1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
227 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
230 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
231 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
232 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
236 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
238 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
239 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
240 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
243 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
248 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
252 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
253 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
254 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
255 /// move on to ChannelReady.
256 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
257 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
258 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
260 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
261 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
262 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
263 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
264 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
265 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
266 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
268 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
269 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
270 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
275 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
276 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
277 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
279 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
280 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
282 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
283 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
284 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
285 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
286 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
287 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
288 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
289 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
290 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
292 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
293 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
294 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
295 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
296 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
297 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
298 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
299 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
300 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
301 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
302 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
303 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
305 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
306 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
308 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
310 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
312 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
314 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
315 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
319 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
321 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
323 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
325 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
326 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
327 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
328 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
329 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
331 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
332 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
334 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
336 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
337 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
339 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
340 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
341 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
342 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
343 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
344 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
346 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
347 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
349 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
350 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
351 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
352 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
353 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
355 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
356 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
358 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
359 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
361 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
362 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
363 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
364 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
370 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
371 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
373 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
375 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
380 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
385 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
400 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
401 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
402 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
403 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
404 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
405 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
406 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
408 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
410 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
412 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
416 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
418 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
419 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
420 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
422 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
423 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
425 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
426 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
427 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
428 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
429 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
431 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
432 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
436 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
442 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
445 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
446 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
448 holding_cell_msat: u64,
449 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
452 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
453 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
454 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
455 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
456 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
457 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
458 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
459 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
461 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
464 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
465 struct HTLCCandidate {
467 origin: HTLCInitiator,
471 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
479 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
481 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
483 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
484 htlc_value_msat: u64,
485 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
490 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
491 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
492 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
493 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
494 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
496 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
497 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
498 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
499 htlc_value_msat: u64,
501 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
502 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
506 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
507 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
508 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
509 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
510 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
511 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
512 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
513 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
514 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
515 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
516 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
519 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
520 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
521 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
522 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
523 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
524 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
525 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
526 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
529 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
531 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
532 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
535 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
536 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
537 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
538 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
539 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
540 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
541 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
542 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
543 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
544 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
545 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
546 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
547 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
548 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
549 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
552 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
553 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
554 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
556 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
557 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
558 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
559 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
561 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
562 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
563 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
564 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
565 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
567 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
568 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
569 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
570 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
572 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
573 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
574 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
576 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
577 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
578 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
579 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
580 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
582 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
583 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
586 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
587 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
589 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
590 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
593 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
594 (0, update, required),
597 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
598 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
599 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
601 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
602 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
603 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
604 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
606 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
610 channel_id: [u8; 32],
611 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
614 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
615 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
617 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
618 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
619 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
621 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
622 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
623 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
624 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
626 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
627 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
629 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
631 holder_signer: Signer,
632 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
633 destination_script: Script,
635 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
636 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
637 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
639 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
640 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
641 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
642 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
643 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
644 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
646 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
647 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
648 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
649 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
650 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
651 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
653 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
655 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
656 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
657 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
659 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
660 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
661 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
662 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
663 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
664 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
665 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
667 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
669 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
670 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
671 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
672 // HTLCs with similar state.
673 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
674 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
675 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
676 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
677 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
678 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
679 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
680 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
681 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
684 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
685 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
686 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
688 update_time_counter: u32,
690 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
691 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
692 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
693 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
694 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
695 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
697 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
698 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
700 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
701 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
702 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
703 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
705 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
706 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
708 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
710 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
712 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
713 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
714 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
715 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
716 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
717 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
719 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
720 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
721 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
722 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
723 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
725 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
726 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
727 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
728 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
729 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
730 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
731 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
732 channel_creation_height: u32,
734 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
737 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
739 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
742 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
744 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
747 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
749 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
751 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
752 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
755 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
757 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
759 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
760 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
762 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
764 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
765 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
766 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
768 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
770 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
771 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
773 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
774 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
775 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
777 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
779 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
781 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
782 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
783 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
784 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
786 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
787 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
788 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
790 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
791 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
792 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
794 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
795 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
796 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
797 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
799 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
800 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
801 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
803 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
804 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
805 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
806 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
807 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
809 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
810 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
812 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
813 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
814 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
815 /// unblock the state machine.
817 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
818 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
819 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
821 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
822 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
823 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
825 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
826 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
827 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
828 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
829 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
830 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
831 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
832 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
834 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
835 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
837 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
838 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
839 // the channel's funding UTXO.
841 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
842 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
843 // associated channel mapping.
845 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
846 // to store all of them.
847 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
849 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
850 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
851 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
852 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
853 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
855 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
856 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
858 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
859 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
861 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
862 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
863 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
865 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
866 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
867 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
870 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
871 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
872 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
873 self.update_time_counter
876 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
877 self.latest_monitor_update_id
880 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
881 self.config.announced_channel
884 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
885 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
888 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
889 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
890 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
891 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
894 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
895 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
896 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
899 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
900 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
901 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
902 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
903 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
906 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
907 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
908 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
909 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
911 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
912 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
914 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
915 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
917 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
918 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
920 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
923 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
924 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
925 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
926 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
928 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
929 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
930 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
931 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
934 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
935 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
936 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
937 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
938 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
943 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
947 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
949 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
950 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
951 self.temporary_channel_id
954 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
958 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
959 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
960 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
964 /// Gets the channel's type
965 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
969 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
970 /// is_usable() returns true).
971 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
972 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
973 self.short_channel_id
976 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
977 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
978 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
981 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
982 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
983 self.outbound_scid_alias
986 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
987 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
988 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
989 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
990 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
993 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
994 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
995 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
996 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
999 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1000 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1001 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1004 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1005 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1006 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1007 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1011 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1014 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1015 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1018 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1019 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1022 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1023 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1024 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1027 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1028 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1031 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1032 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1033 self.counterparty_node_id
1036 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1037 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1038 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1041 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1042 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1043 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1046 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1047 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1049 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1050 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1051 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1052 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1054 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1058 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1059 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1060 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1063 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1064 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1065 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1068 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1069 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1070 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1072 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1073 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1078 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1079 self.channel_value_satoshis
1082 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1083 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1086 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1087 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1090 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1091 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1092 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1094 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1095 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1096 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1097 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1098 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1100 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1104 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1105 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1106 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1109 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1110 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1111 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1114 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1115 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1116 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1119 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1120 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1121 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1124 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1125 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1126 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1129 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1130 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1131 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1134 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1135 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1136 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1137 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1138 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1141 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1143 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1144 self.prev_config = None;
1148 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1149 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1153 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1154 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1155 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1156 let did_channel_update =
1157 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1158 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1159 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1160 if did_channel_update {
1161 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1162 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1163 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1164 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1166 self.config.options = *config;
1170 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1171 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1172 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1175 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1176 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1177 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1178 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1179 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1181 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1182 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1183 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1184 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1185 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1186 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1187 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1189 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1190 where L::Target: Logger
1192 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1193 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1194 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1196 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1197 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1198 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1199 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1201 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1202 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1203 if match update_state {
1204 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1205 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1206 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1207 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1208 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1210 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1214 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1215 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1216 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1217 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1219 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1220 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1221 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1223 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1224 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1225 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1226 transaction_output_index: None
1231 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1232 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1233 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1234 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1235 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1238 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1240 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1241 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1242 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1244 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1245 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1248 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1249 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1252 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1254 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1255 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1256 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1258 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1259 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1265 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1266 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1267 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1268 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1269 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1270 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1271 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1275 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1276 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1278 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1280 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1281 if generated_by_local {
1282 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1283 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1292 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1294 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1295 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1296 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1297 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1298 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1299 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1300 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1303 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1304 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1305 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1306 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1310 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1311 preimages.push(preimage);
1315 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1316 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1318 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1320 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1321 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1323 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1324 if !generated_by_local {
1325 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1333 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1334 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1335 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1336 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1337 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1338 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1339 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1340 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1342 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1344 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1345 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1346 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1347 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1349 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1351 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1352 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1353 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1354 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1357 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1358 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1359 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1360 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1362 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1365 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1366 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1367 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1368 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1370 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1373 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1374 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1379 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1380 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1385 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1387 let channel_parameters =
1388 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1389 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1390 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1397 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1400 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1401 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1402 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1403 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1405 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1406 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1407 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1415 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1416 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1422 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1423 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1424 /// our counterparty!)
1425 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1426 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1427 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1428 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1429 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1430 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1431 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1433 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1437 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1438 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1439 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1440 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1441 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1442 //may see payments to it!
1443 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1444 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1445 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1447 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1450 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1451 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1452 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1453 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1454 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1457 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1458 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1461 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1465 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1466 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1467 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1468 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1469 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1470 // which are near the dust limit.
1471 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1472 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1473 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1474 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1475 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1477 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1478 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1480 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1483 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1484 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1485 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1488 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1489 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1491 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1492 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1493 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1494 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1495 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1496 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1497 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1500 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1503 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1504 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1505 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1507 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1508 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1509 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1510 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1511 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1512 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1514 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1515 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1521 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1522 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1524 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1525 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1526 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1527 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1528 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1529 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1530 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1533 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1536 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1537 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1538 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1540 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1541 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1542 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1543 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1544 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1545 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1547 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1548 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1552 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1553 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1554 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1555 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1556 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1557 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1558 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1560 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1561 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1563 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1570 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1571 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1572 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1573 /// corner case properly.
1574 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1575 -> AvailableBalances
1576 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1578 let context = &self;
1579 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1580 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1581 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1583 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1584 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1585 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1586 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1589 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1591 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1592 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1594 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1596 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1598 if context.is_outbound() {
1599 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1600 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1602 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1603 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1605 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1606 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1607 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1608 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1611 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1612 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1613 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1614 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1616 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1617 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1618 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1619 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1620 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1621 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1622 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1623 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1624 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1625 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1627 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1630 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1631 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1632 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1633 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1634 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1637 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1638 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1640 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1641 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1642 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1644 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1645 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1646 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1647 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1651 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1653 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1654 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1655 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1656 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1657 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1658 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1659 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1661 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1662 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1664 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1665 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1666 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1668 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1669 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1670 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1671 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1672 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1675 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1676 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1677 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1678 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1679 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1680 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1683 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1684 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1685 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1687 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1691 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1692 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1694 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1695 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1699 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1700 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1701 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1702 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1704 outbound_capacity_msat,
1705 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1706 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1711 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1712 let context = &self;
1713 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1716 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1717 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1719 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1720 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1722 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1723 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1725 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1726 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1727 let context = &self;
1728 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1730 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1733 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1734 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1736 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1737 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1739 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1740 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1742 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1743 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1747 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1748 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1754 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1755 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1756 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1759 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1760 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1761 included_htlcs += 1;
1764 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1765 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1769 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1770 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1771 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1772 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1773 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1774 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1779 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1781 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1782 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1787 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1788 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1792 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1793 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1794 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1797 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1798 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1800 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1801 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1802 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1804 total_pending_htlcs,
1805 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1806 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1807 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1809 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1810 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1811 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1813 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1815 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1820 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1821 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1823 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1824 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1826 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1827 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1829 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1830 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1831 let context = &self;
1832 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1834 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1837 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1838 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1840 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1841 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1843 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1844 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1846 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1847 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1851 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1852 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1858 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1859 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1860 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1861 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1862 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1863 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1866 included_htlcs += 1;
1869 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1870 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1873 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1874 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1876 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1877 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1878 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1883 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1884 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1885 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1888 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1889 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1891 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1892 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1894 total_pending_htlcs,
1895 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1896 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1897 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1899 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1900 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1901 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1903 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1905 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1910 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1911 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1912 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1913 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1919 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1920 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1921 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1922 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1923 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1924 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1925 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1926 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1927 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1928 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1929 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1931 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1932 // return them to fail the payment.
1933 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1934 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1935 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1937 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1938 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1943 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1944 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1945 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1946 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1947 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1948 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1949 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1950 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1951 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1952 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1953 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1954 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1955 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1960 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1961 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1962 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1966 // Internal utility functions for channels
1968 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1969 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1970 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1972 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1974 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1975 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1976 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1978 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1981 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1983 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1986 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1987 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1988 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1990 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1992 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1993 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1994 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1995 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1996 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1999 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2000 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2001 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2002 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2003 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2004 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2005 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2008 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2009 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2011 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2012 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2015 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2016 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2017 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2018 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2019 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2020 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2023 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2024 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2025 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
2028 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2029 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2030 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
2031 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
2034 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2035 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2037 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2038 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2039 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2043 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
2044 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2045 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
2046 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2048 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2049 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2050 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2051 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
2052 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2053 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2054 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2055 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2057 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2058 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2059 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2060 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2061 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2062 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2063 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2064 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2066 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2067 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2077 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2078 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2079 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2080 // outside of those situations will fail.
2081 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2085 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2090 1 + // script length (0)
2094 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2095 2 + // witness marker and flag
2096 1 + // witness element count
2097 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2098 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2099 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2100 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2101 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2102 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2104 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2105 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2106 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2112 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2113 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2114 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2115 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2117 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2118 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2119 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2121 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2122 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2123 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2124 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2125 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2126 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2129 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2130 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2133 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2134 value_to_holder = 0;
2137 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2138 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2139 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2140 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2142 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2143 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2146 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2147 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2150 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2153 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2154 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2156 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2158 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2159 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2160 where L::Target: Logger {
2161 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2162 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2163 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2164 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2165 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2166 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2167 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2168 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2172 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2173 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2174 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2175 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2177 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2178 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2180 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2182 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2184 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2185 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2186 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2188 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2189 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2190 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2191 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2192 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2194 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2195 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2196 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2198 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2199 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2201 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2204 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2205 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2209 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2213 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2214 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2215 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2216 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2217 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2218 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2221 // Now update local state:
2223 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2224 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2225 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2226 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2227 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2228 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2229 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2233 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2234 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2235 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2236 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2237 // do not not get into this branch.
2238 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2239 match pending_update {
2240 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2241 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2242 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2243 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2244 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2245 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2246 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2249 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2250 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2251 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2252 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2253 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2254 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2255 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2261 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2262 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2263 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2265 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2266 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2267 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2269 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2270 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2273 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2274 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2276 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2277 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2279 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2280 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2283 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2286 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2287 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2288 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2289 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2294 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2295 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2296 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2297 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2298 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2299 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2300 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2301 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2302 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2303 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2304 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2305 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2306 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2307 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2308 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2310 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2311 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2312 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2313 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2314 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2317 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2318 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2319 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2325 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2326 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2328 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2332 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2333 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2334 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2335 /// before we fail backwards.
2337 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2338 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2339 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2340 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2341 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2342 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2343 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2346 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2347 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2348 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2349 /// before we fail backwards.
2351 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2352 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2353 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2354 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2355 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2356 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2357 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2359 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2361 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2362 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2363 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2365 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2366 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2367 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2369 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2370 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2371 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2373 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2378 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2379 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2385 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2386 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2387 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2388 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2389 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2393 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2394 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2395 force_holding_cell = true;
2398 // Now update local state:
2399 if force_holding_cell {
2400 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2401 match pending_update {
2402 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2403 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2404 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2405 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2409 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2410 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2411 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2412 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2418 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2419 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2420 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2426 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2428 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2429 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2432 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2433 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2434 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2439 // Message handlers:
2441 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2442 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2443 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2444 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2445 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2447 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2450 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2453 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2454 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2456 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2457 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2458 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2459 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2462 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2464 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2465 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2466 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2467 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2469 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2470 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2472 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2473 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2475 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2476 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2477 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2478 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2479 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2484 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2485 initial_commitment_tx,
2488 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2489 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2492 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2493 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2496 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2497 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2498 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2499 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2500 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2501 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2502 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2503 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2504 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2505 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2506 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2507 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2509 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2511 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2513 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2514 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2515 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2516 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2518 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2520 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2521 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2525 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2526 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2528 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2529 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2530 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2531 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2533 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2536 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2537 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2538 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2541 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2542 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2543 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2544 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2545 // when routing outbound payments.
2546 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2550 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2552 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2553 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2554 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2555 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2556 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2557 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2558 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2559 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2560 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2562 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2563 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2564 let expected_point =
2565 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2566 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2568 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2569 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2570 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2571 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2572 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2573 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2575 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2576 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2577 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2578 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2579 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2581 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2582 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2586 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2589 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2590 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2592 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2594 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2597 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2598 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2599 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2600 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2601 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2602 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2604 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2605 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2606 if local_sent_shutdown {
2607 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2609 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2610 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2611 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2614 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2615 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2617 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2618 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2620 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2621 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2623 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2624 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2627 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2628 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2629 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2630 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2632 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2633 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2635 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2636 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2637 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2638 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2639 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2640 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2641 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2642 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2643 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2644 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2645 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2647 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2648 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2649 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2650 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2651 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2652 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2656 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2657 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2660 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2661 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2662 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2664 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2665 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2666 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2667 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2668 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2669 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2670 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2674 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2675 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2676 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2677 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2678 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2679 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2680 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2684 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2685 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2686 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2687 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2688 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2692 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2693 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2694 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2695 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2696 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2698 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2699 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2702 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2703 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2706 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2707 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2708 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2709 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2710 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2711 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2712 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2713 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2714 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2715 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2716 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2717 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2718 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2719 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2720 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2721 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2724 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2725 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2726 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2727 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2731 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2732 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2734 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2735 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2738 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2739 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2740 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2744 // Now update local state:
2745 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2746 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2747 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2748 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2749 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2750 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2751 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2756 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2758 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2759 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2760 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2761 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2762 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2763 None => fail_reason.into(),
2764 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2765 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2766 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2767 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2769 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2773 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2774 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2775 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2776 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2778 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2779 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2784 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2787 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2788 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2789 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2791 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2792 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2795 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2798 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2799 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2800 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2802 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2803 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2806 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2810 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2811 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2814 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2818 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2822 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2823 where L::Target: Logger
2825 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2828 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2831 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2832 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2835 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2837 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2839 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2840 let commitment_txid = {
2841 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2842 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2843 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2845 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2846 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2847 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2848 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2849 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2850 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2854 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2856 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2857 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2858 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2859 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2862 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2863 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2864 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2865 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2868 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2870 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2871 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2872 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2873 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2874 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2875 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2876 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2877 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2878 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2879 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2880 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2886 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2887 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2890 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2891 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2892 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2893 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2894 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2895 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2896 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2897 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2898 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2899 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2900 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2901 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2902 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2905 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2906 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2907 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2908 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2909 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2910 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2911 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2913 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2914 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2915 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2916 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2917 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2918 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2919 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2920 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2922 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2923 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2926 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2928 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2929 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2930 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2933 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2936 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2937 commitment_stats.tx,
2939 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2940 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2941 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2944 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2945 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2947 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2948 let mut need_commitment = false;
2949 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2950 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2951 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2952 need_commitment = true;
2956 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2957 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2958 Some(forward_info.clone())
2960 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2961 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2962 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2963 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2964 need_commitment = true;
2967 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2968 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2969 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2970 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2971 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2972 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2973 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
2974 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
2975 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
2976 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
2977 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
2978 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
2979 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
2980 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
2982 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
2984 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
2985 need_commitment = true;
2989 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2990 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2991 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2992 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
2993 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
2994 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
2996 nondust_htlc_sources,
3000 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3001 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3002 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3003 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3005 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3006 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3007 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3008 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3009 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3010 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3011 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3012 // includes the right HTLCs.
3013 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3014 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3015 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3016 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3017 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3018 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3020 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3021 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3022 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3025 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3026 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3027 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3028 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3029 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3030 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3031 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3032 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3033 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3037 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3038 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3039 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3040 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3043 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3044 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3045 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3046 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3047 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3048 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3049 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3051 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3052 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3053 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3054 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3057 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3058 /// for our counterparty.
3059 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3060 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3061 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3062 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3064 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3065 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3066 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3067 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3069 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3070 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3071 updates: Vec::new(),
3074 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3075 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3076 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3077 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3078 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3079 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3080 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3081 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3082 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3083 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3084 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3085 // to rebalance channels.
3086 match &htlc_update {
3087 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3088 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3089 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3091 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3092 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3094 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3097 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3098 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3099 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3100 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3101 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3102 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3103 // into the holding cell without ever being
3104 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3105 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3106 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3109 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3115 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3116 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3117 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3118 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3119 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3120 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3121 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3122 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3123 (msg, monitor_update)
3124 } else { unreachable!() };
3125 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3126 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3128 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3129 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3130 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3131 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3132 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3133 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3134 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3135 // for a full revocation before failing.
3136 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3139 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3141 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3148 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3149 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3151 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3152 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3157 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3158 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3159 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3160 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3161 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3163 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3164 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3165 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3167 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3168 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3174 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3175 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3176 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3177 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3178 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3179 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3180 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3181 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3182 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3184 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3185 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3187 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3190 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3194 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3196 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3197 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3198 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3202 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3203 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3204 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3205 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3206 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3207 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3208 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3209 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3213 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3215 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3216 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3219 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3220 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3222 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3224 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3225 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3226 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3227 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3228 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3229 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3230 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3231 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3235 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3236 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3237 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3238 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3239 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3240 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3241 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3242 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3243 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3245 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3246 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3249 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3250 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3251 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3252 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3253 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3254 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3255 let mut require_commitment = false;
3256 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3259 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3260 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3261 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3263 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3264 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3265 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3266 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3267 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3268 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3273 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3274 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3275 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3276 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3277 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3279 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3280 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3281 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3286 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3287 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3289 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3293 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3294 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3296 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3297 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3298 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3299 require_commitment = true;
3300 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3301 match forward_info {
3302 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3303 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3304 require_commitment = true;
3306 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3307 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3308 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3310 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3311 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3312 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3316 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3317 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3318 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3319 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3325 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3326 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3327 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3328 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3330 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3331 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3332 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3333 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3334 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3335 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3336 require_commitment = true;
3340 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3342 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3343 match update_state {
3344 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3345 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3346 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3347 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3348 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3350 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3351 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3352 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3353 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3354 require_commitment = true;
3355 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3356 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3361 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3362 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3363 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3364 if require_commitment {
3365 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3366 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3367 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3368 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3369 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3370 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3371 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3372 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3373 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3375 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3376 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3377 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3378 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3379 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3382 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3383 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3384 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3385 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3386 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3387 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3389 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3390 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3392 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3393 if require_commitment {
3394 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3396 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3397 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3398 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3399 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3401 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3402 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3403 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3404 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3406 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3407 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3408 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3414 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3415 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3416 /// commitment update.
3417 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3418 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3419 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3421 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3422 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3425 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3426 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3427 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3428 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3430 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3431 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3432 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3433 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3434 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3435 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3436 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3438 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3439 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3441 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3442 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3444 if !self.context.is_live() {
3445 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3448 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3449 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3450 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3451 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3452 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3453 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3454 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3455 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3456 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3457 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3461 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3462 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3463 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3464 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3465 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3466 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3469 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3470 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3474 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3475 force_holding_cell = true;
3478 if force_holding_cell {
3479 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3483 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3484 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3486 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3487 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3492 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3493 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3495 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3497 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3498 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3499 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3500 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3504 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3505 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3506 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3510 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3511 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3514 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3515 // will be retransmitted.
3516 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3517 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3518 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3520 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3521 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3523 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3524 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3525 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3526 // this HTLC accordingly
3527 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3530 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3531 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3532 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3533 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3536 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3537 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3538 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3539 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3540 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3541 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3546 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3548 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3549 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3550 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3551 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3555 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3556 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3557 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3558 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3559 // the update upon reconnection.
3560 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3564 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3566 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3567 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3570 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3571 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3572 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3573 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3574 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3575 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3576 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3578 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3579 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3580 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3581 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3582 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3583 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3584 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3586 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3587 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3588 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3589 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3590 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3591 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3592 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3595 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3596 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3597 /// to the remote side.
3598 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3599 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3600 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3601 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3604 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3606 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3607 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3609 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3610 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3611 // first received the funding_signed.
3612 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3613 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3614 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3616 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3617 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3618 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3619 funding_broadcastable = None;
3622 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3623 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3624 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3625 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3626 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3627 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3628 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3629 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3630 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3631 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3632 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3633 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3634 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3635 next_per_commitment_point,
3636 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3640 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3642 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3643 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3644 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3645 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3646 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3647 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3649 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3650 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3651 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3652 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3653 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3654 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3658 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3659 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3661 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3662 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3663 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3666 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3667 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3668 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3669 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3670 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3671 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3672 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3673 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3674 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3678 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3679 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3681 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3684 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3687 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3688 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3690 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3691 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3692 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3693 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3694 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3695 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3696 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3697 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3698 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3699 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3700 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3701 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3702 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3703 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3705 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3706 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3707 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3713 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3714 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3715 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3716 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3717 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3718 per_commitment_secret,
3719 next_per_commitment_point,
3721 next_local_nonce: None,
3725 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3726 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3727 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3728 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3729 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3731 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3732 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3733 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3734 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3735 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3736 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3737 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3738 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3739 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3740 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3745 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3746 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3748 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3749 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3750 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3751 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3752 reason: err_packet.clone()
3755 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3756 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3757 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3758 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3759 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3760 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3763 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3764 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3765 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3766 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3767 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3774 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3775 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3776 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3777 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3781 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3782 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3783 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3784 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3785 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3786 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3790 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3791 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3793 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3794 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3795 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3796 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3797 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3798 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3799 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3800 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3803 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3805 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3806 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3807 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3808 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3809 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3812 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3813 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3814 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3817 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3818 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3819 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3820 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3821 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3822 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3824 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3825 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3826 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3827 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3828 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3831 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3832 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3833 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3834 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3835 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3836 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3837 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3838 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3842 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3843 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3844 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3845 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3847 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3851 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3852 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3853 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3854 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3856 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3857 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3858 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3859 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3860 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3864 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3866 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3867 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3868 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3869 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3870 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3871 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3873 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3874 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3875 channel_ready: None,
3876 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3877 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3878 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3882 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3883 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3884 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3885 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3886 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3887 next_per_commitment_point,
3888 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3890 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3891 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3892 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3896 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3897 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3898 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3900 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3901 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3902 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3905 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3908 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3911 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3912 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3913 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3914 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3915 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3916 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3917 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3919 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3921 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3922 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3923 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3924 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3925 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3926 next_per_commitment_point,
3927 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3931 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3932 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3933 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3935 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3938 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3939 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3940 raa: required_revoke,
3941 commitment_update: None,
3942 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3944 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
3945 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3946 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3948 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3951 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3952 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3953 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3954 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3955 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
3956 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3959 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3960 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3961 raa: required_revoke,
3962 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
3963 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
3967 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
3971 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
3972 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
3973 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
3974 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
3976 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
3978 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
3980 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
3981 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
3982 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
3983 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
3984 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
3985 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
3987 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
3988 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
3989 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
3990 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
3991 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
3993 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
3994 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
3995 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
3996 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
3999 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4000 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4001 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4002 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4003 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4004 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4005 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4006 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4007 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4008 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4009 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4010 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4011 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4012 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4013 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4015 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4018 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4019 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4022 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4023 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4024 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4025 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4026 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4027 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4030 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4031 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4032 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4033 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4034 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4035 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4036 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4038 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4044 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4045 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4046 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4047 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4049 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4050 return Ok((None, None));
4053 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4054 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4055 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4057 return Ok((None, None));
4060 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4062 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4063 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4064 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4065 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4067 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4068 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4069 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4071 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4072 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4073 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4074 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4076 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4077 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4078 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4083 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4084 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4086 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4087 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4090 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4091 /// within our expected timeframe.
4093 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4094 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4095 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4098 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4101 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4102 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4105 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4106 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4107 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4108 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4110 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4111 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4113 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4114 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4115 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4116 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4117 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4119 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4120 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4124 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4126 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4127 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4130 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4131 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4132 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4135 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4138 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4139 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4140 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4141 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4143 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4146 assert!(send_shutdown);
4147 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4148 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4149 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4151 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4152 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4154 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4159 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4161 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4162 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4164 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4165 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4166 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4167 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4168 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4169 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4172 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4173 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4175 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4176 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4177 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4178 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4182 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4183 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4184 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4185 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4186 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4187 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4189 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4190 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4197 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4198 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4200 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4203 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4204 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4206 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4208 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4209 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4210 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4211 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4212 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4213 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4214 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4215 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4216 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4218 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4219 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4222 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4226 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4227 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4228 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4229 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4231 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4232 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4234 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4237 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4240 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4244 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4248 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4249 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4250 return Ok((None, None));
4253 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4254 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4255 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4258 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4260 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4263 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4264 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4265 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4266 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4267 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4271 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4272 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4277 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4278 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4279 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4280 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4281 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4282 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4283 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4287 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4289 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4290 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4291 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4292 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4294 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4297 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4298 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4299 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4301 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4302 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4303 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4304 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4308 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4309 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4310 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4311 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4313 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4314 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4315 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4321 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4322 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4323 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4325 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4326 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4328 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4329 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4332 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4333 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4334 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4335 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4336 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4338 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4339 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4340 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4342 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4343 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4346 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4347 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4348 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4349 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4350 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4351 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4352 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4353 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4355 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4358 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4359 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4360 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4361 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4363 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4367 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4368 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4369 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4370 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4372 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4378 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4379 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4380 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4381 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4382 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4383 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4384 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4386 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4387 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4390 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4392 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4393 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4399 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4400 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4401 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4402 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4403 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4404 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4405 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4407 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4408 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4415 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4416 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4419 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4420 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4423 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4424 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4428 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4429 &self.context.holder_signer
4433 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4435 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4436 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4437 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4438 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4439 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4440 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4442 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4444 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4452 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4453 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4457 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4458 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4459 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4460 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4463 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4464 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4465 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4466 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4469 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4470 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4471 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4472 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4473 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4474 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4477 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4478 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4479 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4480 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4481 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4482 if !release_monitor {
4483 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4492 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4493 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4496 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4497 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4498 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4500 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4501 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4502 if self.context.channel_state &
4503 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4504 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4505 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4506 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4507 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4510 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4511 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4512 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4513 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4514 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4515 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4517 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4518 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4519 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4521 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4522 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4523 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4524 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4525 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4526 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4532 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4533 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4534 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4537 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4538 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4539 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4542 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4543 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4544 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4547 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4548 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4549 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4550 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4551 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4552 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4557 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4558 self.context.channel_update_status
4561 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4562 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4563 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4566 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4568 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4569 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4570 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4574 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4575 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4576 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4579 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4583 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4584 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4585 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4587 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4588 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4589 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4591 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4592 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4595 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4596 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4597 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4598 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4599 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4600 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4601 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4602 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4603 self.context.channel_state);
4605 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4609 if need_commitment_update {
4610 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4611 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4612 let next_per_commitment_point =
4613 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4614 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4615 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4616 next_per_commitment_point,
4617 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4621 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4627 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4628 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4629 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4630 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4631 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4632 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4633 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4635 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4638 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4639 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4640 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4641 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4642 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4643 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4644 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4645 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4646 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4647 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4648 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4649 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4650 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4651 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4652 // channel and move on.
4653 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4654 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4656 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4657 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4658 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4660 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4661 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4662 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4663 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4664 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4665 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4666 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4670 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4671 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4672 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4673 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4674 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4678 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4679 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4680 // may have already happened for this block).
4681 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4682 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4683 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4684 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4687 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4688 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4689 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4690 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4698 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4699 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4700 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4701 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4703 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4704 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4707 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4709 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4710 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4711 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4712 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4714 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4717 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4720 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4721 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4722 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4723 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4725 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4728 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4729 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4730 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4732 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4733 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4735 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4736 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4737 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4745 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4747 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4748 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4749 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4751 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4752 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4755 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4756 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4757 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4758 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4759 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4760 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4761 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4762 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4763 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4766 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4767 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4768 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4769 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4771 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4772 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4773 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4775 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4776 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4777 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4778 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4780 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4781 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4782 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4783 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4784 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4785 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4786 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4789 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4790 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4792 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4795 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4796 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4797 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4798 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4799 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4800 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4801 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4802 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4803 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4804 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4805 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4806 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4807 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4808 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4809 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4810 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4811 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4817 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4822 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4823 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4825 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4826 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
4827 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4828 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4830 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4833 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4834 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4835 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4836 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4837 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4838 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4840 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4841 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4844 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4845 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4846 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4847 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4849 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4850 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4852 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4853 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4854 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4855 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4856 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4857 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4863 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4864 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4865 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4866 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4868 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4871 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4875 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4879 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4880 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4884 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4888 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4889 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4892 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4896 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4898 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4903 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4905 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4910 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4912 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4913 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4914 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
4915 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4916 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
4920 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
4922 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4923 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
4924 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4925 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
4926 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4927 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4928 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
4930 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
4931 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4932 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4933 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
4934 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
4935 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
4936 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
4937 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
4938 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
4939 contents: announcement,
4942 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
4946 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
4947 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
4948 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
4949 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
4950 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
4951 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
4952 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4953 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
4955 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
4957 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
4958 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4959 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
4960 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
4962 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
4963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4964 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
4965 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
4968 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
4969 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4970 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
4971 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
4974 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
4977 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
4978 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
4979 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4980 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
4981 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4982 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4985 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
4987 Err(_) => return None,
4989 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
4990 Ok(res) => Some(res),
4995 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
4996 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
4997 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
4998 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4999 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5000 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5001 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5002 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5003 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5004 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5005 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5006 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5007 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5008 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5009 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5010 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5013 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5016 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5017 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5018 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5019 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5020 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5021 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5022 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5023 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5024 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5026 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5027 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5028 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5029 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5030 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5031 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5032 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5033 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5034 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5036 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5037 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5038 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5039 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5040 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5041 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5042 next_funding_txid: None,
5047 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5049 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5050 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5051 /// commitment update.
5053 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5054 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5055 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5056 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5057 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5058 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5059 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5062 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5063 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5064 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5066 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5067 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5072 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5073 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5075 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5077 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5078 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5080 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5081 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5082 /// regenerate them.
5084 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5085 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5087 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5088 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5089 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5090 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5091 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5092 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5093 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5095 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5096 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5098 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5099 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5100 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5103 if amount_msat == 0 {
5104 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5107 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5108 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5109 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5110 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5113 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5114 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5115 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5118 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5119 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5120 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5121 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5122 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5123 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5124 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5125 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5128 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5129 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5130 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5131 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5132 else { "to peer" });
5134 if need_holding_cell {
5135 force_holding_cell = true;
5138 // Now update local state:
5139 if force_holding_cell {
5140 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5145 onion_routing_packet,
5151 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5152 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5154 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5156 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5161 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5162 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5163 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5167 onion_routing_packet,
5170 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5175 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5176 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5177 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5178 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5180 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5181 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5182 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5184 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5185 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5189 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5190 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5191 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5192 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5193 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5194 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5195 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5198 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5199 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5200 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5201 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5202 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5203 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5206 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5208 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5209 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5210 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5212 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5213 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5216 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5217 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5218 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5219 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5220 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5221 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5222 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5223 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5226 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5230 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5231 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5232 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5233 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5235 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5237 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5238 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5239 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5240 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5241 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5242 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5243 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5244 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5245 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5246 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5247 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5253 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5256 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5257 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5258 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5259 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5260 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5261 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5263 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5264 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5265 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5266 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5269 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5270 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5274 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5275 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5277 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5279 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5280 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5281 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5282 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5284 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5285 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5286 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5287 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5288 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5289 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5293 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5294 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5298 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5299 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5302 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5303 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5305 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5306 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5307 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5308 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5309 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5310 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5311 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5312 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5314 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5315 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5316 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5319 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5320 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5321 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5327 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5328 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5331 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5332 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5333 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5334 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5340 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5341 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5343 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5344 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5345 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5346 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5347 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5348 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5349 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5350 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5351 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5354 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5355 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5356 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5358 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5359 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5362 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5363 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5365 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5366 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5367 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5370 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5371 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5372 let mut chan_closed = false;
5373 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5377 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5379 None if !chan_closed => {
5380 // use override shutdown script if provided
5381 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5382 Some(script) => script,
5384 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5385 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5386 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5387 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5391 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5392 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5394 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5400 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5401 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5402 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5403 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5405 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5407 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5409 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5410 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5411 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5412 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5413 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5414 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5417 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5418 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5420 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5421 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5422 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5425 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5426 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5427 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5428 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5429 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5431 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5432 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5439 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5440 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5442 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5445 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5446 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5447 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5449 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5450 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5454 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5458 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5459 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5460 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5463 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5464 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
5465 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5466 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5467 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5468 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<Signer>, APIError>
5469 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5470 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5471 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5473 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5474 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5475 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5476 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5478 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5479 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5481 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5482 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5484 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5485 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5486 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5488 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5489 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5491 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5492 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5493 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5494 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5495 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5498 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5499 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5501 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5503 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5504 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5505 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5506 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5509 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5510 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5512 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5513 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5514 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5515 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5519 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5520 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5521 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5525 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5526 Ok(script) => script,
5527 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5530 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5533 context: ChannelContext {
5536 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5537 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5538 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5539 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5544 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5546 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5547 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5548 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5549 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5551 channel_value_satoshis,
5553 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5556 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5559 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5560 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5563 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5564 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5565 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5566 pending_update_fee: None,
5567 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5568 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5569 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5570 update_time_counter: 1,
5572 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5574 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5575 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5576 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5577 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5578 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5579 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5581 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5582 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5583 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5584 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5586 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5587 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5588 closing_fee_limits: None,
5589 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5591 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
5593 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5594 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5595 short_channel_id: None,
5596 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5598 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
5599 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5600 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5601 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5602 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5603 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5604 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5605 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5606 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5607 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5608 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5609 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5611 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5613 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5614 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5615 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5616 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5617 counterparty_parameters: None,
5618 funding_outpoint: None,
5619 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5621 funding_transaction: None,
5623 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5624 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5625 counterparty_node_id,
5627 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5629 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5631 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5632 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5634 announcement_sigs: None,
5636 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5637 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5638 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5639 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5641 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5642 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5644 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5645 outbound_scid_alias,
5647 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5648 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5650 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5651 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5656 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5661 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5662 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5663 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5664 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5665 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5666 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5669 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5670 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5671 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5672 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5673 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5674 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5675 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5676 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5677 -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5678 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5679 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5681 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5682 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5684 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5685 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5686 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5687 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5690 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5691 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5693 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5696 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5697 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5698 return Err((self, e));
5702 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5704 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5706 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5707 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5708 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5710 let channel = Channel {
5711 context: self.context,
5714 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5715 temporary_channel_id,
5716 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5717 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5720 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5722 next_local_nonce: None,
5726 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5727 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5728 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5729 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5730 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5731 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5732 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5733 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5734 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5735 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5738 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5739 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5740 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5741 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5742 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5743 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5749 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5750 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5751 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5752 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
5753 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5754 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5755 // We've exhausted our options
5758 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5759 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5762 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5763 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5764 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5765 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5767 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5768 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5769 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5770 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5771 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5773 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5775 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5776 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5779 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5780 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5781 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5783 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5784 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5787 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5788 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5791 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5792 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5796 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5797 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5798 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5799 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5800 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5801 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5802 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5803 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5804 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5805 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5806 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5807 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5808 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5809 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5810 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5811 first_per_commitment_point,
5812 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5813 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5814 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5815 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5817 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5822 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5823 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5825 // Check sanity of message fields:
5826 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5827 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5829 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5830 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5832 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5833 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5835 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5836 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5838 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5839 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5841 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5842 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5843 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5845 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5846 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5847 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5849 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5850 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5851 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5853 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5856 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5857 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5860 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5861 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5862 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5864 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5865 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5867 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5868 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5870 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5871 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5873 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5874 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5876 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5877 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5879 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5880 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5883 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5884 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5885 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5887 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
5888 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
5890 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5891 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
5894 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
5895 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
5898 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
5899 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5900 &Some(ref script) => {
5901 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
5902 if script.len() == 0 {
5905 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
5906 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
5908 Some(script.clone())
5911 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
5913 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
5918 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
5919 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
5920 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
5921 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
5922 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
5924 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
5925 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
5927 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
5930 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
5931 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
5932 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
5933 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
5934 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5935 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
5938 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
5939 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
5940 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
5943 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
5944 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
5946 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
5947 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
5953 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5954 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
5955 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
5958 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {
5959 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
5960 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
5961 pub fn new<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5962 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
5963 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
5964 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
5965 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
5966 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
5967 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5968 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
5969 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5972 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
5974 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
5975 // support this channel type.
5976 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
5977 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
5978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
5981 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
5982 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
5983 // `static_remote_key`.
5984 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
5985 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
5987 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
5988 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
5989 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
5991 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
5992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
5994 channel_type.clone()
5996 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
5997 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5998 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6003 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6004 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6005 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6006 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6007 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6008 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6009 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6010 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6011 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6014 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6015 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6018 // Check sanity of message fields:
6019 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6020 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6022 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6023 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6025 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6026 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6028 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6029 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6030 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6032 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6035 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6036 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6038 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6040 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6041 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6044 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6047 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6051 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6052 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6053 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6055 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6056 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6058 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6059 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6061 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6062 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6064 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6065 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6067 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6068 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6070 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6074 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6076 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6077 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6082 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6083 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6084 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6085 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6088 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6091 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6092 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6093 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6095 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6096 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6099 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6100 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6101 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6102 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6103 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6104 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6107 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6108 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6109 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6110 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6111 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6114 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6115 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6116 &Some(ref script) => {
6117 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6118 if script.len() == 0 {
6121 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6124 Some(script.clone())
6127 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6129 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6134 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6135 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6136 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6137 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6141 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6142 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6143 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6147 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6148 Ok(script) => script,
6149 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6152 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6153 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6156 context: ChannelContext {
6159 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6160 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6162 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6167 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6169 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6170 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6171 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6172 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6175 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6178 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6181 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6182 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6183 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6185 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6186 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6187 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6188 pending_update_fee: None,
6189 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6190 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6191 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6192 update_time_counter: 1,
6194 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6196 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6197 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6198 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6199 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6200 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6201 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6203 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6204 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6205 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6206 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6208 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6209 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6210 closing_fee_limits: None,
6211 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6213 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
6215 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6216 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6217 short_channel_id: None,
6218 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6220 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6221 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6222 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6223 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6224 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6225 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6226 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6227 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6228 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6229 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6230 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6231 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6232 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
6234 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6236 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6237 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6238 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6239 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6240 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6241 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6242 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6244 funding_outpoint: None,
6245 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6247 funding_transaction: None,
6249 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6250 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6251 counterparty_node_id,
6253 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6255 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6257 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6258 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6260 announcement_sigs: None,
6262 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6263 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6264 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6265 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6267 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6268 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6270 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6271 outbound_scid_alias,
6273 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6274 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6276 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6277 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6282 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6289 pub fn is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
6290 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
6293 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
6294 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
6295 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
6296 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
6299 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6300 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6302 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6303 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6304 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6305 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6307 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6308 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6310 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6311 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6313 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6314 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
6317 self.context.user_id = user_id;
6318 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
6320 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6323 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6324 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6325 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6327 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6328 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6329 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6330 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6332 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6333 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6334 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6335 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6336 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6337 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6338 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6339 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6340 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6341 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6342 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6343 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6344 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6345 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6346 first_per_commitment_point,
6347 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6348 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6349 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6351 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6353 next_local_nonce: None,
6357 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6358 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6360 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6362 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6363 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6366 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6367 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6369 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6370 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6372 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6373 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6374 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6375 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6376 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6377 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6378 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6379 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6380 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6383 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6384 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6386 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6387 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6388 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6389 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6391 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6392 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6394 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6395 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6398 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
6399 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6400 ) -> Result<(Channel<Signer>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6402 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6405 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6406 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6408 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6409 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6410 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6412 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6414 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
6415 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned())));
6417 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6418 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6419 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6420 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6423 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6424 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6425 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6426 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6427 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6429 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6431 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6432 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6433 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6436 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6437 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6438 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6442 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6443 initial_commitment_tx,
6446 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6447 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6450 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6451 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6454 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6456 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6457 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6458 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6459 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6460 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6461 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6462 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6463 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6464 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6465 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6466 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6468 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6470 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6472 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6473 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6474 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6475 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6477 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6479 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6480 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6481 let mut channel = Channel {
6482 context: self.context,
6484 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6485 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6486 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6488 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6492 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6493 }, channel_monitor))
6497 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6498 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6500 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6506 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6507 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6508 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6509 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6510 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6512 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6513 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6514 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6515 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6521 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6522 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6523 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6524 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6525 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6526 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6531 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6532 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6533 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6534 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6536 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6537 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6538 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6539 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6544 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6545 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6546 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6547 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6548 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6549 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6554 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6555 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6556 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6559 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6561 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6562 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6563 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6564 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6565 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6567 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6568 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6569 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6570 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6572 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6573 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6574 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6576 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6578 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6579 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6580 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6581 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6582 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6583 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6585 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6586 // deserialized from that format.
6587 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6588 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6589 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6591 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6593 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6594 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6595 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6597 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6598 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6599 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6600 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6603 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6604 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6605 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6608 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6609 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6610 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6611 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6613 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6614 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6616 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6618 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6620 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6622 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6625 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6627 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6632 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6633 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6635 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6636 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6637 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6638 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6639 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6640 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6641 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6643 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6645 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6647 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6650 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6651 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6652 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6655 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6657 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6658 preimages.push(preimage);
6660 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6661 reason.write(writer)?;
6663 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6665 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6666 preimages.push(preimage);
6668 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6669 reason.write(writer)?;
6672 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6673 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6674 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6676 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6677 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6678 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6682 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6683 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6684 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6686 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6687 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6691 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6692 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6693 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6694 source.write(writer)?;
6695 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6697 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6698 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6699 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6701 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6702 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6704 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6706 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6707 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6709 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6711 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6712 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6717 match self.context.resend_order {
6718 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6719 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6722 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6723 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6724 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6726 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6727 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6728 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6729 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6732 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6733 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6734 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6735 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6736 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6739 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6740 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6741 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6742 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6744 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6745 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6746 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6748 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6750 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6751 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6752 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6753 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6755 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6756 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6757 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6758 // consider the stale state on reload.
6761 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6762 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6763 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6765 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6766 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6767 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6769 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6770 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6772 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6773 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6774 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6776 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6777 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6779 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6782 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6783 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6784 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6786 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6789 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6790 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6792 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6793 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6794 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6796 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6798 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6800 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6802 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6803 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6804 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6805 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6806 htlc.write(writer)?;
6809 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6810 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6811 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6813 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6814 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6816 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6817 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6818 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6819 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6820 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6821 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6822 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6824 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6825 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6826 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6827 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6828 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6830 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6831 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6833 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6834 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6835 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6836 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6838 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6840 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6841 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6842 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6843 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6844 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6845 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6846 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6848 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6849 (2, chan_type, option),
6850 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6851 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6852 (5, self.context.config, required),
6853 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6854 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6855 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6856 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6857 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6858 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6859 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6860 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6861 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6862 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6863 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6864 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6865 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6866 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6867 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6868 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6869 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6870 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6877 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6878 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6880 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6881 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6883 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6884 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6885 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6887 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6888 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6889 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6890 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6892 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6894 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6895 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6896 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6897 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6898 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6900 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6901 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6904 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6905 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6906 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6908 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6910 let mut keys_data = None;
6912 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6913 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6914 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6915 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6916 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6917 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6918 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6919 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6920 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6921 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6925 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6926 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6927 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6930 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6932 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6933 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6934 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6936 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6938 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6939 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6940 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6941 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6942 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6943 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6944 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6945 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6946 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6947 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6948 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6949 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6950 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6955 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6956 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6957 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6958 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6959 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6960 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6961 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6962 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6963 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6964 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6965 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6966 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6968 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6969 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6972 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6973 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6976 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6977 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6979 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6981 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6985 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6986 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6987 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6988 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6989 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6990 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6991 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6992 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6993 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6994 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6995 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
6997 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6998 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6999 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7001 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7002 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7003 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7005 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7009 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7010 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7011 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7012 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7015 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7017 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7019 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7020 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7021 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7022 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7025 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7026 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7027 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7028 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7031 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7033 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7035 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7036 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7037 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7038 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7040 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7041 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7042 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7043 // consider the stale state on reload.
7044 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7047 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7048 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7049 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7051 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7054 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7055 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7056 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7058 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7059 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7060 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7061 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7063 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7064 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7066 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7067 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7069 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7070 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7071 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7073 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7075 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7076 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7078 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7079 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7082 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7084 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7085 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7086 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7087 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7089 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7092 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7093 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7095 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7097 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7098 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7100 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7101 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7103 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7105 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7106 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7107 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7109 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7110 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7111 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7115 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7116 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7117 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7119 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7125 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7126 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7127 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7128 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7129 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7130 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7131 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7132 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7133 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7134 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7136 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7137 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7138 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7139 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7140 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7141 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7142 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7144 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7145 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7146 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7147 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7149 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7151 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7152 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7154 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7155 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7156 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7157 (2, channel_type, option),
7158 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7159 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7160 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7161 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7162 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7163 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7164 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7165 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7166 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7167 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7168 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7169 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7170 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7171 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7172 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7173 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7174 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7175 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7176 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7177 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7178 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7181 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7182 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7183 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7184 // required channel parameters.
7185 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7186 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7187 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7189 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7191 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7192 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7193 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7194 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7197 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7198 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7199 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7201 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7202 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7204 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7205 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7210 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7211 if iter.next().is_some() {
7212 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7216 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7217 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7218 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7219 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7220 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7223 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7224 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7225 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7227 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7228 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7230 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7231 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7232 // separate u64 values.
7233 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7235 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7237 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7238 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7239 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7240 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7242 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7243 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7245 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7246 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7247 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7248 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7249 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7252 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7253 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7257 context: ChannelContext {
7260 config: config.unwrap(),
7264 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7265 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7266 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7269 temporary_channel_id,
7271 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7273 channel_value_satoshis,
7275 latest_monitor_update_id,
7278 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7281 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7282 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7285 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7286 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7287 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7288 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7292 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7293 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7294 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7295 monitor_pending_forwards,
7296 monitor_pending_failures,
7297 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7300 holding_cell_update_fee,
7301 next_holder_htlc_id,
7302 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7303 update_time_counter,
7306 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7307 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7308 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7309 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7311 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7312 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7313 closing_fee_limits: None,
7314 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7316 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7318 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7319 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7321 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7323 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7324 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7325 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7326 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7327 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7328 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7329 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7330 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7331 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7334 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7336 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7337 funding_transaction,
7339 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7340 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7341 counterparty_node_id,
7343 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7347 channel_update_status,
7348 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7352 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7353 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7354 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7355 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7357 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7358 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7360 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7361 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7362 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7364 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7365 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7367 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7368 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7370 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7373 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7382 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7383 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7384 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7385 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7386 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7388 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7389 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7390 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7391 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7392 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7393 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7394 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7395 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7396 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7397 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7398 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7399 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7400 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7401 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7402 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7403 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7404 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7405 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7406 use crate::util::test_utils;
7407 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7408 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7409 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7410 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7411 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7412 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7413 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7414 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7415 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7416 use crate::prelude::*;
7418 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7421 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7422 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7428 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7429 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7430 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7431 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7435 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7436 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7437 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7438 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7439 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7440 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7441 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7445 signer: InMemorySigner,
7448 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7449 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7452 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7453 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7455 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7456 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7459 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7463 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7465 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7466 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7467 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7468 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7469 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7472 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7473 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7474 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7475 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7479 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7480 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7481 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7485 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7486 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7487 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7488 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7490 let seed = [42; 32];
7491 let network = Network::Testnet;
7492 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7493 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7494 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7497 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7498 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7499 let config = UserConfig::default();
7500 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7501 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7502 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7504 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7505 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7509 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7510 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7512 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7513 let original_fee = 253;
7514 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7515 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7516 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7517 let seed = [42; 32];
7518 let network = Network::Testnet;
7519 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7521 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7522 let config = UserConfig::default();
7523 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7525 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7526 // same as the old fee.
7527 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7528 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7529 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7533 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7534 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7535 // dust limits are used.
7536 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7537 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7538 let seed = [42; 32];
7539 let network = Network::Testnet;
7540 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7541 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7542 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7544 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7545 // they have different dust limits.
7547 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7548 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7549 let config = UserConfig::default();
7550 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7552 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7553 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7554 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7555 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7556 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7558 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7559 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7560 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7561 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7562 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7564 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7565 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7566 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7567 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7569 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7570 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7571 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7573 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7574 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7576 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7577 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7578 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7580 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7581 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7582 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7583 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7586 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7588 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7589 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7590 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7591 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7592 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7593 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7594 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7595 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7596 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7598 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7601 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7602 // the dust limit check.
7603 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7604 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7605 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7606 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7608 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7609 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7610 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7611 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7612 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7613 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7614 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7618 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7619 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7620 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7621 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7622 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7623 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7624 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7625 let seed = [42; 32];
7626 let network = Network::Testnet;
7627 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7629 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7630 let config = UserConfig::default();
7631 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7633 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7634 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7636 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7637 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7638 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7639 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7640 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7641 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7643 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7644 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7645 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7646 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7647 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7649 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7651 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7652 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7653 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7654 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7655 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7657 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7658 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7659 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7660 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7661 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7665 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7666 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7667 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7668 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7669 let seed = [42; 32];
7670 let network = Network::Testnet;
7671 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7672 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7673 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7675 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7677 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7678 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7679 let config = UserConfig::default();
7680 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7682 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7683 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7684 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7685 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7687 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7688 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7689 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7691 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7692 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7693 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7694 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7696 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7697 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7698 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7700 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7701 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7703 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7704 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7705 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7706 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7707 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7708 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7709 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7711 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7713 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7714 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7715 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7716 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7717 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7721 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7722 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7723 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7724 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7725 let seed = [42; 32];
7726 let network = Network::Testnet;
7727 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7728 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7729 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7731 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7732 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7733 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7734 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7735 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7736 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7737 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7738 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7740 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7741 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7742 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7743 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7744 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7745 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7747 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7748 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7749 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7750 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7752 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7754 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7755 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7756 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7757 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7758 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7759 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7761 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7762 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7763 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7764 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7766 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7767 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7768 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7769 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7770 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7772 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7773 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7775 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7776 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7777 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7779 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7780 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7781 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7782 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7783 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7785 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7786 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7788 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7789 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7790 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7794 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7796 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7797 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7798 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7800 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7801 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7802 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7803 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7805 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7806 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7807 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7809 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7811 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7812 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7815 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7816 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7817 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7818 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7819 let seed = [42; 32];
7820 let network = Network::Testnet;
7821 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7822 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7823 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7826 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7827 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7828 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7830 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7831 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7833 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7834 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7835 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7837 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7838 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7840 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7842 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7843 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7845 // Channel Negotiations failed
7846 let result = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7847 assert!(result.is_err());
7852 fn channel_update() {
7853 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7854 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7855 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7856 let seed = [42; 32];
7857 let network = Network::Testnet;
7858 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7859 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7860 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7862 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7863 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7864 let config = UserConfig::default();
7865 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7867 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7868 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7869 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7870 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7871 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7873 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7874 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7875 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7876 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7877 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7879 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7880 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7881 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7882 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7884 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7885 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7886 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7888 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7889 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7891 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7892 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7893 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7895 short_channel_id: 0,
7898 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7899 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7900 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7902 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7903 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7905 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7907 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7909 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7910 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7911 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7912 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7914 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7915 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7916 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7918 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7922 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7924 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7925 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7926 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7927 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7928 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7929 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7930 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7931 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7932 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7933 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7934 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7935 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7936 use crate::sync::Arc;
7938 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7939 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7940 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7941 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7943 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7945 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7946 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7947 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7948 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7949 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7951 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7952 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7958 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7959 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7960 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7962 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7963 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7964 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7965 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7966 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7967 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7969 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7971 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7972 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7973 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7974 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7975 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7976 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7978 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7979 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7980 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7981 selected_contest_delay: 144
7983 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7984 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7986 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7987 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7989 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7990 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7992 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7993 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7995 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7996 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7997 // build_commitment_transaction.
7998 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7999 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8000 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8001 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8002 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8004 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8005 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8006 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8007 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8011 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8012 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8013 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8014 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8018 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8019 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8020 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8022 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8023 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8025 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8026 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8028 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8030 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8031 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8032 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8033 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8034 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8035 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8036 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8038 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8039 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8040 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8041 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8043 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8044 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8045 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8047 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8049 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8050 commitment_tx.clone(),
8051 counterparty_signature,
8052 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8053 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8054 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8056 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8057 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8059 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8060 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8061 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8063 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8064 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8067 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8068 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8070 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8071 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8072 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8073 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8074 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8075 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8076 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8077 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8079 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8082 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8083 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8084 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8088 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8091 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8092 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8093 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8095 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8096 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8097 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8098 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8099 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8100 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8101 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8102 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8104 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8108 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8109 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8110 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8111 "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", {});
8113 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8114 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8116 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8117 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8118 "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", {});
8120 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8121 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8122 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8123 "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", {});
8125 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8126 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8128 amount_msat: 1000000,
8130 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8131 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8133 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8136 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8137 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8139 amount_msat: 2000000,
8141 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8142 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8144 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8147 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8148 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8150 amount_msat: 2000000,
8152 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8153 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8154 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8155 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8157 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8160 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8161 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8163 amount_msat: 3000000,
8165 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8166 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8167 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8168 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8170 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8173 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8174 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8176 amount_msat: 4000000,
8178 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8179 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8181 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8185 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8186 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8187 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8189 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8190 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8191 "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", {
8194 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8195 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8196 "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" },
8199 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8200 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8201 "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" },
8204 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8205 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8206 "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" },
8209 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8210 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8211 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8214 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8215 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8216 "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" }
8219 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8220 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8221 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8223 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8224 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8225 "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", {
8228 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8229 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8230 "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" },
8233 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8234 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8235 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8238 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8239 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8240 "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" },
8243 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8244 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8245 "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" },
8248 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8249 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8250 "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" }
8253 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8254 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8255 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8257 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8258 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8259 "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", {
8262 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8263 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8264 "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" },
8267 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8268 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8269 "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" },
8272 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8273 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8274 "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" },
8277 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8278 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8279 "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" }
8282 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8283 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8284 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8285 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8287 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8288 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8289 "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", {
8292 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8293 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8294 "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" },
8297 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8298 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8299 "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" },
8302 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8303 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8304 "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" },
8307 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8308 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8309 "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" }
8312 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8313 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8314 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8315 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8317 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8318 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8319 "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", {
8322 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8323 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8324 "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" },
8327 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8328 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8329 "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" },
8332 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8333 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8334 "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" },
8337 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8338 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8339 "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" }
8342 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8343 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8344 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8346 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8347 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8348 "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", {
8351 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8352 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8353 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff0000000000000000000174020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b014730440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e501008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8356 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8357 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8358 "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" },
8361 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8362 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8363 "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" }
8366 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8367 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8368 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8370 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8371 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8372 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8375 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8376 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8377 "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" },
8380 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8381 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8382 "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" },
8385 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8386 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8387 "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" }
8390 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8391 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8392 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8394 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8395 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8396 "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", {
8399 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8400 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8401 "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" },
8404 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8405 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8406 "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" }
8409 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8410 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8411 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8412 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8413 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8414 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8416 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8417 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8418 "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", {
8421 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8422 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8423 "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" },
8426 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8427 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8428 "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" }
8431 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8432 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8433 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8434 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8435 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8437 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8438 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8439 "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", {
8442 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8443 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8444 "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" },
8447 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8448 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8449 "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" }
8452 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8453 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8454 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8456 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8457 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8458 "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", {
8461 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8462 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8463 "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" }
8466 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8467 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8468 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8469 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8470 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8472 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8473 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8474 "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", {
8477 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8478 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8479 "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" }
8482 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8483 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8484 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8485 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8486 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8488 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8489 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8490 "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", {
8493 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8494 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8495 "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" }
8498 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8499 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8500 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8501 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8503 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8504 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8505 "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", {});
8507 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8508 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8509 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8510 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8511 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8513 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8514 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8515 "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", {});
8517 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8518 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8519 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8520 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8521 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8523 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8524 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8525 "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", {});
8527 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8528 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8529 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8531 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8532 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8533 "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", {});
8535 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8536 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8537 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8538 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8539 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8541 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8542 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8543 "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", {});
8545 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8546 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8547 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8548 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8549 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8551 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8552 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8553 "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", {});
8555 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8556 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8557 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8558 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8559 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8560 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8562 amount_msat: 2000000,
8564 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8565 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8567 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8570 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8571 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8572 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8574 amount_msat: 5000001,
8576 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8577 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8578 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8579 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8581 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8584 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8585 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8587 amount_msat: 5000000,
8589 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8590 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8591 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8592 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8594 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8598 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8599 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8600 "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", {
8603 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8604 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8605 "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" },
8607 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8608 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8609 "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" },
8611 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8612 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8613 "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" }
8616 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8617 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8618 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8619 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8622 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8623 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8624 "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" },
8626 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8627 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8628 "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" },
8630 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8631 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8632 "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" }
8637 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8638 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8640 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8641 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8642 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8643 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8645 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8646 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8647 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8649 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8650 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8652 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8653 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8655 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8656 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8657 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8661 fn test_key_derivation() {
8662 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8663 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8665 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8666 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8668 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8669 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8671 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8672 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8674 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8675 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8677 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8678 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8680 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8681 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8683 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8684 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8688 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8689 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8690 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8691 let seed = [42; 32];
8692 let network = Network::Testnet;
8693 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8694 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8696 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8697 let config = UserConfig::default();
8698 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8699 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8701 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8702 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8704 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8705 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8706 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8707 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8708 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8709 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8710 assert!(res.is_ok());
8714 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8715 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8716 // resulting `channel_type`.
8717 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8718 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8719 let network = Network::Testnet;
8720 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8721 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8723 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8724 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8726 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8727 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8729 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8730 // need to signal it.
8731 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8732 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8733 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8736 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8738 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8739 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8740 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8742 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8743 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8744 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8747 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8748 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8749 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8750 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8751 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8754 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8755 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8759 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8760 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8761 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8762 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8763 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8764 let network = Network::Testnet;
8765 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8766 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8768 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8769 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8771 let config = UserConfig::default();
8773 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8774 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8775 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8776 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8777 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8779 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8780 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8781 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8784 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8785 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8786 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8788 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8789 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8790 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8791 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8792 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8793 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8795 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8799 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8800 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8802 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8803 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8804 let network = Network::Testnet;
8805 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8806 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8808 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8809 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8811 let config = UserConfig::default();
8813 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8814 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8815 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8816 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8817 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8818 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8819 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8820 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8822 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8823 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8824 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8825 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8826 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8827 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8830 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8831 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8833 let res = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8834 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8835 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8836 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8838 assert!(res.is_err());
8840 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8841 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8842 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8844 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8845 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8846 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8849 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8851 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new(
8852 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8853 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8854 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8857 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8858 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8860 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8861 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8863 assert!(res.is_err());