4512 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4514 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4515 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4516 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4520 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4521 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4522 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4524 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4525 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4526 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4529 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4532 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4533 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4534 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4535 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4536 our_commitment_transaction
4540 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4541 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4542 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4543 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4544 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4545 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4546 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4548 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4550 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4551 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4552 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4553 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4554 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4555 next_per_commitment_point,
4556 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4560 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4561 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4562 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4564 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4567 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4568 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4569 raa: required_revoke,
4570 commitment_update: None,
4571 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4573 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4574 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4575 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4577 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4580 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4581 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4582 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4583 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4584 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4585 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4588 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4589 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4590 raa: required_revoke,
4591 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4592 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4595 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4596 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4597 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4598 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4599 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4602 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4603 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4604 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4605 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4610 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4611 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4612 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4613 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4615 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4617 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4619 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4620 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4621 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4622 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4623 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4624 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4625 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4626 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4628 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4629 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4630 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4631 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4632 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4634 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4635 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4636 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4637 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4640 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4641 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4642 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4643 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4644 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4645 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4646 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4647 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4648 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4649 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4650 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4651 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4652 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4653 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4654 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4656 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4659 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4660 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4663 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4664 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4665 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4666 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4667 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4668 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4671 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4672 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4673 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4674 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4675 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4676 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4677 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4679 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4685 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4686 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4687 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4688 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4690 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4691 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4692 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4693 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4694 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4695 return Ok((None, None, None));
4698 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4699 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4700 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4702 return Ok((None, None, None));
4705 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4706 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4707 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4708 return Ok((None, None, None));
4711 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4713 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4714 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4715 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4716 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4718 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4719 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4721 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4722 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4724 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4725 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4726 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4727 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4729 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4730 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4731 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4735 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4741 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4742 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4744 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4745 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4748 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4749 /// within our expected timeframe.
4751 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4752 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4753 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4756 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4759 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4760 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4764 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4765 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4767 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4770 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4771 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4772 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4773 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4774 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4776 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4777 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4778 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4781 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4783 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4784 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4787 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4788 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4789 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4792 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4795 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4796 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4797 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4798 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4800 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4803 assert!(send_shutdown);
4804 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4805 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4806 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4808 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4809 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4811 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4816 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4818 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4819 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4821 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4822 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4823 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4824 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4825 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4826 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4827 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4830 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4831 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4833 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4834 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4835 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4836 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4840 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4841 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4842 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4843 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4844 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4845 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4847 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4848 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4855 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4856 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4858 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4861 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4862 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4864 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4866 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4867 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4868 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4869 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4870 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4871 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4872 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4873 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4874 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4876 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4877 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4880 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4884 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4885 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4886 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4887 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4889 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4890 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4892 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4893 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4895 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4898 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4899 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4902 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4903 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4906 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4907 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4908 return Ok((None, None, None));
4911 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4912 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4913 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4914 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4916 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4918 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4921 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4922 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4923 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4924 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4925 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4929 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4930 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4935 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4936 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4937 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4938 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4939 closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
4940 monitor_update: None,
4941 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4942 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4943 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4944 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
4945 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
4946 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4947 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
4948 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
4950 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4951 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4952 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4953 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4957 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4959 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4960 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4961 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4962 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4964 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4967 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4968 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4970 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4971 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4972 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4973 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4974 closure_reason: ClosureReason::CooperativeClosure,
4975 monitor_update: None,
4976 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4977 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4978 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4979 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
4980 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
4981 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4982 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
4983 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
4985 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4986 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4987 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4988 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4993 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4994 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4995 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4996 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4998 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4999 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5000 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5002 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5004 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5011 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5012 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5013 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5015 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5016 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5018 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5019 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5022 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5023 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5024 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5025 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5026 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5028 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5030 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5032 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5033 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5036 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5037 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5038 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5039 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5040 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5041 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5042 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5043 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5048 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5049 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5050 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5051 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5057 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5058 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5059 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5060 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5062 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5068 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5069 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5070 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5071 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5072 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5073 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5074 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5076 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5077 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5080 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5082 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5083 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5089 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5090 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5091 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5092 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5093 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5094 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5095 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5097 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5098 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5105 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5106 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5109 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5110 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5113 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5114 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5118 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5119 &self.context.holder_signer
5123 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5125 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5126 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5127 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5128 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5129 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5130 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5132 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5134 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5142 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5143 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5147 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5148 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5149 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5150 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5153 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5154 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5155 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5156 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5159 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5160 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5161 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5162 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5163 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5164 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5167 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5168 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5169 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5170 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5171 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5172 if !release_monitor {
5173 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5182 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
5183 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
5184 /// here after logging them.
5185 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
5186 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
5187 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
5188 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
5191 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
5192 update.update.update_id,
5202 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5203 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5206 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5207 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5208 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5210 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5211 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5213 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5214 if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5216 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5217 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5218 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5221 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5222 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5223 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5224 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5225 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5226 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5228 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5229 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5230 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5232 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5233 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5234 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5235 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5236 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5237 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5243 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5244 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5245 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5246 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5249 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5250 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5251 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5254 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5255 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5256 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5259 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5260 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5261 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5262 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5263 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5266 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5267 self.context.channel_update_status
5270 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5271 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5272 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5275 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5277 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5278 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5279 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5283 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5284 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5285 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5288 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5292 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5293 // channel_ready yet.
5294 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5298 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5299 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5300 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5301 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5303 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5304 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5305 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5307 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5308 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5311 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5312 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5314 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5315 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5316 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5317 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5318 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5319 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5320 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5321 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5323 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5327 if need_commitment_update {
5328 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5329 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5330 let next_per_commitment_point =
5331 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5332 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5333 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5334 next_per_commitment_point,
5335 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5339 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5345 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5346 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5347 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5348 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5349 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5350 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5351 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5353 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5356 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5357 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5358 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5359 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5360 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5361 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5362 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5363 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5364 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5365 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5366 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5367 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5368 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5369 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5370 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5371 // channel and move on.
5372 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5373 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5375 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5376 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5377 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5379 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5380 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5381 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5382 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5383 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5384 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5385 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5386 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5391 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5392 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5393 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5394 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5395 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5398 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5399 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5400 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5401 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5402 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5403 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5406 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5407 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5408 // may have already happened for this block).
5409 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5410 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5411 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5412 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5415 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5416 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5417 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5418 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5426 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5427 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5428 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5429 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5431 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5432 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5435 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5437 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5438 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5439 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5440 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5442 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5445 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5448 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5449 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5450 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5451 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5453 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5456 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5457 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5458 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5460 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5461 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5463 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5464 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5465 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5473 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5475 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5476 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5477 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5479 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5480 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5483 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5484 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5485 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5486 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5487 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5488 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5489 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5490 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5493 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5494 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5495 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5496 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5498 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5499 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5500 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5502 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5503 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5504 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5505 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5507 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5508 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5509 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5510 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5511 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5512 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5513 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5516 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5517 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5519 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5522 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5523 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5524 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5525 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5526 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5527 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5528 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5529 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5530 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5531 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5532 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5533 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5534 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5535 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5536 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5537 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5538 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5544 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5549 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5550 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5552 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5553 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5554 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5555 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5557 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5560 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5562 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5563 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5564 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5565 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5566 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5567 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5569 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5570 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5573 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5574 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5575 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5576 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5577 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5578 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5580 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5581 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5584 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5585 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5586 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5587 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5588 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5594 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5595 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5596 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5597 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5599 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5602 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5606 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5610 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5611 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5615 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5619 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5620 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5623 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5627 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5629 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5634 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5635 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5636 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5638 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5643 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5645 None => return None,
5648 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5650 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5651 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5653 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5654 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5657 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5663 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5665 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5666 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5667 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5668 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5669 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5670 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5671 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5673 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5674 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5675 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5676 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5677 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5678 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5679 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5680 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5681 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5682 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5683 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5684 contents: announcement,
5687 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5692 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5696 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5697 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5698 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5699 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5700 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5701 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5702 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5703 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5705 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5707 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5708 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5709 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5710 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5712 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5713 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5714 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5715 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5718 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5719 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5720 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5721 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5724 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5727 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5728 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5729 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5730 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5731 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5732 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5735 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5737 Err(_) => return None,
5739 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5740 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5745 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5746 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5747 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5748 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5749 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5750 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5751 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5752 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5753 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5754 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5755 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5756 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5757 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5758 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5759 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5760 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5763 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5766 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5767 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5768 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5769 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5770 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5771 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5772 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5773 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5774 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5776 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5777 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5778 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5779 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5780 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5781 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5782 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5783 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5784 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5786 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5787 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5788 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5789 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5790 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5791 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5792 next_funding_txid: None,
5797 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5799 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5800 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5801 /// commitment update.
5803 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5804 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5805 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5806 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5807 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5808 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5809 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5812 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5813 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5814 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5816 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5817 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5822 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5823 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5825 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5827 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5828 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5830 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5831 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5832 /// regenerate them.
5834 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5835 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5837 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5838 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5839 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5840 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5841 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5842 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5843 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5844 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5846 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5847 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5848 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5850 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5852 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5853 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5854 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5857 if amount_msat == 0 {
5858 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5861 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5862 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5863 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5864 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5867 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5868 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5869 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5872 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5873 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5874 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5875 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5876 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5877 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5878 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5879 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5882 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5883 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5884 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5885 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5886 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5887 else { "to peer" });
5889 if need_holding_cell {
5890 force_holding_cell = true;
5893 // Now update local state:
5894 if force_holding_cell {
5895 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5900 onion_routing_packet,
5907 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5908 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5910 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5912 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5918 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5919 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5920 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5924 onion_routing_packet,
5928 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5933 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5934 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5935 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5936 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5938 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5939 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5940 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5942 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5943 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5947 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5948 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5949 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5950 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5951 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5952 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5953 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5956 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5957 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5958 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5959 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5960 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5961 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5964 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5966 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5967 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5968 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5969 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5970 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5972 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5973 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5976 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5977 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5978 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5979 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5980 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5981 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5982 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5983 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5984 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5985 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5986 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5987 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5990 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5994 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5995 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5996 where L::Target: Logger
5998 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5999 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6000 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6002 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6004 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6005 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6006 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6007 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6008 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6009 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6010 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6011 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6012 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6013 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6014 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6020 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6023 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6024 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6025 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6026 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6027 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6028 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6030 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6031 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6032 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6034 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6035 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6036 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6039 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6040 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6044 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6045 &commitment_stats.tx,
6046 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6047 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6048 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6049 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6051 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6053 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6054 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6055 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6056 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6058 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6059 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6060 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6061 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6062 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6063 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6067 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6068 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6072 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6073 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6075 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6081 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6082 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6084 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6085 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6086 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6087 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6088 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6089 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6090 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6091 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6093 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6094 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6095 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6098 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6099 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6100 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6106 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6108 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6109 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6110 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6111 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6112 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6114 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6116 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6122 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6123 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6124 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6125 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6126 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6128 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6129 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6130 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6133 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6134 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6136 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6137 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6139 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6140 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6142 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6143 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6144 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6147 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6150 // use override shutdown script if provided
6151 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6152 Some(script) => script,
6154 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6155 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6156 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6157 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6161 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6162 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6164 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6169 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6170 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6171 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6172 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6174 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6175 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6176 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6177 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6178 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6179 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6180 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6183 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6184 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6186 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6187 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6188 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6191 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6192 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6193 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6194 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6195 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6197 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6198 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6205 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6206 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6208 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6211 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6212 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6213 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6215 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6216 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6220 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6224 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6225 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6226 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6227 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6230 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6231 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6232 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6233 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6234 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6235 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6236 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6237 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6239 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6240 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6241 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6242 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6244 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6245 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6247 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6248 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6250 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6251 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6252 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6254 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6255 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6257 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6258 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6259 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6260 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6261 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6264 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6265 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6267 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6268 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6270 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6272 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6274 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6275 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6276 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6277 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6280 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6281 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6283 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6284 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6285 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6286 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6290 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6291 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6292 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6296 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6297 Ok(script) => script,
6298 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6301 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6304 context: ChannelContext {
6307 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6308 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6309 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6310 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6315 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6317 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6318 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6319 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6320 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6322 channel_value_satoshis,
6324 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6326 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6327 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6330 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6331 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6334 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6335 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6336 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6337 pending_update_fee: None,
6338 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6339 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6340 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6341 update_time_counter: 1,
6343 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6345 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6346 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6347 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6348 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6349 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6350 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6352 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6353 signer_pending_funding: false,
6355 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6356 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6357 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6358 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6360 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6361 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6362 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6363 closing_fee_limits: None,
6364 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6366 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6367 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6368 short_channel_id: None,
6369 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6371 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6372 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6373 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6374 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6375 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6376 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6377 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6378 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6379 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6380 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6381 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6382 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6384 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6386 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6387 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6388 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6389 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6390 counterparty_parameters: None,
6391 funding_outpoint: None,
6392 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6394 funding_transaction: None,
6395 is_batch_funding: None,
6397 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6398 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6399 counterparty_node_id,
6401 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6403 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6405 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6406 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6408 announcement_sigs: None,
6410 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6411 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6412 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6413 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6415 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6416 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6418 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6419 outbound_scid_alias,
6421 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6422 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6424 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6425 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6430 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6432 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6436 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6437 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6438 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6439 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6440 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6441 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6442 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6443 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6444 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6446 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6451 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6452 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6453 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6456 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6457 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6458 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6459 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6462 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6464 next_local_nonce: None,
6468 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6469 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6470 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6471 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6472 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6473 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6474 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6475 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6476 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6477 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6478 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6481 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6482 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6484 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6486 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6487 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6488 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6489 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6492 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6493 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6495 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6497 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6498 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6500 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6501 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6502 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6503 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6504 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6505 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6508 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6509 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6511 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6512 if funding_created.is_none() {
6513 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
6514 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
6516 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
6517 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6518 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6519 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6527 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6528 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6529 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6530 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6531 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6532 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6533 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6534 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6535 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6536 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6539 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6540 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6541 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6542 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6543 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6544 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6550 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6551 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6552 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6553 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6554 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6555 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6557 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6559 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6561 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6562 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6567 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6568 // We've exhausted our options
6571 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6572 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6575 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6576 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6577 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6578 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6580 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6581 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6582 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6583 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6584 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6585 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6587 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6589 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6590 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6593 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6594 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6595 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6597 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6598 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6601 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6602 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6605 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6606 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6610 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6611 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6612 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6613 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6614 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6615 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6616 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6617 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6618 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6619 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6620 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6621 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6622 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6623 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6624 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6625 first_per_commitment_point,
6626 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6627 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6628 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6629 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6631 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6636 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6637 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6639 // Check sanity of message fields:
6640 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6643 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6646 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6647 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6649 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6650 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6652 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6653 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6655 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6657 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6659 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6660 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6661 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6663 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6664 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6665 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6667 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6668 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6670 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6671 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6674 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6675 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6676 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6678 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6679 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6681 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6682 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6684 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6685 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6687 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6688 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6690 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6691 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6693 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6694 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6697 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6698 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6699 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6701 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6702 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6704 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6705 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6706 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6708 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6709 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6712 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6713 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6714 &Some(ref script) => {
6715 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6716 if script.len() == 0 {
6719 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6720 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6722 Some(script.clone())
6725 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6727 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6732 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6733 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6734 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6735 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6736 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6738 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6739 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6741 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6744 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6745 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6746 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6747 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6748 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6749 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6752 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6753 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6754 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6757 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6758 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6760 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6761 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6763 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6768 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6769 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6770 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6771 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6772 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6776 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6777 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6779 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6780 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6782 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6783 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6784 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6785 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6788 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6790 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6791 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6792 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6793 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6795 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6796 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6798 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6799 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6801 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6802 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6803 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6804 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6805 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6806 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6810 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6811 initial_commitment_tx,
6814 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6815 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6819 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6820 if validated.is_err() {
6821 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6824 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6825 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6826 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6827 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6828 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6829 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6830 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6831 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6832 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6833 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6834 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6835 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6837 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6838 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6839 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6840 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6841 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6842 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6843 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6844 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6846 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6847 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6848 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6850 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6852 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6853 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6855 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6857 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6859 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6860 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6861 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6864 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6866 #[cfg(async_signing)]
6867 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6868 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6869 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6870 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6875 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6876 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6877 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6878 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6881 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
6882 /// [`msgs::OpenChannel`].
6883 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
6884 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6885 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
6886 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
6887 if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6888 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6889 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6892 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6893 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6894 // `static_remote_key`.
6895 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6898 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6899 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6900 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6902 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6903 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6904 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6906 Ok(channel_type.clone())
6908 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6909 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6910 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6916 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6917 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6918 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6919 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6920 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6921 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6922 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6923 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6924 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6925 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6926 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6929 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6930 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6932 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6933 // support this channel type.
6934 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(msg, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
6936 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6937 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6938 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6939 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6940 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6941 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6942 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6943 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6944 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6947 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6948 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6951 // Check sanity of message fields:
6952 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6953 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6955 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6956 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6958 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6959 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6961 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6962 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6965 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6966 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6968 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6971 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6973 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6974 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6975 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6977 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6980 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6984 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6985 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6986 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6988 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6989 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6991 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6992 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6994 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6995 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6997 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6998 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7000 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7001 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7003 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7007 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
7009 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
7010 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
7011 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
7015 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
7016 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7017 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7018 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7021 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
7022 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
7024 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7025 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
7026 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7028 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
7029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7032 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
7033 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
7034 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
7035 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
7039 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
7040 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
7041 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
7042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
7045 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
7046 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
7047 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
7048 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7049 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
7052 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7053 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7054 &Some(ref script) => {
7055 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7056 if script.len() == 0 {
7059 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7060 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
7062 Some(script.clone())
7065 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7067 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7072 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
7073 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7074 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
7075 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
7079 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7080 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7085 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7086 Ok(script) => script,
7087 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7090 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7091 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7093 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7096 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7100 context: ChannelContext {
7103 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7104 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7106 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7111 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7113 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7114 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7115 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7116 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7118 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7121 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7123 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7124 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7127 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7128 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7129 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7131 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7132 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7133 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7134 pending_update_fee: None,
7135 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7136 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7137 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7138 update_time_counter: 1,
7140 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7142 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7143 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7144 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7145 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7146 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7147 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7149 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7150 signer_pending_funding: false,
7152 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7153 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7154 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7155 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7157 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7158 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7159 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7160 closing_fee_limits: None,
7161 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7163 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7164 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7165 short_channel_id: None,
7166 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7168 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7169 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7170 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7171 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7172 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7173 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7174 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7175 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7176 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7177 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7178 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7179 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7182 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7184 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7185 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7186 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7187 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7188 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7189 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7190 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7192 funding_outpoint: None,
7193 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7195 funding_transaction: None,
7196 is_batch_funding: None,
7198 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7199 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7200 counterparty_node_id,
7202 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7204 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7206 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7207 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7209 announcement_sigs: None,
7211 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7212 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7213 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7214 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7216 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7217 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7219 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7220 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7222 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7223 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7225 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7226 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7231 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7233 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7239 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7240 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7242 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7243 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7244 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7245 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7248 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7249 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7251 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7253 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7254 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7257 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7260 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7261 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7262 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7264 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7265 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7266 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7267 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7269 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7270 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7271 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7272 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7273 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7274 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7275 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7276 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7277 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7278 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7279 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7280 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7281 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7282 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7283 first_per_commitment_point,
7284 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7285 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7286 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7288 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7290 next_local_nonce: None,
7294 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7295 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7297 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7299 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7300 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7303 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7304 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7306 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7307 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7308 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7309 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7310 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7311 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7312 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7313 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7314 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7315 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7316 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7318 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7321 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7322 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7323 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7327 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7328 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7331 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7332 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7334 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7335 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7337 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7339 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7340 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7341 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7342 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7345 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7346 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7347 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7348 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7349 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7351 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7353 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7354 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7355 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7358 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7359 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7360 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7364 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7365 initial_commitment_tx,
7368 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7369 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7372 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7373 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7376 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7378 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7379 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
7380 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7381 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7383 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7385 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7386 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7387 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7388 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7389 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7390 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7391 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7392 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7393 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7394 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7395 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7397 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
7398 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7399 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7400 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7401 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7402 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7403 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7405 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7406 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7408 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7409 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7410 let mut channel = Channel {
7411 context: self.context,
7413 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7414 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7416 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7420 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7421 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7423 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7429 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7430 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7431 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7432 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7433 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7435 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7436 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7437 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7438 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7444 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7445 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7446 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7447 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7448 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7449 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7454 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7455 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7456 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7457 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7459 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7460 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7461 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7462 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7467 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7468 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7469 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7470 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7471 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7472 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7477 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7478 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7479 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7482 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7484 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7485 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7486 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7487 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7488 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7490 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7491 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7492 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7493 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7495 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7497 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7498 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7499 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7501 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7503 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7505 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7507 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7508 // deserialized from that format.
7509 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7510 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7511 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7513 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7515 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7516 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7517 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7519 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7520 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7521 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7522 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7525 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7526 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7527 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7530 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7531 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7532 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7533 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7535 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7536 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7538 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7540 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7542 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7544 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7547 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7549 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7554 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7555 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7556 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7558 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7559 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7560 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7561 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7562 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7563 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7564 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7566 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7568 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7570 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7573 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7574 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7575 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7578 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7580 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7581 preimages.push(preimage);
7583 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7584 reason.write(writer)?;
7586 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7588 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7589 preimages.push(preimage);
7591 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7592 reason.write(writer)?;
7595 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7596 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7599 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7600 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7601 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7602 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7603 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7604 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7606 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7607 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7608 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7611 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7612 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7613 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7614 source.write(writer)?;
7615 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7617 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7618 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7620 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7622 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7623 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7625 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7627 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7628 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7630 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7631 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7633 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7634 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7635 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7637 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7639 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7640 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7645 match self.context.resend_order {
7646 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7647 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7650 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7651 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7652 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7654 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7655 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7656 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7657 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7660 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7661 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7662 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7663 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7664 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7667 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7668 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7669 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7670 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7672 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7673 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7674 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7676 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7678 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7679 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7680 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7681 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7683 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7684 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7685 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7686 // consider the stale state on reload.
7689 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7690 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7691 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7693 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7694 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7695 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7697 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7698 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7700 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7701 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7702 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7704 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7705 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7707 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7710 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7711 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7712 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7714 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7717 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7718 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7720 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7721 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7722 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7724 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7726 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7728 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7730 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7731 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7732 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7733 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7734 htlc.write(writer)?;
7737 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7738 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7739 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7741 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7742 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7744 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7745 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7746 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7747 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7748 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7749 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7750 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7752 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7753 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7754 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7755 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7756 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7758 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7759 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7761 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7762 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7763 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7764 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7766 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7768 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7769 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7770 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7771 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7772 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7773 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7774 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7776 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7777 (2, chan_type, option),
7778 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7779 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7780 (5, self.context.config, required),
7781 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7782 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7783 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7784 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7785 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7786 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7787 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7788 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7789 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7790 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7791 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7792 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7793 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7794 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7795 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7796 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7797 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7798 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7799 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7800 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7801 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7802 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7809 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7810 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7812 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7813 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7815 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7816 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7817 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7819 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7820 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7821 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7822 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7824 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7826 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7827 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7828 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7829 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7830 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7832 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7833 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7836 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7837 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7838 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7840 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7842 let mut keys_data = None;
7844 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7845 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7846 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7847 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7848 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7849 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7850 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7851 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7852 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7853 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7857 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7858 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7859 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7862 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7864 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7865 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7866 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7868 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7870 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7871 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7872 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7873 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7874 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7875 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7876 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7877 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7878 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7879 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7880 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7881 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7882 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7887 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7888 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7889 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7890 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7891 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7892 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7893 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7894 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7895 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7896 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7897 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7898 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7900 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7901 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7904 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7905 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7908 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7909 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7911 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7913 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7914 blinding_point: None,
7918 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7919 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7920 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7921 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7922 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7923 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7924 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7925 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7926 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7927 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7928 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7929 blinding_point: None,
7931 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7932 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7933 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7935 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7936 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7937 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7939 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7943 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7944 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7945 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7946 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7949 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7950 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7951 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7953 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7954 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7955 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7956 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7959 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7960 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7961 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7962 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7965 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7967 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7969 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7970 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7971 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7972 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7974 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7975 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7976 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7977 // consider the stale state on reload.
7978 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7981 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7982 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7983 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7985 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7988 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7989 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7990 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7992 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7993 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7994 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7995 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7997 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7998 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8000 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8001 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8003 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8004 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8005 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8007 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8009 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8010 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8012 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8013 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8016 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8018 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8019 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8020 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8021 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8023 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8026 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8027 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8029 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8031 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8032 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8034 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8035 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8037 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8039 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8040 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
8041 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8043 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8044 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8045 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8049 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8050 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8051 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8053 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8059 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8060 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8061 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8062 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8063 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8064 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8065 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8066 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8067 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8068 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8070 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8071 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8072 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8073 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8074 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8075 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8076 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8078 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8079 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8080 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8081 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8083 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8085 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8086 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8088 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8090 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8091 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8093 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8095 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8096 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8097 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8098 (2, channel_type, option),
8099 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8100 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8101 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8102 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8103 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8104 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8105 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8106 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8107 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8108 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8109 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8110 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8111 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8112 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8113 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8114 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8115 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8116 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8117 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8118 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8119 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8120 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8121 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8122 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8123 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8126 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8127 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8128 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8129 // required channel parameters.
8130 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8131 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8133 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8135 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8136 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8137 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8138 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8141 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8142 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8143 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8145 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8146 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8148 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8149 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8154 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8155 if iter.next().is_some() {
8156 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8160 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8161 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8162 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8163 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8164 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8167 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8168 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8169 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8171 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8172 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8174 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8175 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8176 // separate u64 values.
8177 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8179 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8181 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8182 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8183 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8184 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8186 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8187 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8189 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8190 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8191 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8192 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8193 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8196 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8197 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8199 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8200 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8201 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8202 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8204 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8205 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8207 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8208 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8209 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8210 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8211 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8214 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8215 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8218 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8219 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8220 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8221 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8222 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8223 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8226 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8227 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8228 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8230 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8235 context: ChannelContext {
8238 config: config.unwrap(),
8242 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8243 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8244 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8247 temporary_channel_id,
8249 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8251 channel_value_satoshis,
8253 latest_monitor_update_id,
8255 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8256 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8259 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8260 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8263 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8264 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8265 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8266 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8270 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8271 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8272 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8273 monitor_pending_forwards,
8274 monitor_pending_failures,
8275 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8277 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8278 signer_pending_funding: false,
8281 holding_cell_update_fee,
8282 next_holder_htlc_id,
8283 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8284 update_time_counter,
8287 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8288 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8289 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8290 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8292 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8293 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8294 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8295 closing_fee_limits: None,
8296 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8298 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8299 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8301 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8303 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8304 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8305 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8306 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8307 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8308 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8309 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8310 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8311 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8314 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8316 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8317 funding_transaction,
8320 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8321 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8322 counterparty_node_id,
8324 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8328 channel_update_status,
8329 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8333 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8334 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8335 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8336 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8338 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8339 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8341 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8342 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8343 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8345 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8346 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8348 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8349 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8351 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8354 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8363 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8364 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8365 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8366 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8367 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8368 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8369 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8370 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8371 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8372 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8373 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8374 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8375 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8376 use crate::ln::msgs;
8377 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8378 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8379 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8380 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8381 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8382 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8383 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8384 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8385 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8386 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8387 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8388 use crate::util::test_utils;
8389 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8390 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8391 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8392 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8393 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8394 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8395 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8396 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8397 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8398 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8399 use crate::prelude::*;
8401 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8404 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8405 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8411 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8412 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8413 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8414 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8418 signer: InMemorySigner,
8421 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8422 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8425 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8426 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8428 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8430 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8431 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8434 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8438 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8440 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8441 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8442 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8443 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8444 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8447 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8448 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8449 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8450 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8454 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8455 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8456 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8460 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8461 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8462 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8463 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8466 let seed = [42; 32];
8467 let network = Network::Testnet;
8468 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8469 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8470 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8473 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8474 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8475 let config = UserConfig::default();
8476 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8477 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8478 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8480 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8481 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8485 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8486 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8488 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8489 let original_fee = 253;
8490 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8491 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8492 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8493 let seed = [42; 32];
8494 let network = Network::Testnet;
8495 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8497 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8498 let config = UserConfig::default();
8499 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8501 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8502 // same as the old fee.
8503 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8504 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8505 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8509 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8510 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8511 // dust limits are used.
8512 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8513 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8514 let seed = [42; 32];
8515 let network = Network::Testnet;
8516 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8517 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8518 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8520 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8521 // they have different dust limits.
8523 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8524 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8525 let config = UserConfig::default();
8526 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8528 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8529 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8530 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8531 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8532 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8534 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8535 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8536 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8537 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8538 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8540 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8541 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8542 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8543 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8545 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8546 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8547 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8549 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8550 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8551 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8553 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8554 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8555 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8557 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8558 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8559 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8560 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8563 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8565 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8566 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8567 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8568 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8569 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8570 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8571 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8572 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8573 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8575 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8576 blinding_point: None,
8579 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8580 // the dust limit check.
8581 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8582 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8583 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8584 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8586 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8587 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8588 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8589 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8590 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8591 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8592 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8596 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8597 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8598 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8599 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8600 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8601 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8602 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8603 let seed = [42; 32];
8604 let network = Network::Testnet;
8605 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8607 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8608 let config = UserConfig::default();
8609 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8611 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8612 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8614 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8615 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8616 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8617 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8618 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8619 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8621 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8622 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8623 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8624 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8625 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8627 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8629 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8630 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8631 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8632 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8633 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8635 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8636 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8637 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8638 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8639 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8643 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8644 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8645 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8646 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8647 let seed = [42; 32];
8648 let network = Network::Testnet;
8649 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8650 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8651 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8653 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8655 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8656 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8657 let config = UserConfig::default();
8658 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8660 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8661 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8662 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8663 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8665 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8666 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8667 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8669 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8670 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8671 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8672 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8674 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8675 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8676 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8678 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8679 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8680 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8682 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8683 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8684 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8685 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8686 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8687 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8688 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8690 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8692 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8693 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8694 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8695 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8696 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8700 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8701 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8702 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8703 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8704 let seed = [42; 32];
8705 let network = Network::Testnet;
8706 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8707 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8708 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8710 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8711 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8712 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8713 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8714 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8715 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8716 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8717 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8719 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8720 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8721 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8722 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8723 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8724 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8726 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8727 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8728 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8729 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8731 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8733 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8734 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8735 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8736 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8737 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8738 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8740 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8741 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8742 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8743 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8745 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8746 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8747 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8748 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8749 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8751 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8752 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8754 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8755 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8756 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8758 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8759 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8760 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8761 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8762 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8764 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8765 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8767 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8768 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8769 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8773 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8775 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8776 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8777 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8779 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8780 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8781 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8782 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8784 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8785 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8786 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8788 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8790 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8791 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8794 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8795 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8796 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8797 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8798 let seed = [42; 32];
8799 let network = Network::Testnet;
8800 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8801 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8802 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8805 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8806 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8807 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8809 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8810 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8812 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8813 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8814 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8816 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8817 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8819 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8821 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8822 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8824 // Channel Negotiations failed
8825 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8826 assert!(result.is_err());
8831 fn channel_update() {
8832 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8833 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8834 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8835 let seed = [42; 32];
8836 let network = Network::Testnet;
8837 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8838 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8839 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8841 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8842 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8843 let config = UserConfig::default();
8844 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8846 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8847 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8848 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8849 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8850 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8852 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8853 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8854 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8855 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8856 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8858 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8859 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8860 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8861 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8863 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8864 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8865 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8867 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8868 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8869 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8871 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8872 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8873 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8875 short_channel_id: 0,
8878 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8879 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8880 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8882 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8883 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8885 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8887 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8889 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8890 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8891 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8892 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8894 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8895 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8896 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8898 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8901 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8905 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
8906 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
8908 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8909 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8910 let seed = [42; 32];
8911 let network = Network::Testnet;
8912 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8914 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8915 let config = UserConfig::default();
8916 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8917 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8918 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8920 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8922 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8923 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8924 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8925 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8929 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8930 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8931 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8933 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8936 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8938 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8939 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8940 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8941 blinding_point: None,
8943 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8944 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8946 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8949 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8952 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8954 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8957 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8958 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8959 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8961 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8962 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8965 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8966 blinding_point: None,
8968 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8969 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8972 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8973 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
8975 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8976 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
8978 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
8981 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8982 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
8983 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8984 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
8985 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8986 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8987 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
8988 } = &mut dummy_add {
8989 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8990 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
8992 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8993 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
8994 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
8996 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
8999 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9001 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9002 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9003 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9004 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9005 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9006 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9007 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9008 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9011 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9013 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9014 use bitcoin::sighash;
9015 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9016 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9017 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9018 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9019 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9020 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9021 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9022 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9023 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9024 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9025 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9026 use crate::sync::Arc;
9027 use core::str::FromStr;
9028 use hex::DisplayHex;
9030 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9031 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9032 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9033 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9035 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9037 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9038 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9039 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9040 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9041 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9043 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9044 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9050 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9051 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9052 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9054 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9055 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9056 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9057 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9058 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9059 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9061 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9063 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9064 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9065 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9066 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9067 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9068 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9070 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9071 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9072 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9073 selected_contest_delay: 144
9075 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9076 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9078 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9079 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9081 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9082 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9084 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9085 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9087 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9088 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9089 // build_commitment_transaction.
9090 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9091 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9092 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9093 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9094 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9096 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9097 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9098 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9099 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9103 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9104 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9105 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9106 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9110 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9111 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9112 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9114 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9115 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9117 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9118 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9120 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9122 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9123 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9124 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9125 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9126 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9127 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9128 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9130 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9131 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9132 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9133 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9135 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9136 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9137 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9139 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9141 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9142 commitment_tx.clone(),
9143 counterparty_signature,
9144 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9145 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9146 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9148 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9149 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9151 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9152 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9153 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9155 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9156 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9159 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9160 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9162 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9163 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9164 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9165 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9166 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9167 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9168 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9169 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9171 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9174 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9175 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9176 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9180 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9183 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9184 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9185 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9186 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9187 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9188 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9190 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9191 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9192 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9193 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9195 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9196 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9197 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9198 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9199 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9201 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9202 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9203 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9204 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9205 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9206 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9208 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9212 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9213 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9214 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9215 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f10529800000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778014730440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a865801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
9217 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9218 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9220 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9221 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9222 "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", {});
9224 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9225 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9226 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9227 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80044a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a508b6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f701483045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
9229 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9230 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9232 amount_msat: 1000000,
9234 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9235 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9237 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9240 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9241 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9243 amount_msat: 2000000,
9245 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9246 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9248 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9251 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9252 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9254 amount_msat: 2000000,
9256 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9257 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9258 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9259 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9260 blinding_point: None,
9262 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9265 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9266 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9268 amount_msat: 3000000,
9270 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9271 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9272 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9273 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9274 blinding_point: None,
9276 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9279 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9280 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9282 amount_msat: 4000000,
9284 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9285 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9287 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9291 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9292 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9293 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9295 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9296 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9297 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9300 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9301 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9302 "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" },
9305 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9306 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9307 "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" },
9310 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9311 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9312 "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" },
9315 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9316 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9317 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
9320 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9321 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9322 "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" }
9325 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9326 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9327 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9329 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9330 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9331 "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", {
9334 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9335 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9336 "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" },
9339 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9340 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9341 "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" },
9344 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9345 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9346 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
9349 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9350 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9351 "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" },
9354 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9355 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9356 "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" }
9359 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9360 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9361 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9363 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9364 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9365 "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", {
9368 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9369 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9370 "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" },
9373 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9374 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9375 "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" },
9378 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9379 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9380 "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" },
9383 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9384 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9385 "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" }
9388 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9389 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9390 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9391 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9393 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9394 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9395 "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", {
9398 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9399 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9400 "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" },
9403 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9404 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9405 "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" },
9408 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9409 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9410 "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" },
9413 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9414 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9415 "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" }
9418 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9419 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9420 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9421 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9423 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9424 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9425 "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", {
9428 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9429 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9430 "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" },
9433 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9434 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9435 "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" },
9438 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9439 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9440 "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" },
9443 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9444 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9445 "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" }
9448 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9449 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9450 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9452 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9453 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9454 "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", {
9457 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9458 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9459 "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" },
9462 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9463 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9464 "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" },
9467 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9468 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9469 "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" }
9472 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9473 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9474 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9476 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9477 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9478 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9481 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9482 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9483 "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" },
9486 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9487 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9488 "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" },
9491 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9492 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9493 "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" }
9496 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9497 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9498 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9500 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9501 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9502 "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", {
9505 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9506 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9507 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900000000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e01483045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d7601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
9510 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9511 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9512 "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" }
9515 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9516 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9517 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9518 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9519 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9520 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9522 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9523 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9524 "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", {
9527 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9528 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9529 "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" },
9532 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9533 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9534 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
9537 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9538 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9539 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9540 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9541 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9543 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9544 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9545 "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", {
9548 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9549 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9550 "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" },
9553 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9554 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9555 "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" }
9558 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9559 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9560 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9562 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9563 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9564 "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", {
9567 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9568 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9569 "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" }
9572 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9573 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9574 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9575 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9576 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9578 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9579 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9580 "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", {
9583 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9584 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9585 "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" }
9588 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9589 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9590 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9591 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9592 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9594 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9595 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9596 "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", {
9599 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9600 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9601 "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" }
9604 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9605 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9606 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9607 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9609 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9610 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9611 "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", {});
9613 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9614 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9615 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9616 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9617 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9619 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9620 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9621 "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", {});
9623 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9624 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9625 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9626 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9627 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9629 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9630 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9631 "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", {});
9633 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9634 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9635 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9637 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9638 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9639 "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", {});
9641 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9642 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9643 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9644 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9645 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9647 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9648 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9649 "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", {});
9651 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9652 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9653 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9654 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9655 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9657 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9658 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9659 "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", {});
9661 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9662 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9663 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9664 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9665 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9666 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9668 amount_msat: 2000000,
9670 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9671 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9673 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9676 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9677 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9678 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9680 amount_msat: 5000001,
9682 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9683 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9684 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9685 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9686 blinding_point: None,
9688 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9691 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9692 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9694 amount_msat: 5000000,
9696 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9697 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9698 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9699 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9700 blinding_point: None,
9702 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9706 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9707 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9708 "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", {
9711 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9712 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9713 "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" },
9715 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9716 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9717 "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" },
9719 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9720 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9721 "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" }
9724 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9725 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9726 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9727 "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", {
9730 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9731 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9732 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c402000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c28347304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
9734 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9735 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9736 "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" },
9738 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9739 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9740 "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" }
9745 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9746 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9748 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9749 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9750 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9751 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9753 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9754 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9755 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9757 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9758 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9760 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9761 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9763 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9764 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9765 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9769 fn test_key_derivation() {
9770 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9771 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9773 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9774 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9776 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9777 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9779 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9780 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9782 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9783 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9785 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9786 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9788 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9789 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9793 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9794 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9795 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9796 let seed = [42; 32];
9797 let network = Network::Testnet;
9798 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9799 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9801 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9802 let config = UserConfig::default();
9803 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9804 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9806 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9807 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9809 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9810 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9811 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9812 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9813 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9814 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9815 assert!(res.is_ok());
9819 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9820 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9821 // resulting `channel_type`.
9822 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9823 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9824 let network = Network::Testnet;
9825 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9826 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9828 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9829 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9831 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9832 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9834 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9835 // need to signal it.
9836 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9837 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9838 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9839 &config, 0, 42, None
9841 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9843 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9844 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9845 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9847 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9848 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9849 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9853 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9854 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9855 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9856 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9857 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9860 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9861 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9865 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9866 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9867 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9868 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9869 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9870 let network = Network::Testnet;
9871 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9872 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9874 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9875 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9877 let config = UserConfig::default();
9879 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9880 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9881 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9882 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9883 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9885 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9886 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9887 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9891 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9892 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9893 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9895 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9896 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9897 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9898 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9899 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9900 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9902 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9906 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9907 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9909 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9910 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9911 let network = Network::Testnet;
9912 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9913 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9915 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9916 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9918 let config = UserConfig::default();
9920 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9921 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9922 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9923 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9924 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9925 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9926 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9927 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9929 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9930 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9931 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9932 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9933 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9934 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9938 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9939 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9941 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9942 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9943 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9944 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9946 assert!(res.is_err());
9948 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9949 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9950 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9952 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9953 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9954 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9957 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9959 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9960 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9961 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9962 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9965 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9966 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9968 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9969 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9971 assert!(res.is_err());
9975 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9976 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9977 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9978 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9979 let seed = [42; 32];
9980 let network = Network::Testnet;
9981 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9982 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9983 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9985 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9986 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9987 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9988 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9990 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9991 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9992 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9997 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10007 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10008 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10009 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10014 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10015 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10021 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10024 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10025 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10026 &accept_channel_msg,
10027 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10028 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10031 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10032 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10033 let tx = Transaction {
10035 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10039 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10042 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10045 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10046 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10047 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10048 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10049 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10050 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10054 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10055 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10063 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10064 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10065 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10066 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10068 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10069 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10076 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10077 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10078 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10079 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10080 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10082 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10083 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10084 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10092 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10093 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10096 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10097 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10098 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10099 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());