1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
54 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
57 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
58 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
65 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
68 pub struct AvailableBalances {
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
75 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
76 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
79 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
81 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
83 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
84 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
85 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
86 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
87 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
88 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
90 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
94 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
95 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
96 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
97 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
100 enum InboundHTLCState {
101 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
102 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
103 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
104 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
105 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
106 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
107 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
108 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
109 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
110 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
111 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
112 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
113 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
114 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
115 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
117 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
118 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
119 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
121 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
122 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
123 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
125 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
126 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
127 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
128 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
129 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
130 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
132 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
133 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
134 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
135 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
136 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
137 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
138 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
142 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
144 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
145 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
146 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
147 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
148 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
149 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
150 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
151 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
154 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
158 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
159 state: InboundHTLCState,
162 enum OutboundHTLCState {
163 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
164 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
165 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
166 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
167 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
168 /// money back (though we won't), and,
169 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
170 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
171 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
172 /// we'll never get out of sync).
173 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
174 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
175 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
177 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
178 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
179 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
180 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
181 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
182 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
183 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
184 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
185 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
190 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
191 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
195 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
196 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
197 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
198 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
201 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
204 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
205 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
210 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
213 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
219 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
223 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
224 state: OutboundHTLCState,
226 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
238 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
239 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
242 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
247 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
251 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
252 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
253 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
254 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
255 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
256 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
257 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
259 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
260 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
261 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
262 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
263 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
264 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
265 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
267 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
268 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
269 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
271 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
272 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
273 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
278 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
279 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
281 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
283 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
284 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
285 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
286 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
287 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
288 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
289 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
291 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
292 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
293 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
294 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
295 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
296 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
298 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
299 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
300 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
301 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
302 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
304 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
305 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
307 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
309 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
311 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
312 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
313 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
314 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
318 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
322 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
324 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
325 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
326 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
327 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
328 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
330 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
331 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
333 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
335 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
336 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
338 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
339 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
340 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
341 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
342 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
343 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
345 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
346 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
348 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
349 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
350 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
351 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
352 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
354 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
355 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
357 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
358 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
360 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
361 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
362 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
363 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
369 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
370 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
372 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
373 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
374 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
379 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
380 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
382 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
383 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
389 macro_rules! secp_check {
390 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
393 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
398 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
399 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
400 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
401 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
402 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
403 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
404 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
405 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
407 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
409 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
411 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
415 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
417 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
418 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
419 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
421 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
422 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
424 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
425 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
426 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
427 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
428 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
430 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
431 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
435 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
441 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
444 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
445 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
446 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
447 holding_cell_msat: u64,
448 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
451 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
452 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
453 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
454 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
455 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
456 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
457 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
458 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
459 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
460 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
463 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
464 struct HTLCCandidate {
466 origin: HTLCInitiator,
470 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
478 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
480 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
482 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
483 htlc_value_msat: u64,
484 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
489 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
490 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
491 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
492 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
493 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
495 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
496 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
497 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
498 htlc_value_msat: u64,
500 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
501 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
505 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
506 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
507 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
508 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
509 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
510 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
511 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
512 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
513 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
514 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
515 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
518 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
519 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
520 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
521 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
522 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
523 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
524 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
525 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
528 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
530 /// Contains a (counterparty_node_id, funding_txo, [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]) tuple
531 /// followed by a list of HTLCs to fail back in the form of the (source, payment hash, and this
532 /// channel's counterparty_node_id and channel_id).
533 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
534 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
535 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
538 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
539 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
540 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
541 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
542 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
543 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
544 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
545 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
546 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
547 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
548 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
549 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
550 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
551 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
552 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
554 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
555 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
556 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
557 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
559 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
560 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
561 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
562 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
564 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
565 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
566 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
567 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
568 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
570 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
571 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
572 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
573 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
575 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
576 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
577 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
579 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
580 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
581 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
582 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
583 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
585 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
586 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
589 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
590 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
592 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
593 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
594 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
595 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
597 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
598 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
601 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
602 (0, update, required),
605 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
606 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
607 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
608 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
609 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
611 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
612 /// in a timely manner.
613 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
616 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
617 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
618 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
620 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
621 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
622 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
623 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
627 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
628 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
629 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
631 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
632 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
633 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
634 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
636 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
640 channel_id: [u8; 32],
641 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
644 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
645 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
647 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
648 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
649 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
651 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
652 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
653 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
654 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
656 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
657 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
659 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
661 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
662 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
663 destination_script: Script,
665 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
666 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
667 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
669 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
670 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
671 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
672 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
673 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
674 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
676 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
677 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
678 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
679 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
680 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
681 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
683 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
685 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
686 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
687 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
689 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
690 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
691 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
692 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
693 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
694 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
695 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
697 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
699 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
700 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
701 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
702 // HTLCs with similar state.
703 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
704 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
705 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
706 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
707 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
708 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
709 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
710 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
711 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
714 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
715 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
716 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
718 update_time_counter: u32,
720 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
721 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
722 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
723 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
724 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
725 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
727 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
728 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
730 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
731 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
732 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
733 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
735 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
736 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
738 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
740 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
742 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
743 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
744 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
745 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
746 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
747 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
748 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
749 channel_creation_height: u32,
751 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
754 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
756 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
759 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
761 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
764 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
766 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
768 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
769 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
772 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
774 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
776 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
777 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
779 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
781 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
782 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
783 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
785 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
787 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
788 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
790 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
791 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
792 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
794 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
796 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
798 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
799 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
800 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
801 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
803 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
804 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
805 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
807 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
808 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
809 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
811 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
812 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
813 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
814 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
815 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
816 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
817 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
818 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
820 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
821 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
822 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
823 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
824 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
826 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
827 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
829 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
830 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
831 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
832 /// unblock the state machine.
834 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
835 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
836 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
838 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
839 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
840 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
842 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
843 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
844 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
845 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
846 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
847 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
848 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
849 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
851 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
852 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
854 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
855 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
856 // the channel's funding UTXO.
858 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
859 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
860 // associated channel mapping.
862 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
863 // to store all of them.
864 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
866 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
867 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
868 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
869 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
870 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
872 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
873 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
875 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
876 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
878 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
879 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
880 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
882 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
883 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
884 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
887 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
888 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
889 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
890 self.update_time_counter
893 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
894 self.latest_monitor_update_id
897 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
898 self.config.announced_channel
901 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
902 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
905 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
906 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
907 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
908 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
911 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
912 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
913 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
916 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
917 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
918 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
919 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
920 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
923 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
924 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
925 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
926 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
928 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
929 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
931 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
932 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
934 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
935 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
937 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
940 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
941 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
942 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
943 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
945 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
946 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
947 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
948 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
951 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
952 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
953 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
954 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
955 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
960 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
964 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
966 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
967 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
968 self.temporary_channel_id
971 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
975 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
976 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
977 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
981 /// Gets the channel's type
982 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
986 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
988 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
989 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
990 self.short_channel_id
993 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
994 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
995 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
998 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
999 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1000 self.outbound_scid_alias
1003 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1004 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1005 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1006 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1007 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1008 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1011 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1012 /// get_funding_created.
1013 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1014 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1017 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1018 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1019 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1022 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1023 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1024 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1025 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1029 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1032 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1033 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1036 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1037 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1040 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1041 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1042 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1045 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1046 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1049 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1050 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1051 self.counterparty_node_id
1054 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1055 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1056 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1059 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1060 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1061 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1064 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1065 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1067 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1068 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1069 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1070 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1072 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1076 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1077 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1078 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1081 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1082 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1083 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1086 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1087 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1088 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1090 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1091 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1096 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1097 self.channel_value_satoshis
1100 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1101 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1104 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1105 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1108 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1109 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1110 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1112 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1113 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1114 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1115 ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority);
1116 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1118 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1122 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1123 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1124 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1127 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1128 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1129 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1132 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1133 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1134 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1137 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1138 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1139 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1142 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1143 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1144 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1147 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1148 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1149 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1152 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1153 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1154 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1155 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1156 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1159 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1161 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1162 self.prev_config = None;
1166 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1167 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1171 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1172 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1173 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1174 let did_channel_update =
1175 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1176 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1177 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1178 if did_channel_update {
1179 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1180 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1181 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1182 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1184 self.config.options = *config;
1188 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1189 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1190 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1193 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1194 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1195 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1196 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1197 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1199 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1200 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1201 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1202 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1203 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1204 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1205 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1207 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1208 where L::Target: Logger
1210 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1211 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1212 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1214 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1215 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1216 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1217 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1219 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1220 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1221 if match update_state {
1222 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1223 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1224 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1225 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1226 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1228 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1232 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1233 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1234 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1235 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1237 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1238 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1239 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1241 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1242 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1243 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1244 transaction_output_index: None
1249 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1250 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1251 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1252 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1253 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1256 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1258 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1259 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1260 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1262 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1263 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1266 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1267 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1270 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1272 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1273 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1274 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1276 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1277 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1283 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1284 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1285 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1286 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1287 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1288 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1289 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1293 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1294 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1296 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1298 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1299 if generated_by_local {
1300 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1301 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1310 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1312 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1313 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1314 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1315 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1316 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1317 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1318 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1321 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1322 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1323 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1324 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1328 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1329 preimages.push(preimage);
1333 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1334 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1336 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1338 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1339 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1341 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1342 if !generated_by_local {
1343 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1351 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1352 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1353 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1354 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1355 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1356 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1357 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1358 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1360 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1362 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1363 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1364 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1365 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1367 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1369 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1370 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1371 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1372 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1375 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1376 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1377 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1378 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1380 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1383 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1384 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1385 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1386 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1388 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1391 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1392 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1397 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1398 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1403 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1405 let channel_parameters =
1406 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1407 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1408 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1415 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1418 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1419 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1420 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1421 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1423 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1424 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1425 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1433 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1434 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1440 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1441 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1442 /// our counterparty!)
1443 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1444 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1445 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1446 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1447 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1448 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1449 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1451 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1455 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1456 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1457 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1458 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1459 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1460 //may see payments to it!
1461 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1462 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1463 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1465 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1468 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1469 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1470 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1471 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1472 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1475 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1476 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1479 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1483 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1484 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1485 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1486 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1487 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1488 // which are near the dust limit.
1489 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1490 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1491 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1492 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1493 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1495 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1496 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1498 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1501 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1502 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1503 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1506 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1507 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1509 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1510 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1511 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1512 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1513 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1514 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1515 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1518 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1521 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1522 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1523 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1525 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1526 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1527 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1528 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1529 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1530 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1532 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1533 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1539 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1540 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1542 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1543 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1544 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1545 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1546 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1547 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1548 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1551 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1554 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1555 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1556 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1558 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1559 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1560 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1561 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1562 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1563 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1565 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1566 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1570 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1571 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1572 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1573 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1574 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1575 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1576 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1578 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1579 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1581 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1588 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1589 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1590 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1591 /// corner case properly.
1592 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1593 -> AvailableBalances
1594 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1596 let context = &self;
1597 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1598 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1599 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1601 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1602 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1604 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1606 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1608 if context.is_outbound() {
1609 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1610 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1612 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1613 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1615 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1616 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1617 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1618 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1621 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1622 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1623 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1624 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1626 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1627 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1628 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1629 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1630 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1631 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1632 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1633 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1634 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1635 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1637 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1640 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1641 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1642 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1643 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1644 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1647 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1648 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1650 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1651 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1652 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1654 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1655 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1656 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1657 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1661 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1663 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1664 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1665 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1666 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1667 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1668 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1669 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1671 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1672 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1674 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1675 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1676 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1678 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1679 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1680 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1681 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1682 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1685 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1686 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1687 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1688 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1689 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1690 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1693 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1694 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1695 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1697 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1701 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1702 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1704 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1705 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1709 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1710 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1711 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1712 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1714 outbound_capacity_msat,
1715 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1716 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1720 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1721 let context = &self;
1722 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1725 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1726 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1728 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1729 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1731 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1732 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1734 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1735 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1736 let context = &self;
1737 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1739 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1742 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1743 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1745 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1746 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1748 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1749 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1751 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1752 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1756 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1757 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1763 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1764 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1765 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1768 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1769 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1770 included_htlcs += 1;
1773 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1774 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1778 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1779 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1780 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1781 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1782 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1783 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1788 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1790 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1791 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1796 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1797 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1801 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1802 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1803 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1806 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1807 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1809 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1810 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1811 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1813 total_pending_htlcs,
1814 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1815 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1816 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1818 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1819 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1820 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1822 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1824 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1829 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1830 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1832 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1833 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1835 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1836 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1838 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1839 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1840 let context = &self;
1841 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1843 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1846 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1847 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1849 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1850 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1852 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1853 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1855 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1856 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1860 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1861 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1867 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1868 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1869 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1870 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1871 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1872 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1875 included_htlcs += 1;
1878 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1879 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1882 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1883 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1885 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1886 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1887 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1892 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1893 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1894 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1897 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1898 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1900 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1901 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1903 total_pending_htlcs,
1904 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1905 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1906 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1908 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1909 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1910 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1912 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1914 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1919 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1920 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1921 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1922 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1928 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
1929 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
1930 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
1931 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
1932 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
1933 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
1934 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
1935 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
1936 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
1937 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
1938 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
1940 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
1941 // return them to fail the payment.
1942 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
1943 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
1944 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1946 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
1947 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
1952 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
1953 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
1954 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
1955 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
1956 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
1957 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
1958 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
1959 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
1960 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1961 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
1962 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1963 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1964 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
1969 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
1970 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1971 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
1975 // Internal utility functions for channels
1977 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1978 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1979 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1981 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1983 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1984 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1985 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1987 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1990 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1992 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1995 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1996 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1997 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1999 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2001 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2002 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2003 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2004 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2005 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2008 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2009 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2010 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2011 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2012 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2013 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2014 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2017 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2018 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2020 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2021 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2024 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2025 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2026 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2027 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2028 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2029 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2032 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
2033 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
2034 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_funding_signed on an
2037 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2038 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2039 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2040 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2043 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2044 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2046 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2047 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2048 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2052 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2053 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2054 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2056 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2057 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2058 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2059 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2061 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2062 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2063 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2064 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2065 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2066 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2067 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2068 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
2069 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
2070 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2071 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2075 // We can afford to use a lower bound with anchors than previously since we can now bump
2076 // fees when broadcasting our commitment. However, we must still make sure we meet the
2077 // minimum mempool feerate, until package relay is deployed, such that we can ensure the
2078 // commitment transaction propagates throughout node mempools on its own.
2079 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2080 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
2082 ConfirmationTarget::Background
2084 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2085 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2086 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2087 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2088 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2089 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2090 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2091 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2093 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2094 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2098 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2104 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2105 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2106 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2107 // outside of those situations will fail.
2108 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2112 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2117 1 + // script length (0)
2121 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2122 2 + // witness marker and flag
2123 1 + // witness element count
2124 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2125 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2126 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2127 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2128 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2129 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2131 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2132 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2133 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2139 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2140 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2141 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2142 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2144 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2145 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2146 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2148 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2149 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2150 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2151 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2152 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2153 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2156 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2157 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2160 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2161 value_to_holder = 0;
2164 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2165 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2166 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2167 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2169 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2170 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2173 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2174 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2177 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2180 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2181 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2183 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2185 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2186 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2187 where L::Target: Logger {
2188 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2189 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2190 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2191 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2192 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2193 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2194 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2195 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2199 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2200 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2201 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2202 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2204 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2205 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2207 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2209 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2211 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2212 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2213 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2215 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2216 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2217 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2218 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2219 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2221 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2222 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2223 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2225 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2226 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2228 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2231 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2232 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2236 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2240 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2241 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2242 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2243 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2244 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2245 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2248 // Now update local state:
2250 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2251 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2252 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2253 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2254 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2255 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2256 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2260 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2261 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2262 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2263 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2264 // do not not get into this branch.
2265 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2266 match pending_update {
2267 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2268 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2269 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2270 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2271 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2272 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2273 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2276 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2277 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2278 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2279 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2280 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2281 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2282 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2288 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2289 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2290 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2292 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2293 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2294 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2296 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2300 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2301 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2303 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2304 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2306 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2307 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2310 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2313 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2314 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2315 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2316 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2321 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2322 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2323 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2324 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2325 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2326 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2327 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2328 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2329 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2330 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2331 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2332 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2333 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2334 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2335 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2337 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2338 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2339 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2340 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2341 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2344 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2345 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2346 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2352 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2353 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2355 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2359 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2360 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2361 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2362 /// before we fail backwards.
2364 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2365 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2366 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2367 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2368 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2369 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2370 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2373 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2374 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2375 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2376 /// before we fail backwards.
2378 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2379 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2380 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2381 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2382 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2383 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2384 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2386 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2388 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2389 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2390 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2392 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2393 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2394 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2396 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2397 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2398 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2400 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2405 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2406 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2412 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2413 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2414 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2415 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2416 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2420 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2421 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2422 force_holding_cell = true;
2425 // Now update local state:
2426 if force_holding_cell {
2427 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2428 match pending_update {
2429 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2430 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2431 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2432 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2436 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2437 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2438 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2439 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2445 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2446 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2447 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2453 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2455 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2456 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2459 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2460 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2461 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2466 // Message handlers:
2468 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2469 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2470 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2471 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2472 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2476 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2479 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2482 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2483 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2484 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2485 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2488 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2490 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2491 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2492 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2493 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2495 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2496 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2498 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2499 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2501 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2502 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2503 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2504 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2505 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2506 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2510 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2511 initial_commitment_tx,
2514 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2515 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2518 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2519 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2522 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2523 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2524 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2525 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2526 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2527 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2528 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2529 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2530 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2531 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2532 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2533 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2535 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2537 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2539 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2540 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2541 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2542 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2544 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2546 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2547 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2551 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2552 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2554 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2555 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2556 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2557 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2559 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2562 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2563 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2564 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2567 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2568 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2569 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2570 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2571 // when routing outbound payments.
2572 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2576 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2578 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2579 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2580 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2581 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2582 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2583 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2584 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2585 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2586 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2588 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2589 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2590 let expected_point =
2591 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2592 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2594 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2595 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2596 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2597 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2598 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2599 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2601 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2602 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2603 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2604 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2605 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2607 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2615 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2616 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2618 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2620 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2623 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2624 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2625 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2626 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2627 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2628 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2630 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2631 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2632 if local_sent_shutdown {
2633 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2635 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2636 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2637 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2638 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2640 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2641 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2643 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2644 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2646 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2647 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2649 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2650 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2653 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2654 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2655 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2656 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2658 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2659 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2661 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2662 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2663 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2664 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2665 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2666 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2667 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2668 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2669 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2670 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2671 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2673 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2674 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2675 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2676 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2677 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2678 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2682 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2683 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2686 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2687 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2688 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2690 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2691 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2692 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2693 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2694 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2695 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2696 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2700 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2701 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2702 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2703 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2704 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2705 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2706 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2710 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2711 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2712 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2713 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2714 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2715 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2718 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2719 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2720 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2721 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2722 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2724 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2728 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2729 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2732 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2733 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2734 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2735 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2736 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2737 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2738 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2739 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2740 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2741 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2742 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2743 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2744 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2745 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2746 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2747 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2750 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2751 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2752 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2753 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2754 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2757 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2758 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2760 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2761 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2764 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2765 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2766 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2770 // Now update local state:
2771 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2772 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2773 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2774 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2775 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2776 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2777 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2782 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2784 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2785 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2786 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2787 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2788 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2789 None => fail_reason.into(),
2790 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2791 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2792 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2793 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2795 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2799 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2800 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2801 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2802 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2804 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2805 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2810 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2813 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2814 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2817 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2818 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2821 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
2824 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2825 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2828 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2832 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2836 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2837 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2838 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2840 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2841 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2844 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
2848 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
2849 where L::Target: Logger
2851 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2854 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2857 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
2861 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2863 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2865 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
2866 let commitment_txid = {
2867 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
2868 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2869 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2871 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
2872 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
2873 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
2874 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2875 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
2876 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2880 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
2882 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
2883 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
2884 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
2885 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
2888 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2889 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2890 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
2891 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
2894 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2896 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2897 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
2898 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
2899 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
2900 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2901 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2902 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
2903 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
2904 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
2905 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
2906 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
2912 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
2913 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
2916 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
2917 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
2918 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
2919 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
2920 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
2921 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
2922 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
2923 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
2924 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
2925 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
2926 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
2927 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
2928 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
2931 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2932 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
2933 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
2934 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
2935 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
2936 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
2937 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
2939 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
2940 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
2941 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
2942 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
2943 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
2944 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2945 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
2946 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
2948 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2949 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
2952 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
2954 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
2955 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
2956 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
2959 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
2962 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2963 commitment_stats.tx,
2965 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
2966 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2967 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2970 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
2971 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2973 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
2974 let mut need_commitment = false;
2975 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
2976 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
2977 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
2978 need_commitment = true;
2982 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2983 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
2984 Some(forward_info.clone())
2986 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
2987 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2988 &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2989 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
2990 need_commitment = true;
2993 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2994 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2995 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
2996 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
2997 &htlc.payment_hash, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2998 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
2999 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3000 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3001 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3002 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3003 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3004 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3005 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3006 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3008 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3010 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3011 need_commitment = true;
3015 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3016 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3017 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3018 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3019 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3020 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3022 nondust_htlc_sources,
3026 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3027 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3028 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3029 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3031 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3032 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3033 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3034 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3035 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3036 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3037 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3038 // includes the right HTLCs.
3039 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3040 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3041 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3042 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3043 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3044 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3046 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3047 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3048 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3051 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3052 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3053 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3054 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3055 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3056 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3057 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3058 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3059 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3063 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3064 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3065 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3066 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3069 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3070 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3071 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3072 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3073 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3074 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3075 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3077 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3078 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3079 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3080 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3083 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3084 /// for our counterparty.
3085 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3086 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3087 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3088 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3090 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3091 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3092 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3093 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3095 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3096 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3097 updates: Vec::new(),
3100 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3101 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3102 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3103 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3104 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3105 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3106 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3107 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3108 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3109 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3110 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3111 // to rebalance channels.
3112 match &htlc_update {
3113 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3114 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3115 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3117 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3118 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3120 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3123 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3124 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3125 &payment_hash, msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3126 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3127 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3128 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3129 // into the holding cell without ever being
3130 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3131 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3132 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3135 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3141 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3142 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3143 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3144 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3145 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3146 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3147 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3148 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3149 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3150 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3151 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3152 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3154 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3155 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3156 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3157 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3158 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3159 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3160 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3161 // for a full revocation before failing.
3162 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3163 update_fail_count += 1;
3166 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3168 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3175 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3176 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3178 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3179 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3184 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3185 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3186 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3187 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3188 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3190 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3191 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3192 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3194 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3195 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3201 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3202 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3203 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3204 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3205 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3206 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3207 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3208 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3209 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3211 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3212 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3214 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3215 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3217 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3218 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3221 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3223 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3224 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3225 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3229 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3230 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3231 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3232 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3233 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3234 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3235 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3236 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3240 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3242 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3243 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3246 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3247 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3248 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3249 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3251 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3255 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3256 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3257 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3258 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3259 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3260 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3261 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3262 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3266 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3267 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3268 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3269 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3270 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3271 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3272 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3273 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3274 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3276 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3277 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3280 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3281 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3282 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3283 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3284 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3285 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3286 let mut require_commitment = false;
3287 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3290 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3291 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3292 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3294 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3295 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3296 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3297 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3298 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3299 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3304 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3305 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3306 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3307 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3308 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3310 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3311 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3312 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3317 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3318 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3320 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3324 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3325 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3327 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3328 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3329 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3330 require_commitment = true;
3331 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3332 match forward_info {
3333 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3334 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3335 require_commitment = true;
3337 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3338 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3339 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3341 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3342 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3343 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3347 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3348 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3349 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3350 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3356 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3357 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3358 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3359 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3361 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3362 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3363 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3364 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3365 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3366 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3367 require_commitment = true;
3371 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3373 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3374 match update_state {
3375 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3376 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3377 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3378 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3379 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3381 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3382 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3383 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3384 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3385 require_commitment = true;
3386 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3387 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3392 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3393 let release_state_str =
3394 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3395 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3396 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3397 if !release_monitor {
3398 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3399 update: monitor_update,
3401 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3403 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3408 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3409 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3410 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3411 if require_commitment {
3412 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3413 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3414 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3415 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3416 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3417 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3418 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3419 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3420 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3422 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3423 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3424 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3425 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3426 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3429 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3430 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3431 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3432 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3433 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3434 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3436 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3437 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), release_state_str);
3439 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3440 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3442 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3443 if require_commitment {
3444 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3446 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3447 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3448 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3449 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3451 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3452 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()),
3453 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3456 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3457 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3459 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3460 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), release_state_str);
3462 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3463 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3469 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3470 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3471 /// commitment update.
3472 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3473 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3474 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3476 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3477 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3480 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3481 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3482 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3483 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3485 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3486 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3487 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3488 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3489 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3490 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3491 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3493 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3494 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3496 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3497 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3499 if !self.context.is_live() {
3500 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3503 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3504 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3505 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3506 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3507 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3508 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3509 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3510 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3511 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3512 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3516 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3517 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3518 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3519 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3520 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3521 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3524 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3525 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3529 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3530 force_holding_cell = true;
3533 if force_holding_cell {
3534 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3538 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3539 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3541 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3542 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3547 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3548 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3550 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3552 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3553 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3554 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3555 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3559 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3560 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3561 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3565 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3566 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3569 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3570 // will be retransmitted.
3571 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3572 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3573 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3575 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3576 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3578 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3579 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3580 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3581 // this HTLC accordingly
3582 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3585 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3586 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3587 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3588 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3591 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3592 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3593 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3594 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3595 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3596 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3601 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3603 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3604 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3605 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3606 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3610 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3611 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3612 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3613 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3614 // the update upon reconnection.
3615 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3619 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3621 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3622 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3625 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3626 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3627 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3628 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3629 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3630 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3631 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3633 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3634 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3635 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3636 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3637 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3638 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3639 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3641 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3642 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3643 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3644 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3645 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3646 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3647 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3650 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3651 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3652 /// to the remote side.
3653 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3654 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3655 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3656 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3659 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3661 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3662 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3664 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3665 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3666 // first received the funding_signed.
3667 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3668 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3669 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3671 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3672 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3673 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3674 funding_broadcastable = None;
3677 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3678 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3679 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3680 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3681 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3682 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3683 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3684 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3685 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3686 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3687 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3688 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3689 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3690 next_per_commitment_point,
3691 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3695 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3697 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3698 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3699 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3700 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3701 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3702 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3704 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3705 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3706 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3707 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3708 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3709 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3713 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3714 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3716 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3717 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3718 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3721 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3722 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3723 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3724 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3725 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3726 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3727 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3728 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3729 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3733 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3734 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3736 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3737 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3739 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3740 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3742 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3743 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3745 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3746 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3747 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3748 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3749 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3750 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3751 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3752 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3753 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3754 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3755 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3756 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3757 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3758 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3760 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3761 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3762 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3768 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3769 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3770 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3771 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3772 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3773 per_commitment_secret,
3774 next_per_commitment_point,
3776 next_local_nonce: None,
3780 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3781 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3782 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3783 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3784 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3786 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3787 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3788 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3789 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3790 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3791 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3792 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3793 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3794 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3795 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
3800 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3801 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3803 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3804 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3805 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3806 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3807 reason: err_packet.clone()
3810 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3811 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3812 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3813 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3814 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3815 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3818 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3819 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3820 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3821 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3822 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3829 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3830 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3831 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3832 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3836 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3837 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3838 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3839 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3840 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3841 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3845 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
3846 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
3847 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
3848 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3849 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
3850 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3851 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
3856 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3857 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3859 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3860 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3861 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3862 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3863 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3864 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
3865 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
3866 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
3869 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3871 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3872 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3873 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3874 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3875 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3878 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3879 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3880 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
3883 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3884 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3885 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3886 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3887 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3888 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3890 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3891 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3892 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3893 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3894 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
3897 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
3898 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
3899 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
3900 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
3901 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
3902 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
3903 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
3904 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
3908 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
3909 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
3910 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
3911 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
3913 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
3917 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
3918 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
3919 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3920 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3922 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
3924 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
3926 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3927 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
3928 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
3929 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3930 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
3931 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
3933 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
3934 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3935 channel_ready: None,
3936 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3937 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3938 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3942 // We have OurChannelReady set!
3943 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3944 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3945 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3946 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3947 next_per_commitment_point,
3948 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3950 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
3951 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3952 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
3956 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3957 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
3958 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
3960 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3961 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3962 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3965 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
3971 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
3972 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
3973 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
3974 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
3975 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
3976 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
3977 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3979 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
3981 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
3982 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
3983 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3984 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3985 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3986 next_per_commitment_point,
3987 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3991 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
3992 if required_revoke.is_some() {
3993 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3995 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3998 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
3999 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4000 raa: required_revoke,
4001 commitment_update: None,
4002 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4004 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4005 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4006 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4008 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4011 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4012 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4013 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4014 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4015 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4016 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4019 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4020 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4021 raa: required_revoke,
4022 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4023 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4027 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4031 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4032 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4033 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4034 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4036 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4038 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4040 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4041 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4042 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4043 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4044 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4045 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4047 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4048 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4049 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4050 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4051 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4053 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4054 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4055 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4056 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4059 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4060 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4061 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4062 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4063 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4064 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4065 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4066 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4067 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4068 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4069 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4070 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4071 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4072 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4073 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4075 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4078 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4079 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4082 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4083 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4084 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4085 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4086 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4087 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4090 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4091 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4092 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4093 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4094 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4095 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4098 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4104 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4105 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4106 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4107 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4109 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4110 return Ok((None, None));
4113 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4114 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4115 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4117 return Ok((None, None));
4120 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4122 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4123 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4124 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4125 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4127 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4128 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4130 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4131 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4133 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4134 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4135 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4136 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4138 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4139 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4140 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4147 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4148 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4150 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4151 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4154 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4155 /// within our expected timeframe.
4157 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4158 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4159 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4162 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4165 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4166 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4170 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4171 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4173 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4174 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4176 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4177 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4178 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4179 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4180 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4182 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4183 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4187 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4189 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4190 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4193 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4194 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4195 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4198 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4201 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4202 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4203 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4204 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4206 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4209 assert!(send_shutdown);
4210 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4211 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4212 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4214 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4215 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4217 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4222 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4224 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4225 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4227 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4228 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4229 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4230 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4231 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4232 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4235 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4236 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4238 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4239 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4240 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4241 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4245 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4246 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4247 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4248 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4249 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4250 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4252 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4253 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4260 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4261 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4263 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4266 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4267 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4269 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4271 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4272 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4273 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4274 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4275 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4276 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4277 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4278 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4279 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4281 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4282 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4285 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4289 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4290 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4291 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4292 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4294 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4295 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4297 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4298 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4300 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4301 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4303 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4307 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4311 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4312 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4313 return Ok((None, None));
4316 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4317 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4318 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4321 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4323 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4326 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4327 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4328 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4329 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4330 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4334 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4335 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4340 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4341 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4342 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4343 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4344 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4345 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4346 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4350 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4352 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4353 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4354 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4355 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4357 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4360 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4361 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4363 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4364 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4366 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4367 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4368 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4369 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4373 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4374 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4375 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4376 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4378 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4379 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4380 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4388 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4389 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4390 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4392 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4393 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4395 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4396 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4399 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4400 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4401 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4402 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4403 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4405 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4406 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4407 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4409 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4410 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4413 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4414 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4415 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4416 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4417 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4418 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4419 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4420 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4422 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4425 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4426 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4427 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4428 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4430 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4434 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4435 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4436 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4437 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4439 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4445 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4446 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4447 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4448 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4449 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4450 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4451 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4453 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4454 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4457 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4459 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4460 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4466 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4467 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4468 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4469 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4470 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4471 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4472 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4474 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4475 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4482 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4483 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4486 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4487 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4490 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4491 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4495 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4496 &self.context.holder_signer
4500 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4502 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4503 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4504 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4505 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4506 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4507 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4509 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4511 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4519 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4520 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4524 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4525 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4526 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4527 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4530 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4531 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4532 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4533 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4536 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4537 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4538 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4539 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4540 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4541 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4544 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4545 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4546 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4547 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4548 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4549 if !release_monitor {
4550 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4559 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4560 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4563 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4564 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4565 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4567 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4568 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4569 if self.context.channel_state &
4570 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4571 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4572 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4573 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4574 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4577 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4578 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4579 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4580 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4581 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4582 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4584 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4585 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4586 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4588 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4589 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4590 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4591 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4592 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4593 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4599 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4600 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4601 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4604 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4605 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4606 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4609 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4610 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4611 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4614 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4615 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4616 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4617 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4618 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4619 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4624 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4625 self.context.channel_update_status
4628 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4629 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4630 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4633 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4635 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4636 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4637 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4641 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4642 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4643 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4646 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4650 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4651 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4652 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4654 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4655 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4656 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4658 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4659 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4662 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4663 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4664 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4665 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4666 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4667 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4668 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4669 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4670 self.context.channel_state);
4672 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4676 if need_commitment_update {
4677 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4678 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4679 let next_per_commitment_point =
4680 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4681 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4682 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4683 next_per_commitment_point,
4684 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4688 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4694 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4695 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4696 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4697 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4698 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4699 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4700 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4702 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4705 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4706 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4707 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4708 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4709 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4710 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4711 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4712 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4713 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4714 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4715 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4716 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4717 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4718 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4719 // channel and move on.
4720 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4721 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4723 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4724 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4725 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4727 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4728 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4729 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4730 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4731 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4732 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4733 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4737 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4738 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4739 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4740 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4741 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4745 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
4746 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
4747 // may have already happened for this block).
4748 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4749 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4750 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
4751 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
4754 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
4755 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
4756 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4757 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
4765 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
4766 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
4767 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
4768 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
4770 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
4771 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
4774 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
4776 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4777 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4778 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4779 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4781 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4784 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
4787 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4788 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
4789 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
4790 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4792 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4795 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
4796 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
4797 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
4799 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
4800 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4802 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
4803 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
4804 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4812 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
4814 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
4815 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4816 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4818 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4819 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
4822 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4823 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
4824 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
4825 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4826 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4827 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
4828 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
4829 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
4830 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
4833 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
4834 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
4835 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
4836 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
4838 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
4839 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
4840 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
4842 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
4843 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
4844 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
4845 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
4847 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
4848 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
4849 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
4850 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
4851 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
4852 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
4853 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
4856 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
4857 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
4859 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
4862 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
4863 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
4864 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
4865 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
4866 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
4867 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
4868 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
4869 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
4870 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
4871 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
4872 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
4873 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
4874 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
4875 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
4876 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
4877 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
4878 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
4884 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
4889 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
4890 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
4892 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
4893 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
4894 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
4895 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
4897 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
4900 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
4902 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
4903 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
4904 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4905 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
4906 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
4907 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
4909 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4910 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
4913 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
4914 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
4915 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
4916 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
4917 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
4918 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
4920 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
4921 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
4924 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
4925 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
4926 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
4927 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
4928 excess_data: Vec::new(),
4934 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4935 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
4936 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
4937 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
4939 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4942 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
4946 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4950 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
4951 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
4955 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
4959 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4960 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
4963 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
4967 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
4969 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
4974 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4975 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4976 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
4978 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
4983 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
4985 None => return None,
4988 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
4990 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
4991 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4993 node_signature: our_node_sig,
4994 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5000 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5002 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5003 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5004 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5005 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5006 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5007 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5008 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5010 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5011 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5012 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5013 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5014 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5015 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5016 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5017 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5018 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5019 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5020 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5021 contents: announcement,
5026 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5030 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5031 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5032 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5033 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5034 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5035 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5036 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5037 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5039 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5041 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5042 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5043 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5044 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5046 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5047 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5048 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5049 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5052 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5053 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5054 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5055 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5058 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5061 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5062 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5063 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5064 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5065 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5066 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5069 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5071 Err(_) => return None,
5073 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5074 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5079 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5080 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5081 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5082 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5083 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5084 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5085 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5086 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5087 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5088 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5089 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5090 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5091 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5092 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5093 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5094 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5097 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5100 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5101 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5102 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5103 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5104 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5105 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5106 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5107 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5108 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5110 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5111 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5112 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5113 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5114 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5115 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5116 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5117 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5118 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5120 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5121 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5122 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5123 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5124 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5125 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5126 next_funding_txid: None,
5131 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5133 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5134 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5135 /// commitment update.
5137 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5138 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5139 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5140 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5141 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5142 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5143 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5146 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5147 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5148 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5150 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5151 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5156 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5157 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5159 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5161 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5162 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5164 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5165 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5166 /// regenerate them.
5168 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5169 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5171 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5172 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5173 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5174 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5175 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5176 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5177 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5179 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5180 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5182 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5183 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5184 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5187 if amount_msat == 0 {
5188 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5191 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5192 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5193 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5194 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5197 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5198 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5199 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5202 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5203 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5204 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5205 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5206 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5207 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5208 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5209 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5212 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5213 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5214 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5215 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5216 else { "to peer" });
5218 if need_holding_cell {
5219 force_holding_cell = true;
5222 // Now update local state:
5223 if force_holding_cell {
5224 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5229 onion_routing_packet,
5235 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5236 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5238 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5240 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5245 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5246 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5247 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5251 onion_routing_packet,
5254 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5259 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5260 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5261 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5262 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5264 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5265 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5266 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5268 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5269 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5273 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5274 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5275 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5276 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5277 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5278 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5279 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5282 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5283 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5284 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5285 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5286 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5287 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5290 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5292 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5293 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5294 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5295 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5296 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5298 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5299 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5302 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5303 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5304 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5305 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5306 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5307 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5308 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5309 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5310 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5311 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5312 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5315 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5319 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5320 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5321 where L::Target: Logger
5323 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5324 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5325 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5327 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5329 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5330 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5331 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5332 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5333 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5334 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5335 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5336 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5337 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5338 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5339 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5345 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5348 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5349 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5350 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5351 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5352 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5353 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5355 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5356 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5357 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5359 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5360 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5361 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5364 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5365 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5369 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5370 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5372 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5374 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5375 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5376 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5377 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5379 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5380 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5381 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5382 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5383 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5384 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5388 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5389 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5393 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5394 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5399 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5400 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5402 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5403 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5404 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5405 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5406 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5407 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5408 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5409 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5411 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5412 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5413 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5416 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5417 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5418 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5424 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5425 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5426 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5428 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5429 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5430 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5431 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5437 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5438 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5440 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5441 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5442 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5443 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5444 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5446 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5447 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5448 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5451 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5452 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5453 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5455 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5456 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5459 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5460 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5462 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5463 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5464 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5467 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5468 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5469 let mut chan_closed = false;
5470 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5474 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5476 None if !chan_closed => {
5477 // use override shutdown script if provided
5478 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5479 Some(script) => script,
5481 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5482 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5483 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5484 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5488 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5489 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5491 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5497 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5498 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5499 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5500 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5502 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5504 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5506 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5507 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5508 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5509 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5510 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5511 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5514 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5515 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5517 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5518 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5519 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5522 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5523 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5524 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5525 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5526 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5528 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5529 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5536 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5537 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5539 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5542 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5543 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5544 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5546 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5547 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5551 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5555 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5556 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5557 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5558 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5561 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5562 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5563 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5564 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5565 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5566 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5567 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5568 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5570 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5571 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5572 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5573 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5575 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5576 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5578 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5579 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5581 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5582 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5583 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5585 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5586 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5588 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5589 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5590 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5591 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5592 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5595 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5596 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5598 let commitment_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5599 ConfirmationTarget::MempoolMinimum
5601 ConfirmationTarget::Normal
5603 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5605 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5606 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5607 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
5608 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5611 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5612 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5614 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5615 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5616 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5617 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5621 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5622 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5623 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5627 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5628 Ok(script) => script,
5629 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5632 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
5635 context: ChannelContext {
5638 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5639 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5640 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5641 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5646 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5648 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5649 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5650 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5651 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5653 channel_value_satoshis,
5655 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5657 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5658 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5661 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5662 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5665 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5666 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5667 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5668 pending_update_fee: None,
5669 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5670 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5671 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5672 update_time_counter: 1,
5674 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5676 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5677 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5678 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5679 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5680 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5681 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5683 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5684 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5685 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5686 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5688 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5689 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5690 closing_fee_limits: None,
5691 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5693 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5694 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5695 short_channel_id: None,
5696 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5698 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5699 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5700 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5701 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5702 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5703 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5704 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5705 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5706 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5707 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5708 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5709 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5711 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5713 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5714 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5715 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5716 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5717 counterparty_parameters: None,
5718 funding_outpoint: None,
5719 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5721 funding_transaction: None,
5723 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5724 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5725 counterparty_node_id,
5727 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
5729 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
5731 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
5732 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
5734 announcement_sigs: None,
5736 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5737 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5738 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5739 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
5741 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
5742 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
5744 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
5745 outbound_scid_alias,
5747 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
5748 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
5750 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5751 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
5756 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
5758 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
5762 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
5763 fn get_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5764 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5765 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5766 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5767 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
5768 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5769 Ok(ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5770 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5775 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5776 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5777 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5778 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5779 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5780 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5781 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5782 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L)
5783 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingCreated), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
5784 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5785 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5787 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5788 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5790 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5791 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5792 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5793 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5796 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5797 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5799 let signature = match self.get_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5802 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5803 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5804 return Err((self, e));
5808 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5810 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5812 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5813 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5814 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5816 let channel = Channel {
5817 context: self.context,
5820 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingCreated {
5821 temporary_channel_id,
5822 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5823 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5826 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5828 next_local_nonce: None,
5832 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
5833 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
5834 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
5835 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
5836 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
5837 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5838 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
5839 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
5840 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
5841 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
5844 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
5845 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
5846 // `only_static_remotekey`.
5847 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
5848 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5849 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
5855 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
5856 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
5857 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
5858 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
5859 &mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
5860 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
5862 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5864 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
5865 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
5866 // We've exhausted our options
5869 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
5870 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
5873 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
5874 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
5875 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
5876 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
5878 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5879 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
5880 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
5881 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
5882 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
5883 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
5885 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
5887 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
5888 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
5891 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5892 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5893 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5895 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5896 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5899 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5900 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5903 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5904 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5908 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5909 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5910 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5911 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5912 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5913 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5914 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5915 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5916 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5917 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5918 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5919 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5920 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5921 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5922 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5923 first_per_commitment_point,
5924 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5925 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5926 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5927 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5929 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5934 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5935 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
5937 // Check sanity of message fields:
5938 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5939 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
5941 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
5944 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
5945 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
5947 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5948 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
5950 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5951 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5953 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5954 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
5955 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5957 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
5958 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
5959 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
5961 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
5962 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
5963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
5965 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
5966 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
5968 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
5969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
5972 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
5973 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
5974 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5976 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5977 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5979 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
5980 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
5982 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
5983 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5985 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5986 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5988 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5989 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
5991 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
5992 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
5995 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
5996 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
5997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
5999 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6000 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6002 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6003 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6004 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6006 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6007 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6010 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6011 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6012 &Some(ref script) => {
6013 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6014 if script.len() == 0 {
6017 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6018 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6020 Some(script.clone())
6023 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6025 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6030 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6031 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6032 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6033 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6034 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6036 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6037 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6039 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6042 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6043 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6044 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6045 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6046 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6047 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6050 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6051 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6052 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6055 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6056 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6058 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6059 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6065 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6066 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6067 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6068 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6071 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6072 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6073 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6074 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6075 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6076 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6077 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6078 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6079 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6080 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6081 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6084 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6086 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6087 // support this channel type.
6088 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6089 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6090 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6093 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6094 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6095 // `static_remote_key`.
6096 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6097 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6099 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6100 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6101 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6103 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6106 channel_type.clone()
6108 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6109 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6115 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6116 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6117 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6118 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6119 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6120 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6121 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6122 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6123 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6126 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6127 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6130 // Check sanity of message fields:
6131 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6132 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6134 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6137 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6138 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6140 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6141 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6144 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6147 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6150 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6152 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6153 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6154 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6156 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6159 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6160 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6163 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6164 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6165 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6167 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6168 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6170 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6171 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6173 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6176 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6179 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6182 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6183 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6186 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6188 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6189 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6190 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6194 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6195 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6196 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6197 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6198 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6200 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6203 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6204 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6205 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6207 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6211 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6212 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6213 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6214 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6215 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
6216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
6219 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
6220 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6221 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6222 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6223 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6226 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6227 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6228 &Some(ref script) => {
6229 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6230 if script.len() == 0 {
6233 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6236 Some(script.clone())
6239 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6246 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6247 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6248 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6249 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6253 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6254 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6259 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6260 Ok(script) => script,
6261 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6264 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6265 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6267 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6270 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6274 context: ChannelContext {
6277 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6278 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6280 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6285 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6287 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6288 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6289 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6290 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6293 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6295 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6296 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6299 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6300 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6301 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6303 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6304 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6305 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6306 pending_update_fee: None,
6307 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6308 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6309 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6310 update_time_counter: 1,
6312 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6314 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6315 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6316 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6317 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6318 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6319 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6321 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6322 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6323 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6324 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6326 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6327 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6328 closing_fee_limits: None,
6329 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6331 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6332 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6333 short_channel_id: None,
6334 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6336 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6337 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6338 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6339 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6340 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6341 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6342 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6343 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6344 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6345 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6346 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6347 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6350 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6352 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6353 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6354 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6355 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6356 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6357 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6358 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6360 funding_outpoint: None,
6361 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6363 funding_transaction: None,
6365 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6366 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6367 counterparty_node_id,
6369 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6371 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6373 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6374 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6376 announcement_sigs: None,
6378 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6379 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6380 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6381 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6383 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6384 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6386 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6387 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6389 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6390 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6392 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6393 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6398 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6400 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6406 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6407 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6409 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6410 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6411 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6412 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6414 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6415 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6417 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6418 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6421 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6424 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6425 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6426 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6428 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6429 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6430 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6431 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6433 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6434 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6435 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6436 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6437 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6438 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6439 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6440 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6441 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6442 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6443 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6444 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6445 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6446 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6447 first_per_commitment_point,
6448 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6449 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6450 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6452 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6454 next_local_nonce: None,
6458 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6459 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6461 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6463 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6464 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6467 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6468 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6470 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6471 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6473 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6474 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6475 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6476 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6477 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6478 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6479 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6480 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6481 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6484 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6485 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6487 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6488 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6489 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6490 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6492 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6493 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6494 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6495 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6496 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
6498 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6499 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6504 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6505 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6506 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6510 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6511 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6513 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6514 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6515 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6517 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6519 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6520 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6521 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6522 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6525 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6526 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6527 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6528 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6529 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6531 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6533 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6534 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6535 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6538 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6539 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6540 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6544 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6545 initial_commitment_tx,
6548 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6549 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6552 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6553 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6556 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6558 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6559 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6560 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6561 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6562 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6563 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6564 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6565 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6566 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6567 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6568 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6570 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6572 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
6574 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6575 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6576 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6577 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6579 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6581 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6582 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6583 let mut channel = Channel {
6584 context: self.context,
6586 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6587 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6588 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6590 Ok((channel, msgs::FundingSigned {
6594 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6595 }, channel_monitor))
6599 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6600 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6602 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6608 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6609 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6610 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6611 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6612 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6614 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6615 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6616 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6617 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6623 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6624 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6625 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6626 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6627 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6628 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6633 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6634 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6635 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6636 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6638 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6639 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6640 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6641 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6646 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6647 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6648 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6649 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6650 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6651 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6656 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6657 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6658 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6661 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6663 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6664 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6665 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6666 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6667 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6669 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6670 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6671 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6672 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6674 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6675 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6676 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6678 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6680 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6681 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6682 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6683 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6684 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6685 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6686 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6688 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6689 // deserialized from that format.
6690 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6691 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6692 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6694 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6696 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6697 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6698 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6700 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6701 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6702 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6703 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6706 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6707 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6708 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6711 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6712 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6713 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6714 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6716 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6717 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6719 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6721 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6723 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6725 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6728 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6730 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6735 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6736 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6738 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6739 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
6740 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6741 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6742 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6743 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6744 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6746 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6748 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6750 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6753 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6754 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6755 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6758 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6760 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6761 preimages.push(preimage);
6763 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6764 reason.write(writer)?;
6766 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6768 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6769 preimages.push(preimage);
6771 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6772 reason.write(writer)?;
6775 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
6776 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6777 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6779 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6780 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6781 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
6785 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
6786 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6787 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
6789 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6790 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
6794 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6795 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6796 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6797 source.write(writer)?;
6798 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6800 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
6801 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
6802 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6804 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
6805 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
6807 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6809 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6810 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6812 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6814 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6815 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6820 match self.context.resend_order {
6821 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6822 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6825 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6826 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6827 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6829 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6830 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6831 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6832 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6835 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6836 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6837 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6838 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6839 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6842 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6843 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6844 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6845 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6847 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6848 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6849 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6851 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6853 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6854 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6855 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6856 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6858 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6859 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6860 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6861 // consider the stale state on reload.
6864 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6865 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6866 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6868 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6869 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6870 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6872 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6873 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6875 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6876 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6877 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6879 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6880 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6882 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6885 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6886 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6887 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6889 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6892 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6893 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6895 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6896 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6897 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6899 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6901 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6903 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6905 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6906 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6907 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6908 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6909 htlc.write(writer)?;
6912 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6913 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6914 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6916 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6917 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6919 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6920 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6921 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6922 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6923 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6924 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6925 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6927 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6928 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6929 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6930 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6931 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6933 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6934 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6936 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6937 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6938 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6939 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6941 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6943 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6944 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6945 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6946 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6947 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6948 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6949 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6951 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6952 (2, chan_type, option),
6953 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6954 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6955 (5, self.context.config, required),
6956 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6957 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6958 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
6959 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6960 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
6961 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6962 (15, preimages, required_vec),
6963 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6964 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6965 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6966 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6967 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6968 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6969 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6970 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6971 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6972 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6973 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
6980 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6981 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
6983 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6984 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6986 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6987 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6988 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6990 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6991 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6992 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6993 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6995 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6997 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6998 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6999 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7000 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7001 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7003 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7004 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7007 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7008 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7009 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7011 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 let mut keys_data = None;
7015 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7016 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7017 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7018 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7019 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7020 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7021 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7022 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7023 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7024 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7028 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7029 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7030 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7033 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7035 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7036 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7037 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7039 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7041 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7042 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7043 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7044 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7045 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7046 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7047 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7048 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7049 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7050 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7051 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7052 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7053 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7058 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7059 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7060 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7061 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7062 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7063 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7064 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7065 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7066 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7067 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7068 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7069 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7071 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7072 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7075 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7076 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7079 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7080 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7082 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7084 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7088 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7089 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7090 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7091 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7092 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7093 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7094 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7095 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7096 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7097 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7098 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7100 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7101 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7102 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7104 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7105 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7106 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7108 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7112 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7113 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7114 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7115 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7118 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7119 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7120 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7122 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7123 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7124 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7125 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7128 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7129 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7130 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7131 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7134 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7136 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7138 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7139 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7140 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7141 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7143 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7144 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7145 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7146 // consider the stale state on reload.
7147 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7150 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7151 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7152 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7154 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7157 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7158 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7159 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7161 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7162 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7163 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7164 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7166 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7167 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7169 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7170 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7172 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7173 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7174 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7176 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7178 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7179 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7181 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7182 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7185 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7187 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7188 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7189 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7190 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7192 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7195 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7196 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7198 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7200 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7201 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7203 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7204 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7206 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7208 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7209 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7210 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7212 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7213 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7214 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7218 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7219 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7220 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7222 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7228 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7229 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7230 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7231 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7232 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7233 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7234 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7235 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7236 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7237 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7239 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7240 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7241 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7242 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7243 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7244 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7245 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7247 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7248 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7249 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7250 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7252 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7254 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7255 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7257 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7258 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7259 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7260 (2, channel_type, option),
7261 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7262 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7263 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7264 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7265 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7266 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7267 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7268 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7269 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7270 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7271 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7272 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7273 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7274 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7275 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7276 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7277 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7278 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7279 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7280 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7281 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7284 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7285 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7286 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7287 // required channel parameters.
7288 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7289 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7290 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7292 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7294 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7295 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7296 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7297 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7300 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7301 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7302 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7304 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7305 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7307 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7308 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7313 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7314 if iter.next().is_some() {
7315 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7319 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7320 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7321 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7322 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7323 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7326 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7327 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7328 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7330 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7331 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7333 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7334 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7335 // separate u64 values.
7336 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7338 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7340 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7341 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7342 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7343 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7345 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7346 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7348 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7349 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7350 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7351 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7352 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7355 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7356 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7360 context: ChannelContext {
7363 config: config.unwrap(),
7367 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7368 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7369 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7372 temporary_channel_id,
7374 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7376 channel_value_satoshis,
7378 latest_monitor_update_id,
7380 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7381 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7384 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7385 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7388 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7389 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7390 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7391 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7395 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7396 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7397 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7398 monitor_pending_forwards,
7399 monitor_pending_failures,
7400 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7403 holding_cell_update_fee,
7404 next_holder_htlc_id,
7405 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7406 update_time_counter,
7409 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7410 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7411 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7412 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7414 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7415 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7416 closing_fee_limits: None,
7417 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7419 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7420 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7422 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7424 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7425 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7426 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7427 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7428 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7429 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7430 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7431 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7432 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7435 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7437 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7438 funding_transaction,
7440 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7441 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7442 counterparty_node_id,
7444 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7448 channel_update_status,
7449 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7453 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7454 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7455 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7456 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7458 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7459 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7461 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7462 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7463 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7465 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7466 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7468 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7469 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7471 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7474 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7483 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7484 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7485 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7486 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7487 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7489 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7490 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7491 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7492 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7493 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7494 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7495 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7496 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7497 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7498 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7499 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7500 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7501 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7502 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7503 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7504 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7505 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7506 use crate::util::test_utils;
7507 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7508 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7509 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7510 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7511 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7512 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7513 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7514 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7515 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7516 use crate::prelude::*;
7518 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7521 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7522 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7528 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7529 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7530 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7531 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7535 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7536 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7537 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7538 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7539 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7540 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7541 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7542 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7546 signer: InMemorySigner,
7549 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7550 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7553 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7554 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7556 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7557 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7560 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7564 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7566 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7567 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7568 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7569 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7570 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7573 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7574 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7575 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7576 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7580 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7581 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7582 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7586 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7587 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7588 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7589 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7591 let seed = [42; 32];
7592 let network = Network::Testnet;
7593 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7594 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7595 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7598 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7599 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7600 let config = UserConfig::default();
7601 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7602 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7603 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7605 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7606 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7610 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7611 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7613 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7614 let original_fee = 253;
7615 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7616 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7617 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7618 let seed = [42; 32];
7619 let network = Network::Testnet;
7620 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7622 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7623 let config = UserConfig::default();
7624 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7626 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7627 // same as the old fee.
7628 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7629 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7630 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7634 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7635 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7636 // dust limits are used.
7637 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7638 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7639 let seed = [42; 32];
7640 let network = Network::Testnet;
7641 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7642 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7643 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7645 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7646 // they have different dust limits.
7648 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7649 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7650 let config = UserConfig::default();
7651 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7653 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7654 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7655 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7656 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7657 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7659 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7660 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7661 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7662 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7663 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7665 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7666 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7667 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7668 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7670 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7671 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7672 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7674 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7675 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7677 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7678 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7679 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7681 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7682 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7683 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7684 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7687 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7689 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7690 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7691 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7692 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7693 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7694 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7695 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7696 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7697 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7699 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7702 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7703 // the dust limit check.
7704 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7705 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7706 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7707 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7709 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7710 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7711 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7712 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7713 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7714 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7715 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7719 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7720 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7721 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7722 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7723 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7724 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7725 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7726 let seed = [42; 32];
7727 let network = Network::Testnet;
7728 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7730 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7731 let config = UserConfig::default();
7732 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7734 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7735 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
7737 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7738 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7739 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7740 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7741 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7742 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7744 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7745 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7746 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7747 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7748 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7750 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7752 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7753 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7754 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7755 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7756 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7758 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7759 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7760 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7761 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7762 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7766 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7767 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7768 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7769 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7770 let seed = [42; 32];
7771 let network = Network::Testnet;
7772 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7773 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7774 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7776 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7778 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7779 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7780 let config = UserConfig::default();
7781 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7783 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7784 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7785 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7786 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7788 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7789 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7790 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7792 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7793 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7794 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7795 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7797 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7798 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7799 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7801 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7802 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7804 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7805 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7806 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7807 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7808 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7809 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7810 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7812 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7814 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7815 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7816 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7817 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7818 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7822 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7823 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7824 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7825 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7826 let seed = [42; 32];
7827 let network = Network::Testnet;
7828 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7829 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7830 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7832 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7833 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7834 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7835 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7836 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7837 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7838 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7839 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7841 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7842 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7843 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7844 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7845 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7846 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7848 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7849 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7850 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7851 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7853 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7855 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
7856 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7857 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7858 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7859 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7860 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7862 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7863 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7864 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7865 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7867 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7868 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7869 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7870 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7871 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7873 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7874 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7876 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7877 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7878 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7880 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7881 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7882 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7883 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7884 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7886 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7887 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7889 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7890 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7891 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7895 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7897 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
7898 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7899 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7901 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7902 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7903 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7904 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7906 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7907 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7908 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7910 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7912 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7913 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7916 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7917 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7918 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7919 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7920 let seed = [42; 32];
7921 let network = Network::Testnet;
7922 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7923 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7924 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7927 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7928 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7929 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7931 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7932 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7934 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7935 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7936 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7938 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7939 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7941 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7943 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7944 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7946 // Channel Negotiations failed
7947 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
7948 assert!(result.is_err());
7953 fn channel_update() {
7954 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7955 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7956 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7957 let seed = [42; 32];
7958 let network = Network::Testnet;
7959 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7960 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7961 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7963 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7964 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7965 let config = UserConfig::default();
7966 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7968 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7969 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7970 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7971 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7972 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7974 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7975 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7976 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7977 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7978 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7980 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7981 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7982 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7983 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7985 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7986 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7987 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7989 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7990 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7992 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7993 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7994 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7996 short_channel_id: 0,
7999 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8000 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8001 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8003 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8004 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8006 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8008 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
8010 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8011 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8012 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8013 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8015 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8016 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8017 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8019 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8023 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8025 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8026 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8027 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8028 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8029 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8030 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8031 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8032 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
8033 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8034 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8035 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8036 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8037 use crate::sync::Arc;
8039 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8040 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8041 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8042 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8044 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8046 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8047 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8048 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8049 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8050 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8052 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8053 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8059 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8060 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8061 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8063 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8064 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8065 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8066 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8067 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8068 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8070 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8072 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8073 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8074 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8075 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8076 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8077 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8079 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8080 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8081 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8082 selected_contest_delay: 144
8084 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8085 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8087 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8088 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8090 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8091 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8093 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8094 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8096 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8097 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8098 // build_commitment_transaction.
8099 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8100 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8101 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8102 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8103 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8105 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8106 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8107 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8108 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8112 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8113 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8114 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8115 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8119 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8120 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8121 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8123 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8124 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8126 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8127 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8129 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8131 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8132 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8133 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8134 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8135 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8136 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8137 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8139 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8140 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8141 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8142 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8144 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8145 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8146 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8148 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8150 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8151 commitment_tx.clone(),
8152 counterparty_signature,
8153 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8154 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8155 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8157 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8158 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8160 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8161 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8162 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8164 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8165 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
8168 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8169 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8171 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8172 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8173 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8174 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8175 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8176 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8177 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8178 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8180 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8183 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8184 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8185 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8189 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8192 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8193 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8194 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8196 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8197 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
8198 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
8199 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
8200 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8201 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
8202 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
8203 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8205 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8209 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8210 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8211 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8212 "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", {});
8214 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8215 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8217 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8218 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8219 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8221 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8222 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8223 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8224 "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", {});
8226 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8227 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8229 amount_msat: 1000000,
8231 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8232 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8234 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8237 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8238 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8240 amount_msat: 2000000,
8242 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8243 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8245 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8248 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8249 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8251 amount_msat: 2000000,
8253 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8254 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8255 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8256 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8258 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8261 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8262 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8264 amount_msat: 3000000,
8266 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8267 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8268 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8269 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8271 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8274 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8275 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8277 amount_msat: 4000000,
8279 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8280 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8282 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8286 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8287 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8288 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8290 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8291 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8292 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8295 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8296 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8297 "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" },
8300 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8301 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8302 "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" },
8305 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8306 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8307 "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" },
8310 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8311 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8312 "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" },
8315 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8316 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8317 "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" }
8320 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8321 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8322 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8324 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8325 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8326 "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", {
8329 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8330 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8331 "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" },
8334 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8335 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8336 "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" },
8339 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8340 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8341 "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" },
8344 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8345 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8346 "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" },
8349 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8350 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8351 "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" }
8354 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8355 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8356 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8358 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8359 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8360 "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", {
8363 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8364 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8365 "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" },
8368 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8369 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8370 "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" },
8373 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8374 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8375 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf1020000000000000000010b0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc62553298901483045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e226079601008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8378 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8379 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8380 "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" }
8383 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8384 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8385 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8386 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8388 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8389 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8390 "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", {
8393 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8394 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8395 "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" },
8398 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8399 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8400 "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" },
8403 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8404 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8405 "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" },
8408 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8409 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8410 "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" }
8413 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8414 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8415 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8416 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8418 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8419 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8420 "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", {
8423 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8424 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8425 "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" },
8428 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8429 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8430 "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" },
8433 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8434 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8435 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d020000000000000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e001473044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c1801008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8438 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8439 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8440 "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" }
8443 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8444 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8445 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8447 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8448 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8449 "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", {
8452 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8453 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8454 "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" },
8457 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8458 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8459 "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" },
8462 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8463 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8464 "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" }
8467 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8468 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8469 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8471 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8472 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8473 "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", {
8476 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8477 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8478 "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" },
8481 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8482 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8483 "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" },
8486 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8487 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8488 "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" }
8491 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8492 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8493 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8495 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8496 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8497 "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", {
8500 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8501 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8502 "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" },
8505 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8506 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8507 "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" }
8510 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8511 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8512 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8513 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8514 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8515 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8517 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8518 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8519 "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", {
8522 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8523 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8524 "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" },
8527 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8528 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8529 "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" }
8532 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8533 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8534 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8535 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8536 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8538 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8539 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8540 "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", {
8543 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8544 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8545 "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" },
8548 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8549 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8550 "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" }
8553 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8554 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8555 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8557 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8558 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8559 "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", {
8562 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8563 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8564 "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" }
8567 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8568 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8569 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8570 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8571 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8573 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8574 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8575 "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", {
8578 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8579 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8580 "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" }
8583 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8584 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8585 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8586 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8587 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8589 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8590 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8591 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8003a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484ae8f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c1901483045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c9524401475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8594 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8595 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8596 "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" }
8599 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8600 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8601 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8602 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8604 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8605 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8606 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8608 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8609 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8610 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8611 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8612 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8614 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8615 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8616 "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", {});
8618 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8619 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8620 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8621 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8622 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8624 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8625 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8626 "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", {});
8628 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8629 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8630 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8632 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8633 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8634 "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", {});
8636 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8637 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8638 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8639 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8640 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8642 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8643 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8644 "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", {});
8646 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8647 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8648 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8649 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8650 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8652 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8653 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8654 "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", {});
8656 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8657 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8658 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8659 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8660 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8661 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8663 amount_msat: 2000000,
8665 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8666 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8668 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8671 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8672 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8673 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8675 amount_msat: 5000001,
8677 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8678 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8679 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8680 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8682 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8685 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8686 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8688 amount_msat: 5000000,
8690 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8691 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8692 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8693 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8695 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8699 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8700 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8701 "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", {
8704 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8705 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8706 "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" },
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8709 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8710 "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" },
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8713 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8714 "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" }
8717 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8718 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
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8720 "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", {
8723 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8724 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8725 "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" },
8727 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8728 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8729 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40300000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c8347304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568f9010000" },
8731 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8732 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8733 "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" }
8738 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8739 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8741 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8742 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8743 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8744 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8746 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8747 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8748 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8750 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8751 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8753 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8754 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8756 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8757 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8758 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8762 fn test_key_derivation() {
8763 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8764 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8766 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8767 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8769 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8770 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8772 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8773 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8775 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8776 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8778 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8779 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8781 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8782 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8784 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8785 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8789 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8790 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8791 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8792 let seed = [42; 32];
8793 let network = Network::Testnet;
8794 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8795 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8797 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8798 let config = UserConfig::default();
8799 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8800 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8802 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8803 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8805 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8806 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8807 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8808 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8809 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8810 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8811 assert!(res.is_ok());
8815 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8816 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8817 // resulting `channel_type`.
8818 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8819 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8820 let network = Network::Testnet;
8821 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8822 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8824 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8825 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8827 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8828 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8830 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8831 // need to signal it.
8832 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8833 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8834 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8837 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8839 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8840 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8841 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8843 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8844 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8845 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8848 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8849 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8850 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8851 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8852 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8855 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8856 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8860 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8861 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8862 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8863 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8864 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8865 let network = Network::Testnet;
8866 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8867 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8869 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8870 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8872 let config = UserConfig::default();
8874 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8875 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8876 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8877 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8878 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8880 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8881 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8882 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8885 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8886 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8887 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8889 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8890 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8891 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8892 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8893 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8894 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8896 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8900 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8901 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8903 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8904 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8905 let network = Network::Testnet;
8906 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8907 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8909 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8910 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8912 let config = UserConfig::default();
8914 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8915 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8916 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8917 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8918 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8919 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8920 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8921 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8923 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8924 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8925 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8926 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8927 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8928 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8931 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8932 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8934 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8935 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8936 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8937 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8939 assert!(res.is_err());
8941 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8942 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8943 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8945 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8946 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8947 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8950 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8952 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
8953 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8954 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8955 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
8958 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8959 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8961 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8962 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8964 assert!(res.is_err());