1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 use core::convert::TryInto;
53 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
54 use crate::sync::Mutex;
55 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
60 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
62 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
67 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
70 pub struct AvailableBalances {
71 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
72 pub balance_msat: u64,
73 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
74 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
76 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
78 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
79 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
83 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
85 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
87 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
88 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
89 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
90 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
91 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
92 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
94 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
98 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
99 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
100 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
101 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
104 enum InboundHTLCState {
105 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
106 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
107 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
108 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
109 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
110 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
111 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
112 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
113 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
114 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
115 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
116 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
117 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
118 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
119 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
121 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
122 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
124 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
125 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
126 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
127 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
128 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
129 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
130 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
131 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
132 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
133 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
134 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
136 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
137 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
138 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
139 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
140 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
141 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
142 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
143 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
145 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
146 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
148 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
149 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
150 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
151 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
152 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
153 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
154 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
155 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
158 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
162 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
163 state: InboundHTLCState,
166 enum OutboundHTLCState {
167 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
168 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
169 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
170 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
171 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
172 /// money back (though we won't), and,
173 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
174 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
175 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
176 /// we'll never get out of sync).
177 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
178 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
179 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
181 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
182 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
183 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
188 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
189 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
190 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
191 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
192 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
193 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
194 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
195 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
199 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
200 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
201 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
202 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
205 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
206 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
208 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
209 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
214 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
215 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
218 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
223 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
227 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
228 state: OutboundHTLCState,
230 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
233 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
234 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
235 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
239 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
241 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
242 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
243 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
246 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
251 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
255 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
256 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
257 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
258 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
259 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
260 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
261 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
263 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
264 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
265 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
266 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
267 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
268 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
269 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
271 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
272 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
273 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
275 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
276 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
277 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
278 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
279 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
280 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
282 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
283 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
285 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
286 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
287 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
288 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
289 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
290 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
291 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
292 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
293 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
295 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
296 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
297 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
298 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
299 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
300 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
301 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
302 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
303 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
304 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
305 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
306 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
307 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
308 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
309 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
310 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
312 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
313 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
314 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
315 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
316 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
317 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
318 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
319 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
321 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
323 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
324 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
326 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
328 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
330 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
332 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
333 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
337 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
339 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
341 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
343 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
344 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
345 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
346 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
347 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
349 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
350 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
352 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
354 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
355 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
357 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
358 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
359 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
360 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
361 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
362 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
364 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
365 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
367 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
368 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
369 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
370 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
371 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
373 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
374 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
376 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
377 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
379 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
380 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
381 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
382 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
388 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
389 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
391 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
393 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
398 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
399 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
401 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
403 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
408 macro_rules! secp_check {
409 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
412 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
417 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
418 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
419 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
420 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
421 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
422 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
423 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
424 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
426 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
428 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
430 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
434 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
436 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
437 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
438 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
440 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
441 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
443 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
444 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
445 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
446 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
447 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
449 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
450 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
454 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
460 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
463 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
464 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
466 holding_cell_msat: u64,
467 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
470 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
471 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
472 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
473 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
474 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
475 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
476 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
477 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
479 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
482 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
483 struct HTLCCandidate {
485 origin: HTLCInitiator,
489 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
497 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
499 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
501 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
502 htlc_value_msat: u64,
503 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
508 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
509 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
510 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
511 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
512 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
514 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
515 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
516 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
517 htlc_value_msat: u64,
519 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
520 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
524 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
525 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
526 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
527 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
528 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
529 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
530 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
531 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
532 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
533 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
534 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
537 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
539 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
540 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
541 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
542 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
543 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
546 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
547 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
548 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
549 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
550 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
551 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
552 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
553 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
556 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
558 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
559 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
560 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
561 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
562 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
563 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
564 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
565 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
568 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
569 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
570 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
571 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
572 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
573 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
574 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
575 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
576 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
577 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
578 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
579 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
580 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
581 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
582 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
584 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
585 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
586 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
587 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
589 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
590 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
591 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
592 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
594 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
595 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
596 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
597 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
598 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
600 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
601 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
602 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
603 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
605 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
606 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
607 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
609 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
610 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
611 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
612 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
613 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
615 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
616 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
619 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
620 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
622 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
623 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
624 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
625 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
627 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
628 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
630 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
631 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
634 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
635 (0, update, required),
638 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
639 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
640 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
641 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
642 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
646 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
647 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
648 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
650 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
652 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
654 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
658 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
660 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
661 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
662 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
667 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
668 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
669 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
670 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
671 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
673 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
674 /// in a timely manner.
675 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
678 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
679 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
680 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
682 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
683 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
684 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
685 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
689 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
690 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
691 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
693 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
694 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
695 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
696 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
698 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
702 /// The current channel ID.
703 channel_id: ChannelId,
704 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
705 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
706 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
709 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
710 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
712 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
713 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
714 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
716 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
717 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
718 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
719 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
721 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
722 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
724 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
726 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
727 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
728 destination_script: Script,
730 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
731 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
732 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
734 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
735 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
736 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
737 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
738 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
739 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
741 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
742 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
743 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
744 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
745 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
746 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
748 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
750 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
751 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
752 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
754 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
755 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
756 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
757 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
758 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
759 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
760 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
762 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
763 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
764 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
766 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
767 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
768 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
769 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
770 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
771 /// outbound or inbound.
772 signer_pending_funding: bool,
774 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
776 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
777 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
778 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
779 // HTLCs with similar state.
780 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
781 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
782 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
783 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
784 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
785 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
786 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
787 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
788 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
791 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
792 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
793 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
795 update_time_counter: u32,
797 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
798 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
799 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
800 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
801 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
802 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
804 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
805 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
807 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
808 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
809 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
810 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
812 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
813 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
815 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
817 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
819 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
820 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
821 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
822 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
823 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
824 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
825 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
826 channel_creation_height: u32,
828 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
831 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
833 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
836 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
838 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
841 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
843 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
845 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
846 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
849 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
851 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
853 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
854 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
856 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
858 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
859 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
860 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
862 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
864 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
865 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
866 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
868 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
869 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
870 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
872 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
874 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
876 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
877 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
878 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
879 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
881 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
882 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
883 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
885 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
886 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
887 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
889 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
890 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
891 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
892 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
893 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
894 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
895 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
896 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
898 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
899 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
900 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
901 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
902 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
904 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
905 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
907 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
908 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
909 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
910 /// unblock the state machine.
912 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
913 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
914 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
916 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
917 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
918 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
920 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
921 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
922 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
923 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
924 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
925 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
926 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
927 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
929 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
930 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
932 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
933 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
934 // the channel's funding UTXO.
936 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
937 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
938 // associated channel mapping.
940 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
941 // to store all of them.
942 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
944 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
945 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
946 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
947 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
948 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
950 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
951 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
953 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
954 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
956 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
957 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
958 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
960 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
961 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
962 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
965 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
966 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
967 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
968 self.update_time_counter
971 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
972 self.latest_monitor_update_id
975 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
976 self.config.announced_channel
979 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
980 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
983 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
984 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
985 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
986 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
989 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
990 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
991 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
994 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
995 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
996 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
997 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
998 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1001 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1002 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1003 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1004 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1006 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1007 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1009 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1010 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1012 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1013 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1015 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1018 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1019 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1020 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1021 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1022 self.channel_state &
1023 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1024 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1025 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1026 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1029 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1030 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1031 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1032 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1033 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1036 // Public utilities:
1038 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1042 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1044 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1045 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1046 self.temporary_channel_id
1049 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1053 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1054 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1055 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1059 /// Gets the channel's type
1060 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1064 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1066 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1067 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1068 self.short_channel_id
1071 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1072 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1073 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1076 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1077 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1078 self.outbound_scid_alias
1081 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1083 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
1084 return &self.holder_signer
1087 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1088 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1089 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1090 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1091 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1092 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1095 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1096 /// get_funding_created.
1097 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1098 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1101 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1102 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1103 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1106 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1107 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1108 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1109 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1113 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1116 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1117 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1120 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1121 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1124 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1125 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1126 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1129 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1130 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1133 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1134 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1135 self.counterparty_node_id
1138 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1139 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1140 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1143 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1144 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1145 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1148 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1149 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1151 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1152 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1153 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1154 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1156 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1160 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1161 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1162 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1165 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1166 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1167 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1170 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1171 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1172 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1174 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1175 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1180 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1181 self.channel_value_satoshis
1184 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1185 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1188 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1189 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1192 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1193 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1194 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1196 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1197 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1198 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1199 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1200 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1202 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1206 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1207 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1208 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1211 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1212 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1213 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1216 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1217 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1218 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1221 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1222 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1223 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1226 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1227 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1228 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1231 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1232 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1233 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1236 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1237 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1238 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1239 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1240 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1243 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1245 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1246 self.prev_config = None;
1250 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1251 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1255 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1256 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1257 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1258 let did_channel_update =
1259 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1260 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1261 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1262 if did_channel_update {
1263 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1264 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1265 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1266 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1268 self.config.options = *config;
1272 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1273 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1274 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1275 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1276 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1279 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1280 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1281 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1282 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1283 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1285 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1286 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1287 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1288 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1289 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1290 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1291 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1293 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1294 where L::Target: Logger
1296 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1297 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1298 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1300 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1301 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1302 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1303 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1305 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1306 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1307 if match update_state {
1308 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1309 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1310 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1311 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1312 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1314 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1318 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1319 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1320 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1322 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1324 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1325 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1326 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1328 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1329 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1330 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1331 transaction_output_index: None
1336 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1337 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1338 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1339 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1340 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1343 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1345 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1346 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1347 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1349 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1350 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1353 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1354 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1357 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1359 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1360 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1361 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1363 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1364 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1370 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1371 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1372 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1373 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1374 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1375 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1376 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1380 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1381 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1383 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1385 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1386 if generated_by_local {
1387 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1388 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1397 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1399 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1400 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1401 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1402 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1403 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1404 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1405 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1408 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1409 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1410 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1411 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1415 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1416 preimages.push(preimage);
1420 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1421 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1423 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1425 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1426 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1428 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1429 if !generated_by_local {
1430 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1438 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1439 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1440 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1441 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1442 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1443 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1444 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1445 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1447 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1449 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1450 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1451 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1452 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1454 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1456 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1457 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1458 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1459 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1462 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1463 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1464 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1465 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1467 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1470 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1471 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1472 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1473 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1475 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1478 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1479 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1484 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1485 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1490 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1492 let channel_parameters =
1493 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1494 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1495 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1502 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1505 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1506 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1507 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1508 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1510 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1511 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1512 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1520 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1521 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1527 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1528 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1529 /// our counterparty!)
1530 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1531 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1532 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1533 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1534 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1535 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1536 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1538 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1542 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1543 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1544 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1545 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1546 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1547 //may see payments to it!
1548 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1549 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1550 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1552 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1555 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1556 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1557 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1558 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1559 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1562 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1563 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1566 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1570 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1571 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1572 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1573 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1574 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1575 // which are near the dust limit.
1576 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1577 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1578 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1579 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1580 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1582 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1583 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1585 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1588 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1589 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1590 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1593 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1594 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1596 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1597 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1598 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1599 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1600 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1601 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1602 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1605 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1608 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1609 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1610 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1612 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1613 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1614 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1615 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1616 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1617 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1619 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1620 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1626 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1627 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1629 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1630 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1631 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1632 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1633 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1634 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1635 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1638 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1641 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1642 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1643 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1645 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1646 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1647 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1648 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1649 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1650 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1652 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1653 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1657 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1658 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1659 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1660 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1661 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1662 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1663 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1665 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1666 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1668 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1675 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1676 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1677 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1678 /// corner case properly.
1679 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1680 -> AvailableBalances
1681 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1683 let context = &self;
1684 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1685 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1686 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1688 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1689 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1690 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1691 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1694 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1696 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1697 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1699 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1701 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1703 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1704 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1708 if context.is_outbound() {
1709 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1710 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1712 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1713 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1715 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1716 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1717 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1718 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1721 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1722 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1723 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1724 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1725 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1726 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1727 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1730 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1731 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1732 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1733 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1734 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1735 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1736 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1737 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1738 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1739 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1740 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1742 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1745 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1746 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1747 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1748 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1749 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1752 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1753 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1755 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1756 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1757 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1759 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1760 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1761 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1762 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1766 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1768 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1769 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1770 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1771 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1772 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1773 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1774 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1776 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1777 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1779 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1780 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1781 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1783 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1784 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1785 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1786 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1787 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1790 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1791 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
1792 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1793 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1794 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1795 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1798 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1799 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1800 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1802 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1806 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1807 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1809 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1810 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1814 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1815 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1816 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1817 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1819 outbound_capacity_msat,
1820 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1821 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1826 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1827 let context = &self;
1828 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1831 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1832 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1834 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1835 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1837 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1838 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1840 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1841 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1842 let context = &self;
1843 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1845 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1848 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1849 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1851 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1852 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1854 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1855 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1857 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1858 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1862 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1863 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1869 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1870 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1871 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1874 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1875 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1876 included_htlcs += 1;
1879 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1880 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1884 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1885 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1886 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1887 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1888 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1889 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1894 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1896 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1897 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1902 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1903 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1907 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1908 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1909 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1912 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1913 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1915 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1916 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1917 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1919 total_pending_htlcs,
1920 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1921 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1922 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1924 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1925 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1926 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1928 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1930 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1935 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1936 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1938 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1939 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1941 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1942 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1944 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1945 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1946 let context = &self;
1947 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1949 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1952 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1953 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1955 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1956 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1958 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1959 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1961 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1962 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1966 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1967 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1973 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1974 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1975 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1976 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1977 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1978 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1981 included_htlcs += 1;
1984 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1985 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1988 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1989 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1991 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1992 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1993 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1998 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1999 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2000 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2003 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2004 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2006 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2007 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2009 total_pending_htlcs,
2010 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2011 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2012 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2014 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2015 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2016 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2018 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2020 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2025 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2026 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2027 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2028 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2035 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2037 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2038 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2041 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2043 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2044 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2045 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2049 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2050 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2051 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2054 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2056 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2057 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2060 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2061 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2062 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2063 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2064 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2065 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2066 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2067 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2068 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2069 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2070 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2072 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2073 // return them to fail the payment.
2074 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2075 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2076 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2078 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2079 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2084 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2085 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2086 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2087 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2088 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2089 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2090 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2091 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2092 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2093 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2094 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2095 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2096 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2100 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2102 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2103 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2106 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2107 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2111 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2112 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2113 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2114 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2115 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2116 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2117 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2118 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2119 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2123 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2124 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2125 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2128 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2129 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2130 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2131 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2134 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2136 next_local_nonce: None,
2140 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2141 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2142 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2143 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2145 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2146 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2147 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2148 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2150 match &self.holder_signer {
2151 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2152 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2153 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2154 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2155 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2158 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2162 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2163 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2164 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2165 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2166 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2167 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2170 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2171 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2177 // Internal utility functions for channels
2179 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2180 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2181 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2183 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2185 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2186 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2187 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2189 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2192 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2194 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2197 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2198 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2199 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2201 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2203 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2204 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2205 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2206 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2207 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2210 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2211 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2212 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2213 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2214 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2215 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2216 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2219 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2220 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2222 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2223 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2226 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2227 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2228 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2229 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2230 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2231 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2234 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2235 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2236 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2237 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2240 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2241 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2243 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2244 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2245 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2249 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2250 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2251 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2253 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2254 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2255 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2256 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2258 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2259 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2260 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2261 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2262 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2263 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2264 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2266 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
2267 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2272 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2273 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2275 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2277 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2278 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2279 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2280 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2282 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2283 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2293 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2294 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2295 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2296 // outside of those situations will fail.
2297 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2301 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2306 1 + // script length (0)
2310 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2311 2 + // witness marker and flag
2312 1 + // witness element count
2313 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2314 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2315 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2316 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2317 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2318 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2320 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2321 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2322 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2328 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2329 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2330 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2331 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2333 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2334 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2335 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2337 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2338 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2339 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2340 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2341 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2342 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2345 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2346 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2349 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2350 value_to_holder = 0;
2353 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2354 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2355 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2356 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2358 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2359 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2362 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2363 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2366 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2369 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2370 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2372 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2374 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2375 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2376 where L::Target: Logger {
2377 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2378 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2379 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2380 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2381 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2382 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2383 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2384 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2388 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2389 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2390 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2391 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2393 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2394 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2396 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2398 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2399 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2400 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2402 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2403 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2404 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2405 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2406 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2407 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2408 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2410 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2411 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2412 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2414 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2415 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2417 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2420 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2421 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2425 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2429 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2430 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2431 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2432 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2433 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2434 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2437 // Now update local state:
2439 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2440 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2441 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2442 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2443 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2444 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2445 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2449 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2450 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2451 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2452 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2453 // do not not get into this branch.
2454 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2455 match pending_update {
2456 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2457 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2458 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2459 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2460 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2461 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2462 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2465 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2466 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2467 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2468 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2469 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2470 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2471 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2477 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2478 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2479 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2481 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2482 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2483 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2485 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2486 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2489 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2490 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2492 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2493 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2495 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2496 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2499 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2502 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2503 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2504 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2505 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2510 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2511 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2512 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2513 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2514 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2515 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2516 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2517 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2518 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2519 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2520 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2521 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2522 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2523 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2524 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2526 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2527 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2528 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2529 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2530 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2533 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2534 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2535 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2541 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2542 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2544 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2548 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2549 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2550 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2551 /// before we fail backwards.
2553 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2554 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2555 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2556 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2557 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2558 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2559 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2562 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2563 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2564 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2565 /// before we fail backwards.
2567 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2568 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2569 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2570 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2571 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2572 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2573 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2575 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2577 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2578 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2579 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2581 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2582 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2583 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2585 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2586 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2587 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2589 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2594 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2595 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2601 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2602 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2603 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2604 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2605 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2609 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2610 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2611 force_holding_cell = true;
2614 // Now update local state:
2615 if force_holding_cell {
2616 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2617 match pending_update {
2618 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2619 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2620 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2621 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2625 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2626 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2627 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2628 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2634 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2635 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2636 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2642 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2644 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2645 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2648 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2649 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2650 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2655 // Message handlers:
2657 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2658 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2659 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2660 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2661 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2665 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2666 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2668 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2669 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2671 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2672 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2673 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2674 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2677 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2679 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2680 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2681 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2682 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2684 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2685 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2687 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2688 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2690 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2691 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2692 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2693 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2694 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2695 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2699 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2700 initial_commitment_tx,
2703 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2704 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2707 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2708 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2711 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2712 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2713 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2714 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2715 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2716 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2717 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2718 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2719 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2720 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2721 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2722 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2724 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2726 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2727 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2728 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2729 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2730 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2731 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2732 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2734 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2735 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2736 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2738 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2740 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2741 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2743 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2745 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2746 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2750 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2751 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2752 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2753 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2754 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2755 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2756 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2759 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2760 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2762 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2763 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2764 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2765 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2767 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2770 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2771 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2772 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2775 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2776 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2777 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2778 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2779 // when routing outbound payments.
2780 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2784 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2786 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2787 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2789 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2790 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2792 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2793 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2794 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2795 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2796 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2797 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2798 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2799 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2800 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2802 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2803 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2804 let expected_point =
2805 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2806 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2808 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2809 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2810 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2811 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2812 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2813 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2815 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2816 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2817 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2818 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2819 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2821 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2822 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2829 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2830 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2832 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2834 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2837 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2838 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2839 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2840 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2841 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2842 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2844 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2845 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2846 if local_sent_shutdown {
2847 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2849 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2850 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2851 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2852 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2854 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2855 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2857 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2858 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2860 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2861 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2863 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2864 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2867 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2868 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2869 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2870 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2872 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2873 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2876 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2877 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2878 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2879 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2880 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2881 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2882 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2883 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2884 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2885 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2886 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2888 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2889 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2890 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2891 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2892 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2893 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2897 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2898 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2901 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2902 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2903 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2905 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2906 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2907 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2908 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2909 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2910 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2911 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2915 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2916 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2917 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2918 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2919 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2920 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2921 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2925 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2926 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2927 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2928 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2929 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2933 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2934 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2936 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2937 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2938 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2940 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2941 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2945 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2946 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2948 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2949 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2953 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2954 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2958 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2959 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2960 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2961 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2962 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2963 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2964 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2965 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2966 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2968 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2969 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2970 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2971 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2972 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2975 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2976 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2977 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2978 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2979 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2982 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2983 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2985 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2986 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2989 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2990 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2991 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2995 // Now update local state:
2996 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2997 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2998 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2999 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3000 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3001 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3002 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3007 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3009 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3010 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3011 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3012 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3013 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3014 None => fail_reason.into(),
3015 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3016 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3017 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3018 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3020 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3024 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3026 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3027 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3029 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3030 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3035 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3038 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3039 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3040 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3042 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3043 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3046 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3049 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3050 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3051 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3053 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3054 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3057 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3061 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3062 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3063 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3065 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3066 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3069 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3073 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3074 where L::Target: Logger
3076 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3077 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3079 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3080 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3082 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3083 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3086 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3088 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3090 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3091 let commitment_txid = {
3092 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3093 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3094 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3096 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3097 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3098 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3099 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3100 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3101 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3105 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3107 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3108 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3109 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3110 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3113 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3114 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3115 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3116 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3119 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3121 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3122 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3123 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3124 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3125 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3126 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3127 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3128 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3129 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3130 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3131 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3137 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3138 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3141 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3142 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3143 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3144 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3145 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3146 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3147 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3148 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3149 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3150 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3151 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3152 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3153 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3156 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3157 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3158 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3159 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3160 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3161 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3162 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3164 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3165 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3166 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3167 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3168 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3169 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3170 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3171 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3173 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3174 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3177 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3179 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3180 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3181 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3184 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3187 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3188 commitment_stats.tx,
3190 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3191 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3192 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3195 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3196 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3198 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3199 let mut need_commitment = false;
3200 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3201 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3202 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3203 need_commitment = true;
3207 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3208 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3209 Some(forward_info.clone())
3211 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3212 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3213 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3214 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3215 need_commitment = true;
3218 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3219 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3220 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3221 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3222 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3223 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3224 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3225 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3226 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3227 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3228 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3229 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3230 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3231 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3233 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3235 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3236 need_commitment = true;
3240 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3241 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3242 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3243 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3244 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3245 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3247 nondust_htlc_sources,
3251 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3252 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3253 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3254 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3256 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3257 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3258 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3259 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3260 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3261 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3262 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3263 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3264 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3265 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3266 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3267 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3268 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3269 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3271 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3272 &self.context.channel_id);
3273 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3276 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3277 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3278 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3279 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3280 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3281 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3282 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3283 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3284 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3288 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3289 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3290 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3291 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3294 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3295 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3296 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3297 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3298 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3299 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3300 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3302 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3303 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3304 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3305 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3308 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3309 /// for our counterparty.
3310 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3311 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3312 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3313 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3315 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3316 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3317 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3318 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3320 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3321 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3322 updates: Vec::new(),
3325 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3326 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3327 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3328 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3329 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3330 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3331 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3332 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3333 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3334 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3335 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3336 // to rebalance channels.
3337 match &htlc_update {
3338 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3339 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3340 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3342 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3343 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3345 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3348 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3349 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3350 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3351 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3352 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3353 // into the holding cell without ever being
3354 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3355 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3356 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3359 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3365 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3366 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3367 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3368 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3369 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3370 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3371 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3372 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3373 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3374 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3375 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3376 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3378 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3379 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3380 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3381 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3382 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3383 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3384 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3385 // for a full revocation before failing.
3386 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3387 update_fail_count += 1;
3390 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3392 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3399 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3400 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3402 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3403 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3408 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3409 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3410 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3411 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3412 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3414 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3415 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3416 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3418 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3419 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3425 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3426 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3427 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3428 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3429 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3430 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3431 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3432 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3433 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3435 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3438 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3439 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3441 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3442 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3445 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3447 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3448 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3449 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3453 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3454 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3455 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3456 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3457 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3458 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3459 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3460 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3461 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3464 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3466 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3467 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3470 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3471 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3472 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3473 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3475 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3479 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3480 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3481 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3482 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3483 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3484 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3485 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3486 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3490 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3491 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3492 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3493 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3494 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3495 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3496 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3497 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3498 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3500 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3501 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3504 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3505 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3506 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3507 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3508 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3509 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3510 let mut require_commitment = false;
3511 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3514 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3515 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3516 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3518 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3519 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3520 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3521 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3522 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3523 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3528 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3529 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3530 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3531 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3532 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3534 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3535 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3536 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3541 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3542 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3544 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3548 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3549 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3551 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3552 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3553 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3554 require_commitment = true;
3555 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3556 match forward_info {
3557 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3558 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3559 require_commitment = true;
3561 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3562 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3563 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3565 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3566 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3567 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3571 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3572 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3573 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3574 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3580 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3581 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3582 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3583 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3585 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3586 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3587 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3588 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3589 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3590 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3591 require_commitment = true;
3595 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3597 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3598 match update_state {
3599 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3600 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3601 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3602 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3603 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3605 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3606 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3607 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3608 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3609 require_commitment = true;
3610 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3611 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3616 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3617 let release_state_str =
3618 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3619 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3620 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3621 if !release_monitor {
3622 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3623 update: monitor_update,
3625 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3627 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3632 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3633 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3634 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3635 if require_commitment {
3636 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3637 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3638 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3639 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3641 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3642 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3643 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3644 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3645 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3647 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3648 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3649 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3650 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3651 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3654 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3655 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3656 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3657 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3658 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3659 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3661 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3662 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3664 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3665 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3667 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3668 if require_commitment {
3669 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3671 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3672 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3673 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3674 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3676 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3677 &self.context.channel_id(),
3678 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3681 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3682 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3684 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3685 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3687 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3688 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3694 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3695 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3696 /// commitment update.
3697 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3698 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3699 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3701 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3702 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3705 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3706 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3707 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3708 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3710 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3711 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3712 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3713 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3714 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3715 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3716 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3718 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3719 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3721 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3722 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3724 if !self.context.is_live() {
3725 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3728 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3729 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3730 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3731 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3732 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3733 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3734 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3735 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3736 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3737 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3741 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3742 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3743 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3744 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3745 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3746 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3749 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3750 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3754 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3755 force_holding_cell = true;
3758 if force_holding_cell {
3759 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3763 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3764 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3766 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3767 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3772 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3773 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3775 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3777 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3778 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3779 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3780 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3784 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3785 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3786 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3790 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3791 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3794 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3795 // will be retransmitted.
3796 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3797 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3798 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3800 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3801 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3803 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3804 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3805 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3806 // this HTLC accordingly
3807 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3810 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3811 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3812 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3813 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3816 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3817 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3818 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3819 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3820 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3821 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3826 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3828 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3829 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3830 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3831 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3835 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3836 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3837 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3838 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3839 // the update upon reconnection.
3840 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3844 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3846 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3847 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3851 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3852 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3853 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3854 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3855 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3856 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3857 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3859 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3860 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3861 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3862 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3863 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3864 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3865 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3867 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3868 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3869 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3870 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3871 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3872 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3873 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3876 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3877 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3878 /// to the remote side.
3879 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3880 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3881 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3882 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3885 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3887 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3888 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3890 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3891 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3892 // first received the funding_signed.
3893 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3894 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3895 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3897 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3898 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3899 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3900 funding_broadcastable = None;
3903 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3904 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3905 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3906 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3907 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3908 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3909 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3910 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3911 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3912 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3913 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3914 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3915 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3916 next_per_commitment_point,
3917 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3921 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3923 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3924 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3925 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3926 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3927 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3928 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3930 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3931 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3932 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3933 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3934 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3935 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3939 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3940 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3942 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3943 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3945 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3946 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3949 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3950 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3951 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3952 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3953 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3954 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3955 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3956 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3957 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3961 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3962 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3964 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3965 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3967 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3968 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3970 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3971 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3973 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3974 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3975 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3976 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3977 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3978 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3979 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3980 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3981 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3982 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3983 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3984 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3985 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3986 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3988 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3989 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3990 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3996 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
3999 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4000 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4001 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4003 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4004 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4006 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4007 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4009 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4010 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4013 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4014 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4015 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4016 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4017 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4019 SignerResumeUpdates {
4027 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4028 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4029 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4030 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4031 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4032 per_commitment_secret,
4033 next_per_commitment_point,
4035 next_local_nonce: None,
4039 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4040 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4041 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4042 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4043 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4044 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4046 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4047 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4048 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4049 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4050 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4051 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4052 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4053 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4054 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4055 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4060 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4061 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4063 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4064 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4065 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4066 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4067 reason: err_packet.clone()
4070 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4071 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4072 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4073 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4074 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4075 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4078 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4079 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4080 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4081 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4082 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4089 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4090 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4091 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4092 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4096 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4097 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4098 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4099 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4100 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4101 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4102 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4106 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4107 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4108 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4112 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4113 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4118 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4119 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4120 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4121 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4122 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4123 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4124 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4129 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4130 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4132 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4133 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4134 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4135 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4136 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4137 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4138 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4139 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4142 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4144 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4145 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4146 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4147 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4148 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4151 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4152 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4156 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4157 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4158 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4159 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4160 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4163 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4164 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4165 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4166 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4167 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4170 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4171 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4172 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4173 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4174 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4175 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4176 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4177 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4181 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4182 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4183 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4184 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4186 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4190 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4191 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4192 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4193 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4195 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4197 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4199 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4200 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4201 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4202 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4203 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4204 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4206 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4207 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4208 channel_ready: None,
4209 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4210 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4211 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4215 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4216 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4217 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4218 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4219 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4220 next_per_commitment_point,
4221 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4223 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4224 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4225 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4229 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4230 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4231 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4233 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4234 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4235 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4238 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4241 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4244 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4245 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4246 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4247 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4248 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4249 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4250 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4252 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4254 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4255 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4256 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4257 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4258 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4259 next_per_commitment_point,
4260 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4264 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4265 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4266 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4268 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4271 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4272 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4273 raa: required_revoke,
4274 commitment_update: None,
4275 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4277 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4278 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4279 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4281 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4284 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4285 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4286 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4287 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4288 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4289 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4292 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4293 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4294 raa: required_revoke,
4295 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4296 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4300 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4304 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4305 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4306 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4307 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4309 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4311 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4313 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4314 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4315 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4316 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4317 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4318 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4319 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4320 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4322 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4323 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4324 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4325 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4326 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4328 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4329 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4330 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4331 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4334 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4335 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4336 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4337 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4338 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4339 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4340 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4341 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4342 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4343 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4344 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4345 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4346 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4347 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4348 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4350 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4353 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4354 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4357 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4358 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4359 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4360 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4361 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4362 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4365 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4366 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4367 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4368 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4369 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4370 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4371 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4373 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4379 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4380 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4381 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4382 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4384 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4385 return Ok((None, None, None));
4388 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4389 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4390 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4392 return Ok((None, None, None));
4395 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4397 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4398 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4399 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4400 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4402 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4403 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4405 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4406 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4408 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4409 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4410 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4411 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4413 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4414 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4415 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4422 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4423 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4425 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4426 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4429 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4430 /// within our expected timeframe.
4432 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4433 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4434 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4437 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4440 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4441 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4445 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4446 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4448 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4449 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4451 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4452 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4453 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4454 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4455 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4457 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4458 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4459 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4462 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4464 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4465 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4468 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4469 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4470 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4473 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4476 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4477 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4478 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4479 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4481 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4484 assert!(send_shutdown);
4485 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4486 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4487 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4489 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4490 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4492 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4497 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4499 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4500 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4502 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4503 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4504 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4505 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4506 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4507 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4510 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4511 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4513 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4514 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4515 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4516 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4520 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4521 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4522 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4523 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4524 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4525 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4527 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4528 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4535 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4536 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4538 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4541 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4542 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4544 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4546 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4547 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4548 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4549 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4550 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4551 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4552 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4553 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4554 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4556 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4557 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4560 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4564 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4565 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4566 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4567 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4569 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4570 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4572 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4575 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4576 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4578 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4582 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4583 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4586 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4587 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4588 return Ok((None, None, None));
4591 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4592 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4593 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4594 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4596 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4598 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4601 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4602 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4603 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4604 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4605 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4609 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4610 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4611 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4615 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4616 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4617 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4618 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4619 monitor_update: None,
4620 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4621 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4623 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4624 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4625 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4626 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4630 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4632 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4633 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4634 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4635 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4637 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4640 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4641 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4643 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4644 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4645 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4646 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4647 monitor_update: None,
4648 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4649 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4651 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4652 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4653 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4654 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4659 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4660 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4661 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4662 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4664 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4665 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4666 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4668 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4674 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4675 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4676 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4678 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4679 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4681 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4682 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4685 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4686 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4687 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4688 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4689 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4691 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4692 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4693 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4695 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4696 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4699 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4700 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4701 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4702 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4703 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4704 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4705 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4706 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4708 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4711 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4712 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4713 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4714 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4716 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4720 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4721 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4722 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4723 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4725 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4731 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4732 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4733 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4734 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4735 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4736 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4737 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4739 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4740 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4743 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4745 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4746 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4752 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4753 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4754 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4755 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4756 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4757 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4758 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4760 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4761 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4768 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4769 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4772 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4773 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4776 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4777 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4781 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4782 &self.context.holder_signer
4786 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4788 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4789 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4790 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4791 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4792 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4793 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4795 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4797 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4805 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4806 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4810 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4811 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4812 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4813 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4816 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4817 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4818 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4819 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4822 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4823 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4824 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4825 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4826 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4827 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4830 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4831 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4832 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4833 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4834 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4835 if !release_monitor {
4836 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4845 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4846 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4849 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4850 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4851 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4853 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4854 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4855 if self.context.channel_state &
4856 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4857 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4858 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4859 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4860 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4863 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4864 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4865 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4866 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4867 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4868 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4870 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4871 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4872 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4874 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4875 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4876 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4877 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4878 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4879 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4885 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4886 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4887 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4890 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4891 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4892 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4895 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4896 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4897 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4900 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4901 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4902 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4903 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4904 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4905 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4910 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4911 self.context.channel_update_status
4914 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4915 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4916 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4919 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4921 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4922 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4923 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4927 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4928 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4929 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4932 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4936 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4937 // channel_ready yet.
4938 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
4942 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4943 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4944 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4945 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4946 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4948 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4949 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4950 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4952 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4953 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4956 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4957 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4958 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4959 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4960 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4961 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4962 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4963 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4964 self.context.channel_state);
4966 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4970 if need_commitment_update {
4971 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4972 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4973 let next_per_commitment_point =
4974 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4975 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4976 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4977 next_per_commitment_point,
4978 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4982 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
4988 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
4989 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
4990 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
4991 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4992 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
4993 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
4994 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
4996 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4999 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5000 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5001 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5002 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5003 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5004 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5005 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5006 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5007 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5008 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5009 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5010 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5011 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5012 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5013 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5014 // channel and move on.
5015 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5016 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5018 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5019 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5020 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5022 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5023 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5024 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5025 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5026 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5027 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5028 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5029 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5034 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5035 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5036 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5037 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5038 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5041 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5042 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5043 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5044 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5045 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5046 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5049 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5050 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5051 // may have already happened for this block).
5052 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5053 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5054 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5055 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5058 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5059 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5060 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5061 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5069 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5070 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5071 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5072 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5074 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5075 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5078 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5080 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5081 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5082 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5083 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5085 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5088 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5091 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5092 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5093 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5094 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5096 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5099 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5100 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5101 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5103 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5104 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5106 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5107 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5108 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5116 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5118 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5119 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5120 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5122 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5123 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5126 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5127 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5128 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5129 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5130 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5131 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5132 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5133 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5134 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5137 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5138 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5139 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5140 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5142 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5143 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5144 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5146 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5147 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5148 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5149 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5151 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5152 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5153 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5154 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5155 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5156 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5157 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5160 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5161 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5163 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5166 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5167 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5168 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5169 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5170 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5171 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5172 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5173 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5174 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5175 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5176 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5177 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5178 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5179 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5180 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5181 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5182 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5188 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5193 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5194 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5196 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5197 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5198 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5199 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5201 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5204 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5206 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5207 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5208 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5209 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5210 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5211 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5213 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5214 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5217 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5218 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5219 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5220 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5221 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5222 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5224 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5225 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5228 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5229 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5230 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5231 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5232 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5238 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5239 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5240 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5241 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5243 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5246 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5250 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5254 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5255 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5259 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5263 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5264 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5267 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5271 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5273 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5278 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5279 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5280 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5282 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5287 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5289 None => return None,
5292 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5294 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5295 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5297 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5298 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5304 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5306 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5307 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5308 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5309 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5310 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5311 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5312 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5314 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5315 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5316 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5317 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5318 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5319 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5320 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5321 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5322 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5323 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5324 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5325 contents: announcement,
5330 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5334 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5335 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5336 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5337 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5338 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5339 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5340 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5341 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5343 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5345 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5346 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5347 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5348 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5350 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5351 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5352 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5353 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5356 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5357 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5358 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5359 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5362 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5365 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5366 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5367 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5368 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5369 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5370 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5373 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5375 Err(_) => return None,
5377 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5378 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5383 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5384 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5385 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5386 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5387 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5388 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5389 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5390 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5391 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5392 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5393 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5394 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5395 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5396 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5397 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5398 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5401 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5404 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5405 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5406 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5407 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5408 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5409 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5410 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5411 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5412 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5414 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5415 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5416 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5417 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5418 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5419 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5420 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5421 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5422 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5424 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5425 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5426 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5427 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5428 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5429 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5430 next_funding_txid: None,
5435 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5437 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5438 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5439 /// commitment update.
5441 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5442 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5443 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5444 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5445 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5446 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5447 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5450 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5451 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5452 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5454 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5455 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5460 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5461 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5463 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5465 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5466 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5468 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5469 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5470 /// regenerate them.
5472 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5473 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5475 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5476 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5477 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5478 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5479 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5480 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5481 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5483 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5484 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5486 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5487 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5488 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5491 if amount_msat == 0 {
5492 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5495 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5496 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5497 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5498 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5501 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5502 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5503 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5506 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5507 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5508 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5509 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5510 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5511 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5512 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5513 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5516 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5517 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5518 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5519 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5520 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5521 else { "to peer" });
5523 if need_holding_cell {
5524 force_holding_cell = true;
5527 // Now update local state:
5528 if force_holding_cell {
5529 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5534 onion_routing_packet,
5540 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5541 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5543 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5545 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5550 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5551 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5552 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5556 onion_routing_packet,
5559 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5564 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5565 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5566 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5567 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5569 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5570 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5571 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5573 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5574 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5578 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5579 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5580 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5581 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5582 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5583 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5584 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5587 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5588 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5589 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5590 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5591 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5592 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5595 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5597 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5598 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5599 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5600 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5601 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5603 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5604 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5607 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5608 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5609 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5610 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5611 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5612 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5613 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5614 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5615 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5616 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5617 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5620 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5624 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5625 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5626 where L::Target: Logger
5628 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5629 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5630 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5632 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5634 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5635 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5636 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5637 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5638 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5639 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5640 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5641 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5642 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5643 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5644 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5650 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5653 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5654 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5655 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5656 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5657 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5658 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5660 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5661 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5662 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5664 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5665 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5666 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5669 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5670 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5674 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5675 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5677 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5679 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5680 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5681 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5682 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5684 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5685 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5686 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5687 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5688 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5689 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5693 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5694 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5698 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5699 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5704 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5705 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5707 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5708 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5709 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5710 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5711 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5712 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5713 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5714 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5716 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5717 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5718 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5721 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5722 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5723 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5729 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5731 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5732 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5733 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5734 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5735 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5737 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5739 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5745 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5746 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5748 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5749 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5750 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5751 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5752 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5754 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5755 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5756 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5759 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5760 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5761 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5763 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5764 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5767 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5768 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5770 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5771 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5772 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5775 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5776 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5777 let mut chan_closed = false;
5778 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5782 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5784 None if !chan_closed => {
5785 // use override shutdown script if provided
5786 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5787 Some(script) => script,
5789 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5790 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5791 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5792 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5796 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5797 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5799 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5805 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5806 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5807 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5808 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5809 monitor_update: None,
5810 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5811 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5813 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5814 Some(shutdown_result)
5816 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5819 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5821 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5822 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5823 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5824 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5825 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5826 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5829 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5830 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5832 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5833 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5834 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5837 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5838 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5839 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5840 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5841 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5843 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5844 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5851 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5852 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5854 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5857 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5858 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5859 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5861 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5862 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5866 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5870 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5871 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5872 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5873 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5876 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5877 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5878 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5879 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5880 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
5881 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5882 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5883 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5885 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5886 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5887 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5888 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5890 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5891 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5893 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5894 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5896 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5897 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5898 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5900 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5903 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5904 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5905 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5906 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5907 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5910 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5911 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5913 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5914 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5916 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5918 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5920 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5921 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5922 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5923 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5926 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5927 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5929 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5930 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5931 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5932 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5936 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5937 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5938 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5942 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5943 Ok(script) => script,
5944 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5947 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
5950 context: ChannelContext {
5953 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5954 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5955 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5956 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5961 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5963 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5964 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5965 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5966 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5968 channel_value_satoshis,
5970 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5972 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5973 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5976 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5977 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5980 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5981 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5982 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5983 pending_update_fee: None,
5984 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
5985 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
5986 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
5987 update_time_counter: 1,
5989 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5991 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
5992 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
5993 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
5994 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
5995 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
5996 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
5998 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
5999 signer_pending_funding: false,
6001 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6002 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6003 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6004 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6006 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6007 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6008 closing_fee_limits: None,
6009 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6011 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6012 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6013 short_channel_id: None,
6014 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6016 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6017 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6018 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6019 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6020 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6021 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6022 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6023 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6024 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6025 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6026 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6027 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6029 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6031 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6032 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6033 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6034 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6035 counterparty_parameters: None,
6036 funding_outpoint: None,
6037 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6039 funding_transaction: None,
6040 is_batch_funding: None,
6042 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6043 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6044 counterparty_node_id,
6046 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6048 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6050 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6051 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6053 announcement_sigs: None,
6055 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6056 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6057 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6058 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6060 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6061 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6063 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6064 outbound_scid_alias,
6066 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6067 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6069 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6070 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6075 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6077 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6081 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6082 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6083 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6084 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6085 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6086 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6087 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6088 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6089 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6090 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6091 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6093 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6094 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6096 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6097 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6098 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6099 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6102 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6103 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6105 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6107 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6108 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6110 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6111 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6112 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6113 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6114 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6115 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6118 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6119 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6121 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6122 if funding_created.is_none() {
6123 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6124 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6125 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6129 let channel = Channel {
6130 context: self.context,
6133 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6136 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6137 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6138 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6139 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6140 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6141 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6142 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6143 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6144 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6145 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6148 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6149 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6150 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6151 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6152 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6153 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6159 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6160 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6161 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6162 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6163 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6164 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6166 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6168 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6169 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6170 // We've exhausted our options
6173 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6174 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6177 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6178 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6179 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6180 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6182 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6183 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6184 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6185 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6186 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6187 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6189 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6191 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6192 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6195 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6196 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6197 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6199 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6200 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6203 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6204 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6207 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6208 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6212 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6213 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6214 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6215 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6216 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6217 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6218 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6219 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6220 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6221 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6222 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6223 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6224 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6225 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6226 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6227 first_per_commitment_point,
6228 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6229 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6230 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6231 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6233 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6238 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6239 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6241 // Check sanity of message fields:
6242 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6245 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6248 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6251 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6254 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6257 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6258 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6259 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6261 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6262 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6265 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6266 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6267 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6269 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6272 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6273 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6276 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6277 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6278 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6280 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6281 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6283 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6284 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6286 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6289 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6292 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6295 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6299 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6300 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6301 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6303 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6304 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6306 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6307 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6310 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6311 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6314 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6315 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6316 &Some(ref script) => {
6317 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6318 if script.len() == 0 {
6321 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6324 Some(script.clone())
6327 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6329 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6334 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6335 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6336 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6337 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6338 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6340 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6341 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6343 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6346 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6347 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6348 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6349 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6350 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6351 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6354 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6355 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6356 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6359 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6360 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6362 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6363 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6369 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6370 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6371 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6372 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6375 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6376 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6377 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6378 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6379 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6380 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6381 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6382 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6383 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6384 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6385 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6388 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6390 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6391 // support this channel type.
6392 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6393 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6394 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6397 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6398 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6399 // `static_remote_key`.
6400 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6401 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6403 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6404 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6405 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6407 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6408 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6410 channel_type.clone()
6412 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6413 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6414 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6419 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6420 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6421 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6422 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6423 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6424 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6425 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6426 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6427 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6430 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6431 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6434 // Check sanity of message fields:
6435 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6436 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6438 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6439 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6441 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6442 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6444 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6445 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6446 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6448 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6449 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6451 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6452 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6454 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6456 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6457 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6458 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6460 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6461 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6463 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6464 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6467 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6468 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6469 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6471 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6472 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6474 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6475 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6477 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6478 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6480 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6481 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6483 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6484 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6486 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6487 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6490 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6492 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6493 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6494 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6498 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6499 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6500 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6501 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6502 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6504 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6505 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6507 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6508 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6509 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6511 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6512 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6515 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6516 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6517 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6518 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6522 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6523 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6524 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6525 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6528 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6529 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6530 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6531 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6532 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6535 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6536 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6537 &Some(ref script) => {
6538 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6539 if script.len() == 0 {
6542 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6543 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6545 Some(script.clone())
6548 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6550 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6555 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6556 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6557 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6558 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6562 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6563 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6564 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6568 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6569 Ok(script) => script,
6570 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6573 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6574 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6576 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6579 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6583 context: ChannelContext {
6586 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6587 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6589 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6594 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6596 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6597 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6598 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6599 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6602 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6604 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6605 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6608 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6609 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6610 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6612 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6613 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6614 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6615 pending_update_fee: None,
6616 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6617 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6618 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6619 update_time_counter: 1,
6621 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6623 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6624 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6625 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6626 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6627 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6628 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6630 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6631 signer_pending_funding: false,
6633 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6634 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6635 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6636 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6638 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6639 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6640 closing_fee_limits: None,
6641 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6643 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6644 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6645 short_channel_id: None,
6646 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6648 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6649 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6650 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6651 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6652 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6653 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6654 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6655 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6656 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6657 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6658 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6659 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6662 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6664 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6665 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6666 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6667 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6668 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6669 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6670 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6672 funding_outpoint: None,
6673 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6675 funding_transaction: None,
6676 is_batch_funding: None,
6678 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6679 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6680 counterparty_node_id,
6682 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6684 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6686 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6687 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6689 announcement_sigs: None,
6691 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6692 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6693 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6694 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6696 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6697 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6699 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6700 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6702 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6703 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6705 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6706 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6711 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6713 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6719 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6720 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6722 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6723 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6724 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6725 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6727 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6728 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6730 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6731 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6734 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6737 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6738 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6739 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6741 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6742 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6743 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6744 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6746 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6747 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6748 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6749 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6750 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6751 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6752 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6753 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6754 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6755 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6756 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6757 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6758 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6759 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6760 first_per_commitment_point,
6761 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6762 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6763 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6765 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6767 next_local_nonce: None,
6771 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6772 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6774 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6776 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6777 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6780 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6781 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6783 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6784 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6785 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6786 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6787 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6788 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6789 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6790 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6791 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6792 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6793 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6795 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6798 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6799 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6800 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6804 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6805 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6807 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6808 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6809 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6811 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6813 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6814 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6815 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6816 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6819 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6820 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6821 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6822 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6823 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6825 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6827 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6828 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6829 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6832 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6833 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6834 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6838 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6839 initial_commitment_tx,
6842 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6843 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6846 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6847 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6850 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6852 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6853 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6854 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6855 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6857 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6859 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6860 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6861 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6862 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6863 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6864 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6865 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6866 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6867 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6868 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6869 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6871 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6873 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6874 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6875 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6876 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6877 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6878 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6880 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6881 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6883 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6884 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6885 let mut channel = Channel {
6886 context: self.context,
6888 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6889 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6891 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6895 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6896 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6898 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6904 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6905 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6906 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6907 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6908 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6910 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6911 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6912 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6913 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6919 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6920 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6921 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6922 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6923 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6924 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6929 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6930 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6931 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6932 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6934 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6935 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6936 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6937 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6942 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6943 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6944 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6945 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6946 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6947 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6952 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6953 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6954 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6957 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6959 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6960 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6961 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6962 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6963 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6965 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6966 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6967 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6968 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6970 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6971 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6972 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6974 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6976 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6977 // deserialized from that format.
6978 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6979 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6980 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6982 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6984 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6985 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6986 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6988 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6989 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6990 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6991 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6994 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6995 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6996 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6999 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7000 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7001 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7002 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7004 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7005 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7007 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7009 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7011 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7013 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7016 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7018 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7023 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7024 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7026 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7027 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7028 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7029 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7030 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7031 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7032 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7034 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7036 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7038 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7041 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7042 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7043 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7046 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7048 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7049 preimages.push(preimage);
7051 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7052 reason.write(writer)?;
7054 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7056 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7057 preimages.push(preimage);
7059 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7060 reason.write(writer)?;
7063 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7064 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7065 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7067 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7068 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7069 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7073 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7074 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7075 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7077 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7078 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7082 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7083 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7084 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7085 source.write(writer)?;
7086 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7088 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7089 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7090 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7092 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7093 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7095 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7097 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7098 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7100 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7102 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7103 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7108 match self.context.resend_order {
7109 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7110 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7113 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7114 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7115 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7117 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7118 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7119 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7120 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7123 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7124 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7125 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7126 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7127 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7130 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7131 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7132 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7133 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7135 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7136 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7137 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7139 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7141 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7142 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7143 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7144 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7146 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7147 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7148 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7149 // consider the stale state on reload.
7152 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7153 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7154 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7156 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7157 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7158 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7160 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7161 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7163 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7164 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7165 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7167 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7168 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7170 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7173 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7174 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7175 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7177 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7180 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7181 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7183 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7184 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7185 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7187 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7189 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7191 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7193 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7194 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7195 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7196 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7197 htlc.write(writer)?;
7200 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7201 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7202 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7204 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7205 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7207 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7208 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7209 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7210 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7211 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7212 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7213 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7215 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7216 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7217 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7218 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7219 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7221 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7222 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7224 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7225 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7226 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7227 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7229 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7231 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7232 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7233 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7234 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7235 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7236 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7237 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7239 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7240 (2, chan_type, option),
7241 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7242 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7243 (5, self.context.config, required),
7244 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7245 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7246 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7247 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7248 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7249 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7250 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7251 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7252 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7253 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7254 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7255 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7256 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7257 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7258 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7259 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7260 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7261 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7262 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7269 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7270 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7272 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7273 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7275 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7276 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7277 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7279 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7280 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7281 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7282 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7284 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7286 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7287 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7288 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7289 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7290 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7292 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7293 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7296 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7297 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7298 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7300 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7302 let mut keys_data = None;
7304 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7305 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7306 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7307 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7308 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7309 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7310 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7311 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7312 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7313 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7317 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7318 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7319 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7322 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7324 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7325 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7326 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7328 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7330 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7331 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7332 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7333 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7334 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7335 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7336 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7337 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7338 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7339 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7340 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7341 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7342 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7347 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7348 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7349 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7350 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7351 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7352 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7353 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7354 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7355 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7356 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7357 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7358 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7360 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7361 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7364 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7365 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7368 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7369 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7371 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7373 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7377 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7378 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7379 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7380 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7381 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7382 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7383 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7384 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7385 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7386 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7387 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7389 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7390 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7391 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7393 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7394 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7395 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7397 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7401 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7402 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7403 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7404 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7407 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7408 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7409 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7411 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7412 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7413 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7414 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7417 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7418 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7419 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7420 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7423 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7425 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7427 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7428 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7429 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7430 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7432 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7433 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7434 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7435 // consider the stale state on reload.
7436 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7439 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7440 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7441 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7443 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7446 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7447 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7448 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7450 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7453 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7455 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7456 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7458 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7459 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7461 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7462 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7463 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7465 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7467 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7468 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7470 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7471 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7474 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7476 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7477 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7478 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7479 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7481 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7484 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7485 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7487 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7490 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7492 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7493 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7495 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7497 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7498 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7499 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7501 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7502 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7503 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7507 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7508 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7509 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7511 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7517 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7518 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7519 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7520 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7521 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7522 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7523 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7524 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7525 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7526 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7528 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7529 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7530 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7531 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7532 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7533 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7534 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7536 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7537 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7538 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7539 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7541 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7543 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7544 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7546 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7548 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7549 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7550 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7551 (2, channel_type, option),
7552 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7553 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7554 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7555 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7556 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7557 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7558 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7559 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7560 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7561 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7562 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7563 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7564 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7565 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7566 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7567 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7568 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7569 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7570 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7571 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7572 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7573 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7576 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7577 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7578 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7579 // required channel parameters.
7580 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7581 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7582 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7584 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7586 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7587 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7588 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7589 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7592 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7593 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7594 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7596 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7597 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7599 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7600 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7605 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7606 if iter.next().is_some() {
7607 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7611 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7612 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7613 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7614 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7615 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7618 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7619 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7620 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7622 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7623 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7625 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7626 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7627 // separate u64 values.
7628 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7630 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7632 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7633 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7634 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7635 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7637 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7638 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7640 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7641 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7642 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7643 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7644 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7647 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7648 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7652 context: ChannelContext {
7655 config: config.unwrap(),
7659 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7660 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7661 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7664 temporary_channel_id,
7666 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7668 channel_value_satoshis,
7670 latest_monitor_update_id,
7672 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7673 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7676 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7677 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7680 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7681 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7682 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7683 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7687 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7688 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7689 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7690 monitor_pending_forwards,
7691 monitor_pending_failures,
7692 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7694 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7695 signer_pending_funding: false,
7698 holding_cell_update_fee,
7699 next_holder_htlc_id,
7700 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7701 update_time_counter,
7704 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7705 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7706 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7707 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7709 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7710 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7711 closing_fee_limits: None,
7712 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7714 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7715 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7717 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7719 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7720 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7721 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7722 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7723 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7724 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7725 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7726 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7727 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7730 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7732 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7733 funding_transaction,
7736 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7737 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7738 counterparty_node_id,
7740 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7744 channel_update_status,
7745 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7749 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7750 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7751 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7752 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7754 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7755 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7757 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7758 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7759 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7761 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7762 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7764 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7765 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7767 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7770 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7779 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7780 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7781 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7782 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7783 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7785 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7786 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7787 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7788 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7789 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7790 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7791 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7792 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7793 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7794 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7795 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7796 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7797 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7798 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7799 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7800 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7801 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7802 use crate::util::test_utils;
7803 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7804 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7805 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7806 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7807 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7808 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7809 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7810 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7811 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7812 use crate::prelude::*;
7814 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7817 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7818 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7824 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7825 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7826 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7827 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7831 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7832 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7833 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7834 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7835 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7836 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7837 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7838 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7842 signer: InMemorySigner,
7845 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7846 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7849 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7850 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7852 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7853 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7856 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7860 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7862 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7863 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7864 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7865 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7866 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7869 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7870 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7871 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7872 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7876 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7877 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7878 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7882 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7883 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7884 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7885 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7887 let seed = [42; 32];
7888 let network = Network::Testnet;
7889 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7890 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7891 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7894 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7895 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7896 let config = UserConfig::default();
7897 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
7898 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7899 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7901 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7902 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7906 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7907 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7909 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7910 let original_fee = 253;
7911 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7912 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7913 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7914 let seed = [42; 32];
7915 let network = Network::Testnet;
7916 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7918 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7919 let config = UserConfig::default();
7920 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7922 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7923 // same as the old fee.
7924 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7925 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7926 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7930 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7931 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7932 // dust limits are used.
7933 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7934 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7935 let seed = [42; 32];
7936 let network = Network::Testnet;
7937 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7938 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7939 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7941 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7942 // they have different dust limits.
7944 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7945 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7946 let config = UserConfig::default();
7947 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7949 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7950 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7951 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7952 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7953 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7955 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7956 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7957 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7958 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7959 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7961 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7962 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7963 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7964 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7966 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7967 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7968 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7970 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7971 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7973 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7974 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7975 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7977 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7978 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7979 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7980 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7983 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7985 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7986 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7987 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7988 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7989 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7990 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7991 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7992 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7993 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7995 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7998 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7999 // the dust limit check.
8000 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8001 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8002 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8003 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8005 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8006 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8007 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8008 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8009 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8010 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8011 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8015 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8016 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8017 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8018 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8019 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8020 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8021 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8022 let seed = [42; 32];
8023 let network = Network::Testnet;
8024 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8026 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8027 let config = UserConfig::default();
8028 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8030 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8031 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8033 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8034 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8035 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8036 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8037 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8038 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8040 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8041 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8042 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8043 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8044 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8046 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8048 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8049 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8050 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8051 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8052 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8054 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8055 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8056 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8057 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8058 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8062 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8063 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8064 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8065 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8066 let seed = [42; 32];
8067 let network = Network::Testnet;
8068 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8069 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8070 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8072 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8074 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8075 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8076 let config = UserConfig::default();
8077 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8079 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8080 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8081 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8082 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8084 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8085 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8086 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8088 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8089 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8090 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8091 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8093 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8094 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8095 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8097 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8098 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8100 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8101 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8102 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8103 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8104 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8105 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8106 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8108 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8110 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8111 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8112 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8113 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8114 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8118 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8119 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8120 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8121 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8122 let seed = [42; 32];
8123 let network = Network::Testnet;
8124 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8125 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8126 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8128 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8129 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8130 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8131 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8132 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8133 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8134 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8135 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8137 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8138 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8139 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8140 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8141 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8142 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8144 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8145 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8146 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8147 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8149 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8151 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8152 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8153 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8154 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8155 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8156 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8158 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8159 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8160 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8161 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8163 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8164 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8165 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8166 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8167 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8169 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8170 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8172 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8173 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8174 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8176 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8177 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8178 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8179 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8180 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8182 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8183 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8185 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8186 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8187 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8191 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8193 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8194 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8195 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8197 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8198 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8199 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8200 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8202 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8203 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8204 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8206 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8208 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8209 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8212 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8213 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8214 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8215 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8216 let seed = [42; 32];
8217 let network = Network::Testnet;
8218 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8219 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8220 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8223 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8224 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8225 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8227 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8228 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8230 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8231 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8232 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8234 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8235 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8237 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8239 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8240 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8242 // Channel Negotiations failed
8243 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8244 assert!(result.is_err());
8249 fn channel_update() {
8250 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8251 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8252 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8253 let seed = [42; 32];
8254 let network = Network::Testnet;
8255 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8256 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8257 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8259 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8260 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8261 let config = UserConfig::default();
8262 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8264 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8265 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8266 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8267 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8268 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8270 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8271 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8272 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8273 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8274 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8276 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8277 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8278 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8279 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8281 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8282 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8283 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8285 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8286 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8288 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8289 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8290 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8292 short_channel_id: 0,
8295 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8296 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8297 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8299 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8300 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8302 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8304 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8306 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8307 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8308 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8309 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8311 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8312 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8313 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8315 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8318 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8321 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8323 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8324 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8325 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8326 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8327 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8328 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8329 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8330 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8331 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8332 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8333 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8334 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8335 use crate::sync::Arc;
8337 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8338 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8339 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8340 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8342 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8344 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8345 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8346 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8347 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8348 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8350 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8351 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8357 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8358 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8359 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8361 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8362 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8363 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8364 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8365 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8366 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8368 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8370 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8371 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8372 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8373 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8374 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8375 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8377 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8378 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8379 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8380 selected_contest_delay: 144
8382 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8383 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8385 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8386 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8388 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8389 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8391 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8392 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8394 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8395 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8396 // build_commitment_transaction.
8397 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8398 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8399 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8400 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8401 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8403 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8404 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8405 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8406 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8410 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8411 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8412 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8413 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8417 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8418 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8419 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8421 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8422 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8424 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8425 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8427 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8429 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8430 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8431 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8432 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8433 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8434 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8435 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8437 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8438 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8439 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8440 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8442 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8443 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8444 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8446 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8448 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8449 commitment_tx.clone(),
8450 counterparty_signature,
8451 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8452 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8453 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8455 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8456 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8458 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8459 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8460 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8462 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8463 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8466 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8467 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8469 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8470 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8471 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8472 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8473 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8474 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8475 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8476 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8478 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8481 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8482 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8483 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8487 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8490 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8491 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8492 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8493 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8494 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8495 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8497 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8498 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8499 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8500 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8502 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8503 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8504 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8505 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8506 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8508 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8509 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8510 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8511 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8512 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&htlc_tx)));
8513 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8515 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8519 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8520 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8521 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8522 "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", {});
8524 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8525 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8527 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8528 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8529 "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", {});
8531 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8532 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8533 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8534 "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", {});
8536 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8537 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8539 amount_msat: 1000000,
8541 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8542 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8544 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8547 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8548 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8550 amount_msat: 2000000,
8552 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8553 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8555 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8558 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8559 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8561 amount_msat: 2000000,
8563 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8564 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8565 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8566 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8568 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8571 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8572 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8574 amount_msat: 3000000,
8576 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8577 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8578 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8579 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8581 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8584 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8585 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8587 amount_msat: 4000000,
8589 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8590 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8592 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8596 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8597 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8598 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8600 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8601 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8602 "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", {
8605 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8606 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8607 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
8610 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8611 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8612 "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" },
8615 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8616 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8617 "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" },
8620 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8621 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8622 "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" },
8625 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8626 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8627 "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" }
8630 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8631 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8632 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8634 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8635 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8636 "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", {
8639 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8640 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8641 "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" },
8644 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8645 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8646 "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" },
8649 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8650 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8651 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe020000000000000000010a060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c801483045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
8654 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8655 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8656 "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" },
8659 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8660 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8661 "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" }
8664 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8665 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8666 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8668 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8669 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8670 "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", {
8673 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8674 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8675 "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" },
8678 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8679 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8680 "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" },
8683 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8684 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8685 "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" },
8688 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8689 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8690 "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" }
8693 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8694 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8695 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8696 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8698 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8699 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8700 "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", {
8703 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8704 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8705 "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" },
8708 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8709 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8710 "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" },
8713 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8714 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8715 "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" },
8718 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8719 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8720 "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" }
8723 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8724 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8725 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8726 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8728 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8729 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8730 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48477956a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e330148304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8733 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8734 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8735 "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" },
8738 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8739 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8740 "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" },
8743 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8744 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8745 "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" },
8748 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8749 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8750 "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" }
8753 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8754 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8755 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8757 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8758 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8759 "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", {
8762 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8763 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8764 "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" },
8767 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8768 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8769 "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" },
8772 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8773 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8774 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8777 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8778 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8779 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8781 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8782 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8783 "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", {
8786 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8787 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8788 "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" },
8791 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8792 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8793 "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" },
8796 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8797 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8798 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8801 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8802 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8803 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8805 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8806 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8807 "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", {
8810 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8811 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8812 "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" },
8815 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8816 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8817 "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" }
8820 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8821 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8822 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8823 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8824 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8825 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8827 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8828 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8829 "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", {
8832 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8833 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8834 "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" },
8837 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8838 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8839 "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" }
8842 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8843 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8844 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8845 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8846 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8848 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8849 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8850 "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", {
8853 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8854 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8855 "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" },
8858 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8859 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8860 "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" }
8863 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8864 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8865 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8867 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8868 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8869 "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", {
8872 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8873 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8874 "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" }
8877 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8878 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8879 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8880 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8881 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8883 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8884 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8885 "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", {
8888 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8889 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8890 "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" }
8893 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8894 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8895 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8896 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8897 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8899 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8900 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8901 "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", {
8904 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8905 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8906 "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" }
8909 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8910 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8911 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8912 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8914 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8915 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8916 "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", {});
8918 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8919 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8920 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8921 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8922 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8924 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8925 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8926 "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", {});
8928 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8929 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8930 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8931 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8932 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8934 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8935 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8936 "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", {});
8938 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8939 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8940 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8942 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8943 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8944 "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", {});
8946 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8947 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8948 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8949 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8950 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8952 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8953 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8954 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a04004830450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1014830450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8956 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8957 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8958 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8959 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8960 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8962 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8963 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8964 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8966 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8967 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8968 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8969 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8970 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8971 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8973 amount_msat: 2000000,
8975 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8976 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8978 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8981 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8982 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8983 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8985 amount_msat: 5000001,
8987 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8988 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8989 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8990 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8992 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8995 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8996 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8998 amount_msat: 5000000,
9000 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9001 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9002 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9003 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9005 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
9009 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9010 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9011 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2d8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121b8813000000000000220020305c12e1a0bc21e283c131cea1c66d68857d28b7b2fce0a6fbc40c164852121bc0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484a69f6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c0147304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c801475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9014 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9015 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9016 "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" },
9018 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9019 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9020 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec01000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a01483045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868f9010000" },
9022 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9023 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9024 "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" }
9027 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9028 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9029 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9030 "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", {
9033 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9034 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9035 "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" },
9037 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9038 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9039 "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" },
9041 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9042 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9043 "020000000001013d060d0305c9616eaabc21d41fae85bcb5477b5d7f1c92aa429cf15339bbe1c40400000000010000000188130000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a183483045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6851b27568fa010000" }
9048 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9049 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9051 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9052 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9053 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9054 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9056 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9057 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9058 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9060 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9061 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9063 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9064 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9066 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9067 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9068 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9072 fn test_key_derivation() {
9073 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9074 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9076 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9077 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9079 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9080 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9082 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9083 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9085 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9086 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
9088 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9089 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9091 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9092 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9094 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9095 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9099 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9100 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9101 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9102 let seed = [42; 32];
9103 let network = Network::Testnet;
9104 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9105 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9107 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9108 let config = UserConfig::default();
9109 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9110 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9112 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9113 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9115 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9116 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9117 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9118 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9119 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9120 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9121 assert!(res.is_ok());
9125 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9126 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9127 // resulting `channel_type`.
9128 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9129 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9130 let network = Network::Testnet;
9131 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9132 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9134 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9135 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9137 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9138 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9140 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9141 // need to signal it.
9142 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9143 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9144 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9145 &config, 0, 42, None
9147 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9149 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9150 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9151 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9153 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9154 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9155 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9159 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9160 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9161 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9162 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9163 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9166 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9167 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9171 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9172 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9173 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9174 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9175 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9176 let network = Network::Testnet;
9177 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9178 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9180 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9181 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9183 let config = UserConfig::default();
9185 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9186 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9187 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9188 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9189 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9191 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9192 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9193 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9197 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9198 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9199 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9201 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9202 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9203 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9204 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9205 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9206 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9208 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9212 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9213 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9215 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9216 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9217 let network = Network::Testnet;
9218 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9219 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9221 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9222 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9224 let config = UserConfig::default();
9226 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9227 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9228 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9229 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9230 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9231 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9232 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9233 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9235 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9236 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9237 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9238 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9239 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9240 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9244 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9245 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9247 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9248 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9249 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9250 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9252 assert!(res.is_err());
9254 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9255 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9256 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9258 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9259 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9260 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9263 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9265 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9266 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9267 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9268 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9271 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9272 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9274 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9275 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9277 assert!(res.is_err());
9281 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9282 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9283 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9284 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9285 let seed = [42; 32];
9286 let network = Network::Testnet;
9287 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9288 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9289 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9291 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9292 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9293 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9294 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9296 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9297 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9298 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9303 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9313 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9314 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9315 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9320 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9321 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9327 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9330 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9331 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9332 &accept_channel_msg,
9333 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9334 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9337 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9338 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9339 let tx = Transaction {
9341 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9345 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9348 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9351 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9352 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9357 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9358 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9359 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9363 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9364 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9372 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9373 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9374 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9375 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9380 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9387 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9388 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9389 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9390 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9392 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9393 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9394 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9397 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9398 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9399 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9407 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9408 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9409 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9410 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9413 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9414 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9416 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9417 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9418 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9420 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());