1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
53 use crate::sync::Mutex;
54 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
59 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
66 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
69 pub struct AvailableBalances {
70 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
71 pub balance_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
73 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
75 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
76 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
79 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
82 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
84 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
86 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
87 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
88 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
89 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
90 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
91 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
93 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
97 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
98 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
99 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
100 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
103 enum InboundHTLCState {
104 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
105 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
106 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
107 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
108 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
109 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
110 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
111 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
112 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
113 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
114 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
115 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
116 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
117 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
118 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
120 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
124 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
125 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
126 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
128 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
129 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
130 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
131 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
132 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
133 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
135 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
136 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
137 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
138 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
139 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
140 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
141 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
142 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
144 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
145 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
147 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
148 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
149 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
150 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
151 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
152 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
153 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
154 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
157 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
161 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
162 state: InboundHTLCState,
165 enum OutboundHTLCState {
166 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
167 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
168 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
169 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
170 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
171 /// money back (though we won't), and,
172 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
173 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
174 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
175 /// we'll never get out of sync).
176 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
177 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
178 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
180 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
181 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
182 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
187 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
188 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
189 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
190 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
191 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
192 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
193 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
194 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
198 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
200 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
201 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
204 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
207 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
208 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
213 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
214 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
222 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
226 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
233 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
234 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
238 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
240 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
241 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
242 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
245 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
250 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
254 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
255 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
256 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
257 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
258 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
259 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
260 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
262 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
263 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
264 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
265 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
266 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
267 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
268 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
270 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
271 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
272 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
282 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
284 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
285 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
286 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
287 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
288 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
289 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
290 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
291 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
292 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
294 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
295 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
297 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
298 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
299 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
300 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
301 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
302 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
303 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
304 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
305 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
306 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
307 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
308 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
309 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
311 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
312 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
313 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
314 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
315 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
316 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
317 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
318 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
320 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
323 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
325 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
327 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
329 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
332 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
336 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
338 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
340 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
342 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
343 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
344 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
345 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
346 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
348 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
349 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
351 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
353 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
354 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
356 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
357 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
358 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
359 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
360 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
361 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
363 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
364 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
366 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
367 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
368 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
369 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
370 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
372 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
373 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
375 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
376 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
378 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
379 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
380 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
381 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
387 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
388 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
390 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
397 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
407 macro_rules! secp_check {
408 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
416 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
417 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
418 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
419 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
420 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
421 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
422 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
423 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
425 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
427 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
429 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
433 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
435 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
436 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
437 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
439 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
440 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
442 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
443 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
444 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
445 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
446 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
448 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
449 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
453 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
459 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
462 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
463 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 holding_cell_msat: u64,
466 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
469 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
470 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
471 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
472 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
473 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
474 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
475 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
476 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
481 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
482 struct HTLCCandidate {
484 origin: HTLCInitiator,
488 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
496 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
498 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
500 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
501 htlc_value_msat: u64,
502 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
507 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
508 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
509 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
510 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
511 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
513 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
514 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
515 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
516 htlc_value_msat: u64,
518 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
519 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
523 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
524 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
525 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
526 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
527 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
528 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
529 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
530 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
531 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
532 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
533 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
536 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
538 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
539 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
540 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
541 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
542 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
545 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
546 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
547 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
548 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
549 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
550 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
551 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
552 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
555 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
557 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
558 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
559 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
560 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
561 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
562 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
563 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
564 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
567 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
568 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
569 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
570 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
571 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
572 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
573 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
574 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
575 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
576 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
577 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
578 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
579 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
580 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
581 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
583 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
584 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
585 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
586 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
588 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
589 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
590 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
591 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
593 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
594 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
595 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
596 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
597 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
599 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
600 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
601 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
602 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
604 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
605 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
606 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
608 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
609 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
610 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
611 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
612 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
614 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
615 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
618 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
619 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
621 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
622 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
623 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
624 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
626 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
627 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
629 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
630 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
633 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
634 (0, update, required),
637 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
638 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
639 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
640 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
641 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
645 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
646 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
647 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
649 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
651 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
657 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
659 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
660 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
661 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
666 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
667 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
668 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
669 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
670 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
672 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
673 /// in a timely manner.
674 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
677 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
678 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
679 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
681 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
682 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
683 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
684 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
688 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
689 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
690 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
692 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
693 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
694 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
695 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
697 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
701 /// The current channel ID.
702 channel_id: ChannelId,
703 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
704 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
705 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
708 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
709 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
711 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
712 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
713 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
715 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
716 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
717 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
718 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
720 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
721 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
723 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
725 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
726 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
727 destination_script: Script,
729 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
730 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
731 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
733 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
734 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
735 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
736 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
737 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
738 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
740 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
741 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
742 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
743 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
744 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
745 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
747 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
749 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
750 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
751 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
753 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
754 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
755 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
756 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
757 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
758 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
759 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
761 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
762 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
763 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
765 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
766 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
767 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
768 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
769 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
770 /// outbound or inbound.
771 signer_pending_funding: bool,
773 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
775 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
776 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
777 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
778 // HTLCs with similar state.
779 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
780 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
781 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
782 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
783 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
784 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
785 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
786 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
787 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
790 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
791 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
792 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
794 update_time_counter: u32,
796 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
797 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
798 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
800 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
801 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
803 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
804 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
806 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
807 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
808 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
809 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
811 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
812 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
814 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
816 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
818 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
819 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
820 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
821 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
822 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
823 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
824 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
825 channel_creation_height: u32,
827 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
830 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
832 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
835 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
837 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
840 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
842 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
844 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
845 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
848 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
850 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
852 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
853 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
855 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
857 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
858 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
859 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
861 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
863 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
864 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
865 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
867 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
868 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
869 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
871 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
873 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
875 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
876 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
877 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
878 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
880 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
881 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
882 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
884 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
885 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
886 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
888 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
889 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
890 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
891 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
893 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
894 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
895 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
897 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
898 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
899 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
900 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
901 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
903 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
904 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
906 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
907 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
908 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
909 /// unblock the state machine.
911 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
912 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
913 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
915 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
916 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
917 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
919 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
920 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
921 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
922 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
923 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
924 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
925 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
926 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
928 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
929 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
931 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
932 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
933 // the channel's funding UTXO.
935 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
936 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
937 // associated channel mapping.
939 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
940 // to store all of them.
941 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
943 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
944 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
945 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
946 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
947 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
949 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
950 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
952 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
953 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
955 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
956 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
957 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
959 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
960 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
961 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
964 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
965 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
966 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
967 self.update_time_counter
970 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
971 self.latest_monitor_update_id
974 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
975 self.config.announced_channel
978 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
979 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
982 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
983 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
984 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
985 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
988 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
989 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
990 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
993 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
994 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
995 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
996 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
997 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1000 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1001 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1002 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1003 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1005 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1006 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1008 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1009 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1011 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1012 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1014 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1017 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1018 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1019 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1020 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1021 self.channel_state &
1022 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1023 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1024 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1025 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1028 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1029 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1030 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1031 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1032 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1035 // Public utilities:
1037 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1041 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1043 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1044 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1045 self.temporary_channel_id
1048 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1052 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1053 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1054 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1058 /// Gets the channel's type
1059 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1063 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1065 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1066 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1067 self.short_channel_id
1070 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1071 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1072 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1075 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1076 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1077 self.outbound_scid_alias
1080 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1081 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1082 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1083 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1084 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1085 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1088 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1089 /// get_funding_created.
1090 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1091 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1094 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1095 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1096 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1099 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1100 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1101 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1102 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1106 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1109 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1110 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1113 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1114 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1117 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1118 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1119 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1122 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1123 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1126 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1127 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1128 self.counterparty_node_id
1131 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1132 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1133 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1136 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1137 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1138 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1141 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1142 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1144 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1145 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1146 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1147 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1149 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1153 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1154 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1155 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1158 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1159 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1160 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1163 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1164 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1165 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1167 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1168 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1173 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1174 self.channel_value_satoshis
1177 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1178 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1181 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1182 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1185 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1186 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1187 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1189 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1190 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1191 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1192 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep);
1193 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1195 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1199 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1200 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1201 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1204 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1205 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1206 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1209 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1210 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1211 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1214 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1215 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1216 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1219 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1220 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1221 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1224 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1225 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1226 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1229 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1230 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1231 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1232 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1233 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1236 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1238 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1239 self.prev_config = None;
1243 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1244 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1248 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1249 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1250 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1251 let did_channel_update =
1252 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1253 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1254 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1255 if did_channel_update {
1256 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1257 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1258 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1259 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1261 self.config.options = *config;
1265 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1266 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1267 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1268 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1269 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1272 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1273 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1274 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1275 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1276 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1278 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1279 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1280 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1281 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1282 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1283 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1284 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1286 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1287 where L::Target: Logger
1289 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1290 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1291 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1293 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1294 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1295 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1296 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1298 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1299 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1300 if match update_state {
1301 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1302 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1303 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1304 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1305 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1307 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1311 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1312 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1313 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1315 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1317 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1318 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1319 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1321 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1322 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1323 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1324 transaction_output_index: None
1329 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1330 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1331 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1332 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1333 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1336 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1338 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1339 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1340 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1342 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1343 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1346 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1347 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1350 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1352 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1353 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1354 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1356 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1357 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1363 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1364 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1365 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1366 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1367 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1368 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1369 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1373 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1374 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1376 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1378 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1379 if generated_by_local {
1380 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1381 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1390 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1392 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1393 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1394 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1395 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1396 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1397 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1398 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1401 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1402 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1403 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1404 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1408 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1409 preimages.push(preimage);
1413 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1414 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1416 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1418 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1419 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1421 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1422 if !generated_by_local {
1423 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1431 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1432 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1433 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1434 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1435 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1436 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1437 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1438 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1440 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1442 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1443 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1444 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1445 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1447 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1449 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1450 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1451 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1452 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1455 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1456 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1457 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1458 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1460 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1463 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1464 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1465 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1466 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1468 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1471 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1472 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1477 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1478 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1483 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1485 let channel_parameters =
1486 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1487 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1488 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1495 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1498 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1499 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1500 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1501 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1503 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1504 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1505 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1513 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1514 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1520 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1521 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1522 /// our counterparty!)
1523 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1524 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1525 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1526 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1527 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1528 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1529 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1531 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1535 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1536 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1537 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1538 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1539 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1540 //may see payments to it!
1541 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1542 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1543 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1545 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1548 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1549 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1550 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1551 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1552 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1555 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1556 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1559 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1563 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1564 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1565 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1566 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1567 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1568 // which are near the dust limit.
1569 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1570 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1571 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1572 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1573 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1575 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1576 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1578 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1581 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1582 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1583 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1586 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1587 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1589 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1590 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1591 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1592 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1593 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1594 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1595 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1598 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1601 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1602 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1603 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1605 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1606 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1607 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1608 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1609 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1610 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1612 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1613 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1619 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1620 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1622 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1623 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1624 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1625 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1626 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1627 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1628 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1631 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1634 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1635 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1636 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1638 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1639 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1640 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1641 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1642 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1643 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1645 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1646 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1650 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1651 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1652 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1653 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1654 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1655 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1656 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1658 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1659 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1661 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1668 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1669 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1670 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1671 /// corner case properly.
1672 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1673 -> AvailableBalances
1674 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1676 let context = &self;
1677 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1678 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1679 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1681 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1682 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1683 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1684 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1687 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1689 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1690 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1692 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1694 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1696 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1697 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1701 if context.is_outbound() {
1702 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1703 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1705 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1706 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1708 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1709 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1710 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1711 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1714 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1715 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1716 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1717 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1718 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1719 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1720 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1723 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1724 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1725 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1726 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1727 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1728 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1729 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1730 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1731 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1732 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1733 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1735 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1738 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1739 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1740 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1741 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1742 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1745 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1746 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1748 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1749 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1750 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1752 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1753 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1754 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1755 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1759 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1761 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1762 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1763 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1764 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1765 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1766 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1767 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1769 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1770 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1772 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1773 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1774 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1776 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1777 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1778 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1779 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1780 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1783 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1784 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1785 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1786 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1787 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1788 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1791 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1792 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1793 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1795 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1799 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1800 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1802 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1803 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1807 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1808 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1809 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1810 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1812 outbound_capacity_msat,
1813 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1814 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1819 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1820 let context = &self;
1821 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1824 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1825 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1827 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1828 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1830 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1831 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1833 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1834 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1835 let context = &self;
1836 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1838 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1841 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1842 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1844 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1845 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1847 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1848 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1850 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1851 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1855 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1856 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1862 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1863 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1864 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1867 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1868 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1869 included_htlcs += 1;
1872 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1873 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1877 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1878 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1879 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1880 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1881 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1882 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1887 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1889 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1890 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1895 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1896 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1900 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1901 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1902 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1905 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1906 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1908 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1909 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1910 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1912 total_pending_htlcs,
1913 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1914 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1915 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1917 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1918 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1919 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1921 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1923 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1928 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1929 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1931 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1932 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1934 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1935 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1937 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1938 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1939 let context = &self;
1940 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1942 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1945 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1946 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1948 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1949 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1951 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1952 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1954 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1955 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1959 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1960 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1966 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1967 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1968 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1969 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1970 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1971 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1974 included_htlcs += 1;
1977 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1978 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1981 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1982 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1984 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1985 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1986 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1991 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1992 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1993 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1996 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1997 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1999 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2000 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2002 total_pending_htlcs,
2003 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2004 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2005 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2007 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2008 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2009 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2011 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2013 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2018 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2019 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2020 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2021 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2028 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2030 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2031 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2034 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2036 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2037 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2038 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2042 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2043 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2044 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2047 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2049 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2050 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2053 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2054 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2055 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2056 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2057 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2058 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2059 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2060 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2061 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2062 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2063 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2065 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2066 // return them to fail the payment.
2067 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2068 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2069 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2071 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2072 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2077 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2078 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2079 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2080 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2081 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2082 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2083 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2084 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2085 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2086 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2087 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2088 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2089 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2093 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2095 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2096 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2099 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2100 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2104 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2105 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2106 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2107 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2108 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2109 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2110 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2111 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2112 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2116 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2117 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2118 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2121 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2122 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2123 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2124 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2127 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2129 next_local_nonce: None,
2134 // Internal utility functions for channels
2136 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2137 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2138 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2140 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2142 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2143 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2144 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2146 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2149 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2151 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2154 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2155 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2156 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2158 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2160 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2161 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2162 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2163 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2164 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2167 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2168 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2169 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2170 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2171 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2172 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2173 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2176 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2177 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2179 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2180 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2183 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2184 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2185 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2186 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2187 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2188 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2191 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2192 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2193 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2194 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2197 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2198 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2200 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2201 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2202 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2206 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2207 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2208 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2210 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2211 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2212 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2213 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2215 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2216 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2217 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2218 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2219 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2220 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2221 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2223 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
2224 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2229 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2230 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2232 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2234 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2235 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2236 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2237 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2239 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2240 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2250 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2251 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2252 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2253 // outside of those situations will fail.
2254 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2258 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2263 1 + // script length (0)
2267 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2268 2 + // witness marker and flag
2269 1 + // witness element count
2270 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2271 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2272 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2273 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2274 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2275 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2277 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2278 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2279 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2285 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2286 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2287 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2288 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2290 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2291 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2292 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2294 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2295 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2296 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2297 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2298 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2299 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2302 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2303 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2306 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2307 value_to_holder = 0;
2310 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2311 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2312 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2313 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2315 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2316 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2319 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2320 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2323 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2326 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2327 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2329 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2331 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2332 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2333 where L::Target: Logger {
2334 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2335 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2336 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2337 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2338 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2339 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2340 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2341 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2345 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2346 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2347 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2348 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2350 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2351 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2353 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2355 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2356 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2357 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2359 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2360 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2361 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2362 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2363 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2364 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2365 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2367 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2368 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2369 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2371 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2372 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2374 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2377 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2378 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2382 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2386 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2387 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2388 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2389 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2390 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2391 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2394 // Now update local state:
2396 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2397 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2398 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2399 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2400 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2401 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2402 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2406 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2407 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2408 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2409 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2410 // do not not get into this branch.
2411 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2412 match pending_update {
2413 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2414 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2415 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2416 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2417 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2418 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2419 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2422 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2423 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2424 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2425 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2426 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2427 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2428 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2434 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2435 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2436 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2438 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2439 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2440 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2442 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2443 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2446 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2447 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2449 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2450 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2452 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2453 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2456 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2459 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2460 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2461 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2462 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2467 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2468 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2469 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2470 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2471 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2472 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2473 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2474 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2475 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2476 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2477 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2478 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2479 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2480 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2481 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2483 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2484 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2485 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2486 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2487 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2490 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2491 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2492 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2498 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2499 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2501 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2505 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2506 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2507 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2508 /// before we fail backwards.
2510 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2511 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2512 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2513 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2514 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2515 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2516 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2519 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2520 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2521 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2522 /// before we fail backwards.
2524 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2525 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2526 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2527 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2528 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2529 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2530 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2532 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2534 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2535 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2536 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2538 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2539 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2540 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2542 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2543 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2544 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2546 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2551 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2552 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2558 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2559 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2560 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2561 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2562 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2566 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2567 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2568 force_holding_cell = true;
2571 // Now update local state:
2572 if force_holding_cell {
2573 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2574 match pending_update {
2575 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2576 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2577 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2578 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2582 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2583 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2584 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2585 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2591 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2592 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2593 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2599 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2601 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2602 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2605 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2606 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2607 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2612 // Message handlers:
2614 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2615 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2616 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2617 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2618 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2622 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2623 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2625 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2626 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2628 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2629 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2630 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2631 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2634 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2636 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2637 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2638 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2639 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2641 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2642 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2644 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2645 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2647 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2648 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2649 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2650 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2651 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2652 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2656 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2657 initial_commitment_tx,
2660 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2661 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2664 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2665 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2668 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2669 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2670 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2671 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2672 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2673 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2674 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2675 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2676 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2677 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2678 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2679 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2681 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2683 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2684 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2685 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2686 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2687 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2688 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2689 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2691 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2692 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2693 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2695 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2697 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2698 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2700 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2702 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2703 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2707 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2708 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2709 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2710 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2711 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2712 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2713 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2716 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2717 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2719 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2720 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2721 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2722 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2724 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2727 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2728 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2729 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2732 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2733 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2734 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2735 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2736 // when routing outbound payments.
2737 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2741 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2743 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2744 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2746 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2747 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2749 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2750 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2751 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2752 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2753 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2754 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2755 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2756 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2757 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2759 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2760 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2761 let expected_point =
2762 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2763 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2765 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2766 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2767 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2768 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2769 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2770 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2772 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2773 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2774 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2775 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2776 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2778 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2783 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2786 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2787 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2789 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2791 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2794 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2795 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2796 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2797 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2798 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2799 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2801 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2802 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2803 if local_sent_shutdown {
2804 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2806 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2807 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2808 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2809 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2811 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2812 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2814 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2817 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2818 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2820 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2821 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2824 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2825 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2826 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2827 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2829 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2830 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2833 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2834 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2835 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2836 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2837 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2838 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2839 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2840 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2841 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2842 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2843 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2845 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2846 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2847 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2848 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2849 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2850 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2854 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2855 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2858 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2859 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2860 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2862 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2863 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2864 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2865 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2866 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2867 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2868 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2872 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2873 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2874 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2875 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2876 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2877 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2878 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2882 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2883 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2884 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2885 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2886 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2887 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2890 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2891 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2893 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2894 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2895 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2897 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2898 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2902 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2903 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2905 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2906 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2910 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2911 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2915 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2916 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2917 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2918 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2919 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2920 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2921 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2922 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2923 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2925 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2926 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2927 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2928 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2929 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2932 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2933 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2934 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2935 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2936 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2939 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2940 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2942 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2943 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2946 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2947 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2948 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2952 // Now update local state:
2953 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2954 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2955 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2956 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2957 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2958 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2959 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2964 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2966 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2967 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2968 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2969 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2970 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2971 None => fail_reason.into(),
2972 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2973 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2974 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2975 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2977 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2981 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2983 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2984 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2986 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2987 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2992 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2995 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2996 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2999 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3000 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3003 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3006 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3007 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3008 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3010 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3011 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3014 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3018 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3019 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3020 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3022 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3023 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3026 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3030 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3031 where L::Target: Logger
3033 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3034 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3036 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3037 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3039 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3043 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3045 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3047 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3048 let commitment_txid = {
3049 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3050 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3051 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3053 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3054 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3055 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3056 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3057 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3058 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3062 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3064 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3065 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3066 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3067 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3070 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3071 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3072 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3073 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3076 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3078 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3079 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3080 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3081 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3082 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3083 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3084 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3085 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3086 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3087 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3088 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3094 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3095 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3098 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3099 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3100 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3101 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3102 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3103 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3104 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3105 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3106 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3107 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3108 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3109 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3110 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3113 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3114 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3115 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3116 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3117 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3118 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3119 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3121 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3122 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3123 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3124 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3125 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3126 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3127 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3130 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3131 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3134 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3136 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3137 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3138 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3141 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3144 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3145 commitment_stats.tx,
3147 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3148 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3149 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3152 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3153 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3155 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3156 let mut need_commitment = false;
3157 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3158 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3159 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3160 need_commitment = true;
3164 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3165 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3166 Some(forward_info.clone())
3168 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3169 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3170 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3171 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3172 need_commitment = true;
3175 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3176 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3177 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3178 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3179 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3180 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3181 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3182 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3183 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3184 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3185 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3186 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3187 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3188 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3190 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3192 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3193 need_commitment = true;
3197 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3198 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3199 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3200 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3201 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3202 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3204 nondust_htlc_sources,
3208 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3209 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3210 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3211 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3213 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3214 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3215 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3216 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3217 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3218 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3219 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3220 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3221 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3222 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3223 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3224 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3225 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3226 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3228 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3229 &self.context.channel_id);
3230 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3233 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3234 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3235 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3236 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3237 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3238 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3239 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3240 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3241 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3245 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3246 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3247 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3248 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3251 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3252 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3253 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3254 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3255 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3256 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3257 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3259 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3260 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3261 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3262 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3265 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3266 /// for our counterparty.
3267 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3268 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3269 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3270 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3272 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3273 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3274 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3275 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3277 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3278 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3279 updates: Vec::new(),
3282 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3283 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3284 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3285 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3286 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3287 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3288 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3289 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3290 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3291 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3292 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3293 // to rebalance channels.
3294 match &htlc_update {
3295 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3296 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3297 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3299 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3300 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3302 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3305 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3306 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3307 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3308 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3309 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3310 // into the holding cell without ever being
3311 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3312 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3313 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3316 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3322 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3323 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3324 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3325 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3326 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3327 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3328 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3329 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3330 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3331 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3332 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3333 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3335 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3336 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3337 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3338 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3339 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3340 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3341 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3342 // for a full revocation before failing.
3343 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3344 update_fail_count += 1;
3347 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3349 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3356 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3357 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3359 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3360 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3365 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3366 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3367 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3368 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3369 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3371 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3372 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3373 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3375 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3376 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3382 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3383 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3384 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3385 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3386 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3387 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3388 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3389 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3390 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3392 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3393 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3395 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3396 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3398 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3402 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3404 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3405 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3406 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3410 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3411 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3412 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3413 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3414 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3415 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3416 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3417 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3418 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3421 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3423 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3424 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3427 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3428 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3429 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3430 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3432 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3436 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3437 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3438 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3439 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3440 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3441 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3442 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3443 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3447 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3448 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3449 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3450 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3451 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3452 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3453 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3454 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3455 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3457 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3458 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3461 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3462 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3463 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3464 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3465 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3466 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3467 let mut require_commitment = false;
3468 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3471 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3472 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3473 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3475 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3476 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3477 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3478 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3479 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3480 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3485 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3486 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3487 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3488 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3489 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3491 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3492 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3493 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3498 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3499 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3501 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3505 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3506 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3508 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3509 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3510 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3511 require_commitment = true;
3512 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3513 match forward_info {
3514 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3515 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3516 require_commitment = true;
3518 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3519 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3520 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3522 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3523 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3524 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3528 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3529 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3530 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3531 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3537 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3538 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3539 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3540 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3542 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3543 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3544 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3545 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3546 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3547 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3548 require_commitment = true;
3552 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3554 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3555 match update_state {
3556 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3557 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3558 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3559 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3560 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3562 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3563 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3564 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3565 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3566 require_commitment = true;
3567 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3568 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3573 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3574 let release_state_str =
3575 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3576 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3577 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3578 if !release_monitor {
3579 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3580 update: monitor_update,
3582 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3584 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3589 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3590 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3591 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3592 if require_commitment {
3593 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3594 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3595 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3596 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3598 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3599 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3600 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3601 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3602 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3604 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3605 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3606 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3607 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3608 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3611 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3612 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3613 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3614 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3615 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3616 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3618 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3619 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3621 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3622 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3624 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3625 if require_commitment {
3626 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3628 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3629 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3630 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3631 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3633 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3634 &self.context.channel_id(),
3635 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3638 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3639 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3641 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3642 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3644 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3645 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3651 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3652 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3653 /// commitment update.
3654 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3655 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3656 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3658 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3659 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3662 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3663 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3664 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3665 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3667 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3668 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3669 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3670 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3671 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3672 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3673 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3675 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3676 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3678 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3679 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3681 if !self.context.is_live() {
3682 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3685 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3686 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3687 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3688 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3689 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3690 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3691 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3692 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3693 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3694 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3698 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3699 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3700 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3701 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3702 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3703 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3706 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3707 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3711 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3712 force_holding_cell = true;
3715 if force_holding_cell {
3716 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3720 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3721 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3723 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3724 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3729 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3730 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3732 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3734 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3735 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3736 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3737 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3741 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3742 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3743 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3747 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3748 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3751 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3752 // will be retransmitted.
3753 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3754 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3755 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3757 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3758 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3760 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3761 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3762 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3763 // this HTLC accordingly
3764 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3767 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3768 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3769 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3770 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3773 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3774 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3775 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3776 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3777 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3778 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3783 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3785 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3786 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3787 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3788 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3792 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3793 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3794 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3795 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3796 // the update upon reconnection.
3797 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3801 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3803 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3804 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3808 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3809 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3810 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3811 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3812 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3813 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3814 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3816 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3817 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3818 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3819 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3820 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3821 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3822 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3824 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3825 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3826 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3827 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3828 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3829 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3830 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3833 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3834 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3835 /// to the remote side.
3836 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3837 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3838 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3839 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3842 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3844 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3845 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3847 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3848 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3849 // first received the funding_signed.
3850 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3851 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3852 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3854 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3855 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3856 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3857 funding_broadcastable = None;
3860 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3861 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3862 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3863 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3864 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3865 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3866 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3867 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3868 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3869 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3870 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3871 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3872 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3873 next_per_commitment_point,
3874 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3878 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3880 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3881 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3882 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3883 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3884 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3885 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3887 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3888 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3889 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3890 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3891 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3892 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3896 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3897 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3899 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3900 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3902 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3903 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3906 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3907 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3908 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3909 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3910 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3911 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3912 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3913 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3914 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3918 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3919 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3921 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3922 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3924 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3925 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3927 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3928 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3930 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3931 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3932 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3933 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3934 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3935 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3936 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3937 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3938 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3939 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3940 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3941 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3942 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3943 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3945 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3946 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3947 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3953 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
3956 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3957 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
3958 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3960 let funding_signed = None;
3961 let channel_ready = None;
3962 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
3963 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
3966 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
3967 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
3968 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
3969 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
3970 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
3972 SignerResumeUpdates {
3980 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3981 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3982 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3983 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3984 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3985 per_commitment_secret,
3986 next_per_commitment_point,
3988 next_local_nonce: None,
3992 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
3993 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3994 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3995 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3996 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3997 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3999 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4000 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4001 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4002 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4003 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4004 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4005 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4006 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4007 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4008 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4013 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4014 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4016 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4017 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4018 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4019 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4020 reason: err_packet.clone()
4023 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4024 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4025 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4026 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4027 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4028 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4031 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4032 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4033 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4034 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4035 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4042 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4043 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4044 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4045 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4049 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4050 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4051 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4052 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4053 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4054 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4055 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4059 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4060 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4061 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4065 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4066 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4071 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4072 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4073 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4074 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4075 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4076 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4077 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4082 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4083 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4085 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4086 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4087 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4088 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4089 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4090 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4091 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4092 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4095 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4097 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4098 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4099 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4100 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4101 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4104 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4105 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4106 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4109 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4110 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4111 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4112 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4113 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4116 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4117 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4118 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4119 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4120 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4123 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4124 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4125 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4126 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4127 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4128 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4129 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4130 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4134 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4135 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4136 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4137 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4139 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4143 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4144 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4145 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4146 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4148 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4150 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4152 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4153 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4154 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4155 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4156 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4159 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4160 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4161 channel_ready: None,
4162 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4163 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4164 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4168 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4169 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4170 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4171 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4172 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4173 next_per_commitment_point,
4174 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4176 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4177 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4178 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4182 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4183 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4184 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4186 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4187 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4188 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4191 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4194 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4197 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4198 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4199 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4200 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4201 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4202 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4203 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4205 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4207 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4208 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4209 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4210 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4211 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4212 next_per_commitment_point,
4213 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4217 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4218 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4219 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4221 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4224 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4225 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4226 raa: required_revoke,
4227 commitment_update: None,
4228 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4230 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4231 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4232 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4234 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4237 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4238 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4239 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4240 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4241 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4242 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4245 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4246 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4247 raa: required_revoke,
4248 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4249 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4253 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4257 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4258 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4259 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4260 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4262 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4264 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4266 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4267 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4268 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4269 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4270 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4271 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4272 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4273 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4275 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4276 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4277 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4278 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4279 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4281 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4282 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4283 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4284 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4287 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4288 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4289 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4290 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4291 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4292 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4293 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4294 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4295 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4296 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4297 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4298 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4299 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4300 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4301 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4303 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4306 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4307 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4310 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4311 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4312 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4313 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4314 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4315 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4318 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4319 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4320 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4321 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4322 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4323 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4324 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4326 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4332 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4333 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4334 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4335 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4337 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4338 return Ok((None, None, None));
4341 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4342 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4343 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4345 return Ok((None, None, None));
4348 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4350 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4351 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4352 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4353 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4355 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4356 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4358 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4359 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4361 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4362 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4363 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4364 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4366 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4367 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4368 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4375 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4376 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4378 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4379 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4382 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4383 /// within our expected timeframe.
4385 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4386 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4387 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4390 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4393 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4394 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4398 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4399 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4401 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4404 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4405 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4406 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4407 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4410 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4411 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4412 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4415 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4417 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4418 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4421 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4422 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4423 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4426 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4429 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4430 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4431 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4432 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4434 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4437 assert!(send_shutdown);
4438 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4439 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4440 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4442 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4443 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4445 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4450 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4452 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4453 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4455 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4456 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4457 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4458 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4459 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4460 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4463 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4464 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4466 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4467 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4468 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4469 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4473 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4474 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4475 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4476 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4477 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4478 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4480 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4481 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4488 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4489 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4491 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4494 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4495 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4497 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4499 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4500 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4501 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4502 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4503 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4504 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4505 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4506 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4507 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4509 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4510 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4513 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4517 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4518 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4519 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4520 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4522 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4523 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4525 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4526 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4528 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4529 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4531 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4532 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4535 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4536 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4539 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4540 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4541 return Ok((None, None, None));
4544 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4545 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4546 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4547 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4549 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4551 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4554 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4555 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4556 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4557 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4558 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4562 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4563 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4564 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4568 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4569 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4570 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4571 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4572 monitor_update: None,
4573 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4574 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4576 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4577 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4578 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4579 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4583 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4585 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4586 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4587 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4588 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4590 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4593 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4594 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4596 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4597 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4598 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4599 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4600 monitor_update: None,
4601 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4602 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4604 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4605 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4606 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4607 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4612 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4613 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4614 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4615 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4617 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4618 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4619 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4621 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4627 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4628 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4629 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4631 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4632 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4634 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4635 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4638 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4639 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4640 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4641 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4642 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4644 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4645 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4646 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4648 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4649 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4652 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4653 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4654 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4655 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4656 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4657 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4658 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4659 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4661 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4664 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4665 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4666 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4667 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4669 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4673 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4674 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4675 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4676 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4678 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4684 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4685 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4686 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4687 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4688 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4689 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4690 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4692 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4693 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4696 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4698 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4699 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4705 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4706 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4707 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4708 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4709 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4710 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4711 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4713 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4714 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4721 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4722 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4725 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4726 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4729 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4730 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4734 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4735 &self.context.holder_signer
4739 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4741 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4742 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4743 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4744 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4745 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4746 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4748 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4750 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4758 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4759 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4763 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4764 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4765 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4766 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4769 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4770 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4771 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4772 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4775 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4776 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4777 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4778 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4779 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4780 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4783 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4784 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4785 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4786 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4787 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4788 if !release_monitor {
4789 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4798 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4799 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4802 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4803 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4804 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4806 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4807 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4808 if self.context.channel_state &
4809 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4810 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4811 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4812 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4813 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4816 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4817 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4818 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4819 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4820 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4821 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4823 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4824 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4825 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4827 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4828 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4829 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4830 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4831 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4832 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4838 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4839 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4840 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4843 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4844 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4845 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4848 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4849 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4850 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4853 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4854 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4855 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4856 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4857 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4858 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4863 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4864 self.context.channel_update_status
4867 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4868 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4869 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4872 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4874 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4875 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4876 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4880 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4881 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4882 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4885 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4889 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4890 // channel_ready yet.
4891 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
4895 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4896 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4897 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4898 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4899 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4901 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4902 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4903 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4905 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4906 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4909 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4910 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4911 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4912 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4913 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4914 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4915 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4916 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4917 self.context.channel_state);
4919 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4923 if need_commitment_update {
4924 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4925 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4926 let next_per_commitment_point =
4927 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4928 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4929 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4930 next_per_commitment_point,
4931 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4935 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4941 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4942 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4943 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4944 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4945 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4946 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4947 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4949 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4952 let mut msgs = (None, None);
4953 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
4954 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
4955 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
4956 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
4957 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4958 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
4959 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
4960 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
4961 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
4962 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4963 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
4964 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
4965 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
4966 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
4967 // channel and move on.
4968 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4969 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4971 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4972 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
4973 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
4975 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4976 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
4977 for input in tx.input.iter() {
4978 if input.witness.is_empty() {
4979 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
4980 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
4981 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4982 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
4987 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
4988 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
4989 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
4990 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
4991 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
4994 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
4995 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
4996 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
4997 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
4998 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
4999 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5002 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5003 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5004 // may have already happened for this block).
5005 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5006 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5007 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5008 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5011 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5012 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5013 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5014 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5022 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5023 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5024 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5025 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5027 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5028 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5031 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5033 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5034 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5035 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5036 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5038 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5041 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5044 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5045 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5046 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5047 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5049 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5052 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5053 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5054 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5056 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5057 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5059 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5060 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5061 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5069 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5071 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5072 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5073 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5075 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5076 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5079 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5080 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5081 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5082 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5083 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5084 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5085 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5086 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5087 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5090 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5091 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5092 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5093 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5095 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5096 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5097 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5099 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5100 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5101 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5102 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5104 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5105 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5106 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5107 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5108 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5109 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5110 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5113 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5114 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5116 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5119 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5120 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5121 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5122 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5123 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5124 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5125 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5126 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5127 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5128 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5129 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5130 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5131 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5132 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5133 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5134 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5135 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5141 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5146 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5147 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5149 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5150 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5151 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5152 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5154 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5157 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5159 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5160 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5161 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5162 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5163 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5164 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5166 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5167 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5170 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5171 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5172 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5173 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5174 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5175 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5177 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5178 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5181 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5182 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5183 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5184 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5185 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5191 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5192 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5193 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5194 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5196 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5199 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5203 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5207 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5208 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5212 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5216 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5217 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5220 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5224 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5226 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5231 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5232 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5233 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5235 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5240 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5242 None => return None,
5245 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5247 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5248 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5250 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5251 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5257 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5259 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5260 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5261 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5262 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5263 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5264 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5265 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5267 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5268 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5269 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5270 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5271 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5272 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5273 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5274 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5275 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5276 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5277 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5278 contents: announcement,
5283 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5287 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5288 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5289 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5290 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5291 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5292 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5293 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5294 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5296 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5298 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5299 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5300 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5301 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5303 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5304 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5305 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5306 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5309 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5310 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5311 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5312 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5315 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5318 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5319 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5320 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5321 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5322 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5323 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5326 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5328 Err(_) => return None,
5330 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5331 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5336 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5337 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5338 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5339 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5340 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5341 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5342 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5343 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5344 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5345 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5346 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5347 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5348 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5349 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5350 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5351 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5354 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5357 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5358 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5359 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5360 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5361 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5362 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5363 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5364 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5365 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5367 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5368 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5369 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5370 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5371 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5372 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5373 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5374 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5375 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5377 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5378 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5379 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5380 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5381 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5382 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5383 next_funding_txid: None,
5388 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5390 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5391 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5392 /// commitment update.
5394 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5395 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5396 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5397 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5398 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5399 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5400 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5403 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5404 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5405 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5407 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5408 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5413 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5414 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5416 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5418 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5419 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5421 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5422 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5423 /// regenerate them.
5425 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5426 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5428 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5429 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5430 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5431 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5432 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5433 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5434 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5436 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5437 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5439 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5440 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5441 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5444 if amount_msat == 0 {
5445 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5448 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5449 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5450 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5451 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5454 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5455 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5456 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5459 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5460 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5461 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5462 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5463 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5464 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5465 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5466 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5469 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5470 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5471 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5472 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5473 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5474 else { "to peer" });
5476 if need_holding_cell {
5477 force_holding_cell = true;
5480 // Now update local state:
5481 if force_holding_cell {
5482 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5487 onion_routing_packet,
5493 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5494 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5496 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5498 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5503 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5504 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5505 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5509 onion_routing_packet,
5512 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5517 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5518 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5519 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5520 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5522 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5523 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5524 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5526 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5527 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5531 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5532 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5533 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5534 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5535 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5536 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5537 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5540 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5541 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5542 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5543 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5544 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5545 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5548 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5550 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5551 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5552 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5553 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5554 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5556 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5557 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5560 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5561 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5562 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5563 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5564 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5565 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5566 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5567 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5568 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5569 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5570 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5573 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5577 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5578 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5579 where L::Target: Logger
5581 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5582 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5583 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5585 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5587 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5588 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5589 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5590 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5591 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5592 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5593 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5594 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5595 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5596 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5597 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5603 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5606 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5607 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5608 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5609 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5610 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5611 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5613 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5614 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5615 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5617 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5618 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5619 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5622 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5623 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5627 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5628 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5630 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5632 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5633 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5634 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5635 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5637 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5638 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5639 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5640 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5641 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5642 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5646 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5647 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5651 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5652 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5657 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5658 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5660 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5661 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5662 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5663 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5664 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5665 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5666 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5667 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5669 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5670 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5671 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5674 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5675 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5676 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5682 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5684 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5685 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5686 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5687 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5688 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5690 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5692 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5698 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5699 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5701 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5702 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5703 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5704 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5705 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5707 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5708 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5709 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5712 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5713 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5714 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5716 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5717 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5720 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5721 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5723 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5724 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5725 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5728 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5729 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5730 let mut chan_closed = false;
5731 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5735 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5737 None if !chan_closed => {
5738 // use override shutdown script if provided
5739 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5740 Some(script) => script,
5742 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5743 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5744 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5745 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5749 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5750 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5752 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5758 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5759 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5760 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5761 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5762 monitor_update: None,
5763 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5764 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5766 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5767 Some(shutdown_result)
5769 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5772 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5774 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5775 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5776 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5777 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5778 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5779 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5782 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5783 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5785 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5786 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5787 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5790 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5791 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5792 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5793 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5794 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5796 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5797 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5804 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5805 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5807 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5810 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5811 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5812 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5814 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5815 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5819 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5823 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5824 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5825 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5826 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5829 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5830 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5831 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5832 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5833 outbound_scid_alias: u64
5834 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5835 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5836 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5838 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5839 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5840 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5841 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5843 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5844 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5846 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5847 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5849 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5850 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5851 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5853 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5854 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5856 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5857 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5858 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5859 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5860 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5863 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5864 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5866 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5867 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5869 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5871 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5873 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5874 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5875 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5876 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5879 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5880 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5882 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5883 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5884 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5885 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5889 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5890 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5891 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5895 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5896 Ok(script) => script,
5897 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5900 let temporary_channel_id = ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source);
5903 context: ChannelContext {
5906 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5907 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5908 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5909 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5914 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5916 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5917 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5918 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5919 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5921 channel_value_satoshis,
5923 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5925 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5926 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5929 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5930 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5933 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5934 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5935 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5936 pending_update_fee: None,
5937 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5938 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5939 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5940 update_time_counter: 1,
5942 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5944 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5945 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5946 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5947 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5948 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5949 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5951 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
5952 signer_pending_funding: false,
5954 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5955 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5956 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
5957 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
5959 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
5960 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
5961 closing_fee_limits: None,
5962 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
5964 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
5965 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
5966 short_channel_id: None,
5967 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
5969 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
5970 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
5971 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
5972 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
5973 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
5974 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5975 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5976 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
5977 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
5978 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
5979 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
5980 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
5982 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
5984 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
5985 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
5986 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
5987 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
5988 counterparty_parameters: None,
5989 funding_outpoint: None,
5990 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
5992 funding_transaction: None,
5993 is_batch_funding: None,
5995 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
5996 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
5997 counterparty_node_id,
5999 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6001 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6003 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6004 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6006 announcement_sigs: None,
6008 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6009 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6010 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6011 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6013 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6014 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6016 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6017 outbound_scid_alias,
6019 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6020 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6022 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6023 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6028 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6030 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6034 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6035 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6036 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6037 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6038 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6039 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6040 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6041 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6042 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6043 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6044 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6046 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6047 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6049 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6050 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6051 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6052 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6055 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6056 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6058 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6060 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6061 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6063 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6064 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6065 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6066 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6067 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6068 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6071 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6072 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6074 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6075 if funding_created.is_none() {
6076 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6077 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6078 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6082 let channel = Channel {
6083 context: self.context,
6086 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6089 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6090 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6091 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6092 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6093 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6094 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6095 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6096 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6097 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6098 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6101 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6102 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6103 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6104 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6105 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6106 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6112 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6113 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6114 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6115 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6116 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6117 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6119 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6121 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6122 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6123 // We've exhausted our options
6126 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6127 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6130 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6131 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6132 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6133 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6135 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6136 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6137 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6138 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6139 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6140 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6142 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6144 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6145 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6148 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6149 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6150 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6152 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6153 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6156 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6157 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6160 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6161 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6165 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6166 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6167 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6168 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6169 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6170 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6171 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6172 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6173 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6174 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6175 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6176 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6177 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6178 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6179 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6180 first_per_commitment_point,
6181 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6182 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6183 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6184 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6186 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6191 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6192 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6194 // Check sanity of message fields:
6195 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6198 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6201 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6202 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6204 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6205 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6207 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6208 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6210 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6212 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6214 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6215 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6218 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6219 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6222 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6223 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6225 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6229 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6230 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6231 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6233 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6234 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6236 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6237 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6239 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6242 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6245 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6248 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6252 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6253 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6256 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6257 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6259 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6260 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6263 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6264 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6267 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6268 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6269 &Some(ref script) => {
6270 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6271 if script.len() == 0 {
6274 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6277 Some(script.clone())
6280 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6282 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6287 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6288 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6289 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6290 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6291 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6293 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6294 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6296 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6299 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6300 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6301 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6302 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6303 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6304 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6307 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6308 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6309 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6312 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6313 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6315 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6316 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6322 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6323 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6324 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6325 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6328 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6329 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6330 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6331 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6332 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6333 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6334 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6335 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6336 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6337 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6338 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6341 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6343 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6344 // support this channel type.
6345 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6346 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6350 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6351 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6352 // `static_remote_key`.
6353 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6356 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6357 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6360 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6361 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6363 channel_type.clone()
6365 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6366 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6367 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6372 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6373 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6374 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6375 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6376 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6377 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6378 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6379 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6380 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6383 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6384 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6387 // Check sanity of message fields:
6388 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6389 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6391 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6392 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6394 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6395 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6397 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6398 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6399 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6401 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6402 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6404 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6405 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6407 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6409 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6410 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6411 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6413 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6416 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6417 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6420 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6421 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6422 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6424 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6425 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6427 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6428 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6430 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6431 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6433 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6434 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6436 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6437 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6439 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6440 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6443 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6445 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6446 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6447 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6451 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6452 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6453 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6454 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6455 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6457 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6458 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6460 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6461 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6462 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6464 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6465 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6468 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6469 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6470 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6471 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6475 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6476 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6477 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6478 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6481 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6482 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6483 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6484 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6485 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6488 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6489 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6490 &Some(ref script) => {
6491 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6492 if script.len() == 0 {
6495 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6496 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6498 Some(script.clone())
6501 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6503 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6508 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6509 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6510 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6511 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6515 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6516 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6517 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6521 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6522 Ok(script) => script,
6523 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6526 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6527 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6529 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6532 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6536 context: ChannelContext {
6539 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6540 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6542 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6547 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6549 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6550 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6551 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6552 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6555 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6557 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6558 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6561 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6562 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6563 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6565 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6566 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6567 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6568 pending_update_fee: None,
6569 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6570 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6571 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6572 update_time_counter: 1,
6574 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6576 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6577 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6578 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6579 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6580 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6581 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6583 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6584 signer_pending_funding: false,
6586 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6587 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6588 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6589 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6591 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6592 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6593 closing_fee_limits: None,
6594 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6596 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6597 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6598 short_channel_id: None,
6599 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6601 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6602 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6603 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6604 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6605 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6606 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6607 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6608 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6609 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6610 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6611 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6612 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6615 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6617 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6618 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6619 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6620 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6621 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6622 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6623 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6625 funding_outpoint: None,
6626 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6628 funding_transaction: None,
6629 is_batch_funding: None,
6631 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6632 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6633 counterparty_node_id,
6635 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6637 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6639 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6640 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6642 announcement_sigs: None,
6644 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6645 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6646 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6647 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6649 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6650 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6652 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6653 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6655 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6656 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6658 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6659 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6664 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6666 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6672 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6673 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6675 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6676 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6677 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6678 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6680 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6681 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6683 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6684 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6687 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6690 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6691 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6692 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6694 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6695 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6696 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6697 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6699 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6700 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6701 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6702 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6703 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6704 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6705 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6706 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6707 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6708 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6709 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6710 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6711 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6712 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6713 first_per_commitment_point,
6714 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6715 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6716 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6718 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6720 next_local_nonce: None,
6724 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6725 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6727 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6729 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6730 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6733 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(CommitmentTransaction, CommitmentTransaction, Option<Signature>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6734 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6736 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6737 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6739 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6740 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6741 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6742 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6743 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6744 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6745 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6746 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6747 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6750 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6751 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6753 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6754 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6755 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6756 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6758 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6759 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6760 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6761 let counterparty_signature = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6762 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok();
6764 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
6765 Ok((counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
6770 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6771 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6772 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6776 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6777 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6779 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6780 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6781 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6783 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6785 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6786 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6787 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6788 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6791 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6792 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6793 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6794 // funding_created_signature may fail.
6795 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6797 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, initial_commitment_tx, sig_opt) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6799 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6800 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6801 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6804 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6805 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6806 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6810 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6811 initial_commitment_tx,
6814 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6815 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6818 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6819 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6822 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6824 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6825 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6826 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6827 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6828 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6829 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6830 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6831 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6832 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6833 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6834 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6836 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6838 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6839 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6840 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6841 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6842 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6843 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6845 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6846 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6847 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6848 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6850 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6852 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6853 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6854 let mut channel = Channel {
6855 context: self.context,
6857 let channel_id = channel.context.channel_id.clone();
6858 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6859 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6861 let funding_signed = if let Some(signature) = sig_opt {
6862 Some(msgs::FundingSigned {
6866 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6869 channel.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6873 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6877 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6878 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6880 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6886 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6887 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6888 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6889 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6890 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6892 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6893 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6894 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6895 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6901 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6902 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6903 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6904 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6905 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6906 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6911 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6912 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6913 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6914 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6916 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6917 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6918 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6919 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6924 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6925 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6926 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6927 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6928 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6929 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6934 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6935 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6936 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6939 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6941 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6942 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6943 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6944 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6945 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6947 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6948 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6949 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6950 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6952 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6953 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6954 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6956 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6958 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6959 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6960 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6961 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6962 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6963 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6964 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6966 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6967 // deserialized from that format.
6968 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6969 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6970 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6972 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6974 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6975 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6976 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6978 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6979 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6980 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6981 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6984 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6985 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6986 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6989 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6990 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6991 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6992 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6994 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6995 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6997 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6999 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7001 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7003 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7006 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7008 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7013 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7014 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7016 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7017 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7018 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7019 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7020 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7021 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7022 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7024 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7026 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7028 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7031 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7032 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7033 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7036 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7038 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7039 preimages.push(preimage);
7041 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7042 reason.write(writer)?;
7044 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7046 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7047 preimages.push(preimage);
7049 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7050 reason.write(writer)?;
7053 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7054 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7055 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7057 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7058 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7059 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7063 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7064 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7065 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7067 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7068 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7072 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7073 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7074 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7075 source.write(writer)?;
7076 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7078 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7079 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7080 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7082 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7083 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7085 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7087 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7088 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7090 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7092 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7093 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7098 match self.context.resend_order {
7099 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7100 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7103 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7104 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7105 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7107 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7108 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7109 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7110 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7113 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7114 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7115 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7116 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7117 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7120 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7121 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7122 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7123 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7125 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7126 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7127 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7129 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7131 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7132 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7133 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7134 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7136 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7137 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7138 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7139 // consider the stale state on reload.
7142 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7143 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7144 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7146 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7147 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7148 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7150 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7151 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7153 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7154 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7155 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7157 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7158 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7160 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7163 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7164 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7165 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7167 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7170 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7171 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7173 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7174 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7175 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7177 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7179 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7181 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7183 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7184 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7185 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7186 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7187 htlc.write(writer)?;
7190 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7191 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7192 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7194 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7195 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7197 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7198 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7199 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7200 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7201 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7202 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7203 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7205 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7206 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7207 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7208 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7209 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7211 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7212 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7214 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7215 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7216 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7217 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7219 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7221 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7222 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7223 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7224 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7225 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7226 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7227 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7229 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7230 (2, chan_type, option),
7231 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7232 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7233 (5, self.context.config, required),
7234 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7235 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7236 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7237 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7238 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7239 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7240 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7241 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7242 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7243 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7244 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7245 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7246 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7247 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7248 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7249 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7250 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7251 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7252 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7259 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7260 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7262 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7263 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7265 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7266 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7267 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7269 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7270 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7271 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7272 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7274 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7276 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7277 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7278 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7279 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7280 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7282 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7283 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7286 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7287 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7288 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7290 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7292 let mut keys_data = None;
7294 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7295 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7296 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7297 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7298 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7299 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7300 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7301 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7302 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7303 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7307 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7308 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7309 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7312 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7314 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7315 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7316 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7318 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7321 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7322 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7323 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7324 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7325 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7326 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7327 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7328 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7329 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7330 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7331 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7332 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7337 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7338 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7339 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7340 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7341 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7342 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7343 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7344 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7345 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7346 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7347 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7348 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7350 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7351 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7354 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7355 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7358 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7359 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7361 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7363 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7367 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7368 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7369 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7370 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7371 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7372 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7373 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7374 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7375 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7376 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7377 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7379 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7380 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7381 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7383 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7384 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7385 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7387 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7391 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7392 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7393 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7394 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7397 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7398 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7399 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7401 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7402 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7403 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7404 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7407 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7408 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7409 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7410 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7413 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7415 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7417 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7418 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7419 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7420 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7422 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7423 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7424 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7425 // consider the stale state on reload.
7426 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7429 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7430 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7431 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7433 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7436 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7437 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7438 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7440 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7441 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7442 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7443 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7445 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7446 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7448 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7449 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7453 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7455 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7457 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7458 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7460 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7461 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7464 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7466 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7467 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7468 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7469 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7471 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7474 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7475 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7479 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7480 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7482 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7483 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7485 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7487 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7488 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7489 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7491 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7492 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7493 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7497 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7498 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7499 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7501 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7507 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7508 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7509 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7510 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7511 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7512 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7513 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7514 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7515 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7516 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7518 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7519 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7520 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7521 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7522 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7523 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7524 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7526 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7527 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7528 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7529 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7531 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7533 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7534 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7536 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7538 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7539 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7540 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7541 (2, channel_type, option),
7542 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7543 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7544 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7545 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7546 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7547 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7548 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7549 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7550 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7551 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7552 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7553 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7554 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7555 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7556 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7557 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7558 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7559 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7560 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7561 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7562 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7563 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7566 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7567 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7568 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7569 // required channel parameters.
7570 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7571 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7572 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7574 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7576 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7577 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7578 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7579 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7582 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7583 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7584 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7586 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7587 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7589 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7590 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7595 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7596 if iter.next().is_some() {
7597 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7601 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7602 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7603 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7604 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7605 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7608 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7609 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7610 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7612 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7613 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7615 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7616 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7617 // separate u64 values.
7618 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7620 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7622 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7623 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7624 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7625 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7627 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7628 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7630 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7631 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7632 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7633 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7634 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7637 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7638 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7642 context: ChannelContext {
7645 config: config.unwrap(),
7649 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7650 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7651 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7654 temporary_channel_id,
7656 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7658 channel_value_satoshis,
7660 latest_monitor_update_id,
7662 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7663 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7666 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7667 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7670 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7671 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7672 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7673 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7677 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7678 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7679 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7680 monitor_pending_forwards,
7681 monitor_pending_failures,
7682 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7684 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7685 signer_pending_funding: false,
7688 holding_cell_update_fee,
7689 next_holder_htlc_id,
7690 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7691 update_time_counter,
7694 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7695 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7696 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7697 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7699 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7700 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7701 closing_fee_limits: None,
7702 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7704 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7705 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7707 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7709 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7710 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7711 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7712 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7713 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7714 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7715 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7716 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7717 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7720 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7722 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7723 funding_transaction,
7726 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7727 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7728 counterparty_node_id,
7730 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7734 channel_update_status,
7735 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7739 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7740 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7741 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7742 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7744 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7745 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7747 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7748 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7749 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7751 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7752 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7754 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7755 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7757 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7760 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7769 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7770 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7771 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7772 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7773 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7775 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7776 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7777 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7778 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7779 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7780 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7781 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7782 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7783 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7784 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7785 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7786 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7787 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7788 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7789 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7790 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7791 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7792 use crate::util::test_utils;
7793 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7794 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7795 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7796 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7797 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7798 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7799 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7800 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7801 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7802 use crate::prelude::*;
7804 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7807 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7808 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7814 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7815 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7816 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7817 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7821 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7822 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7823 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7824 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7825 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7826 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7827 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7828 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7832 signer: InMemorySigner,
7835 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7836 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7839 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7840 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7842 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7843 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7846 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7850 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7852 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7853 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7854 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7855 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7856 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7859 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7860 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7861 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7862 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7866 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7867 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7868 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7872 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7873 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7874 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7875 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7877 let seed = [42; 32];
7878 let network = Network::Testnet;
7879 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7880 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7881 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7884 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7885 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7886 let config = UserConfig::default();
7887 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7888 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7889 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7891 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7892 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7896 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7897 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7899 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7900 let original_fee = 253;
7901 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7902 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7903 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7904 let seed = [42; 32];
7905 let network = Network::Testnet;
7906 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7908 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7909 let config = UserConfig::default();
7910 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7912 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7913 // same as the old fee.
7914 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7915 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7916 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7920 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7921 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7922 // dust limits are used.
7923 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7924 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7925 let seed = [42; 32];
7926 let network = Network::Testnet;
7927 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7928 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7929 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7931 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7932 // they have different dust limits.
7934 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7935 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7936 let config = UserConfig::default();
7937 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7939 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7940 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7941 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7942 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7943 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7945 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7946 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7947 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7948 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7949 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7951 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7952 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7953 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7954 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7956 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7957 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7958 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7960 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7961 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7963 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7964 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7965 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7967 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7968 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7969 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7970 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7973 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7975 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7976 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7977 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7978 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7979 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7980 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7981 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7982 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7983 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7985 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7988 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7989 // the dust limit check.
7990 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7991 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7992 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7993 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7995 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7996 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7997 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7998 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
7999 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8000 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8001 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8005 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8006 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8007 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8008 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8009 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8010 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8011 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8012 let seed = [42; 32];
8013 let network = Network::Testnet;
8014 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8016 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8017 let config = UserConfig::default();
8018 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8020 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8021 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8023 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8024 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8025 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8026 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8027 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8028 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8030 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8031 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8032 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8033 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8034 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8036 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8038 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8039 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8040 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8041 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8042 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8044 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8045 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8046 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8047 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8048 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8052 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8053 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8054 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8055 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8056 let seed = [42; 32];
8057 let network = Network::Testnet;
8058 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8059 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8060 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8062 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8064 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8065 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8066 let config = UserConfig::default();
8067 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8069 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8070 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8071 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8072 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8074 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8075 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8076 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8078 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8079 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8080 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8081 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8083 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8084 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8085 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8087 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8088 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8090 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8091 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8092 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8093 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8094 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8095 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8096 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8098 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8100 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8101 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8102 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8103 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8104 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8108 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8109 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8110 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8111 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8112 let seed = [42; 32];
8113 let network = Network::Testnet;
8114 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8115 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8116 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8118 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8119 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8120 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8121 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8122 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8123 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8124 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8125 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8127 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8128 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8129 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8130 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8131 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8132 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8134 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8135 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8136 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8137 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8139 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8141 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8142 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8143 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8144 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8145 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8146 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8148 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8149 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8150 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8151 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8153 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8154 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8155 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8156 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8157 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8159 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8160 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8162 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
8163 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8164 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8166 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8167 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8168 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8169 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8170 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8172 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8173 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8175 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8176 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8177 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8181 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8183 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8184 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8185 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8187 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8188 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8189 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8190 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8192 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8193 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8194 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8196 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8198 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8199 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8202 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8203 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8204 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8205 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8206 let seed = [42; 32];
8207 let network = Network::Testnet;
8208 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8209 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8210 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8213 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8214 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8215 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8217 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8218 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8220 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8221 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8222 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8224 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8225 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8227 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8229 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8230 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8232 // Channel Negotiations failed
8233 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8234 assert!(result.is_err());
8239 fn channel_update() {
8240 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8241 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8242 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8243 let seed = [42; 32];
8244 let network = Network::Testnet;
8245 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8246 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8247 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8249 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8250 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8251 let config = UserConfig::default();
8252 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8254 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8255 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8256 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8257 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8258 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8260 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8261 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8262 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8263 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8264 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8266 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8267 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8268 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8269 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8271 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8272 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8273 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8275 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8276 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8278 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8279 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8280 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8282 short_channel_id: 0,
8285 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8286 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8287 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8289 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8290 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8292 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8294 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8296 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8297 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8298 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8299 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8301 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8302 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8303 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8305 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8308 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8311 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8313 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8314 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8315 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8316 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8317 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8318 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8319 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8320 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8321 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8322 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8323 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8324 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8325 use crate::sync::Arc;
8327 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8328 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8329 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8330 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8332 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8334 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8335 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8336 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8337 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8338 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8340 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8341 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8347 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8348 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8349 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8351 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8352 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8353 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8354 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8355 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8356 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8358 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8360 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8361 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8362 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8363 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8364 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8365 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8367 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8368 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8369 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8370 selected_contest_delay: 144
8372 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8373 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8375 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8376 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8378 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8379 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8381 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8382 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8384 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8385 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8386 // build_commitment_transaction.
8387 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8388 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8389 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8390 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8391 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8393 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8394 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8395 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8396 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8400 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8401 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8402 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8403 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8407 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8408 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8409 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8411 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8412 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8414 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8415 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8417 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8419 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8420 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8421 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8422 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8423 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8424 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8425 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8427 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8428 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8429 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8430 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8432 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8433 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8434 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8436 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8438 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8439 commitment_tx.clone(),
8440 counterparty_signature,
8441 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8442 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8443 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8445 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8446 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8448 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8449 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8450 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8452 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8453 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8456 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8457 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8459 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8460 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8461 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8462 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8463 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8464 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8465 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8466 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8468 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8471 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8472 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8473 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8477 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8480 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8481 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8482 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8483 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8484 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8485 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8487 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8488 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8489 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8490 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8492 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8493 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8494 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8495 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8496 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8498 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8499 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8500 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8501 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8502 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&htlc_tx)));
8503 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8505 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8509 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8510 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8511 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8512 "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", {});
8514 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8515 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8517 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8518 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8519 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8521 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8522 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8523 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8524 "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", {});
8526 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8527 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8529 amount_msat: 1000000,
8531 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8532 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8534 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8537 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8538 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8540 amount_msat: 2000000,
8542 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8543 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8545 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8548 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8549 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8551 amount_msat: 2000000,
8553 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8554 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8555 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8556 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8558 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8561 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8562 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8564 amount_msat: 3000000,
8566 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8567 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8568 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8569 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8571 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8574 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8575 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8577 amount_msat: 4000000,
8579 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8580 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8582 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8586 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8587 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8588 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8590 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8591 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8592 "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", {
8595 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8596 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8597 "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" },
8600 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8601 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8602 "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" },
8605 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8606 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8607 "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" },
8610 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8611 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8612 "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" },
8615 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8616 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8617 "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" }
8620 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8621 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8622 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8624 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8625 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8626 "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", {
8629 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8630 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8631 "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" },
8634 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8635 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8636 "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" },
8639 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8640 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8641 "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" },
8644 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8645 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8646 "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" },
8649 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8650 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8651 "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" }
8654 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8655 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8656 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8658 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8659 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8660 "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", {
8663 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8664 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8665 "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" },
8668 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8669 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8670 "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" },
8673 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8674 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8675 "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" },
8678 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8679 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8680 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8683 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8684 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8685 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8686 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8688 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8689 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8690 "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", {
8693 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8694 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8695 "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" },
8698 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8699 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8700 "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" },
8703 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8704 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8705 "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" },
8708 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8709 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8710 "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" }
8713 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8714 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8715 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8716 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8718 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8719 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8720 "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", {
8723 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8724 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8725 "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" },
8728 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8729 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8730 "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" },
8733 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8734 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8735 "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" },
8738 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8739 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8740 "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" }
8743 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8744 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8745 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8747 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8748 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8749 "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", {
8752 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8753 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8754 "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" },
8757 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8758 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8759 "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" },
8762 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8763 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8764 "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" }
8767 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8768 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8769 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8771 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8772 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8773 "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", {
8776 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8777 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8778 "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" },
8781 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8782 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8783 "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" },
8786 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8787 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8788 "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" }
8791 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8792 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8793 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8795 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8796 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8797 "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", {
8800 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8801 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8802 "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" },
8805 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8806 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8807 "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" }
8810 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8811 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8812 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8813 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8814 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8815 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8817 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8818 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8819 "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", {
8822 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8823 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8824 "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" },
8827 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8828 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8829 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8832 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8833 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8834 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8835 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8836 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8838 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8839 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8840 "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", {
8843 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8844 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8845 "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" },
8848 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8849 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8850 "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" }
8853 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8854 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8855 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8857 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8858 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8859 "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", {
8862 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8863 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8864 "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" }
8867 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8868 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8869 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8870 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8871 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8873 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8874 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8875 "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", {
8878 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8879 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8880 "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" }
8883 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8884 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8885 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8886 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8887 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8889 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8890 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8891 "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", {
8894 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8895 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8896 "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" }
8899 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8900 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8901 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8902 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8904 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8905 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8906 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484fa926a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf50147304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a72001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8908 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8909 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8910 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8911 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8912 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8914 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8915 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8916 "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", {});
8918 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8919 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8920 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8921 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8922 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8924 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8925 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8926 "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", {});
8928 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8929 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8930 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8932 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8933 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8934 "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", {});
8936 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8937 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8938 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8939 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8940 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8942 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8943 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8944 "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", {});
8946 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8947 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8948 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8949 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8950 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8952 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8953 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8954 "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", {});
8956 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8957 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8958 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8959 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8960 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8961 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8963 amount_msat: 2000000,
8965 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8966 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8968 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8971 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8972 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8973 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8975 amount_msat: 5000001,
8977 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8978 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8979 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8980 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8982 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8985 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8986 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8988 amount_msat: 5000000,
8990 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8991 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8992 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8993 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8995 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8999 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9000 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9001 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9004 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9005 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9006 "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" },
9008 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9009 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9010 "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" },
9012 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9013 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9014 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
9017 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9018 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9019 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9020 "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", {
9023 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9024 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9025 "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" },
9027 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9028 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9029 "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" },
9031 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9032 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9033 "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" }
9038 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9039 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9041 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9042 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9043 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9044 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9046 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9047 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9048 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9050 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9051 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9053 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9054 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9056 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9057 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9058 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9062 fn test_key_derivation() {
9063 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9064 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9066 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9067 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9069 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9070 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9072 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9073 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9075 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9076 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
9078 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9079 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9081 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9082 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9084 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9085 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9089 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9090 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9091 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9092 let seed = [42; 32];
9093 let network = Network::Testnet;
9094 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9095 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9097 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9098 let config = UserConfig::default();
9099 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9100 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
9102 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9103 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9105 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9106 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9107 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9108 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9109 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9110 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9111 assert!(res.is_ok());
9115 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9116 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9117 // resulting `channel_type`.
9118 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9119 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9120 let network = Network::Testnet;
9121 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9122 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9124 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9125 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9127 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9128 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9130 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9131 // need to signal it.
9132 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9133 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9134 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9137 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9139 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9140 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9141 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9143 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9144 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9145 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9148 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9149 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9150 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9151 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9152 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9155 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9156 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9160 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9161 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9162 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9163 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9164 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9165 let network = Network::Testnet;
9166 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9167 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9169 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9170 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9172 let config = UserConfig::default();
9174 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9175 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9176 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9177 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9178 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9180 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9181 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9182 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9185 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9186 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9187 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9189 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9190 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9191 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9192 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9193 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9194 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9196 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9200 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9201 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9203 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9204 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9205 let network = Network::Testnet;
9206 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9207 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9209 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9210 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9212 let config = UserConfig::default();
9214 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9215 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9216 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9217 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9218 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9219 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9220 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9221 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9223 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9224 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9225 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9226 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9227 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9228 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9231 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9232 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9234 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9235 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9236 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9237 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9239 assert!(res.is_err());
9241 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9242 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9243 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9245 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9246 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9247 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
9250 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9252 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9253 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9254 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9255 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9258 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9259 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9261 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9262 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9264 assert!(res.is_err());
9268 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9269 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9270 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9271 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9272 let seed = [42; 32];
9273 let network = Network::Testnet;
9274 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9275 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9276 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9278 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9279 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9280 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9281 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9283 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9284 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9285 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9290 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9299 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9300 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9301 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9306 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9307 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9313 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9316 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9317 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9318 &accept_channel_msg,
9319 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9320 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9323 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9324 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9325 let tx = Transaction {
9327 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9331 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9334 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9337 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9338 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9343 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9344 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9345 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9349 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9350 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9358 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9359 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9360 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9361 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9366 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9373 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9374 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9375 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9376 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9378 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9379 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9380 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9383 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9384 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9385 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9393 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9394 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9395 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9396 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9399 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9400 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9402 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9403 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9404 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9406 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());