1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
13 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
15 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
16 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
20 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
21 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
26 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
28 use crate::ln::types::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
29 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
31 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
32 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
33 use crate::ln::channel_state::{ChannelShutdownState, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, InboundHTLCDetails, InboundHTLCStateDetails, OutboundHTLCDetails, OutboundHTLCStateDetails};
34 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
35 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
36 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
37 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
38 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
39 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
40 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
41 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
42 use crate::sign::ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner;
43 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
44 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
45 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
46 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
47 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
48 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
49 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
50 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
53 use crate::prelude::*;
54 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
56 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
57 use crate::sync::Mutex;
58 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
60 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
63 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
64 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
66 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
70 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
71 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
74 pub struct AvailableBalances {
75 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
76 pub balance_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
78 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
80 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
81 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
83 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
84 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
87 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
89 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
91 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
92 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
93 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
94 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
95 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
96 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
98 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
102 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
103 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
104 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
105 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
108 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
110 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
111 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
112 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
114 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
115 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
117 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
119 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
120 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
121 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
123 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
127 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
129 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
132 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
136 enum InboundHTLCState {
137 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
138 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
139 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
140 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
141 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
142 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
143 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
144 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
145 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
146 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
147 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
148 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
149 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
150 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
151 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
153 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
154 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
155 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
156 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
157 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
158 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
159 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
160 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
161 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
162 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
163 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
164 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
165 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
166 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
168 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
169 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
170 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
171 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
172 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
173 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
174 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
175 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
177 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
178 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
180 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
181 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
182 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
183 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
184 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
185 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
186 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
187 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
190 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
191 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
193 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
194 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
195 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
196 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
197 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
198 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
199 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
200 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
201 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
202 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
203 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
204 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
205 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
210 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
214 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
215 state: InboundHTLCState,
218 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
219 enum OutboundHTLCState {
220 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
221 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
222 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
223 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
224 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
225 /// money back (though we won't), and,
226 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
227 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
228 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
229 /// we'll never get out of sync).
230 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
231 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
232 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
234 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
235 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
236 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
237 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
238 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
239 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
240 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
241 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
242 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
243 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
244 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
245 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
246 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
247 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
248 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
251 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
252 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
254 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
255 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
256 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
257 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
258 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
260 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
261 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
262 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
263 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
264 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
265 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
266 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
267 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
268 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
269 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
275 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
276 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
277 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
278 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
279 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
282 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
283 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
285 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
286 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
291 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
292 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
294 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
295 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
300 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
301 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
305 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
306 state: OutboundHTLCState,
308 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
309 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
312 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
313 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
314 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
315 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
319 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
321 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
322 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
323 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
324 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
327 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
332 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
337 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
341 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
342 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
343 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
344 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
345 struct $flag_type(u32);
350 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
353 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
355 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
358 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
361 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
362 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
365 Ok($flag_type(flags))
370 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
372 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
374 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
376 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
380 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
383 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
385 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
387 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
388 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
390 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
392 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
394 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
395 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
398 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
399 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
401 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
404 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
406 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
408 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
411 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
412 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
414 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
415 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
416 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
417 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
418 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
419 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
420 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
421 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
423 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
425 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
427 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
428 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
430 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
432 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
434 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
435 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
437 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
438 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
440 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
441 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
446 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
449 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
450 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
451 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
452 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
453 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
454 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
455 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
456 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
457 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
458 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
459 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
460 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
461 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
462 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
466 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
468 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
469 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
470 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
471 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
472 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
473 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
474 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
475 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
476 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
477 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
478 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
479 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
480 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
481 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
486 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
487 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
488 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
489 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
490 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
491 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
496 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
497 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
498 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
499 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
500 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
501 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
502 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
503 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
504 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
505 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
506 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
507 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
508 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
509 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
514 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
515 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
516 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
517 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
518 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
519 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
520 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
521 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
525 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
526 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
527 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
529 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
530 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
531 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
532 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
533 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
535 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
536 /// funding transaction to confirm.
537 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
538 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
540 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
541 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
542 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
546 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
547 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
549 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
552 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
561 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
563 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
567 fn $clear(&mut self) {
570 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
572 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
576 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
577 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
579 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
580 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
585 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
587 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
588 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
590 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
591 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
592 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
593 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
594 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
595 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
596 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
597 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
605 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
607 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
608 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
609 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
610 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
611 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
615 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
616 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
619 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
620 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
623 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
625 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
626 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
627 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
631 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
633 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
634 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
635 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
636 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
638 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
644 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
645 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
646 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
647 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
648 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
649 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
650 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
651 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
654 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
656 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
658 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
659 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
660 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
661 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
665 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
667 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
669 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
671 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
672 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
673 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
674 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
675 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
677 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
678 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
680 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
682 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
683 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
685 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
686 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
687 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
688 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
689 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
690 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
692 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
693 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
695 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
696 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
697 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
698 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
699 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
701 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
702 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
704 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
705 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
707 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
708 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
709 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
710 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
716 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
717 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
719 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
720 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
721 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
726 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
727 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
729 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
730 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
731 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
737 pub(super) fn close(err: String) -> Self {
738 ChannelError::Close(err.clone())
742 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
744 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
745 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
746 pub payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>,
749 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
750 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
751 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
752 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
753 record.payment_hash = self.payment_hash;
754 self.logger.log(record)
758 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
759 where L::Target: Logger {
760 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>, payment_hash: Option<PaymentHash>) -> Self
761 where S::Target: SignerProvider
765 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
766 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
772 macro_rules! secp_check {
773 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
776 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
781 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
782 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
783 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
784 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
785 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
786 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
787 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
788 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
790 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
792 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
794 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
798 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
800 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
801 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
802 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
804 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
805 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
807 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
808 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
809 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
810 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
811 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
813 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
814 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
818 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
824 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
826 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
827 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
828 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
829 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
830 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
831 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
832 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
833 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
836 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
837 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
838 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
839 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
840 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
841 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
842 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
843 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
844 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
845 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
846 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
849 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
850 struct HTLCCandidate {
852 origin: HTLCInitiator,
856 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
864 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
866 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
868 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
869 htlc_value_msat: u64,
870 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
875 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
876 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
877 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
878 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
879 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
881 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
882 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
883 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
884 htlc_value_msat: u64,
886 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
887 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
891 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
892 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
893 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
894 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
895 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
896 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
897 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
898 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
899 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
900 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
901 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
902 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
905 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
907 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
908 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
909 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
910 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
913 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
914 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
915 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
916 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
917 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
918 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
919 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
920 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
923 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
925 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
926 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
927 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
928 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
929 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
930 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
931 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
932 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
933 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
934 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
935 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
936 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
937 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
938 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
939 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
942 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
943 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
944 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
945 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
946 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
947 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
948 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
949 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
950 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
951 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
952 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
953 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
954 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
955 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
956 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
958 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
959 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
960 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
961 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
963 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
964 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
965 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
966 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
968 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
969 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
970 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
971 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
972 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
974 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
975 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
976 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
977 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
979 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
980 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
981 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
983 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
984 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
985 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
986 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
987 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
989 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
990 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
993 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
994 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
996 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
997 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
998 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
999 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1001 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1002 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1004 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1005 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1008 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1009 (0, update, required),
1012 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1013 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1014 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1015 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1016 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1017 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1018 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1019 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1020 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1021 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1024 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1025 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1026 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1028 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1030 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1031 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1032 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1033 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1034 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1035 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1036 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1040 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1042 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1043 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1044 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1045 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1046 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1047 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1048 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1053 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1054 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1055 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1056 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1057 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1059 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1060 /// in a timely manner.
1061 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1064 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1065 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1066 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1068 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1069 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1070 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1071 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1075 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1076 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1077 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1079 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1080 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1081 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1082 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1084 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1088 /// The current channel ID.
1089 channel_id: ChannelId,
1090 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1091 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1092 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1093 channel_state: ChannelState,
1095 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1096 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1098 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1099 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1100 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1102 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1103 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1104 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1105 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1107 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1108 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1110 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1112 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1113 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1114 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1116 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1117 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1118 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1120 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1121 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1122 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1123 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1124 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1125 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1127 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1128 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1129 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1130 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1131 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1132 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1134 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1136 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1137 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1138 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1140 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1141 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1142 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1143 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1144 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1145 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1146 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1147 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1149 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1150 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1151 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1153 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1154 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1155 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1156 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1157 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1158 /// outbound or inbound.
1159 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1161 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1163 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1164 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1165 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1166 // HTLCs with similar state.
1167 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1168 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1169 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1170 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1171 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1172 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1173 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1174 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1175 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1176 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1178 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1179 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1180 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1182 update_time_counter: u32,
1184 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1185 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1186 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1187 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1188 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1189 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1191 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1192 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1194 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1195 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1196 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1197 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1199 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1200 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1202 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1204 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1206 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1207 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1208 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1209 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1210 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1212 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1213 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1215 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1216 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1217 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1219 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1220 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1221 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1222 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1223 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1224 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1225 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1226 pub(super) channel_creation_height: u32,
1228 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1231 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1233 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1236 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1238 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1241 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1243 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1245 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1246 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1249 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1251 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1253 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1254 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1256 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1258 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1259 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1260 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1262 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1264 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1265 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1266 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1268 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1269 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1270 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1272 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1274 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1276 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1277 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1278 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1279 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1281 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1282 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1283 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1285 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1286 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1287 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1289 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1290 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1291 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1292 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1293 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1294 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1295 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1296 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1298 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1299 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1300 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1301 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1302 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1304 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1305 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1307 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1308 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1309 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1310 /// unblock the state machine.
1312 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1313 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1314 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1316 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1317 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1318 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1320 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1321 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1322 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1323 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1324 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1325 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1326 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1327 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1329 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1330 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1332 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1333 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1334 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1336 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1337 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1338 // associated channel mapping.
1340 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1341 // to store all of them.
1342 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1344 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1345 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1346 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1347 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1348 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1350 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1351 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1353 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1354 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1356 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1357 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1359 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1360 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1362 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1364 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1366 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1367 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1368 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1371 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1372 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1373 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1374 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1375 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1376 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1377 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1379 config: &'a UserConfig,
1380 current_chain_height: u32,
1383 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1384 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1385 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1386 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1387 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1389 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1390 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1392 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1393 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1395 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1397 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
1398 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1400 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1402 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1403 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1404 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1406 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1407 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1410 // Check sanity of message fields:
1411 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1412 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1413 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1414 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1415 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1417 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1418 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1420 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1421 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1423 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1424 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1425 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1427 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1428 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1430 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1431 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1433 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1435 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1436 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1437 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1439 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1442 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1443 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1446 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1447 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1448 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1450 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1451 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1453 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1454 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1456 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1457 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1459 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1460 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1462 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1463 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1465 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1466 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1469 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1471 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1472 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1477 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1478 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1479 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1480 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1482 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1483 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1485 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1486 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1487 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1489 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1490 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1493 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1494 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1495 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1496 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1500 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1501 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1502 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1503 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1506 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1507 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1508 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1509 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1510 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1513 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1514 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1515 &Some(ref script) => {
1516 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1517 if script.len() == 0 {
1520 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1521 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1523 Some(script.clone())
1526 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1528 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1533 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1534 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1535 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1536 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1540 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1541 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1542 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1546 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1547 Ok(script) => script,
1548 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1551 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1552 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1554 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1557 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1560 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1562 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1564 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1567 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1568 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1570 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1575 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1577 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1578 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1579 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1580 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1582 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1585 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1587 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1588 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1591 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1592 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1595 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1596 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1597 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1598 pending_update_fee: None,
1599 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1600 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1601 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1602 update_time_counter: 1,
1604 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1606 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1607 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1608 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1609 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1610 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1611 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1612 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1614 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1615 signer_pending_funding: false,
1618 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1619 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1620 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1621 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1623 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1624 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1625 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1626 closing_fee_limits: None,
1627 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1629 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1630 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1631 short_channel_id: None,
1632 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1634 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1635 channel_value_satoshis,
1636 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1637 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1638 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1639 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1640 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1641 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1642 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1643 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1644 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1645 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1648 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1650 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1651 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1652 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1653 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1654 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1655 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1656 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1658 funding_outpoint: None,
1659 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1661 funding_transaction: None,
1662 is_batch_funding: None,
1664 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1665 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1666 counterparty_node_id,
1668 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1670 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1672 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1673 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1675 announcement_sigs: None,
1677 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1678 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1679 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1680 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1682 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1683 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1685 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1686 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1688 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1689 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1691 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1692 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1697 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1699 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1705 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1706 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1707 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1708 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1709 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1710 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1711 funding_satoshis: u64,
1714 config: &'a UserConfig,
1715 current_chain_height: u32,
1716 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1717 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1718 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1719 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1720 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1721 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1722 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1724 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1725 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1726 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1728 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1729 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1731 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1733 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1734 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1736 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1737 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1739 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1740 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1741 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1743 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1744 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1747 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1748 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1750 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1751 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1753 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1755 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1757 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1758 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1759 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1760 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1763 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1764 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1766 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1767 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1768 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1769 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1773 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1774 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1775 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1779 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1780 Ok(script) => script,
1781 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1784 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1789 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1790 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1791 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1792 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1797 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1799 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1800 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1801 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1802 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1804 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1805 channel_value_satoshis,
1807 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1809 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1810 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1813 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1814 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1817 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1818 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1819 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1820 pending_update_fee: None,
1821 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1822 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1823 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1824 update_time_counter: 1,
1826 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1828 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1829 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1830 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1831 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1832 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1833 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1834 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1836 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1837 signer_pending_funding: false,
1839 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
1840 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1841 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1842 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1843 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1844 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1846 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1847 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1848 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1849 closing_fee_limits: None,
1850 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1852 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1853 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1854 short_channel_id: None,
1855 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1857 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
1858 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1859 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1860 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1861 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
1862 // receive `accept_channel2`.
1863 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1864 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1865 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1866 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1867 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1868 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1869 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1870 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1872 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1874 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1875 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1876 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1877 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1878 counterparty_parameters: None,
1879 funding_outpoint: None,
1880 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1882 funding_transaction: None,
1883 is_batch_funding: None,
1885 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1886 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1887 counterparty_node_id,
1889 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1891 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1893 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1894 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1896 announcement_sigs: None,
1898 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1899 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1900 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1901 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1903 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1904 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1906 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1907 outbound_scid_alias,
1909 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1910 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1912 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1913 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1918 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1919 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1923 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1924 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1925 self.update_time_counter
1928 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1929 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1932 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1933 self.config.announced_channel
1936 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1937 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1940 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1941 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1942 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1943 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1946 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1947 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1948 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1951 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1952 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1953 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1954 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1955 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1956 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1957 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1960 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1961 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1962 match self.channel_state {
1963 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1964 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1965 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1966 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1967 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1968 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1969 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1971 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1973 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1974 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1978 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1979 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1980 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1981 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1982 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1983 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1986 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1987 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1988 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1992 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1993 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1994 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1995 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1996 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1999 // Public utilities:
2001 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2005 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2007 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2008 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2009 self.temporary_channel_id
2012 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2016 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2017 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2018 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2022 /// Gets the channel's type
2023 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2027 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2029 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2030 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2031 self.short_channel_id
2034 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2035 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2036 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2039 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2040 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2041 self.outbound_scid_alias
2044 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2046 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2047 return &self.holder_signer
2050 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2051 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2052 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2053 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2054 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2055 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2058 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2059 /// get_funding_created.
2060 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2061 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2064 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2065 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2066 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2067 if conf_height > 0 {
2074 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2075 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2076 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2079 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2080 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2081 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2082 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2086 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2089 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2090 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2093 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2094 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2097 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2098 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2099 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2102 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2103 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2106 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2107 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2108 self.counterparty_node_id
2111 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2112 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2113 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2116 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2117 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2118 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2121 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2122 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2124 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2125 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2126 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2127 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2129 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2133 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2134 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2135 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2138 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2139 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2140 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2143 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2144 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2145 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2147 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2148 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2153 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2154 self.channel_value_satoshis
2157 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2158 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2161 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2162 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2165 fn get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate<F: Deref>(&self,
2166 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2167 ) -> u32 where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
2168 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep)
2171 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self, limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw: u32) -> u64 {
2172 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2173 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2174 (limiting_feerate_sat_per_kw as u64).saturating_mul(multiplier)
2176 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2180 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2181 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2182 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2185 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2186 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2187 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2190 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2191 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2192 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2195 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2196 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2197 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2200 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2201 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2202 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2205 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2206 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2207 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2210 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2211 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2212 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2213 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2214 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2217 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2219 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2220 self.prev_config = None;
2224 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2225 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2229 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2230 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2231 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2232 let did_channel_update =
2233 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2234 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2235 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2236 if did_channel_update {
2237 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2238 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2239 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2240 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2242 self.config.options = *config;
2246 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2247 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2248 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2249 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2250 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2253 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2254 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2255 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2256 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2257 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2259 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2260 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2261 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2262 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2263 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2264 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2265 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2267 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2268 where L::Target: Logger
2270 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2271 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2272 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2274 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2275 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2276 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2277 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2279 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2280 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2281 if match update_state {
2282 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2283 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2284 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2285 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2286 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2288 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2292 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2293 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2294 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2296 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2298 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2299 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2300 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2302 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2303 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2304 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2305 transaction_output_index: None
2310 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2311 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2312 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2313 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2314 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2317 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2319 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2320 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2321 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2323 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2324 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2327 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2328 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2331 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2333 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2334 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2335 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2337 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2338 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2344 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2346 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2347 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2348 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2349 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2350 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2351 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2352 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2356 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2357 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2359 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2361 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2362 if generated_by_local {
2363 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2364 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2365 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2375 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2377 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2378 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2379 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2380 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2381 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2382 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2383 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2386 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2387 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2388 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2389 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2393 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2394 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2398 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2399 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2401 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2403 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2404 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2406 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2407 if !generated_by_local {
2408 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2416 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2417 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2418 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2419 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2420 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2421 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2422 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2423 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2425 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2427 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2428 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2429 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2430 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2432 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2434 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2435 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2436 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2437 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2440 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2441 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2442 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2443 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2445 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2448 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2449 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2450 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2451 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2453 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2456 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2457 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2462 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2463 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2468 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2470 let channel_parameters =
2471 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2472 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2473 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2480 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2483 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2484 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2485 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2486 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2494 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2495 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2496 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2497 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2502 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2503 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2504 /// our counterparty!)
2505 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2506 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2507 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2508 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2509 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2510 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2511 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2513 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2517 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2518 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2519 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2520 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2521 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2522 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2523 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2525 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2528 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2529 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2530 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2531 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2532 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2535 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2536 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2539 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2543 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2544 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2545 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2546 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2547 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2548 // which are near the dust limit.
2549 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2550 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2551 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2552 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2553 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2555 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2556 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2558 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2559 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2562 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2563 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2564 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2567 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2568 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate: u32) -> HTLCStats {
2570 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2572 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update);
2573 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2576 (dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2577 dust_buffer_feerate as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2580 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2581 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2583 let mut on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2584 let mut on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs = 0;
2586 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2589 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2590 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2591 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2592 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2593 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2594 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2596 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2598 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2599 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2604 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2605 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2606 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2607 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2609 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2610 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2611 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2612 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2613 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2614 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2616 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2618 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2619 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2623 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2624 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2625 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2626 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2627 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2628 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2629 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2631 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs += 1;
2633 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2634 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2636 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2642 // Include any mining "excess" fees in the dust calculation
2643 let excess_feerate_opt = outbound_feerate_update
2644 .or(self.pending_update_fee.map(|(fee, _)| fee))
2645 .unwrap_or(self.feerate_per_kw)
2646 .checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2647 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2648 let on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs =
2649 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs + on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs;
2650 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2651 commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, on_counterparty_tx_nondust_htlcs, &self.channel_type);
2652 if !self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2653 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2654 on_counterparty_tx_accepted_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2655 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2656 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat +=
2657 on_counterparty_tx_offered_nondust_htlcs as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(&self.channel_type)
2658 * excess_feerate as u64 / 1000;
2663 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2664 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2665 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2666 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2667 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2668 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2669 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2670 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2674 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2675 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2676 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2677 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2678 match holding_cell_update {
2679 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2680 holding_cell_states.insert(
2682 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2685 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2686 holding_cell_states.insert(
2688 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2691 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2692 holding_cell_states.insert(
2694 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2698 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2701 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2702 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2705 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2706 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2708 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2709 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2710 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2711 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2712 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2713 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2714 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2715 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2716 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2717 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2724 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2725 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2726 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2727 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2730 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2731 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2733 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2734 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2735 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2736 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2737 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2738 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2739 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2740 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2741 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2742 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2745 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2746 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2752 } = *holding_cell_update {
2753 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2755 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2756 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2757 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2758 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2759 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2760 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2767 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2768 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2769 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2770 /// corner case properly.
2771 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2772 -> AvailableBalances
2773 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2775 let context = &self;
2776 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the case mentioned in the docs in general
2779 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
2780 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2782 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2783 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2784 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2785 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2788 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
2790 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2791 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
2793 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2795 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2797 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2798 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2802 if context.is_outbound() {
2803 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2804 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2806 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2807 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2809 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2810 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2811 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2812 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2815 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2816 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2817 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2818 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2819 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2820 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2821 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2824 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2825 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2826 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2827 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2828 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2829 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2830 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2831 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2832 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2833 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2834 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2836 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2839 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2840 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2841 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2842 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2843 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2846 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2847 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2849 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2850 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2851 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2853 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2854 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2855 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2856 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2860 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2862 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2863 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2864 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2865 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2866 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2867 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2868 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2870 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2871 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2873 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2874 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2875 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2878 let excess_feerate_opt = self.feerate_per_kw.checked_sub(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
2879 if let Some(excess_feerate) = excess_feerate_opt {
2880 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
2881 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(excess_feerate, &context.channel_type);
2882 let nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
2883 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
2884 if nondust_htlc_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2885 // If adding an extra HTLC would put us over the dust limit in total fees, we cannot
2886 // send any non-dust HTLCs.
2887 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2891 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000) > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_add(1) {
2892 // Note that we don't use the `counterparty_tx_dust_exposure` (with
2893 // `htlc_dust_exposure_msat`) here as it only applies to non-dust HTLCs.
2894 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2895 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
2896 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2899 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2900 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2901 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2902 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
2903 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2906 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2907 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2908 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2910 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2914 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2915 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2917 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
2918 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2922 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2923 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2924 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2925 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2927 outbound_capacity_msat,
2928 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2929 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2934 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2935 let context = &self;
2936 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2939 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2940 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2942 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2943 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2945 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2946 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2948 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2949 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2950 let context = &self;
2951 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2953 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2956 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2957 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2959 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2960 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2962 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2963 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2965 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2966 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2970 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2971 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2977 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2978 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2979 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2982 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2983 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2984 included_htlcs += 1;
2987 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2988 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2992 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2993 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2994 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2995 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2996 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2997 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3002 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3004 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3005 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3010 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3011 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3015 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3016 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3017 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3020 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3021 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3023 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3024 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3025 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3027 total_pending_htlcs,
3028 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3029 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3030 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3032 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3033 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3034 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3036 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3038 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3043 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3044 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3046 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3047 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3049 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3050 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3052 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3053 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3054 let context = &self;
3055 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3057 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3060 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3061 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3063 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3064 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3066 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3067 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3069 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3070 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3074 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3075 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3081 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3082 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3083 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3084 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3085 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3086 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3089 included_htlcs += 1;
3092 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3093 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3096 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3097 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3099 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3100 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3101 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3106 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3107 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3108 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3111 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3112 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3114 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3115 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3117 total_pending_htlcs,
3118 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3119 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3120 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3122 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3123 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3124 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3126 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3128 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3133 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3134 match self.channel_state {
3135 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3136 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3137 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3138 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3148 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3150 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3151 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3154 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3156 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3157 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3158 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3162 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3163 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3164 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3167 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3169 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3170 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3173 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3174 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3175 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3176 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3177 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3178 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3179 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3180 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3181 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3182 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3183 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3185 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3186 // return them to fail the payment.
3187 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3188 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3189 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3191 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3192 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3197 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3198 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3199 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3200 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3201 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3202 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3203 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3204 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3205 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3206 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3207 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3208 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3209 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3210 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3211 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3215 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3216 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3218 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3219 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3223 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3224 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3225 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3226 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3227 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3228 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3229 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3230 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3234 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3235 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3236 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3237 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3239 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3240 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3241 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3242 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3244 match &self.holder_signer {
3245 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3246 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3247 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3248 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3249 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3252 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3256 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3257 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3258 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3260 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3261 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3262 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3264 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3265 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3266 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3269 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3270 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3272 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3278 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3279 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3280 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3281 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3282 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3285 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3287 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3289 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3290 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3295 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3296 // We've exhausted our options
3299 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3300 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3303 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3304 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3305 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3306 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3308 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3309 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3310 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3311 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3312 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3313 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3315 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3317 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3322 // Internal utility functions for channels
3324 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3325 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3326 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3328 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3330 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3331 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3332 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3334 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3337 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3339 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3342 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3343 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3344 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3346 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3348 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3349 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3350 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3351 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3352 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3355 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3356 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3357 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3358 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3359 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3360 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3361 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3364 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3365 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3367 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3369 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3370 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3371 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3372 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3373 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3374 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3375 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3378 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3379 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3381 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3382 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3385 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3386 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3387 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3388 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3389 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3390 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3393 pub(crate) fn per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3394 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3395 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3396 let commitment_tx_fee = COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000;
3397 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3398 commitment_tx_fee + htlc_success_tx_weight(channel_type_features) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000
3404 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3405 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3406 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3407 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3408 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3409 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3410 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3411 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3412 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3413 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3414 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3415 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3418 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3419 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3420 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3421 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3422 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3423 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3426 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3427 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3429 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3430 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3431 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3435 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3436 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3437 trait FailHTLCContents {
3438 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3439 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3440 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3441 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3443 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3444 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3445 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3446 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3448 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3449 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3451 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3452 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3455 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3456 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3457 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3458 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3461 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3462 failure_code: self.1
3465 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3466 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3468 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3469 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3471 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3472 failure_code: self.1
3477 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3478 fn name() -> &'static str;
3480 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3481 fn name() -> &'static str {
3485 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3486 fn name() -> &'static str {
3487 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3491 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3492 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3493 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: EcdsaChannelSigner
3495 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3496 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3497 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3498 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3500 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3501 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3503 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3505 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3506 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3507 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3508 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3510 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3511 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3515 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3521 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3522 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3523 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3524 // outside of those situations will fail.
3525 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3529 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3534 1 + // script length (0)
3538 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3539 2 + // witness marker and flag
3540 1 + // witness element count
3541 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3542 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3543 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3544 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3545 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3546 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3548 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3549 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3550 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3556 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3557 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3558 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3559 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3561 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3562 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3563 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3565 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3566 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3567 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3568 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3569 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3570 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3573 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3574 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3577 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3578 value_to_holder = 0;
3581 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3582 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3583 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3584 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3586 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3587 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3590 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3591 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3594 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3597 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3598 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3600 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3602 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3603 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3604 where L::Target: Logger {
3605 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3606 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3607 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3608 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3609 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3610 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3611 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3612 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3616 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3617 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3618 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3619 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3621 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3622 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3625 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3626 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3627 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3629 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3630 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3631 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3632 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3633 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3634 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3635 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3637 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3638 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3639 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3641 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3642 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3644 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3647 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3648 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3652 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3656 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3657 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3658 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3659 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3660 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3661 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3664 // Now update local state:
3666 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3667 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3668 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3669 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3670 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3671 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3672 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3673 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3675 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3678 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3679 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3680 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3681 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3682 // do not not get into this branch.
3683 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3684 match pending_update {
3685 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3686 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3687 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3688 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3689 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3690 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3691 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3694 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3695 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3697 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3698 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3699 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3700 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3701 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3702 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3708 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3709 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3710 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3712 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3713 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3714 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3716 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3717 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3720 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3721 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3723 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3724 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3726 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3727 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3730 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3733 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3734 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3735 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3736 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3741 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3742 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3743 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3744 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3745 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3746 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3747 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3748 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3749 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3750 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3751 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3752 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3753 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3754 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3755 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3757 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3758 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3759 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3760 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3761 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3764 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3765 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3766 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3772 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3773 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3775 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3779 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3780 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3781 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3782 /// before we fail backwards.
3784 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3785 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3786 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3787 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3788 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3789 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3790 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3793 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3794 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3796 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3797 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3798 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3799 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3800 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3801 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3804 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3805 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3806 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3807 /// before we fail backwards.
3809 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3810 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3811 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3812 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3813 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3815 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3816 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3817 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3820 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3821 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3822 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3824 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3825 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3826 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3828 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3829 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3830 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3832 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3837 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3838 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3844 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3845 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3846 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3847 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3848 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3852 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3853 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3854 force_holding_cell = true;
3857 // Now update local state:
3858 if force_holding_cell {
3859 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3860 match pending_update {
3861 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3862 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3863 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3864 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3868 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3869 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3871 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3872 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3873 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3879 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3880 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
3884 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
3885 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
3887 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3888 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
3891 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
3894 // Message handlers:
3895 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
3896 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
3897 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
3898 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
3899 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3900 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3901 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3904 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3906 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3908 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3909 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3910 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3911 debug_assert!(matches!(
3912 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3914 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3915 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3918 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3919 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3921 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3922 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3923 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3924 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3926 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3929 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3930 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3931 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3934 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3935 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3936 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3937 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3938 // when routing outbound payments.
3939 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3943 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3944 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3945 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3946 match &self.context.channel_state {
3947 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3948 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
3949 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3950 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3951 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3952 check_reconnection = true;
3953 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3954 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3955 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3956 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3957 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3959 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3960 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3963 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3964 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3965 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3967 if check_reconnection {
3968 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3969 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3970 let expected_point =
3971 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3972 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3974 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3975 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3976 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3977 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3978 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3979 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3981 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3982 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3983 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3984 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3985 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3987 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3988 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3993 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3994 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3996 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3998 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4001 pub fn update_add_htlc<F: Deref>(
4002 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4003 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
4004 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator {
4005 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4006 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4008 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4009 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4010 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4012 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4013 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4015 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4016 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4018 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4019 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4021 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4022 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4025 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4026 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4027 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4028 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4030 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4031 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4034 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4035 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4036 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4037 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4038 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4039 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4040 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4041 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4042 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4043 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4044 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4046 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4047 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4048 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4049 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4050 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4051 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4055 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4056 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4057 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4058 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4059 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4060 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4063 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4064 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4066 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4067 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4068 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4070 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4071 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4075 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4078 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4083 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4084 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4088 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4089 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4090 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4091 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4092 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4093 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4096 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4097 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4099 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4103 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4104 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4105 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4109 // Now update local state:
4110 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4111 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4112 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4113 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4114 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4115 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4116 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4117 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4123 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4125 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4126 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4127 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4128 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4129 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4130 None => fail_reason.into(),
4131 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4132 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4133 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4136 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4140 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4141 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4142 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4143 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4145 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4146 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4151 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4154 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4155 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4158 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4162 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4165 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4166 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4167 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4169 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4173 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4177 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4178 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4181 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4185 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4189 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4190 where L::Target: Logger
4192 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4195 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4198 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4202 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4204 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4206 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4207 let commitment_txid = {
4208 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4209 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4210 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4212 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4213 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4214 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4215 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4216 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4221 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4223 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4224 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4225 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4226 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4229 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4230 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4231 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4232 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4235 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4237 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4238 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4239 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4240 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4241 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4242 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4243 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4244 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4245 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4246 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4247 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4253 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4257 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4258 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4259 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4260 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4261 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4262 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4263 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4264 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4265 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4266 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4267 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4268 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4269 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4272 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4273 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4274 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4275 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4276 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4277 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4278 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4280 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4281 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4282 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4283 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4284 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4285 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4286 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4287 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4289 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4290 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4293 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4295 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4296 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4297 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4300 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4303 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4304 commitment_stats.tx,
4306 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4307 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4308 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4311 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4312 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4314 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4315 let mut need_commitment = false;
4316 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4317 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4318 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4319 need_commitment = true;
4323 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4324 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4325 Some(resolution.clone())
4327 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4328 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4329 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4330 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4331 need_commitment = true;
4334 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4335 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4336 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4337 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4338 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4339 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4340 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4341 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4342 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4343 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4344 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4345 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4346 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4347 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4349 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4351 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4352 need_commitment = true;
4356 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4357 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4358 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4359 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4360 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4361 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4362 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4364 nondust_htlc_sources,
4366 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4369 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4370 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4371 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4372 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4373 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4375 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4376 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4377 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4378 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4379 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4380 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4381 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4382 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4383 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4384 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4385 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4386 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4387 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4388 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4390 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4391 &self.context.channel_id);
4392 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4395 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4396 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4397 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4398 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4399 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4400 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4401 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4402 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4403 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4407 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4408 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4409 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4410 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4413 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4414 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4415 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4416 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4417 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4418 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4419 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4421 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4422 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4423 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4426 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4427 /// for our counterparty.
4428 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4429 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4430 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4431 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4433 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4434 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4435 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4436 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4438 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4439 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4440 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4441 updates: Vec::new(),
4442 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4445 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4446 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4447 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4448 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4449 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4450 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4451 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4452 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4453 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4454 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4455 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4456 // to rebalance channels.
4457 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4458 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4459 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4460 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4462 match self.send_htlc(
4463 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4464 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4466 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4469 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4470 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4471 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4472 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4473 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4474 // into the holding cell without ever being
4475 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4476 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4477 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4480 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4487 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4488 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4489 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4490 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4491 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4492 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4493 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4494 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4495 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4496 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4497 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4498 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4501 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4502 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4503 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4505 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4506 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4507 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4510 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4512 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4513 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4514 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4515 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4516 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4517 // for a full revocation before failing.
4518 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4519 update_fail_count += 1;
4521 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4523 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4528 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4529 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4531 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4532 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4537 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4538 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4539 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4540 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4541 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4543 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4544 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4545 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4547 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4548 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4554 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4555 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4556 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4557 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4558 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4559 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4560 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4561 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4562 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4564 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4565 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4567 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4568 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4570 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4574 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4576 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4577 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4582 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4583 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4584 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4585 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4586 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4587 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4588 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4589 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4593 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4595 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4596 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4599 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4600 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4601 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4602 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4604 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4606 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4611 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4612 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4613 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4614 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4615 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4616 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4617 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4618 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4619 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4621 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4624 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4625 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4626 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4627 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4628 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4629 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4630 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4631 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4632 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4634 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4635 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4638 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4639 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4640 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4641 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4642 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4643 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4644 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4645 let mut require_commitment = false;
4646 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4649 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4650 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4651 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4652 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4654 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4655 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4656 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4657 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4658 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4659 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4661 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4665 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4666 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4667 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4668 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4669 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4671 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4672 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4673 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4678 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4679 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4681 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4685 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4686 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4688 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4689 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4690 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4691 require_commitment = true;
4692 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4694 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4695 match pending_htlc_status {
4696 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4697 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4698 require_commitment = true;
4700 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4701 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4702 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4704 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4705 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4706 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4710 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4711 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4712 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4713 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4716 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4717 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4718 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4719 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4725 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4726 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4727 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4728 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4729 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4731 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4732 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4733 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4734 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4735 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4736 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4737 require_commitment = true;
4741 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4743 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4744 match update_state {
4745 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4746 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4747 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4748 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4749 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4750 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4752 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4753 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4754 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4755 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4756 require_commitment = true;
4757 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4758 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4763 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4764 let release_state_str =
4765 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4766 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4767 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4768 if !release_monitor {
4769 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4770 update: monitor_update,
4772 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4774 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4779 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4781 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4782 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4783 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4784 if require_commitment {
4785 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4786 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4787 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4788 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4790 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4791 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4792 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4793 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4794 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4796 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4797 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4798 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4799 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4800 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4803 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4804 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4805 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4806 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4807 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4808 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4810 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4811 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4813 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4814 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4816 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4817 if require_commitment {
4818 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4820 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4821 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4822 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4823 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4825 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4826 &self.context.channel_id(),
4827 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4830 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4831 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4833 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4834 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4836 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4837 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4843 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4844 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4845 /// commitment update.
4846 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4847 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4848 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4850 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4851 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4854 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4855 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4856 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4857 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4859 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4860 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4861 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4862 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4863 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4864 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4865 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4867 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4868 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4870 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4871 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4873 if !self.context.is_live() {
4874 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4877 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4878 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
4879 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw), dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4880 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4881 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4882 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4883 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
4884 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4885 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4886 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4890 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4891 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
4892 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4893 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4896 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4897 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4901 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4902 force_holding_cell = true;
4905 if force_holding_cell {
4906 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4910 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4911 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4913 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4914 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4919 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4920 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4922 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4924 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4925 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4926 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4927 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4931 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4932 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4933 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4937 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4938 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4941 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4942 // will be retransmitted.
4943 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4944 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4945 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4947 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4948 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4950 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4951 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4952 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4953 // this HTLC accordingly
4954 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4957 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4958 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4959 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4960 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4963 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4964 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4965 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4966 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4967 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4968 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4973 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4975 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4976 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4977 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4978 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4982 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4983 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4984 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4985 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4986 // the update upon reconnection.
4987 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4991 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4993 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4994 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4998 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4999 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5000 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5001 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5002 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5003 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5004 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5006 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5007 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5008 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5009 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5010 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5011 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5012 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5014 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5015 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5016 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5017 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5018 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5019 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5020 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5023 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5024 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5025 /// to the remote side.
5026 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5027 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5028 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5029 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5032 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5034 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5035 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5037 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5038 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5039 // first received the funding_signed.
5040 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5041 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5042 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5043 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5045 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5047 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5048 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5049 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5050 funding_broadcastable = None;
5053 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5054 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5055 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5056 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5057 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5058 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5059 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5060 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5061 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5062 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5063 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5064 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5065 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5066 next_per_commitment_point,
5067 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5071 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5073 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5074 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5075 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5076 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5077 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5078 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5079 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5080 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5082 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5083 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5084 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5085 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5086 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5087 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5088 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5092 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5093 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5095 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5096 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5098 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5099 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5102 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5103 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5104 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5105 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5106 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5107 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5108 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5109 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5110 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5111 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5115 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5116 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5118 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5119 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5121 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5122 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5124 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5126 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5127 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5128 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5129 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5130 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5131 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5132 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5134 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5136 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5138 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5143 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5145 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5146 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5147 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5148 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5150 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5151 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5153 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5154 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5157 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5158 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5159 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5160 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5162 SignerResumeUpdates {
5169 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5170 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5171 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5172 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5173 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5174 per_commitment_secret,
5175 next_per_commitment_point,
5177 next_local_nonce: None,
5181 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5182 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5183 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5184 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5185 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5186 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5188 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5189 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5190 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5191 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5192 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5193 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5194 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5195 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5196 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5197 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5198 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5203 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5204 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5206 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5207 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5208 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5209 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5210 reason: err_packet.clone()
5213 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5214 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5215 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5216 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5217 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5218 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5221 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5222 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5223 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5224 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5225 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5232 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5233 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5234 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5235 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5239 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5240 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5241 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5242 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5243 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5244 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5245 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5249 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5250 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5252 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5253 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5254 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5255 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5260 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5261 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5266 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5267 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5268 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5269 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5270 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5271 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5272 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5277 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5278 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5280 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5281 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5282 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5283 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5284 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5285 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5286 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5287 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5290 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5292 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5293 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5294 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5295 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5299 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5300 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5301 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5304 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5305 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5306 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5307 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5308 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5309 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5310 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5312 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5313 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5314 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5315 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5316 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5319 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5320 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5321 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5322 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5323 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5324 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5325 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5326 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5330 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5331 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5332 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5333 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5334 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5335 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5336 our_commitment_transaction
5340 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5341 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5342 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5343 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5345 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5347 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5349 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5350 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5351 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5352 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5353 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5356 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5357 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5358 channel_ready: None,
5359 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5360 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5361 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5365 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5366 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5367 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5368 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5369 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5370 next_per_commitment_point,
5371 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5373 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5374 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5375 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5379 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5380 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5381 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5383 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5384 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5385 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5388 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5391 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5392 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5393 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5394 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5395 our_commitment_transaction
5399 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5400 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5401 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5402 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5403 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5404 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5405 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5407 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5409 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5410 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5411 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5412 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5413 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5414 next_per_commitment_point,
5415 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5419 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5420 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5421 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5423 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5426 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5427 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5428 raa: required_revoke,
5429 commitment_update: None,
5430 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5432 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5433 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5434 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5436 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5439 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5440 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5441 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5442 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5443 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5444 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5447 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5448 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5449 raa: required_revoke,
5450 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5451 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5454 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5455 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5456 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5457 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5458 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5461 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5462 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5463 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5464 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5469 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5470 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5471 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5472 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5474 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5476 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5478 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5479 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5480 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5481 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5482 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5483 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5484 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5485 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5487 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5488 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5489 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5490 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5491 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5493 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5494 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5495 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5496 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5499 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5500 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5501 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5502 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5503 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5504 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5505 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5506 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5507 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5508 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5509 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5510 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5511 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5512 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5513 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5515 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5518 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5519 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5522 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5523 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5524 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5525 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5526 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5527 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5530 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5531 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5532 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5533 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5534 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5535 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5536 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5538 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5544 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5545 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5546 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5547 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5549 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5550 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5551 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5552 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5553 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5554 return Ok((None, None, None));
5557 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5558 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5559 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5561 return Ok((None, None, None));
5564 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5565 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5566 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5567 return Ok((None, None, None));
5570 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5572 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5573 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5574 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5575 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5577 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5578 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5580 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5581 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5583 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5584 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5585 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5586 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5588 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5589 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5590 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5594 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5600 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5601 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5603 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5604 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5607 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5608 /// within our expected timeframe.
5610 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5611 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5612 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5615 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5618 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5619 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5623 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5624 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5626 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5627 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5629 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5630 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5631 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5632 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5633 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5635 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5636 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5637 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5640 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5642 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5643 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5646 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5647 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5648 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5651 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5654 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5655 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5656 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5657 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5659 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5662 assert!(send_shutdown);
5663 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5664 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5665 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5667 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5668 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5670 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5675 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5677 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5678 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5680 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5681 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5682 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5683 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5684 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5685 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5686 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5688 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5690 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5691 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5693 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5694 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5695 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5696 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5700 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5701 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5702 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5703 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5704 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5705 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5707 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5708 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5715 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5716 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5718 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5721 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5722 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5724 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5726 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5727 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5728 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5729 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5730 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5731 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5732 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5733 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5734 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5736 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5737 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5740 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5744 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5745 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5746 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5747 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5749 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5750 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5752 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5753 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5755 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5756 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5758 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5762 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5766 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5767 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5768 return Ok((None, None, None));
5771 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5772 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5773 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5774 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5776 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5778 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5781 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5782 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5783 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5784 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5785 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5789 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5790 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < Amount::from_sat(MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS) {
5791 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5795 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5796 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5798 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5801 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5802 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5803 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5804 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5806 monitor_update: None,
5807 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5808 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5809 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5810 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5811 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5812 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5813 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5814 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5816 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5817 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5818 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5819 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5823 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5825 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5826 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5827 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5828 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5830 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5833 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5834 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5836 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5837 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5838 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5839 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5841 monitor_update: None,
5842 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5843 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5844 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5845 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5846 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5847 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5848 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5849 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5851 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5852 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5853 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5854 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5859 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5860 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5861 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5862 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5864 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5865 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5866 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5868 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5870 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5877 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5878 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5879 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5881 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5882 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5884 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5885 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5888 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5889 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5890 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5891 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5892 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5894 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5896 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5898 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5899 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5902 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5903 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5904 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5905 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5906 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5907 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5908 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5909 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5911 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5914 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5915 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5916 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5917 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5919 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5923 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5924 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5925 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5926 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5928 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5934 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5935 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5936 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5937 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5938 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5939 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5940 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5942 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5943 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5946 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5948 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5949 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5955 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5956 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5957 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5958 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5959 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5960 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5961 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5963 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5964 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5971 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5972 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
5973 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
5975 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
5978 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5979 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
5982 let dust_exposure_limiting_feerate = self.context.get_dust_exposure_limiting_feerate(&fee_estimator);
5983 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None, dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5984 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(dust_exposure_limiting_feerate);
5985 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5988 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5989 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
5990 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
5992 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5993 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5994 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
5995 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5996 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5997 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
5998 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6001 let htlc_dust_exposure_msat =
6002 per_outbound_htlc_counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, &self.context.channel_type);
6003 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure =
6004 htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat.saturating_add(htlc_dust_exposure_msat);
6005 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6006 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to tx fee dust at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6007 counterparty_tx_dust_exposure, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6008 return Err(("Exceeded our tx fee dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6012 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6013 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6014 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6015 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6016 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6017 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6018 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6022 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6023 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6028 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6029 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6030 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6031 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6032 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6033 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6037 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6038 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6039 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6040 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6042 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6043 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6044 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6045 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6046 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6047 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6048 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6049 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6050 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6052 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6053 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6054 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6061 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6062 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
6065 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6066 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6069 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6070 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6074 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6075 &self.context.holder_signer
6079 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6081 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6082 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6083 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6084 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6085 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6086 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6088 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6090 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6098 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6099 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6103 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6104 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6105 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6106 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6109 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6110 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6111 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6112 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6115 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6116 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6117 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6118 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6119 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6120 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6123 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6124 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6125 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6126 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6127 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6128 if !release_monitor {
6129 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6138 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6139 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6140 /// here after logging them.
6141 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6142 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6143 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6144 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6147 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6148 update.update.update_id,
6158 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6159 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6162 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6163 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6164 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6166 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6167 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6169 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6170 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6172 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6173 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6174 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6177 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6178 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6179 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6180 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6181 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6182 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6184 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6185 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6186 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6188 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6189 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6190 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6191 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6192 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6193 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6199 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6200 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6201 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6202 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6205 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6206 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6207 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6210 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6211 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6212 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6215 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6216 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6217 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6220 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6221 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6222 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6223 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6224 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6227 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6228 self.context.channel_update_status
6231 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6232 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6233 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6236 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
6238 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6239 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6240 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6244 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6245 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6246 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6249 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6253 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6254 // channel_ready yet.
6255 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6259 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6260 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6261 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6262 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6264 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6265 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6266 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6268 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6269 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6272 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6273 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6275 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6276 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6277 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6278 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6279 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6280 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6281 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6282 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6284 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6288 if need_commitment_update {
6289 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6290 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6291 let next_per_commitment_point =
6292 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6293 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6294 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6295 next_per_commitment_point,
6296 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6300 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6306 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6307 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6308 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6309 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6310 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6311 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6312 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6314 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6317 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6318 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6319 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6320 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6321 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6322 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6323 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6324 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6325 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_p2wsh() ||
6326 tx.output[txo_idx].value.to_sat() != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6327 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6328 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6329 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6330 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6331 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6332 // channel and move on.
6333 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6334 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6336 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6337 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6338 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6340 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6341 if !tx.is_coinbase() {
6342 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6343 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6344 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6345 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6346 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6347 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6352 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6353 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6354 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6355 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6356 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6359 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6360 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6361 if tx.is_coinbase() &&
6362 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6363 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6364 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6367 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6368 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6369 // may have already happened for this block).
6370 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6371 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6372 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6373 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6376 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6377 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6378 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6379 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6387 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6388 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6389 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6390 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6392 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6393 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6396 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6398 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6399 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6400 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6401 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6403 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6406 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6409 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6410 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6411 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6412 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6414 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6417 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6418 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6419 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6421 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6422 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6424 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6425 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6426 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6434 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6436 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6437 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6438 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6440 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6441 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6444 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6445 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6446 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6447 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6448 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6449 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6450 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6451 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6454 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6455 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6456 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6457 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6459 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6460 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6461 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6463 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6464 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6465 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6466 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6468 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6469 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6470 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6471 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6472 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6473 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6474 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6477 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6478 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6480 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6483 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6484 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6485 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6486 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6487 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6488 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6489 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6490 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6491 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6492 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6493 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6494 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6495 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6496 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6497 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6498 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6499 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6505 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6510 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6511 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6513 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6514 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6515 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6516 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6518 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6521 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6523 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6524 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6525 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6526 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6527 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6528 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6530 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6531 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6534 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6535 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6536 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6537 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6538 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6539 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6541 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6542 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6545 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6546 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6547 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6548 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6549 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6555 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6556 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6557 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6558 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6560 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6563 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6567 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6571 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6572 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6576 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6580 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6581 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6584 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6588 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6590 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6595 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6596 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6597 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6599 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6604 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6606 None => return None,
6609 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6611 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6612 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6614 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6615 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6618 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6624 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6626 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6627 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6628 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6629 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6630 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6631 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6632 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6634 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6635 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6636 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6637 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6638 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6639 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6640 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6641 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6642 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6643 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6644 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6645 contents: announcement,
6648 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6653 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6657 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6658 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6659 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6660 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6661 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6662 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6663 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6664 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6666 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6668 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6669 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6670 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6671 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6673 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6674 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6675 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6676 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6679 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6680 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6681 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6682 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6685 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6688 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6689 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6690 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6691 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6692 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6693 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6696 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6698 Err(_) => return None,
6700 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6701 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6706 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6707 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6708 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6709 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6710 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6711 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6712 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6713 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6714 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6715 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6716 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6717 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6718 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6719 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6720 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6721 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6724 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6727 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6728 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6729 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6730 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6731 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6732 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6733 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6734 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6735 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6737 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6738 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6739 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6740 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6741 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6742 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6743 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6744 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6745 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6747 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6748 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6749 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6750 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6751 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6752 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6753 next_funding_txid: None,
6758 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6760 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6761 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6762 /// commitment update.
6764 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6765 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6766 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6767 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6768 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6769 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6770 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6773 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6774 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6775 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6777 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6778 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6783 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6784 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6786 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6788 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6789 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6791 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6792 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6793 /// regenerate them.
6795 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6796 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6798 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6799 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6800 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6801 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6802 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6803 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6804 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6805 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6807 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6808 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6809 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6811 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6813 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6814 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6815 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6818 if amount_msat == 0 {
6819 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6822 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6823 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6824 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6825 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6828 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6829 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6830 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6833 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6834 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6835 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6836 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6837 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6838 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6839 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6840 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6843 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6844 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6845 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6846 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6847 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6848 else { "to peer" });
6850 if need_holding_cell {
6851 force_holding_cell = true;
6854 // Now update local state:
6855 if force_holding_cell {
6856 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6861 onion_routing_packet,
6868 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6869 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6871 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6873 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6879 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6880 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6881 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6885 onion_routing_packet,
6889 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6894 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6895 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6896 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6897 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6899 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6900 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6901 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6903 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6904 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6908 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6909 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6910 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
6911 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6912 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6913 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6914 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6917 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6918 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6919 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
6920 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6921 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6922 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6925 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6927 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
6928 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6929 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
6930 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6931 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6933 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6934 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6937 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6938 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6939 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6940 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6941 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6942 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6943 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6944 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6945 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6946 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
6947 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
6948 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
6950 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
6952 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
6956 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
6957 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
6958 where L::Target: Logger
6960 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6961 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6962 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
6964 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6966 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6967 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6968 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6969 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6970 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6971 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6972 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6973 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6974 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6975 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
6976 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6982 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
6985 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6986 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6987 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6988 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6989 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6990 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6992 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6993 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6994 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6996 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6997 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6998 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7001 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7002 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7006 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7007 &commitment_stats.tx,
7008 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7009 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7010 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7011 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7013 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7015 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7016 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7017 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7018 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7020 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7021 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7022 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7023 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7024 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7025 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7029 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7030 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7034 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7035 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7037 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7043 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7044 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7046 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7047 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7048 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7049 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7050 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7051 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7052 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7053 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7055 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7056 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7057 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7060 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7061 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7062 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7068 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7070 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7071 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7072 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7073 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7074 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7076 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7078 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7084 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7085 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7086 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7087 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7088 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7090 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7091 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7092 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7095 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7096 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7098 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7099 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7101 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7102 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7104 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7105 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7106 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7109 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7112 // use override shutdown script if provided
7113 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7114 Some(script) => script,
7116 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7117 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7118 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7119 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7123 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7124 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7126 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7131 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7132 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7133 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7134 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7135 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7137 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7138 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7139 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7140 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7141 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7142 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7143 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7145 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7147 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7148 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7150 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7151 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7152 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7155 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7156 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7157 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7158 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7159 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7161 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7162 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7169 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7170 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7172 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7175 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7176 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7177 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7179 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7180 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7184 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7188 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7189 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7190 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7191 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7194 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7195 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7196 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7197 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7198 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7199 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7200 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7201 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7203 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7204 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7205 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7206 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7207 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7208 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7211 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7212 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7213 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7216 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7220 counterparty_node_id,
7222 channel_value_satoshis,
7226 current_chain_height,
7227 outbound_scid_alias,
7228 temporary_channel_id,
7229 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7234 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7239 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7240 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7241 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7242 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7243 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7244 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7245 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7246 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7247 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7249 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7254 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7255 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7256 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7259 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7260 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7261 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7262 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7265 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7267 next_local_nonce: None,
7271 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7272 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7273 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7274 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7275 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7276 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7277 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7278 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7279 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7280 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7281 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7284 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7285 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7287 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7289 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7290 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7291 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7292 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7295 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7296 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7298 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7300 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7301 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7303 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7304 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7305 if funding_transaction.is_coinbase() &&
7306 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7307 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7308 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7311 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7312 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7314 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7315 if funding_created.is_none() {
7316 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7317 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7319 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7320 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7321 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7322 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7330 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7331 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7332 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7333 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7334 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7335 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7337 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7339 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7340 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7343 /// Returns true if we can resume the channel by sending the [`msgs::OpenChannel`] again.
7344 pub fn is_resumable(&self) -> bool {
7345 !self.context.have_received_message() &&
7346 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER
7349 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7350 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7351 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7353 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7354 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7357 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7358 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7361 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7362 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7365 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7367 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7368 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7369 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7370 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7371 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7372 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7373 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7374 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7375 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7376 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7377 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7378 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7379 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7380 first_per_commitment_point,
7381 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7382 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7383 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7384 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7386 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7388 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7389 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7394 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7395 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7397 // Check sanity of message fields:
7398 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7399 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7401 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7402 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7404 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7405 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7407 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7408 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7410 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7411 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7413 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7414 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7415 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7417 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7418 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7419 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7421 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7422 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7423 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7425 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7426 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7428 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7429 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7432 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7433 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7434 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7436 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7437 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7439 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7440 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7442 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7443 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7445 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7446 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7448 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7449 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7451 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7452 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7455 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7456 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7457 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7459 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7460 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7462 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7463 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7464 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7466 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7467 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7470 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7471 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7472 &Some(ref script) => {
7473 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7474 if script.len() == 0 {
7477 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7478 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7480 Some(script.clone())
7483 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7485 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7490 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7491 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7492 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7493 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7494 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7496 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7497 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7499 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7502 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7503 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7504 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7505 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7506 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7507 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7510 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7511 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7512 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7515 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7516 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7518 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7519 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7521 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7526 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7527 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7528 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7529 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7530 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7534 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7535 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7537 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7538 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7540 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7541 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7542 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7543 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7546 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7548 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7549 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7550 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7551 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7553 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7554 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7556 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7557 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7559 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7560 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7561 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7562 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7563 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7564 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7568 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7569 initial_commitment_tx,
7572 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7573 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7577 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7578 if validated.is_err() {
7579 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7582 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7583 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7584 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7585 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7586 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7587 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7588 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7589 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7590 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7591 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7592 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7593 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7595 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7596 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7597 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7598 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7599 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7600 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7601 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7602 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7604 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7605 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7606 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7608 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7610 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7611 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7613 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7615 let mut channel = Channel {
7616 context: self.context,
7617 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7618 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7621 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7622 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7623 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7626 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7628 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7629 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7630 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7631 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7632 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7637 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7638 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7639 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7640 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7643 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7644 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7645 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7646 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7647 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7648 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7649 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7650 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7651 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7654 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7655 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7656 // `static_remote_key`.
7657 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7658 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7660 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7661 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7662 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7664 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7665 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7666 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7668 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7670 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7671 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7672 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7678 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7679 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7680 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7681 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7682 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7683 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7684 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7685 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7686 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7687 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7688 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7691 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id), None);
7693 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7694 // support this channel type.
7695 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7697 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7698 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7699 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7700 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7701 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7702 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7703 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7707 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7711 counterparty_node_id,
7715 current_chain_height,
7720 counterparty_pubkeys,
7722 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7723 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7725 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7727 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7732 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7733 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7735 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7736 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7737 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7738 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7741 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7742 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7744 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7746 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7747 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7750 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7753 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7754 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7755 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7757 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7758 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7759 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7760 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7762 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7763 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7764 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7765 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7766 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7767 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7768 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7769 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7770 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7771 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7772 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7773 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7774 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7775 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7776 first_per_commitment_point,
7777 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7778 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7779 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7781 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7783 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7785 next_local_nonce: None,
7789 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7790 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7792 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7794 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7795 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7798 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7799 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7801 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7802 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7803 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7804 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7805 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7806 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7807 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7808 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7809 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7810 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7811 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7813 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7816 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7817 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7818 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7822 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7823 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7826 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7827 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7829 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7830 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7832 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7834 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7835 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7836 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7837 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7840 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7841 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7842 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7843 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7844 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7846 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7848 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7849 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7850 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7853 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7854 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7855 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7859 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7860 initial_commitment_tx,
7863 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7864 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7867 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7868 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7871 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7873 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7874 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7875 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7876 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7878 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7880 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7881 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_p2wsh();
7882 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7883 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7884 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7885 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7886 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7887 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7888 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7889 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7890 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7892 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7893 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7894 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7895 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7896 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7897 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7898 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7900 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7901 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7903 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7904 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7905 let mut channel = Channel {
7906 context: self.context,
7907 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7908 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7910 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7911 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7913 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7917 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
7918 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7919 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7920 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7921 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7922 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7923 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
7926 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7927 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7928 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7929 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7930 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
7931 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
7932 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
7933 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
7934 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7935 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7937 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
7938 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7939 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7941 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
7943 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
7944 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
7946 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
7947 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
7950 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7954 counterparty_node_id,
7960 current_chain_height,
7961 outbound_scid_alias,
7962 temporary_channel_id,
7963 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7968 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
7969 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
7970 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
7971 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
7972 funding_tx_locktime,
7973 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
7979 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7980 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7981 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7982 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7983 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7984 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
7986 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7988 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7989 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
7992 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
7993 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7994 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
7997 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7998 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8001 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8002 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8003 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8004 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8005 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
8006 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8007 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8009 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8010 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8012 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8013 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8014 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8015 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8016 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8017 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8018 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8019 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8020 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8021 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8022 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8023 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8024 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8025 first_per_commitment_point,
8026 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8027 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8028 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8029 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8031 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8033 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8034 second_per_commitment_point,
8035 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8036 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8041 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8042 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8043 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8044 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8045 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8046 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8049 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8050 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8051 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8052 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8053 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8054 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8055 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8056 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8057 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8058 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8059 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8060 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8063 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8064 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8065 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8066 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8067 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8069 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8070 // support this channel type.
8071 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8072 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8073 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8075 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8077 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8078 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8079 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8080 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8081 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8082 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8085 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8089 counterparty_node_id,
8093 current_chain_height,
8099 counterparty_pubkeys,
8101 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8102 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8103 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8104 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8106 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8107 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8108 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8109 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8113 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8114 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8115 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8116 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8117 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8118 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8125 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8126 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8128 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8129 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8130 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8131 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8134 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8135 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8137 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8139 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8140 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8143 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8146 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8147 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8148 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8150 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8151 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8152 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8153 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8154 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8155 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8156 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8158 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8159 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8160 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8161 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8162 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8163 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8164 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8165 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8166 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8167 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8168 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8169 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8170 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8171 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8172 first_per_commitment_point,
8173 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8174 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8175 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8177 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8179 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8180 second_per_commitment_point,
8181 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8185 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8186 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8188 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8190 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8191 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8195 // Unfunded channel utilities
8197 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8198 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8199 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8200 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8201 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8202 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8203 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8204 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8205 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8206 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8209 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8210 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8211 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8212 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8213 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8214 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8220 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8221 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8223 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8229 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8230 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8231 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8232 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8233 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8235 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8236 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8237 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8238 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8244 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8245 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8246 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8247 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8248 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8249 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8254 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8255 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8256 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8257 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8259 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8260 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8261 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8262 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8267 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8268 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8269 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8270 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8271 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8272 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8277 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8278 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8279 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8282 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8283 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8284 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8285 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8289 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8291 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8293 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8295 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8296 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8297 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8298 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8299 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8301 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8302 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8303 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8304 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8306 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8308 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8309 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8310 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8312 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8314 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8316 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8318 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8320 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8321 // deserialized from that format.
8322 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8323 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8324 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8326 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8328 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8329 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8330 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8332 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8333 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8334 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8335 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8338 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8339 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8340 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8343 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8344 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8345 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8346 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8348 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8349 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8351 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8352 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8353 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8358 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8361 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8363 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8364 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8365 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8370 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8373 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8376 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8378 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8383 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8384 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8385 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8387 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8388 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8389 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8390 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8391 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8392 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8393 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8395 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8397 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8399 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8402 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8403 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8404 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8407 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8409 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8410 preimages.push(preimage);
8412 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8413 reason.write(writer)?;
8415 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8417 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8418 preimages.push(preimage);
8420 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8421 reason.write(writer)?;
8424 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8425 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8428 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8429 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8430 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8431 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8432 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8433 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8435 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8436 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8437 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8440 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8441 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8442 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8443 source.write(writer)?;
8444 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8446 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8447 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8449 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8451 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8452 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8454 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8456 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8457 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8459 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8460 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8462 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8463 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8464 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8466 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8468 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8469 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8474 match self.context.resend_order {
8475 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8476 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8479 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8480 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8481 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8483 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8484 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8485 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8486 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8489 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8490 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8491 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8492 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8493 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8496 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8497 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8498 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8499 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8501 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8502 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8503 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8505 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8507 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8508 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8509 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8510 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8512 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8513 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8514 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8515 // consider the stale state on reload.
8518 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8519 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8520 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8522 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8523 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8524 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8526 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8527 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8529 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8530 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8531 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8533 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8534 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8536 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8539 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8540 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8541 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8543 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8546 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8547 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8549 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8550 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8551 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8553 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8555 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8557 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8559 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8560 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8561 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8562 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8563 htlc.write(writer)?;
8566 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8567 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8568 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8570 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8571 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8573 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8574 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8575 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8576 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8577 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8578 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8579 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8581 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8582 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8583 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8584 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8585 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8587 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8588 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8590 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8591 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8592 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8593 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8595 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8597 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8598 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8599 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8602 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8603 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8604 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8605 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8606 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8607 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8608 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8610 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8611 (2, chan_type, option),
8612 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8613 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8614 (5, self.context.config, required),
8615 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8616 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8617 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8618 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8619 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8620 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8621 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8622 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8623 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8624 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8625 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8626 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8627 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8628 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8629 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8630 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8631 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8632 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8633 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8634 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8635 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8636 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8637 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8638 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
8639 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8646 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8647 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8649 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8650 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8652 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8653 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8654 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8656 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8657 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8658 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8659 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8661 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8663 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8664 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8665 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8666 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8667 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8669 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8670 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8673 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8674 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8675 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8677 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8679 let mut keys_data = None;
8681 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8682 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8683 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8684 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8685 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8686 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8687 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8688 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8689 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8690 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8694 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8695 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8696 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8699 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8701 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8702 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8703 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8705 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8707 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8708 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8709 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8710 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8711 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8712 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8713 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8714 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8716 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8717 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8719 Readable::read(reader)?
8721 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8724 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8725 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8727 Readable::read(reader)?
8729 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8731 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8732 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8733 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8738 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8739 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8740 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8741 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8742 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8743 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8744 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8745 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8746 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8747 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8748 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8749 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8751 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8752 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8755 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8756 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8759 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8760 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8762 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8764 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8765 blinding_point: None,
8769 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8770 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8771 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8772 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8773 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8774 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8775 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8776 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8777 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8778 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8779 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8780 blinding_point: None,
8782 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8783 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8784 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8786 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8787 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8788 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8790 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8794 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8795 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8796 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8797 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8800 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8801 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8802 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8804 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8805 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8806 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8807 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8810 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8811 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8812 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8813 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8816 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8818 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8820 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8821 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8822 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8823 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8825 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8826 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8827 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8828 // consider the stale state on reload.
8829 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8832 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8833 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8834 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8836 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8839 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8840 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8841 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8843 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8844 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8845 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8846 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8848 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8849 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8851 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8852 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8854 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8855 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8856 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8858 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8860 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8861 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8863 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8864 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8867 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8869 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8870 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8871 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8872 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8874 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8877 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8878 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8880 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8882 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8883 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8885 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8886 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8888 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8890 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8891 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8894 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8895 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8896 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8900 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8901 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8902 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8904 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8910 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8911 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8912 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8913 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8914 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8915 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8916 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8917 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8918 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8919 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8921 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8922 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8923 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8924 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8925 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8926 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8927 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8929 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8930 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8931 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8932 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8934 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8936 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8937 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8939 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8941 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
8943 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8944 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8946 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8947 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
8949 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8950 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8951 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8952 (2, channel_type, option),
8953 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8954 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8955 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8956 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8957 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8958 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8959 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8960 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8961 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8962 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8963 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8964 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8965 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8966 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8967 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8968 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8969 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8970 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8971 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8972 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8973 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8974 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8975 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8976 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8977 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8978 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8979 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
8980 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
8983 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8984 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8985 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8986 // required channel parameters.
8987 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8988 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8990 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8992 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8993 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8994 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8995 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8998 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8999 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9000 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9002 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9003 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9005 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9006 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9011 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9012 if iter.next().is_some() {
9013 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9017 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9018 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9019 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9020 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9021 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9024 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9025 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9026 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9028 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9029 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9031 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9032 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9033 // separate u64 values.
9034 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9036 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9038 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9039 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9040 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9041 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9043 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9044 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9046 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9047 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9048 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9049 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9050 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9053 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9054 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9056 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9057 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9058 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9059 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9061 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9062 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9064 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9065 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9066 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9067 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9068 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9071 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9072 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9075 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9076 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9077 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9078 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9079 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9080 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9083 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9084 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9085 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9087 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9092 context: ChannelContext {
9095 config: config.unwrap(),
9099 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9100 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9101 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9104 temporary_channel_id,
9106 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9108 channel_value_satoshis,
9110 latest_monitor_update_id,
9112 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9113 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9116 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9117 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9120 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9121 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9122 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9123 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9127 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9128 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9129 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9130 monitor_pending_forwards,
9131 monitor_pending_failures,
9132 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9133 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9135 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9136 signer_pending_funding: false,
9139 holding_cell_update_fee,
9140 next_holder_htlc_id,
9141 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9142 update_time_counter,
9145 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9146 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9147 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9148 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9150 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9151 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9152 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9153 closing_fee_limits: None,
9154 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9156 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9157 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9159 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9161 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9162 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9163 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9164 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9165 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9166 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9167 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9168 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9169 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9172 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9174 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9175 funding_transaction,
9178 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9179 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9180 counterparty_node_id,
9182 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9186 channel_update_status,
9187 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9191 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9192 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9193 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9194 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9196 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9197 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9199 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9200 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9201 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9203 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9204 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9206 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9207 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9209 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9212 local_initiated_shutdown,
9214 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9216 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9217 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9225 use bitcoin::amount::Amount;
9226 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9227 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9228 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut, Version};
9229 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9230 use bitcoin::network::Network;
9231 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9232 use crate::ln::types::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9233 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9234 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9235 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9236 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9237 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9238 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9239 use crate::ln::msgs;
9240 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9241 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9242 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9243 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9244 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9245 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9246 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9247 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9248 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9249 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9250 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9251 use crate::util::test_utils;
9252 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9253 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9254 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9255 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9256 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9257 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9258 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9259 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9260 use bitcoin::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion, WPubkeyHash};
9261 use crate::prelude::*;
9264 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9265 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9266 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9267 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9269 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9270 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9271 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9272 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9275 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9278 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9279 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9285 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9286 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9287 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9288 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9292 signer: InMemorySigner,
9295 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9296 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9299 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9300 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9302 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9304 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9305 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9308 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9312 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9314 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9315 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9316 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9317 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9318 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9321 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9322 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9323 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9324 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9328 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9329 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9330 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9334 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9335 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9336 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9337 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9340 let seed = [42; 32];
9341 let network = Network::Testnet;
9342 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9343 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9344 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9347 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9348 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9349 let config = UserConfig::default();
9350 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9351 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9352 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9354 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9355 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9359 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9360 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9362 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9363 let original_fee = 253;
9364 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9365 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9366 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9367 let seed = [42; 32];
9368 let network = Network::Testnet;
9369 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9371 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9372 let config = UserConfig::default();
9373 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9375 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9376 // same as the old fee.
9377 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9378 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9379 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9383 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9384 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9385 // dust limits are used.
9386 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9387 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9388 let seed = [42; 32];
9389 let network = Network::Testnet;
9390 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9391 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9392 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9394 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9395 // they have different dust limits.
9397 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9398 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9399 let config = UserConfig::default();
9400 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9402 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9403 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9404 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9405 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9406 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9408 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9409 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9410 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9411 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9412 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9414 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9415 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9416 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9417 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9419 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9420 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9421 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9423 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9424 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9425 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9427 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9428 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9429 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9431 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9432 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9433 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9434 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9437 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9439 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9440 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9441 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9442 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9443 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9444 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9445 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9446 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9447 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9449 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9450 blinding_point: None,
9453 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9454 // the dust limit check.
9455 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9456 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9457 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9458 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9460 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9461 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9462 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9463 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9464 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9465 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9466 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9470 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9471 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9472 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9473 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9474 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9475 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9476 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9477 let seed = [42; 32];
9478 let network = Network::Testnet;
9479 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9481 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9482 let config = UserConfig::default();
9483 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9485 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9486 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9488 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9489 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9490 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9491 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9492 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9493 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9495 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9496 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9497 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9498 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9499 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9501 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9503 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9504 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9505 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9506 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9507 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9509 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9510 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9511 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9512 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9513 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9517 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9518 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9519 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9520 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9521 let seed = [42; 32];
9522 let network = Network::Testnet;
9523 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9524 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9525 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9527 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9529 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9530 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9531 let config = UserConfig::default();
9532 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9534 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9535 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9536 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9537 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9539 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9540 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9541 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9543 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9544 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9545 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9546 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9548 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9549 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9550 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9552 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9553 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9554 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9556 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9557 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9558 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9559 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9560 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9561 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9562 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9564 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9566 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9567 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9568 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9569 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9570 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9574 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9575 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9576 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9577 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9578 let seed = [42; 32];
9579 let network = Network::Testnet;
9580 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9581 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9582 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9584 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9585 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9586 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9587 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9588 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9589 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9590 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9591 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9593 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9594 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9595 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9596 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9597 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9598 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9600 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9601 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9602 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9603 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9605 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9607 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9608 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9609 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9610 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9611 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9612 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9614 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9615 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9616 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9617 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9619 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9620 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9621 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9622 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9623 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9625 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9626 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9628 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9629 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9630 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9632 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9633 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9634 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9635 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9636 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9638 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9639 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9641 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9642 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9643 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9647 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9649 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9650 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9651 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9653 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9654 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9655 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9656 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9658 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9659 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9660 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9662 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9664 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9665 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9668 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9669 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9670 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9671 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9672 let seed = [42; 32];
9673 let network = Network::Testnet;
9674 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9675 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9676 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9679 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9680 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9681 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9683 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9684 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9686 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9687 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9688 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9690 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9691 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9693 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9695 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9696 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9698 // Channel Negotiations failed
9699 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9700 assert!(result.is_err());
9705 fn channel_update() {
9706 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9707 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9708 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9709 let seed = [42; 32];
9710 let network = Network::Testnet;
9711 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9712 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9713 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9715 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9716 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9717 let config = UserConfig::default();
9718 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9720 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9721 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9722 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9723 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9724 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9726 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9727 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9728 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9729 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9730 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9732 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9733 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9734 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9735 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9737 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9738 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9739 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9741 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9742 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9743 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9745 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9746 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9747 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9749 short_channel_id: 0,
9752 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9753 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9754 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9756 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9757 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9759 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9761 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9763 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9764 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9765 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9766 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9768 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9769 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9770 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9772 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9775 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9779 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9780 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9782 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9783 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9784 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9785 let seed = [42; 32];
9786 let network = Network::Testnet;
9787 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9788 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9790 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9791 let config = UserConfig::default();
9792 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9793 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9794 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9796 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9797 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9798 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9800 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9801 let tx = Transaction { version: Version::ONE, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9802 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9804 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9805 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9806 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9807 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9808 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9811 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9813 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9814 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9815 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9816 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9820 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9821 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9822 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9824 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9827 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9829 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9830 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9831 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9832 blinding_point: None,
9834 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9835 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9837 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9840 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9843 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9845 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9848 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9849 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9850 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9852 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9853 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9856 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9857 blinding_point: None,
9859 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9860 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9863 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9864 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9866 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9867 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9869 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9872 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9873 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9874 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9875 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9876 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9877 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9878 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9879 } = &mut dummy_add {
9880 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9881 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9883 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9884 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9885 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9887 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9890 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9892 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9893 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9894 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9895 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9896 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9897 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9898 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9899 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9902 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9904 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
9905 use bitcoin::sighash;
9906 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
9907 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
9908 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9909 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
9910 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
9911 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
9912 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
9913 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
9914 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
9915 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
9916 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
9917 use crate::sync::Arc;
9918 use core::str::FromStr;
9919 use hex::DisplayHex;
9921 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
9922 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
9923 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
9924 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9926 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
9928 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9929 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9930 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9931 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9932 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9934 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9935 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9941 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9942 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9943 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9945 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9946 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9947 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9948 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9949 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9950 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9952 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9954 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9955 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9956 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9957 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9958 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9959 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9961 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9962 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9963 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9964 selected_contest_delay: 144
9966 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9967 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9969 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9970 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9972 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9973 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9975 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9976 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9978 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9979 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9980 // build_commitment_transaction.
9981 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9982 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9983 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9984 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9985 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9987 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9988 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9989 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9990 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9994 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9995 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9996 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9997 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10001 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10002 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10003 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10005 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10006 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10008 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10009 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10011 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10013 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10014 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10015 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10016 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10017 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10018 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10019 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10021 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10022 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10023 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10024 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10026 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10027 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10028 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10030 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10032 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10033 commitment_tx.clone(),
10034 counterparty_signature,
10035 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10036 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10037 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10039 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10040 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10042 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10043 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10044 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10046 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10047 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10050 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10051 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10053 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10054 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10055 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10056 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10057 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10058 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10059 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_digest(sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).p2wsh_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.to_bitcoin_amount(), htlc_sighashtype).unwrap().as_raw_hash().to_byte_array());
10060 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10062 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10065 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10066 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10067 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10071 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10074 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10075 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10076 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10077 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10078 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10079 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10081 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10082 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10083 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10084 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10085 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10086 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10087 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10088 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10089 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10090 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10092 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10093 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10094 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10095 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10096 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10097 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10099 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10103 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10104 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10105 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10106 "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", {});
10108 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10109 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10111 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10112 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10113 "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", {});
10115 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10116 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10117 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10118 "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", {});
10120 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10121 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10123 amount_msat: 1000000,
10125 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10126 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10128 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10131 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10132 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10134 amount_msat: 2000000,
10136 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10137 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10139 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10142 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10143 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10145 amount_msat: 2000000,
10147 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10148 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10149 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10150 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10151 blinding_point: None,
10153 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10156 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10157 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10159 amount_msat: 3000000,
10161 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10162 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10163 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10164 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10165 blinding_point: None,
10167 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10170 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10171 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10173 amount_msat: 4000000,
10175 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10176 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10178 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10182 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10183 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10184 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10186 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10187 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10188 "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", {
10191 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10192 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10193 "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" },
10196 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10197 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10198 "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" },
10201 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10202 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10203 "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" },
10206 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10207 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10208 "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" },
10211 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10212 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10213 "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" }
10216 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10217 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10218 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10220 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10221 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10222 "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", {
10225 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10226 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10227 "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" },
10230 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10231 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10232 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe0100000000000000000124060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c014830450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
10235 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10236 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10237 "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" },
10240 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10241 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10242 "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" },
10245 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10246 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10247 "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" }
10250 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10251 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10252 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10254 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10255 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10256 "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", {
10259 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10260 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10261 "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" },
10264 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10265 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10266 "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" },
10269 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10270 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10271 "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" },
10274 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10275 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10276 "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" }
10279 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10280 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10281 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10282 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10284 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10285 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10286 "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", {
10289 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10290 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10291 "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" },
10294 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10295 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10296 "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" },
10299 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10300 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10301 "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" },
10304 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10305 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10306 "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" }
10309 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10310 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10311 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10312 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10314 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10315 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10316 "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", {
10319 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10320 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10321 "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" },
10324 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10325 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10326 "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" },
10329 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10330 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10331 "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" },
10334 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10335 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10336 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d03000000000000000001f2090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df01483045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
10339 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10340 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10341 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10343 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10344 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10345 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10348 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10349 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10350 "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" },
10353 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10354 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10355 "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" },
10358 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10359 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10360 "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" }
10363 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10364 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10365 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10367 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10368 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10369 "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", {
10372 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10373 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10374 "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" },
10377 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10378 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10379 "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" },
10382 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10383 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10384 "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" }
10387 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10388 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10389 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10391 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10392 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10393 "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", {
10396 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10397 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10398 "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" },
10401 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10402 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10403 "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" }
10406 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10407 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10408 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10409 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10410 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10411 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10413 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10414 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10415 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ac5916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd501473044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10418 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10419 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10420 "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" },
10423 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10424 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10425 "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" }
10428 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10429 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10430 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10431 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10432 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10434 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10435 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10436 "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", {
10439 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10440 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10441 "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" },
10444 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10445 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10446 "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" }
10449 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10450 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10451 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10453 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10454 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10455 "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", {
10458 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10459 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10460 "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" }
10463 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10464 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10465 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10466 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10467 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10469 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10470 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10471 "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", {
10474 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10475 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10476 "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" }
10479 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10480 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10481 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10482 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10483 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10485 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10486 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10487 "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", {
10490 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10491 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10492 "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" }
10495 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10496 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10497 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10498 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10500 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10501 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10502 "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", {});
10504 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10505 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10506 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10507 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10508 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10510 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10511 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10512 "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", {});
10514 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10515 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10516 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10517 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10518 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10520 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10521 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10522 "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", {});
10524 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10525 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10526 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10528 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10529 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10530 "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", {});
10532 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10533 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10534 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10535 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10536 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10538 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10539 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10540 "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", {});
10542 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10543 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10544 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10545 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10546 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10548 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10549 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10550 "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", {});
10552 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10553 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10554 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10555 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10556 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10557 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10559 amount_msat: 2000000,
10561 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10562 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10564 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10567 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10568 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10569 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10571 amount_msat: 5000001,
10573 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10574 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10575 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10576 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10577 blinding_point: None,
10579 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10582 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10583 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10585 amount_msat: 5000000,
10587 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10588 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10589 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10590 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10591 blinding_point: None,
10593 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10597 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10598 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10599 "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", {
10602 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10603 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10604 "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" },
10606 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10607 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10608 "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" },
10610 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10611 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10612 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
10615 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10616 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10617 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10618 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80074a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5e881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7881300000000000022002018e40f9072c44350f134bdc887bab4d9bdfc8aa468a25616c80e21757ba5dac7c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994aad9c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b7601473044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c72501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
10621 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10622 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10623 "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" },
10625 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10626 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10627 "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" },
10629 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10630 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10631 "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" }
10636 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10637 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10639 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10640 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10641 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10642 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10644 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10645 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10646 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10648 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10649 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10651 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10652 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10654 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10655 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10656 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10660 fn test_key_derivation() {
10661 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10662 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10664 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10665 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10667 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10668 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10670 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10671 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10673 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10674 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10676 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10677 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10679 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10680 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10684 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10685 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10686 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10687 let seed = [42; 32];
10688 let network = Network::Testnet;
10689 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10690 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10692 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10693 let config = UserConfig::default();
10694 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10695 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10697 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10698 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10700 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10701 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10702 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10703 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10704 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10705 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10706 assert!(res.is_ok());
10710 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10711 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10712 // resulting `channel_type`.
10713 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10714 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10715 let network = Network::Testnet;
10716 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10717 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10719 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10720 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10722 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10723 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10725 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10726 // need to signal it.
10727 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10728 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10729 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10730 &config, 0, 42, None
10732 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10734 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10735 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10736 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10738 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10739 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10740 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10744 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10745 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10746 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10747 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10748 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10751 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10752 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10756 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10757 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10758 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10759 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10760 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10761 let network = Network::Testnet;
10762 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10763 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10765 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10766 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10768 let config = UserConfig::default();
10770 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10771 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10772 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10773 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10774 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10776 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10777 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10778 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10782 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10783 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10784 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10786 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10787 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10788 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10789 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10790 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10791 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10793 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10797 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10798 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10800 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10801 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10802 let network = Network::Testnet;
10803 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10804 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10806 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10807 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10809 let config = UserConfig::default();
10811 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10812 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10813 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10814 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10815 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10816 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10817 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10818 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10820 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10821 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10822 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10823 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10824 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10825 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10829 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10830 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10832 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10833 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10834 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10835 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10837 assert!(res.is_err());
10839 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10840 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10841 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10843 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10844 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10845 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10848 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10850 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10851 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10852 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10853 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10856 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10857 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10859 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10860 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10862 assert!(res.is_err());
10866 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10867 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10868 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10869 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10870 let seed = [42; 32];
10871 let network = Network::Testnet;
10872 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10873 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10874 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10876 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10877 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10878 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10879 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10881 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10882 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10883 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10888 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10898 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10899 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10900 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10905 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10906 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10912 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
10915 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
10916 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
10917 &accept_channel_msg,
10918 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
10919 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10922 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
10923 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10924 let tx = Transaction {
10925 version: Version::ONE,
10926 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10930 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10933 value: Amount::from_sat(10000000), script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10936 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10937 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10938 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10939 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10940 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10941 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10945 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10946 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10954 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10955 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10956 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10957 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10959 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10960 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10967 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10968 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10969 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10970 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10971 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10973 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10974 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10975 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10983 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10984 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10987 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10988 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10989 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10990 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());