1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
41 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
42 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
43 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
44 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
45 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
46 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
47 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
50 use crate::prelude::*;
51 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 use core::convert::TryInto;
54 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
55 use crate::sync::Mutex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
61 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
62 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
63 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
65 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
69 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
72 pub struct AvailableBalances {
73 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
74 pub balance_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
76 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
78 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
81 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
85 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
87 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
89 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
90 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
91 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
92 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
93 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
94 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
96 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
100 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
101 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
102 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
103 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
106 enum InboundHTLCState {
107 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
108 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
109 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
110 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
111 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
112 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
113 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
114 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
115 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
116 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
117 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
118 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
119 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
120 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
121 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
123 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
127 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
128 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
129 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
130 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
131 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
132 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
133 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
134 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
135 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
136 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
138 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
139 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
140 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
141 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
142 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
143 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
144 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
145 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
147 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
148 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
150 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
151 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
152 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
153 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
154 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
155 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
156 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
157 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
160 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
164 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
165 state: InboundHTLCState,
168 enum OutboundHTLCState {
169 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
170 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
171 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
172 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
173 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
174 /// money back (though we won't), and,
175 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
176 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
177 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
178 /// we'll never get out of sync).
179 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
180 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
181 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
183 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
184 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
185 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
186 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
187 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
188 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
189 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
190 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
191 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
192 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
193 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
194 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
195 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
196 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
197 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
201 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
202 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
203 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
204 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
207 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
208 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
210 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
211 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
216 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
217 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
219 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
220 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
225 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
229 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
230 state: OutboundHTLCState,
232 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
235 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
236 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
237 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
241 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
243 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
244 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
245 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
248 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
253 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
257 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
258 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
259 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
260 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
261 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
262 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
263 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
265 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
266 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
267 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
268 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
269 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
270 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
271 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
273 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
274 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
275 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
280 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
281 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
282 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
284 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
285 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
287 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
288 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
289 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
290 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
291 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
292 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
293 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
294 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
295 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
297 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
298 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
299 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
300 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
301 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
302 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
303 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
304 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
305 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
306 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
307 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
308 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
309 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
310 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
311 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
312 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
314 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
315 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
316 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
317 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
318 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
319 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
320 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
321 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
323 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
324 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
325 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
326 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
328 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
330 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
332 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
333 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
334 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
335 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
339 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
341 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
343 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
345 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
346 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
347 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
348 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
349 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
351 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
352 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
354 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
356 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
357 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
359 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
360 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
361 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
362 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
363 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
364 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
366 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
367 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
369 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
370 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
371 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
372 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
373 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
375 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
376 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
378 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
379 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
381 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
382 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
383 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
384 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
390 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
391 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
393 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
394 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
395 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
400 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
401 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
403 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
404 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
405 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
410 macro_rules! secp_check {
411 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
414 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
419 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
420 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
421 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
422 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
423 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
424 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
425 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
426 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
428 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
430 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
432 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
436 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
438 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
439 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
440 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
442 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
443 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
445 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
446 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
447 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
448 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
449 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
451 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
452 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
456 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
462 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
465 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
466 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
467 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
468 holding_cell_msat: u64,
469 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
472 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
473 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
474 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
475 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
476 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
477 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
478 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
479 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
480 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
481 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
484 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
485 struct HTLCCandidate {
487 origin: HTLCInitiator,
491 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
499 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
501 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
503 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
504 htlc_value_msat: u64,
505 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
510 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
511 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
512 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
513 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
514 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
516 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
517 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
518 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
519 htlc_value_msat: u64,
521 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
522 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
526 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
527 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
528 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
529 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
530 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
531 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
532 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
533 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
534 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
535 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
536 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
539 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
541 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
542 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
543 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
544 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
545 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
548 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
549 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
550 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
551 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
552 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
553 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
554 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
555 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
558 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
560 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
561 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
562 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
563 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
564 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
565 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
566 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
567 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
570 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
571 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
572 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
573 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
574 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
575 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
576 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
577 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
578 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
579 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
580 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
581 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
582 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
583 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
584 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
586 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
587 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
588 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
589 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
591 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
592 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
593 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
594 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
596 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
597 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
598 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
599 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
600 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
602 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
603 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
604 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
605 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
607 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
608 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
609 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
611 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
612 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
613 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
614 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
615 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
617 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
618 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
621 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
622 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
624 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
625 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
626 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
627 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
629 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
630 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
632 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
633 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
636 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
637 (0, update, required),
640 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
641 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
642 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
643 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
644 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
648 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
649 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
650 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
652 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
654 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
655 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
656 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
660 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
662 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
663 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
664 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
669 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
670 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
671 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
672 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
673 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
675 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
676 /// in a timely manner.
677 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
680 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
681 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
682 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
684 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
685 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
686 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
687 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
691 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
692 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
693 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
695 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
696 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
697 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
698 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
700 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
704 /// The current channel ID.
705 channel_id: ChannelId,
706 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
707 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
708 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
711 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
712 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
714 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
715 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
716 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
718 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
719 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
720 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
721 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
723 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
724 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
726 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
728 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>,
729 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
730 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
732 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
733 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
734 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
736 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
737 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
738 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
739 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
740 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
741 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
743 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
744 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
745 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
746 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
747 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
748 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
750 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
752 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
753 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
754 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
756 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
757 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
758 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
759 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
760 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
761 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
762 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
764 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
765 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
766 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
768 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
769 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
770 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
771 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
772 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
773 /// outbound or inbound.
774 signer_pending_funding: bool,
776 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
778 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
779 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
780 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
781 // HTLCs with similar state.
782 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
783 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
784 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
785 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
786 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
787 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
788 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
789 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
790 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
793 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
794 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
795 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
797 update_time_counter: u32,
799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
800 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
801 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
802 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
803 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
804 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
806 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
807 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
809 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
810 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
811 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
812 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
814 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
815 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
817 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
819 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
821 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
822 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
823 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
824 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
825 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
827 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
828 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
830 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
831 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
832 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
834 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
835 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
836 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
837 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
838 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
839 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
840 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
841 channel_creation_height: u32,
843 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
846 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
848 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
851 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
853 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
856 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
858 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
860 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
861 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
864 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
866 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
868 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
869 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
871 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
873 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
874 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
875 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
877 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
879 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
880 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
881 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
883 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
884 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
885 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
887 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
889 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
891 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
892 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
893 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
894 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
896 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
897 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
898 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
900 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
901 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
902 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
904 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
905 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
906 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
907 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
908 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
909 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
910 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
911 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
913 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
914 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
915 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
916 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
917 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
919 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
920 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
922 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
923 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
924 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
925 /// unblock the state machine.
927 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
928 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
929 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
931 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
932 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
933 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
935 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
936 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
937 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
938 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
939 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
940 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
941 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
942 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
944 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
945 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
947 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
948 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
949 // the channel's funding UTXO.
951 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
952 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
953 // associated channel mapping.
955 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
956 // to store all of them.
957 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
959 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
960 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
961 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
962 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
963 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
965 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
966 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
968 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
969 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
971 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
972 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
973 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
975 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
976 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
977 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
980 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
981 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
982 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
983 self.update_time_counter
986 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
987 self.latest_monitor_update_id
990 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
991 self.config.announced_channel
994 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
995 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
998 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
999 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1000 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1001 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1004 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1005 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1006 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
1009 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1010 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1011 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1012 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
1013 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1016 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1017 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1018 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1019 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1021 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1022 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1024 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1025 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1027 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1028 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1030 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1033 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1034 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1035 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1036 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1037 self.channel_state &
1038 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1039 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1040 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1041 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1044 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1045 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1046 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1047 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1048 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1051 // Public utilities:
1053 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1057 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1059 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1060 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1061 self.temporary_channel_id
1064 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1068 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1069 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1070 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1074 /// Gets the channel's type
1075 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1079 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1081 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1082 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1083 self.short_channel_id
1086 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1087 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1088 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1091 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1092 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1093 self.outbound_scid_alias
1096 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1098 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner> {
1099 return &self.holder_signer
1102 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1103 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1104 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1105 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1106 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1107 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1110 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1111 /// get_funding_created.
1112 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1113 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1116 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1117 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1118 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1119 if conf_height > 0 {
1126 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1127 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1128 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1131 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1132 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1133 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1134 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1138 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1141 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1142 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1145 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1146 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1149 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1150 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1151 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1154 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1155 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1158 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1159 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1160 self.counterparty_node_id
1163 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1164 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1165 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1168 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1169 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1170 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1173 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1174 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1176 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1177 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1178 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1179 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1181 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1185 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1186 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1187 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1190 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1191 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1192 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1195 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1196 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1197 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1199 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1200 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1205 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1206 self.channel_value_satoshis
1209 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1210 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1213 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1214 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1217 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1218 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1219 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1221 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1222 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1223 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1224 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1225 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1227 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1231 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1232 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1233 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1236 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1237 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1238 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1241 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1242 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1243 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1246 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1247 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1248 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1251 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1252 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1253 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1256 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1257 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1258 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1261 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1262 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1263 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1264 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1265 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1268 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1270 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1271 self.prev_config = None;
1275 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1276 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1280 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1281 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1282 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1283 let did_channel_update =
1284 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1285 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1286 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1287 if did_channel_update {
1288 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1289 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1290 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1291 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1293 self.config.options = *config;
1297 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1298 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1299 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1300 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1301 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1304 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1305 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1306 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1307 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1308 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1310 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1311 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1312 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1313 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1314 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1315 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1316 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1318 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1319 where L::Target: Logger
1321 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1322 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1323 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1325 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1326 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1327 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1328 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1330 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1331 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1332 if match update_state {
1333 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1334 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1335 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1336 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1337 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1339 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1343 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1344 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1345 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1347 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1349 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1350 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1351 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1353 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1354 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1355 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1356 transaction_output_index: None
1361 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1362 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1363 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1364 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1365 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1368 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1370 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1371 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1372 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1374 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1375 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1378 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1379 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1382 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1384 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1385 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1386 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1388 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1389 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1395 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1396 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1397 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1398 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1399 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1400 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1401 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1405 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1406 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1408 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1410 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1411 if generated_by_local {
1412 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1413 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1422 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1424 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1425 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1426 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1427 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1428 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1429 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1430 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1433 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1434 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1435 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1436 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1440 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1441 preimages.push(preimage);
1445 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1446 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1448 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1450 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1451 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1453 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1454 if !generated_by_local {
1455 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1463 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1464 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1465 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1466 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1467 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1468 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1469 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1470 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1472 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1474 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1475 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1476 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1477 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1479 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1481 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1482 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1483 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1484 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1487 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1488 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1489 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1490 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1492 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1495 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1496 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1497 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1498 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1500 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1503 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1504 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1509 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1510 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1515 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1517 let channel_parameters =
1518 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1519 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1520 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1527 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1530 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1531 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1532 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1533 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1535 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1536 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1537 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1545 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1546 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1552 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1553 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1554 /// our counterparty!)
1555 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1556 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1557 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1558 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1559 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1560 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1561 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1563 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1567 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1568 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1569 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1570 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1571 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1572 //may see payments to it!
1573 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1574 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1575 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1577 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1580 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1581 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1582 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1583 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1584 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1587 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1588 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1591 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1595 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1596 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1597 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1598 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1599 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1600 // which are near the dust limit.
1601 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1602 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1603 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1604 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1605 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1607 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1608 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1610 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1613 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1614 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1615 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1618 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1619 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1621 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1622 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1623 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1624 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1625 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1626 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1627 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1630 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1633 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1634 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1635 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1637 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1638 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1639 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1640 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1641 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1642 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1644 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1645 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1651 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1652 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1654 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1655 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1656 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1657 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1658 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1659 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1660 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1663 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1666 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1667 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1668 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1670 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1671 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1672 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1673 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1674 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1675 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1677 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1678 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1682 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1683 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1684 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1685 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1686 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1687 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1688 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1690 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1691 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1693 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1700 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1701 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1702 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1703 /// corner case properly.
1704 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1705 -> AvailableBalances
1706 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1708 let context = &self;
1709 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1710 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1711 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1713 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1714 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1715 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1716 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1719 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1721 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1722 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1724 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1726 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1728 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1729 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1733 if context.is_outbound() {
1734 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1735 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1737 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1738 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1740 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1741 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1742 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1743 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1746 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1747 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1748 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1749 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1750 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1751 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1752 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1755 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1756 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1757 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1758 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1759 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1760 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1761 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1762 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1763 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1764 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1765 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1767 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1770 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1771 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1772 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1773 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1774 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1777 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1778 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1780 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1781 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1782 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1784 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1785 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1786 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1787 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1791 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1793 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1794 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1795 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1796 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1797 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1798 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1799 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1801 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1802 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1804 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1805 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1806 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1808 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1809 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1810 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1811 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1812 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1815 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1816 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1817 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1818 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1819 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1820 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1823 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1824 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1825 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1827 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1831 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1832 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1834 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1835 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1839 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1840 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1841 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1842 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1844 outbound_capacity_msat,
1845 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1846 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1851 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1852 let context = &self;
1853 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1856 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1857 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1859 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1860 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1862 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1863 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1865 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1866 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1867 let context = &self;
1868 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1870 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1873 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1874 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1876 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1877 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1879 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1880 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1882 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1883 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1887 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1888 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1894 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1895 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1896 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1899 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1900 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1901 included_htlcs += 1;
1904 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1905 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1909 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1910 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1911 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1912 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1913 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1914 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1919 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1921 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1922 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1927 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1928 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1932 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1933 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1934 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1937 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1938 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1940 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1941 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1942 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1944 total_pending_htlcs,
1945 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1946 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1947 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1949 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1950 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1951 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1953 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1955 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1960 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1961 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1963 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1964 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1966 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1967 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1969 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1970 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1971 let context = &self;
1972 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1974 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1977 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1978 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1980 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1981 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1983 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1984 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1986 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1987 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1991 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1992 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1998 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1999 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2000 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2001 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2002 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2003 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2006 included_htlcs += 1;
2009 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2010 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2013 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2014 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2016 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2017 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2018 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2023 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2024 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2025 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2028 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2029 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2031 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2032 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2034 total_pending_htlcs,
2035 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2036 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2037 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2039 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2040 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2041 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2043 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2045 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2050 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2051 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2052 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2053 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2060 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2062 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2063 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2066 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2068 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2069 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2070 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2074 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2075 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2076 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2079 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2081 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2082 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2085 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2086 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2087 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2088 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2089 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2090 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2091 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2092 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2093 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2094 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2095 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2097 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2098 // return them to fail the payment.
2099 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2100 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2101 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2103 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2104 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2109 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2110 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2111 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2112 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2113 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2114 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2115 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2116 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2117 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2118 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2119 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2120 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2121 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2125 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2127 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2128 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2131 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2132 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2136 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2137 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2138 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2139 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2140 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2141 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2142 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2143 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2144 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2148 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2149 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2150 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2153 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2154 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2155 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2156 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2159 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2161 next_local_nonce: None,
2165 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2166 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2167 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2168 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2170 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2171 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2172 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2173 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2175 match &self.holder_signer {
2176 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2177 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2178 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2179 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2180 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2183 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2187 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2188 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2189 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2190 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2191 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2192 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2195 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2196 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2202 // Internal utility functions for channels
2204 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2205 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2206 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2208 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2210 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2211 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2212 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2214 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2217 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2219 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2222 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2223 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2224 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2226 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2228 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2229 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2230 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2231 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2232 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2235 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2236 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2237 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2238 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2239 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2240 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2241 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2244 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2245 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2247 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2248 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2251 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2252 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2253 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2254 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2255 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2256 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2259 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2260 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2261 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2262 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2265 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2266 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2268 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2269 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2270 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2274 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2275 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2276 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2278 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2279 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2280 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2281 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2283 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2284 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2286 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2288 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2289 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2290 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2291 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2293 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2294 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2298 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2304 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2305 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2306 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2307 // outside of those situations will fail.
2308 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2312 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2317 1 + // script length (0)
2321 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2322 2 + // witness marker and flag
2323 1 + // witness element count
2324 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2325 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2326 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2327 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2328 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2329 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2331 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2332 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2333 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2339 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2340 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2341 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2342 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2344 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2345 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2346 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2348 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2349 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2350 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2351 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2352 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2353 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2356 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2357 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2360 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2361 value_to_holder = 0;
2364 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2365 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2366 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2367 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2369 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2370 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2373 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2374 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2377 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2380 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2381 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2383 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2385 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2386 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2387 where L::Target: Logger {
2388 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2389 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2390 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2391 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2392 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2393 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2394 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2395 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2399 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2400 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2401 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2402 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2404 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2405 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2407 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2409 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2410 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2411 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2413 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2414 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2415 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2416 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2417 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2418 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2419 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2421 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2422 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2423 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2425 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2426 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2428 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2431 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2432 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2436 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2440 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2441 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2442 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2443 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2444 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2445 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2448 // Now update local state:
2450 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2451 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2452 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2453 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2454 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2455 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2456 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2460 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2461 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2462 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2463 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2464 // do not not get into this branch.
2465 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2466 match pending_update {
2467 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2468 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2469 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2470 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2471 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2472 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2473 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2476 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2477 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2478 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2479 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2480 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2481 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2482 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2488 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2489 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2490 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2492 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2493 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2494 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2496 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2497 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2500 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2501 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2503 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2504 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2506 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2507 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2510 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2513 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2514 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2515 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2516 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2521 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2522 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2523 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2524 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2525 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2526 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2527 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2528 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2529 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2530 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2531 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2532 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2533 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2534 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2535 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2537 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2538 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2539 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2540 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2541 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2544 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2545 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2546 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2552 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2553 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2555 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2559 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2560 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2561 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2562 /// before we fail backwards.
2564 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2565 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2566 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2567 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2568 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2569 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2570 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2573 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2574 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2575 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2576 /// before we fail backwards.
2578 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2579 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2580 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2581 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2582 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2583 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2584 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2586 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2588 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2589 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2590 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2592 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2593 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2594 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2596 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2597 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2598 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2600 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2605 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2606 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2612 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2613 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2614 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2615 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2616 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2620 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2621 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2622 force_holding_cell = true;
2625 // Now update local state:
2626 if force_holding_cell {
2627 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2628 match pending_update {
2629 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2630 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2631 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2632 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2636 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2637 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2638 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2639 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2645 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2646 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2647 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2653 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2655 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2656 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2659 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2660 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2661 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2666 // Message handlers:
2668 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2669 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2670 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2671 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2672 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>, ChannelError>
2676 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2677 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2679 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2680 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2682 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2683 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2684 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2685 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2688 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2690 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2691 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2692 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2693 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2695 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2696 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2698 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2699 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2701 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2702 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2703 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2704 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2705 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2706 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2710 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2711 initial_commitment_tx,
2714 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2715 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2718 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2719 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2722 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2723 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2724 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2725 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2726 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2727 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2728 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2729 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2730 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2731 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2732 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2733 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2735 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2737 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2738 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2739 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2740 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2741 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2742 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2743 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2745 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2746 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2747 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2749 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2751 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2752 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2754 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2756 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2757 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2761 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2762 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2763 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2764 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2765 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2766 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2767 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2770 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2771 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2773 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2774 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2775 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2776 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2778 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2781 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2782 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2783 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2786 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2787 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2788 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2789 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2790 // when routing outbound payments.
2791 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2795 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2797 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2798 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2800 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2801 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2803 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2804 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2805 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2806 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2807 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2808 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2809 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2810 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2811 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2813 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2814 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2815 let expected_point =
2816 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2817 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2819 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2820 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2821 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2822 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2823 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2824 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2826 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2827 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2828 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2829 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2830 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2832 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2837 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2840 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2841 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2843 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2845 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2848 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2849 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2850 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2851 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2852 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2853 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2855 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2856 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2857 if local_sent_shutdown {
2858 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2860 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2861 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2862 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2865 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2866 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2868 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2869 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2871 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2872 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2874 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2875 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2878 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2879 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2880 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2881 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2883 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2884 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2887 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2888 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2889 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2890 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2891 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2892 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2893 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2894 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2895 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2896 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2897 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2899 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2900 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2901 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2902 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2903 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2904 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2908 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2909 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2912 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2913 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2914 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2916 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2917 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2918 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2919 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2920 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2921 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2922 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2926 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2927 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2928 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2929 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2930 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2931 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2932 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2936 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2937 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2938 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2939 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2940 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2941 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2944 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2945 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2947 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2948 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2949 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2951 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2952 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2956 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2957 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2959 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2960 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2964 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2965 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2969 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2970 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2971 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2972 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2973 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2974 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2975 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2976 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2977 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2979 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2980 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2981 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2982 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2983 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2986 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2987 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2988 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2989 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2993 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2994 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2996 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3000 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3001 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3002 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3006 // Now update local state:
3007 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3008 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3009 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3010 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3011 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3012 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3013 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3018 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3020 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3021 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3022 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3023 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3024 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3025 None => fail_reason.into(),
3026 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3027 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3028 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3031 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3035 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3036 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3037 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3038 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3040 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3046 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3049 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3050 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3053 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3054 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3057 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3060 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3061 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3062 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3064 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3068 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3072 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3073 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3074 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3076 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3080 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3084 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3085 where L::Target: Logger
3087 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3088 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3090 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3091 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3093 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3094 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3097 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3099 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3101 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3102 let commitment_txid = {
3103 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3104 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3105 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3107 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3108 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3109 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3110 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3111 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3112 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3116 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3118 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3119 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3120 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3121 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3124 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3125 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3126 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3127 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3130 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3132 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3133 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3134 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3135 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3136 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3137 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3138 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3139 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3140 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3141 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3142 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3148 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3149 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3152 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3153 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3154 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3155 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3156 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3157 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3158 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3159 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3160 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3161 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3162 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3163 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3164 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3167 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3168 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3169 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3170 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3171 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3172 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3173 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3175 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3176 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3177 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3178 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3179 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3180 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3181 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3184 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3185 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3188 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3190 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3191 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3192 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3195 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3198 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3199 commitment_stats.tx,
3201 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3202 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3203 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3206 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3207 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3209 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3210 let mut need_commitment = false;
3211 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3212 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3213 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3214 need_commitment = true;
3218 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3219 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3220 Some(forward_info.clone())
3222 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3223 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3224 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3225 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3226 need_commitment = true;
3229 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3230 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3231 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3232 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3233 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3234 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3235 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3236 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3237 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3238 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3239 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3240 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3241 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3242 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3244 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3246 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3247 need_commitment = true;
3251 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3252 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3253 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3254 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3255 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3256 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3258 nondust_htlc_sources,
3262 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3263 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3264 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3265 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3266 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3268 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3269 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3270 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3271 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3272 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3273 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3274 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3275 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3276 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3277 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3278 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3279 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3280 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3281 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3283 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3284 &self.context.channel_id);
3285 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3288 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3289 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3290 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3291 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3292 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3293 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3294 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3295 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3296 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3300 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3301 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3302 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3303 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3306 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3307 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3308 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3309 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3310 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3311 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3312 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3314 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3315 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3316 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3317 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3320 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3321 /// for our counterparty.
3322 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3323 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3324 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3325 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3327 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3328 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3329 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3330 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3332 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3333 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3334 updates: Vec::new(),
3337 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3338 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3339 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3340 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3341 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3342 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3343 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3344 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3345 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3346 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3347 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3348 // to rebalance channels.
3349 match &htlc_update {
3350 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3351 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3352 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3354 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3355 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3357 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3360 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3361 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3362 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3363 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3364 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3365 // into the holding cell without ever being
3366 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3367 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3368 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3371 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3377 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3378 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3379 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3380 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3381 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3382 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3383 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3384 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3385 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3386 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3387 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3388 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3390 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3391 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3392 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3393 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3394 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3395 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3396 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3397 // for a full revocation before failing.
3398 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3399 update_fail_count += 1;
3402 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3404 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3411 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3412 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3414 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3415 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3420 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3421 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3422 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3423 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3424 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3426 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3427 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3428 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3430 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3431 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3437 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3438 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3439 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3440 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3441 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3442 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3443 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3444 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3445 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3447 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3448 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3450 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3451 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3453 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3454 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3457 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3459 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3460 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3461 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3465 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3466 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3467 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3468 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3469 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3470 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3471 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3472 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3476 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3478 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3479 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3482 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3483 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3484 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3485 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3487 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3491 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3492 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3493 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3494 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3495 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3496 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3497 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3498 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3502 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3503 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3504 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3505 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3506 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3507 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3508 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3509 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3510 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3512 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3513 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3516 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3517 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3518 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3519 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3520 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3521 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3522 let mut require_commitment = false;
3523 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3526 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3527 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3528 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3529 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3531 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3532 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3533 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3534 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3535 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3536 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3538 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3542 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3543 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3544 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3545 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3546 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3548 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3549 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3550 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3555 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3556 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3558 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3562 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3563 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3565 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3566 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3567 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3568 require_commitment = true;
3569 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3570 match forward_info {
3571 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3572 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3573 require_commitment = true;
3575 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3576 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3577 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3579 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3580 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3581 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3585 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3586 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3587 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3588 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3594 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3595 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3596 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3597 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3598 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3600 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3601 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3602 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3603 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3604 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3605 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3606 require_commitment = true;
3610 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3612 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3613 match update_state {
3614 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3615 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3616 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3617 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3618 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3619 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3621 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3622 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3623 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3624 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3625 require_commitment = true;
3626 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3627 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3632 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3633 let release_state_str =
3634 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3635 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3636 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3637 if !release_monitor {
3638 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3639 update: monitor_update,
3641 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3643 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3648 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3649 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3650 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3651 if require_commitment {
3652 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3653 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3654 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3655 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3657 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3658 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3659 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3660 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3661 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3663 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3664 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3665 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3666 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3667 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3670 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3671 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3672 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3673 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3674 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3675 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3677 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3678 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3680 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3681 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3683 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3684 if require_commitment {
3685 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3687 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3688 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3689 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3690 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3692 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3693 &self.context.channel_id(),
3694 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3697 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3698 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3700 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3701 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3703 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3704 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3710 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3711 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3712 /// commitment update.
3713 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3714 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3715 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3717 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3718 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3721 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3722 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3723 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3724 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3726 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3727 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3728 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3729 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3730 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3731 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3732 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3734 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3735 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3737 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3738 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3740 if !self.context.is_live() {
3741 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3744 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3745 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3746 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3747 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3748 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3749 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3750 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3751 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3752 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3753 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3757 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3758 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3759 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3760 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3761 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3762 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3765 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3766 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3770 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3771 force_holding_cell = true;
3774 if force_holding_cell {
3775 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3779 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3780 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3782 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3783 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3788 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3789 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3791 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3793 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3794 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3795 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3796 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3800 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3801 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3802 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3806 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3807 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3810 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3811 // will be retransmitted.
3812 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3813 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3814 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3816 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3817 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3819 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3820 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3821 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3822 // this HTLC accordingly
3823 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3826 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3827 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3828 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3829 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3832 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3833 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3834 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3835 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3836 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3837 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3842 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3844 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3845 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3846 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3847 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3851 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3852 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3853 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3854 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3855 // the update upon reconnection.
3856 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3860 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3862 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3863 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3867 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3868 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3869 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3870 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3871 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3872 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3873 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3875 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3876 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3877 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3878 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3879 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3880 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3881 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3883 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3884 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3885 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3886 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3887 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3888 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3889 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3892 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3893 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3894 /// to the remote side.
3895 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3896 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3897 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3898 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3901 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3903 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3904 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3906 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3907 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3908 // first received the funding_signed.
3909 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3910 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3911 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3913 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3914 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3915 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3916 funding_broadcastable = None;
3919 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3920 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3921 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3922 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3923 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3924 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3925 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3926 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3927 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3928 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3929 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3930 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3931 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3932 next_per_commitment_point,
3933 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3937 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3939 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3940 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3941 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3942 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3943 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3944 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3946 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3947 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3948 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3949 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3950 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3951 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3955 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3956 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3958 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3959 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3961 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3962 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3965 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3966 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3967 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3968 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3969 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3970 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3971 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3972 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3973 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3977 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3978 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3980 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3981 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3983 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3984 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3986 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3988 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3989 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3990 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3991 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3992 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3993 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3994 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3995 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3996 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3997 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3998 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3999 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4001 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4002 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4003 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4009 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4012 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4013 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4014 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4016 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4017 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4019 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4020 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4022 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4023 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4026 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4027 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4028 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4029 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4030 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4032 SignerResumeUpdates {
4040 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4041 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4042 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4043 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4044 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4045 per_commitment_secret,
4046 next_per_commitment_point,
4048 next_local_nonce: None,
4052 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4053 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4054 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4055 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4056 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4057 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4059 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4060 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4061 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4062 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4063 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4064 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4065 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4066 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4067 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4068 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4073 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4074 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4076 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4077 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4078 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4079 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4080 reason: err_packet.clone()
4083 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4084 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4085 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4086 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4087 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4088 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4091 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4092 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4093 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4094 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4095 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4102 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4103 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4104 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4105 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4109 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4110 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4111 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4112 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4113 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4114 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4115 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4119 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4120 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4121 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4125 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4126 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4131 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4132 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4133 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4134 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4135 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4136 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4137 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4142 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4143 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4145 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4146 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4147 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4148 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4149 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4150 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4151 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4152 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4155 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4157 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4158 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4159 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4160 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4164 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4165 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4166 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4169 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4170 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4171 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4172 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4173 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4174 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4176 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4177 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4178 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4179 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4180 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4183 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4184 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4185 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4186 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4187 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4188 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4189 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4190 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4194 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4195 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4196 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4197 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4199 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4203 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4204 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4205 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4206 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4208 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4210 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4212 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4213 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4214 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4215 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4216 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4219 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4220 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4221 channel_ready: None,
4222 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4223 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4224 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4228 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4229 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4230 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4231 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4232 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4233 next_per_commitment_point,
4234 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4236 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4237 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4238 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4242 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4243 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4244 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4246 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4247 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4248 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4251 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4257 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4258 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4259 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4260 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4261 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4262 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4263 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4265 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4267 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4268 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4269 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4270 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4271 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4272 next_per_commitment_point,
4273 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4277 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4278 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4279 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4281 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4284 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4285 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4286 raa: required_revoke,
4287 commitment_update: None,
4288 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4290 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4291 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4292 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4294 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4297 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4298 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4299 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4300 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4301 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4302 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4305 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4306 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4307 raa: required_revoke,
4308 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4309 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4313 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4317 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4318 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4319 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4320 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4322 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4324 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4326 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4327 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4328 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4329 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4330 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4331 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4332 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4333 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4335 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4336 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4337 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4338 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4339 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4341 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4342 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4343 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4344 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4347 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4348 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4349 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4350 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4351 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4352 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4353 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4354 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4355 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4356 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4357 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4358 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4359 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4360 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4361 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4363 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4366 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4367 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4370 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4371 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4372 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4373 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4374 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4375 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4378 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4379 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4380 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4381 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4382 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4383 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4386 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4392 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4393 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4394 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4395 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4397 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4398 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4399 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4400 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4401 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4402 return Ok((None, None, None));
4405 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4406 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4407 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4409 return Ok((None, None, None));
4412 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4413 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4414 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4415 return Ok((None, None, None));
4418 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4420 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4421 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4422 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4423 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4425 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4426 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4428 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4429 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4431 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4432 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4433 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4434 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4436 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4437 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4438 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4445 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4446 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4448 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4449 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4452 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4453 /// within our expected timeframe.
4455 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4456 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4457 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4460 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4463 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4464 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4468 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4469 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4471 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4472 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4474 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4475 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4476 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4477 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4478 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4480 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4481 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4482 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4485 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4487 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4488 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4491 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4492 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4493 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4496 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4499 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4500 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4501 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4502 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4504 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4507 assert!(send_shutdown);
4508 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4509 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4510 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4512 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4513 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4515 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4520 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4522 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4523 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4525 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4526 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4527 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4528 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4529 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4530 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4533 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4534 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4536 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4537 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4538 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4539 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4543 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4544 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4545 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4546 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4547 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4548 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4550 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4551 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4558 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4559 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4561 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4564 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4565 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4567 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4569 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4570 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4571 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4572 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4573 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4574 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4575 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4576 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4577 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4579 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4580 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4583 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4587 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4588 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4589 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4590 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4592 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4593 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4595 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4598 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4599 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4601 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4605 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4606 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4609 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4610 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4611 return Ok((None, None, None));
4614 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4615 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4616 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4617 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4619 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4621 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4624 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4625 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4626 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4627 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4628 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4632 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4633 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4634 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4638 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4639 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4640 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4641 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4642 monitor_update: None,
4643 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4644 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4646 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4647 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4648 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4649 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4653 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4655 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4656 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4657 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4658 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4660 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4663 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4664 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4666 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4667 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4668 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4669 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4670 monitor_update: None,
4671 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4672 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4674 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4675 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4676 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4677 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4682 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4683 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4684 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4685 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4687 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4688 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4689 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4691 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4697 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4698 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4699 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4701 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4702 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4704 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4705 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4708 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4709 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4710 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4711 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4712 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4714 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4715 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4716 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4718 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4719 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4722 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4723 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4724 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4725 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4726 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4727 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4728 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4729 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4731 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4734 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4735 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4736 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4737 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4739 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4743 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4744 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4745 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4746 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4748 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4754 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4755 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4756 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4757 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4758 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4759 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4760 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4762 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4763 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4766 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4768 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4769 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4775 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4776 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4777 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4778 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4779 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4780 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4781 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4783 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4784 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4791 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4792 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4795 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4796 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4799 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4800 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4804 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner> {
4805 &self.context.holder_signer
4809 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4811 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4812 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4813 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4814 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4815 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4816 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4818 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4820 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4828 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4829 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4833 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4834 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4835 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4836 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4839 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4840 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4841 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4842 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4845 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4846 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4847 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4848 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4849 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4850 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4853 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4854 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4855 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4856 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4857 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4858 if !release_monitor {
4859 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4868 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4869 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4872 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4873 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4874 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4876 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4877 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4878 if self.context.channel_state &
4879 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4880 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4881 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4882 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4883 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4886 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4887 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4888 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4889 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4890 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4891 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4893 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4894 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4895 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4897 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4898 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4899 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4900 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4901 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4902 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4908 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4909 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4910 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4913 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4914 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4915 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4918 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4919 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4920 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4923 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4924 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4925 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4926 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4927 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4928 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4933 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4934 self.context.channel_update_status
4937 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4938 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4939 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4942 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4944 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4945 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4946 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4950 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4951 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4952 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4955 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4959 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4960 // channel_ready yet.
4961 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
4965 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4966 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4967 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4968 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4969 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4971 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4972 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4973 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4975 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4976 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4979 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4980 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4981 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4982 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4983 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4984 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4985 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4986 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4987 self.context.channel_state);
4989 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4993 if need_commitment_update {
4994 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4995 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4996 let next_per_commitment_point =
4997 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4998 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4999 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5000 next_per_commitment_point,
5001 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5005 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5011 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5012 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5013 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5014 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5015 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5016 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5017 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5019 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5022 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5023 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5024 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5025 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5026 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5027 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5028 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5029 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5030 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5031 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5032 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5033 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5034 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5035 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5036 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5037 // channel and move on.
5038 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5039 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5041 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5042 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5043 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5045 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5046 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5047 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5048 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5049 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5050 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5051 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5052 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5057 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5058 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5059 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5060 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5061 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5064 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5065 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5066 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5067 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5068 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5069 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5072 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5073 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5074 // may have already happened for this block).
5075 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5076 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5077 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5078 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5081 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5082 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5083 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5084 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5092 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5093 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5094 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5095 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5097 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5098 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5101 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5103 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5104 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5105 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5106 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5108 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5111 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5114 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5115 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5116 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5117 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5119 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5122 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5123 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5124 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5126 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5127 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5129 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5130 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5131 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5139 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5141 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5142 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5143 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5145 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5146 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5149 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5150 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5151 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5152 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5153 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5154 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5155 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5156 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5157 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5160 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5161 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5162 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5163 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5165 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5166 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5167 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5169 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5170 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5171 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5172 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5174 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5175 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5176 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5177 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5178 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5179 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5180 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5183 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5184 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5186 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5189 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5190 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5191 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5192 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5193 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5194 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5195 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5196 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5197 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5198 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5199 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5200 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5201 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5202 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5203 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5204 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5205 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5211 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5216 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5217 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5219 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5220 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5221 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5222 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5224 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5227 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5229 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5230 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5231 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5232 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5233 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5234 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5236 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5237 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5240 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5241 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5242 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5243 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5244 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5245 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5247 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5248 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5251 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5252 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5253 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5254 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5255 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5261 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5262 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5263 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5264 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5266 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5269 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5273 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5277 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5278 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5282 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5286 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5287 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5290 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5294 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5296 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5301 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5302 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5303 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5305 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5310 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5312 None => return None,
5315 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5317 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5318 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5320 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5321 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5327 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5329 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5330 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5331 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5332 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5333 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5334 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5335 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5337 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5338 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5339 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5340 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5341 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5342 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5343 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5344 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5345 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5346 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5347 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5348 contents: announcement,
5353 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5357 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5358 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5359 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5360 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5361 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5362 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5363 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5364 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5366 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5368 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5369 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5370 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5371 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5373 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5375 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5376 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5379 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5380 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5381 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5382 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5385 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5388 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5389 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5390 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5391 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5392 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5393 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5396 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5398 Err(_) => return None,
5400 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5401 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5406 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5407 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5408 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5409 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5410 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5411 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5412 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5413 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5414 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5415 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5416 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5417 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5418 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5419 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5420 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5421 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5424 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5427 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5428 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5429 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5430 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5431 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5432 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5433 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5434 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5435 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5437 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5438 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5439 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5440 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5441 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5442 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5443 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5444 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5445 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5447 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5448 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5449 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5450 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5451 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5452 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5453 next_funding_txid: None,
5458 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5460 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5461 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5462 /// commitment update.
5464 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5465 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5466 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5467 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5468 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5469 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5470 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5473 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5474 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5475 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5477 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5478 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5483 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5484 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5486 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5488 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5489 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5491 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5492 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5493 /// regenerate them.
5495 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5496 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5498 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5499 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5500 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5501 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5502 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5503 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5504 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5506 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5507 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5509 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5510 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5511 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5514 if amount_msat == 0 {
5515 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5518 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5519 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5520 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5521 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5524 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5525 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5526 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5529 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5530 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5531 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5532 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5533 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5534 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5535 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5536 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5539 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5540 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5541 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5542 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5543 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5544 else { "to peer" });
5546 if need_holding_cell {
5547 force_holding_cell = true;
5550 // Now update local state:
5551 if force_holding_cell {
5552 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5557 onion_routing_packet,
5563 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5564 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5566 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5568 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5573 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5574 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5575 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5579 onion_routing_packet,
5582 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5587 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5588 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5589 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5590 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5592 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5593 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5594 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5596 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5597 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5601 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5602 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5603 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5604 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5605 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5606 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5607 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5610 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5611 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5612 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5613 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5614 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5615 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5618 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5620 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5621 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5622 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5623 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5624 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5626 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5627 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5630 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5631 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5632 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5633 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5634 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5635 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5636 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5637 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5638 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5639 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5640 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5643 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5647 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5648 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5649 where L::Target: Logger
5651 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5652 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5653 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5655 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5657 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5658 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5659 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5660 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5661 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5662 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5663 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5664 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5665 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5666 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5667 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5673 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5676 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5677 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5678 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5679 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5680 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5681 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5683 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5684 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5685 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5687 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5688 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5689 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5692 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5693 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5697 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5698 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5700 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5702 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5703 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5704 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5705 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5707 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5708 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5709 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5710 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5711 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
5712 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5716 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5717 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5721 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5722 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5727 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5728 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5730 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5731 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5732 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5733 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5734 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5735 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5736 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5737 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5739 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5740 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5741 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5744 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5745 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5746 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5752 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5754 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5755 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5756 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5757 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5758 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5760 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5762 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5768 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5769 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5771 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5772 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5773 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5774 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5775 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5777 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5778 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5779 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5782 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5783 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5784 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5786 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5787 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5790 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5791 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5793 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5794 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5795 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5798 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5799 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5800 let mut chan_closed = false;
5801 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5805 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5807 None if !chan_closed => {
5808 // use override shutdown script if provided
5809 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5810 Some(script) => script,
5812 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5813 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5814 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5815 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5819 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5820 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5822 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5828 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5829 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5830 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5831 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5832 monitor_update: None,
5833 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5834 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5836 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5837 Some(shutdown_result)
5839 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5842 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5844 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5845 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5846 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5847 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5848 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5849 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5852 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5853 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5855 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5856 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5857 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5860 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5861 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5862 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5863 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5864 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5866 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5867 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5874 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5875 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5877 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5880 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5881 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5882 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5884 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5885 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5889 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5893 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5894 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5895 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5896 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5899 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5900 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5901 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5902 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5903 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
5904 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5905 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5906 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5908 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5909 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5910 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5911 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5913 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5914 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5916 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5919 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5920 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5921 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5923 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5924 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5926 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5927 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5928 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5929 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5930 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5933 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5934 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5936 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5937 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5939 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5941 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5943 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5944 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5945 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5946 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5949 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5950 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5952 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5953 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5954 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5955 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5959 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5960 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5961 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5965 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
5966 Ok(script) => script,
5967 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5970 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
5973 context: ChannelContext {
5976 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5977 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5978 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5979 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5984 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5986 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5987 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5988 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5989 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5991 channel_value_satoshis,
5993 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5995 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5996 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5999 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6000 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6003 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6004 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6005 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6006 pending_update_fee: None,
6007 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6008 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6009 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6010 update_time_counter: 1,
6012 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6014 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6015 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6016 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6017 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6018 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6019 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6021 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6022 signer_pending_funding: false,
6024 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6025 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6026 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6027 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6029 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6030 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6031 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6032 closing_fee_limits: None,
6033 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6035 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6036 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6037 short_channel_id: None,
6038 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6040 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6041 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6042 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6043 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6044 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6045 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6046 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6047 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6048 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6049 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6050 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6051 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6053 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6055 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6056 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6057 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6058 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6059 counterparty_parameters: None,
6060 funding_outpoint: None,
6061 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6063 funding_transaction: None,
6064 is_batch_funding: None,
6066 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6067 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6068 counterparty_node_id,
6070 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6072 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6074 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6075 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6077 announcement_sigs: None,
6079 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6080 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6081 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6082 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6084 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6085 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6087 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6088 outbound_scid_alias,
6090 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6091 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6093 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6094 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6099 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6101 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6105 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6106 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6107 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6108 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6109 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6110 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6111 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6112 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6113 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6114 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6115 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6117 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6118 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6120 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6121 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6122 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6123 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6126 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6127 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6129 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6131 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6132 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6134 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6135 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6136 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6137 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6138 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6139 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6142 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6143 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6145 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6146 if funding_created.is_none() {
6147 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6148 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6149 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6153 let channel = Channel {
6154 context: self.context,
6157 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6160 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6161 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6162 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6163 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6164 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6165 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6166 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6167 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6168 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6169 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6172 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6173 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6174 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6175 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6176 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6177 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6183 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6184 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6185 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6186 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6187 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6188 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6190 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6192 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6193 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6194 // We've exhausted our options
6197 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6198 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6201 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6202 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6203 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6204 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6206 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6207 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6208 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6209 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6210 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6211 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6213 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6215 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6216 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6219 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6220 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6221 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6223 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6224 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6227 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6228 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6231 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6232 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6236 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6237 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6238 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6239 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6240 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6241 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6242 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6243 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6244 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6245 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6246 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6247 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6248 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6249 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6250 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6251 first_per_commitment_point,
6252 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6253 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6254 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6255 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6257 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6262 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6263 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6265 // Check sanity of message fields:
6266 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6267 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6269 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6272 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6273 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6275 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6276 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6278 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6281 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6283 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6285 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6286 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6289 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6290 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6293 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6294 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6296 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6300 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6301 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6304 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6307 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6308 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6310 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6311 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6313 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6314 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6316 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6317 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6319 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6320 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6323 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6324 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6325 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6327 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6328 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6330 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6331 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6332 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6334 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6335 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6338 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6339 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6340 &Some(ref script) => {
6341 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6342 if script.len() == 0 {
6345 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6346 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6348 Some(script.clone())
6351 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6358 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6359 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6360 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6361 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6362 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6364 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6365 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6367 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6370 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6371 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6372 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6373 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6374 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6375 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6378 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6379 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6380 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6383 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6384 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6386 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6387 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6393 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6394 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6395 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6396 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6399 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6400 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6401 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6402 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6403 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6404 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6405 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6406 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6407 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6408 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6409 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6412 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6414 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6415 // support this channel type.
6416 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6417 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6418 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6421 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6422 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6423 // `static_remote_key`.
6424 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6425 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6427 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6428 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6429 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6431 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6432 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6434 channel_type.clone()
6436 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6437 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6443 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6444 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6445 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6446 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6447 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6448 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6449 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6450 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6451 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6454 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6455 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6458 // Check sanity of message fields:
6459 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6460 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6462 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6463 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6465 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6466 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6468 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6469 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6470 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6472 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6473 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6475 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6476 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6478 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6480 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6481 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6482 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6484 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6485 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6487 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6488 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6491 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6492 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6493 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6495 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6496 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6498 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6499 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6501 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6502 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6504 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6505 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6507 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6508 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6510 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6511 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6514 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6516 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6517 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6518 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6522 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6523 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6524 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6525 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6526 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6528 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6529 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6531 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6532 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6533 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6535 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6536 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6539 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6540 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6541 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6542 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6546 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6547 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6548 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6549 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6552 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6553 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6554 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6555 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6556 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6559 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6560 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6561 &Some(ref script) => {
6562 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6563 if script.len() == 0 {
6566 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6567 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6569 Some(script.clone())
6572 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6574 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6579 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6580 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6581 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6582 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6586 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6587 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6588 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6592 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6593 Ok(script) => script,
6594 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6597 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6598 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6600 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6603 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6607 context: ChannelContext {
6610 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6611 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6613 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6618 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6620 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6621 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6622 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6623 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6626 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6628 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6629 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6632 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6633 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6634 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6636 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6637 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6638 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6639 pending_update_fee: None,
6640 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6641 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6642 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6643 update_time_counter: 1,
6645 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6647 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6648 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6649 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6650 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6651 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6652 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6654 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6655 signer_pending_funding: false,
6657 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6658 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6659 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6660 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6662 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6663 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6664 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6665 closing_fee_limits: None,
6666 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6668 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6669 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6670 short_channel_id: None,
6671 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6673 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6674 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6675 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6676 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6677 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6678 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6679 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6680 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6681 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6682 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6683 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6684 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6687 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6689 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6690 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6691 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6692 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6693 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6694 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6695 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6697 funding_outpoint: None,
6698 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6700 funding_transaction: None,
6701 is_batch_funding: None,
6703 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6704 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6705 counterparty_node_id,
6707 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6709 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6711 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6712 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6714 announcement_sigs: None,
6716 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6717 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6718 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6719 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6721 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6722 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6724 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6725 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6727 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6728 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6730 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6731 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6736 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6738 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6744 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6745 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6747 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6748 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6749 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6750 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6752 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6753 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6755 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6756 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6759 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6762 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6763 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6764 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6766 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6767 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6768 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6769 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6771 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6772 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6773 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6774 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6775 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6776 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6777 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6778 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6779 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6780 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6781 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6782 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6783 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6784 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6785 first_per_commitment_point,
6786 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6787 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6788 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6790 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6792 next_local_nonce: None,
6796 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6797 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6799 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6801 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6802 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6805 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6806 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6808 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6809 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6810 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6811 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6812 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6813 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6814 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6815 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6816 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6817 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6818 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6820 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6823 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6824 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6825 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6829 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6830 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6832 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6833 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6834 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6836 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6838 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6839 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6840 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6841 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6844 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6845 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6846 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6847 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6848 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6850 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6852 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6853 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6854 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6857 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6858 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6859 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6863 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6864 initial_commitment_tx,
6867 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6868 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6871 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6872 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6875 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6877 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6878 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6879 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6880 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6882 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6884 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6885 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6886 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6887 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6888 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6889 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6890 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6891 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6892 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6893 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6894 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6896 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6898 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6899 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6900 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6901 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6902 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6903 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6905 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6906 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6908 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6909 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6910 let mut channel = Channel {
6911 context: self.context,
6913 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6914 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6916 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6920 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6921 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6923 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6929 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6930 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6931 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6932 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6933 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6935 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6936 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6937 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6938 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6944 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6945 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6946 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6947 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6948 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6949 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6954 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6955 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6956 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6957 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6959 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6960 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6961 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6962 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6967 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6968 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6969 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6970 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6971 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6972 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6977 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6978 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6979 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6982 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6984 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6985 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6986 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6987 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6988 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6990 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6991 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6992 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6993 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6995 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6996 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6997 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6999 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7001 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7002 // deserialized from that format.
7003 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7004 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7005 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7007 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7009 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7010 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7011 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7013 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7014 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7015 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7016 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7019 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7020 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7021 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7024 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7025 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7026 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7027 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7029 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7030 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7032 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7034 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7036 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7038 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7041 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7043 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7048 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7049 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7051 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7052 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7053 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7054 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7055 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7056 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7057 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7059 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7061 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7063 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7066 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7067 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7068 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7071 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7073 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7074 preimages.push(preimage);
7076 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7077 reason.write(writer)?;
7079 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7081 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7082 preimages.push(preimage);
7084 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7085 reason.write(writer)?;
7088 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7089 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7090 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7092 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7093 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7094 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7098 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7099 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7100 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7102 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7103 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7107 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7108 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7109 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7110 source.write(writer)?;
7111 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7113 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7114 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7115 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7117 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7118 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7120 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7122 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7123 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7125 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7127 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7128 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7133 match self.context.resend_order {
7134 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7135 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7138 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7139 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7140 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7142 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7143 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7144 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7145 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7148 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7149 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7150 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7151 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7152 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7155 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7156 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7157 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7158 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7160 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7161 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7162 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7164 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7166 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7167 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7168 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7169 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7171 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7172 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7173 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7174 // consider the stale state on reload.
7177 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7178 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7179 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7181 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7182 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7183 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7185 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7186 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7188 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7189 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7190 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7192 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7193 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7195 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7198 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7199 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7200 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7202 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7205 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7206 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7208 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7209 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7210 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7212 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7214 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7216 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7218 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7219 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7220 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7221 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7222 htlc.write(writer)?;
7225 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7226 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7227 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7229 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7230 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7232 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7233 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7234 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7235 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7236 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7237 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7238 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7240 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7241 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7242 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7243 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7244 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7246 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7247 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7249 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7250 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7251 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7252 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7254 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7256 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7257 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7258 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7259 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7260 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7261 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7262 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7264 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7265 (2, chan_type, option),
7266 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7267 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7268 (5, self.context.config, required),
7269 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7270 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7271 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7272 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7273 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7274 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7275 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7276 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7277 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7278 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7279 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7280 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7281 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7282 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7283 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7284 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7285 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7286 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7287 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7294 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7295 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7297 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7298 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7300 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7301 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7302 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7304 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7305 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7306 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7307 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7309 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7311 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7312 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7313 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7314 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7315 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7317 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7318 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7321 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7322 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7323 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7325 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7327 let mut keys_data = None;
7329 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7330 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7331 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7332 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7333 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7334 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7335 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7336 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7337 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7338 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7342 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7343 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7344 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7347 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7349 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7350 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7351 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7353 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7355 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7356 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7357 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7358 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7359 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7360 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7361 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7362 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7363 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7364 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7365 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7366 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7367 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7372 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7373 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7374 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7375 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7376 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7377 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7378 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7379 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7380 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7381 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7382 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7383 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7385 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7386 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7389 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7390 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7393 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7394 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7396 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7398 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7402 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7403 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7404 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7405 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7406 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7407 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7408 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7409 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7410 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7411 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7412 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7414 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7415 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7416 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7418 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7419 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7420 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7422 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7426 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7427 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7428 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7429 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7432 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7433 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7434 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7436 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7437 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7438 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7439 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7442 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7443 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7444 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7445 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7448 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7450 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7453 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7454 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7455 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7457 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7458 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7459 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7460 // consider the stale state on reload.
7461 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7464 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7465 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7466 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7468 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7471 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7472 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7473 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7475 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7476 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7478 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7480 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7481 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7483 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7484 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7486 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7487 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7488 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7490 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7492 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7493 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7495 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7496 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7499 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7501 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7502 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7503 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7504 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7506 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7509 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7510 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7512 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7514 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7515 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7517 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7518 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7520 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7522 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7523 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7524 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7526 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7527 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7528 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7532 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7533 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7534 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7536 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7542 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7543 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7544 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7545 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7546 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7547 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7548 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7549 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7550 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7551 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7553 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7554 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7555 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7556 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7557 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7558 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7559 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7561 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7562 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7563 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7564 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7566 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7568 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7569 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7571 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7573 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7574 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7575 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7576 (2, channel_type, option),
7577 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7578 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7579 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7580 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7581 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7582 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7583 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7584 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7585 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7586 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7587 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7588 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7589 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7590 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7591 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7592 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7593 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7594 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7595 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7596 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7597 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7598 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7601 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7602 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7603 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7604 // required channel parameters.
7605 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7606 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7607 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7609 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7611 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7612 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7613 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7614 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7617 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7618 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7619 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7621 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7622 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7624 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7625 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7630 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7631 if iter.next().is_some() {
7632 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7636 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7637 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7638 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7639 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7640 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7643 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7644 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7645 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7647 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7648 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7650 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7651 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7652 // separate u64 values.
7653 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7655 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7657 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7658 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7659 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7660 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7662 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7663 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7665 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7666 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7667 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7668 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7669 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7672 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7673 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7677 context: ChannelContext {
7680 config: config.unwrap(),
7684 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7685 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7686 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7689 temporary_channel_id,
7691 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7693 channel_value_satoshis,
7695 latest_monitor_update_id,
7697 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7698 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7701 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7702 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7705 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7706 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7707 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7708 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7712 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7713 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7714 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7715 monitor_pending_forwards,
7716 monitor_pending_failures,
7717 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7719 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7720 signer_pending_funding: false,
7723 holding_cell_update_fee,
7724 next_holder_htlc_id,
7725 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7726 update_time_counter,
7729 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7730 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7731 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7732 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7734 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7735 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7736 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7737 closing_fee_limits: None,
7738 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7740 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7741 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7743 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7745 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7746 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7747 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7748 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7749 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7750 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7751 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7752 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7753 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7756 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7758 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7759 funding_transaction,
7762 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7763 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7764 counterparty_node_id,
7766 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7770 channel_update_status,
7771 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7775 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7776 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7777 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7778 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7780 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7781 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7783 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7784 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7785 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7787 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7788 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7790 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7791 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7793 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7796 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7805 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7806 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
7807 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7808 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7809 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7810 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7811 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
7812 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7813 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7814 use crate::ln::channel::{ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7815 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7816 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7817 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7818 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7819 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7820 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7821 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7822 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7823 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7824 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7825 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7826 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7827 use crate::util::test_utils;
7828 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7829 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7830 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7831 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7832 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7833 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7834 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7835 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7836 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
7837 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
7838 use crate::prelude::*;
7840 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7843 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7844 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7850 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7851 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7852 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7853 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7857 signer: InMemorySigner,
7860 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7861 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7864 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7865 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
7867 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
7869 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7870 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7873 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
7877 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7879 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
7880 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7881 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7882 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7883 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
7886 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7887 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7888 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7889 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7893 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7894 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7895 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7899 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7900 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7901 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
7902 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
7905 let seed = [42; 32];
7906 let network = Network::Testnet;
7907 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7908 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7909 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7912 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7913 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7914 let config = UserConfig::default();
7915 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
7916 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7917 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7919 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7920 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7924 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7925 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7927 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7928 let original_fee = 253;
7929 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7930 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7931 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7932 let seed = [42; 32];
7933 let network = Network::Testnet;
7934 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7936 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7937 let config = UserConfig::default();
7938 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7940 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7941 // same as the old fee.
7942 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7943 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7944 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7948 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7949 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7950 // dust limits are used.
7951 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7952 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7953 let seed = [42; 32];
7954 let network = Network::Testnet;
7955 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7956 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7957 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7959 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7960 // they have different dust limits.
7962 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7963 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7964 let config = UserConfig::default();
7965 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7967 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7968 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7969 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7970 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7971 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7973 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7974 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7975 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7976 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7977 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7979 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7980 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7981 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7982 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7984 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7985 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7986 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7988 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7989 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7991 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7992 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7993 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7995 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7996 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
7997 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7998 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8001 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8003 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8004 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8005 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8006 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8007 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8008 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8009 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8010 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8011 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8013 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8016 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8017 // the dust limit check.
8018 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8019 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8020 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8021 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8023 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8024 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8025 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8026 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8027 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8028 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8029 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8033 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8034 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8035 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8036 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8037 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8038 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8039 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8040 let seed = [42; 32];
8041 let network = Network::Testnet;
8042 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8044 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8045 let config = UserConfig::default();
8046 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8048 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8049 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8051 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8052 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8053 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8054 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8055 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8056 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8058 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8059 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8060 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8061 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8062 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8064 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8066 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8067 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8068 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8069 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8070 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8072 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8073 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8074 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8075 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8076 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8080 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8081 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8082 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8083 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8084 let seed = [42; 32];
8085 let network = Network::Testnet;
8086 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8087 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8088 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8090 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8092 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8093 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8094 let config = UserConfig::default();
8095 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8097 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8098 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8099 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8100 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8102 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8103 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8104 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8106 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8107 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8108 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8109 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8111 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8112 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8113 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8115 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8116 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8118 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8119 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8120 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8121 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8122 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8123 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8124 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8126 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8128 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8129 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8130 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8131 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8132 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8136 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8137 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8138 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8139 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8140 let seed = [42; 32];
8141 let network = Network::Testnet;
8142 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8143 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8144 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8146 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8147 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8148 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8149 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8150 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8151 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8152 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8153 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8155 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8156 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8157 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8158 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8159 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8160 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8162 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8163 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8164 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8165 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8167 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8169 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8170 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8171 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8172 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8173 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8174 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8176 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8177 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8178 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8179 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8181 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8182 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8183 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8184 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8185 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8187 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8188 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8190 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8191 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8192 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8194 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8195 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8196 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8197 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8198 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8200 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8201 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8203 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8204 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8205 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8209 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8211 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8212 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8213 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8215 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8216 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8217 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8218 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8220 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8221 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8222 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8224 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8226 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8227 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8230 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8231 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8232 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8233 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8234 let seed = [42; 32];
8235 let network = Network::Testnet;
8236 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8237 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8238 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8241 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8242 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8243 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8245 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8246 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8248 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8249 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8250 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8252 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8253 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8255 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8257 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8258 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8260 // Channel Negotiations failed
8261 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8262 assert!(result.is_err());
8267 fn channel_update() {
8268 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8269 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8270 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8271 let seed = [42; 32];
8272 let network = Network::Testnet;
8273 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8274 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8275 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8277 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8278 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8279 let config = UserConfig::default();
8280 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8282 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8283 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8284 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8285 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8286 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8288 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8289 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8290 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8291 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8292 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8294 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8295 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8296 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8297 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8299 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8300 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8301 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8303 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8304 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8306 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8307 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8308 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8310 short_channel_id: 0,
8313 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8314 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8315 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8317 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8318 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8320 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8322 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8324 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8325 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8326 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8327 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8329 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8330 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8331 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8333 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8336 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8339 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8341 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8342 use bitcoin::sighash;
8343 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8344 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8345 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8346 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8347 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8348 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8349 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8350 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8351 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8352 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8353 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8354 use crate::sync::Arc;
8355 use core::str::FromStr;
8356 use hex::DisplayHex;
8358 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8359 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8360 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8361 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8363 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8365 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8366 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8367 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8368 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8369 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8371 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8372 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8378 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8379 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8380 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8382 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8383 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8384 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8385 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8386 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8387 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8389 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8391 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8392 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8393 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
8394 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8395 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
8396 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
8398 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8399 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8400 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8401 selected_contest_delay: 144
8403 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8404 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8406 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8407 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8409 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8410 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8412 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
8413 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8415 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8416 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8417 // build_commitment_transaction.
8418 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8419 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8420 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8421 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8422 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8424 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8425 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8426 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8427 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8431 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8432 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8433 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8434 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8438 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8439 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8440 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8442 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8443 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8445 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8446 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8448 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8450 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8451 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8452 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8453 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8454 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8455 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
8456 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8458 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8459 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8460 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8461 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8463 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8464 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8465 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8467 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8469 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8470 commitment_tx.clone(),
8471 counterparty_signature,
8472 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8473 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8474 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8476 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8477 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8479 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8480 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8481 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8483 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8484 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8487 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8488 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8490 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8491 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8492 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8493 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8494 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8495 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8496 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8497 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8499 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8502 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
8503 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8504 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8508 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8511 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8512 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8513 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8514 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8515 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8516 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8518 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8519 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8520 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8521 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8523 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8524 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8525 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8526 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8527 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8529 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8530 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8531 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8532 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8533 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
8534 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8536 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8540 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8541 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8542 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8543 "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", {});
8545 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8546 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8548 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8549 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8550 "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", {});
8552 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8553 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8554 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8555 "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", {});
8557 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8558 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8560 amount_msat: 1000000,
8562 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8563 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8565 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8568 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8569 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8571 amount_msat: 2000000,
8573 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8574 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8576 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8579 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8580 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8582 amount_msat: 2000000,
8584 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8585 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8586 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8587 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8589 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8592 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8593 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8595 amount_msat: 3000000,
8597 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8598 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8599 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8600 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8602 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8605 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8606 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8608 amount_msat: 4000000,
8610 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8611 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8613 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
8617 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8618 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8619 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8621 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8622 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8623 "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", {
8626 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8627 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8628 "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" },
8631 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8632 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8633 "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" },
8636 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8637 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8638 "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" },
8641 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8642 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8643 "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" },
8646 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8647 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8648 "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" }
8651 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8652 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8653 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8655 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8656 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8657 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8660 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8661 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8662 "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" },
8665 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8666 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8667 "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" },
8670 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8671 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8672 "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" },
8675 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8676 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8677 "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" },
8680 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8681 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8682 "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" }
8685 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8686 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8687 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8689 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8690 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8691 "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", {
8694 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8695 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8696 "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" },
8699 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8700 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8701 "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" },
8704 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8705 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8706 "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" },
8709 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8710 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8711 "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" }
8714 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8715 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8716 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8717 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8719 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8720 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8721 "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", {
8724 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8725 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8726 "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" },
8729 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8730 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8731 "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" },
8734 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8735 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8736 "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" },
8739 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8740 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8741 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
8744 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8745 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8746 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8747 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8749 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8750 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8751 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8754 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8755 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8756 "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" },
8759 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8760 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8761 "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" },
8764 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8765 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8766 "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" },
8769 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8770 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8771 "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" }
8774 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8775 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8776 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8778 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8779 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8780 "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", {
8783 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8784 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8785 "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" },
8788 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8789 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8790 "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" },
8793 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8794 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8795 "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" }
8798 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8799 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8800 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8802 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8803 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8804 "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", {
8807 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8808 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8809 "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" },
8812 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8813 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8814 "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" },
8817 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8818 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8819 "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" }
8822 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8823 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8824 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8826 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8827 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8828 "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", {
8831 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8832 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8833 "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" },
8836 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8837 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8838 "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" }
8841 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8842 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8843 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8844 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8845 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8846 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8848 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8849 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8850 "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", {
8853 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8854 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8855 "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" },
8858 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8859 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8860 "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" }
8863 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8864 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8865 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8866 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8867 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8869 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8870 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8871 "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", {
8874 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8875 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8876 "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" },
8879 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8880 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8881 "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" }
8884 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8885 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8886 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8888 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8889 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8890 "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", {
8893 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8894 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8895 "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" }
8898 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8899 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8900 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8901 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8902 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8904 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8905 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8906 "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", {
8909 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8910 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8911 "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" }
8914 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8915 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8916 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8917 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8918 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8920 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8921 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8922 "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", {
8925 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8926 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8927 "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" }
8930 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8931 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8932 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8933 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8935 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8936 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8937 "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", {});
8939 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8940 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8941 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8942 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8943 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8945 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8946 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8947 "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", {});
8949 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8950 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8951 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8952 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8953 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8955 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8956 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8957 "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", {});
8959 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8960 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8961 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8963 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8964 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8965 "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", {});
8967 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8968 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8969 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8970 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8971 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8973 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8974 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8975 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a04004830450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1014830450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8977 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8978 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8979 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8980 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8981 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8983 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8984 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8985 "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", {});
8987 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8988 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8989 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8990 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8991 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8992 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8994 amount_msat: 2000000,
8996 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8997 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8999 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9002 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9003 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9004 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9006 amount_msat: 5000001,
9008 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9009 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9010 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9011 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9013 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9016 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9017 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9019 amount_msat: 5000000,
9021 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9022 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9023 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9024 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9026 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9030 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9031 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9032 "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", {
9035 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9036 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9037 "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" },
9039 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9040 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9041 "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" },
9043 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9044 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9045 "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" }
9048 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9049 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9050 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9051 "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", {
9054 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9055 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9056 "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" },
9058 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9059 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9060 "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" },
9062 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9063 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9064 "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" }
9069 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9070 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9072 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9073 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9074 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9075 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9077 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9078 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9079 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9081 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9082 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9084 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9085 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9087 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9088 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9089 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9093 fn test_key_derivation() {
9094 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9095 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9097 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9098 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9100 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9101 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9103 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9104 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9106 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9107 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9109 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9110 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9112 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9113 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9117 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9118 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9119 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9120 let seed = [42; 32];
9121 let network = Network::Testnet;
9122 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9123 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9125 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9126 let config = UserConfig::default();
9127 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9128 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9130 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9131 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9133 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9134 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9135 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9136 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9137 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9138 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9139 assert!(res.is_ok());
9143 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9144 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9145 // resulting `channel_type`.
9146 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9147 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9148 let network = Network::Testnet;
9149 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9150 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9152 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9153 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9155 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9156 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9158 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9159 // need to signal it.
9160 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9161 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9162 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9163 &config, 0, 42, None
9165 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9167 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9168 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9169 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9171 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9172 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9173 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9177 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9178 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9179 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9180 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9181 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9184 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9185 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9189 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9190 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9191 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9192 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9193 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9194 let network = Network::Testnet;
9195 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9196 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9198 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9199 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9201 let config = UserConfig::default();
9203 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9204 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9205 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9206 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9207 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9209 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9210 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9211 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9215 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9216 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9217 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9219 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9220 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9221 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9222 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9223 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9224 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9226 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9230 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9231 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9233 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9234 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9235 let network = Network::Testnet;
9236 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9237 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9239 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9240 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9242 let config = UserConfig::default();
9244 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9245 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9246 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9247 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9248 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9249 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9250 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9251 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9253 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9254 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9255 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9256 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9257 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9258 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9262 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9263 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9265 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9266 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9267 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9268 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9270 assert!(res.is_err());
9272 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9273 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9274 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9276 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9277 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9278 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9281 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9283 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9284 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9285 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9286 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9289 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9290 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9292 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9293 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9295 assert!(res.is_err());
9299 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9300 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9301 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9302 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9303 let seed = [42; 32];
9304 let network = Network::Testnet;
9305 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9306 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9307 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9309 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9310 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9311 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9312 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9314 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9315 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9316 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9321 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9331 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9332 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9333 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9338 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9339 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9345 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9348 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9349 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9350 &accept_channel_msg,
9351 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9352 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9355 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9356 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9357 let tx = Transaction {
9359 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9363 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9366 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9369 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9370 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9375 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9376 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9377 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9381 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9382 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9390 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9391 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9392 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9393 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9398 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9405 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9406 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9407 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9408 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9410 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9411 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9412 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9415 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9416 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9417 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9425 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9426 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9427 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9428 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9431 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9432 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9434 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9435 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9436 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9438 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());