1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
308 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
309 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
310 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
311 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
312 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
313 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
314 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
316 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
318 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
320 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
324 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
326 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
327 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
328 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
330 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
331 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
333 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
334 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
335 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
336 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
337 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
339 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
340 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
344 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
350 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
353 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
354 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
356 holding_cell_msat: u64,
357 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
360 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
361 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
362 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
363 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
364 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
365 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
366 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
367 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
368 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
369 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
372 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
373 struct HTLCCandidate {
375 origin: HTLCInitiator,
379 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
387 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
389 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
391 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
392 htlc_value_msat: u64,
393 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
398 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
399 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
400 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
401 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
402 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
404 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
405 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
406 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
407 htlc_value_msat: u64,
409 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
410 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
414 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
415 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
416 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
417 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
418 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
419 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
420 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
421 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
422 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
423 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
424 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
427 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
428 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
429 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
430 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
431 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
432 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
434 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
437 /// The return type of `force_shutdown`
438 pub(crate) type ShutdownResult = (
439 Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
440 Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>
443 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
444 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
445 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
446 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
447 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
448 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
449 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
450 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
451 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
452 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
453 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
454 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
455 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
456 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
457 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
459 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
460 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
461 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
462 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
464 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
465 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
466 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
467 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
469 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
470 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
471 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
472 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
473 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
475 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
476 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
477 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
478 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
480 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
481 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
482 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
484 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
485 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
486 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
487 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
488 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
490 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
491 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
494 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
495 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
497 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
498 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
499 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
500 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
501 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
503 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
507 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
508 (0, update, required),
509 (2, blocked, required),
512 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
513 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
514 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
516 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
517 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
518 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
519 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
521 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
525 channel_id: [u8; 32],
526 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
529 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
530 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
532 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
533 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
534 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
536 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
537 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
538 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
539 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
541 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
542 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
544 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
546 holder_signer: Signer,
547 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
548 destination_script: Script,
550 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
551 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
552 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
554 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
555 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
556 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
557 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
558 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
559 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
561 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
562 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
563 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
564 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
565 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
566 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
568 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
570 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
571 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
572 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
574 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
575 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
576 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
577 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
578 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
579 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
580 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
582 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
584 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
585 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
586 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
587 // HTLCs with similar state.
588 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
589 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
590 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
591 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
592 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
593 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
594 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
595 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
596 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
599 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
600 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
601 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
603 update_time_counter: u32,
605 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
606 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
607 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
608 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
609 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
610 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
612 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
613 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
615 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
616 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
617 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
618 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
620 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
621 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
623 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
625 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
627 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
628 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
629 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
630 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
631 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
632 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
634 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
635 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
636 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
637 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
638 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
640 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
641 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
642 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
643 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
644 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
645 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
646 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
647 channel_creation_height: u32,
649 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
652 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
657 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
659 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
662 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
664 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
666 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
667 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
670 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
672 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
674 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
675 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
677 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
679 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
680 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
681 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
683 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
685 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
686 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
688 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
689 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
690 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
692 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
694 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
696 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
697 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
698 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
699 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
701 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
702 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
703 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
705 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
706 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
707 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
709 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
710 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
711 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
712 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
713 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
714 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
715 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
716 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
718 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
719 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
720 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
721 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
722 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
724 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
725 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
727 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
728 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
729 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
730 /// unblock the state machine.
732 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
733 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
734 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
736 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
737 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
738 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
740 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
741 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
742 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
743 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
744 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
745 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
746 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
747 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
749 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
750 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
752 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
753 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
754 // the channel's funding UTXO.
756 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
757 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
758 // associated channel mapping.
760 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
761 // to store all of them.
762 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
764 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
765 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
766 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
767 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
768 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
770 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
771 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
773 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
774 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
776 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
777 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
778 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
780 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
781 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
782 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
783 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
784 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
787 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
788 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
789 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
792 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
793 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
794 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
795 pub context: ChannelContext<Signer>,
798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
799 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
801 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
802 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
803 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
807 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
809 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
810 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
811 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
812 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
816 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
818 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
820 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
822 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
823 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
824 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
825 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
826 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
828 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
829 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
831 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
833 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
834 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
836 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
837 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
838 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
839 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
840 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
841 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
843 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
844 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
846 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
847 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
848 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
849 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
850 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
852 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
853 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
855 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
856 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
858 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
859 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
860 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
861 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
867 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
868 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
870 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
871 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
872 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
877 macro_rules! secp_check {
878 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
881 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
886 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
887 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
888 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
889 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
891 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
893 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
894 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
895 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
897 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
900 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
902 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
905 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
906 /// required by us according to the configured or default
907 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
909 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
911 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
912 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
913 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
914 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
915 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
918 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
919 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
920 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
921 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
922 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
923 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
924 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
927 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
928 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
931 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
932 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
933 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
934 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
935 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
936 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
937 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
938 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
939 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
940 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
943 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
944 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
945 // `only_static_remotekey`.
947 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
948 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
949 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
950 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
957 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
958 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
959 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
960 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
961 if !self.is_outbound() || self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
962 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
963 // We've exhausted our options
966 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
967 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
970 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
971 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
972 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
973 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
975 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
976 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
977 assert!(self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
978 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
979 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
980 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
982 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
984 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
988 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
989 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
990 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
991 outbound_scid_alias: u64
992 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
993 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
994 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
995 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
997 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
998 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
999 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1000 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1002 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1003 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1005 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1006 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1008 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1009 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1010 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1012 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1013 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1015 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
1016 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1017 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1018 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1019 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
1022 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1023 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1025 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
1027 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1028 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
1029 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
1030 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1033 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1034 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1036 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1037 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1038 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1039 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1043 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1044 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1045 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1049 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1050 Ok(script) => script,
1051 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1054 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1057 context: ChannelContext {
1060 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1061 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1062 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1063 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1068 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1070 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1071 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1072 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1073 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1075 channel_value_satoshis,
1077 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1080 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1083 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1084 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1087 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1088 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1089 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1090 pending_update_fee: None,
1091 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1092 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1093 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1094 update_time_counter: 1,
1096 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1098 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1099 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1100 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1101 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1102 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1103 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1105 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1106 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1107 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1108 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1110 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1111 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1112 closing_fee_limits: None,
1113 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1115 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1117 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1118 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1119 short_channel_id: None,
1120 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1122 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1123 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1124 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1125 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1126 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1127 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1128 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1129 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1130 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1131 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1132 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1133 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1135 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1137 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1138 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1139 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1140 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1141 counterparty_parameters: None,
1142 funding_outpoint: None,
1143 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1144 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1146 funding_transaction: None,
1148 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1149 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1150 counterparty_node_id,
1152 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1154 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1156 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1157 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1159 announcement_sigs: None,
1161 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1162 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1163 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1164 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1166 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1167 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1169 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1170 outbound_scid_alias,
1172 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1173 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1175 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1176 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1181 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1186 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1187 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1188 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1190 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1191 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1192 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1193 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1194 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1195 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1196 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1197 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1199 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1200 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1201 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1202 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1203 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1204 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1205 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1206 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1208 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1209 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1218 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1219 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1220 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1221 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1222 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1223 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1224 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1225 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1226 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1227 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1228 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1231 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1233 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1234 // support this channel type.
1235 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1236 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1240 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1241 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1242 // `static_remote_key`.
1243 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1246 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1247 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1250 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1251 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1253 channel_type.clone()
1255 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1256 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1257 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1261 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1263 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1264 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1265 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1266 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1267 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1268 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1269 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1270 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1271 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1274 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1278 // Check sanity of message fields:
1279 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1282 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1285 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1286 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1288 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1289 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1292 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1293 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1295 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1296 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1298 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1300 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1301 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1304 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1305 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1307 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1308 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1311 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1312 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1315 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1316 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1318 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1319 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1321 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1324 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1325 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1327 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1328 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1330 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1334 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1336 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1337 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1338 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1342 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1343 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1344 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1345 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1346 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1348 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1349 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1351 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1352 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1353 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1355 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1356 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1359 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1360 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1361 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1362 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1363 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1364 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1367 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1368 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1369 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1370 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1371 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1374 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1375 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1376 &Some(ref script) => {
1377 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1378 if script.len() == 0 {
1381 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1382 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1384 Some(script.clone())
1387 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1389 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1394 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1395 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1396 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1397 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1401 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1402 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1403 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1407 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1408 Ok(script) => script,
1409 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1412 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1413 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1415 let chan = Channel {
1416 context: ChannelContext {
1419 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1420 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1422 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1427 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1429 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1430 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1431 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1432 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1435 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1438 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1441 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1442 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1443 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1445 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1446 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1447 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1448 pending_update_fee: None,
1449 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1450 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1451 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1452 update_time_counter: 1,
1454 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1456 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1457 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1458 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1459 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1460 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1461 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1463 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1464 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1465 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1466 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1468 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1469 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1470 closing_fee_limits: None,
1471 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1473 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1475 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1476 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1477 short_channel_id: None,
1478 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1480 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1481 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1482 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1483 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1484 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1485 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1486 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1487 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1488 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1489 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1490 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1491 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1492 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1494 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1496 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1497 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1498 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1499 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1500 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1501 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1502 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1504 funding_outpoint: None,
1505 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1506 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1508 funding_transaction: None,
1510 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1511 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1512 counterparty_node_id,
1514 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1516 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1518 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1519 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1521 announcement_sigs: None,
1523 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1524 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1525 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1526 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1528 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1529 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1531 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1532 outbound_scid_alias,
1534 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1535 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1537 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1538 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1543 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1550 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1551 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1552 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1553 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1554 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1556 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1557 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1558 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1559 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1560 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1561 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1562 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1564 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1565 where L::Target: Logger
1567 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1568 let num_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1569 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1571 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1572 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1573 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1574 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1576 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.context.feerate_per_kw;
1577 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
1578 if match update_state {
1579 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1580 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1581 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1582 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1583 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1585 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1589 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1590 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1591 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1592 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1594 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1595 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1596 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1598 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1599 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1600 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1601 transaction_output_index: None
1606 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1607 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1608 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1609 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1610 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1613 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1615 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1616 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1617 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1619 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1620 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1623 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1624 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1627 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1629 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1630 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1631 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1633 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1634 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1640 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1641 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1642 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1643 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1644 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1645 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1646 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1650 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1651 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1653 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1655 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1656 if generated_by_local {
1657 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1658 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1667 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1669 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1670 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1671 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1672 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1673 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1674 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1675 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1678 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1679 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1680 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1681 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1685 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1686 preimages.push(preimage);
1690 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1691 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1693 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1695 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1696 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1698 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1699 if !generated_by_local {
1700 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1708 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1709 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1710 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1711 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1712 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1713 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1714 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1715 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1717 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1719 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1720 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1721 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1722 self.context.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1724 self.context.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1726 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1727 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1728 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1729 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1732 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1733 let anchors_val = if self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1734 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1735 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1737 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1740 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1741 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1742 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1743 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1745 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1748 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1749 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1754 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1755 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1760 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1762 let channel_parameters =
1763 if local { self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1764 else { self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1765 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1768 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1773 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1776 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1777 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1778 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1779 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1781 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1782 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1783 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1791 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1792 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1798 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1799 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1800 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1801 // outside of those situations will fail.
1802 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1806 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1811 1 + // script length (0)
1815 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1816 2 + // witness marker and flag
1817 1 + // witness element count
1818 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1819 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1820 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1821 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1822 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1823 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1825 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1826 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1827 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1833 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1834 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1835 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1836 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1838 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1839 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1840 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1842 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1843 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1844 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1845 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1846 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1847 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1850 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1851 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1854 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1855 value_to_holder = 0;
1858 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1859 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1860 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1861 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1863 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1864 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1867 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1868 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1872 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1873 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1874 /// our counterparty!)
1875 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1876 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1877 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1878 let per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
1879 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1880 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1881 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1883 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.context.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1887 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1888 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1889 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1890 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1891 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1892 //may see payments to it!
1893 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1894 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1895 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1897 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.context.secp_ctx, &self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1900 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1901 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1902 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1903 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1904 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1907 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1910 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1911 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1913 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1915 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1916 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1917 where L::Target: Logger {
1918 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1919 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1920 assert!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1921 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1922 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1923 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1924 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1925 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1929 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1930 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1931 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1932 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1934 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1935 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1937 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1939 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1941 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1942 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1943 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1945 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1946 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1947 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1948 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1949 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1951 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1952 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1953 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1955 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1956 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1958 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1961 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1962 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1966 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1970 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1971 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1972 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1973 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1974 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1975 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1978 // Now update local state:
1980 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1981 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1982 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1983 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1984 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
1985 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1986 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1990 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1991 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1992 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1993 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1994 // do not not get into this branch.
1995 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1996 match pending_update {
1997 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1998 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1999 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2000 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2001 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2002 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2003 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2006 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2007 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2008 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2009 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2010 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2011 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2012 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2018 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.context.channel_state);
2019 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2020 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2022 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2023 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2024 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2026 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2027 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2030 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2031 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2033 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2034 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2036 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
2037 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2040 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2043 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2044 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2045 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2046 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2051 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2052 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2053 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2054 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2055 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2056 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2057 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2058 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2059 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2060 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2061 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2062 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2063 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2064 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2065 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2066 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2067 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2069 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2071 let insert_pos = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2072 .unwrap_or(self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2073 let new_mon_id = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2074 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2075 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2076 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2077 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2079 for held_update in self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2080 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2083 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2084 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2085 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2086 update, blocked: true,
2091 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2092 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2093 monitor_update: &self.context.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2094 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2098 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2102 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2103 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2104 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2105 /// before we fail backwards.
2107 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2108 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2109 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2110 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2111 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2112 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2113 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2116 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2117 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2118 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2119 /// before we fail backwards.
2121 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2122 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2123 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2124 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2125 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2126 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2127 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2129 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2131 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2132 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2133 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2135 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2136 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2137 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2139 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2140 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2141 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2143 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2148 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2149 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2155 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2156 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2157 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2158 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2159 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2163 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2164 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2165 force_holding_cell = true;
2168 // Now update local state:
2169 if force_holding_cell {
2170 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2171 match pending_update {
2172 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2173 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2174 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2175 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2179 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2180 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2181 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2182 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2188 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2189 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2190 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2196 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2198 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2199 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2202 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2203 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2204 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2209 // Message handlers:
2211 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2212 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2214 // Check sanity of message fields:
2215 if !self.is_outbound() {
2216 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2218 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2219 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2221 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2222 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2224 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
2225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
2227 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2228 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2230 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2231 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2232 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2234 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2235 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2236 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2238 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2239 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2240 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2242 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2243 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2245 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2249 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2250 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2253 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2254 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2256 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2259 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2262 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2263 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2265 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2266 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2268 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2269 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2272 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2273 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
2274 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2276 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2277 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2279 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2280 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2281 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2283 self.context.channel_type = channel_type;
2286 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2287 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2288 &Some(ref script) => {
2289 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2290 if script.len() == 0 {
2293 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2296 Some(script.clone())
2299 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2301 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2306 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2307 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2308 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2309 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2310 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2312 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2313 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2315 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2318 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2319 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2320 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2321 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2322 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2323 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2326 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2327 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2328 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2331 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2332 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2334 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2335 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2340 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2341 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2343 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2344 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2346 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2347 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2348 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2349 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2350 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2351 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2352 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2353 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2354 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2357 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2358 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2360 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2361 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2362 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2363 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2365 let counterparty_signature = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
2366 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2368 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2369 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2372 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2373 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2376 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2377 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2378 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2380 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2383 if self.is_outbound() {
2384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2386 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2387 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2388 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2390 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2392 if self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2393 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2395 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2396 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2397 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2398 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2401 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2402 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2403 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2404 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2405 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2407 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2409 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2410 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2411 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2414 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2415 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2416 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2420 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2421 initial_commitment_tx,
2424 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2425 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2428 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2429 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2431 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2433 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2434 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2435 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2436 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2437 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2438 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2439 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2440 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2441 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2442 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2443 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2445 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2447 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2449 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2450 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2451 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2452 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2454 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2456 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2457 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2459 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2460 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
2463 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2464 }, channel_monitor))
2467 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2468 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2469 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2470 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2471 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2473 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2476 if !self.is_outbound() {
2477 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2479 if self.context.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2480 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2482 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2483 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2484 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2485 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2488 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2490 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2491 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2492 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2493 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2495 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2496 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2498 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2499 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2501 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2502 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2503 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
2504 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2505 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2506 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2510 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2511 initial_commitment_tx,
2514 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2515 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2518 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2519 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2522 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2523 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2524 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2525 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2526 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2527 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
2528 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
2529 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2530 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2531 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2532 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
2533 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
2535 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
2537 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2539 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2540 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2541 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2542 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2544 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2546 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2547 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2551 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2552 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2554 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2555 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2556 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2557 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2559 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2562 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2563 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2564 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2567 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2568 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2569 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2570 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2571 // when routing outbound payments.
2572 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2576 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2578 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2579 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2580 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2581 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2582 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2583 } else if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2584 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2585 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2586 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2588 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2589 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2590 let expected_point =
2591 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2592 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2594 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2595 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2596 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2597 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2598 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2599 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2601 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2602 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2603 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2604 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2605 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2607 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2608 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2612 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2615 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2616 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2618 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2620 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2623 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2624 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2625 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2626 self.context.funding_transaction.clone()
2632 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2633 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2634 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2635 pending_htlcs: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2636 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2637 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2638 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2639 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2640 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2643 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2646 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2647 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2648 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2650 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2651 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2652 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2653 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2654 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2655 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2657 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2658 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2664 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2665 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2666 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2667 pending_htlcs: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2668 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2669 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2670 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2671 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2672 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2675 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2678 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2679 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2680 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2682 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2683 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2684 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2685 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2686 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2687 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2689 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2690 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2694 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2695 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2696 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2697 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2698 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2699 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2700 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2702 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2703 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2705 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2712 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2713 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2714 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2715 /// corner case properly.
2716 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2717 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2718 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2719 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2721 let mut balance_msat = self.context.value_to_self_msat;
2722 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2723 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2724 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2727 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2729 let outbound_capacity_msat = self.context.value_to_self_msat
2730 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2732 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2734 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2736 if self.is_outbound() {
2737 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2738 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2740 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2741 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2743 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2744 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2745 if !self.opt_anchors() {
2746 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2749 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2750 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2751 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2752 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2754 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2755 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2756 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2757 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
2758 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2759 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2760 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2761 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2762 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2763 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2765 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2768 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2769 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2770 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2771 if !self.opt_anchors() {
2772 real_dust_limit_success_sat += self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2775 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2776 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2778 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2779 let remote_balance_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat)
2780 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2782 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
2783 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2784 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2785 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2789 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2791 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2792 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2793 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2794 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2795 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2796 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2798 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2799 (self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2801 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2802 (self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2803 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2805 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2806 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
2807 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2808 Some(self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2809 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2812 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2813 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
2814 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2815 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2816 self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2817 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2820 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2821 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2822 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2824 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2828 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2829 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2831 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2832 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2836 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2837 - self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2838 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2839 - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2841 outbound_capacity_msat,
2842 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2843 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2848 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2849 (self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2852 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2853 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2854 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2855 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2856 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2857 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2860 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2861 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2863 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2864 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2867 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2868 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2870 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2871 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2873 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2874 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2876 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2877 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2878 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2880 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2883 (self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2884 self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2886 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2887 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2889 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2890 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2892 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2893 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2897 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2898 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2904 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2905 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2906 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2909 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2910 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2911 included_htlcs += 1;
2914 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2915 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2919 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2920 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2921 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2922 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2923 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2924 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2929 for htlc in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2931 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2932 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2937 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2938 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2942 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2943 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2944 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2947 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2948 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2950 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2951 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2952 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2954 total_pending_htlcs,
2955 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2956 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2957 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2959 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2960 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2961 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2963 feerate: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
2965 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2970 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2971 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2973 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2974 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2976 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2977 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2979 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2980 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2981 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2983 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2986 (self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2987 self.context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2989 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2990 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2992 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2993 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2995 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2996 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3000 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3001 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3007 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3008 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3009 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3010 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3011 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3012 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3015 included_htlcs += 1;
3018 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3019 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3022 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3023 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3025 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3026 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3027 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3032 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3033 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
3034 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3037 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3038 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
3040 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3041 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3043 total_pending_htlcs,
3044 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3045 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3046 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3048 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3049 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3050 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3052 feerate: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
3054 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3059 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3060 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
3061 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3062 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3063 if local_sent_shutdown {
3064 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3066 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3067 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3068 if remote_sent_shutdown {
3069 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3071 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3072 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3074 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3075 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3077 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3078 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3080 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3081 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3084 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3085 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3086 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3087 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3089 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3090 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3092 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3093 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3094 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3095 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3096 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3097 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3098 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3099 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3100 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3101 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3102 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3104 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3105 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3106 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3107 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3108 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3109 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3113 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
3116 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3117 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3118 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3120 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3121 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3122 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3123 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3124 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3125 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3126 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3130 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3131 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3132 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3133 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3134 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3135 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3136 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3140 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3141 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3142 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3143 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3144 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3145 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3148 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3149 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3150 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3151 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3152 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3154 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3155 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3158 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3159 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3162 if !self.is_outbound() {
3163 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3164 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3165 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3166 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3167 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3168 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3169 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3170 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3171 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3172 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3173 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3174 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3175 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3176 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3177 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3180 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3181 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3182 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3183 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3187 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3190 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3191 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3194 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3195 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3196 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3200 // Now update local state:
3201 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3202 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3203 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3204 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3205 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3206 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3207 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3212 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3214 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3215 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3216 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3217 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3218 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3219 None => fail_reason.into(),
3220 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3221 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3222 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3225 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3229 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3230 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3231 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3232 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3234 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3235 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3240 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3243 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3244 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3245 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3247 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3248 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3251 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3254 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3255 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3256 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3258 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3262 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3266 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3267 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3270 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3274 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3278 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3279 where L::Target: Logger
3281 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3282 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3284 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3287 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3288 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3291 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3293 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3295 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3296 let commitment_txid = {
3297 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3298 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3299 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3301 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3302 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3303 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3304 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3305 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3306 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3310 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3312 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3313 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3314 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3315 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3318 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3319 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3320 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3321 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3324 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3326 if self.is_outbound() {
3327 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3328 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3329 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3330 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3331 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3332 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3333 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3334 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3335 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3336 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3342 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3343 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3346 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3347 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3348 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3349 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3350 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3351 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3352 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3353 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3354 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3355 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3356 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3357 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3358 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3361 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3362 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3363 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3364 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3365 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3366 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3367 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3369 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3370 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3371 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3372 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3373 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3374 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3375 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3376 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3378 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3379 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3382 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3384 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3385 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3386 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3389 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3392 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3393 commitment_stats.tx,
3395 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3396 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3397 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3400 self.context.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3401 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3403 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3404 let mut need_commitment = false;
3405 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3406 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3407 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3408 need_commitment = true;
3412 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3413 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3414 Some(forward_info.clone())
3416 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3417 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3418 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3419 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3420 need_commitment = true;
3423 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3424 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3425 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3426 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3427 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3428 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3429 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3430 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3431 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3432 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3433 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3434 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3435 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3436 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3438 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3440 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3441 need_commitment = true;
3445 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3446 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3447 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3448 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3449 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3450 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3452 nondust_htlc_sources,
3456 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3457 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3458 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3459 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3461 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3462 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3463 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3464 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3465 if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3466 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3467 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3468 // includes the right HTLCs.
3469 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3470 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3471 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3472 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3473 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3474 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3476 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3477 log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
3478 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3481 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3482 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3483 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3484 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3485 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3486 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3487 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3488 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3489 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3493 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3494 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3495 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3496 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3499 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3500 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3501 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3502 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3503 if self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3504 (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3505 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3506 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3509 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3510 /// for our counterparty.
3511 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3512 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3513 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3514 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3515 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3517 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3518 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3519 updates: Vec::new(),
3522 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3523 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3524 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3525 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3526 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3527 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3528 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3529 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3530 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3531 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3532 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3533 // to rebalance channels.
3534 match &htlc_update {
3535 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3536 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3537 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3540 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3541 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3542 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3543 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3544 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3545 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3546 // into the holding cell without ever being
3547 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3548 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3549 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3552 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3558 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3559 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3560 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3561 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3562 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3563 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3564 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3565 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3566 (msg, monitor_update)
3567 } else { unreachable!() };
3568 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3569 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3571 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3572 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3573 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3574 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3575 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3576 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3577 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3578 // for a full revocation before failing.
3579 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3582 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3584 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3591 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3592 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3594 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3595 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3600 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3601 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3602 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3603 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3604 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3606 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3607 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3608 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3610 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3611 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3617 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3618 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3619 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3620 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3621 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3622 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3623 where L::Target: Logger,
3625 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3626 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3628 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3629 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3631 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3632 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3635 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3637 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3638 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3639 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3643 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3644 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3645 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3646 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3647 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3648 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3649 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3650 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3651 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3654 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3656 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3657 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3660 self.context.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3661 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3663 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3665 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3666 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3667 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3668 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3669 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3670 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3671 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3672 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3676 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3677 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3678 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3679 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3680 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3681 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3682 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3683 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3684 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3686 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3687 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3690 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3691 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3692 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3693 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3694 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3695 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3696 let mut require_commitment = false;
3697 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3700 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3701 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3702 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3704 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3705 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3706 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3707 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3708 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3709 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3714 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3715 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3716 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3717 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3718 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3720 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3721 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3722 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3727 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3728 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3730 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3734 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3735 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3737 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3738 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3739 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3740 require_commitment = true;
3741 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3742 match forward_info {
3743 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3744 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3745 require_commitment = true;
3747 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3748 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3749 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3751 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3752 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3753 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3757 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3758 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3759 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3760 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3766 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3767 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3768 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3769 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3771 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3772 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3773 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3774 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3775 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3776 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3777 require_commitment = true;
3781 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3783 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3784 match update_state {
3785 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3786 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3787 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3788 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3789 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3791 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3792 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3793 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3794 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3795 require_commitment = true;
3796 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3797 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3802 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3803 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3804 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3805 if require_commitment {
3806 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3807 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3808 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3809 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3810 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3811 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3812 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3813 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3814 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3816 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3817 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3818 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3819 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3820 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3823 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3824 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3825 let mut additional_update = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3826 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3827 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3828 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3829 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3831 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3832 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3834 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3835 if require_commitment {
3836 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3838 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3839 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3840 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3841 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3843 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3844 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3845 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3846 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3848 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3849 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3850 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3856 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3857 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3858 /// commitment update.
3859 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3860 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3861 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3864 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3865 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3866 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3867 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3869 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3870 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3871 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3872 if !self.is_outbound() {
3873 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3875 if !self.is_usable() {
3876 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3878 if !self.is_live() {
3879 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3882 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3883 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3884 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3885 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3886 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3887 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3888 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3889 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3890 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3891 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3895 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3896 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3897 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3898 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3899 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3902 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3903 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3907 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3908 force_holding_cell = true;
3911 if force_holding_cell {
3912 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3916 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3917 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3919 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3920 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3925 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3926 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3928 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3930 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3931 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3932 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3933 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3937 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3938 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3939 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3943 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3944 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3947 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3948 // will be retransmitted.
3949 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3950 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3951 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3953 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3954 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3956 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3957 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3958 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3959 // this HTLC accordingly
3960 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3963 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3964 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3965 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3966 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3969 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3970 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3971 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3972 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3973 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3974 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3979 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3981 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3982 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3983 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3984 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3988 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3989 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3990 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3991 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3992 // the update upon reconnection.
3993 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3997 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3999 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
4000 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4003 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4004 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4005 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4006 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4007 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4008 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4009 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4011 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4012 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4013 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4014 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4015 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4016 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4017 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4019 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4020 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4021 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4022 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4023 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4024 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4025 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
4028 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4029 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4030 /// to the remote side.
4031 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4032 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
4033 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4034 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4037 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4039 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
4040 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
4041 let mut found_blocked = false;
4042 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
4043 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
4044 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
4048 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
4049 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4050 // first received the funding_signed.
4051 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4052 if self.is_outbound() && self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4053 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4055 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4056 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4057 if self.context.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4058 funding_broadcastable = None;
4061 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4062 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4063 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4064 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4065 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4066 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4067 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4068 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4069 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4070 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4071 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4072 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4073 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4074 next_per_commitment_point,
4075 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4079 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4081 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4082 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4083 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4084 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4085 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4086 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4088 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
4089 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4090 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4091 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4092 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4093 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4097 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4098 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4100 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4101 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4102 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
4105 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4106 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4107 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4108 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4109 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4110 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4111 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4112 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4113 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4117 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4118 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4120 if self.is_outbound() {
4121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4123 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4124 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4126 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4127 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
4129 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4130 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4131 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4132 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4133 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4134 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4135 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4136 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4137 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4138 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4139 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4141 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4143 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4145 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4151 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4152 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4153 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4154 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4155 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4156 per_commitment_secret,
4157 next_per_commitment_point,
4159 next_local_nonce: None,
4163 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4164 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4165 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4166 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4167 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4169 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4170 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4171 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4172 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4173 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4174 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4175 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4176 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4177 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4182 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4183 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4185 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4186 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4187 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4188 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4189 reason: err_packet.clone()
4192 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4193 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4194 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4195 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4196 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4197 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4200 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4201 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4202 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4203 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4204 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4211 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4212 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4213 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4214 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4218 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4219 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4220 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4221 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4222 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4223 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4227 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4228 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4230 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4231 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4232 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4233 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4234 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4235 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4236 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4237 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4240 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4242 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4243 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4244 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4245 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4246 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4249 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4250 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4251 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4254 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4255 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4256 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4257 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4258 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4259 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4261 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4262 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4263 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4264 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4265 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4268 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4269 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4270 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4271 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4272 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4273 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4274 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4275 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4279 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4280 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4281 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4282 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4284 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4288 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4289 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4290 self.context.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4291 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4293 let shutdown_msg = if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4294 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4295 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4296 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4297 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4301 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4303 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4304 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4305 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4306 self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4307 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4310 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4311 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4312 channel_ready: None,
4313 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4314 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4315 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4319 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4320 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4321 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4322 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4323 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4324 next_per_commitment_point,
4325 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4327 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4328 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4329 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4333 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4334 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4335 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4337 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4338 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4339 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4342 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4348 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4349 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4350 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4351 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4352 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 != 0;
4353 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4354 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4356 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4358 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4359 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4360 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4361 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4362 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4363 next_per_commitment_point,
4364 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4368 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4369 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4370 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4372 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4375 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4376 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4377 raa: required_revoke,
4378 commitment_update: None,
4379 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4381 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4382 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4383 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4385 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4388 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4389 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4390 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4391 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4392 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4393 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4396 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4397 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4398 raa: required_revoke,
4399 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4400 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4404 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4408 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4409 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4410 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4411 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4413 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4415 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4417 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4418 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4419 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4420 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4421 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4422 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4424 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4425 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4426 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4427 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4428 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4430 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4431 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4432 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4433 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4436 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4437 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4438 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4439 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4440 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4441 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4442 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4443 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4444 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4445 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4446 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4447 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4448 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4449 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4450 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4452 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4455 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4456 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4459 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4460 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4461 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4462 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4463 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4464 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4465 self.context.channel_state &
4466 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4467 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4468 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4469 self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4472 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4473 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4474 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4475 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4476 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4477 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4478 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4480 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4486 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4487 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4488 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4489 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4491 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4492 return Ok((None, None));
4495 if !self.is_outbound() {
4496 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4497 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4499 return Ok((None, None));
4502 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4504 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4505 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4506 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4507 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4509 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4510 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4511 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4513 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4514 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4515 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4516 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4518 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4519 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4520 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4525 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4526 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4528 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4529 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4532 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4533 /// within our expected timeframe.
4535 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4536 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4537 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4540 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4543 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4544 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4547 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4548 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4549 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4550 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4552 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4553 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4555 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4556 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4557 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4558 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4559 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4561 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4562 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4563 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4566 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4568 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4569 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4572 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4573 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4574 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4577 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4580 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4581 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4582 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4583 let send_shutdown = (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4585 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4588 assert!(send_shutdown);
4589 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4590 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4591 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4593 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4594 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4596 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4601 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4603 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4604 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4606 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4607 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4608 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4609 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4610 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4611 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4614 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4615 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4616 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4619 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4620 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4621 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4622 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4626 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4627 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4628 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4629 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4630 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4631 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4633 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4634 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4641 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4642 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4644 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4647 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4648 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4650 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4652 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4653 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4654 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4655 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4656 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4657 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4658 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4659 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4660 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4662 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4663 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4666 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4670 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4671 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4672 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4673 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4675 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4676 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4678 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4681 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4684 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4688 if self.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4689 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4692 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4693 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4694 return Ok((None, None));
4697 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4698 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4699 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4700 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4702 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4704 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4707 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4708 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4709 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4710 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4711 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4715 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4716 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4717 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4721 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4722 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4723 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4724 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4725 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4726 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4727 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4731 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4733 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4734 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4735 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4736 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4738 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4741 let sig = self.context.holder_signer
4742 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4743 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4745 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4746 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4747 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4748 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4752 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4753 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4754 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4755 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4757 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4758 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4759 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4765 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4766 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4767 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4769 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4770 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4772 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4773 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4776 if !self.is_outbound() {
4777 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4778 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4779 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4780 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4782 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4783 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4784 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4786 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4787 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4790 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4791 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4792 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4793 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4794 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4795 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4796 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4797 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4799 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4802 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4803 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4804 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4805 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4807 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4811 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4812 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4813 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4814 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4816 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4822 // Public utilities:
4824 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4825 self.context.channel_id
4828 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4830 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4831 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4832 self.context.temporary_channel_id
4835 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4836 self.context.minimum_depth
4839 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4840 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4841 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4842 self.context.user_id
4845 /// Gets the channel's type
4846 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4847 &self.context.channel_type
4850 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4851 /// is_usable() returns true).
4852 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4853 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4854 self.context.short_channel_id
4857 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4858 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4859 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4862 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4863 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4864 self.context.outbound_scid_alias
4866 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4867 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4868 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4869 assert_eq!(self.context.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4870 self.context.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4873 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4874 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4875 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4876 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4879 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4880 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4881 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4884 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4885 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4886 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4887 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4891 height.checked_sub(self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4894 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4895 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4898 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4899 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4902 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4903 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4904 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4907 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4908 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4911 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4912 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4913 self.context.counterparty_node_id
4916 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4917 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4918 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4921 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4922 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4923 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4926 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4927 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4929 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4930 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4931 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4932 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4934 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4938 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4939 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4940 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4943 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4944 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4945 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4948 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4949 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4950 let holder_reserve = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4952 (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4953 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4958 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4959 self.context.channel_value_satoshis
4962 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4963 self.context.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4966 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4967 cmp::max(self.context.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4970 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4971 self.context.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4974 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4975 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4976 self.context.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4979 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4980 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4981 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted
4984 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4985 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4986 self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted
4989 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4990 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4991 self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4994 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4995 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4996 self.is_usable() && !self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted
4999 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
5000 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
5001 self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
5004 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
5005 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
5006 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
5007 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
5008 if self.context.prev_config.is_none() {
5011 let prev_config = self.context.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
5013 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
5014 self.context.prev_config = None;
5018 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
5019 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
5020 self.context.config.options
5023 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
5024 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
5025 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
5026 let did_channel_update =
5027 self.context.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
5028 self.context.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
5029 self.context.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
5030 if did_channel_update {
5031 self.context.prev_config = Some((self.context.config.options, 0));
5032 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
5033 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
5034 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5036 self.context.config.options = *config;
5040 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5041 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5042 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5043 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5044 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5045 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5046 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5048 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5049 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5052 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5054 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5055 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5061 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5062 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5063 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5064 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5065 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5066 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5067 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
5069 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
5070 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5077 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
5078 self.context.feerate_per_kw
5081 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
5082 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
5083 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
5084 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
5085 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
5086 // which are near the dust limit.
5087 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.context.feerate_per_kw;
5088 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
5089 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
5090 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5091 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
5093 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
5094 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
5096 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
5099 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5100 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5103 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5104 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
5107 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5108 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5112 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
5113 &self.context.holder_signer
5117 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5119 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5120 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5121 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5122 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5123 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5124 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5126 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5128 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5136 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5137 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5141 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5142 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
5143 self.context.update_time_counter
5146 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5147 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id
5150 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
5151 self.context.config.announced_channel
5154 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
5155 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
5158 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
5159 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5160 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
5161 self.context.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
5164 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
5165 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
5166 self.context.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
5169 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
5170 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5171 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
5172 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
5173 (self.context.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready
5176 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
5177 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
5178 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5179 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
5180 self.is_usable() && (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5183 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5184 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5185 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5186 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5189 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5190 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5191 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5194 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5195 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5196 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5197 for i in 0..self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5198 if self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5199 self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5200 return Some((&self.context.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5201 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5207 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5208 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5209 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5210 let release_monitor = self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5211 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5212 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5217 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5218 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5220 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5221 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5222 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5223 if release_monitor { self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5226 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5227 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5230 pub fn complete_all_mon_updates_through(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5231 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
5232 if upd.update.update_id <= update_id {
5233 assert!(!upd.blocked, "Completed update must have flown");
5239 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5240 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5243 /// Returns an iterator over all unblocked monitor updates which have not yet completed.
5244 pub fn uncompleted_unblocked_mon_updates(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5245 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.iter()
5246 .filter_map(|upd| if upd.blocked { None } else { Some(&upd.update) })
5249 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5250 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5251 self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5254 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5255 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5256 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5258 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5259 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5260 if self.context.channel_state &
5261 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5262 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5263 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5264 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5265 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5268 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5269 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5270 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5271 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5272 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5273 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5275 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5276 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5277 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5279 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5280 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5281 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5282 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5283 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5284 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5290 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5291 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5292 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.context.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5295 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5296 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5297 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5300 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5301 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5302 (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5305 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5306 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5307 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5308 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5309 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5310 assert!(self.context.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5315 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5316 self.context.channel_update_status
5319 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5320 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5321 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5324 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5326 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5327 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5328 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5332 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5333 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5334 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5337 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5341 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5342 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5343 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5345 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5346 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.context.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5347 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5349 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5350 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5353 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5354 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5355 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5356 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5357 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5358 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5359 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5360 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5361 self.context.channel_state);
5363 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5367 if need_commitment_update {
5368 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5369 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5370 let next_per_commitment_point =
5371 self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5372 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5373 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5374 next_per_commitment_point,
5375 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5379 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5385 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5386 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5387 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5388 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5389 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5390 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5391 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5393 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5396 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5397 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5398 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5399 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5400 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5401 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5402 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5403 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5404 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5405 if self.is_outbound() {
5406 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5407 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5408 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5409 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5410 // channel and move on.
5411 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5412 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5414 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5415 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5416 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5418 if self.is_outbound() {
5419 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5420 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5421 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5422 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5423 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5424 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5428 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5429 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5430 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5431 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5432 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5436 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5437 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5438 // may have already happened for this block).
5439 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5440 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5441 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5442 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5445 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5446 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5447 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5448 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5456 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5457 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5458 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5459 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5461 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5462 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5465 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5467 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5468 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5469 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5470 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5472 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5475 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5478 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5479 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5480 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5481 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5483 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5486 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5487 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5488 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5490 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5491 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5493 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5494 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5495 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5503 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5505 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5506 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5507 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5509 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5510 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5513 let non_shutdown_state = self.context.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5514 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5515 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5516 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5517 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5518 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5519 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5520 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5521 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5524 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5525 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5526 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5527 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5529 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5530 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5531 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5533 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5534 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5535 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5536 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5538 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5539 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5540 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.context.channel_id));
5541 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5542 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5543 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5544 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5547 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5548 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5550 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5553 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5554 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5555 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5556 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5557 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5558 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5559 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5560 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5561 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5562 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5563 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5564 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5565 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5566 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5567 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5568 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5569 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5575 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5580 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5581 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5583 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5584 if !self.is_outbound() {
5585 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5587 if self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5588 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5591 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5592 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5595 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5596 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5600 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5601 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5602 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5603 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5604 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5605 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5606 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5607 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5608 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5609 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5610 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5611 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5612 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5613 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5614 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5615 first_per_commitment_point,
5616 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5617 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5618 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5619 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5621 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5625 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5626 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept
5629 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5630 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5631 assert!(self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5632 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5635 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5636 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5638 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5639 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5640 if self.is_outbound() {
5641 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5643 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5644 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5646 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5647 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5649 if !self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5650 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5653 self.context.user_id = user_id;
5654 self.context.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5656 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5659 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5660 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5661 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5663 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5664 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5665 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5666 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5668 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5669 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5670 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5671 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5672 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5673 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5674 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5675 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5676 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5677 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5678 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5679 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5680 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5681 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5682 first_per_commitment_point,
5683 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5684 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5685 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5687 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
5689 next_local_nonce: None,
5693 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5694 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5696 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5698 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5699 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5702 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5703 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5704 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5705 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5706 Ok(self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
5707 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5710 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5711 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5712 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5713 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5714 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5715 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5716 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5717 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5718 if !self.is_outbound() {
5719 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5721 if self.context.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5722 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5724 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5725 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5726 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5727 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5730 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5731 self.context.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
5733 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5736 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5737 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5742 let temporary_channel_id = self.context.channel_id;
5744 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5746 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5747 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5748 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5750 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5751 temporary_channel_id,
5752 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5753 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5756 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5758 next_local_nonce: None,
5762 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5763 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5764 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5765 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5767 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5770 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5771 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5772 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5773 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5774 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5775 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5777 if !self.is_usable() {
5778 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5781 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5782 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5783 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5784 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5786 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5787 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5789 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5790 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5791 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5792 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5793 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5794 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5800 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5801 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5802 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5803 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5805 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5808 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5812 if !self.is_usable() {
5816 if self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5817 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5821 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5825 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5826 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5829 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5833 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5835 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5840 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5842 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5847 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5849 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5850 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5851 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5852 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5853 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5857 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5859 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5860 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5861 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5862 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5863 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5864 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5865 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5867 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5868 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5869 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.context.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5870 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5871 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5872 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5873 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5874 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5875 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5876 contents: announcement,
5879 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5883 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5884 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5885 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5886 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5887 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5888 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5889 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5890 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5892 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5894 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5895 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5896 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5897 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5899 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5900 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5901 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5902 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5905 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5906 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5907 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5908 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5911 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5914 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5915 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5916 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5917 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5918 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5919 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5922 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5924 Err(_) => return None,
5926 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5927 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5932 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5933 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5934 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5935 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5936 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5937 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5938 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5939 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5940 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5941 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5942 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5943 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5944 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5945 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5946 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5947 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5950 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5953 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5954 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5955 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5956 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5957 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5958 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5959 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5960 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5961 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5963 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5964 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5965 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5966 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5967 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5968 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5969 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5970 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5971 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5973 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5974 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5975 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5976 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5977 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5978 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5979 next_funding_txid: None,
5984 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5986 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5987 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5988 /// commitment update.
5990 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5991 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5992 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5993 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5995 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5996 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5998 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5999 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6004 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6005 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6007 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6009 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6010 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6012 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6013 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6014 /// regenerate them.
6016 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6017 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6019 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6020 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6021 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
6022 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6023 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
6024 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6026 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6027 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6028 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6031 if amount_msat == 0 {
6032 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6035 let available_balances = self.get_available_balances();
6036 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6037 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6038 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6041 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6042 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6043 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6046 if (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
6047 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6048 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6049 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6050 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6051 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6052 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6053 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6056 let need_holding_cell = (self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
6057 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
6058 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6059 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6060 else { "to peer" });
6062 if need_holding_cell {
6063 force_holding_cell = true;
6066 // Now update local state:
6067 if force_holding_cell {
6068 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6073 onion_routing_packet,
6078 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6079 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6081 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6083 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6087 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6088 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6089 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6093 onion_routing_packet,
6095 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6100 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6101 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6102 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6103 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6105 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6106 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6107 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6109 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6110 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6114 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6115 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6116 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6117 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6118 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6119 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6120 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6123 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6124 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6125 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
6126 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6127 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6128 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
6131 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6133 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6134 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6135 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6137 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6138 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6141 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6142 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6143 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6144 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6145 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6146 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6147 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6148 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6151 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6155 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6156 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6157 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6158 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6160 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6162 if !self.is_outbound() {
6163 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6164 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6165 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6166 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6167 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6168 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
6169 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6170 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
6171 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6172 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6178 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6181 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6182 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6183 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6184 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6185 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6186 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6188 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6189 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6190 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6191 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6194 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6195 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6199 let res = self.context.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6200 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6202 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6204 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6205 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6206 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6207 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6209 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6210 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6211 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6212 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6213 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6214 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6218 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6219 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6223 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6224 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6227 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6228 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6230 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6231 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6232 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6233 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6234 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6237 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6238 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6239 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6245 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6246 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6247 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6250 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6251 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6252 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6254 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6255 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6256 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6257 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6263 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6264 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6266 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6267 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6268 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6269 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6270 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6271 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6272 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6273 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6274 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6277 if self.context.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6278 if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6279 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6281 else if (self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6282 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6285 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6286 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6288 assert_eq!(self.context.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6289 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6290 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6293 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6294 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6295 let mut chan_closed = false;
6296 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6300 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6302 None if !chan_closed => {
6303 // use override shutdown script if provided
6304 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6305 Some(script) => script,
6307 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6308 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6309 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6310 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6314 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6315 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6317 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6323 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6324 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6325 if self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6326 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6328 self.context.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6330 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6332 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6333 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6334 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6335 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6336 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6337 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6340 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6341 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6342 self.context.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6345 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6346 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6347 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6350 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6351 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6352 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6353 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6354 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6356 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6357 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6364 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6365 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6367 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6370 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6371 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6372 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6373 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6374 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6375 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
6376 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6377 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6378 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6379 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6380 assert!(self.context.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6382 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6383 // return them to fail the payment.
6384 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6385 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6386 for htlc_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6388 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6389 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id));
6394 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6395 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6396 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6397 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6398 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6399 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6400 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6401 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6402 if self.context.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6403 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6404 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6405 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6406 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6411 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6412 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6413 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6416 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6417 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6418 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6420 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6421 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6425 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6429 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6430 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6432 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6438 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6439 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6440 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6441 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6442 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6444 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6445 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6446 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6447 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6453 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6454 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6455 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6456 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6457 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6458 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6463 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6464 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6465 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6466 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6468 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6469 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6470 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6471 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6476 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6477 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6478 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6479 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6480 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6481 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6486 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6487 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6488 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6491 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6493 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6494 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6495 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6496 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
6497 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6499 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6500 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6501 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6502 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6504 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6505 (self.context.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6506 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6508 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6510 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6511 self.context.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6512 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6513 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6514 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6515 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6517 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6518 // deserialized from that format.
6519 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6520 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6521 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6523 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6525 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6526 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6527 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6529 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6530 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6531 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6532 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6535 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6536 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6537 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6540 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6541 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6542 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6543 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6545 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6546 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6548 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6550 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6552 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6554 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6557 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6559 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6564 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6566 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6567 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6568 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6569 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6570 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6571 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6572 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6574 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6576 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6578 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6581 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6582 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6583 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6586 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6588 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6589 preimages.push(preimage);
6591 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6592 reason.write(writer)?;
6594 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6596 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6597 preimages.push(preimage);
6599 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6600 reason.write(writer)?;
6605 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6606 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6608 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6610 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6611 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6612 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6613 source.write(writer)?;
6614 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6616 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6618 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6619 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6621 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6623 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6624 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6629 match self.context.resend_order {
6630 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6631 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6634 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6635 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6636 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6638 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6639 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6640 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6641 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6644 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6645 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6646 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6647 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6648 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6651 if self.is_outbound() {
6652 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6653 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
6654 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6656 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6657 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6658 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6660 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6662 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6663 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6664 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6665 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6667 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6668 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6669 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6670 // consider the stale state on reload.
6673 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6674 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6675 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6677 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6678 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6679 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6681 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6682 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6684 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6685 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6686 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6688 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6689 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6691 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6694 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6695 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6696 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6698 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6701 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6702 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6704 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6705 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6706 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6708 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6710 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6712 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6714 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6715 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6716 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6717 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6718 htlc.write(writer)?;
6721 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6722 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6723 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6725 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6726 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
6728 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6729 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6730 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6731 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6732 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6733 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
6734 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6736 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6737 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6738 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6739 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6740 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6742 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6743 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6745 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6746 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6747 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6748 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6750 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6752 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6753 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
6754 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6755 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6756 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6757 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6758 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6760 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
6761 (2, chan_type, option),
6762 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6763 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6764 (5, self.context.config, required),
6765 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6766 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6767 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6768 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6769 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
6770 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6771 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6772 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6773 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6774 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6775 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6776 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
6777 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6778 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
6779 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6780 (33, self.context.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6787 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6788 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6790 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6791 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6793 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6794 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6795 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6797 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6798 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6799 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6800 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6802 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6804 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6805 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6806 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6807 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6808 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6810 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6811 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6814 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6815 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6816 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6818 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6820 let mut keys_data = None;
6822 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6823 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6824 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6825 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6826 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6827 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6828 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6829 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6830 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6831 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6835 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6836 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6837 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6840 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6842 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6843 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6846 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6848 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6849 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6850 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6851 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6852 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6853 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6854 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6855 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6856 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6857 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6858 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6859 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6860 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6865 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6866 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6867 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6868 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6869 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6870 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6871 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6872 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6873 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6874 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6875 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6876 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6878 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6879 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6882 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6883 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6886 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6887 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6889 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6894 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6895 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6896 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6897 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6898 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6899 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6900 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6901 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6902 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6903 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6905 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6906 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6907 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6909 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6910 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6911 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6913 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6917 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6918 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6919 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6920 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6923 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6924 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6925 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6927 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6928 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6929 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6930 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6933 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6934 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6935 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6936 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6939 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6941 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6943 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6944 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6945 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6946 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6948 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6949 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6950 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6951 // consider the stale state on reload.
6952 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6955 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6956 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6957 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6959 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6962 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6963 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6964 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6966 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6967 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6969 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6971 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6972 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6974 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6975 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6977 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6978 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6979 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6981 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6983 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6984 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6986 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6987 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6990 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6992 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6993 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6994 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6995 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6997 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7000 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7001 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
7003 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7005 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7006 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7008 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7009 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7011 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7013 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7014 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7015 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7017 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7018 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7019 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7023 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7024 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7025 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7027 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7033 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7034 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7035 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7036 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7037 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7038 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7039 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7040 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7041 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7042 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7044 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7045 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7046 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7047 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7048 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7049 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7050 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7052 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7053 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7054 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7055 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7057 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7059 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7060 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7061 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7062 (2, channel_type, option),
7063 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7064 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7065 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7066 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7067 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7068 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7069 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7070 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7071 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7072 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7073 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7074 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7075 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7076 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7077 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7078 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7079 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7080 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7081 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7084 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7085 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7086 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7087 // required channel parameters.
7088 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7089 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7090 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7092 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7094 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7095 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7096 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7097 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7100 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7101 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7102 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7104 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7105 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7107 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7108 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7113 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7114 if iter.next().is_some() {
7115 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7119 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7120 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7121 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7122 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7123 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7126 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7127 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7129 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7130 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7131 // separate u64 values.
7132 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7134 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7137 context: ChannelContext {
7140 config: config.unwrap(),
7144 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7145 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7146 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7149 temporary_channel_id,
7151 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7153 channel_value_satoshis,
7155 latest_monitor_update_id,
7158 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7161 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7162 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7165 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7166 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7167 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7168 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7172 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7173 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7174 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7175 monitor_pending_forwards,
7176 monitor_pending_failures,
7177 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7180 holding_cell_update_fee,
7181 next_holder_htlc_id,
7182 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7183 update_time_counter,
7186 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7187 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7188 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7189 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7191 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7192 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7193 closing_fee_limits: None,
7194 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7196 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7198 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7199 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7201 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7203 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7204 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7205 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7206 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7207 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7208 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7209 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7210 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7211 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7214 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7216 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7217 funding_transaction,
7219 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7220 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7221 counterparty_node_id,
7223 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7227 channel_update_status,
7228 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7232 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7233 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7234 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7235 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7237 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7238 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7240 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7241 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7242 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7244 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7245 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7247 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7248 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7250 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7253 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7262 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7263 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7264 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7265 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7266 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7268 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7269 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7271 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7272 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7273 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7274 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7275 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7276 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7277 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7278 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7279 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7280 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7281 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7282 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7283 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7284 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7285 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7286 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7287 use crate::util::test_utils;
7288 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7289 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7290 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7291 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7292 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7293 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7294 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7295 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7296 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7297 use crate::prelude::*;
7299 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7302 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7303 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7309 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7310 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7311 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7312 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7316 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7317 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7318 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7319 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7320 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7321 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7322 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7326 signer: InMemorySigner,
7329 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7330 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7333 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7334 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7336 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7337 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7340 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7344 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7346 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7347 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7348 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7349 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7350 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7353 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7354 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7355 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7356 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7360 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7361 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7362 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7366 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7367 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7368 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7369 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7371 let seed = [42; 32];
7372 let network = Network::Testnet;
7373 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7374 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7375 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7378 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7379 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7380 let config = UserConfig::default();
7381 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7382 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7383 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7385 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7386 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7390 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7391 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7393 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7394 let original_fee = 253;
7395 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7396 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7397 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7398 let seed = [42; 32];
7399 let network = Network::Testnet;
7400 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7402 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7403 let config = UserConfig::default();
7404 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7406 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7407 // same as the old fee.
7408 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7409 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7410 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7414 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7415 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7416 // dust limits are used.
7417 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7418 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7419 let seed = [42; 32];
7420 let network = Network::Testnet;
7421 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7422 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7424 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7425 // they have different dust limits.
7427 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7428 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7429 let config = UserConfig::default();
7430 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7432 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7433 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7434 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7435 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7436 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7438 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7439 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7440 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7441 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7442 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7444 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7445 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7446 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7448 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7449 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7450 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7451 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7454 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7456 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7457 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7458 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7459 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7460 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7461 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7462 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7463 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7464 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7468 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7469 // the dust limit check.
7470 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7471 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7472 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7473 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7475 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7476 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7477 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7478 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7479 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7480 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7481 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7485 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7486 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7487 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7488 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7489 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7490 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7491 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7492 let seed = [42; 32];
7493 let network = Network::Testnet;
7494 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7496 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7497 let config = UserConfig::default();
7498 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7500 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7501 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7503 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7504 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7505 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7506 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7507 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7508 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7510 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7511 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7512 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7513 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7514 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7516 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7518 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7519 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7520 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7521 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7522 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7524 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7525 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7526 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7527 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7528 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7532 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7533 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7534 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7535 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7536 let seed = [42; 32];
7537 let network = Network::Testnet;
7538 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7539 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7540 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7542 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7544 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7545 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7546 let config = UserConfig::default();
7547 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7549 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7550 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7551 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7552 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7554 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7555 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7556 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7558 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7559 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7560 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7561 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7563 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7564 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7565 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7567 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7568 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7570 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7571 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7572 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7573 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7574 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7575 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7576 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7578 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7580 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7581 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7582 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7583 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7584 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7588 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7589 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7590 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7591 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7592 let seed = [42; 32];
7593 let network = Network::Testnet;
7594 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7595 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7596 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7598 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7599 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7600 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7601 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7602 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7603 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7604 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7605 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7607 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7608 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7609 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7610 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7611 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7612 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7614 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7615 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7616 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7617 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7619 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7621 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7622 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7623 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7624 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7625 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7626 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7628 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7629 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7630 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7631 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7633 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7634 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7635 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7636 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7637 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7639 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7640 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7642 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7643 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7644 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7646 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7647 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7648 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7649 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7650 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7652 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7653 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7655 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7656 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7657 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7661 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7663 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7664 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7665 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7667 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7668 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7669 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7670 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7672 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7673 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7674 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7676 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7678 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7679 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7682 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7683 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7684 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7685 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7686 let seed = [42; 32];
7687 let network = Network::Testnet;
7688 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7689 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7690 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7693 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7694 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7695 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7697 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7698 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7700 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7701 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7702 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7704 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7705 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7707 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7709 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7710 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7712 // Channel Negotiations failed
7713 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7714 assert!(result.is_err());
7719 fn channel_update() {
7720 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7721 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7722 let seed = [42; 32];
7723 let network = Network::Testnet;
7724 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7725 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7727 // Create a channel.
7728 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7729 let config = UserConfig::default();
7730 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7731 assert!(node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7732 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7733 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7735 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7736 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7737 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7739 short_channel_id: 0,
7742 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7743 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7744 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7746 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7747 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7749 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7751 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7753 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7754 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7755 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7756 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7758 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7759 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7760 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7762 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7766 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7768 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7769 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7770 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7771 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7772 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7773 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7774 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7775 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7776 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7777 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7778 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7779 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7780 use crate::sync::Arc;
7782 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7783 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7784 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7785 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7787 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7789 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7790 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7791 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7792 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7793 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7795 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7796 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7802 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7803 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7804 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7806 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7807 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7808 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7809 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7810 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7811 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7813 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7815 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7816 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7817 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7818 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7819 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7820 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7822 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7823 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7824 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7825 selected_contest_delay: 144
7827 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7828 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7830 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7831 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7833 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7834 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7836 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7837 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7839 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7840 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7841 // build_commitment_transaction.
7842 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7843 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7844 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7845 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7846 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7848 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7849 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7850 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7851 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7855 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7856 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7857 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7858 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7862 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7863 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7864 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7866 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7867 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7869 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7870 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7872 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7874 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7875 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7876 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7877 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7878 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7879 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7880 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7882 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7883 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7884 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7885 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7887 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7888 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7889 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7891 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7893 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7894 commitment_tx.clone(),
7895 counterparty_signature,
7896 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7897 &chan.context.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7898 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7900 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7901 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7903 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7904 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7905 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7907 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7908 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7911 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7912 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7914 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7915 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
7916 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7917 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7918 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7919 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7920 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7921 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7923 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7926 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7927 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7928 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7932 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7935 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7936 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7937 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7939 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7940 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7941 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7942 let channel_parameters = chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7943 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7944 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7945 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7946 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7948 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7952 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7953 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7954 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7955 "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", {});
7957 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7958 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7960 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7961 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7962 "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", {});
7964 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7965 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7966 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7967 "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", {});
7969 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7970 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7972 amount_msat: 1000000,
7974 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7975 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7977 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7980 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7981 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7983 amount_msat: 2000000,
7985 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7986 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7988 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7991 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7992 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7994 amount_msat: 2000000,
7996 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7997 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7998 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8000 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
8003 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8004 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8006 amount_msat: 3000000,
8008 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8009 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8010 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8012 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
8015 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8016 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8018 amount_msat: 4000000,
8020 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8021 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8023 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8027 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8028 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8029 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8031 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8032 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8033 "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", {
8036 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8037 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8038 "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" },
8041 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8042 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8043 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b01000000000000000001d0070000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f89600401483045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8046 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8047 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8048 "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" },
8051 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8052 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8053 "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" },
8056 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8057 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8058 "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" }
8061 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8062 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8063 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8065 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8066 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8067 "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", {
8070 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8071 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8072 "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" },
8075 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8076 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8077 "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" },
8080 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8081 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8082 "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" },
8085 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8086 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8087 "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" },
8090 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8091 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8092 "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" }
8095 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8096 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8097 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8099 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8100 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8101 "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", {
8104 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8105 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8106 "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" },
8109 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8110 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8111 "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" },
8114 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8115 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8116 "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" },
8119 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8120 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8121 "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" }
8124 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8125 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8126 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8127 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8129 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8130 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8131 "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", {
8134 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8135 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8136 "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" },
8139 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8140 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8141 "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" },
8144 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8145 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8146 "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" },
8149 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8150 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8151 "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" }
8154 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8155 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8156 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8157 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8159 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8160 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8161 "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", {
8164 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8165 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8166 "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" },
8169 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8170 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8171 "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" },
8174 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8175 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8176 "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" },
8179 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8180 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8181 "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" }
8184 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8185 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8186 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8188 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8189 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8190 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8193 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8194 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8195 "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" },
8198 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8199 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8200 "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" },
8203 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8204 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8205 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8208 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8209 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8210 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8212 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8213 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8214 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e48440966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d3980147304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8217 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8218 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8219 "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" },
8222 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8223 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8224 "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" },
8227 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8228 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8229 "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" }
8232 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8233 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8234 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8236 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8237 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8238 "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", {
8241 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8242 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8243 "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" },
8246 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8247 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8248 "020000000001018130a10f09b13677ba2885a8bca32860f3a952e5912b829a473639b5a2c07b900100000000000000000199090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a01473044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8251 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8252 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8253 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8254 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8256 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8257 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8258 "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", {
8261 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8262 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8263 "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" },
8266 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8267 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8268 "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" }
8271 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8272 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8273 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8274 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8276 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8277 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8278 "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", {
8281 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8282 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8283 "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" },
8286 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8287 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8288 "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" }
8291 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8292 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8293 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8295 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8296 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8297 "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", {
8300 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8301 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8302 "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" }
8305 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8306 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8307 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8308 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8310 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8311 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8312 "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", {
8315 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8316 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8317 "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" }
8320 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8321 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8322 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8323 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8325 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8326 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8327 "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", {
8330 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8331 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8332 "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" }
8335 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8336 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8337 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8338 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8340 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8341 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8342 "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", {});
8344 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8345 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8346 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8347 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8349 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8350 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8351 "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", {});
8353 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8354 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8355 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8356 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8358 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8359 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8360 "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", {});
8362 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8363 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8364 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8366 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8367 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8368 "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", {});
8370 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8371 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8372 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8373 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8375 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8376 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8377 "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", {});
8379 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8380 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8381 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8382 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8384 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8385 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8386 "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", {});
8388 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8389 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8390 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8391 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8392 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8393 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8395 amount_msat: 2000000,
8397 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8398 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8400 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8403 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8404 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8405 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8407 amount_msat: 5000001,
8409 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8410 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8411 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8413 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8416 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8417 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8419 amount_msat: 5000000,
8421 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8422 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8423 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8425 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8429 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8430 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8431 "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", {
8434 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8435 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8436 "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" },
8438 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8439 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8440 "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" },
8442 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8443 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8444 "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" }
8447 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8448 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8449 "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", {
8452 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8453 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8454 "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" },
8456 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8457 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8458 "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" },
8460 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8461 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8462 "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" }
8467 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8468 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8470 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8471 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8472 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8473 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8475 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8476 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8477 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8479 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8480 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8482 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8483 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8485 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8486 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8487 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8491 fn test_key_derivation() {
8492 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8493 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8495 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8496 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8498 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8499 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8501 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8502 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8504 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8505 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8507 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8508 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8510 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8511 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8513 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8514 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8518 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8519 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8520 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8521 let seed = [42; 32];
8522 let network = Network::Testnet;
8523 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8524 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8526 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8527 let config = UserConfig::default();
8528 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8529 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8531 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8532 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8534 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8535 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8536 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8537 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8538 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8539 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8540 assert!(res.is_ok());
8545 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8546 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8547 // resulting `channel_type`.
8548 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8549 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8550 let network = Network::Testnet;
8551 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8552 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8554 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8555 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8557 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8558 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8560 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8561 // need to signal it.
8562 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8563 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8564 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8567 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8569 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8570 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8571 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8573 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8574 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8575 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8578 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8579 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8580 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8581 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8582 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8585 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8586 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8591 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8592 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8593 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8594 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8595 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8596 let network = Network::Testnet;
8597 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8598 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8600 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8601 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8603 let config = UserConfig::default();
8605 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8606 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8607 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8608 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8609 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8611 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8612 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8613 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8616 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8617 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8618 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8620 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8621 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8622 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8623 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8624 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8625 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8627 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8632 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8633 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8635 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8636 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8637 let network = Network::Testnet;
8638 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8639 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8641 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8642 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8644 let config = UserConfig::default();
8646 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8647 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8648 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8649 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8650 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8651 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8652 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8653 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8655 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8656 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8657 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8658 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8659 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8660 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8663 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8664 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8666 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8667 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8668 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8669 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8671 assert!(res.is_err());
8673 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8674 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8675 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8677 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8678 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8679 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8682 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8684 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8685 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8686 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8687 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8690 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8691 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8693 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8694 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8696 assert!(res.is_err());