1 use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
2 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
3 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn, TxOut, Transaction, SigHashType};
4 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
5 use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
6 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
7 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
9 use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
10 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
11 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
12 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
14 use secp256k1::key::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
15 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Signature};
18 use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, InitFeatures};
20 use ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
21 use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
22 use ln::channelmanager::{PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailReason, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingForwardHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
23 use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys};
25 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
26 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
27 use chain::keysinterface::{ChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
28 use util::transaction_utils;
29 use util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
30 use util::logger::{Logger, LogHolder};
31 use util::errors::APIError;
32 use util::config::{UserConfig,ChannelConfig};
35 use std::default::Default;
36 use std::{cmp,mem,fmt};
40 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
41 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
42 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
43 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
44 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
45 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
46 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
47 pub their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
50 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
51 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
52 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
53 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
56 enum InboundHTLCState {
57 /// Added by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx.
58 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
59 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
60 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
61 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
62 /// We also have not yet included this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on
63 /// a remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
64 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
65 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
66 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
67 /// accept this HTLC. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
68 /// We have included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
70 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
72 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
73 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
75 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
76 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
77 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
78 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
79 /// ChannelMonitor::would_broadcast_at_height) so we actually remove the HTLC from our own
80 /// local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
81 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info will not include this HTLC.
82 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
85 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
89 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
90 state: InboundHTLCState,
93 enum OutboundHTLCState {
94 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
95 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
96 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
97 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
98 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
99 /// money back (though we won't), and,
100 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
101 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
102 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
103 /// we'll never get out of sync).
104 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
105 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
106 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
108 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
109 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
110 RemoteRemoved(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
111 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
112 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
113 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
114 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
115 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
116 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
117 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
118 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
119 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
120 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
121 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
122 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Option<HTLCFailReason>),
125 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
129 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
130 state: OutboundHTLCState,
134 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
135 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
136 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
140 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
142 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
145 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
150 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
154 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
155 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
156 /// TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
157 /// move on to ChannelFunded.
158 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelFunded and FundingSent.
159 /// ChannelFunded can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
160 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
162 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
163 OurInitSent = (1 << 0),
164 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
165 TheirInitSent = (1 << 1),
166 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
167 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
168 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
170 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
171 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The FundingLocked flags are set to indicate when we
172 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
174 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a funding_locked message.
175 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
176 TheirFundingLocked = (1 << 4),
177 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a funding_locked message.
178 /// Once both TheirFundingLocked and OurFundingLocked are set, state moves on to ChannelFunded.
179 OurFundingLocked = (1 << 5),
181 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
182 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
184 PeerDisconnected = (1 << 7),
185 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
186 /// told us they failed to update our ChannelMonitor somewhere and we should pause sending any
187 /// outbound messages until they've managed to do so.
188 MonitorUpdateFailed = (1 << 8),
189 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
190 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
191 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
192 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
194 /// Flag is set on ChannelFunded.
195 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = (1 << 9),
196 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
197 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
198 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
199 RemoteShutdownSent = (1 << 10),
200 /// Flag which is set on ChannelFunded or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
201 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
202 /// TODO: Investigate some kind of timeout mechanism by which point the remote end must provide
203 /// us their shutdown.
204 LocalShutdownSent = (1 << 11),
205 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
206 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
207 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
209 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32);
210 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
212 const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
214 /// Liveness is called to fluctuate given peer disconnecton/monitor failures/closing.
215 /// If channel is public, network should have a liveness view announced by us on a
216 /// best-effort, which means we may filter out some status transitions to avoid spam.
217 /// See further timer_chan_freshness_every_min.
220 /// Status has been gossiped.
222 /// Status has been changed.
224 /// Status has been marked to be gossiped at next flush
228 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
229 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
230 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
232 pub(super) struct Channel<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> {
233 config: ChannelConfig,
237 channel_id: [u8; 32],
239 channel_outbound: bool,
240 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
241 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
243 local_keys: ChanSigner,
244 shutdown_pubkey: PublicKey,
246 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
247 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
248 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
250 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
251 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
252 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
253 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
254 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
255 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
257 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
258 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
259 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
260 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
261 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
262 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
264 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
266 monitor_pending_funding_locked: bool,
267 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
268 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
269 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>,
270 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
272 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee
273 // For outbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated with the value from
274 // pending_update_fee when revoke_and_ack is received
276 // For inbound channel, feerate_per_kw is updated when it receives
277 // commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack is generated
278 // The pending value is kept when another pair of update_fee and commitment_signed
279 // is received during AwaitingRemoteRevoke and relieved when the expected
280 // revoke_and_ack is received and new commitment_signed is generated to be
281 // sent to the funder. Otherwise, the pending value is removed when receiving
282 // commitment_signed.
283 pending_update_fee: Option<u64>,
284 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke is hold in
285 // holdina_cell_update_fee then moved to pending_udpate_fee when revoke_and_ack
286 // is received. holding_cell_update_fee is updated when there are additional
287 // update_fee() during ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
288 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u64>,
289 next_local_htlc_id: u64,
290 next_remote_htlc_id: u64,
291 channel_update_count: u32,
294 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
295 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
296 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
297 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
298 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
299 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
301 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, u64, Signature)>, // (feerate, fee, our_sig)
303 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction reached our CONF_TARGET. We use this
304 /// to detect unconfirmation after a serialize-unserialize roundtrip where we may not see a full
305 /// series of block_connected/block_disconnected calls. Obviously this is not a guarantee as we
306 /// could miss the funding_tx_confirmed_in block as well, but it serves as a useful fallback.
307 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<Sha256dHash>,
308 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
309 /// Used to deduplicate block_connected callbacks, also used to verify consistency during
310 /// ChannelManager deserialization (hence pub(super))
311 pub(super) last_block_connected: Sha256dHash,
312 funding_tx_confirmations: u64,
314 their_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
316 pub(super) our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
318 our_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
320 pub(super) their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
322 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
323 //get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(): u64,
324 /// minimum channel reserve for **self** to maintain - set by them.
325 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
326 //get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(): u64,
327 their_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
328 our_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
329 their_to_self_delay: u16,
330 our_to_self_delay: u16,
332 pub their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
334 their_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
335 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: our_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
338 their_pubkeys: Option<ChannelPublicKeys>,
340 their_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
342 their_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
343 their_node_id: PublicKey,
345 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
347 channel_monitor: ChannelMonitor,
349 network_sync: UpdateStatus,
354 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
355 /// Confirmation count threshold at which we close a channel. Ideally we'd keep the channel around
356 /// on ice until the funding transaction gets more confirmations, but the LN protocol doesn't
357 /// really allow for this, so instead we're stuck closing it out at that point.
358 const UNCONF_THRESHOLD: u32 = 6;
359 /// Exposing these two constants for use in test in ChannelMonitor
360 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
361 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
362 const SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 79; // prevout: 36, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: (3+1)/4, sig: 73/4, if-selector: 1, redeemScript: (6 ops + 2*33 pubkeys + 1*2 delay)/4
363 const B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT: u64 = 104; // prevout: 40, nSequence: 4, script len: 1, witness lengths: 3/4, sig: 73/4, pubkey: 33/4, output: 31 (TODO: Wrong? Useless?)
364 /// Maximmum `funding_satoshis` value, according to the BOLT #2 specification
366 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS: u64 = (1 << 24);
368 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
369 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
370 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
371 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
372 Ignore(&'static str),
374 CloseDelayBroadcast {
376 update: Option<ChannelMonitor>
380 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
381 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
383 &ChannelError::Ignore(e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
384 &ChannelError::Close(e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
385 &ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg, .. } => write!(f, "CloseDelayBroadcast : {}", msg)
390 macro_rules! secp_check {
391 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
394 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
399 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys> Channel<ChanSigner> {
400 // Convert constants + channel value to limits:
401 fn get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
402 channel_value_satoshis * 1000 / 10 //TODO
405 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value **they** need to maintain
407 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
408 pub(crate) fn get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
409 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
410 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000)) //TODO
413 fn derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(at_open_background_feerate: u64) -> u64 {
414 cmp::max(at_open_background_feerate * B_OUTPUT_PLUS_SPENDING_INPUT_WEIGHT / 1000, 546) //TODO
417 fn derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(_at_open_channel_feerate_per_kw: u64) -> u64 {
422 pub fn new_outbound(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, their_node_id: PublicKey, channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, APIError> {
423 let chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(false, channel_value_satoshis);
425 if channel_value_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
426 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "funding value > 2^24"});
429 if push_msat > channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
430 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "push value > channel value"});
432 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
433 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"});
437 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
438 if Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis) < Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate) {
439 return Err(APIError::FeeRateTooHigh{err: format!("Not enough reserve above dust limit can be found at current fee rate({})", background_feerate), feerate: background_feerate});
442 let feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
444 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
445 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(chan_keys.funding_key(), chan_keys.revocation_base_key(), chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key(),
446 chan_keys.htlc_base_key(), chan_keys.payment_base_key(), &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
447 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
451 config: config.channel_options.clone(),
453 channel_id: keys_provider.get_channel_id(),
454 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
455 channel_outbound: true,
457 channel_value_satoshis: channel_value_satoshis,
459 local_keys: chan_keys,
460 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
461 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
462 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
463 value_to_self_msat: channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat,
465 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
466 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
467 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
468 pending_update_fee: None,
469 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
470 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
471 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
472 channel_update_count: 1,
474 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
476 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
477 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
478 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
479 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
480 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
482 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
483 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
484 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
485 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
487 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
489 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
490 short_channel_id: None,
491 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
492 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
494 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
495 their_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
496 our_dust_limit_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate),
497 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
498 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: 0,
499 their_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
500 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(feerate),
501 their_to_self_delay: 0,
502 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
503 their_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
504 minimum_depth: 0, // Filled in in accept_channel
507 their_cur_commitment_point: None,
509 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
510 their_node_id: their_node_id,
512 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
514 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
516 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
522 fn check_remote_fee(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, feerate_per_kw: u32) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
523 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) < fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) {
524 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too low"));
526 if (feerate_per_kw as u64) > fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) * 2 {
527 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer's feerate much too high"));
532 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
533 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
534 pub fn new_from_req(fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, keys_provider: &Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = ChanSigner>>, their_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u64, logger: Arc<Logger>, config: &UserConfig) -> Result<Channel<ChanSigner>, ChannelError> {
535 let mut chan_keys = keys_provider.get_channel_keys(true, msg.funding_satoshis);
536 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
537 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
538 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
539 payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
540 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
541 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
543 chan_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
544 let mut local_config = (*config).channel_options.clone();
546 if config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
547 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay putting user funds at risks"));
550 // Check sanity of message fields:
551 if msg.funding_satoshis >= MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS {
552 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding value > 2^24"));
554 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
555 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
557 if msg.push_msat > (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
558 return Err(ChannelError::Close("push_msat larger than funding value"));
560 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
561 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
563 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
564 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus; channel reserve is less than dust limit"));
566 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
567 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
569 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
571 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
572 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
574 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accpted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
577 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
578 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accpted_htlcs > 483"));
581 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
582 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
583 return Err(ChannelError::Close("funding satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
585 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
586 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
588 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
589 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
591 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
592 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
594 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
597 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
600 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
604 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
606 let their_announce = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
607 if config.peer_channel_config_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
608 if local_config.announced_channel != their_announce {
609 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours"));
612 // we either accept their preference or the preferences match
613 local_config.announced_channel = their_announce;
615 let background_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
617 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_dust_limit_satoshis(background_feerate);
618 let our_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis);
619 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
620 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Suitable channel reserve not found. aborting"));
622 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < our_dust_limit_satoshis {
623 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel_reserve_satoshis too small"));
625 if our_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
626 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit too high for our channel reserve"));
629 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
630 // for full fee payment
631 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
632 if funders_amount_msat < background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT {
633 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
636 let to_local_msat = msg.push_msat;
637 let to_remote_msat = funders_amount_msat - background_feerate * COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT;
638 if to_local_msat <= msg.channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 && to_remote_msat <= our_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
639 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial commitment"));
642 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
643 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(chan_keys.funding_key(), chan_keys.revocation_base_key(), chan_keys.delayed_payment_base_key(),
644 chan_keys.htlc_base_key(), chan_keys.payment_base_key(), &keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(), config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
645 keys_provider.get_destination_script(), logger.clone());
647 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
648 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
649 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
650 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
651 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
653 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
654 } else if script.len() == 0 {
656 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
658 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
661 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
662 &OptionalField::Absent => {
663 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
668 let mut chan = Channel {
670 config: local_config,
672 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
673 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
674 channel_outbound: false,
677 local_keys: chan_keys,
678 shutdown_pubkey: keys_provider.get_shutdown_pubkey(),
679 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
680 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
681 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
683 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
684 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
685 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
686 pending_update_fee: None,
687 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
688 next_local_htlc_id: 0,
689 next_remote_htlc_id: 0,
690 channel_update_count: 1,
692 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
694 monitor_pending_funding_locked: false,
695 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
696 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
697 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
698 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
700 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
701 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
702 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
703 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
705 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
707 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
708 short_channel_id: None,
709 last_block_connected: Default::default(),
710 funding_tx_confirmations: 0,
712 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw as u64,
713 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
714 their_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
715 our_dust_limit_satoshis: our_dust_limit_satoshis,
716 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
717 their_channel_reserve_satoshis: msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
718 their_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
719 our_htlc_minimum_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::derive_our_htlc_minimum_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64),
720 their_to_self_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
721 our_to_self_delay: config.own_channel_config.our_to_self_delay,
722 their_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
723 minimum_depth: config.own_channel_config.minimum_depth,
725 their_pubkeys: Some(their_pubkeys),
726 their_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
728 their_prev_commitment_point: None,
729 their_node_id: their_node_id,
731 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
733 channel_monitor: channel_monitor,
735 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
740 let obscure_factor = chan.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
741 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
742 chan.channel_monitor.set_basic_channel_info(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint, msg.to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript, msg.funding_satoshis, obscure_factor);
747 // Utilities to derive keys:
749 fn build_local_commitment_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> SecretKey {
750 let res = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), idx);
751 SecretKey::from_slice(&res).unwrap()
754 // Utilities to build transactions:
756 fn get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self) -> u64 {
757 let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
758 let our_payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key());
760 let their_payment_basepoint = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().payment_basepoint.serialize();
761 if self.channel_outbound {
762 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
763 sha.input(their_payment_basepoint);
765 sha.input(their_payment_basepoint);
766 sha.input(&our_payment_basepoint.serialize());
768 let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
770 ((res[26] as u64) << 5*8) |
771 ((res[27] as u64) << 4*8) |
772 ((res[28] as u64) << 3*8) |
773 ((res[29] as u64) << 2*8) |
774 ((res[30] as u64) << 1*8) |
775 ((res[31] as u64) << 0*8)
778 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
779 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
780 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
781 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
782 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
784 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
785 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
786 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
787 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
788 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
789 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
790 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
791 /// Returns (the transaction built, the number of HTLC outputs which were present in the
792 /// transaction, the list of HTLCs which were not ignored when building the transaction).
793 /// Note that below-dust HTLCs are included in the third return value, but not the second, and
794 /// sources are provided only for outbound HTLCs in the third return value.
796 fn build_commitment_transaction(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> (Transaction, usize, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) {
797 let obscured_commitment_transaction_number = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor() ^ (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number);
800 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
802 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
803 script_sig: Script::new(),
804 sequence: ((0x80 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number >> 3*8) as u32),
810 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, Option<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)> = Vec::with_capacity(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() + 2);
811 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
813 let dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.our_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.their_dust_limit_satoshis };
814 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
815 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
816 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
818 log_trace!(self, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...", commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number), self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
820 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
821 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
822 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
824 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
825 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
826 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
827 transaction_output_index: None
832 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
833 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
834 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
835 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
836 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
837 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
839 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
840 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
841 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
843 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
844 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
847 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
848 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= dust_limit_satoshis + (feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000) {
849 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
850 txouts.push((TxOut { // "received HTLC output"
851 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc_in_tx, &keys).to_v0_p2wsh(),
852 value: $htlc.amount_msat / 1000
853 }, Some((htlc_in_tx, $source))));
855 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
856 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
862 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
863 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
864 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
865 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
866 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
867 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
868 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
872 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
873 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
875 log_trace!(self, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
877 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
878 if generated_by_local {
879 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
880 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
889 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
890 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
891 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
892 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
893 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
894 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
895 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
899 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
900 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
902 log_trace!(self, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
904 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None)|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) => {
905 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
907 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(None) => {
908 if !generated_by_local {
909 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
917 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
918 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
919 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
920 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
921 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
922 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
923 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
924 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
926 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
928 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
929 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
930 let mut max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
931 self.max_commitment_tx_output_local.lock().unwrap()
933 self.max_commitment_tx_output_remote.lock().unwrap()
935 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
936 max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
937 debug_assert!(max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) as i64);
938 max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
941 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (txouts.len() as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
942 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.channel_outbound {
943 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
945 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - total_fee as i64)
948 let value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
949 let value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
951 if value_to_a >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
952 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
954 script_pubkey: chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&keys.revocation_key,
955 if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay },
956 &keys.a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
957 value: value_to_a as u64
961 if value_to_b >= (dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
962 log_trace!(self, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
964 script_pubkey: Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0)
965 .push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&keys.b_payment_key.serialize())[..])
967 value: value_to_b as u64
971 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |a, b| {
972 if let &Some(ref a_htlc) = a {
973 if let &Some(ref b_htlc) = b {
974 a_htlc.0.cltv_expiry.cmp(&b_htlc.0.cltv_expiry)
975 // Note that due to hash collisions, we have to have a fallback comparison
976 // here for fuzztarget mode (otherwise at least chanmon_fail_consistency
978 .then(a_htlc.0.payment_hash.0.cmp(&b_htlc.0.payment_hash.0))
979 // For non-HTLC outputs, if they're copying our SPK we don't really care if we
980 // close the channel due to mismatches - they're doing something dumb:
981 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
982 } else { cmp::Ordering::Equal }
985 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len());
986 let mut htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(txouts.len() + included_dust_htlcs.len());
987 for (idx, mut out) in txouts.drain(..).enumerate() {
989 if let Some((mut htlc, source_option)) = out.1.take() {
990 htlc.transaction_output_index = Some(idx as u32);
991 htlcs_included.push((htlc, source_option));
994 let non_dust_htlc_count = htlcs_included.len();
995 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
999 lock_time: ((0x20 as u32) << 8*3) | ((obscured_commitment_transaction_number & 0xffffffu64) as u32),
1002 }, non_dust_htlc_count, htlcs_included)
1006 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1007 let our_channel_close_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&self.shutdown_pubkey.serialize());
1008 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_close_key_hash[..]).into_script()
1012 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(a_scriptpubkey: &Script, b_scriptpubkey: &Script) -> u64 {
1013 (4 + 1 + 36 + 4 + 1 + 1 + 2*(8+1) + 4 + a_scriptpubkey.len() as u64 + b_scriptpubkey.len() as u64)*4 + 2 + 1 + 1 + 2*(1 + 72)
1017 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (Transaction, u64) {
1019 let mut ins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
1021 previous_output: self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().into_bitcoin_outpoint(),
1022 script_sig: Script::new(),
1023 sequence: 0xffffffff,
1024 witness: Vec::new(),
1029 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1030 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1031 let mut txouts: Vec<(TxOut, ())> = Vec::new();
1033 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1034 let value_to_self: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.channel_outbound { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1035 let value_to_remote: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.channel_outbound { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1037 if value_to_self < 0 {
1038 assert!(self.channel_outbound);
1039 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_self) as u64;
1040 } else if value_to_remote < 0 {
1041 assert!(!self.channel_outbound);
1042 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_remote) as u64;
1045 if !skip_remote_output && value_to_remote as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1046 txouts.push((TxOut {
1047 script_pubkey: self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap(),
1048 value: value_to_remote as u64
1052 if value_to_self as u64 > self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1053 txouts.push((TxOut {
1054 script_pubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
1055 value: value_to_self as u64
1059 transaction_utils::sort_outputs(&mut txouts, |_, _| { cmp::Ordering::Equal }); // Ordering doesnt matter if they used our pubkey...
1061 let mut outputs: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
1062 for out in txouts.drain(..) {
1063 outputs.push(out.0);
1071 }, total_fee_satoshis)
1075 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1076 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1077 /// our counterparty!)
1078 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke ownership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1079 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1080 fn build_local_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1081 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(commitment_number));
1082 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
1083 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
1084 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1086 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint), "Local tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1090 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1091 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1092 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1093 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, ChannelError> {
1094 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1095 //may see payments to it!
1096 let payment_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key());
1097 let revocation_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key());
1098 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
1099 let their_pubkeys = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap();
1101 Ok(secp_check!(TxCreationKeys::new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &their_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, &revocation_basepoint, &payment_basepoint, &htlc_basepoint), "Remote tx keys generation got bogus keys"))
1104 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1105 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1106 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1107 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1108 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
1109 make_funding_redeemscript(&our_funding_key, self.their_funding_pubkey())
1112 /// Builds the htlc-success or htlc-timeout transaction which spends a given HTLC output
1113 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1114 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1115 fn build_htlc_transaction(&self, prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, local: bool, keys: &TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Transaction {
1116 chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash, feerate_per_kw, if local { self.their_to_self_delay } else { self.our_to_self_delay }, htlc, &keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key)
1119 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1120 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1121 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1122 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
1123 // Either ChannelFunded got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1124 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1125 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1127 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1128 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1130 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1132 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1134 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1135 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1136 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1138 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1139 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1140 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1141 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1143 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1144 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1145 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1147 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1149 return Ok((None, None));
1152 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1153 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1160 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1161 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1164 // Now update local state:
1166 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1167 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1168 self.channel_monitor.provide_payment_preimage(&payment_hash_calc, &payment_preimage_arg);
1170 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1171 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1172 match pending_update {
1173 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1174 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1175 return Ok((None, None));
1178 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1179 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1180 log_warn!(self, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1181 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1182 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1183 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1189 log_trace!(self, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell! Current state: {}", self.channel_state);
1190 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1191 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1193 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1197 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1198 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1200 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1201 return Ok((None, Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())));
1203 log_trace!(self, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
1204 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1207 Ok((Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1208 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1209 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1210 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1211 }), Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())))
1214 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>, Option<ChannelMonitor>), ChannelError> {
1215 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage)? {
1216 (Some(update_fulfill_htlc), _) => {
1217 let (commitment, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1218 Ok((Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)), Some(monitor_update)))
1220 (None, Some(channel_monitor)) => Ok((None, Some(channel_monitor))),
1221 (None, None) => Ok((None, None))
1225 /// Per HTLC, only one get_update_fail_htlc or get_update_fulfill_htlc call may be made.
1226 /// In such cases we debug_assert!(false) and return an IgnoreError. Thus, will always return
1227 /// Ok(_) if debug assertions are turned on and preconditions are met.
1228 pub fn get_update_fail_htlc(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> {
1229 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1230 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1232 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1234 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1235 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1236 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1238 let mut pending_idx = std::usize::MAX;
1239 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1240 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1242 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1243 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
1247 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1254 if pending_idx == std::usize::MAX {
1255 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1258 // Now update local state:
1259 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
1260 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1261 match pending_update {
1262 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1263 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1264 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1267 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1268 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1269 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID"));
1275 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
1276 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1283 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1284 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
1287 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
1288 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1289 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1294 // Message handlers:
1296 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, config: &UserConfig, their_features: InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1297 // Check sanity of message fields:
1298 if !self.channel_outbound {
1299 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer"));
1301 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time"));
1304 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
1305 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1307 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
1308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis"));
1310 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.channel_reserve_satoshis {
1311 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Bogus channel_reserve and dust_limit"));
1313 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < self.our_dust_limit_satoshis {
1314 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer never wants payout outputs?"));
1316 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1317 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Dust limit is bigger than our channel reverse"));
1319 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000 {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is full channel value"));
1322 if msg.to_self_delay > config.peer_channel_config_limits.their_to_self_delay || msg.to_self_delay > MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1323 return Err(ChannelError::Close("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period"));
1325 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1326 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel"));
1328 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > 483 {
1329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max_accepted_htlcs > 483"));
1332 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1333 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1334 return Err(ChannelError::Close("htlc minimum msat is higher than the user specified limit"));
1336 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1337 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max htlc value in flight msat is less than the user specified limit"));
1339 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("channel reserve satoshis is higher than the user specified limit"));
1342 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("max accepted htlcs is less than the user specified limit"));
1345 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < config.peer_channel_config_limits.min_dust_limit_satoshis {
1346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is less than the user specified limit"));
1348 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_dust_limit_satoshis {
1349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("dust limit satoshis is greater than the user specified limit"));
1351 if msg.minimum_depth > config.peer_channel_config_limits.max_minimum_depth {
1352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large"));
1355 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1356 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1357 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1358 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. We enforce it while receiving shutdown msg
1359 if script.is_p2pkh() || script.is_p2sh() || script.is_v0_p2wsh() || script.is_v0_p2wpkh() {
1360 Some(script.clone())
1361 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1362 } else if script.len() == 0 {
1364 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format. Fail the channel
1366 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided a non-accepted scriptpubkey format"));
1369 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1370 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1371 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out"));
1376 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
1377 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
1378 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis = msg.channel_reserve_satoshis;
1379 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
1380 self.their_to_self_delay = msg.to_self_delay;
1381 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
1382 self.minimum_depth = msg.minimum_depth;
1384 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1385 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1386 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1387 payment_basepoint: msg.payment_basepoint,
1388 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1389 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1392 self.local_keys.set_remote_channel_pubkeys(&their_pubkeys);
1393 self.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
1395 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
1396 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = their_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
1398 let obscure_factor = self.get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor();
1399 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1400 self.channel_monitor.set_basic_channel_info(&msg.htlc_basepoint, &msg.delayed_payment_basepoint, msg.to_self_delay, funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis, obscure_factor);
1402 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
1407 fn funding_created_signature(&mut self, sig: &Signature) -> Result<(Transaction, LocalCommitmentTransaction, Signature, TxCreationKeys), ChannelError> {
1408 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1410 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1411 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1412 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1414 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction...
1415 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &sig, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer");
1417 let localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, sig, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), self.their_funding_pubkey());
1419 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
1420 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1421 let remote_signature = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
1422 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0;
1424 // We sign the "remote" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
1425 Ok((remote_initial_commitment_tx, localtx, remote_signature, local_keys))
1428 fn their_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1429 &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().expect("their_funding_pubkey() only allowed after accept_channel").funding_pubkey
1432 pub fn funding_created(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1433 if self.channel_outbound {
1434 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?"));
1436 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
1437 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
1438 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
1440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!"));
1442 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1443 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
1444 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1445 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1448 let funding_txo = OutPoint::new(msg.funding_txid, msg.funding_output_index);
1449 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
1450 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
1452 let (remote_initial_commitment_tx, local_initial_commitment_tx, our_signature, local_keys) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature) {
1455 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
1460 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
1462 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
1463 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(local_initial_commitment_tx, local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1464 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
1465 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
1466 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1467 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1469 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
1470 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1471 signature: our_signature
1472 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
1475 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
1476 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
1477 pub fn funding_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned) -> Result<ChannelMonitor, ChannelError> {
1478 if !self.channel_outbound {
1479 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?"));
1481 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
1482 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!"));
1484 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
1485 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 ||
1486 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
1487 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
1490 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1492 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1493 let local_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
1494 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_initial_commitment_tx).sighash_all(&local_initial_commitment_tx.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1496 let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1498 // They sign the "local" commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
1499 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey), "Invalid funding_signed signature from peer");
1501 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(
1502 LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_initial_commitment_tx, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), their_funding_pubkey),
1503 local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, Vec::new());
1504 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32));
1505 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1507 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
1508 Ok(self.channel_monitor.clone())
1510 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented funding_signed from allowing funding broadcast"))
1514 pub fn funding_locked(&mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingLocked) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1515 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1516 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent funding_locked when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1519 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1521 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
1522 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32;
1523 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
1524 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
1525 self.channel_update_count += 1;
1526 } else if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) != 0 &&
1527 // Note that funding_signed/funding_created will have decremented both by 1!
1528 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
1529 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) ||
1530 // If we reconnected before sending our funding locked they may still resend theirs:
1531 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) ==
1532 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32)) {
1533 if self.their_cur_commitment_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
1534 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect funding_locked with a different point"));
1536 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the funding_locked, which is required
1539 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a funding_locked at a strange time"));
1542 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
1543 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
1547 /// Returns (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1548 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1549 let mut htlc_inbound_value_msat = 0;
1550 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1551 htlc_inbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1553 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32, htlc_inbound_value_msat)
1556 /// Returns (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) *including* pending adds in our
1558 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self) -> (u32, u64) {
1559 let mut htlc_outbound_value_msat = 0;
1560 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1561 htlc_outbound_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1564 let mut htlc_outbound_count = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1565 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1566 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1567 htlc_outbound_count += 1;
1568 htlc_outbound_value_msat += amount_msat;
1572 (htlc_outbound_count as u32, htlc_outbound_value_msat)
1575 /// Get the available (ie not including pending HTLCs) inbound and outbound balance in msat.
1576 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1577 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1578 /// corner case properly.
1579 pub fn get_inbound_outbound_available_balance_msat(&self) -> (u64, u64) {
1580 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1581 (cmp::min(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64,
1582 cmp::min(self.value_to_self_msat as i64 - self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats().1 as i64, 0) as u64)
1585 pub fn update_add_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_state: PendingHTLCStatus) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1586 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1587 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1589 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1592 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
1593 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel"));
1595 if msg.amount_msat < self.our_htlc_minimum_msat {
1596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value"));
1599 let (inbound_htlc_count, htlc_inbound_value_msat) = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats();
1600 if inbound_htlc_count + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
1601 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs"));
1603 // Check our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1604 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis) {
1605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value"));
1607 // Check our_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
1608 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
1609 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
1610 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
1611 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
1612 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
1613 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
1614 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
1615 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
1616 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
1617 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
1619 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
1620 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1621 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(None) = htlc.state {
1622 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1623 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(None) = htlc.state {
1624 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1627 if htlc_inbound_value_msat + msg.amount_msat + self.value_to_self_msat > (self.channel_value_satoshis - Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)) * 1000 + removed_outbound_total_msat {
1628 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them over their reserve value"));
1630 if self.next_remote_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
1631 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote skipped HTLC ID"));
1633 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
1634 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height"));
1637 //TODO: Check msg.cltv_expiry further? Do this in channel manager?
1639 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
1640 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_state {
1641 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
1645 // Now update local state:
1646 self.next_remote_htlc_id += 1;
1647 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
1648 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
1649 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
1650 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
1651 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
1652 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_state),
1657 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
1659 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentHash>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1660 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1661 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
1662 match check_preimage {
1664 Some(payment_hash) =>
1665 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
1666 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC with an incorrect preimage"));
1670 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
1671 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC before it had been committed")),
1672 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
1673 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(fail_reason);
1675 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
1676 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC that they'd already fulfilled/failed")),
1678 return Ok(&htlc.source);
1681 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find"))
1684 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<HTLCSource, ChannelError> {
1685 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1686 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1688 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1692 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&msg.payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
1693 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(payment_hash), None).map(|source| source.clone())
1696 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1697 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1698 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1700 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1701 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1704 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1708 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc<'a>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
1709 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1710 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1712 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1713 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1716 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
1720 pub fn commitment_signed(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1721 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1722 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1724 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1725 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1727 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1728 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
1731 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
1733 let local_keys = self.build_local_transaction_keys(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number)?;
1735 let mut update_fee = false;
1736 let feerate_per_kw = if !self.channel_outbound && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
1738 self.pending_update_fee.unwrap()
1743 let mut local_commitment_tx = {
1744 let mut commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number, &local_keys, true, false, feerate_per_kw);
1745 let htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_tx.2.drain(..).map(|htlc| (htlc.0, htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
1746 (commitment_tx.0, commitment_tx.1, htlcs_cloned)
1748 let local_commitment_txid = local_commitment_tx.0.txid();
1749 let local_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&local_commitment_tx.0).sighash_all(&local_commitment_tx.0.input[0], &funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
1750 log_trace!(self, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&local_commitment_tx.0), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script));
1751 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&local_sighash, &msg.signature, &self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid commitment tx signature from peer");
1753 //If channel fee was updated by funder confirm funder can afford the new fee rate when applied to the current local commitment transaction
1755 let num_htlcs = local_commitment_tx.1;
1756 let total_fee: u64 = feerate_per_kw as u64 * (COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT + (num_htlcs as u64) * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000;
1758 if self.channel_value_satoshis - self.value_to_self_msat / 1000 < total_fee + self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee"));
1763 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != local_commitment_tx.1 {
1764 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures from remote"));
1767 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(local_commitment_tx.2.len());
1768 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in local_commitment_tx.2.drain(..).enumerate() {
1769 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
1770 let htlc_tx = self.build_htlc_transaction(&local_commitment_txid, &htlc, true, &local_keys, feerate_per_kw);
1771 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &local_keys);
1772 log_trace!(self, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} with redeemscript {}", log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(local_keys.b_htlc_key.serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript));
1773 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
1774 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &local_keys.b_htlc_key), "Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer");
1775 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
1777 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
1781 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number - 1));
1782 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
1784 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1785 let mut need_our_commitment = false;
1786 if !self.channel_outbound {
1787 if let Some(fee_update) = self.pending_update_fee {
1788 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_update;
1789 // We later use the presence of pending_update_fee to indicate we should generate a
1790 // commitment_signed upon receipt of revoke_and_ack, so we can only set it to None
1791 // if we're not awaiting a revoke (ie will send a commitment_signed now).
1792 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) == 0 {
1793 need_our_commitment = true;
1794 self.pending_update_fee = None;
1799 let their_funding_pubkey = self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
1801 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(
1802 LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(local_commitment_tx.0, &msg.signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()), &their_funding_pubkey),
1803 local_keys, self.feerate_per_kw, htlcs_and_sigs);
1805 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1806 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
1807 Some(forward_info.clone())
1809 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
1810 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
1811 need_our_commitment = true;
1814 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
1815 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
1816 Some(fail_reason.take())
1818 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(fail_reason);
1819 need_our_commitment = true;
1823 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
1824 // Note that if we need_our_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
1825 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
1826 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
1828 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
1829 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
1830 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
1831 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
1832 if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1833 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
1834 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
1835 // includes the right HTLCs.
1836 // Note that this generates a monitor update that we ignore! This is OK since we
1837 // won't actually send the commitment_signed that generated the update to the other
1838 // side until the latest monitor has been pulled from us and stored.
1839 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
1840 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1842 // TODO: Call maybe_propose_first_closing_signed on restoration (or call it here and
1843 // re-send the message on restoration)
1844 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA"));
1847 let (our_commitment_signed, monitor_update, closing_signed) = if need_our_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
1848 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
1849 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
1850 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
1851 let (msg, monitor) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1852 (Some(msg), monitor, None)
1853 } else if !need_our_commitment {
1854 (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator))
1855 } else { (None, self.channel_monitor.clone(), None) };
1857 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
1858 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1859 per_commitment_secret: per_commitment_secret,
1860 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
1861 }, our_commitment_signed, closing_signed, monitor_update))
1864 /// Used to fulfill holding_cell_htlcs when we get a remote ack (or implicitly get it by them
1865 /// fulfilling or failing the last pending HTLC)
1866 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs(&mut self) -> Result<Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
1867 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
1868 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
1869 log_trace!(self, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(), if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" });
1871 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
1872 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
1873 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1874 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1875 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
1877 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
1878 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
1879 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
1880 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
1881 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
1882 // to rebalance channels.
1883 if err.is_some() { // We're back to AwaitingRemoteRevoke (or are about to fail the channel)
1884 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1886 match &htlc_update {
1887 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
1888 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone()) {
1889 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
1892 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
1893 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {}", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg);
1896 log_info!(self, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} resulting in a channel closure during holding_cell freeing", log_bytes!(payment_hash.0));
1903 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
1904 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage) {
1905 Ok(update_fulfill_msg_option) => update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.0.unwrap()),
1907 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1909 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fulfill holding cell HTLC");
1914 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
1915 match self.get_update_fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone()) {
1916 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap()),
1918 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
1920 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
1927 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(htlc_update);
1928 if let Some(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) = err {
1929 // If we failed to add the HTLC, but got an Ignore error, we should
1930 // still send the new commitment_signed, so reset the err to None.
1936 //TODO: Need to examine the type of err - if it's a fee issue or similar we may want to
1937 //fail it back the route, if it's a temporary issue we can ignore it...
1940 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
1941 // This should never actually happen and indicates we got some Errs back
1942 // from update_fulfill_htlc/update_fail_htlc, but we handle it anyway in
1943 // case there is some strange way to hit duplicate HTLC removes.
1946 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee {
1947 self.pending_update_fee = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take();
1948 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
1949 channel_id: self.channel_id,
1950 feerate_per_kw: feerate as u32,
1955 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
1956 Ok(Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
1958 update_fulfill_htlcs,
1960 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1961 update_fee: update_fee,
1963 }, monitor_update)))
1972 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
1973 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
1974 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
1975 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
1976 /// revoke_and_ack message.
1977 pub fn revoke_and_ack(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Result<(Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
1978 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
1979 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state"));
1981 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
1982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
1984 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
1985 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds"));
1988 if let Some(their_prev_commitment_point) = self.their_prev_commitment_point {
1989 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret")) != their_prev_commitment_point {
1990 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey"));
1993 self.channel_monitor.provide_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
1994 .map_err(|e| ChannelError::Close(e.0))?;
1996 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
1997 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
1998 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
1999 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
2000 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
2001 self.their_prev_commitment_point = self.their_cur_commitment_point;
2002 self.their_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2003 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2005 log_trace!(self, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA...");
2006 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
2007 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
2008 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2009 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2010 let mut require_commitment = false;
2011 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
2014 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
2015 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
2016 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
2017 let logger = LogHolder { logger: &self.logger };
2019 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
2020 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2021 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2022 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2023 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2024 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2029 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2030 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) = &htlc.state {
2031 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2032 if let Some(reason) = fail_reason.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
2033 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
2035 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
2036 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2041 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2042 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
2043 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2045 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
2046 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2050 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2051 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
2053 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
2054 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
2055 require_commitment = true;
2056 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
2057 match forward_info {
2058 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
2059 require_commitment = true;
2061 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
2062 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
2063 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
2065 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
2066 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
2067 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
2071 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
2072 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
2073 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
2079 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2080 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2081 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2082 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2084 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
2085 Some(fail_reason.take())
2087 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
2088 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
2089 require_commitment = true;
2093 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
2095 if self.channel_outbound {
2096 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee.take() {
2097 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2100 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
2101 // Because a node cannot send two commitment_signeds in a row without getting a
2102 // revoke_and_ack from us (as it would otherwise not know the per_commitment_point
2103 // it should use to create keys with) and because a node can't send a
2104 // commitment_signed without changes, checking if the feerate is equal to the
2105 // pending feerate update is sufficient to detect require_commitment.
2106 if feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
2107 require_commitment = true;
2108 self.pending_update_fee = None;
2113 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32 {
2114 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
2115 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
2116 if require_commitment {
2117 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2118 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
2119 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
2120 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
2121 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2123 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
2124 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
2125 return Ok((None, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), None, self.channel_monitor.clone()));
2128 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs()? {
2129 Some(mut commitment_update) => {
2130 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
2131 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
2132 commitment_update.0.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2134 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2135 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
2136 commitment_update.0.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
2138 Ok((Some(commitment_update.0), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, commitment_update.1))
2141 if require_commitment {
2142 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2143 Ok((Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2144 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2145 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
2147 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2150 }), to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, None, monitor_update))
2152 Ok((None, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), self.channel_monitor.clone()))
2159 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
2160 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
2161 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
2162 fn send_update_fee(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> {
2163 if !self.channel_outbound {
2164 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
2166 if !self.is_usable() {
2167 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
2169 if !self.is_live() {
2170 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
2173 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
2174 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2178 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2179 self.pending_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
2181 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
2182 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2183 feerate_per_kw: feerate_per_kw as u32,
2187 pub fn send_update_fee_and_commit(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u64) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateFee, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
2188 match self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw) {
2189 Some(update_fee) => {
2190 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
2191 Ok(Some((update_fee, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
2197 /// Removes any uncommitted HTLCs, to be used on peer disconnection, including any pending
2198 /// HTLCs that we intended to add but haven't as we were waiting on a remote revoke.
2199 /// Returns the set of PendingHTLCStatuses from remote uncommitted HTLCs (which we're
2200 /// implicitly dropping) and the payment_hashes of HTLCs we tried to add but are dropping.
2201 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
2203 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&mut self) -> Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)> {
2204 let mut outbound_drops = Vec::new();
2206 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2207 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2208 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2209 return outbound_drops;
2211 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
2212 // will be retransmitted.
2213 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
2215 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
2216 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
2218 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
2219 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
2220 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
2221 // this HTLC accordingly
2222 inbound_drop_count += 1;
2225 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
2226 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
2227 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
2228 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
2231 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
2232 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
2233 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
2234 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
2235 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
2236 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
2241 self.next_remote_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
2243 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2244 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
2245 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
2246 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
2247 // the update upon reconnection.
2248 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
2252 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2254 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2255 outbound_drops.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2258 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {..} | &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {..} => true,
2261 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
2262 log_debug!(self, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops and {} waiting-to-locally-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", outbound_drops.len(), inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2266 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update failed to be stored by the client and further
2267 /// updates are partially paused.
2268 /// This must be called immediately after the call which generated the ChannelMonitor update
2269 /// which failed. The messages which were generated from that call which generated the
2270 /// monitor update failure must *not* have been sent to the remote end, and must instead
2271 /// have been dropped. They will be regenerated when monitor_updating_restored is called.
2272 pub fn monitor_update_failed(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>) {
2273 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, 0);
2274 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = resend_raa;
2275 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = resend_commitment;
2276 assert!(self.monitor_pending_forwards.is_empty());
2277 mem::swap(&mut pending_forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2278 assert!(self.monitor_pending_failures.is_empty());
2279 mem::swap(&mut pending_fails, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2280 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32;
2283 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
2284 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
2285 /// to the remote side.
2286 pub fn monitor_updating_restored(&mut self) -> (Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, RAACommitmentOrder, Vec<(PendingForwardHTLCInfo, u64)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>, bool, Option<msgs::FundingLocked>) {
2287 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2288 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32);
2290 let needs_broadcast_safe = self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_outbound;
2292 // Because we will never generate a FundingBroadcastSafe event when we're in
2293 // MonitorUpdateFailed, if we assume the user only broadcast the funding transaction when
2294 // they received the FundingBroadcastSafe event, we can only ever hit
2295 // monitor_pending_funding_locked when we're an inbound channel which failed to persist the
2296 // monitor on funding_created, and we even got the funding transaction confirmed before the
2297 // monitor was persisted.
2298 let funding_locked = if self.monitor_pending_funding_locked {
2299 assert!(!self.channel_outbound, "Funding transaction broadcast without FundingBroadcastSafe!");
2300 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = false;
2301 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2302 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2303 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2304 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2305 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2309 let mut forwards = Vec::new();
2310 mem::swap(&mut forwards, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
2311 let mut failures = Vec::new();
2312 mem::swap(&mut failures, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
2314 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
2315 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2316 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2317 return (None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked);
2320 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
2321 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2323 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
2324 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update())
2327 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
2328 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
2329 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
2330 log_trace!(self, "Restored monitor updating resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
2331 if needs_broadcast_safe { "a funding broadcast safe, " } else { "" },
2332 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
2333 if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
2334 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
2335 (raa, commitment_update, order, forwards, failures, needs_broadcast_safe, funding_locked)
2338 pub fn update_fee(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2339 if self.channel_outbound {
2340 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee"));
2342 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2343 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2345 Channel::<ChanSigner>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw)?;
2346 self.pending_update_fee = Some(msg.feerate_per_kw as u64);
2347 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2351 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2352 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number));
2353 let per_commitment_secret = chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
2354 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
2355 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2356 per_commitment_secret,
2357 next_per_commitment_point,
2361 fn get_last_commitment_update(&self) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2362 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
2363 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
2364 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
2365 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
2367 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2368 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
2369 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
2370 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2371 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2372 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2373 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2374 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2375 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
2380 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2381 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
2383 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
2384 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2385 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2386 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2387 reason: err_packet.clone()
2390 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
2391 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2392 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2393 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2394 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
2395 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
2398 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
2399 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2400 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2401 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2402 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
2409 log_trace!(self, "Regenerated latest commitment update with {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
2410 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
2411 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
2412 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
2414 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update().expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
2418 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
2419 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
2420 pub fn channel_reestablish(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish) -> Result<(Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>, Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>, Option<ChannelMonitor>, RAACommitmentOrder, Option<msgs::Shutdown>), ChannelError> {
2421 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
2422 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
2423 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
2424 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
2425 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect"));
2428 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2429 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
2430 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish"));
2433 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
2434 match msg.data_loss_protect {
2435 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
2436 if chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(self.local_keys.commitment_seed(), INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1) != data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret {
2437 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided"));
2439 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2440 self.channel_monitor.provide_rescue_remote_commitment_tx_info(data_loss.my_current_per_commitment_point);
2441 return Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { msg: "We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast remote is going to claim our funds - we can't do any automated broadcasting", update: Some(self.channel_monitor.clone())
2445 OptionalField::Absent => {}
2449 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
2450 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
2451 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
2453 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
2454 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2455 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2456 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2460 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2461 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any funding_locked's.
2462 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) == 0 ||
2463 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2464 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
2465 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent funding_locked yet"));
2467 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
2468 return Ok((None, None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2471 // We have OurFundingLocked set!
2472 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2473 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2474 return Ok((Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2475 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2476 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2477 }), None, None, None, RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst, shutdown_msg));
2480 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2481 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
2482 // Note that if we need to repeat our FundingLocked we'll do that in the next if block.
2484 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number {
2485 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2486 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
2489 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
2492 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction"));
2495 // We increment cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
2496 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
2497 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
2498 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
2499 let our_next_remote_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
2501 let resend_funding_locked = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
2502 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateFailed resending FundingLocked
2503 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
2504 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
2505 Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
2506 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2507 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
2511 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number {
2512 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2513 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2515 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2518 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == 0 {
2519 // We're up-to-date and not waiting on a remote revoke (if we are our
2520 // channel_reestablish should result in them sending a revoke_and_ack), but we may
2521 // have received some updates while we were disconnected. Free the holding cell
2523 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs() {
2524 Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)) => return Err(ChannelError::Close(msg)),
2525 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) | Err(ChannelError::CloseDelayBroadcast { .. }) => panic!("Got non-channel-failing result from free_holding_cell_htlcs"),
2526 Ok(Some((commitment_update, channel_monitor))) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(commitment_update), Some(channel_monitor), self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2527 Ok(None) => return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg)),
2530 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2532 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == our_next_remote_commitment_number - 1 {
2533 if required_revoke.is_some() {
2534 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2536 log_debug!(self, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2539 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
2540 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
2541 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, None, None, None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2544 return Ok((resend_funding_locked, required_revoke, Some(self.get_last_commitment_update()), None, self.resend_order.clone(), shutdown_msg));
2546 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction"));
2550 fn maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> Option<msgs::ClosingSigned> {
2551 if !self.channel_outbound || !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() ||
2552 self.channel_state & (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK ||
2553 self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
2557 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2558 if self.feerate_per_kw > proposed_feerate {
2559 proposed_feerate = self.feerate_per_kw;
2561 let tx_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2562 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate * tx_weight / 1000;
2564 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(proposed_total_fee_satoshis, false);
2565 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2566 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2568 if our_sig.is_none() { return None; }
2570 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((proposed_feerate, total_fee_satoshis, our_sig.clone().unwrap()));
2571 Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2572 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2573 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
2574 signature: our_sig.unwrap(),
2578 pub fn shutdown(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::Shutdown) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> {
2579 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2580 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2582 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2583 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
2584 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
2585 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
2586 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation"));
2588 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2589 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
2590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs"));
2593 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2595 // BOLT 2 says we must only send a scriptpubkey of certain standard forms, which are up to
2596 // 34 bytes in length, so don't let the remote peer feed us some super fee-heavy script.
2597 if self.channel_outbound && msg.scriptpubkey.len() > 34 {
2598 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown_scriptpubkey of absurd length from remote peer"));
2601 //Check shutdown_scriptpubkey form as BOLT says we must
2602 if !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2pkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_p2sh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wpkh() && !msg.scriptpubkey.is_v0_p2wsh() {
2603 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey from remote peer"));
2606 if self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
2607 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
2608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey which did not match their previous scriptpubkey"));
2611 self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
2614 // From here on out, we may not fail!
2616 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
2617 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2619 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
2620 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
2621 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
2622 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
2623 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2624 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
2626 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
2627 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
2633 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back a update_fail_htlc
2634 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown cause we won't send
2635 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
2637 let our_shutdown = if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
2640 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
2641 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2642 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
2646 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
2647 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2649 Ok((our_shutdown, self.maybe_propose_first_closing_signed(fee_estimator), dropped_outbound_htlcs))
2652 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, tx: &mut Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, our_sig: &Signature) {
2653 if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to sign closing transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
2654 if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to re-sign closing transaction"); }
2655 if tx.output.len() > 2 { panic!("Tried to sign bogus closing transaction"); }
2657 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
2659 let our_funding_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()).serialize();
2660 let their_funding_key = self.their_funding_pubkey().serialize();
2661 if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
2662 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2663 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2665 tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2666 tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
2668 tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2669 tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
2671 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
2674 pub fn closing_signed(&mut self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError> {
2675 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
2676 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown"));
2678 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish"));
2681 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
2682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs"));
2684 if msg.fee_satoshis > 21000000 * 10000000 { //this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
2685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee"));
2688 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2689 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
2690 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
2691 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee greater than the value they can claim"));
2693 let mut sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2695 let their_funding_pubkey = &self.their_pubkeys.as_ref().unwrap().funding_pubkey;
2697 match self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, their_funding_pubkey) {
2700 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
2701 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
2702 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
2703 sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&closing_tx).sighash_all(&closing_tx.input[0], &funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
2704 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.their_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer");
2708 if let Some((_, last_fee, our_sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2709 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
2710 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
2711 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2712 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2713 return Ok((None, Some(closing_tx)));
2717 macro_rules! propose_new_feerate {
2718 ($new_feerate: expr) => {
2719 let closing_tx_max_weight = Self::get_closing_transaction_weight(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(), self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap());
2720 let (closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction($new_feerate * closing_tx_max_weight / 1000, false);
2721 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2722 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2723 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
2724 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some(($new_feerate, used_total_fee, our_sig.clone()));
2725 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2726 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2727 fee_satoshis: used_total_fee,
2733 let proposed_sat_per_kw = msg.fee_satoshis * 1000 / closing_tx.get_weight() as u64;
2734 if self.channel_outbound {
2735 let our_max_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
2736 if proposed_sat_per_kw > our_max_feerate {
2737 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2738 if our_max_feerate <= last_feerate {
2739 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something higher than our Normal feerate"));
2742 propose_new_feerate!(our_max_feerate);
2745 let our_min_feerate = fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
2746 if proposed_sat_per_kw < our_min_feerate {
2747 if let Some((last_feerate, _, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
2748 if our_min_feerate >= last_feerate {
2749 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wanted something lower than our Background feerate"));
2752 propose_new_feerate!(our_min_feerate);
2756 let our_sig = self.local_keys
2757 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
2758 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction"))?;
2759 self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &our_sig);
2761 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2762 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2764 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
2765 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2766 fee_satoshis: msg.fee_satoshis,
2768 }), Some(closing_tx)))
2771 // Public utilities:
2773 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
2777 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2778 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2779 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u64 {
2783 /// May only be called after funding has been initiated (ie is_funding_initiated() is true)
2784 pub fn channel_monitor(&mut self) -> &mut ChannelMonitor {
2785 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2786 panic!("Can't get a channel monitor until funding has been created");
2788 &mut self.channel_monitor
2791 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both FundingLocked messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
2792 /// is_usable() returns true).
2793 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2794 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2795 self.short_channel_id
2798 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2799 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
2800 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2801 self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo()
2804 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2805 pub fn get_their_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2809 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2810 pub fn get_our_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2811 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2814 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2815 pub fn get_their_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2816 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat
2819 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2820 self.channel_value_satoshis
2823 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2824 self.config.fee_proportional_millionths
2828 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u64 {
2832 pub fn get_cur_local_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2833 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1
2836 pub fn get_cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2837 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
2840 pub fn get_revoked_remote_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
2841 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2
2845 pub fn get_local_keys(&self) -> &ChanSigner {
2850 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
2852 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
2853 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
2854 channel_reserve_msat: self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000,
2855 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2856 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
2857 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
2859 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2861 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
2869 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
2873 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2874 pub fn get_channel_update_count(&self) -> u32 {
2875 self.channel_update_count
2878 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2879 self.config.announced_channel
2882 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2883 self.channel_outbound
2886 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2887 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2888 pub fn get_our_fee_base_msat(&self, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> u32 {
2889 // For lack of a better metric, we calculate what it would cost to consolidate the new HTLC
2890 // output value back into a transaction with the regular channel output:
2892 // the fee cost of the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transaction:
2893 let mut res = self.feerate_per_kw * cmp::max(HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT, HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT) / 1000;
2895 if self.channel_outbound {
2896 // + the marginal fee increase cost to us in the commitment transaction:
2897 res += self.feerate_per_kw * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC / 1000;
2900 // + the marginal cost of an input which spends the HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout output:
2901 res += fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal) * SPENDING_INPUT_FOR_A_OUTPUT_WEIGHT / 1000;
2906 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2907 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2908 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
2911 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2912 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2913 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2914 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
2915 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)
2918 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2919 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2920 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2921 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2922 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0)
2925 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
2926 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2927 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
2928 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0
2931 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
2932 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
2933 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32
2936 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
2937 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
2938 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
2939 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
2940 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
2941 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2946 pub fn to_disabled_staged(&mut self) {
2947 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged;
2950 pub fn to_disabled_marked(&mut self) {
2951 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked;
2954 pub fn to_fresh(&mut self) {
2955 self.network_sync = UpdateStatus::Fresh;
2958 pub fn is_disabled_staged(&self) -> bool {
2959 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledStaged
2962 pub fn is_disabled_marked(&self) -> bool {
2963 self.network_sync == UpdateStatus::DisabledMarked
2966 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being connected.
2967 /// Note that we only need to use this to detect funding_signed, anything else is handled by
2968 /// the channel_monitor.
2969 /// In case of Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard requirements
2970 /// apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed post-shutdown.
2971 /// Only returns an ErrorAction of DisconnectPeer, if Err.
2972 pub fn block_connected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingLocked>, msgs::ErrorMessage> {
2973 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2974 if header.bitcoin_hash() != self.last_block_connected {
2975 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
2976 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
2977 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
2978 self.funding_tx_confirmations += 1;
2979 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == self.minimum_depth as u64 {
2980 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2981 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32;
2983 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) {
2984 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2985 self.channel_update_count += 1;
2987 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurFundingLocked as u32) {
2988 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2989 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2991 } else if self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 {
2992 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent?: {}", self.channel_state);
2994 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just update
2995 // funding_tx_confirmed_in and return.
2998 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(header.bitcoin_hash());
3000 //TODO: Note that this must be a duplicate of the previous commitment point they sent us,
3001 //as otherwise we will have a commitment transaction that they can't revoke (well, kinda,
3002 //they can by sending two revoke_and_acks back-to-back, but not really). This appears to be
3003 //a protocol oversight, but I assume I'm just missing something.
3004 if need_commitment_update {
3005 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) == 0 {
3006 let next_per_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3007 let next_per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &next_per_commitment_secret);
3008 return Ok(Some(msgs::FundingLocked {
3009 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3010 next_per_commitment_point: next_per_commitment_point,
3013 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked = true;
3020 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::TheirFundingLocked as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3021 for (ref tx, index_in_block) in txn_matched.iter().zip(indexes_of_txn_matched) {
3022 if tx.txid() == self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().txid {
3023 let txo_idx = self.channel_monitor.get_funding_txo().unwrap().index as usize;
3024 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
3025 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
3026 if self.channel_outbound {
3027 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
3028 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
3029 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
3030 // probability in fuzztarget mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
3031 // channel and move on.
3032 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3033 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3035 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3036 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3037 return Err(msgs::ErrorMessage {
3038 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3039 data: "funding tx had wrong script/value".to_owned()
3042 if self.channel_outbound {
3043 for input in tx.input.iter() {
3044 if input.witness.is_empty() {
3045 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
3046 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
3047 #[cfg(not(feature = "fuzztarget"))]
3048 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
3052 self.funding_tx_confirmations = 1;
3053 self.short_channel_id = Some(((height as u64) << (5*8)) |
3054 ((*index_in_block as u64) << (2*8)) |
3055 ((txo_idx as u64) << (0*8)));
3063 /// Called by channelmanager based on chain blocks being disconnected.
3064 /// Returns true if we need to close the channel now due to funding transaction
3065 /// unconfirmation/reorg.
3066 pub fn block_disconnected(&mut self, header: &BlockHeader) -> bool {
3067 if self.funding_tx_confirmations > 0 {
3068 self.funding_tx_confirmations -= 1;
3069 if self.funding_tx_confirmations == UNCONF_THRESHOLD as u64 {
3073 if Some(header.bitcoin_hash()) == self.funding_tx_confirmed_in {
3074 self.funding_tx_confirmations = self.minimum_depth as u64 - 1;
3076 self.last_block_connected = header.bitcoin_hash();
3077 self.channel_monitor.last_block_hash = self.last_block_connected;
3081 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
3082 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
3084 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: Sha256dHash, fee_estimator: &FeeEstimator) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
3085 if !self.channel_outbound {
3086 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
3088 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
3089 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
3092 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3093 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3096 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3099 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3100 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3101 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3102 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
3103 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3104 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3105 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3106 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3107 feerate_per_kw: fee_estimator.get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background) as u32,
3108 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3109 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3110 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()),
3111 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key()),
3112 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key()),
3113 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key()),
3114 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key()),
3115 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3116 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
3117 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3121 pub fn get_accept_channel(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
3122 if self.channel_outbound {
3123 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
3125 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3126 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
3128 if self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3129 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
3132 let local_commitment_secret = self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number);
3134 msgs::AcceptChannel {
3135 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
3136 dust_limit_satoshis: self.our_dust_limit_satoshis,
3137 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3138 channel_reserve_satoshis: Channel::<ChanSigner>::get_our_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis),
3139 htlc_minimum_msat: self.our_htlc_minimum_msat,
3140 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth,
3141 to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
3142 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
3143 funding_pubkey: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key()),
3144 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.revocation_base_key()),
3145 payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.payment_base_key()),
3146 delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key()),
3147 htlc_basepoint: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.htlc_base_key()),
3148 first_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &local_commitment_secret),
3149 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(if self.config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey { self.get_closing_scriptpubkey() } else { Builder::new().into_script() })
3153 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
3154 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature(&mut self) -> Result<(Signature, Transaction), ChannelError> {
3155 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3156 let remote_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, false, self.feerate_per_kw).0;
3157 Ok((self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(self.feerate_per_kw, &remote_initial_commitment_tx, &remote_keys, &Vec::new(), self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
3158 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?.0, remote_initial_commitment_tx))
3161 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
3162 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
3163 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
3164 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
3165 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
3166 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
3167 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
3168 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created(&mut self, funding_txo: OutPoint) -> Result<(msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3169 if !self.channel_outbound {
3170 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
3172 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
3173 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
3175 if self.channel_monitor.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
3176 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3177 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3178 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
3181 let funding_txo_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh();
3182 self.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_txo, funding_txo_script));
3184 let (our_signature, commitment_tx) = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature() {
3187 log_error!(self, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
3188 self.channel_monitor.unset_funding_info();
3193 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
3195 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
3196 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&commitment_tx, Vec::new(), self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3197 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
3198 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
3199 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3201 Ok((msgs::FundingCreated {
3202 temporary_channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
3203 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
3204 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
3205 signature: our_signature
3206 }, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3209 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, as well as a signature covering it using our
3210 /// bitcoin_key, if available, for this channel. The channel must be publicly announceable and
3211 /// available for use (have exchanged FundingLocked messages in both directions). Should be used
3212 /// for both loose and in response to an AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
3213 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
3215 /// Note that the "channel must be funded" requirement is stricter than BOLT 7 requires - see
3216 /// https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/issues/468
3217 pub fn get_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: Sha256dHash) -> Result<(msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, Signature), ChannelError> {
3218 if !self.config.announced_channel {
3219 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements"));
3221 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) == 0 {
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement until the channel funding has been locked"));
3224 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32)) != 0 {
3225 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement once the channel is closing"));
3228 let were_node_one = our_node_id.serialize()[..] < self.their_node_id.serialize()[..];
3229 let our_bitcoin_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, self.local_keys.funding_key());
3231 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
3232 features: ChannelFeatures::supported(),
3233 chain_hash: chain_hash,
3234 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
3235 node_id_1: if were_node_one { our_node_id } else { self.get_their_node_id() },
3236 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_their_node_id() } else { our_node_id },
3237 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_key } else { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() },
3238 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.their_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { our_bitcoin_key },
3239 excess_data: Vec::new(),
3242 let sig = self.local_keys.sign_channel_announcement(&msg, &self.secp_ctx)
3243 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement"))?;
3248 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
3249 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
3250 pub fn get_channel_reestablish(&self) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3251 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
3252 assert_ne!(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
3253 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
3254 let remote_last_secret = self.channel_monitor.get_secret(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
3255 log_trace!(self, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret));
3256 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3257 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
3258 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number + 1))
3261 log_debug!(self, "We don't seen yet any revoked secret, if this channnel has already been updated it means we are fallen-behind, you should wait for other peer closing");
3262 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
3263 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
3264 my_current_per_commitment_point: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &self.build_local_commitment_secret(self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number))
3267 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
3268 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3269 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
3270 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
3271 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
3272 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
3273 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
3274 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
3276 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
3277 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
3278 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3279 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
3280 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
3281 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
3282 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
3283 // cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
3284 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
3286 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
3292 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
3294 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
3295 /// send_htlc_and_commit instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
3296 /// This returns an option instead of a pure UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we are
3297 /// waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack during which time we cannot add new
3298 /// HTLCs on the wire or we wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed.
3299 /// You MUST call send_commitment prior to any other calls on this Channel
3300 /// If an Err is returned, it's a ChannelError::Ignore!
3301 pub fn send_htlc(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> {
3302 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3303 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down"));
3306 if amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3307 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send more than the total value of the channel"));
3309 if amount_msat < self.their_htlc_minimum_msat {
3310 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value"));
3313 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) != 0 {
3314 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
3315 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
3316 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
3317 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
3318 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
3319 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
3320 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected/frozen for channel monitor update"));
3323 let (outbound_htlc_count, htlc_outbound_value_msat) = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats();
3324 if outbound_htlc_count + 1 > self.their_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3325 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs"));
3327 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
3328 if htlc_outbound_value_msat + amount_msat > self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3329 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept"));
3332 // Check self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
3333 // reserve for them to have something to claim if we misbehave)
3334 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 + amount_msat + htlc_outbound_value_msat {
3335 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put us over their reserve value"));
3338 //TODO: Check cltv_expiry? Do this in channel manager?
3340 // Now update local state:
3341 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3342 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3343 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3344 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3345 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3347 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3352 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3353 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3354 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3355 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
3356 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3357 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
3361 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3362 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3363 htlc_id: self.next_local_htlc_id,
3364 amount_msat: amount_msat,
3365 payment_hash: payment_hash,
3366 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
3367 onion_routing_packet: onion_routing_packet,
3369 self.next_local_htlc_id += 1;
3374 /// Creates a signed commitment transaction to send to the remote peer.
3375 /// Always returns a ChannelError::Close if an immediately-preceding (read: the
3376 /// last call to this Channel) send_htlc returned Ok(Some(_)) and there is an Err.
3377 /// May panic if called except immediately after a successful, Ok(Some(_))-returning send_htlc.
3378 pub fn send_commitment(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3379 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelFunded as u32) {
3380 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until channel is fully established");
3382 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) {
3383 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until remote revokes their previous commitment");
3385 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3386 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while disconnected, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3388 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32)) == (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) {
3389 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx while awaiting monitor update unfreeze, as send_htlc will have returned an Err so a send_commitment precondition has been violated");
3391 let mut have_updates = self.pending_update_fee.is_some();
3392 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3393 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3394 have_updates = true;
3396 if have_updates { break; }
3398 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3399 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3400 have_updates = true;
3402 if have_updates { break; }
3405 panic!("Cannot create commitment tx until we have some updates to send");
3407 self.send_commitment_no_status_check()
3409 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
3410 fn send_commitment_no_status_check(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor), ChannelError> {
3411 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
3412 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
3414 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3415 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3416 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
3418 if let Some(state) = new_state {
3422 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3423 if let Some(fail_reason) = if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut fail_reason) = &mut htlc.state {
3424 Some(fail_reason.take())
3426 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(fail_reason);
3429 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
3431 let (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update() {
3432 Ok((res, (remote_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
3433 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3434 let htlcs_no_ref = htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
3435 (res, remote_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
3437 Err(e) => return Err(e),
3440 self.channel_monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&remote_commitment_tx, htlcs, self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, self.their_cur_commitment_point.unwrap());
3441 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
3442 Ok((res, self.channel_monitor.clone()))
3445 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
3446 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
3447 fn send_commitment_no_state_update(&self) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Transaction, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> {
3448 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
3449 if let Some(feerate) = self.pending_update_fee {
3450 if self.channel_outbound {
3451 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3455 let remote_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys()?;
3456 let remote_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number, &remote_keys, false, true, feerate_per_kw);
3457 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
3460 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(remote_commitment_tx.2.len());
3461 for &(ref htlc, _) in remote_commitment_tx.2.iter() {
3465 let res = self.local_keys.sign_remote_commitment(feerate_per_kw, &remote_commitment_tx.0, &remote_keys, &htlcs, self.our_to_self_delay, &self.secp_ctx)
3466 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed"))?;
3468 htlc_signatures = res.1;
3470 log_trace!(self, "Signed remote commitment tx {} with redeemscript {} -> {}",
3471 encode::serialize_hex(&remote_commitment_tx.0),
3472 encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
3473 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]));
3475 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
3476 log_trace!(self, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {}",
3477 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&remote_commitment_tx.0.txid(), feerate_per_kw, self.our_to_self_delay, htlc, &remote_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &remote_keys.revocation_key)),
3478 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &remote_keys)),
3479 log_bytes!(remote_keys.a_htlc_key.serialize()),
3480 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]));
3484 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
3485 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3488 }, (remote_commitment_tx.0, remote_commitment_tx.2)))
3491 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
3492 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
3493 /// Shorthand for calling send_htlc() followed by send_commitment(), see docs on those for
3495 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitor)>, ChannelError> {
3496 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet)? {
3497 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
3498 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check()?;
3499 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
3505 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
3506 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
3507 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self) -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError> {
3508 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3509 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3510 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first"});
3513 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
3514 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
3515 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress"});
3517 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
3518 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote"});
3521 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3522 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateFailed as u32) != 0 {
3523 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?"});
3526 let our_closing_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3528 // From here on out, we may not fail!
3529 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3530 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3532 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
3534 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3536 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
3537 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
3538 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
3539 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3540 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
3542 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
3543 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
3550 Ok((msgs::Shutdown {
3551 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3552 scriptpubkey: our_closing_script,
3553 }, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
3556 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3557 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3558 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3559 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3560 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3561 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self) -> (Vec<Transaction>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) {
3562 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
3564 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3565 // return them to fail the payment.
3566 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3567 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3569 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3570 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash));
3576 for _htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.drain(..) {
3577 //TODO: Do something with the remaining HTLCs
3578 //(we need to have the ChannelManager monitor them so we can claim the inbound HTLCs
3582 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3583 self.channel_update_count += 1;
3584 (self.channel_monitor.get_latest_local_commitment_txn(), dropped_outbound_htlcs)
3588 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3589 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
3591 impl Writeable for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3592 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3594 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref error_packet) => {
3596 error_packet.write(writer)?;
3598 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref onion_hash, ref err_code)) => {
3600 onion_hash.write(writer)?;
3601 err_code.write(writer)?;
3603 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3605 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3612 impl<R: ::std::io::Read> Readable<R> for InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
3613 fn read(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3614 Ok(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3615 0 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(Readable::read(reader)?),
3616 1 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3617 2 => InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(Readable::read(reader)?),
3618 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3623 impl<ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Writeable> Writeable for Channel<ChanSigner> {
3624 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
3625 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
3626 // called but include holding cell updates (and obviously we don't modify self).
3628 writer.write_all(&[SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3629 writer.write_all(&[MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION; 1])?;
3631 self.user_id.write(writer)?;
3632 self.config.write(writer)?;
3634 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
3635 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
3636 self.channel_outbound.write(writer)?;
3637 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3639 self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
3640 self.shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?;
3642 self.cur_local_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3643 self.cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
3644 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
3646 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
3647 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3648 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3649 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
3652 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3653 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3654 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3655 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3656 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3657 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3659 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {}, // Drop
3660 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
3662 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3664 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
3666 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
3668 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3671 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
3673 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
3678 macro_rules! write_option {
3681 &None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3690 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3691 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3692 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3693 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3694 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3695 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3696 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
3698 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
3700 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
3702 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3705 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref fail_reason) => {
3707 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3709 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref fail_reason) => {
3711 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3713 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref fail_reason) => {
3715 write_option!(*fail_reason);
3720 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3721 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3723 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
3725 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
3726 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
3727 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3728 source.write(writer)?;
3729 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
3731 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
3733 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
3734 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3736 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3738 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3739 err_packet.write(writer)?;
3744 match self.resend_order {
3745 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3746 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
3749 self.monitor_pending_funding_locked.write(writer)?;
3750 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
3751 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
3753 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3754 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
3755 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
3756 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3759 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
3760 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
3761 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
3762 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
3763 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
3766 write_option!(self.pending_update_fee);
3767 write_option!(self.holding_cell_update_fee);
3769 self.next_local_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
3770 (self.next_remote_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
3771 self.channel_update_count.write(writer)?;
3772 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
3774 match self.last_sent_closing_fee {
3775 Some((feerate, fee, sig)) => {
3777 feerate.write(writer)?;
3781 None => 0u8.write(writer)?,
3784 write_option!(self.funding_tx_confirmed_in);
3785 write_option!(self.short_channel_id);
3787 self.last_block_connected.write(writer)?;
3788 self.funding_tx_confirmations.write(writer)?;
3790 self.their_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3791 self.our_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3792 self.their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
3793 self.their_channel_reserve_satoshis.write(writer)?;
3794 self.their_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3795 self.our_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
3796 self.their_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
3797 self.our_to_self_delay.write(writer)?;
3798 self.their_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
3799 self.minimum_depth.write(writer)?;
3801 write_option!(self.their_pubkeys);
3802 write_option!(self.their_cur_commitment_point);
3804 write_option!(self.their_prev_commitment_point);
3805 self.their_node_id.write(writer)?;
3807 write_option!(self.their_shutdown_scriptpubkey);
3809 self.channel_monitor.write_for_disk(writer)?;
3814 impl<R : ::std::io::Read, ChanSigner: ChannelKeys + Readable<R>> ReadableArgs<R, Arc<Logger>> for Channel<ChanSigner> {
3815 fn read(reader: &mut R, logger: Arc<Logger>) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
3816 let _ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3817 let min_ver: u8 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3818 if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
3819 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownVersion);
3822 let user_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3823 let config: ChannelConfig = Readable::read(reader)?;
3825 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3826 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
3827 let channel_outbound = Readable::read(reader)?;
3828 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3830 let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3831 let shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3833 let cur_local_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3834 let cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
3835 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3837 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3838 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3839 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
3840 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3841 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3842 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3843 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3844 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3845 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3846 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
3847 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
3848 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
3849 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
3850 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3855 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3856 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3857 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
3858 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
3859 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3860 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3861 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3862 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3863 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
3864 state: match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3865 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
3866 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
3867 2 => OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
3868 3 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(Readable::read(reader)?),
3869 4 => OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
3870 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3875 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3876 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
3877 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
3878 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3879 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3880 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
3881 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
3882 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
3883 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
3884 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3886 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3887 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
3888 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3890 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
3891 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
3892 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
3894 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3898 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3899 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
3900 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3901 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3904 let monitor_pending_funding_locked = Readable::read(reader)?;
3905 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
3906 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
3908 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3909 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3910 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
3911 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3914 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
3915 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
3916 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
3917 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
3920 let pending_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
3921 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
3923 let next_local_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3924 let next_remote_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3925 let channel_update_count = Readable::read(reader)?;
3926 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
3928 let last_sent_closing_fee = match <u8 as Readable<R>>::read(reader)? {
3930 1 => Some((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?)),
3931 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
3934 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
3935 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3937 let last_block_connected = Readable::read(reader)?;
3938 let funding_tx_confirmations = Readable::read(reader)?;
3940 let their_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3941 let our_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3942 let their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3943 let their_channel_reserve_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
3944 let their_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3945 let our_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
3946 let their_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
3947 let our_to_self_delay = Readable::read(reader)?;
3948 let their_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
3949 let minimum_depth = Readable::read(reader)?;
3951 let their_pubkeys = Readable::read(reader)?;
3952 let their_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3954 let their_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
3955 let their_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
3957 let their_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
3958 let (monitor_last_block, channel_monitor) = ReadableArgs::read(reader, logger.clone())?;
3959 // We drop the ChannelMonitor's last block connected hash cause we don't actually bother
3960 // doing full block connection operations on the internal CHannelMonitor copies
3961 if monitor_last_block != last_block_connected {
3962 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
3972 secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
3973 channel_value_satoshis,
3978 cur_local_commitment_transaction_number,
3979 cur_remote_commitment_transaction_number,
3982 pending_inbound_htlcs,
3983 pending_outbound_htlcs,
3984 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
3988 monitor_pending_funding_locked,
3989 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
3990 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
3991 monitor_pending_forwards,
3992 monitor_pending_failures,
3995 holding_cell_update_fee,
3997 next_remote_htlc_id,
3998 channel_update_count,
4001 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4002 max_commitment_tx_output_local: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4003 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
4004 max_commitment_tx_output_remote: ::std::sync::Mutex::new((0, 0)),
4006 last_sent_closing_fee,
4008 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
4010 last_block_connected,
4011 funding_tx_confirmations,
4013 their_dust_limit_satoshis,
4014 our_dust_limit_satoshis,
4015 their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4016 their_channel_reserve_satoshis,
4017 their_htlc_minimum_msat,
4018 our_htlc_minimum_msat,
4019 their_to_self_delay,
4021 their_max_accepted_htlcs,
4025 their_cur_commitment_point,
4027 their_prev_commitment_point,
4030 their_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
4034 network_sync: UpdateStatus::Fresh,
4043 use bitcoin::util::bip143;
4044 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
4045 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
4046 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
4047 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
4048 use bitcoin_hashes::hex::FromHex;
4050 use ln::channelmanager::{HTLCSource, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
4051 use ln::channel::{Channel,ChannelKeys,InboundHTLCOutput,OutboundHTLCOutput,InboundHTLCState,OutboundHTLCState,HTLCOutputInCommitment,TxCreationKeys};
4052 use ln::channel::MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS;
4054 use ln::chan_utils::{LocalCommitmentTransaction, ChannelPublicKeys};
4055 use chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator,ConfirmationTarget};
4056 use chain::keysinterface::{InMemoryChannelKeys, KeysInterface};
4057 use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
4058 use util::config::UserConfig;
4059 use util::test_utils;
4060 use util::logger::Logger;
4061 use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Message, Signature, All};
4062 use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
4063 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
4064 use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
4065 use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
4066 use bitcoin_hashes::Hash;
4069 struct TestFeeEstimator {
4072 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
4073 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u64 {
4079 fn test_max_funding_satoshis() {
4080 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS <= 21_000_000 * 100_000_000,
4081 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS is greater than all satoshis in existence");
4085 chan_keys: InMemoryChannelKeys,
4087 impl KeysInterface for Keys {
4088 type ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys;
4090 fn get_node_secret(&self) -> SecretKey { panic!(); }
4091 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
4092 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4093 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4094 let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = Hash160::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
4095 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
4098 fn get_shutdown_pubkey(&self) -> PublicKey {
4099 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
4100 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4101 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)
4104 fn get_channel_keys(&self, _inbound: bool, channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> InMemoryChannelKeys {
4105 self.chan_keys.clone()
4107 fn get_onion_rand(&self) -> (SecretKey, [u8; 32]) { panic!(); }
4108 fn get_channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
4111 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
4112 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
4116 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
4117 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix C:
4118 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
4119 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
4120 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4122 let chan_keys = InMemoryChannelKeys {
4123 funding_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4124 payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4125 delayed_payment_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4126 htlc_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4128 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
4129 revocation_base_key: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4130 commitment_seed: [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
4131 remote_channel_pubkeys: None,
4132 channel_value_satoshis: 7000000000,
4134 assert_eq!(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan_keys.funding_key()).serialize()[..],
4135 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
4136 let keys_provider: Arc<KeysInterface<ChanKeySigner = InMemoryChannelKeys>> = Arc::new(Keys { chan_keys });
4138 let their_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
4139 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
4140 config.channel_options.announced_channel = false;
4141 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemoryChannelKeys>::new_outbound(&feeest, &keys_provider, their_node_id, 10000000, 100000, 42, Arc::clone(&logger), &config).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
4142 chan.their_to_self_delay = 144;
4143 chan.our_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
4145 let funding_info = OutPoint::new(Sha256dHash::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), 0);
4146 chan.channel_monitor.set_funding_info((funding_info, Script::new()));
4148 let their_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
4149 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4150 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
4151 payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
4152 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
4153 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
4156 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4157 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4159 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
4160 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
4162 assert_eq!(their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
4163 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
4165 // We can't just use build_local_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
4166 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
4167 // build_commitment_transaction.
4168 let delayed_payment_base = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.delayed_payment_base_key());
4169 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4170 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4171 let htlc_basepoint = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key());
4172 let keys = TxCreationKeys::new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &delayed_payment_base, &htlc_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.payment_basepoint, &their_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint).unwrap();
4174 chan.their_pubkeys = Some(their_pubkeys);
4176 let mut unsigned_tx: (Transaction, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>);
4178 macro_rules! test_commitment {
4179 ( $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr) => {
4181 let mut res = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4182 let htlcs = res.2.drain(..)
4183 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
4187 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
4188 let their_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4189 let sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&unsigned_tx.0).sighash_all(&unsigned_tx.0.input[0], &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis)[..]).unwrap();
4190 secp_ctx.verify(&sighash, &their_signature, chan.their_funding_pubkey()).unwrap();
4192 let mut localtx = LocalCommitmentTransaction::new_missing_local_sig(unsigned_tx.0.clone(), &their_signature, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, chan.local_keys.funding_key()), chan.their_funding_pubkey());
4193 localtx.add_local_sig(chan.local_keys.funding_key(), &redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis, &chan.secp_ctx);
4195 assert_eq!(serialize(localtx.with_valid_witness())[..],
4196 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4200 macro_rules! test_htlc_output {
4201 ( $htlc_idx: expr, $their_sig_hex: expr, $our_sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr ) => {
4202 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($their_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4204 let ref htlc = unsigned_tx.1[$htlc_idx];
4205 let mut htlc_tx = chan.build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.0.txid(), &htlc, true, &keys, chan.feerate_per_kw);
4206 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &keys);
4207 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000)[..]).unwrap();
4208 secp_ctx.verify(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.b_htlc_key).unwrap();
4210 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
4213 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
4214 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
4215 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
4219 assert!(preimage.is_some());
4222 chan_utils::sign_htlc_transaction(&mut htlc_tx, &remote_signature, &preimage, &htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key, &keys.per_commitment_point, chan.local_keys.htlc_base_key(), &chan.secp_ctx).unwrap();
4223 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..],
4224 hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..]);
4229 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
4230 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
4232 test_commitment!("3045022100f51d2e566a70ba740fc5d8c0f07b9b93d2ed741c3c0860c613173de7d39e7968022041376d520e9c0e1ad52248ddf4b22e12be8763007df977253ef45a4ca3bdb7c0",
4233 "3044022051b75c73198c6deee1a875871c3961832909acd297c6b908d59e3319e5185a46022055c419379c5051a78d00dbbce11b5b664a0c22815fbcc6fcef6b1937c3836939",
4234 "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");
4237 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4238 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4240 amount_msat: 1000000,
4242 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4243 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4245 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
4248 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4249 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4251 amount_msat: 2000000,
4253 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4254 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4256 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
4259 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4260 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4262 amount_msat: 2000000,
4264 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4265 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4266 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4268 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
4271 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
4272 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
4274 amount_msat: 3000000,
4276 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4277 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
4278 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
4280 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
4283 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
4284 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
4286 amount_msat: 4000000,
4288 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
4289 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
4291 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
4296 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4297 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4298 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
4300 test_commitment!("304402204fd4928835db1ccdfc40f5c78ce9bd65249b16348df81f0c44328dcdefc97d630220194d3869c38bc732dd87d13d2958015e2fc16829e74cd4377f84d215c0b70606",
4301 "30440220275b0c325a5e9355650dc30c0eccfbc7efb23987c24b556b9dfdd40effca18d202206caceb2c067836c51f296740c7ae807ffcbfbf1dd3a0d56b6de9a5b247985f06",
4302 "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");
4304 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4306 test_htlc_output!(0,
4307 "304402206a6e59f18764a5bf8d4fa45eebc591566689441229c918b480fb2af8cc6a4aeb02205248f273be447684b33e3c8d1d85a8e0ca9fa0bae9ae33f0527ada9c162919a6",
4308 "304402207cb324fa0de88f452ffa9389678127ebcf4cabe1dd848b8e076c1a1962bf34720220116ed922b12311bd602d67e60d2529917f21c5b82f25ff6506c0f87886b4dfd5",
4309 "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");
4311 test_htlc_output!(1,
4312 "3045022100d5275b3619953cb0c3b5aa577f04bc512380e60fa551762ce3d7a1bb7401cff9022037237ab0dac3fe100cde094e82e2bed9ba0ed1bb40154b48e56aa70f259e608b",
4313 "3045022100c89172099507ff50f4c925e6c5150e871fb6e83dd73ff9fbb72f6ce829a9633f02203a63821d9162e99f9be712a68f9e589483994feae2661e4546cd5b6cec007be5",
4314 "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");
4316 test_htlc_output!(2,
4317 "304402201b63ec807771baf4fdff523c644080de17f1da478989308ad13a58b51db91d360220568939d38c9ce295adba15665fa68f51d967e8ed14a007b751540a80b325f202",
4318 "3045022100def389deab09cee69eaa1ec14d9428770e45bcbe9feb46468ecf481371165c2f022015d2e3c46600b2ebba8dcc899768874cc6851fd1ecb3fffd15db1cc3de7e10da",
4319 "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");
4321 test_htlc_output!(3,
4322 "3045022100daee1808f9861b6c3ecd14f7b707eca02dd6bdfc714ba2f33bc8cdba507bb182022026654bf8863af77d74f51f4e0b62d461a019561bb12acb120d3f7195d148a554",
4323 "30440220643aacb19bbb72bd2b635bc3f7375481f5981bace78cdd8319b2988ffcc6704202203d27784ec8ad51ed3bd517a05525a5139bb0b755dd719e0054332d186ac08727",
4324 "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");
4326 test_htlc_output!(4,
4327 "304402207e0410e45454b0978a623f36a10626ef17b27d9ad44e2760f98cfa3efb37924f0220220bd8acd43ecaa916a80bd4f919c495a2c58982ce7c8625153f8596692a801d",
4328 "30440220549e80b4496803cbc4a1d09d46df50109f546d43fbbf86cd90b174b1484acd5402205f12a4f995cb9bded597eabfee195a285986aa6d93ae5bb72507ebc6a4e2349e",
4329 "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");
4333 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4334 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4335 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
4337 test_commitment!("3045022100a5c01383d3ec646d97e40f44318d49def817fcd61a0ef18008a665b3e151785502203e648efddd5838981ef55ec954be69c4a652d021e6081a100d034de366815e9b",
4338 "304502210094bfd8f5572ac0157ec76a9551b6c5216a4538c07cd13a51af4a54cb26fa14320220768efce8ce6f4a5efac875142ff19237c011343670adf9c7ac69704a120d1163",
4339 "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");
4341 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 5);
4343 test_htlc_output!(0,
4344 "30440220385a5afe75632f50128cbb029ee95c80156b5b4744beddc729ad339c9ca432c802202ba5f48550cad3379ac75b9b4fedb86a35baa6947f16ba5037fb8b11ab343740",
4345 "304402205999590b8a79fa346e003a68fd40366397119b2b0cdf37b149968d6bc6fbcc4702202b1e1fb5ab7864931caed4e732c359e0fe3d86a548b557be2246efb1708d579a",
4346 "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");
4348 test_htlc_output!(1,
4349 "304402207ceb6678d4db33d2401fdc409959e57c16a6cb97a30261d9c61f29b8c58d34b90220084b4a17b4ca0e86f2d798b3698ca52de5621f2ce86f80bed79afa66874511b0",
4350 "304402207ff03eb0127fc7c6cae49cc29e2a586b98d1e8969cf4a17dfa50b9c2647720b902205e2ecfda2252956c0ca32f175080e75e4e390e433feb1f8ce9f2ba55648a1dac",
4351 "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");
4353 test_htlc_output!(2,
4354 "304402206a401b29a0dff0d18ec903502c13d83e7ec019450113f4a7655a4ce40d1f65ba0220217723a084e727b6ca0cc8b6c69c014a7e4a01fcdcba3e3993f462a3c574d833",
4355 "3045022100d50d067ca625d54e62df533a8f9291736678d0b86c28a61bb2a80cf42e702d6e02202373dde7e00218eacdafb9415fe0e1071beec1857d1af3c6a201a44cbc47c877",
4356 "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");
4358 test_htlc_output!(3,
4359 "30450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d",
4360 "3045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb",
4361 "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb6030000000000000000010c0a0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009b1c987ba599ee3bde1dbca776b85481d70a78b681a8d84206723e2795c7cac002207aac84ad910f8598c4d1c0ea2e3399cf6627a4e3e90131315bc9f038451ce39d01483045022100db9dc65291077a52728c622987e9895b7241d4394d6dcb916d7600a3e8728c22022036ee3ee717ba0bb5c45ee84bc7bbf85c0f90f26ae4e4a25a6b4241afa8a3f1cb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000");
4363 test_htlc_output!(4,
4364 "3045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f0",
4365 "304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f",
4366 "020000000001018323148ce2419f21ca3d6780053747715832e18ac780931a514b187768882bb604000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100cc28030b59f0914f45b84caa983b6f8effa900c952310708c2b5b00781117022022027ba2ccdf94d03c6d48b327f183f6e28c8a214d089b9227f94ac4f85315274f00147304402202d1a3c0d31200265d2a2def2753ead4959ae20b4083e19553acfffa5dfab60bf022020ede134149504e15b88ab261a066de49848411e15e70f9e6a5462aec2949f8f012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
4370 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4371 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4372 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
4374 test_commitment!("3044022072714e2fbb93cdd1c42eb0828b4f2eff143f717d8f26e79d6ada4f0dcb681bbe02200911be4e5161dd6ebe59ff1c58e1997c4aea804f81db6b698821db6093d7b057",
4375 "3045022100a2270d5950c89ae0841233f6efea9c951898b301b2e89e0adbd2c687b9f32efa02207943d90f95b9610458e7c65a576e149750ff3accaacad004cd85e70b235e27de",
4376 "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");
4378 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4380 test_htlc_output!(0,
4381 "3044022062ef2e77591409d60d7817d9bb1e71d3c4a2931d1a6c7c8307422c84f001a251022022dad9726b0ae3fe92bda745a06f2c00f92342a186d84518588cf65f4dfaada8",
4382 "3045022100a4c574f00411dd2f978ca5cdc1b848c311cd7849c087ad2f21a5bce5e8cc5ae90220090ae39a9bce2fb8bc879d7e9f9022df249f41e25e51f1a9bf6447a9eeffc098",
4383 "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");
4385 test_htlc_output!(1,
4386 "3045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d4",
4387 "304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0",
4388 "02000000000101579c183eca9e8236a5d7f5dcd79cfec32c497fdc0ec61533cde99ecd436cadd10100000000000000000109060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e968cbbb5f402ed389fdc7f6cd2a80ed650bb42c79aeb2a5678444af94f6c78502204b47a1cb24ab5b0b6fe69fe9cfc7dba07b9dd0d8b95f372c1d9435146a88f8d40147304402207679cf19790bea76a733d2fa0672bd43ab455687a068f815a3d237581f57139a0220683a1a799e102071c206b207735ca80f627ab83d6616b4bcd017c5d79ef3e7d0012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000");
4390 test_htlc_output!(2,
4391 "3045022100aa91932e305292cf9969cc23502bbf6cef83a5df39c95ad04a707c4f4fed5c7702207099fc0f3a9bfe1e7683c0e9aa5e76c5432eb20693bf4cb182f04d383dc9c8c2",
4392 "304402200df76fea718745f3c529bac7fd37923e7309ce38b25c0781e4cf514dd9ef8dc802204172295739dbae9fe0474dcee3608e3433b4b2af3a2e6787108b02f894dcdda3",
4393 "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");
4395 test_htlc_output!(3,
4396 "3044022035cac88040a5bba420b1c4257235d5015309113460bc33f2853cd81ca36e632402202fc94fd3e81e9d34a9d01782a0284f3044370d03d60f3fc041e2da088d2de58f",
4397 "304402200daf2eb7afd355b4caf6fb08387b5f031940ea29d1a9f35071288a839c9039e4022067201b562456e7948616c13acb876b386b511599b58ac1d94d127f91c50463a6",
4398 "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");
4402 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4403 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4404 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
4406 test_commitment!("3044022001d55e488b8b035b2dd29d50b65b530923a416d47f377284145bc8767b1b6a75022019bb53ddfe1cefaf156f924777eaaf8fdca1810695a7d0a247ad2afba8232eb4",
4407 "304402203ca8f31c6a47519f83255dc69f1894d9a6d7476a19f498d31eaf0cd3a85eeb63022026fd92dc752b33905c4c838c528b692a8ad4ced959990b5d5ee2ff940fa90eea",
4408 "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");
4410 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 4);
4412 test_htlc_output!(0,
4413 "3045022100d1cf354de41c1369336cf85b225ed033f1f8982a01be503668df756a7e668b66022001254144fb4d0eecc61908fccc3388891ba17c5d7a1a8c62bdd307e5a513f992",
4414 "3044022056eb1af429660e45a1b0b66568cb8c4a3aa7e4c9c292d5d6c47f86ebf2c8838f022065c3ac4ebe980ca7a41148569be4ad8751b0a724a41405697ec55035dae66402",
4415 "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");
4417 test_htlc_output!(1,
4418 "3045022100d065569dcb94f090345402736385efeb8ea265131804beac06dd84d15dd2d6880220664feb0b4b2eb985fadb6ec7dc58c9334ea88ce599a9be760554a2d4b3b5d9f4",
4419 "3045022100914bb232cd4b2690ee3d6cb8c3713c4ac9c4fb925323068d8b07f67c8541f8d9022057152f5f1615b793d2d45aac7518989ae4fe970f28b9b5c77504799d25433f7f",
4420 "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");
4422 test_htlc_output!(2,
4423 "3045022100d4e69d363de993684eae7b37853c40722a4c1b4a7b588ad7b5d8a9b5006137a102207a069c628170ee34be5612747051bdcc087466dbaa68d5756ea81c10155aef18",
4424 "304402200e362443f7af830b419771e8e1614fc391db3a4eb799989abfc5ab26d6fcd032022039ab0cad1c14dfbe9446bf847965e56fe016e0cbcf719fd18c1bfbf53ecbd9f9",
4425 "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");
4427 test_htlc_output!(3,
4428 "30450221008ec888e36e4a4b3dc2ed6b823319855b2ae03006ca6ae0d9aa7e24bfc1d6f07102203b0f78885472a67ff4fe5916c0bb669487d659527509516fc3a08e87a2cc0a7c",
4429 "304402202c3e14282b84b02705dfd00a6da396c9fe8a8bcb1d3fdb4b20a4feba09440e8b02202b058b39aa9b0c865b22095edcd9ff1f71bbfe20aa4993755e54d042755ed0d5",
4430 "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");
4434 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4435 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4436 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
4438 test_commitment!("3045022100f2377f7a67b7fc7f4e2c0c9e3a7de935c32417f5668eda31ea1db401b7dc53030220415fdbc8e91d0f735e70c21952342742e25249b0d062d43efbfc564499f37526",
4439 "30440220443cb07f650aebbba14b8bc8d81e096712590f524c5991ac0ed3bbc8fd3bd0c7022028a635f548e3ca64b19b69b1ea00f05b22752f91daf0b6dab78e62ba52eb7fd0",
4440 "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");
4442 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4444 test_htlc_output!(0,
4445 "3045022100eed143b1ee4bed5dc3cde40afa5db3e7354cbf9c44054b5f713f729356f08cf7022077161d171c2bbd9badf3c9934de65a4918de03bbac1450f715275f75b103f891",
4446 "3045022100a0d043ed533e7fb1911e0553d31a8e2f3e6de19dbc035257f29d747c5e02f1f5022030cd38d8e84282175d49c1ebe0470db3ebd59768cf40780a784e248a43904fb8",
4447 "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");
4449 test_htlc_output!(1,
4450 "3044022071e9357619fd8d29a411dc053b326a5224c5d11268070e88ecb981b174747c7a02202b763ae29a9d0732fa8836dd8597439460b50472183f420021b768981b4f7cf6",
4451 "3045022100adb1d679f65f96178b59f23ed37d3b70443118f345224a07ecb043eee2acc157022034d24524fe857144a3bcfff3065a9994d0a6ec5f11c681e49431d573e242612d",
4452 "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");
4454 test_htlc_output!(2,
4455 "3045022100c9458a4d2cbb741705577deb0a890e5cb90ee141be0400d3162e533727c9cb2102206edcf765c5dc5e5f9b976ea8149bf8607b5a0efb30691138e1231302b640d2a4",
4456 "304402200831422aa4e1ee6d55e0b894201770a8f8817a189356f2d70be76633ffa6a6f602200dd1b84a4855dc6727dd46c98daae43dfc70889d1ba7ef0087529a57c06e5e04",
4457 "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");
4461 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4462 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4463 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
4465 test_commitment!("3045022100d33c4e541aa1d255d41ea9a3b443b3b822ad8f7f86862638aac1f69f8f760577022007e2a18e6931ce3d3a804b1c78eda1de17dbe1fb7a95488c9a4ec86203953348",
4466 "304402203b1b010c109c2ecbe7feb2d259b9c4126bd5dc99ee693c422ec0a5781fe161ba0220571fe4e2c649dea9c7aaf7e49b382962f6a3494963c97d80fef9a430ca3f7061",
4467 "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");
4469 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 3);
4471 test_htlc_output!(0,
4472 "30450221009ed2f0a67f99e29c3c8cf45c08207b765980697781bb727fe0b1416de0e7622902206052684229bc171419ed290f4b615c943f819c0262414e43c5b91dcf72ddcf44",
4473 "3044022004ad5f04ae69c71b3b141d4db9d0d4c38d84009fb3cfeeae6efdad414487a9a0022042d3fe1388c1ff517d1da7fb4025663d372c14728ed52dc88608363450ff6a2f",
4474 "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");
4476 test_htlc_output!(1,
4477 "30440220155d3b90c67c33a8321996a9be5b82431b0c126613be751d400669da9d5c696702204318448bcd48824439d2c6a70be6e5747446be47ff45977cf41672bdc9b6b12d",
4478 "304402201707050c870c1f77cc3ed58d6d71bf281de239e9eabd8ef0955bad0d7fe38dcc02204d36d80d0019b3a71e646a08fa4a5607761d341ae8be371946ebe437c289c915",
4479 "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");
4481 test_htlc_output!(2,
4482 "3045022100a12a9a473ece548584aabdd051779025a5ed4077c4b7aa376ec7a0b1645e5a48022039490b333f53b5b3e2ddde1d809e492cba2b3e5fc3a436cd3ffb4cd3d500fa5a",
4483 "3045022100ff200bc934ab26ce9a559e998ceb0aee53bc40368e114ab9d3054d9960546e2802202496856ca163ac12c143110b6b3ac9d598df7254f2e17b3b94c3ab5301f4c3b0",
4484 "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");
4488 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4489 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4490 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
4492 test_commitment!("304402205e2f76d4657fb732c0dfc820a18a7301e368f5799e06b7828007633741bda6df0220458009ae59d0c6246065c419359e05eb2a4b4ef4a1b310cc912db44eb7924298",
4493 "304402203b12d44254244b8ff3bb4129b0920fd45120ab42f553d9976394b099d500c99e02205e95bb7a3164852ef0c48f9e0eaf145218f8e2c41251b231f03cbdc4f29a5429",
4494 "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");
4496 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4498 test_htlc_output!(0,
4499 "3045022100a8a78fa1016a5c5c3704f2e8908715a3cef66723fb95f3132ec4d2d05cd84fb4022025ac49287b0861ec21932405f5600cbce94313dbde0e6c5d5af1b3366d8afbfc",
4500 "3045022100be6ae1977fd7b630a53623f3f25c542317ccfc2b971782802a4f1ef538eb22b402207edc4d0408f8f38fd3c7365d1cfc26511b7cd2d4fecd8b005fba3cd5bc704390",
4501 "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");
4503 test_htlc_output!(1,
4504 "3045022100e769cb156aa2f7515d126cef7a69968629620ce82afcaa9e210969de6850df4602200b16b3f3486a229a48aadde520dbee31ae340dbadaffae74fbb56681fef27b92",
4505 "30440220665b9cb4a978c09d1ca8977a534999bc8a49da624d0c5439451dd69cde1a003d022070eae0620f01f3c1bd029cc1488da13fb40fdab76f396ccd335479a11c5276d8",
4506 "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");
4510 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4511 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4512 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
4514 test_commitment!("3045022100c1a3b0b60ca092ed5080121f26a74a20cec6bdee3f8e47bae973fcdceb3eda5502207d467a9873c939bf3aa758014ae67295fedbca52412633f7e5b2670fc7c381c1",
4515 "304402200e930a43c7951162dc15a2b7344f48091c74c70f7024e7116e900d8bcfba861c022066fa6cbda3929e21daa2e7e16a4b948db7e8919ef978402360d1095ffdaff7b0",
4516 "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");
4518 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 2);
4520 test_htlc_output!(0,
4521 "3045022100dfb73b4fe961b31a859b2bb1f4f15cabab9265016dd0272323dc6a9e85885c54022059a7b87c02861ee70662907f25ce11597d7b68d3399443a831ae40e777b76bdb",
4522 "304402202765b9c9ece4f127fa5407faf66da4c5ce2719cdbe47cd3175fc7d48b482e43d02205605125925e07bad1e41c618a4b434d72c88a164981c4b8af5eaf4ee9142ec3a",
4523 "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");
4525 test_htlc_output!(1,
4526 "3045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9",
4527 "30440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c",
4528 "02000000000101b8de11eb51c22498fe39722c7227b6e55ff1a94146cf638458cb9bc6a060d3a30100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ea9dc2a7c3c3640334dab733bb4e036e32a3106dc707b24227874fa4f7da746802204d672f7ac0fe765931a8df10b81e53a3242dd32bd9dc9331eb4a596da87954e9014730440220048a41c660c4841693de037d00a407810389f4574b3286afb7bc392a438fa3f802200401d71fa87c64fe621b49ac07e3bf85157ac680acb977124da28652cc7f1a5c012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000");
4532 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4533 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4534 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
4536 test_commitment!("30450221008b7c191dd46893b67b628e618d2dc8e81169d38bade310181ab77d7c94c6675e02203b4dd131fd7c9deb299560983dcdc485545c98f989f7ae8180c28289f9e6bdb0",
4537 "3044022047305531dd44391dce03ae20f8735005c615eb077a974edb0059ea1a311857d602202e0ed6972fbdd1e8cb542b06e0929bc41b2ddf236e04cb75edd56151f4197506",
4538 "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");
4540 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4542 test_htlc_output!(0,
4543 "3044022044f65cf833afdcb9d18795ca93f7230005777662539815b8a601eeb3e57129a902206a4bf3e53392affbba52640627defa8dc8af61c958c9e827b2798ab45828abdd",
4544 "3045022100b94d931a811b32eeb885c28ddcf999ae1981893b21dd1329929543fe87ce793002206370107fdd151c5f2384f9ceb71b3107c69c74c8ed5a28a94a4ab2d27d3b0724",
4545 "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");
4549 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4550 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4551 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
4553 test_commitment!("304402206d6cb93969d39177a09d5d45b583f34966195b77c7e585cf47ac5cce0c90cefb022031d71ae4e33a4e80df7f981d696fbdee517337806a3c7138b7491e2cbb077a0e",
4554 "304402206a2679efa3c7aaffd2a447fd0df7aba8792858b589750f6a1203f9259173198a022008d52a0e77a99ab533c36206cb15ad7aeb2aa72b93d4b571e728cb5ec2f6fe26",
4555 "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");
4557 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 1);
4559 test_htlc_output!(0,
4560 "3045022100fcb38506bfa11c02874092a843d0cc0a8613c23b639832564a5f69020cb0f6ba02206508b9e91eaa001425c190c68ee5f887e1ad5b1b314002e74db9dbd9e42dbecf",
4561 "304502210086e76b460ddd3cea10525fba298405d3fe11383e56966a5091811368362f689a02200f72ee75657915e0ede89c28709acd113ede9e1b7be520e3bc5cda425ecd6e68",
4562 "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");
4566 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4567 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4568 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
4570 test_commitment!("304402200769ba89c7330dfa4feba447b6e322305f12ac7dac70ec6ba997ed7c1b598d0802204fe8d337e7fee781f9b7b1a06e580b22f4f79d740059560191d7db53f8765552",
4571 "3045022100a012691ba6cea2f73fa8bac37750477e66363c6d28813b0bb6da77c8eb3fb0270220365e99c51304b0b1a6ab9ea1c8500db186693e39ec1ad5743ee231b0138384b9",
4572 "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");
4574 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4578 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
4579 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4580 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
4582 test_commitment!("3044022037f83ff00c8e5fb18ae1f918ffc24e54581775a20ff1ae719297ef066c71caa9022039c529cccd89ff6c5ed1db799614533844bd6d101da503761c45c713996e3bbd",
4583 "30440220514f977bf7edc442de8ce43ace9686e5ebdc0f893033f13e40fb46c8b8c6e1f90220188006227d175f5c35da0b092c57bea82537aed89f7778204dc5bacf4f29f2b9",
4584 "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");
4586 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4590 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
4591 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4592 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
4594 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4595 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4596 "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");
4598 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4602 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
4603 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
4604 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
4606 test_commitment!("3044022064901950be922e62cbe3f2ab93de2b99f37cff9fc473e73e394b27f88ef0731d02206d1dfa227527b4df44a07599289e207d6fd9cca60c0365682dcd3deaf739567e",
4607 "3044022031a82b51bd014915fe68928d1abf4b9885353fb896cac10c3fdd88d7f9c7f2e00220716bda819641d2c63e65d3549b6120112e1aeaf1742eed94a471488e79e206b1",
4608 "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");
4610 assert_eq!(unsigned_tx.1.len(), 0);
4615 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
4616 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
4618 let mut seed = [0; 32];
4619 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
4620 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
4621 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
4623 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
4624 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
4625 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
4627 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
4628 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
4630 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
4631 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
4633 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
4634 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
4635 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
4639 fn test_key_derivation() {
4640 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
4641 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
4643 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4644 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
4646 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
4647 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
4649 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
4650 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
4652 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4653 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
4655 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4656 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
4658 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).unwrap().serialize()[..],
4659 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
4661 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret).unwrap(),
4662 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());