1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, EntropySource, BaseSign, SignerProvider};
39 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
41 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
42 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
43 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
44 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use crate::prelude::*;
48 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
50 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use crate::sync::Mutex;
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 pub struct AvailableBalances {
67 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
68 pub balance_msat: u64,
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
77 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
79 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
81 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
82 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
83 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
84 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
85 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
86 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
88 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
92 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
93 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
94 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
95 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
98 enum InboundHTLCState {
99 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
100 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
101 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
102 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
103 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
104 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
105 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
106 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
107 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
108 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
109 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
110 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
111 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
112 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
113 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
115 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
116 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
119 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
120 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
123 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
124 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
125 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
126 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
127 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
128 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
130 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
131 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
132 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
133 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
134 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
135 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
136 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
137 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
139 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
140 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
142 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
143 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
144 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
145 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
146 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
147 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
148 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
149 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
152 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
156 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
157 state: InboundHTLCState,
160 enum OutboundHTLCState {
161 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
162 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
163 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
164 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
165 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
166 /// money back (though we won't), and,
167 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
168 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
169 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
170 /// we'll never get out of sync).
171 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
172 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
173 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
175 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
176 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
177 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
178 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
179 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
180 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
181 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
182 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
183 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
188 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
189 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
193 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
194 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
195 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
198 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
201 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
202 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
207 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
208 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
216 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
220 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
221 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
226 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
227 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
233 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
236 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
241 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
245 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
246 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
247 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
248 /// move on to ChannelReady.
249 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
250 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
251 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
253 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
254 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
255 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
256 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
257 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
258 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
259 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
261 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
262 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
263 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
265 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
266 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
267 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
268 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
269 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
270 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
272 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
273 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
275 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
277 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
278 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
279 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
280 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
281 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
282 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
283 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
285 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
286 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
287 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
288 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
289 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
290 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
292 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
293 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
294 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
295 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
296 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
298 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
299 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
301 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
303 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
304 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
305 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
306 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
307 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
308 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
309 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
310 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
312 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
314 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
316 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
320 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
322 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
323 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
324 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
326 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
327 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
329 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
330 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
331 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
332 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
333 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
335 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
336 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
340 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
346 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
349 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
350 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 holding_cell_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
356 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
357 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
358 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
359 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
360 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
361 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
362 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
363 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
368 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
369 struct HTLCCandidate {
371 origin: HTLCInitiator,
375 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
383 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
385 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
387 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
388 htlc_value_msat: u64,
389 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
394 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
395 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
396 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
397 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
398 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
400 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
401 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
402 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
403 htlc_value_msat: u64,
404 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
405 /// in the holding cell).
406 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
408 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
409 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
413 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
415 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
416 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
421 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
424 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
425 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
426 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
427 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
428 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
429 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
430 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
431 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
432 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
433 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
434 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
437 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
438 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
439 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
440 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
441 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
442 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
443 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
444 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
447 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
448 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
449 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
450 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
451 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
452 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
453 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
454 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
455 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
456 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
457 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
458 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
459 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
460 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
461 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
463 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
464 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
465 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
466 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
468 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
469 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
470 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
471 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
473 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
474 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
475 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
476 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
477 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
479 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
480 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
481 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
482 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
484 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
485 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
486 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
488 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
489 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
490 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
491 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
492 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
494 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
495 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
496 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
499 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
500 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
501 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
502 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
504 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
505 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
506 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
507 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
509 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
513 channel_id: [u8; 32],
516 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
517 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
519 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
520 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
521 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
523 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
524 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
525 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
526 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
528 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
529 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
531 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
533 holder_signer: Signer,
534 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
535 destination_script: Script,
537 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
538 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
539 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
541 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
544 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
545 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
546 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
548 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
549 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
550 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
551 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
552 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
553 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
555 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
557 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
558 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
559 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
560 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
561 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
562 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
564 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
566 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
567 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
568 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
569 // HTLCs with similar state.
570 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
571 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
572 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
573 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
574 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
575 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
576 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
577 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
578 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
581 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
582 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
583 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
585 update_time_counter: u32,
587 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
588 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
589 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
590 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
591 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
592 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
594 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
595 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
597 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
598 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
599 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
600 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
602 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
603 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
605 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
607 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
609 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
610 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
611 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
612 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
613 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
614 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
616 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
617 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
618 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
619 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
620 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
622 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
623 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
624 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
625 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
626 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
627 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
628 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
629 channel_creation_height: u32,
631 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
634 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
636 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
639 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
644 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
646 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
648 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
649 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
652 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
656 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
657 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
659 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
665 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
667 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
668 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
670 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
674 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
676 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
678 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
679 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
680 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
681 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
683 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
684 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
685 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
687 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
688 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
689 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
691 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
692 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
693 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
694 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
695 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
696 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
697 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
698 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
700 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
701 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
702 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
703 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
704 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
706 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
707 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
710 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
711 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
712 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
713 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
714 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
715 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
716 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
718 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
719 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
721 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
722 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
723 // the channel's funding UTXO.
725 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
726 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
727 // associated channel mapping.
729 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
730 // to store all of them.
731 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
733 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
734 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
735 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
736 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
737 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
739 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
740 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
742 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
743 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
744 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
747 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
748 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
750 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
751 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
752 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
756 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
758 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
761 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
765 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
767 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
769 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
771 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
772 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
773 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
774 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
775 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
777 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
778 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
780 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
782 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
783 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
785 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
786 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
787 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
788 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
789 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
790 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
792 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
793 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
795 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
796 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
797 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
798 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
799 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
801 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
802 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
804 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
805 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
807 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
808 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
809 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
810 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
816 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
817 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
819 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
821 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
826 macro_rules! secp_check {
827 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
830 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
835 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
836 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
837 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
838 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
840 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
842 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
843 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
844 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
846 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
849 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
851 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
854 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
855 /// required by us according to the configured or default
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
858 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
860 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
861 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
862 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
863 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
864 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
867 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
868 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
869 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
870 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
871 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
872 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
873 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
876 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
877 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
880 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
881 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
882 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
883 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
884 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
885 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
886 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
887 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
888 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
889 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
892 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
893 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
894 // `only_static_remotekey`.
896 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
897 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
898 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
899 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
906 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
907 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
908 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
909 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
910 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
911 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
912 // We've exhausted our options
915 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
916 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
919 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
920 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
921 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
922 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
924 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
925 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
926 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
927 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
928 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
929 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
931 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
933 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
937 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
938 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
939 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
940 outbound_scid_alias: u64
941 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
942 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
943 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
944 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
946 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
947 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
948 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
949 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
951 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
952 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
954 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
955 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
957 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
958 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
959 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
961 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
962 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
964 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
965 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
966 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
967 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
968 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
971 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
972 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
974 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
976 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
977 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
978 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
979 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
982 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
983 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
985 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
986 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
989 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
990 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
991 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
998 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
999 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1000 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1001 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1006 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1008 channel_id: entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes(),
1009 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1010 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1012 channel_value_satoshis,
1014 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1017 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1018 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1020 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1021 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1024 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1025 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1026 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1027 pending_update_fee: None,
1028 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1029 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1030 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1031 update_time_counter: 1,
1033 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1035 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1036 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1037 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1038 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1039 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1040 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1042 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1043 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1044 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1045 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1047 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1048 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1049 closing_fee_limits: None,
1050 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1052 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1054 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1055 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1056 short_channel_id: None,
1057 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1059 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1060 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1061 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1062 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1063 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1064 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1065 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1066 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1067 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1068 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1069 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1071 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1073 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1074 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1075 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1076 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1077 counterparty_parameters: None,
1078 funding_outpoint: None,
1079 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1080 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1082 funding_transaction: None,
1084 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1085 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1086 counterparty_node_id,
1088 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1090 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1092 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1093 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1095 announcement_sigs: None,
1097 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1098 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1099 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1100 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1102 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1104 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1105 outbound_scid_alias,
1107 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1109 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1110 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1117 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1118 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1119 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1121 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1122 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1123 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1124 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1125 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1126 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1127 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1130 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1131 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1132 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1133 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1134 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1135 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1136 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1137 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1139 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1140 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1144 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1149 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1150 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1151 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1152 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1153 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1154 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1155 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1156 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1157 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1158 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1159 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1162 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1164 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1165 // support this channel type.
1166 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1167 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1168 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1171 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1172 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1173 // `static_remote_key`.
1174 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1175 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1177 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1178 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1181 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1184 channel_type.clone()
1186 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1187 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1188 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1192 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1194 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1195 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1196 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1197 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1198 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1199 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1200 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1201 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1202 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1205 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1209 // Check sanity of message fields:
1210 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1213 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1216 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1219 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1220 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1221 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1223 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1224 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1226 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1227 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1229 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1231 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1232 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1233 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1235 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1238 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1239 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1242 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1243 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1244 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1246 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1247 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1249 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1252 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1253 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1255 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1258 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1261 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1265 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1267 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1268 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1269 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1273 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1274 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1275 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1276 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1277 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1279 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1280 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1282 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1283 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1284 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1286 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1287 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1290 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1291 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1292 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1293 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1294 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1298 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1299 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1300 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1301 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1302 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1305 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1306 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1307 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1308 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1309 if script.len() == 0 {
1312 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1313 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1315 Some(script.clone())
1318 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1319 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1320 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1325 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1326 Some(signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1329 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1330 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1331 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1335 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1336 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1338 let chan = Channel {
1341 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1342 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1344 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1349 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1351 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1352 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1353 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1356 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1359 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1360 destination_script: signer_provider.get_destination_script(),
1362 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1363 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1364 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1366 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1367 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1368 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1369 pending_update_fee: None,
1370 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1371 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1372 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1373 update_time_counter: 1,
1375 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1377 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1378 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1379 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1380 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1381 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1382 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1384 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1385 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1386 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1387 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1389 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1390 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1391 closing_fee_limits: None,
1392 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1394 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1396 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1397 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1398 short_channel_id: None,
1399 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1401 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1402 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1403 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1404 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1405 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1406 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1407 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1408 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1409 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1410 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1411 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1412 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1414 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1416 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1417 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1418 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1419 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1420 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1421 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1422 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1424 funding_outpoint: None,
1425 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1426 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1428 funding_transaction: None,
1430 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1431 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1432 counterparty_node_id,
1434 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1436 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1438 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1439 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1441 announcement_sigs: None,
1443 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1444 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1445 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1446 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1448 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1450 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1451 outbound_scid_alias,
1453 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1455 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1456 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1465 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1466 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1467 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1468 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1469 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1471 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1472 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1473 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1474 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1475 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1476 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1477 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1479 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1480 where L::Target: Logger
1482 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1483 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1484 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1486 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1487 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1488 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1489 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1491 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1492 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1493 if match update_state {
1494 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1495 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1496 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1497 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1498 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1500 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1504 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1505 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1506 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1507 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1509 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1510 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1511 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1513 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1514 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1515 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1516 transaction_output_index: None
1521 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1522 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1523 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1524 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1525 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1528 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1530 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1531 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1532 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1534 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1535 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1538 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1539 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1542 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1544 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1545 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1546 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1548 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1549 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1555 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1556 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1557 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1558 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1559 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1560 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1561 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1565 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1566 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1568 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1570 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1571 if generated_by_local {
1572 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1573 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1582 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1584 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1585 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1586 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1587 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1588 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1589 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1590 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1593 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1594 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1595 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1596 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1600 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1601 preimages.push(preimage);
1605 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1606 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1608 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1610 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1611 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1613 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1614 if !generated_by_local {
1615 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1623 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1624 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1625 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1626 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1627 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1628 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1629 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1630 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1632 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1634 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1635 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1636 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1637 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1639 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1641 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1642 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1643 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1644 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1647 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1648 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1649 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1650 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1652 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1655 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1656 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1657 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1658 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1660 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1663 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1664 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1669 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1670 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1675 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1677 let channel_parameters =
1678 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1679 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1680 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1683 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1688 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1691 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1692 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1693 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1694 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1696 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1697 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1698 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1706 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1707 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1713 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1714 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1715 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1716 // outside of those situations will fail.
1717 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1721 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1726 1 + // script length (0)
1730 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1731 2 + // witness marker and flag
1732 1 + // witness element count
1733 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1734 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1735 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1736 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1737 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1738 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1740 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1741 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1742 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1748 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1749 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1750 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1751 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1753 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1754 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1755 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1757 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1758 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1759 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1760 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1761 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1762 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1765 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1766 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1769 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1770 value_to_holder = 0;
1773 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1774 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1775 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1776 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1778 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1779 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1782 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1783 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1787 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1788 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1789 /// our counterparty!)
1790 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1791 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1792 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1793 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1794 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1795 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1796 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1798 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1802 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1803 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1804 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1805 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1806 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1807 //may see payments to it!
1808 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1809 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1810 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1812 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1815 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1816 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1817 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1818 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1819 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1822 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1825 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1826 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1828 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1830 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1831 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1832 where L::Target: Logger {
1833 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1834 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1835 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1836 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1837 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1838 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1839 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1840 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1844 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1845 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1846 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1847 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1849 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1850 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1852 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1854 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1856 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1857 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1858 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1860 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1861 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1862 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1863 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1864 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1866 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1867 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1868 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1870 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1871 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1873 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1876 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1877 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1881 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1885 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1886 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1887 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1888 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1889 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1890 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1893 // Now update local state:
1895 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1896 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1897 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1898 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1899 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1900 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1901 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1905 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1906 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1907 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1908 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1909 // do not not get into this branch.
1910 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1911 match pending_update {
1912 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1913 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1914 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1915 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1916 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1917 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1918 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1921 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1922 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1923 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1924 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1925 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1926 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1927 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1933 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1934 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1935 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1937 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1938 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1939 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1941 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1942 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1945 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1946 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1948 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1949 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1951 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1952 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1955 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1958 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1959 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1960 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1961 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1966 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1967 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1968 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1969 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1970 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1973 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1974 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1975 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1976 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1977 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1979 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1980 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1981 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1985 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1986 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1987 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1988 /// before we fail backwards.
1990 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
1991 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
1992 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
1993 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
1994 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1995 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
1996 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
1999 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2000 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2001 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2002 /// before we fail backwards.
2004 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2005 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2006 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2007 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2008 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2009 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2010 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2012 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2014 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2015 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2016 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2018 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2019 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2020 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2022 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2023 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2024 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2026 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2031 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2032 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2038 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2039 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2040 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2041 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2042 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2046 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2047 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2048 force_holding_cell = true;
2051 // Now update local state:
2052 if force_holding_cell {
2053 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2054 match pending_update {
2055 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2056 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2057 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2058 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2062 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2063 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2064 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2065 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2071 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2072 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2073 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2079 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2081 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2082 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2085 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2086 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2087 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2092 // Message handlers:
2094 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2095 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2097 // Check sanity of message fields:
2098 if !self.is_outbound() {
2099 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2101 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2102 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2104 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2105 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2107 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2108 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2110 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2111 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2113 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2114 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2115 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2117 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2118 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2121 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2122 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2123 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2125 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2128 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2132 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2133 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2134 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2136 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2139 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2140 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2142 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2143 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2145 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2146 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2148 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2149 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2151 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2152 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2155 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2156 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2159 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2160 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2162 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2163 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2164 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2166 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2169 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2170 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2171 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2172 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2173 if script.len() == 0 {
2176 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2177 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2179 Some(script.clone())
2182 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2183 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2184 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2189 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2190 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2191 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2192 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2193 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2195 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2196 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2198 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2201 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2202 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2203 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2204 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2205 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2206 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2209 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2210 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2211 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2214 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2215 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2217 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2218 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2223 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2224 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2226 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2227 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2229 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2230 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2231 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2232 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2233 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2234 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2235 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2236 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2237 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2240 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2241 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2243 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2244 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2245 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2246 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2248 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2249 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2251 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2252 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2255 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2256 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2259 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2260 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2261 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2263 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2266 if self.is_outbound() {
2267 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2269 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2270 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2271 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2275 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2276 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2278 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2279 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2280 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2281 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2284 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2285 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2286 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2287 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2288 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2290 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2292 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2293 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2297 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2298 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2299 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2303 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2304 initial_commitment_tx,
2307 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2308 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2311 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2312 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2314 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2316 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2317 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2318 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2319 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2320 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2321 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2322 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2323 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2324 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2325 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2326 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2328 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2330 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2332 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2333 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2334 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2335 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2337 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2339 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2340 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2342 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2345 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2346 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2347 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2348 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2349 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2351 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2354 if !self.is_outbound() {
2355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2357 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2358 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2360 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2361 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2362 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2363 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2366 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2368 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2369 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2370 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2371 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2373 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2374 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2376 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2377 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2379 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2380 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2381 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2382 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2383 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2388 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2389 initial_commitment_tx,
2392 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2393 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2396 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2397 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2400 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2401 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2402 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2403 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2404 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2405 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2406 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2407 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2408 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2409 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2410 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2411 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2413 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2415 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2417 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2418 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2419 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2420 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2422 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2424 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2427 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2428 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2430 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2431 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2432 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2433 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2436 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2437 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2438 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2439 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2440 // when routing outbound payments.
2441 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2445 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2447 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2448 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2449 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2450 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2451 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2452 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2453 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2454 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2455 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2457 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2458 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2459 let expected_point =
2460 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2461 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2463 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2465 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2466 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2467 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2468 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2469 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2471 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2472 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2476 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2479 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2480 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2482 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2484 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2487 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2488 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2489 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2490 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2496 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2497 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2498 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2499 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2500 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2501 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2502 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2503 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2504 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2507 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2510 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2511 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2512 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2514 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2515 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2516 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2517 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2518 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2519 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2521 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2522 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2528 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2529 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2530 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2531 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2532 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2533 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2534 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2535 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2536 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2539 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2542 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2543 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2544 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2546 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2547 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2548 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2549 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2550 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2551 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2553 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2554 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2558 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2559 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2560 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2561 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2562 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2563 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2564 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2566 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2567 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2569 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2576 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2577 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2578 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2579 /// corner case properly.
2580 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2581 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2582 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2584 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2585 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2586 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2587 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2590 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2592 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2593 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2594 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2597 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2598 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2599 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2600 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2602 outbound_capacity_msat,
2603 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2604 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2605 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2611 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2612 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2615 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2616 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2617 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2618 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2619 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2620 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2623 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2624 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2626 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2627 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2630 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2631 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2632 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2634 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2635 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2637 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2640 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2641 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2643 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2644 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2646 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2647 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2649 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2650 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2654 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2655 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2661 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2662 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2663 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2666 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2667 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2668 included_htlcs += 1;
2671 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2672 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2676 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2677 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2678 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2679 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2680 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2681 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2686 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2688 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2689 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2694 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2695 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2699 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2700 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2701 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2704 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2705 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2707 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2708 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2709 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2711 total_pending_htlcs,
2712 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2713 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2714 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2716 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2717 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2718 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2720 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2722 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2727 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2728 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2729 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2731 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2732 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2734 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2737 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2738 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2740 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2741 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2743 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2744 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2746 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2747 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2751 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2752 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2758 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2759 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2760 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2761 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2762 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2763 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2766 included_htlcs += 1;
2769 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2770 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2773 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2774 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2776 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2777 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2778 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2783 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2784 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2785 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2788 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2789 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2791 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2792 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2794 total_pending_htlcs,
2795 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2796 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2797 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2799 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2800 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2801 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2803 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2805 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2810 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2811 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2812 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2813 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2814 if local_sent_shutdown {
2815 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2817 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2818 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2819 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2820 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2822 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2823 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2825 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2826 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2828 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2829 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2831 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2832 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2835 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2836 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2837 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2838 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2840 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2841 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2843 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2844 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2845 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2846 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2847 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2848 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2849 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2850 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2851 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2852 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2853 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2855 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2856 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2857 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2858 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2859 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2860 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2864 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2867 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2868 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2869 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2871 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2872 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2873 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2874 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2875 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2876 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2877 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2881 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2882 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2883 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2884 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2885 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2886 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2887 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2891 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2892 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2893 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2894 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2895 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2896 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2899 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2900 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2901 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2902 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2903 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2905 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2906 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2909 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2910 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2913 if !self.is_outbound() {
2914 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2915 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2916 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2917 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2918 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2919 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2920 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2921 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2922 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2923 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2924 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2925 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2926 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2927 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2928 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2931 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2932 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2933 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2934 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2935 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2938 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2939 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2941 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2942 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2945 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2946 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2947 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2951 // Now update local state:
2952 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2953 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2954 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2955 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2956 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2957 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2958 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2963 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2965 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2966 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2967 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2968 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2969 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2970 None => fail_reason.into(),
2971 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2972 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2973 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2974 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2976 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2980 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2982 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2983 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2985 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2986 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2991 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2994 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2995 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2996 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2998 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2999 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3002 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3005 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3006 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3009 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3010 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3013 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3017 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3018 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3019 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3021 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3022 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3025 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3029 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
3030 where L::Target: Logger
3032 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3033 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
3035 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3036 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
3038 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3039 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
3042 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3044 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3046 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3047 let commitment_txid = {
3048 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3049 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3050 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3052 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3053 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3054 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3055 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3056 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3057 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3061 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3063 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3064 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3065 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3066 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3069 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3070 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3071 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3072 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3075 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3077 if self.is_outbound() {
3078 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3079 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3080 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3081 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3082 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3083 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3084 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3085 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3086 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3087 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3093 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3094 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3097 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3098 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3099 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3100 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3101 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3102 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3103 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3105 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3106 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3107 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3108 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3109 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3110 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3111 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3112 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3114 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3116 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3120 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3121 commitment_stats.tx,
3123 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3124 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3125 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3128 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3129 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3130 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3131 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3133 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3134 let mut need_commitment = false;
3135 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3136 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3137 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3138 need_commitment = true;
3142 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3143 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3144 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3145 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3146 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3147 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3151 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3152 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3153 Some(forward_info.clone())
3155 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3156 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3157 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3158 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3159 need_commitment = true;
3162 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3163 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3164 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3165 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3166 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3167 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3168 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3169 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3170 need_commitment = true;
3174 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3175 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3176 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3177 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3179 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3180 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3181 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3182 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3183 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3184 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3185 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3186 // includes the right HTLCs.
3187 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3188 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3189 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3190 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3191 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3192 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3194 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3195 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3196 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3199 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3200 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3201 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3202 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3203 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3204 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3205 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3206 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3207 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3211 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3212 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3214 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3215 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3216 per_commitment_secret,
3217 next_per_commitment_point,
3218 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3221 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3222 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3223 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3224 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3225 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3226 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3227 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3228 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3231 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3232 /// for our counterparty.
3233 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3234 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3235 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3236 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3237 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3239 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3240 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3241 updates: Vec::new(),
3244 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3245 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3246 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3247 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3248 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3249 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3250 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3251 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3252 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3253 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3254 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3255 // to rebalance channels.
3256 match &htlc_update {
3257 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3258 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3259 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3262 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3263 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3264 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3265 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3266 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3267 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3268 // into the holding cell without ever being
3269 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3270 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3271 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3274 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3280 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3281 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3282 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3283 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3284 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3285 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3286 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3287 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3288 (msg, monitor_update)
3289 } else { unreachable!() };
3290 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3291 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3293 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3294 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3295 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3296 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3297 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3298 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3299 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3300 // for a full revocation before failing.
3301 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3304 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3306 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3313 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3314 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3316 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3317 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3322 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3323 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3324 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3325 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3326 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3328 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3329 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3330 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3332 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3334 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3336 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3339 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3341 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3345 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3346 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3347 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3348 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3349 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3350 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3351 where L::Target: Logger,
3353 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3354 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3356 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3357 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3359 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3360 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3363 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3365 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3366 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3367 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3371 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3372 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3373 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3374 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3375 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3376 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3377 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3378 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3382 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3384 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3385 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3388 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3389 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3391 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3393 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3394 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3395 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3396 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3397 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3398 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3399 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3400 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3404 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3405 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3406 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3407 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3408 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3409 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3410 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3411 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3413 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3414 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3417 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3418 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3419 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3420 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3421 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3422 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3423 let mut require_commitment = false;
3424 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3427 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3428 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3429 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3431 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3432 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3433 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3434 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3435 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3436 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3441 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3442 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3443 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3444 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3445 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3447 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3448 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3449 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3454 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3455 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3457 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3461 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3462 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3464 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3465 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3466 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3467 require_commitment = true;
3468 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3469 match forward_info {
3470 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3471 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3472 require_commitment = true;
3474 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3475 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3476 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3478 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3479 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3480 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3484 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3485 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3486 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3487 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3493 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3494 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3495 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3496 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3498 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3499 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3500 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3501 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3502 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3503 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3504 require_commitment = true;
3508 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3510 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3511 match update_state {
3512 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3513 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3514 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3515 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3516 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3518 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3519 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3520 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3521 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3522 require_commitment = true;
3523 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3524 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3529 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3530 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3531 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3532 if require_commitment {
3533 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3534 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3535 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3536 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3537 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3538 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3539 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3540 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3541 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3543 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3544 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3545 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3546 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3547 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3548 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3549 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3551 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3555 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3556 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3557 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3558 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3559 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3561 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3562 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3563 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3566 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3567 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3568 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3569 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3572 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3573 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3574 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3575 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3577 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3580 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3581 if require_commitment {
3582 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3584 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3585 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3586 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3587 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3589 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3590 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3592 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3593 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3594 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3596 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3600 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3601 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3602 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3605 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3607 commitment_update: None,
3608 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3609 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3610 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3617 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3618 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3619 /// commitment update.
3620 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3621 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3622 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3625 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3626 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3627 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3628 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3630 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3631 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3632 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3633 if !self.is_outbound() {
3634 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3636 if !self.is_usable() {
3637 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3639 if !self.is_live() {
3640 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3643 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3644 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3645 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3646 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3647 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3648 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3649 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3650 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3651 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3652 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3656 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3657 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3658 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3659 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3660 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3663 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3664 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3668 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3669 force_holding_cell = true;
3672 if force_holding_cell {
3673 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3677 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3678 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3680 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3681 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3686 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3687 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3689 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3691 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3692 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3693 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3694 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3698 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3699 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3700 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3704 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3705 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3708 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3709 // will be retransmitted.
3710 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3711 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3712 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3714 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3715 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3717 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3718 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3719 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3720 // this HTLC accordingly
3721 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3724 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3725 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3726 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3727 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3730 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3731 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3732 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3733 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3734 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3735 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3740 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3742 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3743 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3744 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3745 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3749 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3750 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3751 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3752 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3753 // the update upon reconnection.
3754 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3758 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3759 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3762 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3763 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3764 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3765 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3766 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3767 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3769 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3770 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3771 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3772 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3773 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3774 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3776 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3777 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3778 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3779 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3780 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3781 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3782 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3785 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3786 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3787 /// to the remote side.
3788 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3789 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3790 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3792 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3793 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3794 // first received the funding_signed.
3795 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3796 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3797 self.funding_transaction.take()
3799 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3800 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3801 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3802 funding_broadcastable = None;
3805 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3806 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3807 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3808 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3809 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3810 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3811 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3812 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3813 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3814 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3815 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3816 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3817 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3818 next_per_commitment_point,
3819 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3823 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
3825 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3826 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3827 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3828 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3829 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3830 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3832 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3833 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3834 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3835 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3836 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3837 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3841 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3842 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3844 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3845 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3848 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3849 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3850 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3851 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3852 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3853 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3854 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3855 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3856 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3860 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3861 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3863 if self.is_outbound() {
3864 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3866 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3867 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3869 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3870 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3872 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3873 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3874 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3875 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3876 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3877 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3878 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3879 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3880 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3881 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3882 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3883 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3884 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3886 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3887 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3888 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3894 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3895 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3896 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3897 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3898 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3899 per_commitment_secret,
3900 next_per_commitment_point,
3904 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3905 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3906 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3907 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3908 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3910 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3911 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3912 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3913 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3914 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3915 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3916 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3917 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3918 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3923 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3924 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3926 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3927 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3928 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3929 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3930 reason: err_packet.clone()
3933 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3934 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3935 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3936 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3937 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3938 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3941 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3942 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3943 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3944 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3945 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3952 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3953 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3954 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3955 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3959 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3960 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3961 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3962 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3963 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3964 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3968 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3969 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3971 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3972 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3973 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3974 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3975 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3976 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock)
3977 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3978 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3979 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3980 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3981 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3985 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3986 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3987 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3990 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3991 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3992 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3993 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3994 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3995 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3996 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3997 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3999 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4000 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4001 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4002 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4003 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4006 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4007 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4008 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4009 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4010 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4011 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4012 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4013 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4016 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4020 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4021 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4022 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4023 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4025 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4029 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4030 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4031 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4033 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4034 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4035 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4036 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4037 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4041 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4043 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4044 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4045 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4046 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4047 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4048 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4050 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4051 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4052 channel_ready: None,
4053 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4054 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4055 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4059 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4060 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4061 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4062 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4063 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4064 next_per_commitment_point,
4065 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4067 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4068 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4069 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4073 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4074 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4075 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4077 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4078 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4079 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4082 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4085 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4088 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4089 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4090 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4091 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4092 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4094 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4095 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4096 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4097 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4098 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4099 next_per_commitment_point,
4100 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4104 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4105 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4106 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4108 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4111 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4112 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4113 raa: required_revoke,
4114 commitment_update: None,
4115 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4117 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4118 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4119 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4121 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4124 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4125 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4126 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4127 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4128 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4129 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4132 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4133 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4134 raa: required_revoke,
4135 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4136 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4140 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4144 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4145 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4146 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4147 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4149 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4151 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4153 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4154 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4155 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4156 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4157 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4158 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4160 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4161 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4162 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4163 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4164 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4166 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4167 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4168 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4169 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4172 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4173 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4174 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4175 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4176 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4177 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4178 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4179 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4180 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4181 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4182 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4183 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4184 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4185 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4186 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4188 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4191 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4192 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4195 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4196 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4197 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4198 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4199 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4200 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4201 self.channel_state &
4202 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4203 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4204 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4205 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4208 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4209 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4210 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4211 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4212 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4213 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4216 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4222 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4223 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4224 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4225 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4227 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4228 return Ok((None, None));
4231 if !self.is_outbound() {
4232 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4233 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4235 return Ok((None, None));
4238 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4240 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4241 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4242 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4243 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4245 let sig = self.holder_signer
4246 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4247 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4249 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4250 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4251 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4252 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4254 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4255 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4256 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4261 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4262 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4263 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4264 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4266 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4267 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4269 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4270 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4271 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4272 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4275 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4276 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4277 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4280 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4282 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4283 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4286 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4287 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4288 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4291 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4294 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4295 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4296 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4297 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4299 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4302 assert!(send_shutdown);
4303 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4304 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4305 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4307 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4312 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4314 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4315 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4317 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4318 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4319 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4320 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4321 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4322 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4326 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4327 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4328 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4329 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4333 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4334 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4335 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4336 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4337 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4338 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4340 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4341 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4348 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4349 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4351 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4354 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4355 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4357 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4359 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4360 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4361 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4362 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4363 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4364 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4365 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4366 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4367 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4369 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4370 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4373 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4377 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4378 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4379 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4380 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4382 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4383 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4385 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4386 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4388 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4389 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4391 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4392 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4395 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4396 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4399 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4400 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4401 return Ok((None, None));
4404 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4405 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4406 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4407 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4409 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4411 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4414 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4415 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4416 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4417 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4418 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4422 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4423 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4424 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4428 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4429 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4430 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4431 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4432 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4433 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4434 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4438 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4440 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4441 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4442 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4443 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4445 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4448 let sig = self.holder_signer
4449 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4450 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4452 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4453 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4454 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4455 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4459 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4460 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4461 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4462 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4464 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4465 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4466 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4472 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4473 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4474 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4476 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4477 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4479 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4480 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4483 if !self.is_outbound() {
4484 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4485 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4486 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4487 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4489 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4490 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4491 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4493 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4494 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4497 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4498 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4499 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4500 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4501 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4502 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4503 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4504 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4506 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4509 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4510 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4511 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4512 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4514 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4518 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4519 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4520 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4521 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4523 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4529 // Public utilities:
4531 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4535 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4539 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4540 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4541 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4545 /// Gets the channel's type
4546 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4550 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4551 /// is_usable() returns true).
4552 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4553 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4554 self.short_channel_id
4557 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4558 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4559 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4562 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4563 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4564 self.outbound_scid_alias
4566 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4567 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4568 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4569 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4570 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4573 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4574 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4575 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4576 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4579 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4580 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4581 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4584 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4585 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4586 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4587 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4591 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4594 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4595 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4598 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4599 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4602 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4603 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4604 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4607 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4608 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4611 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4612 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4613 self.counterparty_node_id
4616 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4617 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4618 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4621 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4622 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4623 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4626 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4627 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4629 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4630 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4631 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4632 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4634 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4638 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4639 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4640 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4643 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4644 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4645 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4648 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4649 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4650 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4652 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4653 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4658 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4659 self.channel_value_satoshis
4662 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4663 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4666 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4667 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4670 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4671 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4674 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4675 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4676 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4679 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4680 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4681 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4684 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4685 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4686 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4689 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4690 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4691 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4692 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4693 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4696 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4698 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4699 self.prev_config = None;
4703 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4704 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4708 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4709 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4710 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4711 let did_channel_update =
4712 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4713 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4714 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4715 if did_channel_update {
4716 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4717 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4718 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4719 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4721 self.config.options = *config;
4725 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4726 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4727 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4728 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4729 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4730 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4731 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4733 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4734 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4737 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4739 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4740 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4746 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4747 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4748 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4749 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4750 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4751 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4752 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4754 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4755 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4762 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4766 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4767 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4768 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4769 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4770 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4771 // which are near the dust limit.
4772 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4773 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4774 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4775 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4776 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4778 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4779 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4781 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4784 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4785 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4788 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4789 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4792 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4793 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4797 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4802 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4804 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4805 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4806 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4807 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4808 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4809 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4811 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4813 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4821 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4822 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4826 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4827 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4828 self.update_time_counter
4831 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4832 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4835 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4836 self.config.announced_channel
4839 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4840 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4843 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4844 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4845 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4846 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4849 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4850 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4851 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4854 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4855 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4856 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4857 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4858 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4861 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4862 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4863 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4864 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4865 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4868 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4869 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4870 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4871 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4874 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4875 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4876 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4879 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4880 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4881 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4883 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4884 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4885 if self.channel_state &
4886 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4887 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4888 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4889 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4890 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4893 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4894 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4895 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4896 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4897 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4898 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4900 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4901 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4902 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4904 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4905 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4906 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4907 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4908 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4909 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4915 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4916 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4917 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4920 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4921 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4922 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4925 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4926 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4927 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4930 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4931 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4932 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4933 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4934 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4935 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4940 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4941 self.channel_update_status
4944 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4945 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4946 self.channel_update_status = status;
4949 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4951 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4952 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4953 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4957 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4958 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4959 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4962 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4966 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4967 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4968 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4970 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4971 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4972 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4974 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4975 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4978 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4979 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4980 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4981 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4982 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4983 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4984 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4985 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4986 self.channel_state);
4988 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4992 if need_commitment_update {
4993 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4994 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4995 let next_per_commitment_point =
4996 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4997 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4998 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4999 next_per_commitment_point,
5000 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5004 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5010 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5011 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5012 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5013 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
5014 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L)
5015 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5016 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5017 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5018 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5019 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5020 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5021 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5022 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5023 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5024 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5025 if self.is_outbound() {
5026 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5027 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5028 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5029 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5030 // channel and move on.
5031 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5032 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5034 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5035 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5036 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5038 if self.is_outbound() {
5039 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5040 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5041 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5042 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5043 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5044 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5048 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5049 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5050 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5051 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5052 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5056 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5057 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5058 // may have already happened for this block).
5059 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5060 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5061 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5062 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5065 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5066 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5067 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5068 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5076 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5077 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5078 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5079 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5081 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5082 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5085 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5087 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, user_config: UserConfig, logger: &L)
5088 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5089 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk, user_config)), logger)
5092 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey, UserConfig)>, logger: &L)
5093 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5094 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5095 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5096 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5098 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5099 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5101 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5102 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5103 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5111 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5113 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5114 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk, user_config)) = genesis_node_pk {
5115 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, &user_config, height, logger)
5117 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5118 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5121 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5122 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5123 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5124 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5125 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5126 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5127 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5128 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5129 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5132 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5133 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5134 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5135 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5137 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5138 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5139 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5141 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5142 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5143 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5144 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5146 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5147 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5148 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5149 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5150 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5151 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5152 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5155 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk, user_config)) = genesis_node_pk {
5156 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, &user_config, height, logger)
5158 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5161 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5162 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5163 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5164 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5165 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5166 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5167 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5168 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5169 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5170 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5171 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5172 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5173 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5174 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5175 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5176 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5177 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5183 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5188 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5189 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5191 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5192 if !self.is_outbound() {
5193 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5195 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5196 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5199 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5200 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5203 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5204 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5208 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5209 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5210 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5211 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5212 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5213 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5214 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5215 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5216 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5217 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5218 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5219 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5220 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5221 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5222 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5223 first_per_commitment_point,
5224 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5225 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5226 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5227 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5229 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5233 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5234 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5237 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5238 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5239 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5240 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5243 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5244 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5246 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5247 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5248 if self.is_outbound() {
5249 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5251 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5252 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5254 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5255 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5257 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5258 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5261 self.user_id = user_id;
5262 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5264 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5267 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5268 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5269 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5271 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5272 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5273 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5274 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5276 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5277 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5278 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5279 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5280 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5281 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5282 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5283 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5284 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5285 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5286 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5287 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5288 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5289 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5290 first_per_commitment_point,
5291 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5292 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5293 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5295 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5299 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5300 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5302 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5304 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5305 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5308 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5309 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5310 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5311 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5312 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5313 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5316 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5317 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5318 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5319 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5320 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5321 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5322 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5323 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5324 if !self.is_outbound() {
5325 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5327 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5328 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5330 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5331 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5332 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5333 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5336 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5337 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5339 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5342 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5343 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5348 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5350 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5352 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5353 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5354 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5356 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5357 temporary_channel_id,
5358 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5359 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5364 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5365 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5366 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5367 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5369 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5372 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5373 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5374 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5375 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5377 if !self.is_usable() {
5378 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5381 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5383 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5384 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5386 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5387 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5388 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5389 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5390 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5391 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5397 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5398 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5399 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5403 if !self.is_usable() {
5407 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5408 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5412 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5416 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5417 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5420 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5424 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5426 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5431 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5433 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5434 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5435 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5436 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5437 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5441 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5443 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5444 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5445 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5447 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5448 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5449 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5450 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5451 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5452 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5453 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5454 contents: announcement,
5457 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5461 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5462 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5463 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5464 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5465 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash, user_config)?;
5467 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5469 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5470 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5471 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5472 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5474 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5475 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5476 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5477 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5480 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5481 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5482 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5483 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5486 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5489 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5490 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5491 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5492 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5495 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash, user_config) {
5497 Err(_) => return None,
5499 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5500 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5505 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5506 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5507 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5508 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5509 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5510 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5511 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5512 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5513 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5514 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5515 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5516 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5517 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5518 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5519 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5520 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5521 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5522 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5523 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5526 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5527 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5528 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5529 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5532 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5533 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5534 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5535 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5536 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5537 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5538 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5539 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5541 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5542 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5543 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5544 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5545 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5546 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5547 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5548 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5549 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5551 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5557 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5559 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5560 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5561 /// commitment update.
5563 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5564 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5565 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5566 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5568 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5569 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5571 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5572 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5577 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5578 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5580 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5582 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5583 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5585 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5586 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5587 /// regenerate them.
5589 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5590 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5592 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5593 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5594 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5595 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5596 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5597 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5599 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5600 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5601 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5604 if amount_msat == 0 {
5605 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5608 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5609 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5612 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5613 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5614 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5615 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5616 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5617 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5618 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5619 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5622 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5623 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5624 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5625 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5627 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5628 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5629 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5632 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5633 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5634 if !self.is_outbound() {
5635 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5636 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5637 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5638 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5639 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5640 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5644 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5647 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5648 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5649 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5651 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5652 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5653 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5654 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5655 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5656 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5660 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5661 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5662 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5663 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5664 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5665 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5669 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5670 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5671 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5674 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5675 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5676 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5677 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5679 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5680 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5683 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5684 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5685 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5686 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5687 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5690 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5691 force_holding_cell = true;
5694 // Now update local state:
5695 if force_holding_cell {
5696 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5701 onion_routing_packet,
5706 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5707 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5709 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5711 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5715 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5716 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5717 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5721 onion_routing_packet,
5723 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5728 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5729 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5730 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5731 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5732 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5734 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5735 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5736 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5738 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5739 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5743 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5744 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5745 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5746 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5747 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5748 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5749 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5752 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5753 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5754 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5755 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5756 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5757 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5760 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5762 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5763 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5764 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5765 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5766 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5767 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5769 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5772 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5773 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5776 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5777 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5778 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5779 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5780 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5781 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5782 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5783 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5786 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5787 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5790 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5791 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5792 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5793 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5794 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5795 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5796 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5800 if !self.is_outbound() {
5801 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5802 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5803 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5804 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5805 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5806 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5807 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5808 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5809 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5810 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5817 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5818 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5822 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5823 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5825 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5827 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5828 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5829 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5830 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5832 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5833 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5834 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5835 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5836 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5837 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5841 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5842 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5845 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5848 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5849 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5851 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5852 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5853 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5854 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger)? {
5855 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5856 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5857 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5863 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5864 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5865 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5868 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5869 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5872 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5873 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5874 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5875 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5881 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5882 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5883 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5884 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5885 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
5886 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5887 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5888 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5891 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5892 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5893 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5895 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5896 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5899 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5900 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5901 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5904 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5907 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5908 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5909 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5911 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5916 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5917 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5918 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5919 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5921 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5923 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5925 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5926 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5927 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5928 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5929 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5930 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5934 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5935 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5936 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5939 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5940 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5941 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5942 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5943 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5945 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5946 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5953 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5956 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5957 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5958 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5959 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5960 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5961 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5962 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5963 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5964 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5965 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5966 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5968 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5969 // return them to fail the payment.
5970 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5971 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5972 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5974 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5975 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5980 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5981 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5982 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5983 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5984 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5985 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5986 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
5987 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
5988 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
5989 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5990 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5991 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5992 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
5997 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5998 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5999 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6002 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6003 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6004 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6006 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6007 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6011 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6015 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6016 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6018 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6024 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6025 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6026 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6027 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6028 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6030 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6031 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6032 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6033 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6039 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6040 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6041 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6042 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6043 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6044 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6049 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6050 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6051 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6052 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6054 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6055 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6056 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6057 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6062 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6063 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6064 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6065 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6066 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6067 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6072 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6073 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6074 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6077 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6079 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6080 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6081 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6082 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6083 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6085 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6086 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6087 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6088 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6090 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6091 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6092 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6094 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6096 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6097 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6098 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6099 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6100 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6101 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6103 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6104 // deserialized from that format.
6105 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6106 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6107 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6109 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6111 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6112 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6113 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6115 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6116 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6117 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6118 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6121 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6122 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6123 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6126 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6127 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6128 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6129 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6131 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6132 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6134 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6136 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6138 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6140 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6143 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6145 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6150 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6152 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6153 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6154 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6155 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6156 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6157 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6158 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6160 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6162 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6164 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6167 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6168 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6169 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6172 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6174 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6175 preimages.push(preimage);
6177 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6178 reason.write(writer)?;
6180 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6182 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6183 preimages.push(preimage);
6185 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6186 reason.write(writer)?;
6191 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6192 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6194 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6196 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6197 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6198 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6199 source.write(writer)?;
6200 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6202 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6204 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6205 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6207 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6209 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6210 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6215 match self.resend_order {
6216 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6217 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6220 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6221 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6222 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6224 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6225 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6226 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6227 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6230 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6231 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6232 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6233 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6234 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6237 if self.is_outbound() {
6238 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6239 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6240 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6242 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6243 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6244 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6246 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6248 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6249 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6250 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6251 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6253 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6254 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6255 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6256 // consider the stale state on reload.
6259 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6260 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6261 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6263 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6264 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6265 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6267 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6268 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6270 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6271 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6272 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6274 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6275 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6277 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6280 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6281 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6282 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6284 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6287 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6288 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6290 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6291 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6292 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6294 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6296 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6298 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6300 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6301 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6302 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6303 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6304 htlc.write(writer)?;
6307 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6308 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6309 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6311 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6312 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6314 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6315 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6316 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6317 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6318 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6319 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6320 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6322 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6323 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6324 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6325 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6326 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6328 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6330 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6331 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6332 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6333 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6335 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6336 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6337 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6338 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6339 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6340 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6341 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6343 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6344 (2, chan_type, option),
6345 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6346 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6347 (5, self.config, required),
6348 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6349 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6350 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6351 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6352 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6353 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6354 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6355 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6356 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6357 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6358 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6359 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6366 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6367 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6369 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6370 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6372 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6373 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6374 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6376 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6377 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6378 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6379 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6381 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6383 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6384 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6385 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6386 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6387 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6389 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6390 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6393 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6394 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6395 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6397 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6399 let mut keys_data = None;
6401 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6402 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6403 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6404 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6405 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6406 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6407 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6408 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6409 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6410 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6414 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6415 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6416 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6419 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6421 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6422 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6423 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6425 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6426 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6427 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6428 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6429 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6430 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6431 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6432 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6433 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6434 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6435 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6436 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6437 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6438 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6443 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6444 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6445 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6446 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6447 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6448 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6449 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6450 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6451 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6452 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6453 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6454 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6456 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6457 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6460 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6461 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6464 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6465 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6467 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6472 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6473 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6474 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6475 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6476 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6477 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6478 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6479 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6480 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6481 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6483 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6484 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6485 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6487 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6488 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6489 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6491 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6495 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6496 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6497 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6498 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6501 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6502 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6503 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6505 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6506 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6507 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6508 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6511 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6512 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6513 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6514 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6517 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6519 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6521 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6522 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6523 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6524 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6526 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6527 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6528 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6529 // consider the stale state on reload.
6530 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6533 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6534 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6535 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6537 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6540 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6541 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6542 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6544 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6545 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6546 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6547 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6549 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6550 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6552 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6553 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6555 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6556 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6557 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6559 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6561 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6562 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6564 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6565 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6568 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6570 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6571 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6572 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6573 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6575 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6578 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6579 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6581 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6583 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6584 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6586 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6587 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6589 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6591 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6592 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6593 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6595 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6596 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6597 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6601 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6602 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6603 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6605 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6611 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6612 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6613 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6614 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6615 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6616 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6617 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6618 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6619 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6620 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6622 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6623 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6624 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6625 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6626 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6627 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6629 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6630 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6632 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6633 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6634 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6635 (2, channel_type, option),
6636 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6637 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6638 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6639 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6640 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6641 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6642 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6643 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6644 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6645 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6646 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6647 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6648 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6649 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6650 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6653 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6654 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6655 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6656 // required channel parameters.
6657 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6658 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6659 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6661 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6663 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6664 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6665 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6666 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6669 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6670 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6671 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6673 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6674 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6676 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6677 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6682 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6683 if iter.next().is_some() {
6684 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6688 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6689 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6690 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6691 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6692 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6695 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6696 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6698 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6699 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6700 // separate u64 values.
6701 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6706 config: config.unwrap(),
6710 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6711 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6712 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6716 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6718 channel_value_satoshis,
6720 latest_monitor_update_id,
6723 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6726 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6727 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6730 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6731 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6732 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6736 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6737 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6738 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6739 monitor_pending_forwards,
6740 monitor_pending_failures,
6741 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6744 holding_cell_update_fee,
6745 next_holder_htlc_id,
6746 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6747 update_time_counter,
6750 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6751 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6752 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6753 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6755 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6756 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6757 closing_fee_limits: None,
6758 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6760 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6762 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6763 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6765 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6767 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6768 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6769 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6770 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6771 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6772 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6773 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6774 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6775 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6778 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6780 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6781 funding_transaction,
6783 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6784 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6785 counterparty_node_id,
6787 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6791 channel_update_status,
6792 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6796 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6797 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6799 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6801 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6803 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6804 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6805 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6807 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6809 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6810 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6812 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6821 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6822 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6823 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6824 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6825 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6827 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6828 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6830 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
6831 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6832 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6833 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6834 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6835 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6836 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6837 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6838 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6839 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6840 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
6841 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6842 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6843 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6844 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6845 use crate::util::test_utils;
6846 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6847 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6848 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6849 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6850 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6851 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6852 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6853 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6854 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6855 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6856 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6857 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6858 use crate::prelude::*;
6860 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6863 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6864 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6870 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6871 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6872 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6873 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6877 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6878 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6879 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6880 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6881 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6882 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6883 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6887 signer: InMemorySigner,
6890 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6891 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6894 impl NodeSigner for Keys {
6895 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6897 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
6898 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6899 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &self.get_node_secret(recipient)?))
6902 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6904 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6906 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6909 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6910 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6912 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6913 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6916 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6920 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6922 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6923 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6924 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6925 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6926 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6929 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6930 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6931 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6932 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6936 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6937 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6938 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6942 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6943 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6944 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6945 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6947 let seed = [42; 32];
6948 let network = Network::Testnet;
6949 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6950 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6951 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6954 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6955 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6956 let config = UserConfig::default();
6957 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6958 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6959 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6961 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6962 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6966 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6967 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6969 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6970 let original_fee = 253;
6971 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6972 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6973 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6974 let seed = [42; 32];
6975 let network = Network::Testnet;
6976 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6978 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6979 let config = UserConfig::default();
6980 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6982 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
6983 // same as the old fee.
6984 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
6985 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
6986 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
6990 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
6991 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
6992 // dust limits are used.
6993 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
6994 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6995 let seed = [42; 32];
6996 let network = Network::Testnet;
6997 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6998 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7000 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7001 // they have different dust limits.
7003 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7004 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7005 let config = UserConfig::default();
7006 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7008 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7009 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7010 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7011 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7012 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7014 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7015 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7016 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7017 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7018 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7020 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7021 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7022 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7024 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7025 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7026 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7027 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7030 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7032 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7033 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7034 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7035 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7036 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7038 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7039 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7040 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7041 payment_secret: None,
7042 payment_params: None,
7046 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7047 // the dust limit check.
7048 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7049 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7050 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7051 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7053 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7054 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7055 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7056 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7057 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7058 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7059 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7063 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7064 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7065 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7066 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7067 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7068 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7069 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7070 let seed = [42; 32];
7071 let network = Network::Testnet;
7072 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7074 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7075 let config = UserConfig::default();
7076 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7078 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7079 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7081 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7082 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7083 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7084 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7085 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7086 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7088 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7089 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7090 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7091 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7092 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7094 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7096 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7097 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7098 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7099 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7100 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7102 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7103 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7104 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7105 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7106 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7110 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7111 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7112 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7113 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7114 let seed = [42; 32];
7115 let network = Network::Testnet;
7116 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7117 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7118 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7120 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7122 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7123 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7124 let config = UserConfig::default();
7125 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7127 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7128 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7129 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7130 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7132 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7133 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7134 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7136 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7137 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7138 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7139 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7141 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7142 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7143 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7145 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7146 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7148 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7149 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7150 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7151 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7152 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7153 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7154 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7155 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7156 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7161 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7163 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7164 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7165 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7166 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7167 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7168 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7169 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7176 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7177 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7178 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7179 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7180 let seed = [42; 32];
7181 let network = Network::Testnet;
7182 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7183 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7184 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7186 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7187 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7188 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7189 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7190 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7191 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7192 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7193 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7195 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7196 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7197 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7198 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7199 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7200 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7202 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7203 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7204 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7205 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7207 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7209 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7210 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7211 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7212 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7213 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7214 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7216 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7217 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7218 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7219 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7221 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7222 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7223 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7224 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7225 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7227 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7228 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7230 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7231 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7232 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7234 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7235 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7236 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7237 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7238 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7240 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7241 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7243 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7244 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7245 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7249 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7251 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7252 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7253 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7255 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7256 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7257 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7258 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7260 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7261 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7262 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7264 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7266 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7267 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7270 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7271 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7272 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7273 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7274 let seed = [42; 32];
7275 let network = Network::Testnet;
7276 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7277 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7278 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7281 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7282 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7283 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7285 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7286 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7288 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7289 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7290 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7292 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7293 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7295 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7297 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7298 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7300 // Channel Negotiations failed
7301 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7302 assert!(result.is_err());
7307 fn channel_update() {
7308 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7309 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7310 let seed = [42; 32];
7311 let network = Network::Testnet;
7312 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7313 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7315 // Create a channel.
7316 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7317 let config = UserConfig::default();
7318 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7319 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7320 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7321 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7323 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7324 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7325 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7327 short_channel_id: 0,
7330 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7331 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7332 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7334 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7335 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7337 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7339 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7341 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7342 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7343 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7344 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7346 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7347 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7348 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7350 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7354 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7356 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7357 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7358 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7359 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7360 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7361 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7362 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7363 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7364 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7365 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7366 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7367 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7368 use crate::sync::Arc;
7370 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7371 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7372 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7373 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7375 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7377 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7378 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7379 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7380 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7381 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7382 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7384 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7385 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7390 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7391 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7392 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7394 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7395 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7396 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7397 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7398 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7399 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7401 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7403 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7404 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7405 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7406 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7407 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7408 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7410 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7411 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7412 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7413 selected_contest_delay: 144
7415 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7416 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7418 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7419 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7421 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7422 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7424 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7425 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7427 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7428 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7429 // build_commitment_transaction.
7430 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7431 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7432 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7433 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7434 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7436 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7437 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7438 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7439 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7443 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7444 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7445 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7446 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7450 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7451 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7452 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7454 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7455 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7457 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7458 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7460 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7462 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7463 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7464 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7465 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7466 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7467 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7468 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7470 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7471 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7472 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7473 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7475 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7476 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7477 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7479 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7481 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7482 commitment_tx.clone(),
7483 counterparty_signature,
7484 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7485 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7486 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7488 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7489 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7491 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7492 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7493 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7495 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7496 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7499 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7500 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7502 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7503 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7504 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7505 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7506 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7507 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7508 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7509 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7511 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7514 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7515 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7516 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7520 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7523 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7524 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7525 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7527 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7528 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7529 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7530 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7531 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7532 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7533 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7534 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7536 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7540 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7541 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7543 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7544 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7545 "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", {});
7547 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7548 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7549 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7550 "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", {});
7552 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7553 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7555 amount_msat: 1000000,
7557 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7558 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7560 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7563 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7564 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7566 amount_msat: 2000000,
7568 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7569 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7571 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7574 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7575 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7577 amount_msat: 2000000,
7579 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7580 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7581 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7583 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7586 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7587 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7589 amount_msat: 3000000,
7591 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7592 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7593 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7595 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7598 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7599 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7601 amount_msat: 4000000,
7603 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7604 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7606 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7610 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7611 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7612 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7614 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7615 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7616 "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", {
7619 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7620 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7621 "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" },
7624 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7625 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7626 "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" },
7629 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7630 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7631 "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" },
7634 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7635 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7636 "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" },
7639 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7640 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7641 "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" }
7644 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7645 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7646 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7648 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7649 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7650 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e09c6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e04004830450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb701483045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7653 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7654 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7655 "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" },
7658 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7659 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7660 "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" },
7663 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7664 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7665 "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" },
7668 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7669 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7670 "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" },
7673 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7674 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7675 "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" }
7678 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7679 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7680 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7682 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7683 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7684 "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", {
7687 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7688 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7689 "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" },
7692 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7693 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7694 "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" },
7697 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7698 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7699 "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" },
7702 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7703 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7704 "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" }
7707 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7708 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7709 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7710 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7712 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7713 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7714 "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", {
7717 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7718 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7719 "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" },
7722 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7723 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7724 "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" },
7727 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7728 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7729 "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" },
7732 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7733 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7734 "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" }
7737 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7738 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7739 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7740 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7742 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7743 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7744 "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", {
7747 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7748 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7749 "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" },
7752 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7753 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7754 "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" },
7757 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7758 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7759 "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" },
7762 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7763 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7764 "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" }
7767 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7768 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7769 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7771 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7772 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7773 "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", {
7776 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7777 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7778 "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" },
7781 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7782 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7783 "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" },
7786 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7787 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7788 "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" }
7791 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7792 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7793 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7795 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7796 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7797 "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", {
7800 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7801 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7802 "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" },
7805 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7806 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7807 "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" },
7810 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7811 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7812 "02000000000101153cd825fdb3aa624bfe513e8031d5d08c5e582fb3d1d1fe8faf27d3eed410cd020000000000000000019a090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b014830450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7815 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7816 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7817 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7819 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7820 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7821 "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", {
7824 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7825 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7826 "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" },
7829 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7830 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7831 "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" }
7834 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7835 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7836 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7837 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7839 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7840 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7841 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80064a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994b80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994ac5916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd501473044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c001475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7844 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7845 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7846 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc02000000000100000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb834730440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f01008876a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6851b27568f7010000" },
7849 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7850 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7851 "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" }
7854 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7855 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7856 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7857 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7859 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7860 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7861 "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", {
7864 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7865 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7866 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0000000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb890147304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
7869 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7870 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7871 "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" }
7874 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7875 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7876 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7878 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7879 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7880 "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", {
7883 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7884 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7885 "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" }
7888 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7889 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7890 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7891 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7893 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7894 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7895 "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", {
7898 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7899 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7900 "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" }
7903 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7904 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7905 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7906 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7908 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7909 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7910 "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", {
7913 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7914 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7915 "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" }
7918 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7919 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7920 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7921 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7923 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7924 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7925 "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", {});
7927 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7928 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7929 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7930 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7932 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7933 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7934 "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", {});
7936 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7937 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7938 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7939 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7941 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7942 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7943 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b800222020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80ec0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4840400483045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de0147304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7945 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7946 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7947 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7949 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7950 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7951 "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", {});
7953 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7954 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7955 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7956 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7958 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7959 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7960 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80024a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994c0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994a04004830450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1014830450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
7962 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7963 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7964 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7965 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7967 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7968 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7969 "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", {});
7971 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7972 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7973 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7974 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7975 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7976 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7978 amount_msat: 2000000,
7980 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7981 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7983 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7986 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
7987 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7988 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7990 amount_msat: 5000000,
7992 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7993 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7994 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7996 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
7999 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8000 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8002 amount_msat: 5000000,
8004 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8005 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8006 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8008 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8012 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
8013 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
8014 "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", {
8017 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
8018 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
8019 "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" },
8021 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
8022 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
8023 "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" },
8025 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
8026 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
8027 "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" }
8030 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8031 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8032 "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", {
8035 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8036 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8037 "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" },
8039 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8040 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8041 "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" },
8043 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8044 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8045 "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" }
8050 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8051 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8053 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8054 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8055 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8056 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8058 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8059 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8060 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8062 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8063 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8065 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8066 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8068 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8069 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8070 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8074 fn test_key_derivation() {
8075 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8076 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8078 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8079 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8081 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8082 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8084 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8085 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8087 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8088 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8090 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8091 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8093 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8094 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8096 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8097 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8101 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8102 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8103 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8104 let seed = [42; 32];
8105 let network = Network::Testnet;
8106 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8107 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8109 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8110 let config = UserConfig::default();
8111 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8112 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8114 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8115 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8117 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8118 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8119 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8120 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8121 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8122 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8123 assert!(res.is_ok());
8128 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8129 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8130 // resulting `channel_type`.
8131 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8132 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8133 let network = Network::Testnet;
8134 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8135 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8137 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8138 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8140 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8141 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8143 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8144 // need to signal it.
8145 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8146 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8147 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8150 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8152 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8153 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8154 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8156 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8157 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8158 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8161 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8162 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8163 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8164 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8165 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8168 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8169 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8174 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8175 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8176 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8177 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8178 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8179 let network = Network::Testnet;
8180 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8181 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8183 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8184 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8186 let config = UserConfig::default();
8188 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8189 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8190 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8191 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8192 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8194 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8195 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8196 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8199 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8200 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8201 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8203 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8204 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8205 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8206 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8207 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8208 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8210 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8215 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8216 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8218 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8219 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8220 let network = Network::Testnet;
8221 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8222 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8224 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8225 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8227 let config = UserConfig::default();
8229 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8230 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8231 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8232 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8233 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8234 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8235 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8236 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8238 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8239 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8240 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8241 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8242 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8243 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8246 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8247 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8249 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8250 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8251 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8252 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8254 assert!(res.is_err());
8256 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8257 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8258 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8260 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8261 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8262 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8265 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8267 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8268 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8269 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8270 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8273 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8274 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8276 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8277 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8279 assert!(res.is_err());