1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
13 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
14 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
19 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
26 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
27 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
29 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
30 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
31 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
34 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
35 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
36 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
37 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
38 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
39 use crate::sign::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
40 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
41 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
42 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
43 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
44 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
45 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
46 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
49 use crate::prelude::*;
50 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
52 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
53 use crate::sync::Mutex;
54 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
59 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
60 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
61 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
62 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
64 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
65 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
66 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
69 pub struct AvailableBalances {
70 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
71 pub balance_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
73 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
75 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
76 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
78 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
79 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
82 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
84 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
86 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
87 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
88 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
89 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
90 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
91 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
93 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
97 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
98 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
99 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
100 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
103 enum InboundHTLCState {
104 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
105 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
106 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
107 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
108 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
109 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
110 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
111 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
112 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
113 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
114 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
115 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
116 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
117 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
118 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
120 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
123 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
124 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
125 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
126 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
128 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
129 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
130 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
131 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
132 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
133 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
135 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
136 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
137 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
138 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
139 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
140 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
141 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
142 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
144 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
145 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
147 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
148 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
149 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
150 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
151 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
152 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
153 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
154 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
157 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
161 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
162 state: InboundHTLCState,
165 enum OutboundHTLCState {
166 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
167 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
168 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
169 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
170 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
171 /// money back (though we won't), and,
172 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
173 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
174 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
175 /// we'll never get out of sync).
176 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
177 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
178 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
180 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
181 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
182 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
183 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
184 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
185 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
186 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
187 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
188 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
189 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
190 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
191 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
192 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
193 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
194 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
198 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
200 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
201 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
204 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
207 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
208 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
213 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
214 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
216 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
217 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
222 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
226 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
227 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
232 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
233 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
234 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
238 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
240 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
241 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
242 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
245 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
250 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
254 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
255 /// We first move through init with `OurInitSent` -> `TheirInitSent` -> `FundingCreated` -> `FundingSent`.
256 /// `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` then get set on `FundingSent`, and when both are set we
257 /// move on to `ChannelReady`.
258 /// Note that `PeerDisconnected` can be set on both `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent`.
259 /// `ChannelReady` can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
260 /// move on to `ShutdownComplete`, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
262 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
263 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
264 /// Implies we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message
265 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
266 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to `FundingSent`.
267 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate `funding_signed`
268 /// upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
270 /// Set when we have received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting
271 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The `ChannelReady` flags are set to indicate when we
272 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
274 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate they sent us a `channel_ready` message.
275 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
276 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
277 /// Flag which can be set on `FundingSent` to indicate we sent them a `channel_ready` message.
278 /// Once both `TheirChannelReady` and `OurChannelReady` are set, state moves on to `ChannelReady`.
279 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
281 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` and `FundingSent` indicating remote side is considered
282 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a `channel_reestablish`
284 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
285 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady`, FundingCreated, and `FundingSent` indicating the user has
286 /// told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
287 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
288 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
289 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
290 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
291 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
292 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
294 /// Flag is set on `ChannelReady`.
295 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
296 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after receiving a shutdown message from
297 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
298 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
299 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
300 /// Flag which is set on `ChannelReady` or `FundingSent` after sending a shutdown message. At this
301 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
302 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
303 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
304 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
305 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
306 /// Flag which is set on `FundingSent` to indicate this channel is funded in a batch and the
307 /// broadcasting of the funding transaction is being held until all channels in the batch
308 /// have received funding_signed and have their monitors persisted.
309 WaitingForBatch = 1 << 13,
311 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 =
312 ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 |
313 ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
314 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
315 BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
316 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
317 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
318 const STATE_FLAGS: u32 =
320 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 |
321 ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 |
322 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
323 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
325 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
327 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
329 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
330 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
331 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
332 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
336 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
338 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
340 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
342 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
343 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
344 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
345 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
346 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
348 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
349 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
351 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
353 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
354 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
356 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
357 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
358 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
359 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
360 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
361 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
363 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
364 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
366 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
367 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
368 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
369 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
370 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
372 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
373 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
375 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
376 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
378 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
379 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
380 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
381 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
387 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
388 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
390 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
391 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
392 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
397 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
398 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
400 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
401 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
402 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
407 macro_rules! secp_check {
408 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
411 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
416 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
417 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
418 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
419 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
420 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
421 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
422 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
423 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
425 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
427 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
429 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
433 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
435 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
436 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
437 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
439 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
440 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
442 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
443 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
444 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
445 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
446 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
448 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
449 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
453 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
459 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
462 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
463 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
464 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
465 holding_cell_msat: u64,
466 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
469 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
470 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
471 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
472 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
473 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
474 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
475 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
476 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
477 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
478 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
481 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
482 struct HTLCCandidate {
484 origin: HTLCInitiator,
488 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
496 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
498 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
500 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
501 htlc_value_msat: u64,
502 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
507 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
508 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
509 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
510 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
511 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
513 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
514 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
515 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
516 htlc_value_msat: u64,
518 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
519 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
523 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
524 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
525 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
526 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
527 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
528 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
529 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
530 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
531 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
532 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
533 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
536 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
538 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
539 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
540 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
541 pub funding_created: Option<msgs::FundingCreated>,
542 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
545 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
546 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
547 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
548 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
549 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
550 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
551 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
552 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
555 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
557 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
558 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
559 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
560 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
561 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
562 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
563 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
564 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
567 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
568 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
569 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
570 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
571 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
572 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
573 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
574 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
575 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
576 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
577 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
578 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
579 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
580 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
581 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
583 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
584 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
585 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
586 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
588 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
589 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
590 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
591 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
593 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
594 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
595 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
596 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
597 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
599 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
600 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
601 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
602 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
604 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
605 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
606 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
608 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
609 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
610 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
611 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
612 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
614 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
615 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
618 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
619 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
621 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
622 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
623 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
624 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
626 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
627 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
629 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
630 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
633 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
634 (0, update, required),
637 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
638 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
639 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
640 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
641 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
645 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
646 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
647 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: ChannelSigner,
649 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
651 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
652 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
653 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
657 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
659 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
660 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
661 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
666 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
667 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
668 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
669 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
670 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
672 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
673 /// in a timely manner.
674 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
677 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
678 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
679 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
681 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
682 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
683 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
684 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
688 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
689 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
690 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
692 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
693 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
694 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
695 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
697 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
701 /// The current channel ID.
702 channel_id: ChannelId,
703 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
704 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
705 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
708 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
709 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
711 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
712 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
713 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
715 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
716 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
717 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
718 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
720 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
721 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
723 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
725 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>,
726 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
727 destination_script: Script,
729 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
730 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
731 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
733 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
734 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
735 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
736 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
737 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
738 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
740 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
741 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
742 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
743 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
744 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
745 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
747 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
749 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
750 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
751 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
753 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
754 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
755 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
756 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
757 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
758 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
759 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
761 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
762 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
763 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
765 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
766 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
767 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
768 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
769 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
770 /// outbound or inbound.
771 signer_pending_funding: bool,
773 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
775 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
776 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
777 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
778 // HTLCs with similar state.
779 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
780 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
781 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
782 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
783 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
784 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
785 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
786 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
787 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
790 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
791 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
792 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
794 update_time_counter: u32,
796 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
797 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
798 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
799 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
800 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
801 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
803 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
804 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
806 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
807 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
808 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
809 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
811 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
812 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
814 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
816 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
818 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
819 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
820 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
821 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
822 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
823 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
824 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
825 channel_creation_height: u32,
827 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
830 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
832 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
835 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
837 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
840 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
842 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
844 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
845 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
848 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
850 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
852 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
853 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
855 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
857 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
858 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
859 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
861 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
863 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
864 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
865 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
867 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
868 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
869 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
871 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
873 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
875 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
876 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
877 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
878 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
880 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
881 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
882 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
884 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
885 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
886 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
888 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
889 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
890 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
891 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
892 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
893 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
894 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
895 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
897 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
898 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
899 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
900 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
901 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
903 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
904 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
906 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
907 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
908 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
909 /// unblock the state machine.
911 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
912 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
913 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
915 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
916 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
917 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
919 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
920 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
921 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
922 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
923 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
924 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
925 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
926 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
928 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
929 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
931 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
932 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
933 // the channel's funding UTXO.
935 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
936 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
937 // associated channel mapping.
939 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
940 // to store all of them.
941 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
943 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
944 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
945 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
946 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
947 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
949 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
950 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
952 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
953 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
955 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
956 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
957 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
959 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
960 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
961 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
964 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
965 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
966 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
967 self.update_time_counter
970 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
971 self.latest_monitor_update_id
974 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
975 self.config.announced_channel
978 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
979 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
982 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
983 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
984 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
985 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
988 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
989 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
990 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
993 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
994 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
995 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
996 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
997 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1000 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1001 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1002 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
1003 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete;
1005 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 && self.channel_state & (ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == 0 {
1006 return ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated;
1008 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1009 return ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs;
1011 if (self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1012 return ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee;
1014 return ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown;
1017 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1018 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1019 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1020 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1021 self.channel_state &
1022 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK |
1023 ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
1024 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 |
1025 ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK
1028 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1029 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1030 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1031 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1032 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
1035 // Public utilities:
1037 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1041 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1043 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1044 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1045 self.temporary_channel_id
1048 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1052 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1053 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1054 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1058 /// Gets the channel's type
1059 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1063 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1065 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1066 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1067 self.short_channel_id
1070 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1071 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1072 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1075 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1076 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1077 self.outbound_scid_alias
1080 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1082 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
1083 return &self.holder_signer
1086 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1087 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1088 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1089 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1090 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1091 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1094 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1095 /// get_funding_created.
1096 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1097 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1100 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1101 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1102 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1105 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1106 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1107 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1108 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1112 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1115 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1116 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1119 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1120 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1123 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1124 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1125 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1128 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1129 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1132 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1133 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1134 self.counterparty_node_id
1137 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1138 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1139 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1142 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1143 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1144 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1147 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1148 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1150 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1151 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1152 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1153 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1155 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1159 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1160 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1161 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1164 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1165 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1166 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1169 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1170 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1171 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1173 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1174 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1179 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1180 self.channel_value_satoshis
1183 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1184 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1187 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1188 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1191 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1192 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1193 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1195 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1196 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1197 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1198 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep);
1199 feerate_per_kw as u64 * multiplier
1201 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1205 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1206 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1207 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1210 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1211 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1212 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1215 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1216 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1217 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1220 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1221 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1222 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1225 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1226 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1227 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1230 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1231 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1232 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1235 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1236 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1237 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1238 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1239 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1242 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1244 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1245 self.prev_config = None;
1249 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1250 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1254 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1255 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1256 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1257 let did_channel_update =
1258 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1259 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1260 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1261 if did_channel_update {
1262 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1263 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1264 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1265 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1267 self.config.options = *config;
1271 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1272 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1273 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1274 self.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 &&
1275 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
1278 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1279 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1280 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1281 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1282 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1284 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1285 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1286 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1287 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1288 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1289 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1290 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1292 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1293 where L::Target: Logger
1295 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1296 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1297 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1299 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1300 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1301 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1302 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1304 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1305 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1306 if match update_state {
1307 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1308 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1309 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1310 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1311 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1313 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1317 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1318 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1319 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1321 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1323 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1324 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1325 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1327 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1328 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1329 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1330 transaction_output_index: None
1335 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1336 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1337 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1338 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1339 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1342 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1344 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1345 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1346 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1348 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1349 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1352 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1353 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1356 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1358 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1359 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1360 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1362 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1363 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1369 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1370 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1371 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1372 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1373 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1374 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1375 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1379 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1380 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1382 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1384 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1385 if generated_by_local {
1386 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1387 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1396 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1398 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1399 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1400 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1401 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1402 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1403 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1404 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1407 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1408 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1409 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1410 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1414 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1415 preimages.push(preimage);
1419 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1420 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1422 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1424 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1425 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1427 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1428 if !generated_by_local {
1429 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1437 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1438 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1439 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1440 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1441 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1442 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1443 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1444 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1446 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1448 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1449 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1450 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1451 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1453 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1455 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1456 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1457 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1458 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1461 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1462 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1463 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1464 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1466 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1469 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1470 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1471 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1472 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1474 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1477 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1478 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1483 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1484 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1489 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1491 let channel_parameters =
1492 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1493 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1494 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1501 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1504 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1505 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1506 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1507 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1509 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1510 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1511 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1519 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1520 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1526 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1527 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1528 /// our counterparty!)
1529 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1530 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1531 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1532 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1533 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1534 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1535 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1537 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1541 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1542 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1543 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1544 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1545 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1546 //may see payments to it!
1547 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1548 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1549 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1551 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1554 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1555 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1556 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1557 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1558 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1561 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1562 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1565 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1569 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1570 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1571 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1572 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1573 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1574 // which are near the dust limit.
1575 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1576 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1577 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1578 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1579 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1581 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1582 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1584 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1587 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1588 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1589 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1592 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1593 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1595 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1596 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1597 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1598 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1599 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1600 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1601 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1604 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1607 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1608 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1609 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1611 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1612 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1613 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1614 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1615 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1616 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1618 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1619 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1625 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1626 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1628 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1629 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1630 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1631 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1632 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1633 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1634 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1637 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1640 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1641 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1642 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1644 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1645 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1646 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1647 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1648 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1649 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1651 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1652 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1656 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1657 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1658 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1659 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1660 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1661 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1662 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1664 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1665 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1667 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1674 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1675 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1676 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1677 /// corner case properly.
1678 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1679 -> AvailableBalances
1680 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1682 let context = &self;
1683 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1684 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1685 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1687 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1688 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1689 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1690 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1693 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1695 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1696 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1698 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1700 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1702 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1703 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1707 if context.is_outbound() {
1708 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1709 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
1711 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
1712 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
1714 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
1715 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1716 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1717 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1720 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1721 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
1722 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1723 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
1724 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1725 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1726 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
1729 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
1730 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
1731 // match the value to right-below-dust.
1732 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
1733 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
1734 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
1735 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
1736 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
1737 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
1738 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
1739 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
1741 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
1744 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
1745 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
1746 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1747 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1748 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
1751 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
1752 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
1754 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
1755 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
1756 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1758 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
1759 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
1760 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
1761 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
1765 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
1767 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
1768 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
1769 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
1770 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
1771 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
1772 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
1773 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
1775 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1776 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
1778 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
1779 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1780 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1782 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1783 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1784 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
1785 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
1786 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
1789 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
1790 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 {
1791 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
1792 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
1793 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
1794 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
1797 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
1798 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
1799 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
1801 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
1805 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
1806 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
1808 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
1809 available_capacity_msat = 0;
1813 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
1814 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
1815 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
1816 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
1818 outbound_capacity_msat,
1819 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
1820 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
1825 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
1826 let context = &self;
1827 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
1830 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
1831 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
1833 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1834 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1836 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1837 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1839 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1840 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1841 let context = &self;
1842 assert!(context.is_outbound());
1844 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1847 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1848 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1850 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1851 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1853 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1854 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1856 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1857 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1861 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1862 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1868 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1869 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1870 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1873 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
1874 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
1875 included_htlcs += 1;
1878 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1879 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1883 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1884 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1885 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1886 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
1887 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
1888 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
1893 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1895 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
1896 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1901 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
1902 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
1906 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1907 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1908 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1911 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
1912 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
1914 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
1915 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
1916 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
1918 total_pending_htlcs,
1919 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1920 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
1921 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
1923 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
1924 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
1925 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
1927 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
1929 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
1934 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
1935 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
1937 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
1938 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
1940 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
1941 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
1943 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
1944 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
1945 let context = &self;
1946 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
1948 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1951 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1952 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1954 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1955 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1957 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
1958 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
1960 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
1961 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1965 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
1966 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1972 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
1973 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
1974 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
1975 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
1976 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1977 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1980 included_htlcs += 1;
1983 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1984 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
1987 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
1988 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
1990 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
1991 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
1992 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
1997 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
1998 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
1999 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2002 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2003 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2005 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2006 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2008 total_pending_htlcs,
2009 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2010 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2011 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2013 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2014 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2015 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2017 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2019 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2024 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2025 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2026 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 != 0 ||
2027 self.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 != 0 {
2034 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2036 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2037 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2040 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2042 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2043 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2044 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2048 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2049 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2050 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2053 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2055 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2056 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2059 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2060 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2061 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2062 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2063 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2064 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2065 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2066 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2067 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2068 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2069 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
2071 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2072 // return them to fail the payment.
2073 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2074 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2075 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2077 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2078 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2083 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2084 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
2085 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2086 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2087 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2088 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2089 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2090 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2091 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
2092 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2093 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2094 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2095 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2099 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2101 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
2102 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2105 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2106 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2110 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2111 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
2112 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2113 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2114 let signature = match &self.holder_signer {
2115 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2116 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2117 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2118 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
2122 if self.signer_pending_funding {
2123 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
2124 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2127 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
2128 temporary_channel_id: self.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
2129 funding_txid: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
2130 funding_output_index: self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
2133 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2135 next_local_nonce: None,
2139 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2140 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2141 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2142 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2144 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2145 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2146 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2147 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2149 match &self.holder_signer {
2150 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2151 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2152 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2153 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2154 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2157 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2161 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2162 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2163 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2164 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2165 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2166 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2169 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2170 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2176 // Internal utility functions for channels
2178 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2179 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2180 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2182 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2184 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2185 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2186 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2188 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2191 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2193 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2196 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2197 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2198 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2200 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2202 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2203 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2204 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2205 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2206 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2209 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2210 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2211 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2212 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2213 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2214 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2215 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2218 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2219 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2221 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2222 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2225 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2226 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2227 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2228 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2229 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2230 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2233 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2234 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2235 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2236 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2239 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2240 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2242 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2243 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2244 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2248 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2249 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2250 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2252 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2253 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2254 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2255 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2257 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
2258 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
2259 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
2260 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust. This doesn't
2261 // apply to channels supporting anchor outputs since HTLC transactions are pre-signed with a
2262 // zero fee, so their fee is no longer considered to determine dust limits.
2263 if !channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2265 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::MaxAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee) as u64;
2266 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
2267 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
2271 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2272 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2274 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2276 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2277 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2278 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2279 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2281 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2282 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2292 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
2293 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2294 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2295 // outside of those situations will fail.
2296 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2300 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2305 1 + // script length (0)
2309 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2310 2 + // witness marker and flag
2311 1 + // witness element count
2312 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2313 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2314 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2315 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2316 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2317 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2319 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2320 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2321 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2327 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2328 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2329 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2330 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2332 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2333 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2334 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2336 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2337 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2338 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2339 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2340 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2341 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2344 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2345 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2348 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2349 value_to_holder = 0;
2352 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2353 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2354 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2355 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2357 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2358 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2361 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2362 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2365 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2368 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2369 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2371 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2373 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2374 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2375 where L::Target: Logger {
2376 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2377 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2378 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
2379 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2380 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2381 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2382 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2383 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2387 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2388 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2389 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2390 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2392 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2393 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2395 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2397 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2398 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2399 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2401 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2402 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2403 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2404 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2405 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner()));
2406 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2407 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2409 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2410 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2411 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2413 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2414 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2416 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2419 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2420 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2424 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2428 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2429 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2430 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2431 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2432 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2433 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2436 // Now update local state:
2438 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2439 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2440 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2441 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2442 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2443 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2444 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2448 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2449 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2450 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2451 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2452 // do not not get into this branch.
2453 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2454 match pending_update {
2455 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2456 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2457 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2458 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2459 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2460 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2461 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2464 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2465 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2466 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2467 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2468 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2469 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2470 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2476 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state);
2477 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2478 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2480 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2481 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2482 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2484 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2485 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2488 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2489 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2491 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2492 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2494 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2495 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2498 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2501 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2502 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2503 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2504 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2509 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2510 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2511 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2512 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2513 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2514 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2515 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2516 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2517 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2518 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2519 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2520 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2521 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2522 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2523 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2525 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2526 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2527 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2528 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2529 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2532 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2533 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2534 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2540 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2541 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2543 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2547 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2548 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2549 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2550 /// before we fail backwards.
2552 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2553 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2554 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2555 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2556 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2557 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2558 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2561 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2562 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2563 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2564 /// before we fail backwards.
2566 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2567 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2568 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2569 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2570 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2571 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2572 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2574 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2576 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2577 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2578 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2580 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2581 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2582 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2584 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2585 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2586 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2588 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2593 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2594 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2600 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2601 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2602 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2603 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2604 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2608 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2609 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2610 force_holding_cell = true;
2613 // Now update local state:
2614 if force_holding_cell {
2615 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2616 match pending_update {
2617 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2618 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2619 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2620 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2624 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2625 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2626 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2627 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2633 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2634 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2635 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2641 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2643 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2644 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2647 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2648 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2649 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2654 // Message handlers:
2656 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2657 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2658 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
2659 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2660 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, ChannelError>
2664 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2665 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2667 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2668 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2670 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2671 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2672 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2673 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2676 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2678 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2679 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2680 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2681 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2683 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2684 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2686 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2687 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2689 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2690 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2691 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2692 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2693 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2694 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2698 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2699 initial_commitment_tx,
2702 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2703 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2706 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2707 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2710 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
2711 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2712 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2713 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
2714 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2715 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2716 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2717 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2718 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2719 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2720 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2721 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2723 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2725 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
2726 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
2727 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
2728 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
2729 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
2730 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
2731 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
2733 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2734 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
2735 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32;
2737 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2739 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2740 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2742 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2744 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2745 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2749 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2750 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2751 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2752 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2753 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2754 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2755 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32);
2758 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2759 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2761 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2762 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2763 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2764 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2766 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2769 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2770 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2771 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2774 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2775 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2776 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2777 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2778 // when routing outbound payments.
2779 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2783 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2785 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2786 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2788 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 == 0 ||
2789 non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0
2791 if non_shutdown_state & !(ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2792 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2793 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2794 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2795 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2796 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2797 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2798 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2799 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2801 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2802 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2803 let expected_point =
2804 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2805 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2807 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2808 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2809 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2810 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2811 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2812 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2814 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2815 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2816 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2817 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2818 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2820 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2821 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2825 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2828 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2829 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2831 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2833 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2836 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
2837 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
2838 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
2839 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2840 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
2841 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2843 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2844 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2845 if local_sent_shutdown {
2846 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2848 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2849 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2850 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2851 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2853 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2854 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2856 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2857 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2859 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2860 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2862 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2863 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2866 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2867 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2868 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2869 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2871 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2872 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2875 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2876 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2877 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2878 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2879 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2880 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2881 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2882 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2883 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2884 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2885 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2887 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2888 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2889 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2890 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2891 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2892 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2896 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2897 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2900 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2901 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2902 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2904 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2905 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2906 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2907 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2908 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2909 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2910 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2914 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2915 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2916 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2917 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
2918 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2919 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
2920 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2924 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2925 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2926 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2927 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2928 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2929 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2932 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2933 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2935 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2936 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2937 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2939 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2940 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2944 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2945 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2947 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2948 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2952 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2953 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2957 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
2958 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2959 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
2960 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
2961 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
2962 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2963 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2964 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2965 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2967 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2968 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2969 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2970 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
2971 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2974 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2975 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2976 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2977 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2978 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2981 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2982 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2984 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2985 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2988 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2989 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2990 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2994 // Now update local state:
2995 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2996 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2997 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2998 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2999 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3000 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3001 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3006 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3008 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3009 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3010 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3011 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3012 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3013 None => fail_reason.into(),
3014 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3015 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3016 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3017 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3019 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3023 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3024 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3025 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3026 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3028 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3034 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3037 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3038 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3041 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3045 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3048 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3049 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3050 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3052 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3053 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3056 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3060 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3061 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3062 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3064 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3065 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3068 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3072 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3073 where L::Target: Logger
3075 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3076 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3078 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3079 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3081 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3082 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3085 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3087 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3089 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3090 let commitment_txid = {
3091 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3092 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3093 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3095 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3096 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3097 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3098 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3099 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3100 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3104 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3106 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3107 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3108 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3109 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3112 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3113 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3114 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3115 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3118 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3120 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3121 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3122 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3123 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3124 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3125 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3126 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3127 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3128 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3129 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3130 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3136 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3140 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3141 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3142 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3143 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3144 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3145 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3146 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3147 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3148 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3149 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3150 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3151 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3152 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3155 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3156 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3157 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3158 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3159 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3160 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3161 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3163 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3164 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3165 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3166 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3167 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3168 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3169 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3172 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3173 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3176 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3178 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3179 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3180 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3183 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3186 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3187 commitment_stats.tx,
3189 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3190 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3191 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3194 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3195 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3197 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3198 let mut need_commitment = false;
3199 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3200 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3201 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3202 need_commitment = true;
3206 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3207 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3208 Some(forward_info.clone())
3210 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3211 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3212 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3213 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3214 need_commitment = true;
3217 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3218 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3219 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3220 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3221 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3222 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3223 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3224 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3225 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3226 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3227 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3228 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3229 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3230 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3232 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3234 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3235 need_commitment = true;
3239 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3240 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3241 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3242 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3243 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3244 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3246 nondust_htlc_sources,
3250 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3251 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3252 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3253 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3255 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3256 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3257 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3258 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3259 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3260 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3261 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3262 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3263 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3264 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3265 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3266 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3267 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3268 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3270 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3271 &self.context.channel_id);
3272 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3275 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3276 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3277 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3278 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3279 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3280 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3281 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3282 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3283 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3287 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3288 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3289 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3290 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3293 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3294 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3295 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3296 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3297 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3298 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3299 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3301 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3302 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3303 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3304 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3307 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3308 /// for our counterparty.
3309 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3310 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3311 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3312 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3314 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3315 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3316 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3317 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3319 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3320 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3321 updates: Vec::new(),
3324 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3325 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3326 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3327 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3328 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3329 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3330 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3331 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3332 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3333 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3334 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3335 // to rebalance channels.
3336 match &htlc_update {
3337 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3338 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3339 skimmed_fee_msat, ..
3341 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(),
3342 onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
3344 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3347 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3348 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3349 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3350 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3351 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3352 // into the holding cell without ever being
3353 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3354 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3355 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3358 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3364 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3365 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3366 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3367 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3368 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3369 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3370 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3371 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3372 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3373 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3374 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3375 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3377 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3378 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3379 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3380 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3381 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3382 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3383 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3384 // for a full revocation before failing.
3385 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3386 update_fail_count += 1;
3389 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3391 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3398 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3399 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3401 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3402 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3407 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3408 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3409 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3410 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3411 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3413 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3414 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3415 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3417 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3418 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3424 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3425 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3426 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3427 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3428 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3429 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3430 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3431 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3432 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3434 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3435 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3437 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3438 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3440 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3441 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3444 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3446 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3447 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3448 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3452 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3453 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3454 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3455 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3456 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3457 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3458 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3459 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3460 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3463 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3465 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3466 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3469 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3470 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3471 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3472 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3474 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3478 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3479 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3480 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3481 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3482 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3483 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3484 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3485 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3489 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3490 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3491 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3492 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3493 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3494 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3495 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3496 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3497 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3499 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3500 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3503 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3504 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3505 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3506 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3507 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3508 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3509 let mut require_commitment = false;
3510 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3513 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3514 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3515 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3517 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3518 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3519 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3520 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3521 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3522 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3527 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3528 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3529 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3530 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3531 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3533 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3534 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3535 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3540 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3541 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3543 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3547 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3548 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3550 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3551 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3552 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3553 require_commitment = true;
3554 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3555 match forward_info {
3556 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3557 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3558 require_commitment = true;
3560 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3561 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3562 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3564 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3565 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3566 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3570 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3571 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3572 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3573 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3579 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3580 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3581 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3582 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3584 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3585 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3586 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3587 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3588 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3589 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3590 require_commitment = true;
3594 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3596 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3597 match update_state {
3598 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3599 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3600 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3601 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3602 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3604 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3605 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3606 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3607 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3608 require_commitment = true;
3609 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3610 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3615 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3616 let release_state_str =
3617 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3618 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3619 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3620 if !release_monitor {
3621 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3622 update: monitor_update,
3624 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3626 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3631 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3632 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3633 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3634 if require_commitment {
3635 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3636 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3637 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3638 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3640 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3641 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3642 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3643 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3644 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3646 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3647 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3648 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3649 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3650 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3653 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3654 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3655 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3656 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3657 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3658 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3660 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3661 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3663 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3664 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3666 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3667 if require_commitment {
3668 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3670 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3671 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3672 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3673 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3675 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3676 &self.context.channel_id(),
3677 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3680 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3681 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3683 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3684 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3686 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3687 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3693 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3694 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3695 /// commitment update.
3696 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3697 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3698 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3700 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3701 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3704 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3705 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3706 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3707 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3709 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3710 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3711 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3712 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3713 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3714 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3715 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3717 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3718 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3720 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3721 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3723 if !self.context.is_live() {
3724 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3727 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3728 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3729 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3730 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3731 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3732 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3733 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3734 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3735 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3736 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3740 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3741 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3742 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3743 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3744 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3745 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3748 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3749 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3753 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3754 force_holding_cell = true;
3757 if force_holding_cell {
3758 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3762 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3763 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3765 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3766 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3771 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3772 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3774 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3776 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3777 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3778 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3779 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3783 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3784 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3785 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3789 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3790 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3793 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3794 // will be retransmitted.
3795 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3796 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3797 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3799 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3800 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3802 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3803 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3804 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3805 // this HTLC accordingly
3806 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3809 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3810 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3811 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3812 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3815 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3816 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3817 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3818 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3819 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3820 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3825 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3827 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3828 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3829 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3830 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3834 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3835 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3836 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3837 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3838 // the update upon reconnection.
3839 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3843 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3845 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3846 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
3850 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3851 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3852 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3853 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3854 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3855 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3856 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3858 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3859 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3860 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3861 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3862 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3863 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3864 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3866 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3867 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3868 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3869 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3870 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3871 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3872 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3875 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3876 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3877 /// to the remote side.
3878 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3879 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3880 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3881 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3884 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3886 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3887 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3889 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3890 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3891 // first received the funding_signed.
3892 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3893 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 && self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 == 0 {
3894 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
3896 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3897 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3898 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3899 funding_broadcastable = None;
3902 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3903 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3904 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3905 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3906 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3907 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3908 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3909 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3910 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3911 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3912 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
3913 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3914 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3915 next_per_commitment_point,
3916 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
3920 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3922 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3923 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
3924 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3925 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
3926 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3927 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3929 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3930 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3931 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3932 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3933 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3934 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3938 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3939 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3941 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3942 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
3944 if commitment_update.is_some() {
3945 self.mark_awaiting_response();
3948 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3949 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3950 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
3951 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3952 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3953 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3954 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3955 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3956 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3960 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3961 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3963 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3964 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3966 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3967 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3969 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3970 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3972 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3973 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3974 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3975 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3976 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3977 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3978 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3979 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3980 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3981 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3982 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3983 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3984 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3985 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3987 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3988 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3989 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3995 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
3998 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3999 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4000 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4002 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4003 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4005 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4006 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4008 let funding_created = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
4009 self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
4012 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed, {} funding_created, and {} channel_ready",
4013 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4014 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4015 if funding_created.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4016 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4018 SignerResumeUpdates {
4026 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4027 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4028 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4029 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4030 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4031 per_commitment_secret,
4032 next_per_commitment_point,
4034 next_local_nonce: None,
4038 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4039 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4040 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4041 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4042 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4043 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4045 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4046 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4047 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4048 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4049 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4050 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4051 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4052 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4053 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4054 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4059 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4060 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4062 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4063 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4064 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4065 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4066 reason: err_packet.clone()
4069 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4070 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4071 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4072 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4073 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4074 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4077 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4078 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4079 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4080 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4081 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4088 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4089 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4090 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4091 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4095 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4096 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4097 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4098 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4099 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4100 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4101 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4105 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4106 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4107 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4111 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4112 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4117 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4118 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4119 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4120 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4121 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4122 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4123 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4128 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4129 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4131 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4132 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4133 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4134 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4135 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4136 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4137 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4138 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4141 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4143 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4144 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4145 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4146 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4147 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4150 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4151 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4152 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4155 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4156 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4157 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4158 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4159 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4160 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4161 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4163 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4164 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4165 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4166 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4167 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4170 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4171 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4172 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4173 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4174 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4175 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4176 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4177 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4181 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4182 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4183 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4184 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4185 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4186 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4187 our_commitment_transaction
4191 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4192 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4193 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4194 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4196 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4198 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4200 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4201 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4202 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4203 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4204 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4205 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4207 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4208 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4209 channel_ready: None,
4210 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4211 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4212 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4216 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4217 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4218 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4219 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4220 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4221 next_per_commitment_point,
4222 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4224 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4225 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4226 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4230 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4231 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4232 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4234 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4235 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4236 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4239 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4242 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4243 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4244 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4245 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4246 our_commitment_transaction
4250 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4251 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4252 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4253 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4254 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4255 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4256 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4258 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4260 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4261 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4262 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4263 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4264 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4265 next_per_commitment_point,
4266 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4270 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4271 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4272 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4274 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4277 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4278 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4279 raa: required_revoke,
4280 commitment_update: None,
4281 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4283 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4284 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4285 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4287 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4290 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4291 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4292 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4293 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4294 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4295 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4298 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4299 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4300 raa: required_revoke,
4301 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4302 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4305 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4306 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4307 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4308 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4309 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4312 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4313 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4314 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4315 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4320 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4321 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4322 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4323 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4325 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4327 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4329 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4330 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4331 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4332 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4333 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4334 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4335 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4336 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4338 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4339 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4340 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4341 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4342 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4344 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4345 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4346 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4347 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4350 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4351 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4352 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4353 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4354 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4355 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4356 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4357 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4358 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4359 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4360 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4361 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4362 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4363 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4364 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4366 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4369 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4370 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4373 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4374 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4375 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4376 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4377 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4378 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4381 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4382 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4383 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4384 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4385 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4386 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4389 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4395 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4396 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4397 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4398 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4400 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4401 return Ok((None, None, None));
4404 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4405 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4406 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4408 return Ok((None, None, None));
4411 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4413 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4414 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4415 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4416 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4418 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4419 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4421 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4422 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4424 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4425 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4426 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4427 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4429 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4430 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4431 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4438 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4439 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4441 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4442 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4445 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4446 /// within our expected timeframe.
4448 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4449 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4450 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4453 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4456 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4457 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4461 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4462 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4464 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4465 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4467 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4468 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4469 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4470 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4471 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4473 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4474 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4475 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4478 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4480 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4481 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4484 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4485 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4486 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4489 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4492 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4493 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4494 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4495 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4497 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4500 assert!(send_shutdown);
4501 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4502 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4503 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4505 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4506 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4508 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4513 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4515 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4516 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4518 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4519 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4520 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4521 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4522 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4523 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4526 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4527 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4529 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4530 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4531 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4532 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4536 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4537 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4538 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4539 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4540 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4541 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4543 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4544 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4551 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4552 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4554 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4557 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4558 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4560 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4562 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4563 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4564 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4565 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4566 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4567 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4568 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4569 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4570 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4572 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4573 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4576 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4580 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4581 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4582 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4583 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4585 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4586 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4588 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4589 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4591 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4592 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4594 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4595 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4598 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4599 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4602 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4603 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4604 return Ok((None, None, None));
4607 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4608 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4609 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4610 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4612 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4614 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4617 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4618 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4619 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4620 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4621 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4625 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4626 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4627 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4631 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4632 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4633 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4634 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4635 monitor_update: None,
4636 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4637 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4639 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4640 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4641 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4642 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4646 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4648 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4649 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4650 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4651 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4653 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4656 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4657 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4659 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4660 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4661 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4662 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4663 monitor_update: None,
4664 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4665 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4667 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4668 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4669 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4670 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4675 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4676 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4677 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4678 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4680 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4681 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4682 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4684 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4690 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4691 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4692 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4694 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4695 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4697 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4698 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4701 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4702 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4703 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4704 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4705 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4707 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4708 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4709 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4711 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4712 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4715 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4716 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4717 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4718 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4719 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4720 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4721 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4722 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4724 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4727 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4728 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4729 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4730 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4732 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4736 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4737 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4738 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4739 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4741 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4747 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4748 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4749 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4750 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4751 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4752 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4753 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4755 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4756 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4759 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4761 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4762 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4768 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4769 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4770 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4771 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4772 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4773 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4774 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4776 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4777 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4784 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4785 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4788 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4789 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4792 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4793 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4797 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer> {
4798 &self.context.holder_signer
4802 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4804 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
4805 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4806 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4807 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4808 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4809 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4811 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4813 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4821 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4822 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4826 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4827 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4828 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4829 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4832 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
4833 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4834 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
4835 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
4838 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
4839 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
4840 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
4841 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
4842 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
4843 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
4846 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
4847 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
4848 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
4849 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
4850 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
4851 if !release_monitor {
4852 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4861 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
4862 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
4865 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4866 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4867 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4869 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4870 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4871 if self.context.channel_state &
4872 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 | ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32)
4873 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4874 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4875 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4876 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4879 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4880 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4881 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4882 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4883 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4884 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4886 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4887 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4888 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4890 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4891 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4892 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4893 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4894 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4895 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4901 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4902 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4903 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4906 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4907 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4908 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4911 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4912 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4913 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4916 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4917 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4918 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4919 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4920 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4921 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4926 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4927 self.context.channel_update_status
4930 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4931 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4932 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
4935 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4937 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4938 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4939 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4943 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4944 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4945 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4948 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4952 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
4953 // channel_ready yet.
4954 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
4958 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
4959 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
4960 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4961 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4962 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4964 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4965 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4966 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4968 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4969 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4972 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4973 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4974 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4975 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4976 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4977 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4978 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4979 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4980 self.context.channel_state);
4982 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4986 if need_commitment_update {
4987 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4988 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4989 let next_per_commitment_point =
4990 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4991 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4992 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4993 next_per_commitment_point,
4994 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4998 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5004 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5005 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5006 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5007 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5008 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5009 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5010 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5012 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5015 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5016 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5017 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5018 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5019 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5020 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5021 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5022 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5023 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5024 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5025 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5026 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5027 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5028 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5029 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5030 // channel and move on.
5031 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5032 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5034 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5035 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5036 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5038 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5039 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5040 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5041 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5042 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5043 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5044 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5045 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5050 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5051 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5052 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5053 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5054 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5057 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5058 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5059 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5060 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5061 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5062 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5065 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5066 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5067 // may have already happened for this block).
5068 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5069 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5070 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5071 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5074 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5075 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5076 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5077 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5085 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5086 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5087 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5088 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5090 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5091 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5094 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5096 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5097 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5098 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5099 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5101 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5104 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5107 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5108 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5109 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5110 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5112 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5115 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5116 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5117 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5119 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5120 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5122 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5123 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5124 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5132 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5134 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5135 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5136 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5138 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5139 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5142 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5143 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5144 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5145 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5146 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5147 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5148 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5149 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5150 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5153 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5154 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5155 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5156 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5158 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5159 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5160 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5162 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5163 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5164 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5165 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5167 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5168 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5169 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5170 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5171 assert!(non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5172 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5173 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5176 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5177 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5179 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5182 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5183 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5184 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5185 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5186 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5187 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5188 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5189 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5190 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5191 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5192 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5193 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5194 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5195 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5196 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5197 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5198 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5204 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5209 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5210 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5212 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5213 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5214 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5215 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5217 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5220 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5222 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5223 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5224 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5225 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5226 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5227 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5229 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5230 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5233 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5234 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5235 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5236 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5237 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5238 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5240 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5241 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5244 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5245 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5246 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5247 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5248 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5254 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5255 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5256 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5257 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5259 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5262 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5266 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5270 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5271 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5275 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5279 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5280 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5283 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5287 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5289 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5294 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5295 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5296 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5298 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5303 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5305 None => return None,
5308 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5310 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5311 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5313 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5314 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5320 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5322 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5323 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5324 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5325 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5326 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5327 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5328 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5330 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5331 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5332 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5333 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5334 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5335 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5336 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5337 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5338 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5339 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5340 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5341 contents: announcement,
5346 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5350 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5351 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5352 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5353 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5354 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5355 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5356 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5357 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5359 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5361 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5362 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5363 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5364 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5366 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5367 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5368 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5369 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5372 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5373 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5374 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5375 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5378 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5381 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5382 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5383 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5384 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5385 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5386 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5389 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5391 Err(_) => return None,
5393 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5394 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5399 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5400 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5401 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5402 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5403 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5404 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5405 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5406 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5407 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5408 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5409 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5410 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5411 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5412 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5413 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5414 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5417 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5420 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5421 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5422 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5423 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5424 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5425 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5426 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5427 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5428 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5430 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5431 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5432 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5433 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5434 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5435 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5436 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5437 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5438 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5440 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5441 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5442 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5443 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5444 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5445 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5446 next_funding_txid: None,
5451 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5453 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5454 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5455 /// commitment update.
5457 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5458 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5459 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5460 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5461 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5462 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5463 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5466 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5467 skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger)
5468 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5470 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5471 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5476 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5477 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5479 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5481 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5482 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5484 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5485 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5486 /// regenerate them.
5488 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5489 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5491 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5492 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5493 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5494 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5495 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5496 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5497 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5499 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5500 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5502 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5503 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5504 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5507 if amount_msat == 0 {
5508 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5511 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5512 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5513 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5514 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5517 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5518 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5519 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5522 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5523 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5524 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5525 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5526 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5527 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5528 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5529 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5532 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
5533 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5534 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5535 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5536 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5537 else { "to peer" });
5539 if need_holding_cell {
5540 force_holding_cell = true;
5543 // Now update local state:
5544 if force_holding_cell {
5545 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5550 onion_routing_packet,
5556 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5557 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5559 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5561 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5566 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5567 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5568 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5572 onion_routing_packet,
5575 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5580 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5581 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5582 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5583 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5585 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5586 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5587 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5589 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5590 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5594 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5595 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5596 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5597 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5598 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5599 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5600 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5603 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5604 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5605 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5606 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5607 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5608 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5611 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5613 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5614 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5615 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5616 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5617 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5619 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5620 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5623 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5624 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5625 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5626 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5627 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5628 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5629 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5630 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5631 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5632 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5633 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5636 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5640 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5641 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5642 where L::Target: Logger
5644 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5645 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5646 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5648 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5650 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5651 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5652 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5653 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5654 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5655 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5656 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5657 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5658 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5659 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5660 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5666 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5669 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5670 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5671 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5672 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5673 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5674 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5676 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5677 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5678 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5680 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5681 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5682 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5685 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5686 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5690 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5691 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5693 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5695 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5696 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5697 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5698 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5700 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5701 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5702 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5703 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5704 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5705 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5709 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5710 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5714 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5715 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5720 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5721 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5723 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5724 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5725 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5726 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5727 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5728 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5729 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5730 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5732 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5733 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, fee_estimator, logger);
5734 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5737 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5738 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5739 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5745 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5747 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5748 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5749 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5750 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5751 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5753 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5755 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5761 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5762 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5764 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
5765 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
5766 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5767 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5768 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ShutdownResult>), APIError>
5770 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5771 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5772 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5775 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5776 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5777 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5779 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5780 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5783 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
5784 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
5786 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5787 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5788 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5791 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
5792 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
5793 let mut chan_closed = false;
5794 if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5798 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5800 None if !chan_closed => {
5801 // use override shutdown script if provided
5802 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
5803 Some(script) => script,
5805 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
5806 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5807 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5808 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5812 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5813 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5815 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5821 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5822 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5823 let shutdown_result = if self.context.channel_state & !STATE_FLAGS < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5824 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5825 monitor_update: None,
5826 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5827 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5829 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5830 Some(shutdown_result)
5832 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5835 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5837 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5838 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5839 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5840 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5841 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5842 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5845 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5846 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5848 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5849 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5850 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5853 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5854 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5855 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5856 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5857 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5859 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5860 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5867 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
5868 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
5870 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs, shutdown_result))
5873 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
5874 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
5875 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
5877 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
5878 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
5882 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
5886 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
5887 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5888 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
5889 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
5892 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5893 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
5894 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5895 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
5896 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
5897 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
5898 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
5899 F::Target: FeeEstimator
5901 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
5902 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
5903 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
5904 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
5906 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
5907 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
5909 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
5910 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
5912 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5913 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
5914 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
5916 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
5917 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
5919 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
5920 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5921 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
5922 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
5923 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
5926 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
5927 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
5929 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5930 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
5932 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
5934 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
5936 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
5937 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
5938 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
5939 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
5942 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
5943 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
5945 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
5946 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5947 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
5948 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
5952 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5953 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
5954 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5958 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
5959 Ok(script) => script,
5960 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
5963 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
5966 context: ChannelContext {
5969 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
5970 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
5971 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
5972 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
5977 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
5979 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
5980 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
5981 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
5982 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
5984 channel_value_satoshis,
5986 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
5988 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
5989 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
5992 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5993 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
5996 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5997 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5998 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
5999 pending_update_fee: None,
6000 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6001 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6002 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6003 update_time_counter: 1,
6005 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6007 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6008 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6009 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6010 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6011 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6012 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6014 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6015 signer_pending_funding: false,
6017 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6018 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6019 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6020 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6022 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6023 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6024 closing_fee_limits: None,
6025 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6027 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6028 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6029 short_channel_id: None,
6030 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6032 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6033 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6034 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6035 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6036 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6037 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6038 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6039 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6040 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6041 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6042 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6043 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6045 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6047 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6048 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6049 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6050 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6051 counterparty_parameters: None,
6052 funding_outpoint: None,
6053 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6055 funding_transaction: None,
6056 is_batch_funding: None,
6058 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6059 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6060 counterparty_node_id,
6062 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6064 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6066 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6067 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6069 announcement_sigs: None,
6071 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6072 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6073 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6074 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6076 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6077 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6079 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6080 outbound_scid_alias,
6082 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6083 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6085 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6086 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6091 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6093 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6097 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6098 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6099 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6100 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6101 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6102 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6103 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6104 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6105 -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingCreated>), (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6106 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6107 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6109 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6110 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6112 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6113 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6114 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6115 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6118 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6119 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6121 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6123 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
6124 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6126 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6127 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6128 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6129 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6130 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6131 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6134 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6135 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6137 let funding_created = self.context.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6138 if funding_created.is_none() {
6139 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6140 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6141 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6145 let channel = Channel {
6146 context: self.context,
6149 Ok((channel, funding_created))
6152 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6153 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6154 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6155 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6156 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6157 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6158 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6159 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6160 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6161 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6164 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6165 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6166 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6167 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6168 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6169 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6175 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6176 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6177 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6178 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6179 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6180 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6182 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6184 if !self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
6185 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6186 // We've exhausted our options
6189 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6190 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6193 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6194 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6195 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6196 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6198 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6199 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6200 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6201 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6202 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6203 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6205 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6207 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6208 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6211 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6212 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6213 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6215 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6216 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6219 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6220 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6223 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6224 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6228 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6229 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6230 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6231 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6232 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6233 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6234 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6235 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6236 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6237 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6238 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6239 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6240 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6241 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6242 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6243 first_per_commitment_point,
6244 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6245 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6246 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6247 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6249 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6254 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6255 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6257 // Check sanity of message fields:
6258 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6261 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
6262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6264 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6265 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6267 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6270 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6271 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6273 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6274 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6275 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6277 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6278 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6281 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6282 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6285 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6286 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6288 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6292 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6293 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6296 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6299 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6302 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6303 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6305 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6306 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6308 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6309 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6311 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6315 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6316 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6317 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6319 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6320 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6322 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6323 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6324 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6326 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6327 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6330 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6331 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6332 &Some(ref script) => {
6333 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6334 if script.len() == 0 {
6337 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6338 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6340 Some(script.clone())
6343 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6350 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6351 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6352 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6353 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6354 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6356 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6357 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6359 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6362 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6363 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6364 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6365 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6366 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6367 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6370 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6371 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6372 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6375 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6376 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6378 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
6379 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6385 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6386 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6387 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6388 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6391 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6392 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6393 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6394 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6395 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6396 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6397 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6398 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6399 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6400 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6401 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6404 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6406 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6407 // support this channel type.
6408 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6409 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6413 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6414 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6415 // `static_remote_key`.
6416 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6417 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6419 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6420 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6421 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6423 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6424 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6426 channel_type.clone()
6428 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6429 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6430 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6435 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6436 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6437 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6438 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6439 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6440 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
6441 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6442 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6443 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
6446 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6447 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6450 // Check sanity of message fields:
6451 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6452 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6454 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6455 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6457 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6458 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6460 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6461 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6462 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6464 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6465 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6467 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6468 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6470 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
6472 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6473 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6474 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6476 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6479 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6480 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6483 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6484 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6485 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6487 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6488 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6490 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6491 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6493 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6494 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6496 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6497 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6499 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6500 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6502 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6503 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6506 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6508 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6509 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6510 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6514 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6515 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6516 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6517 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6518 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6520 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6521 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6523 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6524 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6525 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6527 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6528 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6531 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6532 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6533 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6534 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6538 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6539 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6540 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6541 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6544 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6545 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6546 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6547 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6548 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6551 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6552 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6553 &Some(ref script) => {
6554 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6555 if script.len() == 0 {
6558 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6559 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6561 Some(script.clone())
6564 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6566 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6571 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6572 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6573 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6574 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6578 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6579 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6580 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6584 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
6585 Ok(script) => script,
6586 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6589 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6590 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6592 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6595 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6599 context: ChannelContext {
6602 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6603 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6605 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6610 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6612 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6613 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6614 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
6615 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6618 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6620 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6621 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6624 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6625 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6626 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6628 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6629 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6630 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6631 pending_update_fee: None,
6632 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6633 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6634 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6635 update_time_counter: 1,
6637 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6639 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6640 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6641 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6642 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6643 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6644 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6646 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6647 signer_pending_funding: false,
6649 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6650 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6651 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6652 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
6654 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6655 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6656 closing_fee_limits: None,
6657 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6659 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6660 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6661 short_channel_id: None,
6662 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6664 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
6665 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
6666 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
6667 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6668 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
6669 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6670 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
6671 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6672 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
6673 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6674 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
6675 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6678 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6680 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6681 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6682 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6683 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
6684 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6685 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6686 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6688 funding_outpoint: None,
6689 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6691 funding_transaction: None,
6692 is_batch_funding: None,
6694 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
6695 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6696 counterparty_node_id,
6698 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6700 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6702 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6703 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6705 announcement_sigs: None,
6707 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6708 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6710 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6712 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6713 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6715 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6716 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
6718 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6719 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6721 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6722 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6727 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6729 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6735 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
6736 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
6738 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6739 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6740 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6741 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
6743 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6744 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
6746 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6747 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6750 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6753 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6754 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
6755 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
6757 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6758 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6759 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6760 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6762 msgs::AcceptChannel {
6763 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6764 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6765 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6766 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6767 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6768 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
6769 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6770 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6771 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6772 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
6773 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6774 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
6775 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
6776 first_per_commitment_point,
6777 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6778 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6779 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6781 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6783 next_local_nonce: None,
6787 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
6788 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
6790 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
6792 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
6793 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
6796 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6797 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6799 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6800 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
6801 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6802 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6803 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6804 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
6805 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
6806 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
6807 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
6808 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
6809 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
6811 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
6814 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
6815 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6816 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>), (Self, ChannelError)>
6820 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6821 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
6823 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
6824 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
6825 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
6827 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
6829 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6830 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6831 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6832 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6835 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
6836 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6837 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
6838 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
6839 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6841 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
6843 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
6844 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
6845 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
6848 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
6849 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
6850 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
6854 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6855 initial_commitment_tx,
6858 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6859 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6862 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
6863 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6866 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6868 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
6869 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6870 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6871 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6873 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
6875 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6876 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6877 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6878 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6879 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6880 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6881 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6882 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6883 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
6884 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6885 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6887 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6889 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6890 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
6891 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
6892 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
6893 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6894 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6896 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
6897 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
6899 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
6900 // `ChannelMonitor`.
6901 let mut channel = Channel {
6902 context: self.context,
6904 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6905 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6907 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
6911 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6912 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6914 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6920 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6921 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6922 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6923 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6924 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6926 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6927 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6928 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6929 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6935 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6936 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6937 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6938 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6939 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6940 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6945 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6946 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6947 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6948 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6950 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6951 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6952 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6953 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6958 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6959 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6960 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6961 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6962 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6963 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6968 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6969 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6970 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6973 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6975 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6976 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6977 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6978 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6979 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6981 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6982 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6983 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6984 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6986 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6987 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6988 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6990 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6992 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6993 // TODO (taproot|arik): Introduce serialization distinction for non-ECDSA signers.
6994 self.context.holder_signer.as_ecdsa().expect("Only ECDSA signers may be serialized").write(&mut key_data)?;
6995 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6996 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6997 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6998 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
7000 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7001 // deserialized from that format.
7002 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7003 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7004 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7006 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7008 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7009 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7010 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7012 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7013 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7014 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7015 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7018 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7019 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7020 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7023 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7024 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7025 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7026 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7028 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7029 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7031 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7033 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7035 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7037 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7040 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7042 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7047 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7048 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7050 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7051 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
7052 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7053 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7054 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7055 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7056 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7058 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7060 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7062 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7065 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7066 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7067 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7070 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7072 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7073 preimages.push(preimage);
7075 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7076 reason.write(writer)?;
7078 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7080 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7081 preimages.push(preimage);
7083 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7084 reason.write(writer)?;
7087 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = htlc.skimmed_fee_msat {
7088 if pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7089 for _ in 0..idx { pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7091 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7092 } else if !pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7093 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(None);
7097 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7098 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7099 for (idx, update) in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().enumerate() {
7101 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7102 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7106 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7107 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7108 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7109 source.write(writer)?;
7110 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7112 if let Some(skimmed_fee) = skimmed_fee_msat {
7113 if holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() {
7114 for _ in 0..idx { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7116 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(Some(skimmed_fee));
7117 } else if !holding_cell_skimmed_fees.is_empty() { holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(None); }
7119 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7121 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7122 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7124 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7126 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7127 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7132 match self.context.resend_order {
7133 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7134 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7137 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7138 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7139 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7141 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7142 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7143 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7144 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7147 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7148 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7149 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7150 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7151 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7154 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7155 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7156 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7157 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7159 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7160 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7161 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7163 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7165 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7166 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7167 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7168 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7170 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7171 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7172 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7173 // consider the stale state on reload.
7176 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7177 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7178 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7180 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7181 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7182 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7184 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7185 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7187 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7188 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7189 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7191 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7192 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7194 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7197 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7198 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7199 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7201 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7204 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7205 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7207 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7208 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7209 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7211 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7213 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7215 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7217 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7218 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7219 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7220 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7221 htlc.write(writer)?;
7224 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7225 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7226 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7228 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7229 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7231 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7232 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7233 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7234 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7235 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7236 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7237 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7239 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7240 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7241 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7242 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7243 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7245 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7246 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7248 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7249 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7250 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7251 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7253 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7255 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7256 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7257 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7258 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7259 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7260 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7261 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7263 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7264 (2, chan_type, option),
7265 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7266 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7267 (5, self.context.config, required),
7268 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7269 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7270 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7271 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7272 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7273 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7274 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7275 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7276 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7277 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7278 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7279 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7280 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7281 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7282 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7283 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7284 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7285 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7286 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7293 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7294 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7296 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7297 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7299 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7300 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7301 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7303 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7304 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7305 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7306 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7308 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7310 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7311 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7312 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7313 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7314 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7316 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7317 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7320 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7321 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
7322 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7324 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7326 let mut keys_data = None;
7328 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7329 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7330 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7331 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7332 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7333 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7334 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7335 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7336 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7337 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7341 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7342 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7343 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7346 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7348 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7349 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7350 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7352 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7354 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7355 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7356 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7357 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7358 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7359 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7360 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7361 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7362 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7363 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7364 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7365 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7366 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7371 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7372 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7373 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7374 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7375 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7376 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7377 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7378 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7379 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7380 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7381 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7382 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7384 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7385 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7388 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7389 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7392 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7393 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7395 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7397 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7401 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7402 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7403 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7404 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7405 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7406 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7407 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7408 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7409 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7410 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7411 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7413 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7414 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7415 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7417 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7418 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7419 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7421 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7425 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7426 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7427 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7428 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7431 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7432 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7433 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7435 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7436 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7437 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7438 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7441 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7442 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7443 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7444 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7447 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7449 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7451 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7452 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7453 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7454 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7456 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7457 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7458 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7459 // consider the stale state on reload.
7460 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7463 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7464 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7465 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7467 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7470 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7471 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7472 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7474 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7475 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7476 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7477 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7479 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7480 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7482 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7483 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7485 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7486 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7487 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7489 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7491 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7492 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7494 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7495 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7498 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7500 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7501 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7502 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7503 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7505 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7508 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7509 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7511 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7513 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7514 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7516 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7517 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7519 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7521 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7522 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7523 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7525 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7526 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7527 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7531 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7532 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7533 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7535 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7541 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7542 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7543 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7544 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7545 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7546 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7547 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7548 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7549 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7550 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7552 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7553 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7554 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7555 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7556 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7557 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7558 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7560 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7561 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7562 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7563 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7565 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7567 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7568 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7570 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7572 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7573 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7574 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7575 (2, channel_type, option),
7576 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7577 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7578 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7579 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7580 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7581 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7582 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7583 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7584 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7585 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7586 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7587 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7588 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7589 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7590 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7591 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7592 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7593 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7594 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7595 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7596 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7597 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7600 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7601 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7602 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7603 // required channel parameters.
7604 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7605 if non_shutdown_state & !STATE_FLAGS >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7606 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7608 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7610 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7611 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7612 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7613 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7616 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7617 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7618 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7620 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7621 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7623 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7624 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7629 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7630 if iter.next().is_some() {
7631 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7635 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7636 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7637 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7638 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7639 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7642 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
7643 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
7644 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
7646 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7647 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7649 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7650 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7651 // separate u64 values.
7652 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7654 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7656 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
7657 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7658 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7659 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7661 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7662 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7664 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
7665 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
7666 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
7667 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
7668 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7671 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
7672 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
7676 context: ChannelContext {
7679 config: config.unwrap(),
7683 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7684 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7685 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7688 temporary_channel_id,
7690 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7692 channel_value_satoshis,
7694 latest_monitor_update_id,
7696 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7697 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7700 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7701 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7704 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7705 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7706 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7707 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7711 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7712 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7713 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7714 monitor_pending_forwards,
7715 monitor_pending_failures,
7716 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7718 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7719 signer_pending_funding: false,
7722 holding_cell_update_fee,
7723 next_holder_htlc_id,
7724 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7725 update_time_counter,
7728 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7729 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7730 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7731 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7733 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7734 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7735 closing_fee_limits: None,
7736 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7738 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7739 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7741 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7743 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7744 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7745 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7746 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7747 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7748 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7749 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7750 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7751 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7754 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7756 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7757 funding_transaction,
7760 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7761 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7762 counterparty_node_id,
7764 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7768 channel_update_status,
7769 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7773 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7774 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7775 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7776 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7778 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7779 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7781 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7782 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7783 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7785 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7786 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7788 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7789 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7791 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7794 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7803 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
7804 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7805 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7806 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7807 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7809 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7810 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7811 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7812 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, commit_tx_fee_msat};
7813 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7814 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7815 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7816 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7817 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7818 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7819 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7820 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7821 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7822 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7823 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7824 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7825 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7826 use crate::util::test_utils;
7827 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
7828 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7829 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7830 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7831 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7832 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7833 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7834 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7835 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7836 use crate::prelude::*;
7838 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7841 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7842 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7848 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7849 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7850 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7851 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7855 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7856 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7857 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7858 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7859 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7860 assert!(Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::check_remote_fee(
7861 &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), &bounded_fee_estimator,
7862 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7866 signer: InMemorySigner,
7869 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7870 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7873 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7874 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7876 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7877 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7880 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7884 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7886 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7887 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7888 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7889 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7890 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7893 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7894 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7895 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7896 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7900 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
7901 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7902 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7906 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7907 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7908 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7909 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7911 let seed = [42; 32];
7912 let network = Network::Testnet;
7913 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7914 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7915 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7918 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7919 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7920 let config = UserConfig::default();
7921 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
7922 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7923 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7925 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7926 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7930 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7931 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7933 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7934 let original_fee = 253;
7935 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7936 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7937 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7938 let seed = [42; 32];
7939 let network = Network::Testnet;
7940 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7942 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7943 let config = UserConfig::default();
7944 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7946 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7947 // same as the old fee.
7948 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7949 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7950 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7954 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7955 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7956 // dust limits are used.
7957 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7958 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7959 let seed = [42; 32];
7960 let network = Network::Testnet;
7961 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7962 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7963 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7965 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7966 // they have different dust limits.
7968 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7969 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7970 let config = UserConfig::default();
7971 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
7973 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7974 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7975 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
7976 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7977 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
7979 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7980 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
7981 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7982 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7983 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7985 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7986 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7987 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7988 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7990 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7991 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7992 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
7994 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7995 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7997 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7998 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7999 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8001 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8002 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
8003 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8004 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8007 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8009 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8010 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
8011 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8012 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8013 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8014 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8015 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8016 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8017 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8019 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8022 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8023 // the dust limit check.
8024 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8025 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8026 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8027 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8029 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8030 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8031 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8032 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8033 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8034 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8035 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8039 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8040 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8041 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8042 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8043 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8044 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8045 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8046 let seed = [42; 32];
8047 let network = Network::Testnet;
8048 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8050 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8051 let config = UserConfig::default();
8052 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8054 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8055 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8057 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8058 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8059 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8060 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8061 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8062 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8064 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8065 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8066 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8067 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8068 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8070 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8072 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8073 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8074 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8075 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8076 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8078 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8079 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8080 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8081 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8082 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8086 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8087 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8088 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8089 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8090 let seed = [42; 32];
8091 let network = Network::Testnet;
8092 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8093 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8094 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8096 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8098 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8099 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8100 let config = UserConfig::default();
8101 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8103 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8104 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8105 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8106 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8108 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8109 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8110 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8112 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8113 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8114 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8115 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8117 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8118 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8119 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8121 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8122 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8124 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8125 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8126 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8127 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8128 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8129 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8130 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8132 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8134 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8135 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8136 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8137 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8138 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8142 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8143 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8144 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8145 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8146 let seed = [42; 32];
8147 let network = Network::Testnet;
8148 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8149 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8150 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8152 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8153 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8154 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8155 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8156 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8157 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8158 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8159 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8161 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8162 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8163 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8164 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8165 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8166 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8168 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8169 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8170 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8171 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8173 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8175 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8176 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8177 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8178 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8179 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8180 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8182 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8183 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8184 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8185 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8187 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8188 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8189 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8190 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8191 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8193 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8194 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8196 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8197 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8198 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8200 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8201 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8202 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8203 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8204 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8206 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8207 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8209 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8210 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8211 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8215 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8217 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8218 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8219 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8221 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8222 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8223 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8224 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8226 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8227 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8228 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8230 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8232 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8233 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8236 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8237 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8238 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8239 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8240 let seed = [42; 32];
8241 let network = Network::Testnet;
8242 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8243 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8244 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8247 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8248 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8249 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8251 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8252 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8254 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8255 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8256 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8258 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8259 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8261 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8263 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8264 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8266 // Channel Negotiations failed
8267 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8268 assert!(result.is_err());
8273 fn channel_update() {
8274 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8275 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8276 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8277 let seed = [42; 32];
8278 let network = Network::Testnet;
8279 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8280 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8281 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8283 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8284 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8285 let config = UserConfig::default();
8286 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8288 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8289 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8290 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8291 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8292 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8294 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8295 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8296 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8297 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8298 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8300 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8301 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8302 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8303 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8305 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8306 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8307 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8309 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8310 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
8312 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8313 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8314 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8316 short_channel_id: 0,
8319 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8320 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8321 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8323 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8324 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8326 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8328 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8330 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8331 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8332 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8333 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8335 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8336 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8337 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8339 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8342 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8345 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
8347 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8348 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
8349 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8350 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
8351 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8352 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8353 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8354 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, EcdsaChannelSigner};
8355 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8356 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8357 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8358 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8359 use crate::sync::Arc;
8361 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8362 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8363 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8364 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8366 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8368 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8369 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8370 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8371 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8372 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8374 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8375 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8381 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8382 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8383 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8385 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8386 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8387 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8388 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8389 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8390 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8392 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8394 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8395 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8396 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8397 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8398 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8399 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
8401 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8402 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8403 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8404 selected_contest_delay: 144
8406 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8407 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8409 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8410 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8412 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8413 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8415 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
8416 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8418 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8419 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8420 // build_commitment_transaction.
8421 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8422 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8423 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8424 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8425 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8427 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8428 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8429 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8430 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8434 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8435 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8436 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8437 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8441 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8442 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8443 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8445 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8446 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8448 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8449 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8451 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8453 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8454 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8455 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8456 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8457 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8458 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
8459 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8461 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8462 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8463 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8464 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8466 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8467 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8468 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8470 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8472 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8473 commitment_tx.clone(),
8474 counterparty_signature,
8475 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8476 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8477 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8479 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8480 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8482 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8483 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8484 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8486 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8487 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8490 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8491 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8493 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8494 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8495 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8496 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8497 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8498 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8499 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8500 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8502 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8505 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
8506 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8507 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8511 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8514 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8515 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8516 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8517 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8518 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8519 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
8521 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
8522 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
8523 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
8524 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
8526 preimage: preimage.clone(),
8527 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
8528 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8529 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
8530 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
8532 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8533 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
8534 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
8535 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
8536 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&htlc_tx)));
8537 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
8539 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
8543 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
8544 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
8545 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
8546 "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", {});
8548 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8549 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
8551 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
8552 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
8553 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8002c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48454a56a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004730440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae05564714201483045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8555 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
8556 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
8557 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
8558 "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", {});
8560 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8561 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8563 amount_msat: 1000000,
8565 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8566 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8568 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
8571 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8572 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8574 amount_msat: 2000000,
8576 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8577 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8579 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8582 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8583 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8585 amount_msat: 2000000,
8587 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8588 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8589 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8590 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8592 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8595 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8596 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8598 amount_msat: 3000000,
8600 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8601 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8602 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8603 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8605 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8608 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8609 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8611 amount_msat: 4000000,
8613 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8614 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8616 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8620 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8621 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8622 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8624 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8625 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8626 "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", {
8629 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8630 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8631 "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" },
8634 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8635 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8636 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8639 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8640 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8641 "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" },
8644 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8645 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8646 "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" },
8649 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8650 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8651 "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" }
8654 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8655 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8656 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8658 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8659 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8660 "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", {
8663 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8664 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8665 "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" },
8668 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8669 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8670 "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" },
8673 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8674 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8675 "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" },
8678 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8679 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8680 "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" },
8683 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8684 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8685 "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" }
8688 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8689 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8690 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8692 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8693 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8694 "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", {
8697 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8698 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8699 "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" },
8702 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8703 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8704 "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" },
8707 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8708 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8709 "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" },
8712 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8713 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8714 "020000000001010f44041fdfba175987cf4e6135ba2a154e3b7fb96483dc0ed5efc0678e5b6bf103000000000000000001d90d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be01483045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8717 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8718 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8719 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8720 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8722 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8723 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8724 "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", {
8727 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8728 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8729 "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" },
8732 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8733 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8734 "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" },
8737 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8738 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8739 "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" },
8742 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8743 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8744 "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" }
8747 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8748 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8749 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8750 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8752 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8753 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8754 "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", {
8757 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8758 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8759 "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" },
8762 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8763 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8764 "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" },
8767 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8768 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8769 "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" },
8772 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8773 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8774 "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" }
8777 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8778 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8779 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8781 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8782 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8783 "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", {
8786 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8787 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8788 "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" },
8791 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8792 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8793 "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" },
8796 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8797 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8798 "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" }
8801 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8802 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8803 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8805 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8806 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8807 "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", {
8810 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8811 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8812 "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" },
8815 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8816 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8817 "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" },
8820 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8821 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8822 "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" }
8825 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8826 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8827 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8829 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8830 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8831 "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", {
8834 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8835 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8836 "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" },
8839 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8840 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8841 "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" }
8844 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8845 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8846 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8847 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8848 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
8849 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8851 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8852 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8853 "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", {
8856 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8857 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8858 "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" },
8861 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8862 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8863 "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" }
8866 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8867 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8868 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8869 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8870 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8872 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8873 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8874 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8877 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8878 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8879 "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" },
8882 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8883 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8884 "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" }
8887 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8888 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8889 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8891 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8892 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8893 "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", {
8896 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8897 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8898 "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" }
8901 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8902 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8903 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8904 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8905 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8907 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8908 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8909 "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", {
8912 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8913 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8914 "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" }
8917 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8918 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8919 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8920 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8921 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8923 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8924 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8925 "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", {
8928 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8929 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8930 "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" }
8933 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8934 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8935 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8936 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8938 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8939 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8940 "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", {});
8942 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8943 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8944 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8945 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8946 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8948 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8949 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8950 "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", {});
8952 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8953 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8954 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8955 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8956 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
8958 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8959 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8960 "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", {});
8962 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8963 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8964 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8966 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8967 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8968 "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", {});
8970 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8971 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8972 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8973 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8974 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8976 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8977 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8978 "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", {});
8980 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8981 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8982 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8983 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8984 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
8986 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8987 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8988 "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", {});
8990 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8991 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8992 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8993 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8994 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8995 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8997 amount_msat: 2000000,
8999 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9000 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9002 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
9005 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9006 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9007 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9009 amount_msat: 5000001,
9011 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9012 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9013 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9014 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9016 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
9019 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9020 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9022 amount_msat: 5000000,
9024 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9025 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9026 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9027 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9029 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
9033 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9034 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9035 "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", {
9038 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9039 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9040 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec000000000000000000011f070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce501473044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
9042 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9043 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9044 "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" },
9046 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9047 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9048 "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" }
9051 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9052 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9053 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9054 "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", {
9057 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9058 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9059 "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" },
9061 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9062 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9063 "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" },
9065 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9066 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9067 "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" }
9072 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9073 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9075 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9076 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9077 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9078 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9080 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9081 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9082 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9084 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9085 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9087 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9088 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9090 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9091 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9092 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9096 fn test_key_derivation() {
9097 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9098 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9100 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9101 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9103 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9104 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9106 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9107 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9109 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9110 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
9112 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9113 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9115 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
9116 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9118 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9119 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9123 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9124 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9125 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9126 let seed = [42; 32];
9127 let network = Network::Testnet;
9128 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9129 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9131 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9132 let config = UserConfig::default();
9133 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9134 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9136 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9137 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9139 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9140 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9141 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9142 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9143 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9144 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9145 assert!(res.is_ok());
9149 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9150 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9151 // resulting `channel_type`.
9152 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9153 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9154 let network = Network::Testnet;
9155 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9156 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9158 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9159 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9161 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9162 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9164 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9165 // need to signal it.
9166 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9167 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9168 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9169 &config, 0, 42, None
9171 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9173 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9174 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9175 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9177 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9178 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9179 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9183 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9184 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9185 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9186 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9187 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9190 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9191 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9195 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9196 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9197 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9198 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9199 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9200 let network = Network::Testnet;
9201 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9202 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9204 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9205 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9207 let config = UserConfig::default();
9209 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9210 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9211 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9212 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9213 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9215 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9216 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9217 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9221 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9222 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9223 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9225 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9226 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9227 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9228 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9229 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9230 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9232 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9236 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9237 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9239 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9240 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9241 let network = Network::Testnet;
9242 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9243 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9245 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9246 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9248 let config = UserConfig::default();
9250 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9251 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9252 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9253 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9254 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9255 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9256 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9257 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9259 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9260 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9261 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9262 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9263 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9264 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9268 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9269 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9271 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9272 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9273 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9274 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9276 assert!(res.is_err());
9278 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9279 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9280 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9282 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9283 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9284 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9287 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9289 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9290 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9291 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9292 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9295 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9296 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9298 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9299 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9301 assert!(res.is_err());
9305 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9306 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9307 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9308 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9309 let seed = [42; 32];
9310 let network = Network::Testnet;
9311 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9312 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9313 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9315 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9316 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9317 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9318 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9320 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9321 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9322 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9327 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9337 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9338 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9339 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9344 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9345 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9351 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9354 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9355 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9356 &accept_channel_msg,
9357 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9358 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9361 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9362 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9363 let tx = Transaction {
9365 lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO,
9369 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9372 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9375 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9376 let (mut node_a_chan, funding_created_msg) = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9381 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9382 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9383 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9387 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9388 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9396 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9397 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9398 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9399 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(),
9404 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9411 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9412 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9413 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9414 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9416 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9417 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9418 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32,
9421 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9422 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9423 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9431 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9432 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9433 ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as u32 |
9434 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9437 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9438 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9440 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9441 ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 |
9442 ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32,
9444 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());