1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
309 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
310 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
311 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
312 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
316 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
318 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
320 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
322 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
323 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
324 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
325 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
326 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
328 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
329 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
331 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
333 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
334 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
336 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
337 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
338 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
339 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
340 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
341 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
343 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
344 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
346 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
347 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
348 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
349 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
350 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
352 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
353 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
355 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
356 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
358 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
359 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
360 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
361 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
367 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
368 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
370 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
371 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
372 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
377 macro_rules! secp_check {
378 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
381 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
386 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
387 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
388 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
389 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
390 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
391 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
392 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
393 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
395 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
397 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
399 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
403 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
405 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
406 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
407 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
409 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
410 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
412 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
413 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
414 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
415 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
416 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
418 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
419 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
423 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
429 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
432 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
433 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
434 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
435 holding_cell_msat: u64,
436 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
439 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
440 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
441 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
442 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
443 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
444 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
445 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
446 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
447 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
448 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
451 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
452 struct HTLCCandidate {
454 origin: HTLCInitiator,
458 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
466 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
468 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
470 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
471 htlc_value_msat: u64,
472 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
477 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
478 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
479 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
480 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
481 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
483 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
484 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
485 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
486 htlc_value_msat: u64,
488 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
489 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
493 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
494 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
495 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
496 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
497 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
498 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
499 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
500 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
501 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
502 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
503 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
506 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
507 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
508 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
509 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
510 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
511 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
512 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
513 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
516 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
517 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
518 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
519 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
522 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
523 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
524 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
525 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
526 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
527 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
528 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
529 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
530 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
531 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
532 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
533 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
534 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
535 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
536 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
538 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
539 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
540 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
541 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
543 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
544 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
545 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
546 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
548 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
549 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
550 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
551 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
552 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
554 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
555 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
556 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
557 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
559 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
560 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
561 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
563 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
564 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
565 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
566 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
567 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
569 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
570 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
573 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
574 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
576 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
577 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
578 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
579 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
580 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
582 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
586 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
587 (0, update, required),
588 (2, blocked, required),
591 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
592 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
593 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
595 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
596 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
597 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
598 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
600 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
604 channel_id: [u8; 32],
605 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
608 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
609 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
611 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
612 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
613 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
615 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
616 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
617 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
618 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
620 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
621 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
623 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
625 holder_signer: Signer,
626 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
627 destination_script: Script,
629 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
630 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
631 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
633 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
634 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
635 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
636 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
637 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
638 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
640 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
641 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
642 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
643 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
644 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
645 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
647 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
649 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
650 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
651 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
653 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
654 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
655 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
656 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
657 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
658 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
659 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
661 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
663 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
664 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
665 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
666 // HTLCs with similar state.
667 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
668 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
669 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
670 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
671 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
672 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
673 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
674 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
675 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
678 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
679 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
680 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
682 update_time_counter: u32,
684 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
685 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
686 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
687 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
688 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
689 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
691 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
692 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
694 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
695 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
696 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
697 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
699 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
700 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
702 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
704 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
706 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
707 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
708 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
709 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
710 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
711 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
713 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
714 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
715 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
716 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
717 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
719 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
720 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
721 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
722 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
723 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
724 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
725 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
726 channel_creation_height: u32,
728 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
731 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
733 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
736 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
738 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
741 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
743 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
745 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
746 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
749 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
751 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
753 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
754 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
756 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
758 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
759 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
760 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
762 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
764 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
765 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
767 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
768 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
769 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
771 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
773 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
775 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
776 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
777 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
778 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
780 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
781 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
782 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
784 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
785 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
786 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
788 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
789 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
790 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
791 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
792 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
793 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
794 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
795 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
797 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
798 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
799 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
800 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
801 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
803 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
804 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
806 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
807 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
808 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
809 /// unblock the state machine.
811 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
812 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
813 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
815 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
816 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
817 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
819 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
820 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
821 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
822 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
823 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
824 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
825 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
826 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
828 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
829 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
831 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
832 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
833 // the channel's funding UTXO.
835 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
836 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
837 // associated channel mapping.
839 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
840 // to store all of them.
841 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
843 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
844 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
845 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
846 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
847 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
849 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
850 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
852 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
853 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
855 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
856 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
857 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
859 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
860 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
861 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
862 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
863 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
866 impl<Signer: ChannelSigner> ChannelContext<Signer> {
867 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
868 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
871 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
872 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
873 self.update_time_counter
876 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
877 self.latest_monitor_update_id
880 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
881 self.config.announced_channel
884 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
885 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
888 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
889 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
890 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
891 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
894 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
895 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
896 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
899 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
900 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
901 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
902 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
903 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
906 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
907 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
908 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
909 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
910 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
915 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
919 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
921 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
922 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
923 self.temporary_channel_id
926 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
930 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
931 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
932 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
936 /// Gets the channel's type
937 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
941 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
942 /// is_usable() returns true).
943 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
944 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
945 self.short_channel_id
948 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
949 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
950 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
953 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
954 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
955 self.outbound_scid_alias
958 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
959 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
960 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
961 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
962 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
965 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
966 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
967 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
968 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
971 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
972 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
973 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
976 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
977 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
978 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
979 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
983 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
986 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
987 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
990 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
991 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
994 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
995 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
996 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
999 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1000 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1003 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1004 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1005 self.counterparty_node_id
1008 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1009 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1010 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1013 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1014 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1015 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1018 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1019 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1021 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1022 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1023 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1024 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1026 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1030 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1031 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1032 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1035 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1036 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1037 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1040 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1041 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1042 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1044 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1045 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1050 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1051 self.channel_value_satoshis
1054 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1055 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1058 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1059 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1062 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1063 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
1066 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1067 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1068 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1071 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1072 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1073 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1076 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1077 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1078 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1081 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1082 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1083 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1086 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1087 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1088 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1091 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1092 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1093 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1096 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1097 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1098 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1099 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1100 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1103 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1105 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1106 self.prev_config = None;
1110 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1111 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1115 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1116 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1117 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1118 let did_channel_update =
1119 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1120 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1121 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1122 if did_channel_update {
1123 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1124 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1125 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1126 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1128 self.config.options = *config;
1132 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
1133 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
1134 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
1137 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1138 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1139 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1140 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1141 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1143 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1144 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1145 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1146 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1147 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1148 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1149 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1151 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1152 where L::Target: Logger
1154 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1155 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1156 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1158 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1159 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1160 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1161 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1163 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1164 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1165 if match update_state {
1166 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1167 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1168 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1169 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1170 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1172 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1176 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1177 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1178 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1179 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1181 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1182 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1183 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1185 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1186 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1187 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1188 transaction_output_index: None
1193 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1194 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1195 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1196 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1197 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1200 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1202 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1203 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1204 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1206 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1207 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1210 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1211 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1214 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1216 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1217 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1218 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1220 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1221 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1227 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1228 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1229 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1230 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1231 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1232 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1233 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1237 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1238 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1240 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1242 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1243 if generated_by_local {
1244 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1245 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1254 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1256 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1257 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1258 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1259 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1260 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1261 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1262 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1265 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1266 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1267 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1272 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1273 preimages.push(preimage);
1277 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1278 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1280 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1282 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1283 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1285 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1286 if !generated_by_local {
1287 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1295 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1296 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1297 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1298 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1299 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1300 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1301 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1302 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1304 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1306 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1307 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1308 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1309 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1311 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1313 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1314 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1315 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1316 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1319 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1320 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1321 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1322 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1324 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1327 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1328 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1329 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1330 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1332 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1335 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1336 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1341 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1342 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1347 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1349 let channel_parameters =
1350 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1351 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1352 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1355 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1360 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1363 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1364 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1365 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1366 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1368 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1369 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1370 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1378 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1379 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1385 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1386 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1387 /// our counterparty!)
1388 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1389 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1390 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1391 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1392 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1393 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1394 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1396 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1400 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1401 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1402 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1403 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1404 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1405 //may see payments to it!
1406 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1407 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1408 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1410 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1413 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1414 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1415 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1416 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1417 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1420 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1421 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1424 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1428 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1429 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1430 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1431 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1432 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1433 // which are near the dust limit.
1434 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1435 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1436 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1437 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1438 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1440 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1441 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1443 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1446 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1447 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1448 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1451 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1452 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1454 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1455 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1456 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1457 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1458 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1459 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1460 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1463 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1466 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1467 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1468 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1470 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1471 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1472 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1473 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1474 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1475 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1477 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1478 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1484 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1485 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1487 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1488 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1489 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1490 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1491 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1492 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1493 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1496 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1499 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1500 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1501 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1503 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1504 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1505 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1506 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1507 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1508 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1510 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1511 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1515 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1516 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1517 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1518 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1519 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1520 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1521 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1523 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1524 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1526 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1533 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1534 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1535 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1536 /// corner case properly.
1537 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
1538 let context = &self;
1539 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1540 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1541 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1543 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1544 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1545 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1546 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1549 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1551 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1552 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1554 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1556 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1558 if context.is_outbound() {
1559 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1560 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1562 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1563 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1565 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1566 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1567 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1568 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1571 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1572 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1573 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1574 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1576 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1577 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1578 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1579 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
1580 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1581 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1582 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1583 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1584 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1585 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1587 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1590 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1591 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1592 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1593 if !context.opt_anchors() {
1594 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
1597 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1598 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1600 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1601 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1602 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1604 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
1605 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1606 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1607 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1611 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1613 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1614 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1615 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1616 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1617 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1618 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1620 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1621 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1623 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1624 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1625 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1627 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1628 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1629 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1630 Some(context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1631 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1634 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1635 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
1636 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1637 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1638 context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1639 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1642 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1643 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1644 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1646 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1650 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1651 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1653 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1654 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1658 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1659 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1660 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1661 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1663 outbound_capacity_msat,
1664 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1665 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1670 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1671 let context = &self;
1672 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1675 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1676 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1678 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1679 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1681 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1682 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1684 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1685 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1686 let context = &self;
1687 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1689 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1692 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1693 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1695 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1696 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1698 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1699 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1701 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1702 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1706 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1707 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1713 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1714 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1715 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1718 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1719 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1720 included_htlcs += 1;
1723 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1724 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1728 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1729 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1730 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1731 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1732 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1733 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1738 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1740 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1741 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1746 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1747 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1751 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1752 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1753 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1756 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1757 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1759 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1760 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1761 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1763 total_pending_htlcs,
1764 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1765 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1766 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1768 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1769 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1770 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1772 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1774 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1779 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1780 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1782 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1783 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1785 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1786 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1788 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1789 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1790 let context = &self;
1791 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1793 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.opt_anchors() {
1796 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
1797 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
1799 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1800 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1802 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1803 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1805 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1806 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1810 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1811 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1817 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1818 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1819 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1820 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1821 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1822 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1825 included_htlcs += 1;
1828 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1829 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1832 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1833 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1835 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1836 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1837 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1842 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1843 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, context.opt_anchors());
1844 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1847 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1848 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, context.opt_anchors());
1850 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1851 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1853 total_pending_htlcs,
1854 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1855 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1856 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1858 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1859 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1860 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1862 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1864 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1869 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
1870 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
1871 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
1872 self.funding_transaction.clone()
1879 // Internal utility functions for channels
1881 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
1882 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
1883 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
1885 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
1887 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
1888 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
1889 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
1891 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
1894 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
1896 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
1899 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
1900 /// required by us according to the configured or default
1901 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
1903 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
1905 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
1906 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
1907 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
1908 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
1909 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
1912 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
1913 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
1914 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
1915 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
1916 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
1917 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
1918 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
1921 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1922 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1924 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1925 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
1928 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
1929 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
1930 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
1931 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
1932 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
1933 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
1936 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
1937 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
1938 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
1941 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
1942 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
1943 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
1944 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
1947 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1948 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1950 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
1951 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1952 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1956 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
1957 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
1958 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
1959 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
1960 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
1961 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
1962 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1963 // We've exhausted our options
1966 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
1967 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
1970 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
1971 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
1972 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
1973 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
1975 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1976 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1977 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
1978 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
1979 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
1980 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
1982 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
1984 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
1989 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1990 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1991 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1993 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1994 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1995 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1996 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1997 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1998 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1999 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2000 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2002 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2003 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
2004 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
2005 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
2006 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
2007 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
2008 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2009 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2011 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2012 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2016 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2021 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
2022 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
2023 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2024 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
2025 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
2026 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
2027 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
2028 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
2029 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
2030 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2031 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
2034 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
2036 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
2037 // support this channel type.
2038 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
2039 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
2040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
2043 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
2044 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
2045 // `static_remote_key`.
2046 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
2047 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
2049 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
2050 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
2051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
2053 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
2054 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
2056 channel_type.clone()
2058 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2059 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2064 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2066 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
2067 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
2068 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
2069 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2070 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2071 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2072 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2073 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2074 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2077 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
2078 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
2081 // Check sanity of message fields:
2082 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
2083 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
2085 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
2086 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
2088 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
2089 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
2091 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2092 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
2093 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2095 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
2096 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
2098 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2099 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2101 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
2103 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2104 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
2105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
2107 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2108 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2110 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2114 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2115 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
2116 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
2118 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2121 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2124 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2125 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2127 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2130 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2131 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2133 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2137 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
2139 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
2140 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
2141 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
2145 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
2146 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2147 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
2148 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
2149 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2151 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
2152 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
2154 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2155 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
2156 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
2158 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
2159 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2162 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
2163 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
2164 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
2165 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
2166 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
2167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
2170 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
2171 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
2172 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
2173 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2174 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
2177 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2178 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2179 &Some(ref script) => {
2180 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2181 if script.len() == 0 {
2184 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
2187 Some(script.clone())
2190 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2192 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2197 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
2198 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
2199 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
2200 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
2204 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2205 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
2206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
2210 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
2211 Ok(script) => script,
2212 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
2215 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
2216 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
2218 let chan = Channel {
2219 context: ChannelContext {
2222 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
2223 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
2225 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
2230 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
2232 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
2233 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
2234 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
2235 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
2238 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
2241 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
2244 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2245 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
2246 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
2248 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2249 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2250 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
2251 pending_update_fee: None,
2252 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
2253 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
2254 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
2255 update_time_counter: 1,
2257 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
2259 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
2260 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
2261 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
2262 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
2263 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
2264 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
2266 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2267 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
2268 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2269 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
2271 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
2272 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
2273 closing_fee_limits: None,
2274 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
2276 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
2278 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
2279 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
2280 short_channel_id: None,
2281 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
2283 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
2284 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
2285 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
2286 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
2287 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
2288 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
2289 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
2290 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
2291 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
2292 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
2293 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
2294 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
2295 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
2297 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
2299 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
2300 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
2301 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
2302 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
2303 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2304 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2305 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2307 funding_outpoint: None,
2308 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
2309 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
2311 funding_transaction: None,
2313 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
2314 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
2315 counterparty_node_id,
2317 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
2319 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
2321 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
2322 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
2324 announcement_sigs: None,
2326 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2327 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2328 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2329 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2331 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
2332 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
2334 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
2335 outbound_scid_alias,
2337 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
2338 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
2340 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2341 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
2346 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
2354 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2355 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2356 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2357 // outside of those situations will fail.
2358 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2362 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2367 1 + // script length (0)
2371 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2372 2 + // witness marker and flag
2373 1 + // witness element count
2374 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2375 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2376 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2377 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2378 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2379 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2381 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2382 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2383 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2389 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2390 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2391 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2392 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2394 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2395 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2396 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2398 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2399 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2400 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2401 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2402 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2403 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2406 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2407 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2410 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2411 value_to_holder = 0;
2414 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2415 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2416 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2417 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2419 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2420 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2423 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2424 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2427 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2430 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2431 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2433 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2435 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2436 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2437 where L::Target: Logger {
2438 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2439 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2440 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2441 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2442 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2443 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2444 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2445 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2449 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2450 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2451 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2452 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2454 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2455 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2457 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2459 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
2461 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2462 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2463 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2465 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2466 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2467 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2468 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2469 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
2471 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2472 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2473 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2475 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2476 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2478 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2481 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2482 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2486 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2490 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2491 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2492 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2493 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2494 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2495 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2498 // Now update local state:
2500 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2501 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2502 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2503 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2504 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2505 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2506 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2510 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2511 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2512 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2513 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2514 // do not not get into this branch.
2515 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2516 match pending_update {
2517 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2518 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2519 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2520 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2521 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2522 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2523 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2526 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2527 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2528 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2529 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2530 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2531 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2532 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2538 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2539 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2540 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2542 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2543 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2544 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2546 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2547 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2550 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2551 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2553 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2554 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2556 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2557 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2560 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2563 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2564 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2565 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2566 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2571 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2572 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2573 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2574 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2575 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2576 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2577 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2578 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2579 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2580 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2581 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2582 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2583 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2584 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2585 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2586 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2587 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2589 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2591 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2592 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2593 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2594 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2595 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2596 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2597 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2599 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2600 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2603 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2604 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2605 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2606 update, blocked: true,
2611 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2612 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2613 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2614 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2618 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2622 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2623 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2624 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2625 /// before we fail backwards.
2627 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2628 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2629 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2630 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2631 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2632 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2633 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2636 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2637 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2638 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2639 /// before we fail backwards.
2641 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2642 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2643 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2644 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2645 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2646 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2647 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2649 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2651 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2652 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2653 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2655 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2656 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2657 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2659 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2660 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2661 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2663 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2668 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2669 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2675 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2676 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2677 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2678 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2679 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2683 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2684 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2685 force_holding_cell = true;
2688 // Now update local state:
2689 if force_holding_cell {
2690 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2691 match pending_update {
2692 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2693 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2695 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2699 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2700 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2701 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2702 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2708 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2709 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2710 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2716 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2718 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2719 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2722 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2723 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2724 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2729 // Message handlers:
2731 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2732 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2734 // Check sanity of message fields:
2735 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2736 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2738 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2741 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2742 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2744 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
2745 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
2747 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2748 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2750 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2751 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2752 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2754 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2755 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2756 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2758 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2759 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2760 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2762 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2765 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2766 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2769 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2770 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2773 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2774 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2776 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2777 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2779 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2780 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2782 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2783 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2785 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2786 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2788 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2789 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2792 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2793 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
2794 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2796 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2797 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2799 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2800 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2801 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2803 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
2806 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2807 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2808 &Some(ref script) => {
2809 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2810 if script.len() == 0 {
2813 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2814 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2816 Some(script.clone())
2819 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2821 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2826 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2827 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2828 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2829 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2830 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2832 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2833 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2835 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2838 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2839 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2840 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2841 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2842 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2843 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2846 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2847 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2848 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2851 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2852 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2854 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2855 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2860 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2861 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2863 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2864 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2866 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2867 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2868 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2869 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2870 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2871 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2872 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2873 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2874 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2877 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2878 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2880 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2881 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2882 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2883 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2885 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
2886 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2888 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2889 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2892 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2893 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2894 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2896 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2899 if self.context.is_outbound() {
2900 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2902 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2903 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2904 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2906 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2908 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2909 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2911 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2912 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2913 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2914 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2917 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2918 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2919 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2920 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2921 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2923 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2925 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2926 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2927 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2930 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2931 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2932 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2936 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2937 initial_commitment_tx,
2940 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2941 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2944 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2945 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2947 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2949 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2950 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2951 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2952 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2953 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2954 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2955 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2956 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2957 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2958 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2959 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2961 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2963 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2965 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2966 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2967 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2968 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2970 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
2972 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2973 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2975 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2976 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
2979 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2980 }, channel_monitor))
2983 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2984 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2985 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2986 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2987 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2989 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2992 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2993 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2995 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2996 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2998 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2999 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3000 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3001 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3004 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3006 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3007 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3008 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3009 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3011 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3012 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3014 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3015 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
3017 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3018 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3019 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3020 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
3021 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
3022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
3026 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3027 initial_commitment_tx,
3030 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3031 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3034 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
3035 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3038 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3039 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
3040 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
3041 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
3042 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
3043 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
3044 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
3045 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
3046 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
3047 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
3048 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
3049 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
3051 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
3053 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
3055 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
3056 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
3057 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3058 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3060 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3062 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
3063 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3067 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3068 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3070 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3071 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3072 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3073 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3075 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3078 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3079 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3080 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3083 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3084 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3085 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3086 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3087 // when routing outbound payments.
3088 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3092 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3094 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3095 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
3096 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
3097 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
3098 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3099 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
3100 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
3101 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
3102 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
3104 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3105 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3106 let expected_point =
3107 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3108 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3110 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3111 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3112 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3113 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3114 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3115 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3117 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3118 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3119 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3120 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3121 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3123 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3124 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
3131 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3132 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3134 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3136 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3139 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3140 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
3141 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3142 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3143 if local_sent_shutdown {
3144 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3146 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3147 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3148 if remote_sent_shutdown {
3149 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3151 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3154 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3157 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3158 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3160 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3161 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3164 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3165 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3166 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3169 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3170 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3172 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3173 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3174 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3175 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3176 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3177 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3178 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3179 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3180 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3181 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3182 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3184 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3185 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3186 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3187 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3188 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3189 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3193 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.opt_anchors() {
3196 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3197 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3198 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3200 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3201 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3202 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3203 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3204 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3205 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3206 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3210 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3211 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3212 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3213 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3214 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3215 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3216 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3220 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3221 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3222 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3223 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3224 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3225 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3228 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3229 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3230 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3231 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3232 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3234 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3238 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3239 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3242 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3243 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3244 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3245 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3246 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3247 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3248 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3249 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3250 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3251 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3252 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3253 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3254 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3255 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3256 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3257 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3260 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3261 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3262 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3263 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3267 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3270 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3274 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3275 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3276 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3280 // Now update local state:
3281 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3282 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3283 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3284 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3285 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3286 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3287 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3292 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3294 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3295 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3296 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3297 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3298 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3299 None => fail_reason.into(),
3300 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3301 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3302 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3305 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3309 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3310 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3311 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3312 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3314 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3320 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3323 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3324 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3325 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3327 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3328 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3331 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3334 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3335 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3336 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3338 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3342 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3346 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3347 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3350 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3351 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3354 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3358 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3359 where L::Target: Logger
3361 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3364 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3365 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3367 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3368 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3371 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3373 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3375 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3376 let commitment_txid = {
3377 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3378 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3379 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3381 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3382 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3383 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3384 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3385 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3390 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3392 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3393 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3394 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3395 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3398 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3399 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3400 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3401 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3404 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3406 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3407 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3408 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3409 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3410 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3411 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3412 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3413 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3414 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3415 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3416 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3422 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3423 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3426 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3427 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3428 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3429 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3430 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3431 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3432 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3433 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3434 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3435 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3436 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3437 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3438 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3441 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3442 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3443 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3444 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3445 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3446 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(),
3447 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3449 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3450 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3451 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3452 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3453 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3454 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3455 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3456 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3458 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3459 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3462 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3464 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3465 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3466 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3469 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3472 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3473 commitment_stats.tx,
3475 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3476 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3477 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3480 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3481 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3483 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3484 let mut need_commitment = false;
3485 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3486 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3487 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3488 need_commitment = true;
3492 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3493 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3494 Some(forward_info.clone())
3496 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3497 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3498 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3499 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3500 need_commitment = true;
3503 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3504 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3505 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3506 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3507 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3508 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3509 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3510 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3511 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3512 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3513 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3514 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3515 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3516 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3518 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3520 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3521 need_commitment = true;
3525 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3526 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3527 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3528 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3529 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3530 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3532 nondust_htlc_sources,
3536 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3537 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3538 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3539 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3541 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3542 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3543 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3544 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3545 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3546 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3547 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3548 // includes the right HTLCs.
3549 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3550 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3551 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3552 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3553 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3554 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3556 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3557 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3558 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3561 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3562 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3563 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3564 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3565 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3566 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3567 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3568 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3569 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3573 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3574 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3575 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3576 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3579 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3580 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3581 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3582 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3583 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3584 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3585 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3586 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3589 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3590 /// for our counterparty.
3591 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3592 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3593 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3594 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3595 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3597 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3598 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3599 updates: Vec::new(),
3602 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3603 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3604 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3605 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3606 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3607 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3608 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3609 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3610 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3611 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3612 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3613 // to rebalance channels.
3614 match &htlc_update {
3615 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3616 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3617 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3620 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3621 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3622 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3623 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3624 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3625 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3626 // into the holding cell without ever being
3627 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3628 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3629 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3632 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3638 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3639 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3640 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3641 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3642 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3643 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3644 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3645 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3646 (msg, monitor_update)
3647 } else { unreachable!() };
3648 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3649 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3651 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3652 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3653 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3654 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3655 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3656 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3657 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3658 // for a full revocation before failing.
3659 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3662 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3664 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3671 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3672 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3674 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3675 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3680 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3681 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3682 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3683 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3684 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3686 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3687 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3688 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3690 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3691 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3697 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3698 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3699 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3700 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3701 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3702 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3703 where L::Target: Logger,
3705 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3706 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3708 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3709 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3711 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3712 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3715 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3717 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3718 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3719 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3723 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3724 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3725 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3726 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3727 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3728 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3729 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3730 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3731 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3734 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3736 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3737 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3740 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3741 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3743 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3745 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3746 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3747 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3748 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3749 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3750 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3751 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3752 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3756 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3757 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3758 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3759 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3760 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3761 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3762 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3763 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3764 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3766 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3767 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3770 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3771 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3772 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3773 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3774 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3775 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3776 let mut require_commitment = false;
3777 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3780 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3781 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3782 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3784 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3785 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3786 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3787 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3788 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3789 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3794 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3795 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3796 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3797 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3798 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3800 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3801 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3802 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3807 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3808 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3810 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3814 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3815 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3817 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3818 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3819 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3820 require_commitment = true;
3821 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3822 match forward_info {
3823 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3824 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3825 require_commitment = true;
3827 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3828 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3829 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3831 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3832 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3833 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3837 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3838 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3839 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3840 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3846 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3847 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3848 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3849 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3851 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3852 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3853 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3854 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3855 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3856 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3857 require_commitment = true;
3861 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3863 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3864 match update_state {
3865 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3866 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3867 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3868 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3869 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3871 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3872 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3873 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3874 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3875 require_commitment = true;
3876 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3877 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3882 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3883 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3884 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3885 if require_commitment {
3886 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3887 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3888 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3889 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3890 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3891 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3892 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3893 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3894 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3896 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3897 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3898 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3899 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3900 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3903 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3904 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3905 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3906 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3907 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3908 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3909 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3911 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3912 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3914 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3915 if require_commitment {
3916 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3918 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3919 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3920 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3921 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3923 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3924 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3925 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3926 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3928 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
3929 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3930 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3936 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3937 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3938 /// commitment update.
3939 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3940 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3941 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3944 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3945 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3946 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3947 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3949 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3950 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3951 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3952 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3953 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3955 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3956 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3958 if !self.context.is_live() {
3959 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3962 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3963 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3964 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3965 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3966 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3967 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3968 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3969 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3970 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3971 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3975 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3976 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3977 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3978 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3979 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3982 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3983 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3987 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3988 force_holding_cell = true;
3991 if force_holding_cell {
3992 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3996 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3997 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3999 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4000 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4005 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4006 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4008 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4010 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
4011 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4012 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4013 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4017 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
4018 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4019 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4023 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4024 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4027 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4028 // will be retransmitted.
4029 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4030 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4031 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4033 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4034 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4036 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4037 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4038 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4039 // this HTLC accordingly
4040 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4043 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4044 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4045 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4046 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4049 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4050 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4051 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4052 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4053 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4054 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4059 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4061 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4062 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4063 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4064 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4068 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4069 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4070 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4071 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4072 // the update upon reconnection.
4073 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4077 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4079 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
4080 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4083 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4084 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4085 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4086 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4087 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4088 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4089 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4091 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4092 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4093 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4094 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4095 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4096 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4097 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4099 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4100 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4101 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4102 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4103 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4104 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4105 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
4108 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4109 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4110 /// to the remote side.
4111 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4112 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4113 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4114 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4117 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4119 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
4120 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
4121 let mut found_blocked = false;
4122 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4123 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
4124 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
4128 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
4129 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4130 // first received the funding_signed.
4131 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4132 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4133 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4135 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4136 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4137 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4138 funding_broadcastable = None;
4141 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4142 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4143 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4144 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4145 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4146 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4147 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4148 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4149 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4150 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4151 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4152 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4153 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4154 next_per_commitment_point,
4155 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4159 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4161 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4162 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4163 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4164 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4165 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4166 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4168 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
4169 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4170 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4171 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4172 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4173 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4177 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4178 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4180 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4181 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4182 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
4185 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4186 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4187 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4188 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4189 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4190 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4191 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4192 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4193 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4197 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4198 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4200 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4201 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4203 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4206 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4207 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
4209 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4210 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4211 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4212 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4213 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4214 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4215 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4216 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4217 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4218 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4219 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4221 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4223 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4225 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4231 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4232 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4233 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4234 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4235 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4236 per_commitment_secret,
4237 next_per_commitment_point,
4239 next_local_nonce: None,
4243 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4244 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4245 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4246 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4247 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4249 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4250 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4251 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4252 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4253 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4254 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4255 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4256 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4257 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4262 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4263 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4265 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4266 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4267 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4268 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4269 reason: err_packet.clone()
4272 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4273 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4274 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4275 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4276 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4277 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4280 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4281 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4282 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4283 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4284 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4291 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4292 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4293 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4294 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4298 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4299 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4300 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4301 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4302 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4303 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4307 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4308 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4310 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4311 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4312 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4313 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4314 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4315 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4316 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4317 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4320 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4322 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4323 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4324 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4325 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4326 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4329 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4330 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4334 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4335 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4336 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4337 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4338 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4341 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4342 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4343 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4344 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4345 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4348 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4349 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4350 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4351 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4352 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4353 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4354 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4355 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4359 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4360 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4361 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4362 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4364 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4368 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4369 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4370 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4371 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4373 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4374 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4375 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4376 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4377 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4381 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4383 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4384 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4385 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4386 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4387 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4388 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4390 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4391 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4392 channel_ready: None,
4393 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4394 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4395 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4399 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4400 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4401 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4402 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4403 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4404 next_per_commitment_point,
4405 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4407 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4408 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4409 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4413 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4414 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4415 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4417 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4418 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4419 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4422 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4425 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4428 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4429 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4430 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4431 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4432 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4433 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4434 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4436 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4438 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4439 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4440 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4441 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4442 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4443 next_per_commitment_point,
4444 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4448 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4449 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4450 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4452 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4455 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4456 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4457 raa: required_revoke,
4458 commitment_update: None,
4459 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4461 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4462 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4463 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4465 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
4468 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4469 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4470 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4471 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4472 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4473 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4476 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4477 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4478 raa: required_revoke,
4479 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4480 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4484 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4488 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4489 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4490 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4491 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4493 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4495 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4497 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4498 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4499 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4500 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4501 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4502 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4504 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4505 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4506 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4507 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4508 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4510 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4511 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4512 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4513 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4516 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4517 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4518 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4519 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4520 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4521 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4522 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4523 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4524 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4525 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4526 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4527 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4528 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4529 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4530 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4532 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4535 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4536 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4539 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4540 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4541 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4542 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4543 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4544 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4545 self.context.channel_state &
4546 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4547 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4548 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4549 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4552 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4553 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4554 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4555 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4556 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4557 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4558 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4560 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4566 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4567 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4568 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4569 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4571 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4572 return Ok((None, None));
4575 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4576 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4577 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4579 return Ok((None, None));
4582 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4584 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4585 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4586 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4587 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4589 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4590 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4591 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4593 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4594 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4595 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4596 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4598 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4599 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4600 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4605 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4606 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4608 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4609 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4612 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4613 /// within our expected timeframe.
4615 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4616 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4617 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4620 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4623 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4624 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4627 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4628 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4629 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4630 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4632 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4633 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4635 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4636 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4637 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4638 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4639 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4641 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4642 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4643 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4646 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4648 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4649 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4652 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4653 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4654 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4657 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4660 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4661 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4662 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4663 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4665 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4668 assert!(send_shutdown);
4669 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4670 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4671 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4673 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4674 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4676 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4681 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4683 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4684 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4686 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4687 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4688 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4689 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4690 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4691 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4694 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4695 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4696 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4699 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4700 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4701 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4702 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4706 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4707 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4708 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4709 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4710 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4711 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4713 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4714 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4721 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4722 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4724 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4727 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4728 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4730 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4732 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4733 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4734 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4735 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4736 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4737 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4738 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4739 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4740 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4742 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4743 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4746 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4750 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4751 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4752 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4753 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4755 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4756 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4758 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4761 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4762 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4764 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4765 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4768 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4772 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4773 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4774 return Ok((None, None));
4777 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4778 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4779 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4780 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4782 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4784 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4787 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4788 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4789 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4790 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4791 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4795 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4796 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4797 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4801 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4802 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4803 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4804 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4805 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4806 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4807 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4811 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4813 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4814 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4815 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4816 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4818 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4821 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4822 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4823 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4825 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4826 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4827 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4828 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4832 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4833 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4834 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4835 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4837 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4838 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4839 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4845 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4846 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4847 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4849 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4850 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4852 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4853 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4856 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4857 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4858 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4859 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4860 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4862 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4863 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4864 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4866 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4867 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4870 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4871 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4872 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4873 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4874 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4875 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4876 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4877 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4879 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4882 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4883 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4884 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4885 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4887 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4891 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4892 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4893 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4894 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4896 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4902 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4903 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4904 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4905 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4906 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4907 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4908 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4910 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4911 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4914 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4916 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4917 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4923 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4924 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4925 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4926 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4927 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4928 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4929 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4931 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4932 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4939 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4940 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4943 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4944 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4947 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4948 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4952 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4953 &self.context.holder_signer
4957 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4959 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4960 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4961 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4962 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4963 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4964 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4966 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4968 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4976 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4977 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4981 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4982 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4983 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4984 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4987 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4988 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4989 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4992 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4993 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4994 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4995 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
4996 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
4997 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
4998 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
4999 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5005 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5006 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5007 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5008 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5009 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5010 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5015 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5016 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5018 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5019 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5020 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5021 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5024 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5025 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5028 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5029 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
5030 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
5031 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
5037 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5038 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5041 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
5042 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5043 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
5044 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
5047 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5048 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5049 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5051 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5052 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5053 if self.context.channel_state &
5054 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5055 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5056 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5057 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5058 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5061 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5062 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5063 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5064 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5065 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5066 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5068 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5069 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5070 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5072 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5073 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5074 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5075 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5076 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5077 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5083 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5084 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5085 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5088 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5089 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5090 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5093 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5094 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5095 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5098 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5099 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5100 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5101 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5102 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5103 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5108 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5109 self.context.channel_update_status
5112 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5113 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5114 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5117 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5119 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5120 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5121 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5125 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5126 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5127 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5130 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5134 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5135 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5136 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5138 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5139 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5140 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5142 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5143 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5146 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5147 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5148 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5149 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5150 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5151 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5152 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5153 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5154 self.context.channel_state);
5156 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5160 if need_commitment_update {
5161 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5162 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5163 let next_per_commitment_point =
5164 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5165 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5166 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5167 next_per_commitment_point,
5168 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5172 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5178 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5179 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5180 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5181 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5182 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5183 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5184 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5186 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5189 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5190 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5191 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5192 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5193 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5194 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5195 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5196 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5197 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5198 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5199 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5200 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5201 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5202 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5203 // channel and move on.
5204 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5205 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5207 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5208 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5209 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5211 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5212 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5213 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5214 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5215 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5216 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5217 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5221 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5222 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5223 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5224 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5225 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5229 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5230 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5231 // may have already happened for this block).
5232 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5233 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5234 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5235 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5238 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5239 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5240 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5241 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5249 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5250 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5251 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5252 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5254 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5255 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5258 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5260 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5261 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5262 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5263 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5265 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5268 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5271 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5272 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5273 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5274 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5276 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5279 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5280 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5281 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5283 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5284 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5286 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5287 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5288 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5296 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5298 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5299 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5300 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5302 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5303 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5306 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5307 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5308 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5309 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5310 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5311 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5312 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5313 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5314 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5317 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5318 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5319 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5320 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5322 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5323 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5324 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5326 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5327 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5328 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5329 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5331 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5332 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5333 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5334 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5335 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5336 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5337 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5340 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5341 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5343 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5346 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5347 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5348 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5349 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5350 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5351 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5352 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5353 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5354 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5355 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5356 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5357 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5358 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5359 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5360 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5361 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5362 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5368 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5373 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5374 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5376 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5377 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5378 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5380 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5381 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5384 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5385 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5388 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5389 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5393 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5394 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5395 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5396 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5397 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5398 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5399 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5400 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5401 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5402 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5403 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5404 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5405 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5406 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5407 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5408 first_per_commitment_point,
5409 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5410 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5411 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5412 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5414 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5418 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5419 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
5422 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5423 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5424 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5425 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5428 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5429 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5431 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5432 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5433 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5434 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5436 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5437 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5439 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5440 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5442 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5443 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5446 self.context.user_id = user_id;
5447 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5449 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5452 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5453 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5454 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5456 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5457 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5458 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5459 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
5461 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5462 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5463 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5464 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5465 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5466 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5467 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5468 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5469 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5470 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5471 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5472 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5473 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5474 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5475 first_per_commitment_point,
5476 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5477 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5478 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5480 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5482 next_local_nonce: None,
5486 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5487 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5489 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5491 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5492 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5495 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5496 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5497 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5498 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5499 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5500 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5503 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5504 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5505 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5506 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5507 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5508 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5509 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5510 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5511 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5512 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5514 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5515 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5517 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5518 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5519 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5520 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5523 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5524 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5526 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5529 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5530 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5535 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5537 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5539 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5540 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5541 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5543 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5544 temporary_channel_id,
5545 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5546 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5549 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5551 next_local_nonce: None,
5555 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5556 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5557 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5558 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5560 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5563 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5564 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5565 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5566 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5567 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5568 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5570 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5571 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5574 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5575 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5576 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5577 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5579 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5580 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5582 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5583 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5584 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5585 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5586 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5587 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5593 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5594 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5595 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5596 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5598 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5601 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5605 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5609 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5610 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5614 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5618 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5619 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5622 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5626 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5628 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5633 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5635 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5640 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5642 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5643 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5644 short_channel_id: self.context.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5645 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5646 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5650 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5652 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5653 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5654 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5655 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5656 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5657 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5658 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5660 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5661 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5662 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5663 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5664 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5665 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5666 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5667 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5668 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5669 contents: announcement,
5672 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5676 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5677 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5678 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5679 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5680 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5681 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5682 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5683 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5685 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5687 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5688 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5689 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5690 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5692 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5693 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5694 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5695 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5698 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5699 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5700 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5701 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5704 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5707 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5708 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5709 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5710 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5711 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5712 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5715 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5717 Err(_) => return None,
5719 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5720 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5725 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5726 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5727 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5728 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5729 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5730 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5731 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5732 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5733 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5734 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5735 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5736 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5737 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5738 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5739 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5740 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5743 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
5746 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5747 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5748 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5749 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5750 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5751 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5752 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5753 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5754 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5756 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5757 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5758 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5759 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5760 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5761 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5762 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5763 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5764 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5766 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5767 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5768 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5769 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5770 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5771 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5772 next_funding_txid: None,
5777 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5779 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5780 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5781 /// commitment update.
5783 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5784 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5785 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5786 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5788 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5789 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5791 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5792 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5797 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5798 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5800 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5802 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5803 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5805 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5806 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5807 /// regenerate them.
5809 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5810 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5812 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5813 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5814 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5815 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5816 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5817 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5819 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5820 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5821 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5824 if amount_msat == 0 {
5825 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5828 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances();
5829 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5830 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5831 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5834 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5835 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5836 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5839 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5840 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5841 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5842 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5843 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5844 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5845 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5846 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5849 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5850 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
5851 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5852 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5853 else { "to peer" });
5855 if need_holding_cell {
5856 force_holding_cell = true;
5859 // Now update local state:
5860 if force_holding_cell {
5861 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5866 onion_routing_packet,
5871 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5872 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5874 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5876 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5880 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5881 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5882 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5886 onion_routing_packet,
5888 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5893 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5894 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5895 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5896 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5898 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5899 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5900 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5902 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5903 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5907 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5908 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5909 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5910 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5911 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5912 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5913 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5916 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5917 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5918 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5919 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5920 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5921 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5924 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5926 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5927 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5928 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5930 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5931 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5934 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5935 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5936 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5937 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5938 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5939 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5940 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5941 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5944 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5948 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
5949 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5950 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5951 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5953 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5955 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5956 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5957 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5958 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5959 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5960 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5961 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5962 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5963 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5964 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.opt_anchors());
5965 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5971 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
5974 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5975 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5976 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5977 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5978 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5979 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5981 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5982 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5983 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5984 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5987 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5988 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5992 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5993 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5995 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5997 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5998 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5999 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6000 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6002 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6003 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6004 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6005 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.context.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6006 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6007 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id()));
6011 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6012 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6016 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6017 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6020 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6021 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6023 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6024 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6025 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6026 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6027 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6030 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6031 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6032 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6038 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6039 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6042 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6043 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6044 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6045 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6051 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6052 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6054 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6055 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6056 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6057 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6058 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6059 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6060 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6061 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6062 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6065 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6066 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6067 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6069 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6070 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6073 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6074 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6076 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6077 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6078 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6081 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6082 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6083 let mut chan_closed = false;
6084 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6088 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6090 None if !chan_closed => {
6091 // use override shutdown script if provided
6092 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6093 Some(script) => script,
6095 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6096 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6097 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6098 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6102 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6103 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6105 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6111 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6112 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6113 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6114 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6116 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6118 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6120 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6121 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6122 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6123 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6124 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6125 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6128 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6129 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6130 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6133 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6134 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6135 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6138 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6139 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6140 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6141 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6142 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6144 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6145 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6152 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6153 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6155 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6158 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6159 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6160 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6161 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6162 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6163 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
6164 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6165 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6166 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6167 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6168 assert!(self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6170 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6171 // return them to fail the payment.
6172 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6173 let counterparty_node_id = self.context.get_counterparty_node_id();
6174 for htlc_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6176 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6177 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id));
6182 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6183 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6184 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6185 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6186 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6187 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6188 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6189 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6190 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6191 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6192 Some((self.context.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6193 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6194 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6199 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6200 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6201 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6204 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6205 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6206 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6208 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6209 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6213 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6217 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6218 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
6219 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
6222 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> OutboundV1Channel<Signer> {
6223 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6224 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6225 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6226 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6227 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6228 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6229 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6230 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6231 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6232 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6235 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6236 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6237 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6239 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
6240 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6241 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6242 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6249 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
6250 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6251 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6252 outbound_scid_alias: u64
6253 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
6254 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6255 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
6256 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6258 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6259 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6260 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6261 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6263 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6264 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6266 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6267 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6269 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6270 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6271 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6273 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6274 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6276 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6277 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6278 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6279 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6280 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6283 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6284 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6286 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
6288 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6289 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
6290 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
6291 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6294 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6295 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6297 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6298 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6299 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6300 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6304 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6305 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6306 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6310 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6311 Ok(script) => script,
6312 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6315 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
6318 context: ChannelContext {
6321 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6322 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6323 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6324 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6329 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6331 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6332 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6333 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
6334 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6336 channel_value_satoshis,
6338 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6341 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6344 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6345 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6348 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6349 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6350 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6351 pending_update_fee: None,
6352 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6353 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6354 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6355 update_time_counter: 1,
6357 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6359 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6360 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6361 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6362 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6363 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6364 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6366 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6367 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6368 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6369 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6371 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6372 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6373 closing_fee_limits: None,
6374 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6376 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6378 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6379 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6380 short_channel_id: None,
6381 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6383 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
6384 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6385 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6386 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6387 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6388 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6389 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6390 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6391 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6392 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6393 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6394 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6396 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6398 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6399 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6400 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6401 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6402 counterparty_parameters: None,
6403 funding_outpoint: None,
6404 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
6405 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
6407 funding_transaction: None,
6409 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6410 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6411 counterparty_node_id,
6413 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6415 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6417 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6418 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6420 announcement_sigs: None,
6422 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6423 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6424 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6425 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6427 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6428 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6430 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6431 outbound_scid_alias,
6433 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6434 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6436 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6437 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6442 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6448 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6449 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
6450 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
6453 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> InboundV1Channel<Signer> {}
6455 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6456 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6458 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6464 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6465 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6466 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6467 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6468 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6470 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6471 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6472 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6473 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6479 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6480 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6481 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6482 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6483 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6484 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6489 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6490 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6491 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6492 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6494 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6495 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6496 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6497 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6502 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6503 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6504 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6505 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6506 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6507 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6512 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6513 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6514 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6517 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6519 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6520 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6521 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6522 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6523 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6525 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6526 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6527 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6528 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6530 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6531 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6532 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6534 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6536 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6537 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6538 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6539 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6540 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6541 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6543 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6544 // deserialized from that format.
6545 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6546 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6547 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6549 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6551 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6552 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6553 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6555 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6556 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6557 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6558 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6561 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6562 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6563 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6566 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6567 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6568 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6569 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6571 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6572 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6574 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6576 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6578 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6580 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6583 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6585 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6590 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6592 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6593 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6594 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6595 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6596 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6597 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6598 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6600 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6602 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6604 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6607 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6608 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6609 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6612 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6614 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6615 preimages.push(preimage);
6617 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6618 reason.write(writer)?;
6620 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6622 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6623 preimages.push(preimage);
6625 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6626 reason.write(writer)?;
6631 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6632 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6634 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6636 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6637 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6638 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6639 source.write(writer)?;
6640 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6642 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6644 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6645 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6647 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6649 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6650 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6655 match self.context.resend_order {
6656 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6657 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6660 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6661 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6662 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6664 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6665 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6666 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6667 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6670 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6671 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6672 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6673 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6674 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6677 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6678 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6679 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6680 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6682 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6683 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6684 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6686 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6688 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6689 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6690 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6691 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6693 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6694 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6695 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6696 // consider the stale state on reload.
6699 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6700 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6701 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6703 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6704 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6705 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6707 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6708 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6710 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6711 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6712 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6714 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6715 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6717 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6720 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6721 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6722 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6724 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6727 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6728 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6730 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6731 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6732 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6734 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6736 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6738 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6740 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6741 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6742 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6743 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6744 htlc.write(writer)?;
6747 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6748 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6749 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6751 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6752 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6754 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6755 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6756 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6757 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6758 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6759 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6760 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6762 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6763 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6764 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6765 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6766 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6768 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6769 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6771 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6772 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6773 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6774 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6776 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6778 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6779 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6780 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6781 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6782 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6783 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6784 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6786 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6787 (2, chan_type, option),
6788 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6789 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6790 (5, self.context.config, required),
6791 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6792 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6793 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6794 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6795 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6796 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6797 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6798 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6799 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6800 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6801 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6802 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6803 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6804 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6805 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6806 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6813 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6814 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6816 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6817 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6819 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6820 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6821 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6823 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6824 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6825 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6826 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6828 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6830 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6831 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6832 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6833 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6834 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6836 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6837 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6840 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6841 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6842 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6846 let mut keys_data = None;
6848 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6849 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6850 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6851 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6852 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6853 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6854 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6855 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6856 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6857 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6861 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6862 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6863 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6866 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6868 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6869 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6870 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6872 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6874 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6875 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6876 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6877 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6878 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6879 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6880 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6881 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6882 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6883 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6884 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6885 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6886 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6891 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6892 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6893 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6894 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6895 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6896 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6897 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6898 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6899 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6900 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6901 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6902 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6904 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6905 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6908 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6909 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6912 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6913 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6915 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6920 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6922 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6923 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6924 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6925 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6926 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6927 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6928 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6929 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6931 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6932 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6933 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6935 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6936 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6937 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6939 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6943 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6944 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6945 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6946 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6949 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6950 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6951 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6953 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6954 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6955 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6956 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6959 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6960 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6961 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6962 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6965 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6967 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6969 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6970 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6971 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6972 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6974 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6975 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6976 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6977 // consider the stale state on reload.
6978 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6981 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6982 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6983 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6985 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6988 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6989 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6992 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6993 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6994 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6995 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6997 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6998 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7000 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7001 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7003 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7004 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7007 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7009 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7010 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7012 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7013 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7016 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7018 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7019 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7020 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7021 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7023 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7026 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7027 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7029 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7031 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7032 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7034 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7035 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7037 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7039 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7040 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7041 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7043 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7044 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7045 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7049 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7050 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7051 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7053 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7059 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7060 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7061 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7062 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7063 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7064 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7065 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7066 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7067 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7068 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7070 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7071 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7072 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7073 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7074 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7075 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7076 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7078 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7079 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7080 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7081 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7083 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7085 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7086 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7087 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7088 (2, channel_type, option),
7089 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7090 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7091 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7092 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7093 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7094 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7095 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7096 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7097 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7098 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7099 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7100 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7101 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7102 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7103 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7104 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7105 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7106 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7107 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7110 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7111 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7112 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7113 // required channel parameters.
7114 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7115 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7116 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7118 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7120 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7121 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7122 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7123 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7126 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7127 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7128 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7130 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7131 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7133 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7134 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7139 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7140 if iter.next().is_some() {
7141 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7145 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7146 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7147 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7148 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7149 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7152 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7153 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7155 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7156 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7157 // separate u64 values.
7158 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7160 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7163 context: ChannelContext {
7166 config: config.unwrap(),
7170 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7171 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7172 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7175 temporary_channel_id,
7177 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7179 channel_value_satoshis,
7181 latest_monitor_update_id,
7184 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7187 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7188 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7191 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7192 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7193 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7194 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7198 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7199 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7200 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7201 monitor_pending_forwards,
7202 monitor_pending_failures,
7203 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7206 holding_cell_update_fee,
7207 next_holder_htlc_id,
7208 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7209 update_time_counter,
7212 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7213 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7214 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7215 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7217 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7218 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7219 closing_fee_limits: None,
7220 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7222 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7224 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7225 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7227 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7229 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7230 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7231 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7232 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7233 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7234 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7235 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7236 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7237 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7240 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7242 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7243 funding_transaction,
7245 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7246 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7247 counterparty_node_id,
7249 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7253 channel_update_status,
7254 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7258 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7259 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7260 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7261 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7263 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7264 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7266 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7267 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7268 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7270 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7271 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7273 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7274 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7276 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7279 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7288 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7289 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7290 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7291 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7292 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7294 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7295 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7297 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7298 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7299 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7300 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7301 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7302 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7303 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7304 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7305 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7306 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7307 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7308 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7309 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7310 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7311 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7312 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7313 use crate::util::test_utils;
7314 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7315 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7316 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7317 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7318 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7319 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7320 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7321 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7322 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7323 use crate::prelude::*;
7325 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7328 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7329 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7335 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7336 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7337 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7338 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7342 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7343 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7344 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7345 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7346 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7347 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7348 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7352 signer: InMemorySigner,
7355 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7356 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7359 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7360 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7362 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7363 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7366 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7370 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7372 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7373 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7374 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7375 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7376 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7379 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7380 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7381 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7382 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7386 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7387 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7388 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7392 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7393 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7394 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7395 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7397 let seed = [42; 32];
7398 let network = Network::Testnet;
7399 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7400 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7401 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7404 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7405 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7406 let config = UserConfig::default();
7407 match OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7408 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7409 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7411 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7412 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7416 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7417 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7419 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7420 let original_fee = 253;
7421 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7422 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7423 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7424 let seed = [42; 32];
7425 let network = Network::Testnet;
7426 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7428 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7429 let config = UserConfig::default();
7430 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7432 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7433 // same as the old fee.
7434 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7435 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7436 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7440 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7441 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7442 // dust limits are used.
7443 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7444 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7445 let seed = [42; 32];
7446 let network = Network::Testnet;
7447 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7448 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7450 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7451 // they have different dust limits.
7453 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7454 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7455 let config = UserConfig::default();
7456 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7458 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7459 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7460 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7461 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7462 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7464 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7465 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7466 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7467 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7468 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7470 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7471 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7472 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7474 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7475 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7476 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7477 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7480 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7482 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7483 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7484 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7485 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7486 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7487 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7488 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7489 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7490 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7494 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7495 // the dust limit check.
7496 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7497 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7498 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7499 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7501 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7502 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7503 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7504 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.opt_anchors());
7505 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7506 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7507 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7511 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7512 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7513 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7514 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7515 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7516 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7517 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7518 let seed = [42; 32];
7519 let network = Network::Testnet;
7520 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7522 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7523 let config = UserConfig::default();
7524 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7526 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7527 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.opt_anchors());
7529 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7530 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7531 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7532 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7533 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7534 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7536 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7537 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7538 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7539 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7540 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7542 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7544 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7545 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7546 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7547 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7548 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7550 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7551 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7552 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7553 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7554 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7558 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7559 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7560 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7561 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7562 let seed = [42; 32];
7563 let network = Network::Testnet;
7564 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7565 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7566 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7568 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7570 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7571 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7572 let config = UserConfig::default();
7573 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7575 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7576 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7577 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7578 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7580 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7581 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7582 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7584 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7585 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7586 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7587 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7589 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7590 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7591 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7593 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7594 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7596 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7597 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7598 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7599 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7600 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7601 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7602 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7604 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7606 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7607 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7608 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7609 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7610 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7614 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7615 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7616 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7617 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7618 let seed = [42; 32];
7619 let network = Network::Testnet;
7620 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7621 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7622 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7624 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7625 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7626 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7627 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7628 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7629 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7630 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7631 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7633 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7634 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7635 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7636 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7637 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7638 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7640 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7641 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7642 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7643 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7645 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7647 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7648 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7649 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7650 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7651 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7652 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7654 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7655 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7656 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7657 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7659 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7660 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7661 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7662 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7663 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7665 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7666 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7668 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7669 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7670 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7672 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7673 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7674 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7675 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7676 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7678 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7679 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7681 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7682 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7683 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7687 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7689 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7690 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7691 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7693 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7694 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7695 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7696 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7698 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7699 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7700 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7702 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7704 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7705 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7708 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7709 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7710 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7711 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7712 let seed = [42; 32];
7713 let network = Network::Testnet;
7714 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7715 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7716 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7719 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7720 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7721 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7723 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7724 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7726 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7727 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7728 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7730 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7731 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7733 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7735 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7736 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7738 // Channel Negotiations failed
7739 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7740 assert!(result.is_err());
7745 fn channel_update() {
7746 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7747 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7748 let seed = [42; 32];
7749 let network = Network::Testnet;
7750 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7751 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7753 // Create a channel.
7754 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7755 let config = UserConfig::default();
7756 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7757 assert!(node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7758 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7759 assert!(node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7761 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7762 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7763 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7765 short_channel_id: 0,
7768 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7769 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7770 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7772 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7773 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7775 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7777 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7779 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7780 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7781 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7782 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7784 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7785 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7786 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7788 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7792 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7794 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7795 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7796 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7797 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7798 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7799 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7800 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7801 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7802 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7803 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7804 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7805 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7806 use crate::sync::Arc;
7808 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7809 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7810 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7811 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7813 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7815 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7816 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7817 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7818 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7819 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7821 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7822 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7828 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7829 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7830 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7832 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7833 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7834 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7835 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7836 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7837 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7839 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7841 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7842 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7843 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7844 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7845 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7846 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7848 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7849 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7850 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7851 selected_contest_delay: 144
7853 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7854 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7856 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7857 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7859 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7860 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7862 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7863 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7865 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7866 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7867 // build_commitment_transaction.
7868 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7869 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7870 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7871 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7872 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7874 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7875 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7876 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7877 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7881 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7882 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7883 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7884 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7888 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7889 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7890 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7892 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7893 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7895 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7896 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7898 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7900 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7901 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7902 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7903 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7904 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7905 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7906 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7908 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7909 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7910 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7911 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7913 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7914 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7915 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7917 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7919 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7920 commitment_tx.clone(),
7921 counterparty_signature,
7922 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7923 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7924 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7926 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7927 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7929 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7930 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7931 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7933 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7934 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7937 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7938 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7940 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7941 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
7942 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7943 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7944 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7945 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7946 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7947 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7949 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7952 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7953 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7954 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7958 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7961 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7962 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7963 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7965 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7966 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7967 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7968 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7969 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7970 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7971 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7972 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7974 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7978 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7979 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7980 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7981 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f10529800000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778014730440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a865801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7983 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7984 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7986 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7987 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7988 "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", {});
7990 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7991 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7992 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7993 "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", {});
7995 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7996 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7998 amount_msat: 1000000,
8000 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8001 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8003 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8006 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8007 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8009 amount_msat: 2000000,
8011 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8012 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8014 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8017 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8018 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8020 amount_msat: 2000000,
8022 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8023 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8024 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8026 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8029 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8030 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8032 amount_msat: 3000000,
8034 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8035 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8036 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8038 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8041 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8042 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8044 amount_msat: 4000000,
8046 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8047 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8049 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8053 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8054 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8055 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8057 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8058 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8059 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8062 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8063 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8064 "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" },
8067 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8068 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8069 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8072 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8073 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8074 "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" },
8077 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8078 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8079 "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" },
8082 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8083 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8084 "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" }
8087 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8088 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8089 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8091 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8092 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8093 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8096 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8097 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8098 "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" },
8101 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8102 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8103 "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" },
8106 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8107 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8108 "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" },
8111 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8112 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8113 "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" },
8116 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8117 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8118 "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" }
8121 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8122 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8123 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8125 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8126 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8127 "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", {
8130 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8131 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8132 "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" },
8135 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8136 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8137 "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" },
8140 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8141 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8142 "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" },
8145 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8146 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8147 "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" }
8150 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8151 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8152 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8153 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8155 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8156 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8157 "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", {
8160 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8161 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8162 "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" },
8165 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8166 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8167 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320003000000000100000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e83483045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac6851b2756800000000" },
8170 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8171 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8172 "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" },
8175 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8176 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8177 "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" }
8180 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8181 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8182 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8183 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8185 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8186 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8187 "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", {
8190 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8191 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8192 "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" },
8195 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8196 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8197 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8200 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8201 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8202 "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" },
8205 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8206 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8207 "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" }
8210 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8211 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8212 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8214 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8215 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8216 "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", {
8219 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8220 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8221 "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" },
8224 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8225 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8226 "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" },
8229 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8230 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8231 "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" }
8234 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8235 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8236 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8238 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8239 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8240 "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", {
8243 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8244 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8245 "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" },
8248 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8249 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8250 "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" },
8253 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8254 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8255 "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" }
8258 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8259 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8260 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8262 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8263 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8264 "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", {
8267 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8268 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8269 "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" },
8272 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8273 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8274 "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" }
8277 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8278 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8279 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8280 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8282 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8283 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8284 "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", {
8287 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8288 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8289 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
8292 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8293 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8294 "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" }
8297 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8298 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8299 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8300 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8302 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8303 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8304 "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", {
8307 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8308 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8309 "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" },
8312 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8313 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8314 "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" }
8317 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8318 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8319 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8321 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8322 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8323 "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", {
8326 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8327 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8328 "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" }
8331 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8332 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8333 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8334 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8336 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8337 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8338 "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", {
8341 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8342 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8343 "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" }
8346 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8347 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8348 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8349 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8351 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8352 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8353 "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", {
8356 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8357 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8358 "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" }
8361 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8362 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8363 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8364 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8366 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8367 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8368 "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", {});
8370 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8371 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8372 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8373 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8375 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8376 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8377 "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", {});
8379 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8380 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8381 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8382 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8384 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8385 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8386 "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", {});
8388 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8389 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8390 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8392 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8393 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8394 "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", {});
8396 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8397 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8398 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8399 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8401 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8402 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8403 "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", {});
8405 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8406 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8407 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8408 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8410 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8411 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8412 "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", {});
8414 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8415 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8416 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8417 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8418 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8419 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8421 amount_msat: 2000000,
8423 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8424 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8426 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8429 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8430 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8431 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8433 amount_msat: 5000001,
8435 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8436 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8437 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8439 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8442 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8443 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8445 amount_msat: 5000000,
8447 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8448 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8449 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8451 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8455 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8456 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8457 "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", {
8460 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8461 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8462 "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" },
8464 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8465 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8466 "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" },
8468 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8469 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8470 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
8473 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8474 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8475 "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", {
8478 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8479 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8480 "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" },
8482 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8483 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8484 "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" },
8486 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8487 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8488 "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" }
8493 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8494 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8496 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8497 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8498 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8499 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8501 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8502 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8503 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8505 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8506 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8508 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8509 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8511 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8512 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8513 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8517 fn test_key_derivation() {
8518 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8519 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8521 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8522 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8524 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8525 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8527 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8528 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8530 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8531 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8533 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8534 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8536 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8537 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8539 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8540 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8544 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8545 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8546 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8547 let seed = [42; 32];
8548 let network = Network::Testnet;
8549 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8550 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8552 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8553 let config = UserConfig::default();
8554 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8555 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8557 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8558 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8560 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8561 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8562 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8563 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8564 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8565 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8566 assert!(res.is_ok());
8571 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8572 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8573 // resulting `channel_type`.
8574 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8575 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8576 let network = Network::Testnet;
8577 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8578 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8580 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8581 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8583 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8584 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8586 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8587 // need to signal it.
8588 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8589 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8590 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8593 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8595 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8596 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8597 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8599 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8600 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8601 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8604 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8605 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8606 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8607 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8608 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8611 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8612 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8617 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8618 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8619 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8620 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8621 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8622 let network = Network::Testnet;
8623 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8624 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8626 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8627 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8629 let config = UserConfig::default();
8631 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8632 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8633 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8634 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8635 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8637 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8638 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8639 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8642 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8643 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8644 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8646 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8647 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8648 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8649 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8650 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8651 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8653 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8658 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8659 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8661 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8662 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8663 let network = Network::Testnet;
8664 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8665 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8667 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8668 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8670 let config = UserConfig::default();
8672 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8673 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8674 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8675 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8676 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8677 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8678 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8679 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8681 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8682 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8683 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8684 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8685 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8686 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8689 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8690 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8692 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8693 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8694 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8695 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8697 assert!(res.is_err());
8699 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8700 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8701 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8703 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8704 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8705 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8708 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8710 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8711 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8712 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8713 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8716 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8717 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8719 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8720 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8722 assert!(res.is_err());