1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
265 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
269 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
270 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
271 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
272 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
273 struct $flag_type(u32);
278 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
281 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
283 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
286 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
289 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
290 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
293 Ok($flag_type(flags))
298 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
301 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
304 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
306 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
308 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
310 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
312 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
313 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
315 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
317 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
319 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
320 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
323 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
324 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
326 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
327 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
328 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
330 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
332 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
333 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
335 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
337 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
339 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
340 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
342 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
343 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
345 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
346 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
351 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
354 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
355 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
356 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
357 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
358 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
359 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
360 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
361 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
362 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
363 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
364 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
365 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
366 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
367 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
371 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
373 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
374 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
375 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
376 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
377 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
378 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
379 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
380 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
381 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
382 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
387 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
388 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
389 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
390 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
391 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
392 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
397 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
398 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
399 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
400 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
401 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
402 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
403 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
404 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
405 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
406 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
407 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
412 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
413 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
414 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
415 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
416 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
417 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
418 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
422 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
424 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
425 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
426 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
427 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
428 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
430 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
431 /// funding transaction to confirm.
432 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
433 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
435 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
436 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
437 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
441 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
442 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
444 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
447 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
456 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
458 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
462 fn $clear(&mut self) {
465 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
467 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
471 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
472 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
474 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
475 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
480 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
482 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
483 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
485 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
486 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
487 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
488 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
489 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
490 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
491 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
492 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
500 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
502 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
503 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
504 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
505 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
506 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
510 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
511 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
514 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
515 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
518 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
520 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
521 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
522 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
526 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
528 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
529 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
530 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
531 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
533 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
539 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
540 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
541 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
542 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
543 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
544 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
545 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
546 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
547 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
548 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
549 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
550 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
551 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
552 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady);
553 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
554 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
557 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
559 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
561 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
562 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
564 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
568 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
570 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
572 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
574 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
575 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
576 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
577 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
578 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
580 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
581 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
583 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
585 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
586 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
588 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
589 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
590 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
591 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
592 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
593 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
595 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
596 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
598 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
599 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
600 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
601 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
602 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
604 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
605 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
607 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
608 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
610 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
611 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
612 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
613 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
619 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
620 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
622 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
623 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
624 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
629 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
630 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
632 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
633 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
639 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
641 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
642 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
645 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
646 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
647 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
648 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
649 self.logger.log(record)
653 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
654 where L::Target: Logger {
655 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
656 where S::Target: SignerProvider
660 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
661 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
666 macro_rules! secp_check {
667 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
670 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
675 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
676 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
677 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
678 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
679 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
680 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
681 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
682 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
684 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
686 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
688 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
692 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
694 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
695 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
696 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
698 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
699 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
701 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
702 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
703 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
704 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
705 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
707 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
708 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
712 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
718 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
721 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
722 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
723 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
724 holding_cell_msat: u64,
725 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
728 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
729 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
730 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
731 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
732 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
733 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
734 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
735 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
736 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
737 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
738 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
741 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
742 struct HTLCCandidate {
744 origin: HTLCInitiator,
748 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
756 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
758 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
760 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
761 htlc_value_msat: u64,
762 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
767 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
768 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
769 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
770 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
771 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
773 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
774 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
775 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
776 htlc_value_msat: u64,
778 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
779 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
783 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
784 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
785 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
786 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
787 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
788 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
789 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
790 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
791 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
792 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
793 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
796 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
798 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
799 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
800 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
801 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
804 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
805 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
806 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
807 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
808 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
809 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
810 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
811 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
814 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
816 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
817 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
818 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
819 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
820 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
821 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
822 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
823 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
824 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
825 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
828 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
829 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
830 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
831 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
832 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
833 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
834 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
835 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
836 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
837 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
838 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
839 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
840 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
841 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
842 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
844 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
845 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
846 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
847 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
849 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
850 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
851 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
852 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
854 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
855 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
856 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
857 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
858 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
860 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
861 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
862 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
863 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
865 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
866 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
867 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
869 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
870 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
871 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
872 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
873 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
875 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
876 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
879 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
880 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
882 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
883 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
884 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
885 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
887 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
888 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
890 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
891 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
894 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
895 (0, update, required),
898 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
899 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
900 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
901 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
902 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
906 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
907 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
908 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
910 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
912 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
913 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
914 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
918 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
920 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
921 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
922 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
927 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
928 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
929 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
930 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
931 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
933 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
934 /// in a timely manner.
935 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
938 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
939 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
940 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
942 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
943 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
944 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
945 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
949 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
950 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
951 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
953 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
954 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
955 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
956 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
958 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
962 /// The current channel ID.
963 channel_id: ChannelId,
964 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
965 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
966 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
967 channel_state: ChannelState,
969 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
970 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
972 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
973 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
974 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
976 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
977 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
978 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
979 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
981 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
982 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
984 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
986 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
987 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
988 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
990 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
991 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
992 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
994 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
995 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
996 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
997 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
998 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
999 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1001 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1002 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1003 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1004 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1005 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1006 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1008 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1010 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1011 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1012 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1014 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1015 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1016 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1017 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1018 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1019 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1020 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1022 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1023 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1024 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1026 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1027 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1028 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1029 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1030 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1031 /// outbound or inbound.
1032 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1034 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1036 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1037 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1038 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1039 // HTLCs with similar state.
1040 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1041 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1042 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1043 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1044 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1045 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1046 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1047 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1048 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1049 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1051 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1052 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1053 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1055 update_time_counter: u32,
1057 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1058 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1059 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1060 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1061 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1062 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1064 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1065 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1067 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1068 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1069 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1070 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1072 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1073 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1075 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1077 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1079 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1080 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1081 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1082 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1083 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1085 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1086 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1088 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1089 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1090 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1092 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1093 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1094 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1095 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1096 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1097 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1098 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1099 channel_creation_height: u32,
1101 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1104 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1106 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1109 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1111 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1114 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1116 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1118 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1119 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1122 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1124 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1126 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1127 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1129 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1131 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1132 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1133 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1135 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1137 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1138 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1139 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1141 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1142 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1143 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1145 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1147 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1149 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1150 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1151 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1152 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1154 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1155 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1156 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1158 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1159 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1160 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1162 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1163 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1164 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1165 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1166 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1167 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1168 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1169 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1171 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1172 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1173 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1174 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1175 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1177 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1178 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1180 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1181 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1182 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1183 /// unblock the state machine.
1185 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1186 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1187 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1189 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1190 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1191 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1193 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1194 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1195 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1196 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1197 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1198 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1199 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1200 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1202 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1203 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1205 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1206 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1207 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1209 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1210 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1211 // associated channel mapping.
1213 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1214 // to store all of them.
1215 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1217 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1218 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1219 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1220 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1221 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1223 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1224 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1226 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1227 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1229 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1230 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1231 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1233 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1234 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1235 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1238 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1239 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1240 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1241 self.update_time_counter
1244 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1245 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1248 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1249 self.config.announced_channel
1252 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1253 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1256 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1257 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1258 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1259 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1262 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1263 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1264 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1267 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1268 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1269 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1270 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1271 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1272 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1273 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1276 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1277 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1278 match self.channel_state {
1279 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1280 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1281 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1282 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1283 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1284 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1285 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1287 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1289 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1290 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1294 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1295 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1296 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1297 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1298 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1299 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1302 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1303 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1304 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1308 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1309 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1310 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1311 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1312 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1315 // Public utilities:
1317 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1321 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1323 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1324 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1325 self.temporary_channel_id
1328 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1332 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1333 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1334 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1338 /// Gets the channel's type
1339 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1343 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1345 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1346 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1347 self.short_channel_id
1350 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1351 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1352 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1355 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1356 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1357 self.outbound_scid_alias
1360 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1362 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1363 return &self.holder_signer
1366 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1367 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1368 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1369 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1370 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1371 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1374 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1375 /// get_funding_created.
1376 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1377 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1380 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1381 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1382 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1383 if conf_height > 0 {
1390 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1391 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1392 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1395 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1396 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1397 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1398 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1402 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1405 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1406 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1409 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1410 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1413 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1414 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1415 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1418 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1419 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1422 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1423 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1424 self.counterparty_node_id
1427 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1428 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1429 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1432 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1433 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1434 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1437 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1438 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1440 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1441 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1442 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1443 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1445 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1449 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1450 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1451 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1454 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1455 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1456 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1459 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1460 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1461 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1463 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1464 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1469 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1470 self.channel_value_satoshis
1473 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1474 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1477 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1478 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1481 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1482 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1483 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1485 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1486 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1487 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1488 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1489 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1491 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1495 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1496 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1497 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1500 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1501 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1502 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1505 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1506 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1507 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1510 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1511 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1512 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1515 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1516 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1517 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1520 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1521 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1522 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1525 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1526 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1527 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1528 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1529 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1532 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1534 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1535 self.prev_config = None;
1539 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1540 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1544 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1545 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1546 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1547 let did_channel_update =
1548 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1549 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1550 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1551 if did_channel_update {
1552 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1553 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1554 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1555 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1557 self.config.options = *config;
1561 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1562 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1563 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1564 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1565 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1568 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1569 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1570 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1571 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1572 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1574 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1575 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1576 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1577 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1578 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1579 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1580 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1582 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1583 where L::Target: Logger
1585 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1586 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1587 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1589 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1590 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1591 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1592 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1594 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1595 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1596 if match update_state {
1597 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1598 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1599 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1600 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1601 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1603 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1607 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1608 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1609 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1611 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1613 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1614 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1615 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1617 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1618 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1619 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1620 transaction_output_index: None
1625 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1626 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1627 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1628 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1629 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1632 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1634 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1635 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1636 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1638 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1639 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1642 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1643 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1646 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1648 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1649 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1650 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1652 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1653 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1659 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1661 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1662 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1663 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1664 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1665 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1666 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1667 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1671 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1672 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1674 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1676 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1677 if generated_by_local {
1678 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1679 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1680 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1690 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1692 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1693 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1694 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1695 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1696 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1697 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1698 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1701 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1702 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1703 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1704 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1708 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1709 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1713 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1714 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1716 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1718 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1719 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1721 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1722 if !generated_by_local {
1723 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1731 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1732 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1733 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1734 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1735 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1736 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1737 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1738 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1740 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1742 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1743 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1744 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1745 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1747 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1749 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1750 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1751 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1752 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1755 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1756 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1757 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1758 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1760 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1763 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1764 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1765 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1766 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1768 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1771 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1772 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1777 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1778 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1783 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1785 let channel_parameters =
1786 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1787 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1788 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1795 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1798 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1799 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1800 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1801 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1803 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1804 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1805 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1813 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1814 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1815 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1816 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1821 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1822 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1823 /// our counterparty!)
1824 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1825 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1826 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1827 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1828 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1829 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1830 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1832 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1836 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1837 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1838 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1839 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1840 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1841 //may see payments to it!
1842 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1843 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1844 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1846 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1849 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1850 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1851 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1852 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1853 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1856 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1857 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1860 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1864 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1865 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1866 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1867 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1868 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1869 // which are near the dust limit.
1870 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1871 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1872 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1873 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1874 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1876 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1877 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1879 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1882 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1883 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1884 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1887 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1888 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1890 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1891 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1892 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1893 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1894 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1895 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1896 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1899 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1902 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1903 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1904 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1906 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1907 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1908 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1909 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1910 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1911 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1913 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1914 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1920 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1921 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1923 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1924 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1925 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1926 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1927 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1928 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1929 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1932 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1935 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1936 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1937 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1939 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1940 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1941 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1942 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1943 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1944 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1946 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1947 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1951 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1952 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1953 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1954 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1955 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1956 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1957 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1959 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1960 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1962 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1969 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1970 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1971 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1972 /// corner case properly.
1973 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1974 -> AvailableBalances
1975 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1977 let context = &self;
1978 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1979 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1980 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1982 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1983 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1984 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1985 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1988 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1990 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1991 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1993 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1995 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1997 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1998 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2002 if context.is_outbound() {
2003 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2004 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2006 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2007 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2009 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2010 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2011 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2012 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2015 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2016 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2017 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2018 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2019 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2020 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2021 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2024 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2025 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2026 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2027 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2028 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2029 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2030 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2031 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2032 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2033 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2034 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2036 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2039 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2040 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2041 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2042 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2043 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2046 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2047 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2049 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2050 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2051 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2053 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2054 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2055 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2056 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2060 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2062 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2063 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2064 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2065 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2066 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2067 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2068 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2070 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2071 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2073 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2074 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2075 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2077 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2078 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2079 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2080 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2081 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2084 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2085 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2086 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2087 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2088 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2089 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2092 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2093 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2094 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2096 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2100 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2101 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2103 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2104 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2108 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2109 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2110 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2111 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2113 outbound_capacity_msat,
2114 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2115 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2120 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2121 let context = &self;
2122 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2125 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2126 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2128 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2129 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2131 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2132 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2134 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2135 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2136 let context = &self;
2137 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2139 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2142 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2143 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2145 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2146 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2148 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2149 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2151 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2152 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2156 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2157 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2163 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2164 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2165 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2168 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2169 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2170 included_htlcs += 1;
2173 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2174 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2178 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2179 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2180 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2181 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2182 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2183 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2188 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2190 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2191 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2196 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2197 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2201 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2202 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2203 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2206 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2207 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2209 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2210 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2211 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2213 total_pending_htlcs,
2214 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2215 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2216 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2218 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2219 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2220 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2222 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2224 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2229 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2230 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2232 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2233 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2235 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2236 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2238 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2239 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2240 let context = &self;
2241 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2243 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2246 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2247 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2249 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2250 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2252 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2253 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2255 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2256 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2260 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2261 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2267 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2268 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2269 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2270 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2271 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2272 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2275 included_htlcs += 1;
2278 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2279 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2282 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2283 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2285 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2286 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2287 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2292 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2293 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2294 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2297 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2298 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2300 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2301 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2303 total_pending_htlcs,
2304 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2305 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2306 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2308 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2309 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2310 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2312 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2314 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2319 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2320 match self.channel_state {
2321 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2322 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2323 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
2324 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
2334 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2336 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2337 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2340 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2342 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2343 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2344 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2348 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2349 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2350 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2353 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2355 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2356 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2359 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2360 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2361 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2362 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2363 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2364 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2365 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2366 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2367 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2368 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2369 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2371 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2372 // return them to fail the payment.
2373 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2374 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2375 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2377 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2378 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2383 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2384 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2385 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2386 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2387 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2388 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2389 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2390 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2391 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2392 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2395 if generate_monitor_update {
2396 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2397 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2398 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2399 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2400 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2404 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2406 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2407 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2410 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2411 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2412 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2413 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2417 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2418 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2419 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2420 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2422 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2423 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2424 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2425 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2427 match &self.holder_signer {
2428 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2429 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2430 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2431 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2432 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2435 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2439 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2440 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
2441 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
2443 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
2444 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2445 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2447 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2448 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2449 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2452 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2453 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2455 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2462 // Internal utility functions for channels
2464 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2465 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2466 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2468 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2470 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2471 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2472 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2474 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2477 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2479 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2482 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2483 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2484 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2486 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2488 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2489 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2490 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2491 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2492 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2495 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2496 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2497 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2498 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2499 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2500 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2501 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2504 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2505 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2507 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2508 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2511 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2512 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2513 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2514 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2515 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2516 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2519 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2520 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2521 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2522 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2525 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2526 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2528 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2529 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2530 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2534 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
2535 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
2536 trait FailHTLCContents {
2537 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
2538 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
2539 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
2540 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
2542 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
2543 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
2544 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2545 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
2547 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2548 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
2550 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2551 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
2554 impl FailHTLCContents for (u16, [u8; 32]) {
2555 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC; // (failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
2556 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
2557 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2560 failure_code: self.0,
2561 sha256_of_onion: self.1
2564 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
2565 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(
2566 InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((self.1, self.0))
2569 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
2570 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
2572 failure_code: self.0,
2573 sha256_of_onion: self.1
2578 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
2579 fn name() -> &'static str;
2581 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2582 fn name() -> &'static str {
2586 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
2587 fn name() -> &'static str {
2588 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
2592 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2593 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2594 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2596 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2597 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2598 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2599 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2601 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2602 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2604 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2606 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2607 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2608 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2609 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2611 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2612 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2616 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2622 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2623 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2624 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2625 // outside of those situations will fail.
2626 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2630 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2635 1 + // script length (0)
2639 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2640 2 + // witness marker and flag
2641 1 + // witness element count
2642 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2643 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2644 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2645 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2646 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2647 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2649 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2650 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2651 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2657 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2658 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2659 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2660 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2662 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2663 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2664 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2666 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2667 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2668 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2669 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2670 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2671 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2674 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2675 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2678 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2679 value_to_holder = 0;
2682 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2683 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2684 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2685 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2687 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2688 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2691 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2692 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2695 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2698 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2699 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2701 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2703 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2704 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2705 where L::Target: Logger {
2706 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2707 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2708 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2709 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2710 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2711 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2712 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2713 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2717 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2718 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2719 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2720 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2722 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2723 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2726 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2727 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2728 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2730 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2731 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2732 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2733 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2734 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2735 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2736 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2738 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2739 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2740 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2742 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2743 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2745 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2748 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2749 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2753 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2757 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2758 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2759 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2760 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2761 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2762 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2765 // Now update local state:
2767 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2768 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2769 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2770 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2771 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2772 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
2773 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2774 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2778 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2779 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2780 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2781 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2782 // do not not get into this branch.
2783 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2784 match pending_update {
2785 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2786 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2787 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2788 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2789 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2790 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2791 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2794 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2795 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2797 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2798 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2799 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2800 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2801 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2802 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2808 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2809 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2810 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2812 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2813 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2814 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2816 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2817 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2820 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2821 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2823 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2824 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2826 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2827 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2830 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2833 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2834 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2835 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2836 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2841 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2842 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2843 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2844 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2845 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2846 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2847 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2848 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2849 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2850 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2851 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2852 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2853 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2854 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2855 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2857 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2858 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2859 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2860 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2861 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2864 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2865 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2866 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2872 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2873 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2875 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2879 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2880 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2881 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2882 /// before we fail backwards.
2884 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2885 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2886 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2887 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2888 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2889 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2890 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2893 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
2894 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
2896 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
2897 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
2898 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
2899 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2900 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (failure_code, sha256_of_onion), true, logger)
2901 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2904 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2905 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2906 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2907 /// before we fail backwards.
2909 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2910 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2911 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2912 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
2913 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
2915 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2916 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2917 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2920 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2921 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2922 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2924 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2925 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2926 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2928 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2929 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2930 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2932 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2937 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2938 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2944 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2945 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2946 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2947 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2948 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2952 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2953 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2954 force_holding_cell = true;
2957 // Now update local state:
2958 if force_holding_cell {
2959 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2960 match pending_update {
2961 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2962 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2963 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2964 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2968 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
2969 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
2971 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2972 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2973 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2979 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2980 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_packet.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
2984 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
2985 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
2987 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2988 htlc.state = err_packet.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
2991 Ok(Some(err_packet.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
2994 // Message handlers:
2995 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2996 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2997 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2998 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2999 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
3000 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
3001 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
3004 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
3006 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
3008 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
3009 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
3010 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
3011 debug_assert!(matches!(
3012 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
3014 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
3015 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
3018 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
3019 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
3021 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
3022 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
3023 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
3024 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
3026 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
3029 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3030 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
3031 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
3034 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
3035 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
3036 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
3037 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
3038 // when routing outbound payments.
3039 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
3043 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
3044 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
3045 let mut check_reconnection = false;
3046 match &self.context.channel_state {
3047 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
3048 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
3049 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3050 if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
3051 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3052 check_reconnection = true;
3053 } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
3054 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
3055 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
3056 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
3057 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
3059 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
3060 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
3063 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
3064 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
3065 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
3067 if check_reconnection {
3068 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
3069 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
3070 let expected_point =
3071 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
3072 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
3074 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
3075 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
3076 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
3077 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
3078 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
3079 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3081 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3082 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3083 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3084 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3085 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3087 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3088 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3093 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3094 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3096 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3098 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3101 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3102 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3103 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3104 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3105 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3106 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3108 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3109 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3111 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3112 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3113 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3115 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3116 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3117 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3119 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3120 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3122 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3123 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3125 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3126 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3128 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3129 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3132 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3133 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3134 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3135 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3137 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3138 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3141 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3142 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3143 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3144 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3145 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3146 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3147 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3148 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3149 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3150 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3151 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3153 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3154 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3155 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3156 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3157 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3158 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3162 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3163 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3166 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3167 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3168 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3170 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3171 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3172 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3173 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3174 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3175 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3176 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3180 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3181 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3182 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3183 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3184 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3185 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3186 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3190 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3191 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3192 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3193 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3194 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3195 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3198 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3199 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3201 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3202 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3203 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3205 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3206 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3210 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3211 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3213 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3218 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3219 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3223 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3224 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3225 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3226 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3227 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3228 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3229 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3230 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3231 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3233 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3234 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3235 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3236 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3237 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3240 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3241 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3242 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3243 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3247 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3250 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3251 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3254 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3255 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3256 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3260 // Now update local state:
3261 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3262 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3263 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3264 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3265 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3266 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3267 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3272 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3274 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3275 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3276 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3277 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3278 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3279 None => fail_reason.into(),
3280 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3281 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3282 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3283 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3285 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3289 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3290 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3291 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3292 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3294 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3295 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3300 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3303 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3304 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3305 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3307 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3308 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3311 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3314 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3315 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3316 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3318 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3319 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3322 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3326 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3327 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3328 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3330 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3331 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3334 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3338 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3339 where L::Target: Logger
3341 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3342 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3344 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3345 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3347 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3348 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3351 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3353 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3355 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3356 let commitment_txid = {
3357 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3358 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3359 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3361 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3362 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3363 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3364 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3365 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3366 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3370 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3372 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3373 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3374 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3375 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3378 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3379 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3380 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3381 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3384 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3386 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3387 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3388 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3389 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3390 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3391 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3392 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3393 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3394 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3395 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3396 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3402 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3403 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3406 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3407 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3408 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3409 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3410 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3411 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3412 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3413 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3414 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3415 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3416 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3417 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3418 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3421 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3422 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3423 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3424 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3425 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3426 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3427 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3429 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3430 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3431 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3432 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3433 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3434 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3435 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3436 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3438 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3439 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3442 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3444 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3445 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3446 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3449 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3452 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3453 commitment_stats.tx,
3455 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3456 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3457 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3460 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3461 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3463 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3464 let mut need_commitment = false;
3465 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3466 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3467 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3468 need_commitment = true;
3472 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3473 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3474 Some(forward_info.clone())
3476 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3477 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3478 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3479 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3480 need_commitment = true;
3483 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3484 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3485 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3486 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3487 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3488 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3489 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3490 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3491 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3492 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3493 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3494 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3495 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3496 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3498 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3500 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3501 need_commitment = true;
3505 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3506 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3507 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3508 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3509 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3510 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3511 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3513 nondust_htlc_sources,
3517 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3518 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3519 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3520 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3521 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3523 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3524 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3525 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3526 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3527 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3528 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3529 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3530 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3531 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3532 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3533 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3534 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3535 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3536 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3538 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3539 &self.context.channel_id);
3540 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3543 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3544 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3545 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3546 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3547 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3548 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3549 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3550 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3551 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3555 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3556 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3557 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3558 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3561 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3562 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3563 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3564 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3565 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3566 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3567 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3569 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3570 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3571 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3574 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3575 /// for our counterparty.
3576 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3577 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3578 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3579 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3581 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3582 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3583 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3584 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3586 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3587 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3588 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3589 updates: Vec::new(),
3592 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3593 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3594 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3595 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3596 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3597 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3598 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3599 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3600 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3601 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3602 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3603 // to rebalance channels.
3604 match &htlc_update {
3605 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3606 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3607 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3609 match self.send_htlc(
3610 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3611 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3613 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3616 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3617 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3618 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3619 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3620 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3621 // into the holding cell without ever being
3622 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3623 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3624 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3627 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3633 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3634 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3635 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3636 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3637 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3638 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3639 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3640 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3641 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3642 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3643 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3644 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3646 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3647 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3648 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3649 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3650 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3651 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3652 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3653 // for a full revocation before failing.
3654 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3655 update_fail_count += 1;
3658 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3660 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3665 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
3666 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (failure_code, sha256_of_onion), false, logger) {
3667 Ok(update_fail_malformed_opt) => {
3668 debug_assert!(update_fail_malformed_opt.is_some()); // See above comment
3669 update_fail_count += 1;
3672 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3674 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3681 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3682 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3684 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3685 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3690 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3691 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3692 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3693 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3694 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3696 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3697 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3698 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3700 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3701 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3707 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3708 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3709 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3710 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3711 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3712 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3713 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3714 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3715 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3717 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3718 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3720 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3721 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3723 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3724 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3727 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3729 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3730 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3731 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3735 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3736 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3737 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3738 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3739 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3740 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3741 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3742 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3743 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3746 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3748 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3749 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3752 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3753 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3754 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3755 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3757 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3759 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3764 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3765 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3766 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3767 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3768 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3769 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3770 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3771 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3772 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3776 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3777 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3778 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3779 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3780 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3781 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3782 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3783 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3784 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3786 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3787 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3790 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3791 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3792 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3793 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3794 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3795 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3796 let mut require_commitment = false;
3797 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3800 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3801 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3802 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3803 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3805 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3806 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3807 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3808 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3809 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3810 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3812 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3816 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3817 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3818 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3819 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3820 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3822 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3823 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3824 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3829 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3830 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3832 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3836 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3837 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3839 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3840 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3841 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3842 require_commitment = true;
3843 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3844 match forward_info {
3845 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3846 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3847 require_commitment = true;
3849 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3850 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3851 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3853 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3854 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3855 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3859 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3860 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3861 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3862 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3868 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3869 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3870 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3871 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3872 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3874 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3875 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3876 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3877 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3878 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3879 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3880 require_commitment = true;
3884 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3886 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3887 match update_state {
3888 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3889 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3890 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3891 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3892 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3893 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3895 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3896 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3897 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3898 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3899 require_commitment = true;
3900 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3901 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3906 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3907 let release_state_str =
3908 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3909 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3910 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3911 if !release_monitor {
3912 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3913 update: monitor_update,
3915 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3917 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3922 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3923 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3924 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3925 if require_commitment {
3926 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3927 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3928 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3929 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3931 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3932 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3933 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3934 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3935 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3937 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3938 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3939 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3940 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3941 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3944 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3945 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3946 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3947 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3948 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3949 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3951 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3952 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3954 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3955 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3957 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3958 if require_commitment {
3959 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3961 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3962 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3963 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3964 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3966 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3967 &self.context.channel_id(),
3968 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3971 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3972 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3974 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3975 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3977 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3978 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3984 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3985 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3986 /// commitment update.
3987 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3988 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3989 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3991 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3992 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3995 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3996 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3997 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3998 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4000 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4001 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4002 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4003 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4004 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4005 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4006 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4008 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4009 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4011 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4012 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4014 if !self.context.is_live() {
4015 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4018 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4019 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4020 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4021 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4022 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4023 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4024 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
4025 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4026 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4027 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
4031 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
4032 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4033 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4034 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4035 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4036 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4039 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4040 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
4044 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4045 force_holding_cell = true;
4048 if force_holding_cell {
4049 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
4053 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
4054 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
4056 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4057 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4062 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
4063 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
4065 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
4067 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
4068 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4069 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4070 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4074 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4075 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
4076 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
4080 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4081 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
4084 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
4085 // will be retransmitted.
4086 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
4087 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
4088 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
4090 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
4091 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4093 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
4094 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4095 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4096 // this HTLC accordingly
4097 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4100 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4101 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4102 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4103 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4106 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4107 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4108 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4109 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4110 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4111 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4116 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4118 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4119 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4120 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4121 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4125 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4126 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4127 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4128 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4129 // the update upon reconnection.
4130 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4134 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4136 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4137 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4141 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4142 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4143 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4144 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4145 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4146 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4147 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4149 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4150 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4151 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4152 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4153 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4154 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4155 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4157 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4158 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4159 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4160 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4161 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4162 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4163 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4166 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4167 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4168 /// to the remote side.
4169 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4170 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4171 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4172 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4175 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4177 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4178 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4180 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4181 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4182 // first received the funding_signed.
4183 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4184 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4185 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4186 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4188 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4190 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4191 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4192 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4193 funding_broadcastable = None;
4196 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4197 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4198 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4199 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4200 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4201 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4202 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4203 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4204 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4205 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4206 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4207 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4208 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4209 next_per_commitment_point,
4210 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4214 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4216 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4217 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4218 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4219 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4220 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4221 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4223 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4224 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4225 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4226 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4227 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4228 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4232 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4233 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4235 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4236 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4238 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4239 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4242 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4243 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4244 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4245 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4246 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4247 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4248 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4249 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4250 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4254 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4255 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4257 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4258 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4260 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4263 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4265 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4266 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4267 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4268 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4269 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4270 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4271 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4272 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4273 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4274 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4275 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4276 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4278 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4280 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4286 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4288 #[cfg(async_signing)]
4289 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4290 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4291 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4293 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4294 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4296 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4297 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4300 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4301 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4302 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4303 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4305 SignerResumeUpdates {
4312 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4313 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4314 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4315 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4316 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4317 per_commitment_secret,
4318 next_per_commitment_point,
4320 next_local_nonce: None,
4324 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4325 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4326 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4327 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4328 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4329 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4331 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4332 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4333 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4334 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4335 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4336 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4337 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4338 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4339 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4340 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4341 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4346 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4347 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4349 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4350 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4351 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4352 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4353 reason: err_packet.clone()
4356 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4357 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4358 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4359 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4360 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4361 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4364 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4365 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4366 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4367 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4368 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4375 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4376 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4377 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4378 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4382 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4383 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4384 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4385 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4386 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4387 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4388 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4392 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
4393 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
4395 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
4396 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4397 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4398 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4403 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4404 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4409 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4410 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4411 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4412 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4413 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4414 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4415 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4420 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4421 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4423 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4424 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4425 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4426 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4427 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4428 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4429 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4430 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4433 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4435 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4436 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4437 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4438 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4439 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4442 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4443 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4444 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4447 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4448 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4449 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4450 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4451 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4452 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4453 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4455 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4456 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4457 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4458 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4459 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4462 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4463 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4464 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4465 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4466 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4467 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4468 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4469 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4473 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4474 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4475 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4476 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4477 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4478 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4479 our_commitment_transaction
4483 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4484 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4485 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4486 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4488 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4490 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4492 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4493 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4494 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4495 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4496 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4497 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4499 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4500 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4501 channel_ready: None,
4502 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4503 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4504 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4508 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4509 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4510 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4511 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4512 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4513 next_per_commitment_point,
4514 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4516 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4517 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4518 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4522 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4523 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4524 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4526 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4527 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4528 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4531 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4534 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4535 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4536 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4537 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4538 our_commitment_transaction
4542 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4543 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4544 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4545 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4546 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4547 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4548 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4550 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4552 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4553 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4554 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4555 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4556 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4557 next_per_commitment_point,
4558 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4562 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4563 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4564 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4566 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4569 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4570 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4571 raa: required_revoke,
4572 commitment_update: None,
4573 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4575 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4576 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4577 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4579 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4582 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4583 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4584 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4585 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4586 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4587 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4590 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4591 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4592 raa: required_revoke,
4593 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4594 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4597 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4598 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4599 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4600 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4601 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4604 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4605 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4606 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4607 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4612 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4613 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4614 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4615 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4617 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4619 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4621 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4622 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4623 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4624 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4625 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4626 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4627 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4628 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4630 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4631 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4632 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4633 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4634 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4636 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4637 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4638 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4639 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4642 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4643 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4644 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4645 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4646 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4647 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4648 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4649 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4650 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4651 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4652 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4653 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4654 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4655 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4656 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4658 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4661 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4662 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4665 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4666 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4667 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4668 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4669 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4670 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4673 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4674 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4675 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4676 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4677 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4678 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4681 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4687 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4688 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4689 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4690 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4692 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4693 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4694 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4695 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4696 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4697 return Ok((None, None, None));
4700 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4701 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4702 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4704 return Ok((None, None, None));
4707 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4708 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4709 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4710 return Ok((None, None, None));
4713 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4715 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4716 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4717 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4718 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4720 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4721 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4723 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4724 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4726 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4727 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4728 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4729 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4731 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4732 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4733 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4737 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4743 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4744 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4746 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4747 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4750 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4751 /// within our expected timeframe.
4753 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4754 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4755 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4758 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4761 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4762 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4766 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4767 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4769 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4770 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4772 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4773 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4774 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4775 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4776 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4778 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4779 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4780 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4783 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4785 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4786 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4789 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4790 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4791 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4794 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4797 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4798 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4799 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4800 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4802 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4805 assert!(send_shutdown);
4806 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4807 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4808 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4810 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4811 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4813 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4818 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4820 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4821 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4823 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4824 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4825 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4826 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4827 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4828 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4829 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4832 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4833 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4835 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4836 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4837 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4838 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4842 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4843 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4844 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4845 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4846 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4847 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4849 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4850 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4857 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4858 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4860 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4863 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4864 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4866 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4868 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4869 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4870 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4871 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4872 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4873 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4874 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4875 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4876 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4878 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4879 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4882 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4886 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4887 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4888 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4889 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4891 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4892 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4894 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4895 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4897 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4898 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4900 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4904 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4905 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4908 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4909 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4910 return Ok((None, None, None));
4913 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4914 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4915 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4916 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4918 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4920 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4923 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4924 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4925 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4926 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4927 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4931 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4932 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4933 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4937 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4938 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4939 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4940 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4941 monitor_update: None,
4942 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4943 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4944 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4945 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4947 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4948 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4949 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4950 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4954 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4956 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4957 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4958 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4959 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4961 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4964 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4965 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4967 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4968 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4969 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4970 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4971 monitor_update: None,
4972 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4973 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4974 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4975 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4977 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4978 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4979 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4980 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4985 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4986 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4987 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4988 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4990 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4991 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4992 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4994 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4996 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5003 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5004 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5005 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5007 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5008 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5010 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5011 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5014 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5015 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
5016 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
5017 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
5018 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
5020 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5021 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
5022 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
5024 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
5025 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5028 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
5029 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
5030 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5031 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
5032 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
5033 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5034 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
5035 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5037 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
5040 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
5041 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5042 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
5043 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5045 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5049 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5050 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
5051 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5052 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
5054 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
5060 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
5061 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
5062 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5063 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
5064 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
5065 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
5066 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
5068 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
5069 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
5072 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
5074 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
5075 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
5081 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
5082 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
5083 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
5084 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
5085 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
5086 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
5087 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
5089 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
5090 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
5097 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5098 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5101 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5102 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5105 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5106 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5110 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5111 &self.context.holder_signer
5115 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5117 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5118 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5119 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5120 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5121 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5122 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5124 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5126 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5134 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5135 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5139 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5140 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5141 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5142 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5145 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5146 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5147 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5148 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5151 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5152 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5153 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5154 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5155 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5156 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5159 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5160 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5161 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5162 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5163 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5164 if !release_monitor {
5165 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5174 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5175 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5178 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5179 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5180 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5182 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5183 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5185 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5186 if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5188 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5189 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5190 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5193 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5194 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5195 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5196 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5197 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5198 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5200 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5201 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5202 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5204 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5205 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5206 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5207 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5208 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5209 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5215 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5216 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5217 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5218 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5221 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5222 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5223 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5226 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5227 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5228 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5231 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5232 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5233 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5234 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5235 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5238 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5239 self.context.channel_update_status
5242 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5243 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5244 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5247 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5249 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5250 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5251 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5255 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5256 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5257 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5260 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5264 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5265 // channel_ready yet.
5266 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5270 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5271 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5272 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5273 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5275 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5276 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5277 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5279 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5280 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5283 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5284 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5286 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5287 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5288 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5289 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5290 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5291 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5292 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5293 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5295 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5299 if need_commitment_update {
5300 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5301 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5302 let next_per_commitment_point =
5303 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5304 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5305 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5306 next_per_commitment_point,
5307 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5311 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5317 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5318 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5319 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5320 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5321 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5322 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5323 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5325 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5328 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5329 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5330 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5331 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5332 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5333 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5334 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5335 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5336 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5337 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5338 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5339 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5340 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5341 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5342 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5343 // channel and move on.
5344 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5345 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5347 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5348 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5349 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5351 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5352 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5353 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5354 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5355 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5356 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5357 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5358 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5363 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5364 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5365 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5366 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5367 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5370 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5371 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5372 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5373 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5374 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5375 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5378 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5379 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5380 // may have already happened for this block).
5381 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5382 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5383 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5384 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5387 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5388 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5389 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5390 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5398 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5399 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5400 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5401 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5403 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5404 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5407 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5409 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5410 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5411 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5412 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5414 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5417 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5420 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5421 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5422 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5423 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5425 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5428 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5429 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5430 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5432 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5433 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5435 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5436 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5437 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5445 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5447 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5448 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5449 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5451 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5452 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5455 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5456 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5457 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5458 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5459 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5460 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5461 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5462 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5465 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5466 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5467 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5468 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5470 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5471 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5472 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5474 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5475 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5476 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5477 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5479 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5480 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5481 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5482 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5483 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5484 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5485 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5488 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5489 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5491 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5494 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5495 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5496 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5497 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5498 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5499 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5500 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5501 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5502 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5503 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5504 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5505 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5506 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5507 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5508 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5509 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5510 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5516 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5521 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5522 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5524 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5525 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5526 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5527 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5529 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5532 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5534 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5535 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5536 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5537 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5538 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5539 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5541 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5542 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5545 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5546 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5547 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5548 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5549 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5550 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5552 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5553 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5556 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5557 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5558 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5559 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5560 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5566 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5567 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5568 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5569 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5571 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5574 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5578 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5582 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5583 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5587 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5591 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5592 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5595 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5599 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5601 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5606 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5607 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5608 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5610 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5615 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5617 None => return None,
5620 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5622 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5623 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5625 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5626 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5629 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5635 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5637 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5638 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5639 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5640 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5641 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5642 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5643 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5645 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5646 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5647 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5648 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5649 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5650 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5651 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5652 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5653 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5654 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5655 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5656 contents: announcement,
5659 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5664 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5668 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5669 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5670 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5671 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5672 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5673 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5674 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5675 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5677 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5679 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5680 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5681 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5682 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5684 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5685 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5686 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5687 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5690 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5691 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5692 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5693 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5696 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5699 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5700 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5701 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5702 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5703 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5704 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5707 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5709 Err(_) => return None,
5711 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5712 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5717 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5718 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5719 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5720 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5721 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5722 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5723 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5724 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5725 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5726 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5727 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5728 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5729 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5730 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5731 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5732 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5735 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5738 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5739 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5740 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5741 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5742 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5743 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5744 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5745 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5746 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5748 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5749 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5750 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5751 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5752 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5753 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5754 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5755 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5756 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5758 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5759 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5760 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5761 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5762 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5763 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5764 next_funding_txid: None,
5769 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5771 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5772 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5773 /// commitment update.
5775 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5776 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5777 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5778 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5779 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5780 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5781 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5784 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5785 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5786 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5788 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5789 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5794 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5795 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5797 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5799 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5800 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5802 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5803 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5804 /// regenerate them.
5806 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5807 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5809 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5810 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5811 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5812 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5813 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5814 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5815 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5816 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5818 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5819 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5820 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5822 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5824 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5825 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5826 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5829 if amount_msat == 0 {
5830 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5833 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5834 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5835 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5836 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5839 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5840 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5841 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5844 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5845 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5846 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5847 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5848 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5849 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5850 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5851 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5854 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5855 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5856 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5857 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5858 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5859 else { "to peer" });
5861 if need_holding_cell {
5862 force_holding_cell = true;
5865 // Now update local state:
5866 if force_holding_cell {
5867 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5872 onion_routing_packet,
5879 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5880 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5882 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5884 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5890 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5891 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5892 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5896 onion_routing_packet,
5900 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5905 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5906 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5907 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5908 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5910 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5911 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5912 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5914 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5915 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5919 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5920 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5921 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5922 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5923 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5924 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5925 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5928 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5929 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5930 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5931 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5932 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5933 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5936 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5938 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5939 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5940 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5941 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5942 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5944 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5945 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5948 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5949 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5950 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5951 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5952 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5953 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5954 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5955 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5956 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5957 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5958 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5959 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5962 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5966 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5967 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5968 where L::Target: Logger
5970 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5971 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5972 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5974 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5976 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5977 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5978 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5979 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5980 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5981 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5982 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5983 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5984 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5985 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5986 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5992 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5995 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5996 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5997 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5998 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5999 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6000 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6002 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6003 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6004 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6006 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6007 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6008 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6011 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6012 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6016 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
6017 &commitment_stats.tx,
6018 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
6019 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
6020 &self.context.secp_ctx,
6021 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6023 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6025 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6026 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6027 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6028 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6030 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6031 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6032 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6033 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
6034 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
6035 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
6039 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6040 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6044 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6045 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6047 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6053 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6054 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6056 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6057 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6058 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6059 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
6060 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6061 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6062 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
6063 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6065 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
6066 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
6067 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6070 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6071 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6072 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6078 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
6080 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
6081 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6082 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6083 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6084 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6086 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
6088 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
6094 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6095 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6096 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6097 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6098 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6100 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6101 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6102 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6105 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6106 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6108 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6109 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6111 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6112 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6114 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6115 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6116 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6119 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6122 // use override shutdown script if provided
6123 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6124 Some(script) => script,
6126 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6127 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6128 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6129 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6133 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6134 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6136 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6141 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6142 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6143 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6144 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6146 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6147 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6148 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6149 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6150 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6151 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6152 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6155 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6156 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6158 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6159 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6160 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6163 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6164 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6165 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6166 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6167 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6169 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6170 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6177 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6178 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6180 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6183 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6184 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6185 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6187 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6188 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6192 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6196 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6197 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6198 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6199 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6202 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6203 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6204 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6205 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6206 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6207 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6208 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6209 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6211 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6212 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6213 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6214 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6216 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6217 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6219 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6220 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6222 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6223 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6224 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6226 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6227 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6229 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6230 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6231 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6232 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6233 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6236 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6237 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6239 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6240 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6242 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6244 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6246 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6247 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6248 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6249 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6252 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6253 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6255 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6256 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6257 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6258 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6262 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6263 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6264 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6268 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6269 Ok(script) => script,
6270 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6273 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6276 context: ChannelContext {
6279 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6280 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6281 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6282 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6287 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6289 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6290 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6291 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6292 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6294 channel_value_satoshis,
6296 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6298 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6299 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6302 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6303 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6306 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6307 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6308 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6309 pending_update_fee: None,
6310 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6311 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6312 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6313 update_time_counter: 1,
6315 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6317 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6318 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6319 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6320 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6321 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6322 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6324 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6325 signer_pending_funding: false,
6327 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6328 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6329 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6330 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6332 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6333 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6334 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6335 closing_fee_limits: None,
6336 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6338 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6339 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6340 short_channel_id: None,
6341 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6343 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6344 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6345 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6346 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6347 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6348 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6349 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6350 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6351 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6352 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6353 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6354 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6356 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6358 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6359 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6360 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6361 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6362 counterparty_parameters: None,
6363 funding_outpoint: None,
6364 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6366 funding_transaction: None,
6367 is_batch_funding: None,
6369 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6370 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6371 counterparty_node_id,
6373 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6375 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6377 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6378 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6380 announcement_sigs: None,
6382 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6383 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6384 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6385 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6387 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6388 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6390 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6391 outbound_scid_alias,
6393 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6394 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6396 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6397 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6402 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6404 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6408 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6409 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6410 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6411 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6412 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6413 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6414 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6415 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6416 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6418 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6423 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6424 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6425 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6428 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6429 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6430 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6431 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6434 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6436 next_local_nonce: None,
6440 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6441 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6442 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6443 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6444 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6445 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6446 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6447 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6448 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6449 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6450 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6453 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6454 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6456 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6458 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6459 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6460 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6461 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6464 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6465 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6467 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6469 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6470 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6472 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6473 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6474 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6475 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6476 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6477 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6480 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6481 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6483 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6484 if funding_created.is_none() {
6485 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
6486 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
6488 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
6489 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6490 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6491 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6499 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6500 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6501 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6502 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6503 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6504 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6505 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6506 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6507 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6508 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6511 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6512 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6513 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6514 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6515 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6516 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6522 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6523 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6524 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6525 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6526 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6527 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6529 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6531 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6533 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6534 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6539 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6540 // We've exhausted our options
6543 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6544 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6547 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6548 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6549 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6550 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6552 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6553 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6554 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6555 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6556 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6557 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6559 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6561 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6562 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6565 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6566 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6567 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6569 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6570 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6573 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6574 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6577 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6578 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6582 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6583 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6584 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6585 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6586 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6587 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6588 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6589 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6590 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6591 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6592 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6593 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6594 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6595 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6596 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6597 first_per_commitment_point,
6598 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6599 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6600 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6601 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6603 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6608 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6609 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6611 // Check sanity of message fields:
6612 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6613 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6615 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6616 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6618 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6619 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6621 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6622 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6624 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6625 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6627 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6628 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6629 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6631 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6632 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6633 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6635 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6636 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6639 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6640 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6642 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6643 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6646 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6647 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6648 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6650 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6651 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6653 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6654 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6656 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6657 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6659 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6660 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6662 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6663 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6665 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6666 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6669 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6670 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6671 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6673 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6674 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6676 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6677 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6678 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6680 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6681 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6684 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6685 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6686 &Some(ref script) => {
6687 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6688 if script.len() == 0 {
6691 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6692 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6694 Some(script.clone())
6697 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6699 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6704 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6705 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6706 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6707 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6708 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6710 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6711 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6713 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6716 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6717 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6718 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6719 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6720 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6721 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6724 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6725 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6726 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6729 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6730 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6732 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6733 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6735 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6740 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6741 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6742 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6743 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6744 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6748 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6749 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6751 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6752 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6754 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6755 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6756 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6757 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6760 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6762 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6763 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6764 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6765 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6767 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6768 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6770 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6771 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6773 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6774 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6775 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6776 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6777 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6778 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6782 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6783 initial_commitment_tx,
6786 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6787 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6791 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6792 if validated.is_err() {
6793 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6796 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6797 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6798 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6799 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6800 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6801 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6802 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6803 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6804 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6805 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6806 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6807 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6809 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6810 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6811 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6812 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6813 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6814 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6815 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6816 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6818 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6819 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6820 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6822 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6824 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6825 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6827 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6829 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6831 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6832 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6833 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6836 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6838 #[cfg(async_signing)]
6839 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6840 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6841 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6842 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6847 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6848 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6849 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6850 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6853 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6854 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6855 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6856 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6857 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6858 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6859 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6860 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6861 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6862 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6863 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6866 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6867 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6869 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6870 // support this channel type.
6871 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6872 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6876 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6877 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6878 // `static_remote_key`.
6879 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6880 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6882 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6883 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6884 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6886 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6887 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6889 channel_type.clone()
6891 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6892 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6893 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6898 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6899 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6900 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6901 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6902 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6903 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6904 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6905 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6906 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6909 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6910 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6913 // Check sanity of message fields:
6914 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6915 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6917 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6918 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6920 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6921 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6923 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6924 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6925 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6927 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6928 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6930 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6931 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6933 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6935 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6936 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6937 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6939 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6940 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6942 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6943 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6946 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6947 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6948 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6950 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6951 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6953 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6954 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6956 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6957 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6959 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6960 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6962 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6963 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6965 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6966 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6969 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6971 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6972 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6973 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6977 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6978 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6979 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6980 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6983 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6984 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6986 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6987 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6988 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6990 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6991 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6994 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6995 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6996 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6997 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
7001 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
7002 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
7003 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
7004 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
7007 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
7008 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
7009 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
7010 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7011 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
7014 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7015 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7016 &Some(ref script) => {
7017 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7018 if script.len() == 0 {
7021 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7022 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
7024 Some(script.clone())
7027 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7034 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
7035 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7036 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
7037 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
7041 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7042 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
7043 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
7047 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
7048 Ok(script) => script,
7049 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
7052 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7053 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7055 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
7058 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
7062 context: ChannelContext {
7065 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
7066 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
7068 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
7073 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7075 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
7076 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
7077 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7078 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7080 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7083 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
7085 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
7086 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7089 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7090 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
7091 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
7093 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7094 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
7095 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
7096 pending_update_fee: None,
7097 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
7098 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
7099 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
7100 update_time_counter: 1,
7102 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7104 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7105 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7106 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7107 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7108 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7109 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7111 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7112 signer_pending_funding: false,
7114 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7115 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7116 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7117 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7119 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7120 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7121 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7122 closing_fee_limits: None,
7123 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7125 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7126 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7127 short_channel_id: None,
7128 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7130 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7131 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7132 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7133 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7134 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7135 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7136 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7137 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7138 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7139 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7140 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7141 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7144 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7146 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7147 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7148 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7149 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7150 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7151 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7152 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7154 funding_outpoint: None,
7155 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7157 funding_transaction: None,
7158 is_batch_funding: None,
7160 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7161 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7162 counterparty_node_id,
7164 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7166 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7168 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7169 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7171 announcement_sigs: None,
7173 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7174 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7175 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7176 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7178 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7179 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7181 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7182 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7184 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7185 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7187 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7188 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7193 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7195 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7201 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7202 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7204 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7205 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7206 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7207 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7210 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7211 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7213 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7215 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7216 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7219 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7222 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7223 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7224 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7226 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7227 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7228 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7229 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7231 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7232 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7233 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7234 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7235 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7236 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7237 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7238 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7239 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7240 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7241 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7242 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7243 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7244 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7245 first_per_commitment_point,
7246 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7247 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7248 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7250 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7252 next_local_nonce: None,
7256 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7257 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7259 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7261 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7262 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7265 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7266 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7268 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7269 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7270 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7271 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7272 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7273 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7274 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7275 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7276 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7277 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7278 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7280 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7283 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7284 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7285 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7289 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7290 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7293 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7294 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7296 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7297 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7299 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7301 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7302 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7303 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7304 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7307 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7308 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7309 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7310 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7311 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7313 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7315 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7316 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7317 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7320 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7321 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7322 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7326 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7327 initial_commitment_tx,
7330 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7331 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7334 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7335 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7338 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7340 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7341 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
7342 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7343 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7345 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7347 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7348 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7349 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7350 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7351 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7352 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7353 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7354 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7355 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7356 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7357 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7359 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
7360 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7361 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7362 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7363 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7364 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7365 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7367 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7368 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7370 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7371 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7372 let mut channel = Channel {
7373 context: self.context,
7375 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7376 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7378 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7382 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7383 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7385 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7391 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7392 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7393 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7394 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7395 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7397 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7398 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7399 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7400 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7406 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7407 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7408 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7409 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7410 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7411 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7416 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7417 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7418 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7419 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7421 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7422 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7423 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7424 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7429 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7430 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7431 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7432 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7433 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7434 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7439 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7440 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7441 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7444 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7446 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7447 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7448 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7449 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7450 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7452 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7453 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7454 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7455 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7457 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7459 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7460 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7461 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7463 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7465 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7467 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7469 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7470 // deserialized from that format.
7471 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7472 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7473 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7475 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7477 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7478 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7479 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7481 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7482 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7483 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7484 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7487 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7488 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7489 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7492 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7493 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7494 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7495 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7497 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7498 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7500 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7502 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7504 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7506 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7509 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7511 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7516 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7517 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7518 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7520 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7521 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7522 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7523 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7524 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7525 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7526 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7528 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7530 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7532 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7535 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7536 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7537 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7540 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7542 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7543 preimages.push(preimage);
7545 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7546 reason.write(writer)?;
7548 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7550 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7551 preimages.push(preimage);
7553 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7554 reason.write(writer)?;
7557 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7558 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7561 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7562 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7563 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
7564 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
7565 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7566 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7568 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7569 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7570 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7573 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7574 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7575 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7576 source.write(writer)?;
7577 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7579 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7580 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7582 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7584 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7585 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7587 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7589 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7590 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7592 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
7593 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
7595 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
7596 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
7597 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
7599 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
7601 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7602 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
7607 match self.context.resend_order {
7608 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7609 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7612 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7613 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7614 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7616 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7617 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7618 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7619 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7622 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7623 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7624 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7625 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7626 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7629 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7630 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7631 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7632 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7634 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7635 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7636 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7638 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7640 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7641 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7642 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7643 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7645 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7646 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7647 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7648 // consider the stale state on reload.
7651 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7652 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7653 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7655 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7656 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7657 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7659 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7660 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7662 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7663 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7664 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7666 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7667 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7669 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7672 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7673 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7674 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7676 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7679 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7680 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7682 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7683 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7684 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7686 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7688 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7690 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7692 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7693 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7695 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7696 htlc.write(writer)?;
7699 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7700 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7701 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7703 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7704 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7706 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7707 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7708 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7709 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7710 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7711 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7712 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7714 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7715 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7716 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7717 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7718 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7720 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7721 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7723 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7724 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7725 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7726 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7728 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7730 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7731 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7732 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7733 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7734 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7735 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7736 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7738 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7739 (2, chan_type, option),
7740 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7741 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7742 (5, self.context.config, required),
7743 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7744 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7745 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7746 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7747 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7748 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7749 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7750 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7751 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7752 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7753 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7754 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7755 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7756 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7757 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7758 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7759 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7760 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7761 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7762 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7763 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7764 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
7771 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7772 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7774 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7775 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7777 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7778 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7779 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7781 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7782 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7783 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7784 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7786 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7788 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7789 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7790 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7791 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7792 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7794 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7795 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7798 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7799 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7800 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7802 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7804 let mut keys_data = None;
7806 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7807 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7808 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7809 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7810 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7811 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7812 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7813 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7814 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7815 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7819 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7820 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7821 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7824 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7826 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7827 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7828 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7830 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7832 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7833 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7834 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7835 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7836 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7837 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7838 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7839 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7840 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7841 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7842 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7843 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7844 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7849 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7850 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7851 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7852 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7853 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7854 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7855 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7856 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7857 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7858 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7859 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7860 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7862 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7863 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7866 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7867 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7870 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7871 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7873 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7875 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7876 blinding_point: None,
7880 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7881 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7882 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7883 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7884 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7885 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7886 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7887 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7888 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7889 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7890 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7891 blinding_point: None,
7893 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7894 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7895 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7897 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7898 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7899 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7901 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7905 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7906 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7907 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7908 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7911 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7912 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7913 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7915 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7916 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7917 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7918 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7921 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7922 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7923 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7924 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7927 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7929 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7931 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7932 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7933 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7934 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7936 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7937 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7938 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7939 // consider the stale state on reload.
7940 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7943 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7944 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7945 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7947 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7950 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7951 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7952 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7954 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7955 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7956 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7957 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7959 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7960 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7962 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7963 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7965 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7966 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7967 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7969 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7971 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7972 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7974 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7975 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7978 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7980 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7981 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7982 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7983 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7985 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7988 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7989 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7991 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7993 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7994 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7996 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7997 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7999 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8001 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8002 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
8003 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8005 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8006 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8007 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8011 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8012 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8013 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
8015 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
8021 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
8022 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
8023 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
8024 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
8025 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
8026 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
8027 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
8028 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
8029 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
8030 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
8032 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
8033 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
8034 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
8035 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
8036 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
8037 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
8038 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
8040 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
8041 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
8042 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
8043 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
8045 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
8047 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8048 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
8050 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
8052 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8053 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
8055 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
8057 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
8058 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
8059 (1, minimum_depth, option),
8060 (2, channel_type, option),
8061 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8062 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8063 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
8064 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
8065 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8066 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8067 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8068 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
8069 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
8070 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
8071 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
8072 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8073 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
8074 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8075 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8076 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
8077 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8078 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
8079 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8080 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8081 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
8082 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
8083 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8084 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
8085 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8088 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
8089 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8090 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
8091 // required channel parameters.
8092 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
8093 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
8095 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
8097 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
8098 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8099 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
8100 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
8103 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
8104 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
8105 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8107 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8108 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8110 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
8111 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
8116 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
8117 if iter.next().is_some() {
8118 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
8122 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8123 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8124 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8125 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8126 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8129 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8130 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8131 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8133 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8134 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8136 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8137 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8138 // separate u64 values.
8139 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8141 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8143 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8144 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8145 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8146 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8148 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8149 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8151 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8152 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8153 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8154 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8155 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8158 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8159 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8161 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8162 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8163 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8164 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8166 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8167 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8169 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8170 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8171 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8172 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8173 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8176 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8177 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8180 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
8181 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
8182 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
8183 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
8184 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
8185 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
8188 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8189 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8190 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8192 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
8197 context: ChannelContext {
8200 config: config.unwrap(),
8204 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8205 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8206 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8209 temporary_channel_id,
8211 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8213 channel_value_satoshis,
8215 latest_monitor_update_id,
8217 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8218 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8221 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8222 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8225 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8226 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8227 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8228 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8232 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8233 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8234 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8235 monitor_pending_forwards,
8236 monitor_pending_failures,
8237 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8239 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8240 signer_pending_funding: false,
8243 holding_cell_update_fee,
8244 next_holder_htlc_id,
8245 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8246 update_time_counter,
8249 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8250 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8251 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8252 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8254 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8255 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8256 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8257 closing_fee_limits: None,
8258 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8260 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8261 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8263 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8265 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8266 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8267 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8268 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8269 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8270 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8271 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8272 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8273 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8276 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8278 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8279 funding_transaction,
8282 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8283 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8284 counterparty_node_id,
8286 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8290 channel_update_status,
8291 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8295 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8296 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8297 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8298 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8300 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8301 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8303 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8304 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8305 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8307 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8308 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8310 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8311 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8313 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8316 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8325 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8326 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8327 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8328 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8329 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8330 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
8331 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8332 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8333 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8334 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8335 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8336 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8337 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8338 use crate::ln::msgs;
8339 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8340 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8341 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8342 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8343 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8344 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8345 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8346 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8347 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8348 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8349 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8350 use crate::util::test_utils;
8351 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8352 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8353 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8354 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8355 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8356 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8357 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8358 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8359 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8360 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8361 use crate::prelude::*;
8363 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8366 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8367 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8373 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8374 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8375 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8376 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8380 signer: InMemorySigner,
8383 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8384 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8387 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8388 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8390 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8392 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8393 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8396 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8400 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8402 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8403 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8404 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8405 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8406 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8409 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8410 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8411 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8412 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8416 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8417 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8418 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8422 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8423 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8424 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8425 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8428 let seed = [42; 32];
8429 let network = Network::Testnet;
8430 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8431 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8432 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8435 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8436 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8437 let config = UserConfig::default();
8438 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8439 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8440 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8442 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8443 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8447 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8448 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8450 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8451 let original_fee = 253;
8452 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8453 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8454 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8455 let seed = [42; 32];
8456 let network = Network::Testnet;
8457 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8459 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8460 let config = UserConfig::default();
8461 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8463 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8464 // same as the old fee.
8465 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8466 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8467 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8471 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8472 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8473 // dust limits are used.
8474 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8475 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8476 let seed = [42; 32];
8477 let network = Network::Testnet;
8478 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8479 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8480 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8482 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8483 // they have different dust limits.
8485 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8486 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8487 let config = UserConfig::default();
8488 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8490 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8491 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8492 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8493 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8494 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8496 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8497 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8498 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8499 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8500 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8502 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8503 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8504 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8505 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8507 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8508 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8509 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8511 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8512 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8513 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8515 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8516 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8517 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8519 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8520 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8521 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8522 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8525 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8527 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8528 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8529 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8530 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8531 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8532 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8533 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8534 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8535 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8537 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8538 blinding_point: None,
8541 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8542 // the dust limit check.
8543 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8544 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8545 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8546 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8548 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8549 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8550 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8551 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8552 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8553 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8554 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8558 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8559 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8560 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8561 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8562 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8563 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8564 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8565 let seed = [42; 32];
8566 let network = Network::Testnet;
8567 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8569 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8570 let config = UserConfig::default();
8571 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8573 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8574 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8576 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8577 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8578 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8579 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8580 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8581 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8583 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8584 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8585 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8586 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8587 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8589 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8591 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8592 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8593 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8594 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8595 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8597 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8598 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8599 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8600 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8601 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8605 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8606 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8607 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8608 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8609 let seed = [42; 32];
8610 let network = Network::Testnet;
8611 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8612 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8613 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8615 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8617 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8618 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8619 let config = UserConfig::default();
8620 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8622 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8623 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8624 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8625 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8627 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8628 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8629 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8631 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8632 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8633 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8634 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8636 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8637 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8638 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8640 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8641 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8642 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8644 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8645 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8646 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8647 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8648 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8649 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8650 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8652 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8654 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8655 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8656 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8657 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8658 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8662 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8663 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8664 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8665 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8666 let seed = [42; 32];
8667 let network = Network::Testnet;
8668 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8669 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8670 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8672 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8673 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8674 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8675 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8676 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8677 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8678 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8679 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8681 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8682 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8683 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8684 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8685 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8686 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8688 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8689 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8690 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8691 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8693 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8695 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8696 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8697 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8698 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8699 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8700 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8702 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8703 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8704 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8705 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8707 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8708 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8709 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8710 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8711 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8713 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8714 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8716 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8717 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8718 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8720 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8721 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8722 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8723 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8724 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8726 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8727 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8729 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8730 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8731 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8735 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8737 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8738 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8739 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8741 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8742 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8743 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8744 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8746 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8747 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8748 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8750 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8752 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8753 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8756 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8757 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8758 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8759 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8760 let seed = [42; 32];
8761 let network = Network::Testnet;
8762 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8763 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8764 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8767 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8768 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8769 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8771 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8772 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8774 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8775 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8776 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8778 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8779 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8781 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8783 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8784 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8786 // Channel Negotiations failed
8787 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8788 assert!(result.is_err());
8793 fn channel_update() {
8794 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8795 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8796 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8797 let seed = [42; 32];
8798 let network = Network::Testnet;
8799 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8800 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8801 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8803 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8804 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8805 let config = UserConfig::default();
8806 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8808 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8809 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8810 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8811 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8812 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8814 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8815 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8816 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8817 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8818 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8820 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8821 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8822 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8823 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8825 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8826 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8827 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8829 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8830 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8831 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8833 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8834 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8835 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8837 short_channel_id: 0,
8840 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8841 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8842 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8844 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8845 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8847 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8849 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8851 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8852 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8853 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8854 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8856 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8857 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8858 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8860 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8863 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8867 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
8868 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
8870 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8871 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8872 let seed = [42; 32];
8873 let network = Network::Testnet;
8874 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8876 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8877 let config = UserConfig::default();
8878 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8879 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8880 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8882 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8884 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8885 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8886 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8887 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8891 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8892 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8893 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8895 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8898 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8900 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8901 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8902 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8903 blinding_point: None,
8905 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8906 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8908 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8911 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8914 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8916 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8919 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8920 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8921 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8923 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8924 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8927 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8928 blinding_point: None,
8930 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8931 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8934 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8935 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
8937 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8938 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
8940 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
8943 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8944 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
8945 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8946 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
8947 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8948 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8949 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
8950 } = &mut dummy_add {
8951 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8952 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
8954 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8955 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
8956 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
8958 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
8961 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8963 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8964 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8965 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8966 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8967 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8968 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8969 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8970 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8973 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8975 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8976 use bitcoin::sighash;
8977 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8978 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8979 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8980 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8981 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8982 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
8983 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8984 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8985 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8986 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8987 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8988 use crate::sync::Arc;
8989 use core::str::FromStr;
8990 use hex::DisplayHex;
8992 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8993 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8994 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8995 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8997 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8999 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9000 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9001 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9002 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9003 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9005 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
9006 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
9012 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9013 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
9014 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
9016 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9017 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9018 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
9019 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
9020 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9021 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
9023 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
9025 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
9026 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
9027 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
9028 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
9029 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
9030 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
9032 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
9033 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
9034 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
9035 selected_contest_delay: 144
9037 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
9038 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
9040 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
9041 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9043 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
9044 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
9046 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9047 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
9049 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
9050 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
9051 // build_commitment_transaction.
9052 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
9053 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9054 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9055 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
9056 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
9058 macro_rules! test_commitment {
9059 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9060 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9061 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
9065 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
9066 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
9067 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9068 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
9072 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
9073 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
9074 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
9076 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
9077 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
9079 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
9080 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
9082 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
9084 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
9085 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
9086 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9087 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9088 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
9089 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
9090 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
9092 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
9093 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9094 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
9095 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
9097 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9098 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
9099 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
9101 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
9103 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
9104 commitment_tx.clone(),
9105 counterparty_signature,
9106 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
9107 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
9108 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
9110 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9111 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
9113 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9114 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
9115 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
9117 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
9118 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
9121 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
9122 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9124 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
9125 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
9126 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
9127 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
9128 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
9129 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
9130 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9131 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
9133 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
9136 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
9137 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
9138 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
9142 assert!(preimage.is_some());
9145 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
9146 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
9147 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
9148 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
9149 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
9150 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9152 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9153 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9154 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9155 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9157 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9158 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9159 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9160 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9161 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9163 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9164 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9165 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9166 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9167 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9168 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9170 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9174 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9175 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9176 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9177 "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", {});
9179 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9180 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9182 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9183 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9184 "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", {});
9186 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9187 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9188 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9189 "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", {});
9191 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9192 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9194 amount_msat: 1000000,
9196 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9197 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9199 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9202 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9203 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9205 amount_msat: 2000000,
9207 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9208 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9210 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9213 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9214 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9216 amount_msat: 2000000,
9218 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9219 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9220 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9221 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9222 blinding_point: None,
9224 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9227 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9228 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9230 amount_msat: 3000000,
9232 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9233 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9234 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9235 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9236 blinding_point: None,
9238 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9241 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9242 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9244 amount_msat: 4000000,
9246 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9247 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9249 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9253 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9254 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9255 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9257 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9258 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9259 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9262 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9263 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9264 "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" },
9267 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9268 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9269 "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" },
9272 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9273 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9274 "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" },
9277 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9278 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9279 "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" },
9282 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9283 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9284 "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" }
9287 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9288 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9289 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9291 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9292 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9293 "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", {
9296 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9297 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9298 "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" },
9301 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9302 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9303 "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" },
9306 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9307 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9308 "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" },
9311 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9312 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9313 "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" },
9316 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9317 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9318 "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" }
9321 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9322 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9323 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9325 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9326 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9327 "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", {
9330 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9331 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9332 "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" },
9335 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9336 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9337 "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" },
9340 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9341 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9342 "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" },
9345 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9346 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9347 "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" }
9350 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9351 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9352 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9353 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9355 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9356 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9357 "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", {
9360 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9361 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9362 "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" },
9365 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9366 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9367 "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" },
9370 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9371 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9372 "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" },
9375 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9376 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9377 "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" }
9380 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9381 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9382 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9383 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9385 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9386 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9387 "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", {
9390 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9391 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9392 "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" },
9395 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9396 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9397 "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" },
9400 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9401 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9402 "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" },
9405 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9406 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9407 "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" }
9410 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9411 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9412 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9414 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9415 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9416 "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", {
9419 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9420 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9421 "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" },
9424 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9425 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9426 "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" },
9429 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9430 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9431 "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" }
9434 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9435 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9436 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9438 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9439 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9440 "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", {
9443 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9444 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9445 "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" },
9448 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9449 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9450 "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" },
9453 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9454 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9455 "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" }
9458 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9459 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9460 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9462 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9463 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9464 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484b8976a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d17670147304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce40301475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9467 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9468 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9469 "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" },
9472 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9473 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9474 "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" }
9477 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9478 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9479 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9480 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9481 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9482 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9484 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9485 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9486 "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", {
9489 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9490 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9491 "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" },
9494 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9495 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9496 "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" }
9499 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9500 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9501 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9502 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9503 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9505 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9506 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9507 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8004b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4846f916a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf750148304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee4016901475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
9510 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9511 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9512 "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" },
9515 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9516 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9517 "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" }
9520 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9521 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9522 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9524 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9525 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9526 "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", {
9529 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9530 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9531 "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" }
9534 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9535 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9536 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9537 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9538 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9540 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9541 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9542 "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", {
9545 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9546 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9547 "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" }
9550 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9551 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9552 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9553 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9554 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9556 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9557 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9558 "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", {
9561 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9562 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9563 "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" }
9566 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9567 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9568 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9569 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9571 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9572 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9573 "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", {});
9575 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9576 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9577 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9578 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9579 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9581 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9582 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9583 "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", {});
9585 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9586 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9587 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9588 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9589 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9591 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9592 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9593 "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", {});
9595 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9596 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9597 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9599 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9600 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9601 "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", {});
9603 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9604 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9605 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9606 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9607 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9609 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9610 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9611 "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", {});
9613 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9614 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9615 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9616 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9617 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9619 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9620 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9621 "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", {});
9623 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9624 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9625 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9626 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9627 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9628 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9630 amount_msat: 2000000,
9632 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9633 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9635 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9638 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9639 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9640 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9642 amount_msat: 5000001,
9644 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9645 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9646 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9647 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9648 blinding_point: None,
9650 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9653 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9654 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9656 amount_msat: 5000000,
9658 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9659 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9660 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9661 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9662 blinding_point: None,
9664 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9668 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9669 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9670 "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", {
9673 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9674 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9675 "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" },
9677 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9678 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9679 "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" },
9681 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9682 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9683 "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" }
9686 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9687 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9688 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9689 "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", {
9692 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9693 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9694 "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" },
9696 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9697 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9698 "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" },
9700 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9701 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9702 "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" }
9707 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9708 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9710 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9711 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9712 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9713 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9715 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9716 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9717 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9719 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9720 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9722 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9723 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9725 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9726 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9727 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9731 fn test_key_derivation() {
9732 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9733 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9735 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9736 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9738 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9739 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9741 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9742 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9744 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9745 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9747 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9748 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9750 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9751 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9755 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9756 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9757 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9758 let seed = [42; 32];
9759 let network = Network::Testnet;
9760 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9761 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9763 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9764 let config = UserConfig::default();
9765 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9766 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9768 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9769 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9771 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9772 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9773 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9774 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9775 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9776 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9777 assert!(res.is_ok());
9781 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9782 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9783 // resulting `channel_type`.
9784 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9785 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9786 let network = Network::Testnet;
9787 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9788 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9790 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9791 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9793 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9794 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9796 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9797 // need to signal it.
9798 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9799 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9800 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9801 &config, 0, 42, None
9803 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9805 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9806 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9807 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9809 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9810 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9811 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9815 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9816 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9817 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9818 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9819 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9822 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9823 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9827 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9828 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9829 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9830 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9831 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9832 let network = Network::Testnet;
9833 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9834 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9836 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9837 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9839 let config = UserConfig::default();
9841 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9842 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9843 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9844 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9845 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9847 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9848 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9849 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9853 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9854 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9855 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9857 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9858 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9859 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9860 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9861 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9862 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9864 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9868 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9869 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9871 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9872 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9873 let network = Network::Testnet;
9874 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9875 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9877 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9878 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9880 let config = UserConfig::default();
9882 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9883 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9884 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9885 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9886 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9887 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9888 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9889 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9891 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9892 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9893 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9894 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9895 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9896 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9900 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9901 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9903 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9904 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9905 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9906 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9908 assert!(res.is_err());
9910 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9911 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9912 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9914 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9915 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9916 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9919 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9921 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9922 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9923 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9924 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9927 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9928 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9930 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9931 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9933 assert!(res.is_err());
9937 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9938 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9939 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9940 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9941 let seed = [42; 32];
9942 let network = Network::Testnet;
9943 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9944 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9945 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9947 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9948 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9949 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9950 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9952 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9953 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9954 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9959 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9969 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9970 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9971 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9976 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9977 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9983 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9986 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9987 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9988 &accept_channel_msg,
9989 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9990 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9993 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9994 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9995 let tx = Transaction {
9997 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
10001 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
10004 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
10007 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
10008 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
10009 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
10010 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10011 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
10012 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
10016 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
10017 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10025 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
10026 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
10027 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
10028 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
10030 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
10031 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
10038 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
10039 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
10040 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
10041 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
10042 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
10044 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
10045 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
10046 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
10054 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
10055 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
10058 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
10059 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
10060 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
10061 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());