1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
53 use crate::sync::Mutex;
54 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
59 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
66 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
69 pub struct AvailableBalances {
70 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
71 pub balance_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
73 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
75 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
76 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
79 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
82 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
84 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
86 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
87 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
88 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
89 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
90 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
91 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
93 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
97 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
98 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
99 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
100 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
103 enum InboundHTLCState {
104 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
105 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
106 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
107 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
108 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
109 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
110 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
111 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
112 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
113 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
114 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
115 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
116 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
117 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
118 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
120 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
124 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
125 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
126 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
128 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
129 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
130 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
131 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
132 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
133 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
135 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
136 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
137 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
138 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
139 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
140 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
141 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
142 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
144 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
145 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
147 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
148 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
149 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
150 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
151 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
152 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
153 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
154 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
157 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
161 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
162 state: InboundHTLCState,
165 enum OutboundHTLCState {
166 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
167 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
168 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
169 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
170 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
171 /// money back (though we won't), and,
172 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
173 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
174 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
175 /// we'll never get out of sync).
176 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
177 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
178 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
180 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
181 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
182 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
187 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
188 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
189 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
190 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
191 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
192 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
193 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
194 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
198 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
200 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
201 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
204 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
207 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
208 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
213 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
214 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
222 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
226 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
233 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
234 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
238 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
240 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
241 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
242 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
245 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
250 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
254 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
255 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
256 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
257 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
258 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
259 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
260 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
262 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
263 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
264 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
265 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
266 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
267 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
268 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
270 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
271 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
272 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
282 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
284 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
285 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
286 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
287 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
288 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
289 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
290 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
291 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
292 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
294 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
295 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
297 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
298 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
299 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
300 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
301 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
302 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
303 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
304 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
305 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
306 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
307 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
308 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
309 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
311 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
312 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
313 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
314 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
315 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
316 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
317 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
318 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
320 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
323 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
325 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
327 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
329 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
332 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
336 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
338 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
340 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
342 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
343 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
344 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
345 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
346 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
348 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
349 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
351 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
353 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
354 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
356 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
357 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
358 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
359 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
360 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
361 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
363 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
364 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
366 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
367 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
368 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
369 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
370 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
372 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
373 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
375 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
376 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
378 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
379 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
380 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
381 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
387 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
388 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
390 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
397 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
407 macro_rules! secp_check {
408 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
416 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
417 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
418 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
419 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
420 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
421 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
422 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
423 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
425 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
427 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
429 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
433 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
435 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
436 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
437 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
439 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
440 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
442 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
443 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
444 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
445 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
446 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
448 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
449 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
453 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
459 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
462 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
463 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 holding_cell_msat: u64,
466 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
469 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
470 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
471 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
472 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
473 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
474 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
475 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
476 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
481 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
482 struct HTLCCandidate {
484 origin: HTLCInitiator,
488 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
496 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
498 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
500 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
501 htlc_value_msat: u64,
502 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
507 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
508 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
509 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
510 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
511 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
513 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
514 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
515 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
516 htlc_value_msat: u64,
518 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
519 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
523 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
524 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
525 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
526 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
527 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
528 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
529 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
530 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
531 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
532 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
533 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
536 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
538 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
539 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
540 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
541 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
542 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
545 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
546 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
547 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
548 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
549 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
550 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
551 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
552 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
555 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
557 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
558 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
559 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
560 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
561 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
562 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
563 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
564 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
567 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
568 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
569 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
570 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
571 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
572 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
573 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
574 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
575 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
576 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
577 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
578 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
579 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
580 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
581 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
583 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
584 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
585 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
586 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
588 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
589 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
590 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
591 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
593 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
594 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
595 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
596 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
597 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
599 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
600 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
601 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
602 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
604 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
605 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
606 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
608 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
609 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
610 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
611 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
612 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
614 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
615 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
618 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
619 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
621 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
622 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
623 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
624 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
626 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
627 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
629 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
630 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
633 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
634 (0, update, required),
637 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
638 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
639 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
640 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
641 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
645 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
646 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
647 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
649 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
651 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
657 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
659 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
660 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
661 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
666 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
667 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
668 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
669 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
670 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
672 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
673 /// in a timely manner.
674 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
677 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
678 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
679 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
681 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
682 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
683 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
684 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
688 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
689 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
690 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
692 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
693 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
694 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
695 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
697 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
701 /// The current channel ID.
702 channel_id: ChannelId,
703 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
704 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
705 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
708 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
709 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
711 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
712 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
713 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
715 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
716 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
717 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
718 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
720 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
721 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
723 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
725 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
726 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
727 destination_script: Script,
729 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
730 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
731 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
733 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
734 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
735 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
736 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
737 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
738 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
740 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
741 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
742 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
743 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
744 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
745 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
747 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
749 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
750 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
751 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
753 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
754 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
755 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
756 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
757 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
758 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
759 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
761 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
762 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
763 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
765 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
766 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
767 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
768 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
769 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
770 /// outbound or inbound.
771 signer_pending_funding: bool,
773 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
775 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
776 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
777 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
778 // HTLCs with similar state.
779 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
780 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
781 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
782 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
783 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
784 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
785 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
786 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
787 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
790 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
791 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
792 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
794 update_time_counter: u32,
796 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
797 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
798 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
800 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
801 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
803 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
804 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
806 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
807 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
808 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
809 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
811 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
812 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
814 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
816 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
818 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
819 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
820 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
821 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
822 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
823 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
824 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
825 channel_creation_height: u32,
827 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
830 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
832 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
835 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
837 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
840 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
842 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
844 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
845 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
848 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
850 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
852 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
853 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
855 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
857 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
858 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
859 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
861 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
863 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
864 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
865 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
867 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
868 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
869 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
871 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
873 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
875 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
876 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
877 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
878 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
880 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
881 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
882 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
884 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
885 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
886 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
888 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
889 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
890 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
891 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
893 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
894 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
895 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
897 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
898 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
899 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
900 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
901 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
903 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
904 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
906 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
907 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
908 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
909 /// unblock the state machine.
911 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
912 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
913 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
915 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
916 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
917 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
919 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
920 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
921 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
922 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
923 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
924 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
925 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
926 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
928 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
929 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
931 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
932 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
933 // the channel's funding UTXO.
935 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
936 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
937 // associated channel mapping.
939 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
940 // to store all of them.
941 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
943 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
944 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
945 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
946 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
947 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
949 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
950 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
952 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
953 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
955 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
956 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
957 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
959 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
960 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
961 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
964 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
965 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
966 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
967 self.update_time_counter
970 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
971 self.latest_monitor_update_id
974 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
975 self.config.announced_channel
978 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
979 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
982 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
983 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
984 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
985 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
988 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
989 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
990 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
993 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
994 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
995 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
996 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
997 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1000 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1001 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1002 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1003 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1005 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1006 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1008 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1009 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1011 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1012 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1014 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1017 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1018 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1019 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1020 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1021 self.channel_state &
1022 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1023 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1024 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1025 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1028 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1029 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1030 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1031 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1032 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1035 // Public utilities:
1037 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1041 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1043 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1044 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1045 self.temporary_channel_id
1048 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1052 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1053 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1054 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1058 /// Gets the channel's type
1059 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1063 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1065 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1066 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1067 self.short_channel_id
1070 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1071 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1072 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1075 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1076 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1077 self.outbound_scid_alias
1080 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1081 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1082 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1083 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1084 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1085 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1088 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1089 /// get_funding_created.
1090 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1091 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1094 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1095 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1096 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1099 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1100 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1101 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1102 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1106 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1109 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1110 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1113 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1114 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1117 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1118 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1119 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1122 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1123 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1126 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1127 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1128 self.counterparty_node_id
1131 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1132 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1133 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1136 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1137 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1138 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1141 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1142 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1144 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1145 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1146 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1147 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1149 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1153 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1154 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1155 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1158 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1159 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1160 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1163 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1164 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1165 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1167 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1168 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1173 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1174 self.channel_value_satoshis
1177 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1178 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1181 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1182 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1185 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1186 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1187 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1189 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1190 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1191 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1192 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep);
1193 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1195 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1199 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1200 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1201 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1204 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1205 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1206 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1209 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1210 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1211 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1214 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1215 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1216 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1219 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1220 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1221 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1224 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1225 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1226 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1229 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1230 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1231 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1232 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1233 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1236 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1238 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1239 self.prev_config = None;
1243 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1244 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1248 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1249 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1250 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1251 let did_channel_update =
1252 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1253 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1254 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1255 if did_channel_update {
1256 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1257 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1258 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1259 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1261 self.config.options = *config;
1265 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1266 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1267 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1268 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1269 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1272 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1273 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1274 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1275 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1276 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1278 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1279 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1280 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1281 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1282 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1283 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1284 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1286 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1287 where L::Target: Logger
1289 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1290 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1291 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1293 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1294 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1295 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1296 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1298 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1299 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1300 if match update_state {
1301 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1302 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1303 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1304 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1305 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1307 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1311 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1312 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1313 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1315 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1317 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1318 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1319 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1321 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1322 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1323 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1324 transaction_output_index: None
1329 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1330 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1331 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1332 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1333 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1336 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1338 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1339 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1340 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1342 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1343 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1346 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1347 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1350 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1352 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1353 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1354 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1356 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1357 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1363 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1364 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1365 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1366 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1367 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1368 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1369 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1373 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1374 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1376 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1378 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1379 if generated_by_local {
1380 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1381 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1390 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1392 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1393 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1394 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1395 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1396 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1397 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1398 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1401 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1402 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1403 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1404 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1408 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1409 preimages.push(preimage);
1413 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1414 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1416 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1418 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1419 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1421 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1422 if !generated_by_local {
1423 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1431 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1432 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1433 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1434 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1435 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1436 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1437 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1438 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1440 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1442 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1443 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1444 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1445 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1447 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1449 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1450 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1451 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1452 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1455 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1456 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1457 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1458 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1460 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1463 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1464 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1465 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1466 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1468 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1471 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1472 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1477 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1478 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1483 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1485 let channel_parameters =
1486 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1487 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1488 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1495 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1498 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1499 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1500 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1501 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1503 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1504 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1505 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1513 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1514 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1520 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1521 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1522 /// our counterparty!)
1523 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1524 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1525 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1526 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1527 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1528 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1529 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1531 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1535 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1536 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1537 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1538 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1539 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1540 //may see payments to it!
1541 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1542 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1543 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1545 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1548 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1549 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1550 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1551 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1552 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1555 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1556 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1559 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1563 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1564 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1565 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1566 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1567 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1568 // which are near the dust limit.
1569 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1570 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1571 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1572 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1573 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1575 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1576 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1578 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1581 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1582 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1583 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1586 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1587 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1589 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1590 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1591 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1592 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1593 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1594 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1595 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1598 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1601 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1602 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1603 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1605 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1606 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1607 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1608 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1609 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1610 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1612 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1613 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1619 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1620 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1622 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1623 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1624 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1625 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1626 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1627 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1628 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1631 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1634 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1635 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1636 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1638 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1639 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1640 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1641 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1642 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1643 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1645 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1646 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1650 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1651 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1652 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1653 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1654 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1655 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1656 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1658 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1659 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1661 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1668 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1669 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1670 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1671 /// corner case properly.
1672 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1673 -> AvailableBalances
1674 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1676 let context = &self;
1677 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1678 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1679 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1681 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1682 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1683 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1684 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1687 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1689 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1690 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1692 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1694 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1696 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1697 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1701 if context.is_outbound() {
1702 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1703 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1705 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1706 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1708 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1709 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1710 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1711 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1714 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1715 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1716 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1717 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1718 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1719 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1720 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1723 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1724 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1725 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1726 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1727 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1728 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1729 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1730 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1731 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1732 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1733 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1735 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1738 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1739 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1740 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1741 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1742 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1745 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1746 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1748 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1749 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1750 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1752 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1753 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1754 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1755 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1759 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1761 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1762 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1763 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1764 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1765 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1766 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1767 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1769 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1770 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1772 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1773 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1774 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1776 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1777 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1778 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1779 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1780 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1783 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1784 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1785 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1786 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1787 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1788 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1791 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1792 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1793 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1795 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1799 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1800 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1802 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1803 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1807 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1808 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1809 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1810 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1812 outbound_capacity_msat,
1813 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1814 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1819 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1820 let context = &self;
1821 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1824 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1825 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1827 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1828 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1830 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1831 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1833 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1834 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1835 let context = &self;
1836 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1838 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1841 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1842 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1844 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1845 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1847 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1848 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1850 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1851 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1855 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1856 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1862 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1863 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1864 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1867 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1868 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1869 included_htlcs += 1;
1872 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1873 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1877 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1878 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1879 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1880 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1881 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1882 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1887 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1889 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1890 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1895 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1896 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1900 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1901 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1902 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1905 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1906 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1908 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1909 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1910 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1912 total_pending_htlcs,
1913 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1914 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1915 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1917 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1918 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1919 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1921 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1923 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1928 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1929 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1931 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1932 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1934 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1935 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1937 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1938 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1939 let context = &self;
1940 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1942 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1945 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1946 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1948 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1949 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1951 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1952 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1954 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1955 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1959 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1960 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1966 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1967 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1968 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1969 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1970 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1971 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1974 included_htlcs += 1;
1977 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1978 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1981 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1982 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1984 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1985 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1986 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1991 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1992 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1993 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1996 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1997 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1999 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2000 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2002 total_pending_htlcs,
2003 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2004 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2005 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2007 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2008 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2009 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2011 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2013 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2018 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2019 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2020 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2021 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2028 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2030 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2031 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2034 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2036 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2037 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2038 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2042 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2043 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2044 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2047 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2049 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2050 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2053 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2054 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2055 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2056 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2057 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2058 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2059 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2060 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2061 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2062 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2063 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2065 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2066 // return them to fail the payment.
2067 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2068 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2069 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2071 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2072 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2077 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2078 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2079 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2080 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2081 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2082 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2083 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2084 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2085 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2086 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2087 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2088 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2089 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2093 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2095 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2096 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2099 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2100 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2104 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2105 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2106 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2107 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2108 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2109 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2110 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2111 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2112 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2116 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2117 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2118 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2121 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2122 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2123 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2124 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2127 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2129 next_local_nonce: None,
2133 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2134 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2135 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2136 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2138 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2139 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2140 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2141 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2143 match &self.holder_signer {
2144 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2145 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2146 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2147 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2148 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2151 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2155 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2156 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2157 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2158 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2159 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2160 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2163 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2164 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2171 // Internal utility functions for channels
2173 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2174 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2175 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2177 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2179 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2180 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2181 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2183 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2186 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2188 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2191 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2192 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2193 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2195 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2197 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2198 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2199 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2200 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2201 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2204 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2205 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2206 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2207 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2208 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2209 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2210 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2213 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2214 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2216 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2217 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2220 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2221 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2222 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2223 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2224 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2225 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2228 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2229 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2230 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2231 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2234 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2235 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2237 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2238 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2239 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2243 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2244 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2245 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2247 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2248 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2249 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2250 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2252 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2253 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2254 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2255 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2256 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2257 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2258 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2260 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
2261 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2266 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2267 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2269 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2271 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2272 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2273 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2274 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2276 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2277 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2287 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2288 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2289 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2290 // outside of those situations will fail.
2291 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2295 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2300 1 + // script length (0)
2304 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2305 2 + // witness marker and flag
2306 1 + // witness element count
2307 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2308 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2309 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2310 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2311 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2312 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2314 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2315 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2316 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2322 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2323 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2324 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2325 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2327 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2328 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2329 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2331 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2332 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2333 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2334 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2335 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2336 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2339 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2340 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2343 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2344 value_to_holder = 0;
2347 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2348 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2349 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2350 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2352 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2353 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2356 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2357 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2360 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2363 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2364 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2366 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2368 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2369 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2370 where L::Target: Logger {
2371 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2372 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2373 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2374 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2375 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2376 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2377 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2378 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2382 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2383 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2384 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2385 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2387 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2388 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2390 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2392 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2393 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2394 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2396 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2397 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2398 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2399 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2400 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2401 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2402 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2404 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2405 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2406 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2408 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2409 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2411 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2414 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2415 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2419 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2423 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2424 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2425 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2426 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2427 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2428 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2431 // Now update local state:
2433 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2434 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2435 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2436 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2437 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2438 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2439 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2443 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2444 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2445 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2446 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2447 // do not not get into this branch.
2448 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2449 match pending_update {
2450 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2451 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2452 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2453 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2454 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2455 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2456 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2459 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2460 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2461 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2462 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2463 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2464 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2465 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2471 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2472 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2473 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2475 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2476 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2477 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2479 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2480 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2483 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2484 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2486 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2487 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2489 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2490 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2493 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2496 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2497 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2498 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2499 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2504 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2505 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2506 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2507 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2508 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2509 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2510 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2511 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2512 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2513 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2514 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2515 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2516 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2517 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2518 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2520 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2521 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2522 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2523 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2524 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2527 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2528 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2529 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2535 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2536 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2538 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2542 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2543 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2544 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2545 /// before we fail backwards.
2547 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2548 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2549 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2550 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2551 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2552 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2553 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2556 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2557 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2558 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2559 /// before we fail backwards.
2561 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2562 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2563 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2564 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2565 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2566 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2567 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2569 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2571 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2572 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2573 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2575 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2576 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2577 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2579 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2580 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2581 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2583 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2588 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2589 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2595 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2596 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2597 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2598 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2599 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2603 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2604 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2605 force_holding_cell = true;
2608 // Now update local state:
2609 if force_holding_cell {
2610 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2611 match pending_update {
2612 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2613 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2614 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2615 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2619 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2620 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2621 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2622 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2628 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2629 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2630 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2636 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2638 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2639 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2642 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2643 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2644 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2649 // Message handlers:
2651 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2652 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2653 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2654 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2655 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2659 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2660 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2662 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2663 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2665 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2666 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2667 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2668 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2671 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2673 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2674 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2675 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2676 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2678 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2679 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2681 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2682 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2684 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2685 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2686 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2687 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2688 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2693 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2694 initial_commitment_tx,
2697 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2698 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2701 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2702 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2705 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2706 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2707 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2708 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2709 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2710 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2711 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2712 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2713 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2714 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2715 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2716 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2718 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2720 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2721 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2722 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2723 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2724 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2725 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2726 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2728 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2729 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2730 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2732 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2734 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2735 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2737 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2739 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2740 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2744 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2745 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2746 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2747 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2748 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2749 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2750 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2753 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2754 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2756 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2757 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2758 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2759 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2761 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2764 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2765 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2766 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2769 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2770 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2771 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2772 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2773 // when routing outbound payments.
2774 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2778 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2780 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2781 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2783 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2784 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2786 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2787 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2788 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2789 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2790 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2791 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2792 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2793 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2794 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2796 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2797 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2798 let expected_point =
2799 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2800 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2802 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2803 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2804 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2805 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2806 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2807 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2809 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2810 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2811 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2812 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2813 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2815 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2816 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2820 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2823 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2824 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2826 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2828 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2831 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2832 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2833 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2834 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2835 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2836 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2838 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2839 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2840 if local_sent_shutdown {
2841 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2843 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2844 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2845 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2846 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2848 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2849 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2851 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2854 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2857 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2861 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2862 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2863 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2864 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2866 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2867 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2870 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2871 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2872 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2873 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2874 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2875 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2876 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2877 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2878 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2879 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2880 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2882 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2883 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2884 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2885 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2886 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2887 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2891 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2892 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2895 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2896 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2897 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2899 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2900 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2901 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2902 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2903 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2904 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2905 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2909 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2910 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2911 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2912 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2913 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2914 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2915 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2919 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2920 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2921 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2922 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2923 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2924 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2927 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2928 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2930 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2931 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2932 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2934 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2935 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2939 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2940 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2942 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2947 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2948 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2952 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2953 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2954 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2955 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2956 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2957 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2958 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2959 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2960 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2962 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2963 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2964 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2965 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2966 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2969 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2970 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2971 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2972 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2976 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2977 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2979 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2980 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2983 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2984 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2985 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2989 // Now update local state:
2990 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2991 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2992 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2993 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2994 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2995 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2996 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3001 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3003 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3004 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3005 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3006 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3007 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3008 None => fail_reason.into(),
3009 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3010 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3011 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3012 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3014 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3018 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3019 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3020 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3021 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3023 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3024 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3029 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3032 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3033 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3034 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3036 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3040 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3043 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3044 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3047 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3051 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3055 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3056 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3057 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3059 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3063 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3067 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3068 where L::Target: Logger
3070 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3073 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3076 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3080 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3082 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3084 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3085 let commitment_txid = {
3086 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3087 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3088 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3090 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3091 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3092 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3093 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3094 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3095 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3099 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3101 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3102 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3103 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3104 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3107 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3108 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3109 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3113 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3115 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3116 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3117 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3118 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3119 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3120 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3121 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3122 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3123 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3124 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3125 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3131 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3135 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3136 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3137 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3138 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3139 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3140 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3141 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3142 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3143 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3144 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3145 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3146 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3147 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3150 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3151 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3152 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3153 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3154 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3155 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3156 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3158 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3159 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3160 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3161 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3162 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3163 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3164 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3165 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3167 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3168 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3171 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3173 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3174 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3175 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3178 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3181 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3182 commitment_stats.tx,
3184 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3185 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3186 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3189 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3190 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3192 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3193 let mut need_commitment = false;
3194 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3195 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3196 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3197 need_commitment = true;
3201 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3202 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3203 Some(forward_info.clone())
3205 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3206 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3207 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3208 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3209 need_commitment = true;
3212 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3213 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3214 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3215 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3216 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3217 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3218 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3219 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3220 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3221 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3222 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3223 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3224 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3225 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3227 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3229 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3230 need_commitment = true;
3234 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3235 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3236 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3237 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3238 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3239 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3241 nondust_htlc_sources,
3245 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3246 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3247 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3248 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3250 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3251 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3252 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3253 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3254 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3255 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3256 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3257 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3258 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3259 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3260 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3261 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3262 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3263 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3265 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3266 &self.context.channel_id);
3267 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3270 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3271 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3272 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3273 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3274 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3275 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3276 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3277 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3278 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3282 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3283 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3284 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3285 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3288 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3289 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3290 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3291 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3292 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3293 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3294 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3296 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3297 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3298 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3299 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3302 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3303 /// for our counterparty.
3304 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3305 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3306 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3307 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3309 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3310 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3311 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3312 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3314 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3315 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3316 updates: Vec::new(),
3319 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3320 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3321 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3322 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3323 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3324 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3325 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3326 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3327 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3328 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3329 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3330 // to rebalance channels.
3331 match &htlc_update {
3332 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3333 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3334 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3336 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3337 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3339 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3342 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3343 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3344 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3345 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3346 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3347 // into the holding cell without ever being
3348 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3349 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3350 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3353 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3359 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3360 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3361 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3362 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3363 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3364 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3365 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3366 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3367 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3368 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3369 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3370 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3372 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3373 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3374 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3375 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3376 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3377 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3378 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3379 // for a full revocation before failing.
3380 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3381 update_fail_count += 1;
3384 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3386 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3393 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3394 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3396 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3397 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3402 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3403 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3404 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3405 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3406 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3408 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3409 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3410 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3412 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3413 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3419 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3420 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3421 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3422 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3423 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3424 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3425 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3426 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3427 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3429 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3430 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3432 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3433 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3435 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3439 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3441 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3442 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3443 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3447 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3448 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3449 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3450 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3451 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3452 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3453 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3454 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3455 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3458 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3460 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3461 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3464 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3465 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3466 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3467 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3469 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3473 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3474 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3475 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3476 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3477 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3478 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3479 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3480 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3484 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3485 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3486 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3487 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3488 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3489 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3490 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3491 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3492 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3494 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3495 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3498 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3499 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3500 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3501 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3502 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3503 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3504 let mut require_commitment = false;
3505 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3508 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3509 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3510 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3512 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3513 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3514 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3515 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3516 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3517 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3522 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3523 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3524 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3525 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3526 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3528 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3529 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3530 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3535 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3536 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3538 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3542 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3543 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3545 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3546 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3547 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3548 require_commitment = true;
3549 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3550 match forward_info {
3551 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3552 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3553 require_commitment = true;
3555 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3556 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3557 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3559 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3560 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3561 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3565 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3566 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3567 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3568 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3574 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3575 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3576 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3577 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3579 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3580 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3581 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3582 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3583 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3584 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3585 require_commitment = true;
3589 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3591 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3592 match update_state {
3593 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3594 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3595 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3596 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3597 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3599 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3600 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3601 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3602 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3603 require_commitment = true;
3604 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3605 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3610 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3611 let release_state_str =
3612 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3613 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3614 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3615 if !release_monitor {
3616 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3617 update: monitor_update,
3619 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3621 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3626 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3627 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3628 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3629 if require_commitment {
3630 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3631 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3632 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3633 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3635 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3636 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3637 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3638 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3639 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3641 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3642 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3643 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3644 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3645 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3648 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3649 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3650 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3651 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3652 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3653 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3655 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3656 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3658 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3659 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3661 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3662 if require_commitment {
3663 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3665 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3666 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3667 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3668 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3670 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3671 &self.context.channel_id(),
3672 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3675 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3676 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3678 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3679 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3681 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3682 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3688 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3689 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3690 /// commitment update.
3691 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3692 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3693 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3695 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3696 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3699 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3700 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3701 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3702 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3704 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3705 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3706 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3707 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3708 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3709 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3710 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3712 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3713 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3715 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3716 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3718 if !self.context.is_live() {
3719 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3722 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3723 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3724 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3725 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3726 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3727 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3728 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3729 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3730 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3731 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3735 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3736 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3737 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3738 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3739 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3740 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3743 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3744 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3748 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3749 force_holding_cell = true;
3752 if force_holding_cell {
3753 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3757 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3758 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3760 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3761 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3766 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3767 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3769 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3771 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3772 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3773 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3774 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3778 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3779 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3780 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3784 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3785 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3788 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3789 // will be retransmitted.
3790 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3791 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3792 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3794 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3795 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3797 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3798 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3799 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3800 // this HTLC accordingly
3801 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3804 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3805 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3806 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3807 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3810 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3811 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3812 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3813 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3814 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3815 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3820 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3822 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3823 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3824 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3825 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3829 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3830 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3831 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3832 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3833 // the update upon reconnection.
3834 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3838 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3840 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3841 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3845 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3846 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3847 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3848 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3849 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3850 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3851 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3853 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3854 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3855 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3856 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3857 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3858 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3859 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3861 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3862 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3863 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3864 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3865 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3866 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3867 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3870 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3871 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3872 /// to the remote side.
3873 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3874 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3875 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3876 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3879 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3881 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3882 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3884 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3885 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3886 // first received the funding_signed.
3887 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3888 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3889 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3891 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3892 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3893 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3894 funding_broadcastable = None;
3897 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3898 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3899 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3900 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3901 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3902 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3903 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3904 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3905 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3906 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3907 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3908 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3909 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3910 next_per_commitment_point,
3911 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3915 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3917 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3918 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3919 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3920 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3921 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3922 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3924 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3925 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3926 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3927 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3928 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3929 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3933 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3934 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3936 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3937 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3939 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3940 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3943 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3944 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3945 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3946 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3947 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3948 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3949 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3950 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3951 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3955 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3956 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3958 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3959 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3961 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3962 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3964 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3965 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3967 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3968 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3969 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3970 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3971 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3972 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3973 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3974 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3975 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3976 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3977 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3978 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3979 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3980 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3982 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3983 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3984 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3990 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
3993 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3994 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
3995 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3997 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
3998 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4000 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4001 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4003 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4004 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4007 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4008 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4009 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4010 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4011 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4013 SignerResumeUpdates {
4021 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4022 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4023 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4024 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4025 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4026 per_commitment_secret,
4027 next_per_commitment_point,
4029 next_local_nonce: None,
4033 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4034 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4035 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4036 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4037 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4038 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4040 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4041 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4042 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4043 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4044 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4045 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4046 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4047 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4048 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4049 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4054 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4055 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4057 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4058 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4059 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4060 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4061 reason: err_packet.clone()
4064 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4065 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4066 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4067 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4068 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4069 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4072 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4073 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4074 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4075 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4076 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4083 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4084 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4085 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4086 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4090 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4091 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4092 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4093 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4094 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4095 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4096 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4100 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4101 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4102 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4106 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4107 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4112 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4113 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4114 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4115 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4116 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4117 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4118 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4123 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4124 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4126 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4127 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4128 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4129 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4130 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4131 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4132 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4133 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4136 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4138 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4139 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4140 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4141 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4145 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4146 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4150 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4151 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4152 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4153 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4154 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4157 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4158 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4159 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4160 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4161 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4164 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4165 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4166 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4167 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4168 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4169 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4170 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4171 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4175 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4176 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4177 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4178 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4180 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4184 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4185 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4186 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4187 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4189 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4191 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4193 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4194 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4195 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4196 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4197 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4198 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4200 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4201 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4202 channel_ready: None,
4203 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4204 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4205 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4209 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4210 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4211 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4212 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4213 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4214 next_per_commitment_point,
4215 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4217 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4218 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4219 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4223 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4224 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4225 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4227 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4228 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4229 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4232 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4238 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4239 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4240 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4241 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4242 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4243 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4244 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4246 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4248 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4249 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4250 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4251 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4252 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4253 next_per_commitment_point,
4254 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4258 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4259 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4260 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4262 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4265 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4266 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4267 raa: required_revoke,
4268 commitment_update: None,
4269 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4271 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4272 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4273 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4275 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4278 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4279 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4280 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4281 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4282 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4283 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4286 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4287 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4288 raa: required_revoke,
4289 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4290 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4294 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4298 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4299 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4300 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4301 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4303 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4305 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4307 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4308 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4309 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4310 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4311 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4312 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4313 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4314 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4316 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4317 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4318 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4319 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4320 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4322 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4323 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4324 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4325 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4328 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4329 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4330 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4331 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4332 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4333 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4334 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4335 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4336 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4337 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4338 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4339 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4340 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4341 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4342 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4344 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4347 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4348 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4351 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4352 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4353 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4354 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4355 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4356 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4359 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4360 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4361 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4362 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4363 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4364 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4365 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4367 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4373 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4374 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4375 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4376 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4378 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4379 return Ok((None, None, None));
4382 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4383 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4384 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4386 return Ok((None, None, None));
4389 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4391 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4392 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4393 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4394 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4396 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4397 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4399 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4400 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4402 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4403 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4404 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4405 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4407 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4408 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4409 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4416 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4417 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4419 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4420 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4423 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4424 /// within our expected timeframe.
4426 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4427 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4428 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4431 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4434 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4435 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4439 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4440 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4442 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4443 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4445 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4446 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4447 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4448 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4449 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4451 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4452 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4453 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4456 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4458 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4459 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4462 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4463 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4464 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4467 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4470 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4471 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4472 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4473 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4475 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4478 assert!(send_shutdown);
4479 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4480 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4481 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4483 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4484 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4486 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4491 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4493 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4494 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4496 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4497 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4498 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4499 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4500 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4501 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4504 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4505 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4507 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4508 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4509 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4510 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4514 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4515 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4516 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4517 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4518 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4519 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4521 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4522 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4529 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4530 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4532 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4535 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4536 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4538 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4540 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4541 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4542 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4543 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4544 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4545 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4546 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4547 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4548 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4550 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4551 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4554 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4558 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4559 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4560 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4561 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4563 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4564 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4566 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4569 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4570 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4572 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4576 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4577 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4580 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4581 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4582 return Ok((None, None, None));
4585 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4586 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4587 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4588 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4590 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4592 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4595 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4596 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4597 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4598 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4599 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4603 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4604 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4609 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4610 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4611 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4612 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4613 monitor_update: None,
4614 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4615 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4617 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4618 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4619 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4620 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4624 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4626 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4627 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4628 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4629 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4631 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4634 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4635 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4637 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4638 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4639 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4640 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4641 monitor_update: None,
4642 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4643 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4645 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4646 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4647 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4648 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4653 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4654 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4655 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4656 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4658 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4659 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4660 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4662 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4668 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4669 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4670 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4672 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4673 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4675 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4676 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4679 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4680 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4681 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4682 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4683 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4685 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4686 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4687 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4689 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4690 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4693 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4694 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4695 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4696 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4697 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4698 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4699 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4700 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4702 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4705 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4706 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4707 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4708 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4710 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4714 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4715 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4716 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4717 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4719 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4725 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4726 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4727 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4728 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4729 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4730 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4731 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4733 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4734 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4737 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4739 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4740 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4746 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4747 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4748 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4749 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4750 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4751 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4752 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4754 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4755 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4762 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4763 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4766 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4767 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4770 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4771 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4775 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4776 &self.context.holder_signer
4780 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4782 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4783 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4784 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4785 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4786 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4787 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4789 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4791 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4799 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4800 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4804 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4805 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4806 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4807 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4810 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4811 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4812 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4813 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4816 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4817 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4818 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4819 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4820 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4821 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4824 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4825 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4826 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4827 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4828 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4829 if !release_monitor {
4830 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4839 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4840 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4843 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4844 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4845 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4847 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4848 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4849 if self.context.channel_state &
4850 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4851 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4852 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4853 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4854 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4857 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4858 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4859 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4860 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4861 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4862 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4864 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4865 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4866 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4868 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4869 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4870 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4871 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4872 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4873 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4879 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4880 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4881 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4884 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4885 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4886 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4889 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4890 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4891 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4894 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4895 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4896 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4897 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4898 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4899 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4904 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4905 self.context.channel_update_status
4908 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4909 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4910 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4913 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4915 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4916 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4917 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4921 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4922 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4923 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4926 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4930 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4931 // channel_ready yet.
4932 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
4936 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4937 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4938 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4939 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4940 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4942 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4943 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4944 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4946 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4947 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4950 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4951 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4952 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4953 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4954 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4955 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4956 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4957 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4958 self.context.channel_state);
4960 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4964 if need_commitment_update {
4965 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4966 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4967 let next_per_commitment_point =
4968 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4969 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4970 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4971 next_per_commitment_point,
4972 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4976 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4982 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4983 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4984 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4985 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4986 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4987 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4988 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4990 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4993 let mut msgs = (None, None);
4994 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4995 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4996 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4997 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4998 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4999 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5000 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5001 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5002 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5003 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5004 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5005 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5006 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5007 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5008 // channel and move on.
5009 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5010 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5012 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5013 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5014 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5016 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5017 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5018 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5019 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5020 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5021 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5022 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5023 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5028 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5029 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5030 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5031 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5032 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5035 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5036 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5037 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5038 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5039 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5040 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5043 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5044 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5045 // may have already happened for this block).
5046 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5047 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5048 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5049 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5052 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5053 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5054 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5055 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5063 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5064 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5065 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5066 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5068 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5069 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5072 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5074 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5075 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5076 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5077 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5079 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5082 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5085 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5086 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5087 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5088 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5090 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5093 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5094 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5095 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5097 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5098 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5100 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5101 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5102 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5110 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5112 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5113 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5114 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5116 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5117 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5120 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5121 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5122 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5123 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5124 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5125 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5126 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5127 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5128 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5131 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5132 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5133 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5134 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5136 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5137 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5138 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5140 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5141 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5142 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5143 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5145 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5146 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5147 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5148 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5149 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5150 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5151 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5154 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5155 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5157 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5160 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5161 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5162 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5163 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5164 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5165 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5166 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5167 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5168 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5169 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5170 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5171 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5172 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5173 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5174 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5175 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5176 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5182 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5187 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5188 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5190 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5191 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5192 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5193 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5195 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5198 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5200 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5201 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5202 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5203 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5204 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5205 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5207 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5208 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5211 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5212 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5213 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5214 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5215 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5216 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5218 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5219 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5222 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5223 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5224 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5225 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5226 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5232 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5233 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5234 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5235 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5237 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5240 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5244 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5248 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5249 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5253 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5257 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5258 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5261 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5265 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5267 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5272 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5273 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5274 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5276 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5281 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5283 None => return None,
5286 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5288 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5289 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5291 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5292 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5298 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5300 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5301 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5302 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5303 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5304 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5305 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5306 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5308 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5309 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5310 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5311 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5312 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5313 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5314 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5315 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5316 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5317 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5318 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5319 contents: announcement,
5324 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5328 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5329 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5330 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5331 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5332 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5333 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5334 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5335 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5337 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5339 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5340 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5341 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5342 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5344 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5345 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5346 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5347 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5350 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5351 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5352 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5353 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5356 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5359 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5360 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5361 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5362 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5363 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5364 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5367 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5369 Err(_) => return None,
5371 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5372 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5377 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5378 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5379 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5380 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5381 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5382 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5383 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5384 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5385 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5386 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5387 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5388 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5389 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5390 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5391 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5392 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5395 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5398 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5399 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5400 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5401 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5402 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5403 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5404 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5405 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5406 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5408 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5409 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5410 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5411 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5412 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5413 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5414 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5415 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5416 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5418 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5419 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5420 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5421 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5422 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5423 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5424 next_funding_txid: None,
5429 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5431 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5432 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5433 /// commitment update.
5435 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5436 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5437 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5438 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5439 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5440 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5441 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5444 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5445 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5446 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5448 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5449 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5454 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5455 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5457 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5459 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5460 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5462 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5463 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5464 /// regenerate them.
5466 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5467 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5469 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5470 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5471 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5472 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5473 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5474 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5475 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5477 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5478 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5480 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5481 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5482 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5485 if amount_msat == 0 {
5486 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5489 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5490 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5491 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5492 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5495 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5496 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5497 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5500 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5501 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5502 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5503 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5504 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5505 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5506 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5507 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5510 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5511 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5512 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5513 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5514 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5515 else { "to peer" });
5517 if need_holding_cell {
5518 force_holding_cell = true;
5521 // Now update local state:
5522 if force_holding_cell {
5523 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5528 onion_routing_packet,
5534 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5535 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5537 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5539 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5544 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5545 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5546 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5550 onion_routing_packet,
5553 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5558 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5559 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5560 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5561 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5563 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5564 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5565 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5567 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5568 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5572 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5573 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5574 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5575 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5576 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5577 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5578 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5581 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5582 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5583 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5584 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5585 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5586 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5589 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5591 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5592 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5593 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5594 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5595 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5597 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5598 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5601 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5602 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5603 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5604 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5605 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5606 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5607 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5608 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5609 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5610 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5611 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5614 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5618 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5619 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5620 where L::Target: Logger
5622 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5623 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5624 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5626 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5628 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5629 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5630 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5631 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5632 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5633 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5634 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5635 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5636 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5637 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5638 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5644 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5647 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5648 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5649 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5650 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5651 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5652 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5654 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5655 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5656 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5658 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5659 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5660 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5663 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5664 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5668 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5669 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5671 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5673 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5674 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5675 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5676 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5678 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5679 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5680 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5681 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5682 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5683 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5687 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5688 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5692 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5693 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5698 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5699 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5701 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5702 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5703 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5704 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5705 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5706 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5707 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5708 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5710 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5711 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5712 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5715 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5716 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5717 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5723 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5725 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5726 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5727 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5728 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5729 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5731 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5733 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5739 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5740 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5742 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5743 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5744 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5745 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5746 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5748 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5749 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5750 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5753 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5754 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5755 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5757 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5758 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5761 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5762 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5764 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5765 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5766 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5769 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5770 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5771 let mut chan_closed = false;
5772 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5776 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5778 None if !chan_closed => {
5779 // use override shutdown script if provided
5780 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5781 Some(script) => script,
5783 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5784 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5785 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5786 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5790 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5791 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5793 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5799 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5800 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5801 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5802 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5803 monitor_update: None,
5804 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5805 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5807 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5808 Some(shutdown_result)
5810 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5813 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5815 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5816 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5817 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5818 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5819 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5820 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5823 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5824 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5826 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5827 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5828 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5831 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5832 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5833 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5834 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5835 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5837 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5838 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5845 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5846 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5848 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5851 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5852 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5853 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5855 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5856 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5860 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5864 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5865 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5866 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5867 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5870 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5871 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5872 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5873 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5874 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5875 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5876 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5877 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5879 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5880 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5881 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5882 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5884 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5885 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5887 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5888 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5890 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5891 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5892 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5894 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5895 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5897 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5898 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5899 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5900 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5904 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5905 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5907 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5908 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5910 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5912 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5914 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5915 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5916 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5920 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5921 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5923 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5924 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5925 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5926 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5930 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5931 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5932 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5936 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5937 Ok(script) => script,
5938 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5941 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5944 context: ChannelContext {
5947 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5948 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5949 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5950 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5955 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5957 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5958 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5959 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5960 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5962 channel_value_satoshis,
5964 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5966 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5967 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5970 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5971 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5974 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5975 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5976 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5977 pending_update_fee: None,
5978 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5979 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5980 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5981 update_time_counter: 1,
5983 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5985 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5986 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5987 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5988 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5989 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5990 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5992 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
5993 signer_pending_funding: false,
5995 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5996 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5997 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5998 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6000 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6001 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6002 closing_fee_limits: None,
6003 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6005 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6006 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6007 short_channel_id: None,
6008 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6010 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6011 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6012 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6013 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6014 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6015 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6016 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6017 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6018 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6019 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6020 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6021 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6023 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6025 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6026 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6027 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6028 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6029 counterparty_parameters: None,
6030 funding_outpoint: None,
6031 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6033 funding_transaction: None,
6034 is_batch_funding: None,
6036 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6037 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6038 counterparty_node_id,
6040 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6042 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6044 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6045 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6047 announcement_sigs: None,
6049 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6050 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6051 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6052 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6054 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6055 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6057 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6058 outbound_scid_alias,
6060 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6061 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6063 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6064 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6069 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6071 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6075 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6076 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6077 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6078 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6079 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6080 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6081 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6082 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6083 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6084 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6085 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6087 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6088 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6090 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6091 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6092 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6093 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6096 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6097 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6099 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6101 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6102 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6104 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6105 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6106 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6107 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6108 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6109 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6112 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6113 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6115 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6116 if funding_created.is_none() {
6117 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6118 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6119 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6123 let channel = Channel {
6124 context: self.context,
6127 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6130 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6131 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6132 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6133 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6134 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6135 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6136 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6137 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6138 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6139 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6142 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6143 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6144 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6145 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6146 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6147 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6153 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6154 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6155 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6156 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6157 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6158 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6160 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6162 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6163 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6164 // We've exhausted our options
6167 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6168 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6171 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6172 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6173 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6174 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6176 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6177 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6178 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6179 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6180 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6181 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6183 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6185 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6186 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6189 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6190 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6191 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6193 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6194 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6197 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6198 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6201 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6202 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6206 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6207 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6208 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6209 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6210 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6211 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6212 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6213 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6214 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6215 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6216 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6217 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6218 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6219 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6220 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6221 first_per_commitment_point,
6222 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6223 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6224 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6225 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6227 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6232 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6233 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6235 // Check sanity of message fields:
6236 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6239 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6240 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6242 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6245 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6248 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6251 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6253 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6255 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6256 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6259 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6260 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6263 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6266 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6267 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6270 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6271 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6272 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6274 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6277 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6280 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6283 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6286 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6289 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6293 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6294 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6295 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6297 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6298 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6300 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6301 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6304 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6305 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6308 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6309 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6310 &Some(ref script) => {
6311 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6312 if script.len() == 0 {
6315 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6316 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6318 Some(script.clone())
6321 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6328 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6329 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6330 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6331 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6332 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6334 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6335 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6337 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6340 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6341 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6342 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6343 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6344 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6345 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6348 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6349 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6350 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6353 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6354 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6356 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6357 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6363 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6364 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6365 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6366 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6369 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6370 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6371 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6372 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6373 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6374 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6375 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6376 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6377 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6378 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6379 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6382 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6384 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6385 // support this channel type.
6386 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6387 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6388 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6391 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6392 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6393 // `static_remote_key`.
6394 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6395 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6397 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6398 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6401 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6404 channel_type.clone()
6406 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6407 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6413 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6414 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6415 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6416 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6417 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6418 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6419 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6420 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6421 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6424 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6425 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6428 // Check sanity of message fields:
6429 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6430 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6432 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6433 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6435 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6436 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6438 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6439 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6440 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6442 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6443 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6445 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6446 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6448 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6450 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6451 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6452 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6454 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6455 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6457 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6458 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6461 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6462 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6463 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6465 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6466 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6468 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6469 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6471 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6472 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6474 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6475 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6477 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6478 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6480 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6481 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6484 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6486 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6487 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6488 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6492 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6493 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6494 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6495 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6496 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6498 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6499 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6501 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6502 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6503 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6505 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6506 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6509 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6510 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6511 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6512 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6516 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6517 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6518 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6519 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6522 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6523 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6524 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6525 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6526 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6529 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6530 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6531 &Some(ref script) => {
6532 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6533 if script.len() == 0 {
6536 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6537 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6539 Some(script.clone())
6542 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6544 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6549 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6550 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6551 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6552 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6556 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6557 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6558 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6562 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6563 Ok(script) => script,
6564 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6567 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6568 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6570 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6573 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6577 context: ChannelContext {
6580 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6581 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6583 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6588 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6590 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6591 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6592 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6593 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6596 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6598 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6599 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6602 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6603 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6604 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6606 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6607 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6608 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6609 pending_update_fee: None,
6610 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6611 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6612 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6613 update_time_counter: 1,
6615 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6617 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6618 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6619 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6620 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6621 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6622 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6624 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6625 signer_pending_funding: false,
6627 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6628 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6629 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6630 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6632 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6633 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6634 closing_fee_limits: None,
6635 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6637 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6638 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6639 short_channel_id: None,
6640 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6642 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6643 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6644 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6645 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6646 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6647 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6648 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6649 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6650 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6651 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6652 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6653 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6656 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6658 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6659 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6660 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6661 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6662 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6663 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6664 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6666 funding_outpoint: None,
6667 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6669 funding_transaction: None,
6670 is_batch_funding: None,
6672 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6673 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6674 counterparty_node_id,
6676 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6678 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6680 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6681 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6683 announcement_sigs: None,
6685 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6686 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6687 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6688 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6690 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6691 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6693 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6694 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6696 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6697 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6699 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6700 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6705 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6707 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6713 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6714 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6716 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6717 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6718 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6719 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6721 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6722 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6724 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6725 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6728 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6731 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6732 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6733 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6735 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6736 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6737 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6738 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6740 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6741 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6742 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6743 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6744 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6745 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6746 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6747 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6748 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6749 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6750 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6751 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6752 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6753 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6754 first_per_commitment_point,
6755 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6756 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6757 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6759 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6761 next_local_nonce: None,
6765 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6766 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6768 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6770 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6771 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6774 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6775 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6777 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6778 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6779 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6780 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6781 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6782 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6783 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6784 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6785 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6786 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6787 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6789 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6792 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6793 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6794 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6798 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6799 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6801 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6802 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6803 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6805 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6807 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6808 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6809 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6810 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6813 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6814 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6815 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6816 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6817 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6819 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6821 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6822 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6823 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6826 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6827 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6828 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6832 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6833 initial_commitment_tx,
6836 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6837 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6840 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6841 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6844 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6846 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6847 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6848 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6849 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6851 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6853 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6854 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6855 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6856 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6857 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6858 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6859 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6860 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6861 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6862 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6863 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6865 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6867 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6868 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6869 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6870 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6871 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6872 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6874 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6875 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6877 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6878 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6879 let mut channel = Channel {
6880 context: self.context,
6882 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6883 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6885 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6889 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6890 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6892 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6898 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6899 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6900 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6901 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6902 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6904 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6905 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6906 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6907 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6913 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6914 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6915 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6916 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6917 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6918 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6923 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6924 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6925 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6926 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6928 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6929 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6930 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6931 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6936 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6937 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6938 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6939 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6940 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6941 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6946 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6947 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6948 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6951 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6953 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6954 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6955 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6956 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6957 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6959 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6960 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6961 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6962 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6964 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6965 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6966 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6968 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6970 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6971 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6972 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6973 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6974 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6975 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6976 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6978 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6979 // deserialized from that format.
6980 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6981 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6982 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6984 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6986 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6987 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6988 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6990 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6991 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6992 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6993 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6996 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6997 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6998 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7001 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7002 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7003 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7004 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7006 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7007 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7009 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7011 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7013 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7015 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7018 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7020 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7025 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7026 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7028 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7029 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7030 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7031 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7032 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7033 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7034 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7036 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7038 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7040 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7043 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7044 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7045 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7048 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7050 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7051 preimages.push(preimage);
7053 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7054 reason.write(writer)?;
7056 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7058 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7059 preimages.push(preimage);
7061 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7062 reason.write(writer)?;
7065 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7066 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7067 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7069 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7070 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7071 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7075 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7076 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7077 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7079 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7080 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7084 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7085 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7086 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7087 source.write(writer)?;
7088 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7090 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7091 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7092 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7094 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7095 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7097 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7099 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7100 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7102 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7104 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7105 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7110 match self.context.resend_order {
7111 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7112 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7115 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7116 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7117 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7119 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7120 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7121 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7122 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7125 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7126 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7127 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7128 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7129 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7132 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7133 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7134 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7135 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7137 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7138 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7139 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7141 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7143 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7144 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7145 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7146 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7148 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7149 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7150 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7151 // consider the stale state on reload.
7154 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7155 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7156 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7158 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7159 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7160 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7162 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7163 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7165 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7166 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7167 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7169 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7170 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7172 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7175 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7176 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7177 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7179 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7182 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7183 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7185 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7186 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7187 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7189 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7191 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7193 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7195 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7196 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7197 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7198 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7199 htlc.write(writer)?;
7202 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7203 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7204 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7206 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7207 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7209 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7210 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7211 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7212 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7213 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7214 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7215 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7217 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7218 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7219 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7220 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7221 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7223 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7224 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7226 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7227 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7228 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7229 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7231 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7233 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7234 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7235 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7236 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7237 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7238 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7239 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7241 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7242 (2, chan_type, option),
7243 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7244 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7245 (5, self.context.config, required),
7246 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7247 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7248 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7249 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7250 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7251 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7252 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7253 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7254 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7255 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7256 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7257 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7258 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7259 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7260 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7261 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7262 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7263 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7264 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7271 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7272 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7274 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7275 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7277 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7278 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7279 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7281 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7282 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7283 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7284 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7286 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7288 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7289 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7290 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7291 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7292 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7294 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7295 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7298 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7299 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7300 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7302 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7304 let mut keys_data = None;
7306 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7307 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7308 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7309 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7310 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7311 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7312 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7313 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7314 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7315 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7319 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7320 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7321 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7324 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7326 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7327 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7328 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7330 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7332 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7333 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7334 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7335 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7336 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7337 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7338 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7339 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7340 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7341 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7342 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7343 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7344 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7349 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7350 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7351 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7352 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7353 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7354 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7355 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7356 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7357 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7358 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7359 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7360 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7362 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7363 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7366 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7367 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7370 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7371 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7373 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7375 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7379 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7380 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7381 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7382 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7383 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7384 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7385 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7386 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7387 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7388 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7389 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7391 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7392 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7393 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7395 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7396 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7397 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7399 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7403 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7404 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7405 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7406 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7409 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7410 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7411 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7413 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7414 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7415 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7416 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7419 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7420 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7421 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7422 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7425 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7427 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7429 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7430 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7431 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7432 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7434 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7435 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7436 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7437 // consider the stale state on reload.
7438 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7441 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7442 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7443 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7445 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7448 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7449 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7450 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7453 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7454 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7455 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7457 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7458 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7460 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7461 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7463 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7464 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7465 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7467 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7469 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7470 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7472 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7473 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7476 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7478 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7479 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7480 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7481 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7483 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7486 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7487 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7491 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7492 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7494 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7495 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7497 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7499 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7500 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7501 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7503 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7504 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7505 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7509 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7510 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7511 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7513 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7519 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7520 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7521 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7522 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7523 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7524 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7525 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7526 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7527 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7528 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7530 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7531 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7532 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7533 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7534 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7535 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7536 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7538 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7539 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7540 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7541 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7543 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7545 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7546 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7548 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7550 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7551 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7552 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7553 (2, channel_type, option),
7554 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7555 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7556 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7557 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7558 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7559 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7560 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7561 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7562 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7563 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7564 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7565 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7566 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7567 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7568 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7569 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7570 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7571 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7572 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7573 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7574 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7575 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7578 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7579 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7580 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7581 // required channel parameters.
7582 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7583 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7584 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7586 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7588 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7589 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7590 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7591 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7594 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7595 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7596 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7598 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7599 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7601 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7602 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7607 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7608 if iter.next().is_some() {
7609 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7613 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7614 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7615 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7616 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7617 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7620 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7621 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7622 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7624 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7625 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7627 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7628 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7629 // separate u64 values.
7630 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7632 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7634 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7635 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7636 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7637 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7639 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7640 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7642 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7643 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7644 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7645 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7646 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7649 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7650 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7654 context: ChannelContext {
7657 config: config.unwrap(),
7661 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7662 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7663 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7666 temporary_channel_id,
7668 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7670 channel_value_satoshis,
7672 latest_monitor_update_id,
7674 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7675 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7678 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7679 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7682 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7683 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7684 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7685 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7689 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7690 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7691 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7692 monitor_pending_forwards,
7693 monitor_pending_failures,
7694 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7696 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7697 signer_pending_funding: false,
7700 holding_cell_update_fee,
7701 next_holder_htlc_id,
7702 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7703 update_time_counter,
7706 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7707 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7708 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7709 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7711 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7712 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7713 closing_fee_limits: None,
7714 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7716 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7717 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7719 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7721 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7722 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7723 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7724 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7725 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7726 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7727 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7728 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7729 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7732 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7734 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7735 funding_transaction,
7738 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7739 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7740 counterparty_node_id,
7742 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7746 channel_update_status,
7747 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7751 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7752 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7753 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7754 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7756 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7757 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7759 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7760 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7761 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7763 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7764 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7766 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7767 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7769 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7772 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7781 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7782 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7783 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7784 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7785 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7787 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7788 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7789 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7790 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7791 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7792 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7793 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7794 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7795 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7796 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7797 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7798 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7799 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7800 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7801 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7802 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7803 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7804 use crate::util::test_utils;
7805 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7806 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7807 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7808 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7809 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7810 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7811 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7812 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7813 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7814 use crate::prelude::*;
7816 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7819 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7820 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7826 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7827 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7828 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7829 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7833 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7834 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7835 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7836 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7837 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7838 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7839 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7840 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7844 signer: InMemorySigner,
7847 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7848 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7851 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7852 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7854 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7855 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7858 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7862 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7864 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7865 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7866 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7867 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7868 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7871 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7872 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7873 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7874 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7878 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7879 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7880 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7884 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7885 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7886 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7887 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7889 let seed = [42; 32];
7890 let network = Network::Testnet;
7891 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7892 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7893 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7896 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7897 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7898 let config = UserConfig::default();
7899 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7900 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7901 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7903 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7904 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7908 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7909 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7911 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7912 let original_fee = 253;
7913 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7914 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7915 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7916 let seed = [42; 32];
7917 let network = Network::Testnet;
7918 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7920 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7921 let config = UserConfig::default();
7922 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7924 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7925 // same as the old fee.
7926 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7927 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7928 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7932 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7933 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7934 // dust limits are used.
7935 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7936 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7937 let seed = [42; 32];
7938 let network = Network::Testnet;
7939 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7940 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7941 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7943 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7944 // they have different dust limits.
7946 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7947 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7948 let config = UserConfig::default();
7949 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7951 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7952 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7953 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7954 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7955 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7957 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7958 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7959 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7960 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7961 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7963 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7964 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7965 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7966 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7968 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7969 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7970 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7972 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7973 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7975 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7976 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7977 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7979 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7980 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7981 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7982 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7985 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7987 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7988 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7989 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7990 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7991 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7992 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7993 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7994 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7995 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7997 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8000 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8001 // the dust limit check.
8002 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8003 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8004 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8005 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8007 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8008 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8009 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8010 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8011 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8012 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8013 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8017 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8018 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8019 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8020 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8021 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8022 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8023 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8024 let seed = [42; 32];
8025 let network = Network::Testnet;
8026 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8028 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8029 let config = UserConfig::default();
8030 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8032 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8033 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8035 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8036 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8037 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8038 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8039 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8040 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8042 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8043 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8044 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8045 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8046 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8048 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8050 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8051 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8052 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8053 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8054 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8056 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8057 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8058 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8059 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8060 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8064 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8065 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8066 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8067 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8068 let seed = [42; 32];
8069 let network = Network::Testnet;
8070 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8071 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8072 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8074 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8076 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8077 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8078 let config = UserConfig::default();
8079 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8081 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8082 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8083 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8084 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8086 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8087 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8088 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8090 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8091 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8092 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8093 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8095 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8096 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8097 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8099 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8100 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8102 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8103 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8104 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8105 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8106 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8107 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8108 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8110 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8112 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8113 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8114 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8115 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8116 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8120 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8121 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8122 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8123 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8124 let seed = [42; 32];
8125 let network = Network::Testnet;
8126 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8127 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8128 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8130 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8131 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8132 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8133 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8134 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8135 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8136 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8137 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8139 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8140 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8141 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8142 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8143 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8144 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8146 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8147 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8148 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8149 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8151 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8153 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8154 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8155 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8156 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8157 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8158 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8160 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8161 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8162 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8163 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8165 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8166 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8167 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8168 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8169 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8171 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8172 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8174 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8175 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8176 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8178 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8179 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8180 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8181 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8182 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8184 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8185 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8187 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8188 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8189 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8193 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8195 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8196 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8197 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8199 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8200 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8201 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8202 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8204 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8205 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8206 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8208 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8210 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8211 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8214 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8215 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8216 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8217 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8218 let seed = [42; 32];
8219 let network = Network::Testnet;
8220 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8221 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8222 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8225 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8226 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8227 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8229 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8230 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8232 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8233 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8234 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8236 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8237 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8239 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8241 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8242 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8244 // Channel Negotiations failed
8245 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8246 assert!(result.is_err());
8251 fn channel_update() {
8252 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8253 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8254 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8255 let seed = [42; 32];
8256 let network = Network::Testnet;
8257 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8258 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8259 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8261 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8262 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8263 let config = UserConfig::default();
8264 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8266 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8267 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8268 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8269 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8270 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8272 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8273 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8274 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8275 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8276 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8278 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8279 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8280 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8281 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8283 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8284 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8285 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8287 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8288 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8290 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8291 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8292 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8294 short_channel_id: 0,
8297 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8298 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8299 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8301 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8302 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8304 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8306 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8308 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8309 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8310 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8311 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8313 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8314 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8315 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8317 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8320 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8323 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8325 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8326 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8327 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8328 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8329 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8330 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8331 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8332 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8333 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8334 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8335 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8336 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8337 use crate::sync::Arc;
8339 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8340 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8341 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8342 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8344 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8346 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8347 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8348 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8349 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8350 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8352 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8353 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8359 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8360 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8361 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8363 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8364 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8365 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8366 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8367 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8368 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8370 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8372 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8373 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8374 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8375 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8376 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8377 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8379 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8380 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8381 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8382 selected_contest_delay: 144
8384 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8385 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8387 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8388 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8390 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8391 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8393 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8394 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8396 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8397 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8398 // build_commitment_transaction.
8399 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8400 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8401 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8402 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8403 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8405 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8406 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8407 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8408 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8412 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8413 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8414 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8415 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8419 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8420 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8421 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8423 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8424 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8426 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8427 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8429 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8431 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8432 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8433 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8434 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8435 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8436 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8437 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8439 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8440 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8441 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8442 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8444 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8445 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8446 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8448 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8450 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8451 commitment_tx.clone(),
8452 counterparty_signature,
8453 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8454 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8455 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8457 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8458 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8460 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8461 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8462 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8464 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8465 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8468 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8469 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8471 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8472 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8473 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8474 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8475 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8476 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8477 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8478 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8480 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8483 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8484 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8485 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8489 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8492 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8493 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8494 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8495 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8496 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8497 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8499 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8500 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8501 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8502 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8504 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8505 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8506 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8507 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8508 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8510 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8511 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8512 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8513 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8514 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&htlc_tx)));
8515 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8517 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8521 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8522 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8523 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8524 "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", {});
8526 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8527 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8529 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8530 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8531 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8533 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8534 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8535 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8536 "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", {});
8538 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8539 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8541 amount_msat: 1000000,
8543 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8544 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8546 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8549 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8550 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8552 amount_msat: 2000000,
8554 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8555 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8557 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8560 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8561 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8563 amount_msat: 2000000,
8565 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8566 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8567 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8568 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8570 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8573 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8574 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8576 amount_msat: 3000000,
8578 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8579 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8580 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8581 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8583 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8586 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8587 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8589 amount_msat: 4000000,
8591 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8592 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8594 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8598 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8599 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8600 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8602 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8603 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8604 "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", {
8607 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8608 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8609 "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" },
8612 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8613 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8614 "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" },
8617 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8618 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8619 "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" },
8622 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8623 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8624 "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" },
8627 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8628 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8629 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8632 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8633 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8634 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8636 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8637 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8638 "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", {
8641 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8642 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8643 "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" },
8646 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8647 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8648 "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" },
8651 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8652 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8653 "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" },
8656 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8657 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8658 "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" },
8661 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8662 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8663 "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" }
8666 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8667 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8668 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8670 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8671 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8672 "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", {
8675 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8676 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8677 "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" },
8680 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8681 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8682 "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" },
8685 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8686 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8687 "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" },
8690 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8691 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8692 "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" }
8695 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8696 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8697 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8698 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8700 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8701 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8702 "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", {
8705 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8706 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8707 "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" },
8710 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8711 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8712 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8715 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8716 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8717 "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" },
8720 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8721 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8722 "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" }
8725 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8726 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8727 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8728 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8730 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8731 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8732 "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", {
8735 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8736 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8737 "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" },
8740 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8741 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8742 "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" },
8745 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8746 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8747 "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" },
8750 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8751 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8752 "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" }
8755 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8756 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8757 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8759 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8760 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8761 "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", {
8764 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8765 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8766 "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" },
8769 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8770 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8771 "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" },
8774 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8775 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8776 "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" }
8779 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8780 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8781 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8783 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8784 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8785 "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", {
8788 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8789 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8790 "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" },
8793 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8794 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8795 "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" },
8798 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8799 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8800 "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" }
8803 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8804 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8805 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8807 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8808 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8809 "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", {
8812 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8813 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8814 "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" },
8817 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8818 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8819 "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" }
8822 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8823 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8824 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8825 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8826 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8827 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8829 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8830 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8831 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ac5916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd501473044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8834 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8835 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8836 "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" },
8839 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8840 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8841 "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" }
8844 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8845 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8846 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8847 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8848 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8850 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8851 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8852 "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", {
8855 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8856 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8857 "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" },
8860 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8861 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8862 "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" }
8865 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8866 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8867 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8869 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8870 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8871 "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", {
8874 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8875 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8876 "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" }
8879 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8880 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8881 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8882 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8883 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8885 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8886 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8887 "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", {
8890 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8891 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8892 "02000000000101542562b326c08e3a076d9cfca2be175041366591da334d8d513ff1686fd95a6002000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c83483045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8895 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8896 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8897 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8898 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8899 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8901 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8902 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8903 "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", {
8906 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8907 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8908 "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" }
8911 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8912 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8913 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8914 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8916 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8917 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8918 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8920 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8921 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8922 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8923 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8924 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8926 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8927 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8928 "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", {});
8930 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8931 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8932 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8933 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8934 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8936 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8937 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8938 "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", {});
8940 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8941 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8942 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8944 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8945 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8946 "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", {});
8948 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8949 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8950 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8951 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8952 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8954 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8955 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8956 "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", {});
8958 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8959 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8960 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8961 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8962 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8964 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8965 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8966 "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", {});
8968 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8969 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8970 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8971 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8972 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8973 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8975 amount_msat: 2000000,
8977 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8978 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8980 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8983 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8984 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8985 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8987 amount_msat: 5000001,
8989 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8990 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8991 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8992 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8994 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8997 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8998 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9000 amount_msat: 5000000,
9002 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9003 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9004 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9005 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9007 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
9011 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9012 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9013 "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", {
9016 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9017 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9018 "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" },
9020 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9021 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9022 "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" },
9024 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9025 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9026 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
9029 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9030 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9031 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9032 "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", {
9035 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9036 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9037 "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" },
9039 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9040 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9041 "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" },
9043 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9044 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9045 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a183483045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
9050 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9051 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9053 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9054 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9055 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9056 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9058 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9059 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9060 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9062 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9063 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9065 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9066 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9068 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9069 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9070 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9074 fn test_key_derivation() {
9075 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9076 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9078 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9079 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9081 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9082 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9084 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9085 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9087 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9088 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
9090 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9091 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9093 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9094 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9096 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9097 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9101 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9102 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9103 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9104 let seed = [42; 32];
9105 let network = Network::Testnet;
9106 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9107 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9109 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9110 let config = UserConfig::default();
9111 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9112 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
9114 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9115 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9117 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9118 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9119 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9120 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9121 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9122 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9123 assert!(res.is_ok());
9127 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9128 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9129 // resulting `channel_type`.
9130 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9131 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9132 let network = Network::Testnet;
9133 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9134 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9136 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9137 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9139 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9140 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9142 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9143 // need to signal it.
9144 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9145 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9146 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9149 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9151 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9152 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9153 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9155 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9156 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9157 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9160 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9161 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9162 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9163 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9164 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9167 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9168 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9172 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9173 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9174 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9175 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9176 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9177 let network = Network::Testnet;
9178 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9179 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9181 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9182 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9184 let config = UserConfig::default();
9186 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9187 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9188 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9189 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9190 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9192 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9193 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9194 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9197 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9198 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9199 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9201 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9202 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9203 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9204 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9205 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9206 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9208 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9212 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9213 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9215 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9216 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9217 let network = Network::Testnet;
9218 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9219 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9221 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9222 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9224 let config = UserConfig::default();
9226 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9227 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9228 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9229 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9230 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9231 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9232 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9233 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9235 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9236 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9237 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9238 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9239 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9240 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9243 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9244 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9246 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9247 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9248 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9249 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9251 assert!(res.is_err());
9253 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9254 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9255 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9257 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9258 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9259 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9262 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9264 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9265 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9266 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9267 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9270 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9271 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9273 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9274 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9276 assert!(res.is_err());
9280 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9281 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9282 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9283 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9284 let seed = [42; 32];
9285 let network = Network::Testnet;
9286 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9287 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9288 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9290 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9291 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9292 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9293 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9295 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9296 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9297 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9302 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9311 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9312 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9313 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9318 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9319 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9325 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9328 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9329 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9330 &accept_channel_msg,
9331 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9332 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9335 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9336 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9337 let tx = Transaction {
9339 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9343 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9346 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9349 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9350 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9355 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9356 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9357 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9361 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9362 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9370 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9371 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9372 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9373 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9378 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9385 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9386 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9387 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9388 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9390 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9391 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9392 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9395 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9396 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9397 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9405 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9406 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9407 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9408 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9411 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9412 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9414 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9415 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9416 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9418 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());