1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
54 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
55 use crate::sync::Mutex;
56 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
58 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
61 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
62 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
63 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
65 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
69 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
72 pub struct AvailableBalances {
73 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
74 pub balance_msat: u64,
75 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
76 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
77 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
78 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
79 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
80 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
81 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
82 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
85 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
87 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
89 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
90 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
91 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
92 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
93 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
94 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
96 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
100 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
101 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
102 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
103 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
106 /// Represents the resolution status of an inbound HTLC.
108 enum InboundHTLCResolution {
109 /// Resolved implies the action we must take with the inbound HTLC has already been determined,
110 /// i.e., we already know whether it must be failed back or forwarded.
112 // TODO: Once this variant is removed, we should also clean up
113 // [`MonitorRestoreUpdates::accepted_htlcs`] as the path will be unreachable.
115 pending_htlc_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
117 /// Pending implies we will attempt to resolve the inbound HTLC once it has been fully committed
118 /// to by both sides of the channel, i.e., once a `revoke_and_ack` has been processed by both
119 /// nodes for the state update in which it was proposed.
121 update_add_htlc: msgs::UpdateAddHTLC,
125 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCResolution,
127 (0, pending_htlc_status, required),
130 (0, update_add_htlc, required),
134 enum InboundHTLCState {
135 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
136 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
137 RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution),
138 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
139 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
140 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
141 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
142 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
143 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
144 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
145 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
146 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
147 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
148 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
149 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
151 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
152 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
153 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
154 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
155 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
156 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
157 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
158 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
159 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
160 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
161 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
162 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
163 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
164 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
166 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
167 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(InboundHTLCResolution),
168 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
169 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
170 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
171 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
172 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
173 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(InboundHTLCResolution),
175 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
176 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
178 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
179 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
180 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
181 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
182 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
183 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
184 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
185 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
188 /// Exposes the state of pending inbound HTLCs.
190 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
191 /// through the following states in the state machine:
192 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
193 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
194 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
195 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
196 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
197 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
198 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
200 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
201 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
202 pub enum InboundHTLCStateDetails {
203 /// We have added this HTLC in our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
204 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
205 /// before this HTLC is included on the remote commitment transaction.
206 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
207 /// This HTLC has been included in the commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages on both sides
208 /// and is included in both commitment transactions.
210 /// This HTLC is now safe to either forward or be claimed as a payment by us. The HTLC will
211 /// remain in this state until the forwarded upstream HTLC has been resolved and we resolve this
212 /// HTLC correspondingly, or until we claim it as a payment. If it is part of a multipart
213 /// payment, it will only be claimed together with other required parts.
215 /// We have received the preimage for this HTLC and it is being removed by fulfilling it with
216 /// update_fulfill_htlc. This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting
217 /// the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote
218 /// commitment transaction after update_fulfill_htlc.
219 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
220 /// The HTLC is being removed by failing it with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc.
221 /// This HTLC is still on both commitment transactions, but we are awaiting the appropriate
222 /// revoke_and_ack's from the remote before this HTLC is removed from the remote commitment
224 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
227 impl From<&InboundHTLCState> for Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
228 fn from(state: &InboundHTLCState) -> Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails> {
230 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => None,
231 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) =>
232 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
233 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) =>
234 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
235 InboundHTLCState::Committed =>
236 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed),
237 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(_)) =>
238 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
239 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(_)) =>
240 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail),
241 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) =>
242 Some(InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill),
247 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(InboundHTLCStateDetails,
248 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
249 (2, Committed) => {},
250 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill) => {},
251 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail) => {};
254 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
258 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
259 state: InboundHTLCState,
262 /// Exposes details around pending inbound HTLCs.
263 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
264 pub struct InboundHTLCDetails {
266 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
267 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
268 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
270 /// The amount in msat.
271 pub amount_msat: u64,
272 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
273 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
274 /// The payment hash.
275 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
276 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
278 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
279 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
281 /// See [`InboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
283 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
284 /// states may result in `None` here.
285 pub state: Option<InboundHTLCStateDetails>,
286 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
287 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
288 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
289 /// transactions as well.
291 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
292 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
295 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
296 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
300 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(InboundHTLCDetails, {
301 (0, htlc_id, required),
302 (2, amount_msat, required),
303 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
304 (6, payment_hash, required),
305 (7, state, upgradable_option),
306 (8, is_dust, required),
309 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
310 enum OutboundHTLCState {
311 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
312 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
313 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
314 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
315 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
316 /// money back (though we won't), and,
317 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
318 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
319 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
320 /// we'll never get out of sync).
321 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
322 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
323 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
325 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
326 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
327 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
328 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
329 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
330 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
331 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
332 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
333 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
334 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
335 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
336 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
337 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
338 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
339 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
342 /// Exposes the state of pending outbound HTLCs.
344 /// At a high level, an HTLC being forwarded from one Lightning node to another Lightning node goes
345 /// through the following states in the state machine:
346 /// - Announced for addition by the originating node through the update_add_htlc message.
347 /// - Added to the commitment transaction of the receiving node and originating node in turn
348 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
349 /// - Announced for resolution (fulfillment or failure) by the receiving node through either one of
350 /// the update_fulfill_htlc, update_fail_htlc, and update_fail_malformed_htlc messages.
351 /// - Removed from the commitment transaction of the originating node and receiving node in turn
352 /// through the exchange of commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack messages.
354 /// This can be used to inspect what next message an HTLC is waiting for to advance its state.
355 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
356 pub enum OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
357 /// We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote before the HTLC is added
358 /// on the remote's commitment transaction after update_add_htlc.
359 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
360 /// The HTLC has been added to the remote's commitment transaction by sending commitment_signed
361 /// and receiving revoke_and_ack in return.
363 /// The HTLC will remain in this state until the remote node resolves the HTLC, or until we
364 /// unilaterally close the channel due to a timeout with an uncooperative remote node.
366 /// The HTLC has been fulfilled successfully by the remote with a preimage in update_fulfill_htlc,
367 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
368 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
369 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
370 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
371 /// The HTLC has been failed by the remote with update_fail_htlc or update_fail_malformed_htlc,
372 /// and we removed the HTLC from our commitment transaction by receiving commitment_signed and
373 /// returning revoke_and_ack. We are awaiting the appropriate revoke_and_ack's from the remote
374 /// for the removal from its commitment transaction.
375 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
378 impl From<&OutboundHTLCState> for OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
379 fn from(state: &OutboundHTLCState) -> OutboundHTLCStateDetails {
381 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
382 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd,
383 OutboundHTLCState::Committed =>
384 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
385 // RemoteRemoved states are ignored as the state is transient and the remote has not committed to
387 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
388 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::Committed,
389 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
390 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
391 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
392 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
393 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) =>
394 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess,
395 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(_)) =>
396 OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure,
401 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum_upgradable!(OutboundHTLCStateDetails,
402 (0, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd) => {},
403 (2, Committed) => {},
404 (4, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveSuccess) => {},
405 (6, AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFailure) => {};
409 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
410 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
411 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
412 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
413 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
416 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
417 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
419 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
420 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
425 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
426 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
428 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
429 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
434 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
435 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
439 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
440 state: OutboundHTLCState,
442 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
443 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
446 /// Exposes details around pending outbound HTLCs.
447 #[derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq)]
448 pub struct OutboundHTLCDetails {
450 /// The IDs are incremented by 1 starting from 0 for each offered HTLC.
451 /// They are unique per channel and inbound/outbound direction, unless an HTLC was only announced
452 /// and not part of any commitment transaction.
454 /// Not present when we are awaiting a remote revocation and the HTLC is not added yet.
455 pub htlc_id: Option<u64>,
456 /// The amount in msat.
457 pub amount_msat: u64,
458 /// The block height at which this HTLC expires.
459 pub cltv_expiry: u32,
460 /// The payment hash.
461 pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
462 /// The state of the HTLC in the state machine.
464 /// Determines on which commitment transactions the HTLC is included and what message the HTLC is
465 /// waiting for to advance to the next state.
467 /// See [`OutboundHTLCStateDetails`] for information on the specific states.
469 /// LDK will always fill this field in, but when downgrading to prior versions of LDK, new
470 /// states may result in `None` here.
471 pub state: Option<OutboundHTLCStateDetails>,
472 /// The extra fee being skimmed off the top of this HTLC.
473 pub skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
474 /// Whether the HTLC has an output below the local dust limit. If so, the output will be trimmed
475 /// from the local commitment transaction and added to the commitment transaction fee.
476 /// For non-anchor channels, this takes into account the cost of the second-stage HTLC
477 /// transactions as well.
479 /// When the local commitment transaction is broadcasted as part of a unilateral closure,
480 /// the value of this HTLC will therefore not be claimable but instead burned as a transaction
483 /// Note that dust limits are specific to each party. An HTLC can be dust for the local
484 /// commitment transaction but not for the counterparty's commitment transaction and vice versa.
488 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(OutboundHTLCDetails, {
489 (0, htlc_id, required),
490 (2, amount_msat, required),
491 (4, cltv_expiry, required),
492 (6, payment_hash, required),
493 (7, state, upgradable_option),
494 (8, skimmed_fee_msat, required),
495 (10, is_dust, required),
498 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
499 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
500 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
501 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
505 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
507 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
508 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
509 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
510 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
513 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
518 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
523 sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32],
527 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
528 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
529 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
530 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
531 struct $flag_type(u32);
536 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
539 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
541 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
544 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
547 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
548 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
551 Ok($flag_type(flags))
556 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
558 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
560 fn set(&mut self, flag: Self) { *self |= flag }
562 fn clear(&mut self, flag: Self) -> Self { self.0 &= !flag.0; *self }
566 define_state_flags!($flag_type, Self::$flag, $get, $set, $clear);
569 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
571 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
573 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
574 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
576 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
578 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
580 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
581 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
584 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
585 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
587 ($flag_type: ident, $flag: expr, $get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident) => {
590 fn $get(&self) -> bool { self.is_set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
592 fn $set(&mut self) { self.set($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
594 fn $clear(&mut self) -> Self { self.clear($flag_type::new() | $flag) }
597 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
598 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
600 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
601 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected);
602 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
603 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress);
604 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
605 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent);
606 define_state_flags!($flag_type, FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
607 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent);
609 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
611 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
613 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
614 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
616 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
618 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
620 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
621 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
623 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
624 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
626 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
627 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
632 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
635 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
636 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
637 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
638 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
639 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
640 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
641 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
642 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
643 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
644 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
645 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
646 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
647 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
648 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
652 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
654 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
655 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED,
656 is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected),
657 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
658 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
659 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS,
660 is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress),
661 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
662 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
663 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
664 is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent),
665 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
666 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
667 is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent)
672 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
673 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
674 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
675 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT, is_our_init_sent, set_our_init_sent, clear_our_init_sent),
676 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
677 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT, is_their_init_sent, set_their_init_sent, clear_their_init_sent)
682 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
683 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
684 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
685 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
686 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY,
687 is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready),
688 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
689 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
690 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY,
691 is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready),
692 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
693 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
694 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH,
695 is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch)
700 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
701 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
702 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
703 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
704 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
705 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
706 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE,
707 is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke)
711 // Note that the order of this enum is implicitly defined by where each variant is placed. Take this
712 // into account when introducing new states and update `test_channel_state_order` accordingly.
713 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
715 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
716 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
717 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
718 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
719 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
721 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
722 /// funding transaction to confirm.
723 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
724 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
726 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
727 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
728 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
732 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
733 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
735 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
738 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$get(),
747 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.$set(),
749 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
753 fn $clear(&mut self) {
756 ChannelState::$state(flags) => { let _ = flags.$clear(); },
758 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
762 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, FUNDED_STATES) => {
763 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
765 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state: ident) => {
766 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, [$state]);
771 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
773 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
774 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
776 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
777 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
778 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
779 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
780 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
781 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
782 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
783 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
791 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
793 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
794 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
795 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
796 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
797 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
801 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
802 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
805 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
806 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
809 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
811 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
812 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
813 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
817 fn can_generate_new_commitment(&self) -> bool {
819 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
820 !flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) &&
821 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) &&
822 !flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
824 debug_assert!(false, "Can only generate new commitment within ChannelReady");
830 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected, FUNDED_STATES);
831 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress, FUNDED_STATES);
832 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
833 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent, FUNDED_STATES);
834 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
835 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready, AwaitingChannelReady);
836 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch, AwaitingChannelReady);
837 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke, ChannelReady);
840 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
842 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
844 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
845 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
846 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
847 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
851 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
853 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
855 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
857 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
858 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
859 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
860 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
861 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
863 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
864 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
866 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
868 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
869 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
871 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
872 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
873 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
874 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
875 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
876 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
878 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
879 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
881 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
882 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
883 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
884 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
885 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
887 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
888 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
890 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
891 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
893 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
894 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
895 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
896 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
902 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
903 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
905 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
906 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
907 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
912 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
913 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
915 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
916 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
917 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
922 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
924 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
925 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
928 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
929 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
930 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
931 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
932 self.logger.log(record)
936 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
937 where L::Target: Logger {
938 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
939 where S::Target: SignerProvider
943 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
944 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
949 macro_rules! secp_check {
950 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
953 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
958 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
959 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
960 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
961 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
962 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
963 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
964 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
965 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
967 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
969 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
971 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
975 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
977 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
978 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
979 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
981 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
982 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
984 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
985 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
986 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
987 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
988 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
990 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
991 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
995 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
1001 /// Current counts of various HTLCs, useful for calculating current balances available exactly.
1003 pending_inbound_htlcs: usize,
1004 pending_outbound_htlcs: usize,
1005 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1006 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
1007 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1008 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
1009 outbound_holding_cell_msat: u64,
1010 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
1013 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
1014 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
1015 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
1016 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
1017 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
1018 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
1019 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
1020 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1021 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees *not* considering dust limits
1022 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
1023 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
1026 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
1027 struct HTLCCandidate {
1029 origin: HTLCInitiator,
1032 impl HTLCCandidate {
1033 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
1041 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
1043 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
1045 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1046 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1047 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
1052 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
1053 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
1054 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
1055 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
1056 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
1058 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
1059 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1060 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
1061 htlc_value_msat: u64,
1063 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
1064 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
1068 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
1069 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
1070 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1071 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1072 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1073 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1074 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1075 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1076 pub pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1077 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
1078 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1079 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1082 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
1084 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
1085 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1086 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
1087 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1090 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
1091 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
1092 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1093 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
1094 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
1095 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1096 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
1097 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
1100 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
1102 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
1103 pub(crate) closure_reason: ClosureReason,
1104 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
1105 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelId, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
1106 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
1107 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
1108 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
1109 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
1110 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
1111 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
1112 pub(crate) user_channel_id: u128,
1113 pub(crate) channel_capacity_satoshis: u64,
1114 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1115 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_funding_tx: Option<Transaction>,
1116 pub(crate) channel_funding_txo: Option<OutPoint>,
1119 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
1120 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
1121 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
1122 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
1123 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
1124 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
1125 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
1126 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
1127 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
1128 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
1129 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
1130 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
1131 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1132 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
1133 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
1135 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
1136 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
1137 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
1138 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
1140 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
1141 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
1142 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
1143 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
1145 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
1146 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
1147 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
1148 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
1149 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
1151 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
1152 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
1153 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
1154 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
1156 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
1157 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
1158 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
1160 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
1161 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
1162 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
1163 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
1164 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
1166 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
1167 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
1170 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
1171 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
1173 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
1174 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
1175 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1176 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
1178 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
1179 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
1181 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
1182 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
1185 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
1186 (0, update, required),
1189 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
1190 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
1191 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1192 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
1193 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
1194 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1195 UnfundedOutboundV2(OutboundV2Channel<SP>),
1196 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1197 UnfundedInboundV2(InboundV2Channel<SP>),
1198 Funded(Channel<SP>),
1201 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
1202 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1203 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
1205 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
1207 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
1208 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1209 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
1210 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1211 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1212 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1213 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(chan) => &chan.context,
1217 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
1219 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1220 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1221 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1222 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1223 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1224 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
1225 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV2(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
1230 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
1231 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
1232 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
1233 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
1234 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
1236 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
1237 /// in a timely manner.
1238 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
1241 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
1242 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
1243 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
1245 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
1246 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
1247 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
1248 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
1252 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
1253 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1254 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
1256 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
1257 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
1258 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
1259 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
1261 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
1265 /// The current channel ID.
1266 channel_id: ChannelId,
1267 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
1268 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
1269 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1270 channel_state: ChannelState,
1272 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
1273 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
1275 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
1276 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
1277 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
1279 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
1280 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1281 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
1282 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
1284 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
1285 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
1287 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
1289 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
1290 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
1291 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
1293 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
1294 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
1295 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
1297 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1298 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
1299 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
1300 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
1301 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
1302 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
1304 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
1305 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
1306 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
1307 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1308 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1309 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1311 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1313 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1314 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1315 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1317 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1318 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1319 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1320 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1321 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1322 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1323 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1324 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>,
1326 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1327 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1328 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1330 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1331 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1332 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1333 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1334 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1335 /// outbound or inbound.
1336 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1338 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1340 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1341 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1342 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1343 // HTLCs with similar state.
1344 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1345 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1346 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1347 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1348 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1349 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1350 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1351 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1352 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1353 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1355 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1356 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1357 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1359 update_time_counter: u32,
1361 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1362 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1363 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1364 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1365 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1366 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1368 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1369 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1371 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1372 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1373 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1374 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1376 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1377 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1379 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1381 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1383 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1384 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1385 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1386 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1387 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1389 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1390 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1392 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1393 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1394 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1396 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1397 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1398 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1399 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1400 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1401 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1402 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1403 channel_creation_height: u32,
1405 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1408 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1410 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1413 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1415 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1418 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1420 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1422 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1423 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1426 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1428 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1430 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1431 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1433 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1435 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1436 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1437 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1439 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1441 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1442 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1443 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1445 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1446 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1447 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1449 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1451 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1453 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1454 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1455 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1456 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1458 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1459 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1460 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1462 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1463 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1464 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1466 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1467 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1468 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1469 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1470 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1471 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1472 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1473 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1475 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1476 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1477 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1478 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1479 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1481 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1482 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1484 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1485 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1486 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1487 /// unblock the state machine.
1489 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1490 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1491 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1493 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1494 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1495 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1497 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1498 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1499 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1500 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1501 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1502 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1503 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1504 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1506 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1507 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1509 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1510 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1511 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1513 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1514 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1515 // associated channel mapping.
1517 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1518 // to store all of them.
1519 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1521 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1522 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1523 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1524 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1525 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1527 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1528 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1530 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1531 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1533 /// Some if we initiated to shut down the channel.
1534 local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()>,
1536 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1537 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1539 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1541 pub channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1543 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1544 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1545 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1548 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1549 fn new_for_inbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1550 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1551 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1552 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1553 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1554 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1556 config: &'a UserConfig,
1557 current_chain_height: u32,
1560 our_funding_satoshis: u64,
1561 counterparty_pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1562 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1563 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1564 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1566 open_channel_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields,
1567 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, ChannelError>
1569 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1570 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1572 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1574 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id));
1575 let announced_channel = if (open_channel_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1577 let channel_value_satoshis = our_funding_satoshis.saturating_add(open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis);
1579 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
1580 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1581 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1583 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1584 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1587 // Check sanity of message fields:
1588 if channel_value_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1589 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1590 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}. Peer contribution: {}. Our contribution: {}",
1591 config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis,
1592 open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis, our_funding_satoshis)));
1594 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1595 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", channel_value_satoshis)));
1597 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1598 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be no greater than channel_value_satoshis: {}", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1600 let full_channel_value_msat = (channel_value_satoshis - msg_channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1601 if msg_push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1602 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg_push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1604 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > channel_value_satoshis {
1605 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than channel_value_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, channel_value_satoshis)));
1607 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1608 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1610 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, None, &&logger)?;
1612 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1613 if open_channel_fields.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1614 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, open_channel_fields.to_self_delay)));
1616 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1617 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1619 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1623 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1624 if channel_value_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1625 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", channel_value_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1627 if open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1628 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1630 if open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1631 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1633 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1634 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1636 if open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1637 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1639 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1640 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1642 if open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1643 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1646 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1648 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1649 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1654 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1655 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1656 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1657 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1659 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1660 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg_push_msat)));
1662 if msg_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1663 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1664 msg_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1666 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis {
1667 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1670 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1671 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1672 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1673 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
1677 let funders_amount_msat = open_channel_fields.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat;
1678 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
1679 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
1680 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
1683 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
1684 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1685 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1686 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1687 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1690 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1691 match &open_channel_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1692 &Some(ref script) => {
1693 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1694 if script.len() == 0 {
1697 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1698 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1700 Some(script.clone())
1703 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1705 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1710 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1711 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1712 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1713 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1717 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1718 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1719 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1723 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1724 Ok(script) => script,
1725 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1728 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1729 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1731 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
1734 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
1737 let value_to_self_msat = our_funding_satoshis * 1000 + msg_push_msat;
1739 // TODO(dual_funding): Checks for `funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight`?
1741 let channel_context = ChannelContext {
1744 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1745 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1747 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1752 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1754 temporary_channel_id: Some(open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id),
1755 channel_id: open_channel_fields.temporary_channel_id,
1756 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
1757 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
1759 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1762 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1764 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1765 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1768 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1769 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1772 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1773 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1774 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1775 pending_update_fee: None,
1776 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1777 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1778 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1779 update_time_counter: 1,
1781 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1783 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1784 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1785 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1786 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1787 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1788 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1789 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
1791 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
1792 signer_pending_funding: false,
1795 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1796 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1797 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1798 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((value_to_self_msat, (channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - msg_push_msat).saturating_sub(value_to_self_msat))),
1800 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1801 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1802 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
1803 closing_fee_limits: None,
1804 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1806 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1807 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1808 short_channel_id: None,
1809 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1811 feerate_per_kw: open_channel_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
1812 channel_value_satoshis,
1813 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: open_channel_fields.dust_limit_satoshis,
1814 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1815 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(open_channel_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, channel_value_satoshis * 1000),
1816 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1817 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg_channel_reserve_satoshis),
1818 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1819 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: open_channel_fields.htlc_minimum_msat,
1820 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1821 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: open_channel_fields.max_accepted_htlcs,
1822 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1825 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1827 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1828 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1829 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1830 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1831 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1832 selected_contest_delay: open_channel_fields.to_self_delay,
1833 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1835 funding_outpoint: None,
1836 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
1838 funding_transaction: None,
1839 is_batch_funding: None,
1841 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(open_channel_fields.first_per_commitment_point),
1842 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1843 counterparty_node_id,
1845 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1847 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1849 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1850 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1852 announcement_sigs: None,
1854 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1855 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1856 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1857 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1859 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1860 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
1862 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1863 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
1865 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1866 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1868 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1869 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
1874 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
1876 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1882 fn new_for_outbound_channel<'a, ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
1883 fee_estimator: &'a LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1884 entropy_source: &'a ES,
1885 signer_provider: &'a SP,
1886 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1887 their_features: &'a InitFeatures,
1888 funding_satoshis: u64,
1891 config: &'a UserConfig,
1892 current_chain_height: u32,
1893 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1894 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
1895 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1896 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1897 holder_signer: <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner,
1898 pubkeys: ChannelPublicKeys,
1899 ) -> Result<ChannelContext<SP>, APIError>
1901 ES::Target: EntropySource,
1902 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1903 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
1905 // This will be updated with the counterparty contribution if this is a dual-funded channel
1906 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis;
1908 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
1910 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
1911 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
1913 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1914 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
1916 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
1917 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
1918 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
1920 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1921 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
1924 let channel_type = get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
1925 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
1927 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1928 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
1930 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
1932 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
1934 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
1935 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
1936 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
1937 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1940 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1941 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1943 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1944 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1945 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1946 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1950 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1951 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1952 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1956 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
1957 Ok(script) => script,
1958 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1961 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
1966 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1967 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1968 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1969 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1974 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1976 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1977 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1978 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
1979 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1981 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we receive `accept_channel2`.
1982 channel_value_satoshis,
1984 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1986 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
1987 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1990 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1991 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1994 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1995 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1996 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1997 pending_update_fee: None,
1998 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1999 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
2000 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
2001 update_time_counter: 1,
2003 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
2005 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
2006 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
2007 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
2008 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
2009 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
2010 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
2011 monitor_pending_update_adds: Vec::new(),
2013 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
2014 signer_pending_funding: false,
2016 // We'll add our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` to these max commitment output assertions
2017 // when we receive `accept_channel2`.
2018 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2019 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2020 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2021 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
2023 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
2024 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
2025 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
2026 closing_fee_limits: None,
2027 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
2029 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
2030 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
2031 short_channel_id: None,
2032 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
2034 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
2035 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
2036 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
2037 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
2038 // We'll adjust this to include our counterparty's `funding_satoshis` when we
2039 // receive `accept_channel2`.
2040 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
2041 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2042 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
2043 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
2044 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
2045 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
2046 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
2047 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
2049 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
2051 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
2052 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
2053 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
2054 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
2055 counterparty_parameters: None,
2056 funding_outpoint: None,
2057 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
2059 funding_transaction: None,
2060 is_batch_funding: None,
2062 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
2063 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
2064 counterparty_node_id,
2066 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
2068 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
2070 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
2071 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
2073 announcement_sigs: None,
2075 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2076 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2077 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2078 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
2080 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
2081 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
2083 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
2084 outbound_scid_alias,
2086 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
2087 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
2089 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2090 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: new_hash_set(),
2095 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
2096 local_initiated_shutdown: None,
2100 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2101 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
2102 self.update_time_counter
2105 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
2106 self.latest_monitor_update_id
2109 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
2110 self.config.announced_channel
2113 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
2114 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
2117 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
2118 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2119 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
2120 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
2123 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
2124 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
2125 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
2128 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
2129 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2130 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
2131 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
2132 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
2133 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
2134 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
2137 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
2138 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
2139 match self.channel_state {
2140 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
2141 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
2142 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
2143 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2144 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
2145 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
2146 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
2148 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
2150 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
2151 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
2155 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
2156 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
2157 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
2158 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2159 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
2160 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
2163 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2164 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
2165 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
2169 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
2170 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
2171 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2172 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
2173 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
2176 // Public utilities:
2178 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
2182 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
2184 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
2185 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
2186 self.temporary_channel_id
2189 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2193 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
2194 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
2195 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
2199 /// Gets the channel's type
2200 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
2204 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
2206 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
2207 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2208 self.short_channel_id
2211 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2212 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2213 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
2216 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2217 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
2218 self.outbound_scid_alias
2221 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
2223 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
2224 return &self.holder_signer
2227 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
2228 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
2229 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
2230 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
2231 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
2232 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
2235 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
2236 /// get_funding_created.
2237 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
2238 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
2241 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2242 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
2243 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
2244 if conf_height > 0 {
2251 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
2252 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
2253 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
2256 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
2257 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
2258 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
2259 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
2263 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
2266 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
2267 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
2270 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2271 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
2274 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
2275 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
2276 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
2279 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
2280 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
2283 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2284 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
2285 self.counterparty_node_id
2288 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2289 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2290 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
2293 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2294 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2295 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2298 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2299 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2301 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
2302 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
2303 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
2304 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
2306 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2310 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
2311 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
2312 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
2315 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
2316 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
2317 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
2320 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
2321 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
2322 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
2324 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
2325 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
2330 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
2331 self.channel_value_satoshis
2334 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
2335 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
2338 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
2339 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
2342 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
2343 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
2344 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2346 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
2347 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
2348 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
2349 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
2350 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
2352 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
2356 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
2357 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
2358 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
2361 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
2362 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2363 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2366 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2367 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
2368 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
2371 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
2372 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2373 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
2376 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
2377 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
2378 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
2381 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
2382 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
2383 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
2386 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
2387 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
2388 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
2389 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
2390 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
2393 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
2395 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
2396 self.prev_config = None;
2400 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
2401 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
2405 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
2406 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
2407 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
2408 let did_channel_update =
2409 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
2410 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
2411 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
2412 if did_channel_update {
2413 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
2414 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
2415 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
2416 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2418 self.config.options = *config;
2422 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
2423 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
2424 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
2425 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
2426 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
2429 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
2430 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
2431 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
2432 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
2433 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
2435 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
2436 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
2437 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
2438 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
2439 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
2440 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
2441 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
2443 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
2444 where L::Target: Logger
2446 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
2447 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2448 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
2450 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
2451 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2452 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
2453 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
2455 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2456 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2457 if match update_state {
2458 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
2459 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
2460 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2461 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
2462 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
2464 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
2468 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
2469 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
2470 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
2472 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
2474 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
2475 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
2476 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
2478 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
2479 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
2480 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
2481 transaction_output_index: None
2486 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
2487 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
2488 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
2489 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
2490 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2493 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2495 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2496 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2497 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2499 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2500 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2503 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
2504 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2507 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2509 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
2510 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2511 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2513 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
2514 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
2520 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2522 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2523 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2524 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
2525 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
2526 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
2527 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2528 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
2532 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
2533 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2535 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2537 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2538 if generated_by_local {
2539 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
2540 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2541 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2551 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
2553 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2554 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
2555 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
2556 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
2557 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
2558 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
2559 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
2562 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
2563 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2564 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2565 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
2569 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
2570 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
2574 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
2575 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2577 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
2579 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2580 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2582 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
2583 if !generated_by_local {
2584 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
2592 let value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
2593 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
2594 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
2595 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
2596 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
2597 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
2598 let value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
2599 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
2601 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
2603 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
2604 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
2605 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
2606 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2608 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
2610 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
2611 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
2612 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
2613 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
2616 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
2617 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
2618 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
2619 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
2621 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
2624 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
2625 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
2626 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
2627 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2629 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
2632 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2633 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
2638 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
2639 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
2644 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
2646 let channel_parameters =
2647 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
2648 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
2649 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
2656 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
2659 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
2660 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
2661 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
2662 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
2670 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
2671 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
2672 inbound_htlc_preimages,
2673 outbound_htlc_preimages,
2678 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
2679 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
2680 /// our counterparty!)
2681 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
2682 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
2683 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
2684 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
2685 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
2686 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2687 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2689 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
2693 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
2694 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
2695 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
2696 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
2697 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
2698 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
2699 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
2701 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
2704 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
2705 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
2706 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
2707 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2708 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
2711 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2712 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2715 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
2719 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
2720 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
2721 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
2722 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
2723 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
2724 // which are near the dust limit.
2725 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
2726 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
2727 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
2728 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
2729 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2731 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
2732 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
2734 let feerate_plus_quarter = feerate_per_kw.checked_mul(1250).map(|v| v / 1000);
2735 cmp::max(feerate_per_kw + 2530, feerate_plus_quarter.unwrap_or(u32::max_value()))
2738 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
2739 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
2740 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
2743 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending htlcs
2744 fn get_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2746 let uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors = self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
2748 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if uses_0_htlc_fee_anchors {
2751 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2752 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2753 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2756 let mut on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2757 let mut on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat = 0;
2759 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2761 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2762 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2763 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2764 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2765 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2766 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2768 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2769 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2774 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat = 0;
2775 let mut outbound_holding_cell_msat = 0;
2776 let mut on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count = 0;
2777 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2779 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2780 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2781 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2782 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2783 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2784 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2786 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2787 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2791 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2792 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2793 pending_outbound_htlcs += 1;
2794 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2795 outbound_holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2796 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2797 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2799 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2800 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2802 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2809 pending_inbound_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len(),
2810 pending_outbound_htlcs,
2811 pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2812 pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat,
2813 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2814 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat,
2815 outbound_holding_cell_msat,
2816 on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count,
2820 /// Returns information on all pending inbound HTLCs.
2821 pub fn get_pending_inbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<InboundHTLCDetails> {
2822 let mut holding_cell_states = new_hash_map();
2823 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2824 match holding_cell_update {
2825 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2826 holding_cell_states.insert(
2828 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFulfill,
2831 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2832 holding_cell_states.insert(
2834 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2837 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2838 holding_cell_states.insert(
2840 InboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemoveFail,
2844 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { .. } => {},
2847 let mut inbound_details = Vec::new();
2848 let htlc_success_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2851 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2852 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2854 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2855 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2856 if let Some(state_details) = (&htlc.state).into() {
2857 inbound_details.push(InboundHTLCDetails{
2858 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
2859 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2860 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2861 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2862 state: Some(holding_cell_states.remove(&htlc.htlc_id).unwrap_or(state_details)),
2863 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat,
2870 /// Returns information on all pending outbound HTLCs.
2871 pub fn get_pending_outbound_htlc_details(&self) -> Vec<OutboundHTLCDetails> {
2872 let mut outbound_details = Vec::new();
2873 let htlc_timeout_dust_limit = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2876 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2877 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
2879 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2880 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2881 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2882 htlc_id: Some(htlc.htlc_id),
2883 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
2884 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
2885 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
2886 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
2887 state: Some((&htlc.state).into()),
2888 is_dust: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2891 for holding_cell_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2892 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
2898 } = *holding_cell_update {
2899 outbound_details.push(OutboundHTLCDetails{
2901 amount_msat: amount_msat,
2902 cltv_expiry: cltv_expiry,
2903 payment_hash: payment_hash,
2904 skimmed_fee_msat: skimmed_fee_msat,
2905 state: Some(OutboundHTLCStateDetails::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAdd),
2906 is_dust: amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat,
2913 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2914 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2915 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2916 /// corner case properly.
2917 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
2918 -> AvailableBalances
2919 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
2921 let context = &self;
2922 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2923 let htlc_stats = context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2925 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
2926 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2927 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2928 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2931 balance_msat -= htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat;
2933 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
2934 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat)
2936 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2938 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2940 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2941 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
2945 if context.is_outbound() {
2946 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2947 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2949 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2950 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2952 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2953 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2954 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2955 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2958 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2959 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2960 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2961 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2962 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2963 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2964 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2967 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2968 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2969 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2970 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2971 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2972 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2973 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2974 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2975 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2976 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2977 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2979 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2982 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2983 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2984 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2985 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2986 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2989 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2990 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2992 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2993 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2994 .saturating_sub(htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat);
2996 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2997 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2998 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2999 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
3003 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
3005 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
3006 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
3007 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
3008 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
3009 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
3010 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
3011 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3013 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3014 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
3016 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3017 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3018 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3020 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
3021 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
3022 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat));
3023 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
3026 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
3027 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
3028 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
3029 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
3030 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
3033 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
3034 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
3035 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
3037 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
3041 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
3042 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs_value_msat);
3044 if htlc_stats.pending_outbound_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
3045 available_capacity_msat = 0;
3049 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
3050 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
3051 - htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat as i64
3052 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
3054 outbound_capacity_msat,
3055 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
3056 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
3061 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
3062 let context = &self;
3063 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
3066 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
3067 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
3069 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3070 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3072 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3073 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3075 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3076 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3077 let context = &self;
3078 assert!(context.is_outbound());
3080 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3083 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3084 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3086 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3087 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3089 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3090 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3092 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3093 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3097 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3098 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3104 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3105 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3106 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3109 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
3110 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
3111 included_htlcs += 1;
3114 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3115 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3119 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3120 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3121 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3122 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
3123 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
3124 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
3129 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3131 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
3132 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3137 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
3138 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
3142 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3143 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3144 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3147 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3148 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3150 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3151 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3152 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3154 total_pending_htlcs,
3155 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3156 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3157 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3159 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3160 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3161 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3163 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3165 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3170 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
3171 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
3173 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
3174 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
3176 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
3177 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
3179 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
3180 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
3181 let context = &self;
3182 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
3184 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3187 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3188 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3190 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3191 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3193 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
3194 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
3196 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
3197 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3201 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
3202 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3208 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
3209 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
3210 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
3211 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
3212 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3213 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
3216 included_htlcs += 1;
3219 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3220 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
3223 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
3224 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
3226 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
3227 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
3228 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
3233 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
3234 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
3235 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3238 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
3239 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
3241 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
3242 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3244 total_pending_htlcs,
3245 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3246 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
3247 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
3249 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3250 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3251 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3253 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
3255 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3260 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O> where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
3261 match self.channel_state {
3262 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
3263 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
3264 if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) ||
3265 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into())
3275 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3277 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
3278 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
3281 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
3283 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3284 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
3285 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
3289 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
3290 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
3291 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
3294 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
3296 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
3297 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
3300 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
3301 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
3302 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
3303 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
3304 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
3305 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool, closure_reason: ClosureReason) -> ShutdownResult {
3306 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
3307 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
3308 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
3309 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
3310 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3312 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
3313 // return them to fail the payment.
3314 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
3315 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
3316 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3318 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
3319 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
3324 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
3325 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
3326 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
3327 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
3328 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
3329 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
3330 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
3331 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
3332 if !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3333 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
3334 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, self.channel_id(), ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3335 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3336 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
3337 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
3338 channel_id: Some(self.channel_id()),
3342 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
3343 let unbroadcasted_funding_tx = self.unbroadcasted_funding();
3345 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
3346 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3350 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
3351 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
3352 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3353 user_channel_id: self.user_id,
3354 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
3355 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
3356 unbroadcasted_funding_tx,
3357 channel_funding_txo: self.get_funding_txo(),
3361 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
3362 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
3363 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
3364 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
3366 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
3367 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3368 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
3369 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
3371 match &self.holder_signer {
3372 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
3373 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3374 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
3375 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
3376 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3379 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
3383 if funding_signed.is_none() {
3384 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
3385 panic!("Failed to get signature for funding_signed");
3387 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
3388 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
3389 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
3391 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
3392 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
3393 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
3396 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
3397 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
3399 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3405 /// If we receive an error message when attempting to open a channel, it may only be a rejection
3406 /// of the channel type we tried, not of our ability to open any channel at all. We can see if a
3407 /// downgrade of channel features would be possible so that we can still open the channel.
3408 pub(crate) fn maybe_downgrade_channel_features<F: Deref>(
3409 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
3412 F::Target: FeeEstimator
3414 if !self.is_outbound() ||
3416 self.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
3417 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
3422 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
3423 // We've exhausted our options
3426 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
3427 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
3430 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
3431 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
3432 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
3433 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
3435 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3436 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
3437 self.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
3438 assert!(!self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
3439 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
3440 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
3442 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
3444 self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.channel_type.clone();
3449 // Internal utility functions for channels
3451 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
3452 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
3453 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
3455 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
3457 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
3458 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
3459 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
3461 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
3464 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
3466 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
3469 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
3470 /// required by us according to the configured or default
3471 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
3473 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3475 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3476 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
3477 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
3478 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
3479 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
3482 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
3483 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
3484 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
3485 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
3486 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3487 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3488 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
3491 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value each party needs to maintain, fixed in the spec to a
3492 /// default of 1% of the total channel value.
3494 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
3496 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
3497 /// of `dust_limit_satoshis`.
3498 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3499 fn get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, dust_limit_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
3500 // Fixed at 1% of channel value by spec.
3501 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
3502 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, dust_limit_satoshis))
3505 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3506 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3508 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3509 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
3512 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
3513 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
3514 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
3515 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
3516 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
3517 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
3520 /// Context for dual-funded channels.
3521 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3522 pub(super) struct DualFundingChannelContext {
3523 /// The amount in satoshis we will be contributing to the channel.
3524 pub our_funding_satoshis: u64,
3525 /// The amount in satoshis our counterparty will be contributing to the channel.
3526 pub their_funding_satoshis: u64,
3527 /// The funding transaction locktime suggested by the initiator. If set by us, it is always set
3528 /// to the current block height to align incentives against fee-sniping.
3529 pub funding_tx_locktime: u32,
3530 /// The feerate set by the initiator to be used for the funding transaction.
3531 pub funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: u32,
3534 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
3535 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
3536 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
3537 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
3538 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
3539 pub dual_funding_channel_context: Option<DualFundingChannelContext>,
3542 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3543 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
3545 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
3546 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
3547 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
3551 /// Contents of a wire message that fails an HTLC backwards. Useful for [`Channel::fail_htlc`] to
3552 /// fail with either [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`] or [`msgs::UpdateFailHTLC`] as needed.
3553 trait FailHTLCContents {
3554 type Message: FailHTLCMessageName;
3555 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message;
3556 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState;
3557 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK;
3559 impl FailHTLCContents for msgs::OnionErrorPacket {
3560 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailHTLC;
3561 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3562 msgs::UpdateFailHTLC { htlc_id, channel_id, reason: self }
3564 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3565 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(self))
3567 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3568 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet: self }
3571 impl FailHTLCContents for ([u8; 32], u16) {
3572 type Message = msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC;
3573 fn to_message(self, htlc_id: u64, channel_id: ChannelId) -> Self::Message {
3574 msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3577 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3578 failure_code: self.1
3581 fn to_inbound_htlc_state(self) -> InboundHTLCState {
3582 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed(self))
3584 fn to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(self, htlc_id: u64) -> HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
3585 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
3587 sha256_of_onion: self.0,
3588 failure_code: self.1
3593 trait FailHTLCMessageName {
3594 fn name() -> &'static str;
3596 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3597 fn name() -> &'static str {
3601 impl FailHTLCMessageName for msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3602 fn name() -> &'static str {
3603 "update_fail_malformed_htlc"
3607 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
3608 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
3609 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
3611 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3612 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
3613 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
3614 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3616 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3617 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3619 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
3621 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
3622 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
3623 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
3624 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
3626 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
3627 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
3631 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
3637 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
3638 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
3639 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
3640 // outside of those situations will fail.
3641 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
3645 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
3650 1 + // script length (0)
3654 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
3655 2 + // witness marker and flag
3656 1 + // witness element count
3657 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
3658 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
3659 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
3660 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
3661 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3662 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3664 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
3665 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
3666 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
3672 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
3673 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3674 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
3675 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3677 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
3678 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
3679 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
3681 if value_to_holder < 0 {
3682 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3683 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
3684 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
3685 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3686 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
3689 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3690 value_to_counterparty = 0;
3693 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
3694 value_to_holder = 0;
3697 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
3698 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
3699 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
3700 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
3702 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
3703 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
3706 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
3707 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
3710 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
3713 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
3714 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
3716 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
3718 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
3719 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
3720 where L::Target: Logger {
3721 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
3722 // (see equivalent if condition there).
3723 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment());
3724 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
3725 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
3726 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
3727 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
3728 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
3732 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3733 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
3734 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
3735 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
3737 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3738 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3741 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3742 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3743 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3745 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3746 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
3747 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3748 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3749 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
3750 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
3751 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
3753 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3754 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3755 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3757 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
3758 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3760 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3763 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3764 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
3768 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
3772 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3773 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3774 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
3775 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
3776 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3777 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3780 // Now update local state:
3782 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
3783 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
3784 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3785 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3786 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3787 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3788 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
3789 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
3791 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
3794 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3795 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
3796 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
3797 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
3798 // do not not get into this branch.
3799 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3800 match pending_update {
3801 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3802 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3803 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
3804 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
3805 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3806 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3807 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
3810 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3811 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3813 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3814 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3815 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
3816 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
3817 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
3818 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3824 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
3825 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
3826 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3828 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3829 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3830 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3832 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3833 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
3836 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
3837 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
3839 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3840 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
3842 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3843 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
3846 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
3849 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3850 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
3851 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
3852 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
3857 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
3858 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
3859 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
3860 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
3861 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
3862 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
3863 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
3864 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
3865 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
3866 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
3867 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3868 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
3869 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3870 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3871 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3873 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
3874 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
3875 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
3876 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
3877 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
3880 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
3881 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3882 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3888 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3889 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
3891 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
3895 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3896 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3897 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3898 /// before we fail backwards.
3900 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3901 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3902 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3903 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
3904 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3905 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
3906 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3909 /// Used for failing back with [`msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC`]. For now, this is used when we
3910 /// want to fail blinded HTLCs where we are not the intro node.
3912 /// See [`Self::queue_fail_htlc`] for more info.
3913 pub fn queue_fail_malformed_htlc<L: Deref>(
3914 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, failure_code: u16, sha256_of_onion: [u8; 32], logger: &L
3915 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3916 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), true, logger)
3917 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
3920 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
3921 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
3922 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
3923 /// before we fail backwards.
3925 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
3926 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
3927 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
3928 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref, E: FailHTLCContents + Clone>(
3929 &mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_contents: E, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3931 ) -> Result<Option<E::Message>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3932 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3933 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
3936 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
3937 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
3938 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
3940 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
3941 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
3942 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
3944 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
3945 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
3946 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3948 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3953 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
3954 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
3960 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
3961 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3962 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
3963 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
3964 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3968 if !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
3969 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
3970 force_holding_cell = true;
3973 // Now update local state:
3974 if force_holding_cell {
3975 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
3976 match pending_update {
3977 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
3978 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3979 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3980 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
3984 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } |
3985 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, .. } =>
3987 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
3988 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
3989 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
3995 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
3996 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(err_contents.to_htlc_update_awaiting_ack(htlc_id_arg));
4000 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with {} message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg,
4001 E::Message::name(), &self.context.channel_id());
4003 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
4004 htlc.state = err_contents.clone().to_inbound_htlc_state();
4007 Ok(Some(err_contents.to_message(htlc_id_arg, self.context.channel_id())))
4010 // Message handlers:
4011 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
4012 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
4013 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
4014 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
4015 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
4016 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
4017 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
4020 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
4022 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
4024 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
4025 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
4026 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
4027 debug_assert!(matches!(
4028 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
4030 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
4031 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
4034 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
4035 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
4037 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
4038 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4039 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
4040 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
4042 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
4045 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4046 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
4047 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
4050 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
4051 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
4052 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
4053 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
4054 // when routing outbound payments.
4055 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
4059 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
4060 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
4061 let mut check_reconnection = false;
4062 match &self.context.channel_state {
4063 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
4064 let flags = flags.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into());
4065 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4066 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
4067 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4068 check_reconnection = true;
4069 } else if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
4070 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
4071 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
4072 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
4073 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4075 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
4076 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
4079 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
4080 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
4081 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
4083 if check_reconnection {
4084 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
4085 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
4086 let expected_point =
4087 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4088 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
4090 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
4091 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
4092 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
4093 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
4094 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
4095 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
4097 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
4098 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
4099 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
4100 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
4101 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
4103 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
4104 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
4109 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4110 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4112 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
4114 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger))
4117 pub fn update_add_htlc(
4118 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
4119 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4120 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4121 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4123 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
4124 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
4125 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4127 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4128 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4130 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
4131 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
4133 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
4134 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
4136 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
4137 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
4140 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4141 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as usize {
4142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
4144 if htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
4145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
4148 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
4149 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
4150 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
4151 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
4152 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
4153 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
4154 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
4155 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
4156 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
4157 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
4158 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
4160 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
4161 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4162 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4163 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4164 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
4165 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
4169 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
4170 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
4171 let pending_remote_value_msat =
4172 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
4173 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
4174 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
4177 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
4178 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
4180 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
4181 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4182 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
4184 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4185 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4189 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
4190 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
4192 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
4193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
4197 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4198 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
4202 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4203 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
4204 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
4205 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
4206 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
4207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
4210 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
4211 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
4213 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
4214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
4217 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4218 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
4219 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
4223 // Now update local state:
4224 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
4225 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
4226 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
4227 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
4228 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
4229 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
4230 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved {
4231 pending_htlc_status: pending_forward_status
4237 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
4239 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
4240 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
4241 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4242 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
4243 let outcome = match check_preimage {
4244 None => fail_reason.into(),
4245 Some(payment_preimage) => {
4246 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
4247 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
4248 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
4250 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
4254 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
4255 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
4256 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
4257 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
4259 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
4260 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
4265 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
4268 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64, Option<u64>), ChannelError> {
4269 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4270 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4272 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4273 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4276 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat, htlc.skimmed_fee_msat))
4279 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4280 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4281 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4283 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4284 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4287 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4291 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4292 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4293 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4295 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4296 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4299 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
4303 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
4304 where L::Target: Logger
4306 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4307 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4309 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4310 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4312 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4313 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4316 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4318 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4320 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
4321 let commitment_txid = {
4322 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
4323 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
4324 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4326 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
4327 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
4328 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
4329 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
4330 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
4331 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4335 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
4337 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
4338 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
4339 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4340 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
4343 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4344 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
4345 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
4346 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
4349 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4351 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4352 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
4353 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4354 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
4355 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
4356 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
4357 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
4358 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
4359 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
4360 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
4361 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
4367 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
4368 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
4371 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
4372 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
4373 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
4374 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
4375 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
4376 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
4377 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
4378 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
4379 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
4380 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
4381 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
4382 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
4383 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
4386 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4387 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
4388 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
4389 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
4390 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
4391 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
4392 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
4394 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
4395 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
4396 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
4397 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
4398 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
4399 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
4400 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
4401 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
4403 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4404 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
4407 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
4409 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
4410 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
4411 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
4414 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
4417 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
4418 commitment_stats.tx,
4420 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
4421 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
4422 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
4425 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
4426 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
4428 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4429 let mut need_commitment = false;
4430 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
4431 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4432 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
4433 need_commitment = true;
4437 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4438 let htlc_resolution = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref resolution) = &htlc.state {
4439 Some(resolution.clone())
4441 if let Some(htlc_resolution) = htlc_resolution {
4442 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4443 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4444 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(htlc_resolution);
4445 need_commitment = true;
4448 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4449 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4450 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4451 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
4452 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
4453 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4454 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4455 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4456 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
4457 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
4458 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
4459 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
4460 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
4461 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
4463 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
4465 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
4466 need_commitment = true;
4470 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4471 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4472 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4473 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4474 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
4475 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
4476 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
4478 nondust_htlc_sources,
4480 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4483 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4484 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
4485 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
4486 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
4487 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
4489 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4490 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
4491 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
4492 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4493 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4494 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
4495 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
4496 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
4497 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4498 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4499 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4500 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4501 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4502 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4504 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
4505 &self.context.channel_id);
4506 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4509 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4510 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
4511 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
4512 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
4513 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4514 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4515 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4516 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4517 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4521 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
4522 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
4523 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4524 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
4527 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
4528 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
4529 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
4530 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4531 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4532 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4533 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4535 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment() {
4536 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
4537 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
4540 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
4541 /// for our counterparty.
4542 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4543 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4544 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
4545 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4547 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4548 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
4549 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
4550 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
4552 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4553 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
4554 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4555 updates: Vec::new(),
4556 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4559 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
4560 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
4561 let mut update_add_count = 0;
4562 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
4563 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
4564 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
4565 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
4566 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
4567 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
4568 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
4569 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
4570 // to rebalance channels.
4571 let fail_htlc_res = match &htlc_update {
4572 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
4573 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
4574 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
4576 match self.send_htlc(
4577 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
4578 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
4580 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
4583 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
4584 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
4585 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
4586 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
4587 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
4588 // into the holding cell without ever being
4589 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
4590 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
4591 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
4594 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
4601 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
4602 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
4603 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
4604 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
4605 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
4606 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
4607 let mut additional_monitor_update =
4608 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
4609 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
4610 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
4611 update_fulfill_count += 1;
4612 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
4615 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
4616 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger)
4617 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4619 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC { htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion } => {
4620 Some(self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, (sha256_of_onion, failure_code), false, logger)
4621 .map(|fail_msg_opt| fail_msg_opt.map(|_| ())))
4624 if let Some(res) = fail_htlc_res {
4626 Ok(fail_msg_opt) => {
4627 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
4628 // `queue_fail_{malformed_}htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
4629 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
4630 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
4631 // for a full revocation before failing.
4632 debug_assert!(fail_msg_opt.is_some());
4633 update_fail_count += 1;
4635 Err(ChannelError::Ignore(_)) => {},
4637 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
4642 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
4643 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
4645 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
4646 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
4651 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4652 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
4653 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
4654 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4655 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4657 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
4658 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
4659 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
4661 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4662 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
4668 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
4669 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
4670 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
4671 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
4672 /// revoke_and_ack message.
4673 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
4674 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
4675 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
4676 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
4678 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
4679 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
4681 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4682 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4684 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
4685 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
4688 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
4690 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4691 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
4692 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
4696 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
4697 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
4698 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
4699 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
4700 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
4701 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
4702 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
4703 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
4704 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
4707 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
4709 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4710 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
4713 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4714 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4715 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
4716 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4718 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
4720 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4725 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
4726 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
4727 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4728 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4729 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4730 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4731 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
4732 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
4733 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
4735 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
4738 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
4739 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
4740 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
4741 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
4742 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4743 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4744 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
4745 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
4746 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
4748 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
4749 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
4752 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
4753 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
4754 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
4755 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
4756 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4757 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4758 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4759 let mut require_commitment = false;
4760 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
4763 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
4764 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
4765 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
4766 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
4768 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
4769 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4770 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4771 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4772 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
4773 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4775 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4779 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
4780 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
4781 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
4782 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
4783 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
4785 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
4786 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
4787 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
4792 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4793 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
4795 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
4799 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4800 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
4802 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution) = state {
4803 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4804 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution);
4805 require_commitment = true;
4806 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution) = state {
4808 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } =>
4809 match pending_htlc_status {
4810 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
4811 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
4812 require_commitment = true;
4814 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
4815 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
4816 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
4818 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
4819 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
4820 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
4824 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
4825 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed, attempting to forward", &htlc.payment_hash);
4826 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
4827 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4830 InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { update_add_htlc } => {
4831 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4832 pending_update_adds.push(update_add_htlc);
4833 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
4839 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4840 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4841 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
4842 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4843 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4845 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
4846 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
4847 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
4848 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
4849 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
4850 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
4851 require_commitment = true;
4855 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
4857 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4858 match update_state {
4859 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
4860 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
4861 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4862 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4863 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4864 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
4866 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
4867 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
4868 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4869 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
4870 require_commitment = true;
4871 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
4872 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4877 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
4878 let release_state_str =
4879 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
4880 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
4881 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
4882 if !release_monitor {
4883 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
4884 update: monitor_update,
4886 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
4888 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
4893 self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.append(&mut pending_update_adds);
4895 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4896 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
4897 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
4898 if require_commitment {
4899 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4900 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
4901 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
4902 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
4904 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4905 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4906 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4907 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4908 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4910 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
4911 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
4912 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4913 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
4914 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
4917 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
4918 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
4919 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
4920 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4921 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4922 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4924 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
4925 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4927 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4928 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4930 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
4931 if require_commitment {
4932 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
4934 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
4935 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
4936 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
4937 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
4939 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
4940 &self.context.channel_id(),
4941 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
4944 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4945 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4947 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
4948 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
4950 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4951 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
4957 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
4958 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
4959 /// commitment update.
4960 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
4961 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4962 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4964 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
4965 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
4968 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
4969 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
4970 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
4971 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
4973 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
4974 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
4975 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4976 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
4977 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
4978 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
4979 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4981 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4982 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
4984 if !self.context.is_usable() {
4985 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
4987 if !self.context.is_live() {
4988 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
4991 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
4992 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
4993 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
4994 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
4995 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_outbound_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
4996 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - htlc_stats.outbound_holding_cell_msat;
4997 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
4998 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
4999 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
5003 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
5004 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
5005 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5006 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5009 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5010 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
5014 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5015 force_holding_cell = true;
5018 if force_holding_cell {
5019 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
5023 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
5024 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
5026 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5027 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5032 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
5033 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
5035 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
5037 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
5038 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5039 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5040 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5044 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5045 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
5046 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
5050 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
5051 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
5054 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
5055 // will be retransmitted.
5056 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
5057 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
5058 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
5060 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
5061 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
5063 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
5064 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
5065 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
5066 // this HTLC accordingly
5067 inbound_drop_count += 1;
5070 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
5071 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
5072 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
5073 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
5076 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
5077 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
5078 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
5079 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
5080 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
5081 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
5086 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
5088 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5089 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
5090 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5091 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5095 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5096 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
5097 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
5098 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
5099 // the update upon reconnection.
5100 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
5104 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5106 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
5107 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
5111 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
5112 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
5113 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
5114 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
5115 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
5116 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
5117 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
5119 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
5120 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
5121 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
5122 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
5123 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
5124 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
5125 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
5127 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
5128 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
5129 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
5130 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
5131 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
5132 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
5133 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
5136 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
5137 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
5138 /// to the remote side.
5139 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5140 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5141 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
5142 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
5145 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5147 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
5148 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
5150 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
5151 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
5152 // first received the funding_signed.
5153 let mut funding_broadcastable =
5154 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
5155 (matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
5156 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)))
5158 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
5160 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
5161 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
5162 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5163 funding_broadcastable = None;
5166 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
5167 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
5168 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
5169 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
5170 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
5171 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
5172 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
5173 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
5174 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
5175 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
5176 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5177 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5178 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5179 next_per_commitment_point,
5180 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5184 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
5186 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
5187 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
5188 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5189 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
5190 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5191 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
5192 let mut pending_update_adds = Vec::new();
5193 mem::swap(&mut pending_update_adds, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
5195 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5196 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5197 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5198 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5199 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
5200 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, pending_update_adds,
5201 funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5205 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
5206 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5208 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
5209 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5211 if commitment_update.is_some() {
5212 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5215 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
5216 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
5217 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
5218 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
5219 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
5220 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
5221 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
5222 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
5223 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs,
5224 pending_update_adds, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
5228 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5229 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5231 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5232 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
5234 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5237 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
5239 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
5240 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5241 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
5242 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
5243 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5244 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
5245 if htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5247 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5249 if htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
5250 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
5251 msg.feerate_per_kw, htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat)));
5257 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
5259 #[cfg(async_signing)]
5260 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
5261 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5262 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
5264 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
5265 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
5267 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
5268 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
5271 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
5272 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5273 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
5274 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
5276 SignerResumeUpdates {
5283 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5284 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5285 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
5286 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
5287 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5288 per_commitment_secret,
5289 next_per_commitment_point,
5291 next_local_nonce: None,
5295 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
5296 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
5297 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
5298 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
5299 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
5300 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
5302 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5303 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
5304 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5305 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5306 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5307 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
5308 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
5309 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
5310 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
5311 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
5312 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
5317 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5318 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
5320 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
5321 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
5322 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5323 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5324 reason: err_packet.clone()
5327 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
5328 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
5329 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5330 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5331 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
5332 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
5335 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
5336 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
5337 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5338 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
5339 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
5346 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
5347 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
5348 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5349 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
5353 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
5354 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
5355 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
5356 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
5357 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5358 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
5359 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
5363 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
5364 panic!("Failed to get signature for new commitment state");
5366 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
5367 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
5368 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
5369 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
5374 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
5375 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
5380 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
5381 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
5382 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
5383 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5384 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5385 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5386 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5391 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
5392 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
5394 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
5395 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
5396 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
5397 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
5398 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
5399 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
5400 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
5401 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
5404 NS::Target: NodeSigner
5406 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5407 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
5408 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
5409 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
5410 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
5413 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5414 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
5415 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
5418 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
5419 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
5420 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5421 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
5422 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
5423 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
5424 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
5426 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
5427 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
5428 ($err_msg: expr) => {
5429 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5430 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
5433 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
5434 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
5435 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
5436 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
5437 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
5438 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
5439 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
5440 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
5444 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
5445 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
5446 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
5447 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
5448 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5449 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5450 our_commitment_transaction
5454 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
5455 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
5456 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
5457 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
5459 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
5461 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height, logger);
5463 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
5464 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
5465 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
5466 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5467 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
5468 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
5470 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
5471 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5472 channel_ready: None,
5473 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5474 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5475 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5479 // We have OurChannelReady set!
5480 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5481 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5482 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5483 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5484 next_per_commitment_point,
5485 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5487 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
5488 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
5489 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5493 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
5494 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
5495 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
5497 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
5498 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5499 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
5502 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
5505 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
5506 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5507 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5508 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
5509 our_commitment_transaction
5513 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
5514 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
5515 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
5516 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
5517 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5518 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
5519 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5521 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
5523 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
5524 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
5525 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5526 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5527 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5528 next_per_commitment_point,
5529 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5533 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5534 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5535 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
5537 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
5540 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5541 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5542 raa: required_revoke,
5543 commitment_update: None,
5544 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5546 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
5547 if required_revoke.is_some() {
5548 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5550 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
5553 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5554 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
5555 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5556 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5557 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
5558 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5561 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
5562 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
5563 raa: required_revoke,
5564 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
5565 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
5568 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
5569 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5570 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5571 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5572 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5575 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5576 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
5577 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
5578 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
5583 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
5584 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
5585 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
5586 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
5588 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5590 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
5592 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
5593 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
5594 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
5595 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
5596 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
5597 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
5598 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
5599 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
5601 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
5602 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
5603 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
5604 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
5605 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
5607 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
5608 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
5609 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
5610 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
5613 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
5614 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
5615 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
5616 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
5617 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
5618 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
5619 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
5620 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
5621 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
5622 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
5623 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
5624 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
5625 // target feerate-calculated fee.
5626 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
5627 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
5629 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
5632 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
5633 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
5636 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
5637 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
5638 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
5639 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
5640 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
5641 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
5644 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
5645 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
5646 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
5647 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5648 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5649 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
5650 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
5652 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
5658 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5659 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
5660 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5661 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5663 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
5664 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
5665 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
5666 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
5667 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
5668 return Ok((None, None, None));
5671 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5672 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
5673 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
5675 return Ok((None, None, None));
5678 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
5679 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
5680 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
5681 return Ok((None, None, None));
5684 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5686 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5687 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
5688 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
5689 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
5691 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5692 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5694 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5695 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
5697 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
5698 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5699 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5700 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
5702 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5703 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5704 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5708 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5714 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
5715 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
5717 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
5718 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
5721 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
5722 /// within our expected timeframe.
5724 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
5725 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
5726 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
5729 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
5732 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
5733 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
5737 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
5738 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
5740 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5741 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5743 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
5744 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
5745 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
5746 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
5747 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
5749 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
5750 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5751 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5754 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
5756 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
5757 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5760 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
5761 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
5762 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
5765 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
5768 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
5769 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
5770 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
5771 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
5773 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5776 assert!(send_shutdown);
5777 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
5778 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
5779 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
5781 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5782 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
5784 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5789 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5791 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
5792 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5794 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5795 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5796 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5797 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5798 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5799 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5800 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5802 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
5804 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5805 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
5807 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
5808 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
5809 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5810 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5814 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
5815 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
5816 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
5817 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5818 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5819 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5821 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5822 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5829 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
5830 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5832 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5835 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
5836 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
5838 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
5840 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
5841 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
5842 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5843 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5844 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
5845 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
5846 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
5847 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5848 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5850 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
5851 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
5854 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
5858 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
5859 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
5860 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
5861 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
5863 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
5864 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
5866 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5867 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
5869 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
5870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
5872 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
5873 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
5876 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
5877 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
5880 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5881 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
5882 return Ok((None, None, None));
5885 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
5886 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
5887 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
5888 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
5890 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5892 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
5895 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
5896 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
5897 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
5898 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
5899 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
5903 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
5904 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
5905 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
5909 let closure_reason = if self.initiated_shutdown() {
5910 ClosureReason::LocallyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5912 ClosureReason::CounterpartyInitiatedCooperativeClosure
5915 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
5916 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
5917 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5918 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5920 monitor_update: None,
5921 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5922 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5923 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5924 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5925 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5926 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5927 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5928 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5930 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5931 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5932 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5933 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
5937 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
5939 macro_rules! propose_fee {
5940 ($new_fee: expr) => {
5941 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5942 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
5944 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
5947 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
5948 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5950 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5951 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
5952 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
5953 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
5955 monitor_update: None,
5956 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
5957 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
5958 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5959 user_channel_id: self.context.user_id,
5960 channel_capacity_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
5961 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
5962 unbroadcasted_funding_tx: self.context.unbroadcasted_funding(),
5963 channel_funding_txo: self.context.get_funding_txo(),
5965 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
5966 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5967 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
5968 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
5973 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
5974 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
5975 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5976 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
5978 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
5979 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
5980 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
5982 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
5984 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5991 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
5992 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
5993 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
5995 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
5996 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
5998 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
5999 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6002 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6003 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
6004 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
6005 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
6006 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
6008 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6009 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
6010 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
6012 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
6013 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6016 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
6017 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
6018 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
6019 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
6020 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
6021 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6022 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
6023 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6025 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
6028 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
6029 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6030 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
6031 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6033 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
6037 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
6038 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
6039 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
6040 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
6042 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
6048 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
6049 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
6050 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6051 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
6052 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
6053 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
6054 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
6056 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
6057 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
6060 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
6062 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
6063 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
6069 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
6070 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
6071 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
6072 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
6073 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
6074 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
6075 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
6077 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
6078 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
6085 pub fn can_accept_incoming_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6086 &self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: L
6087 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)>
6089 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6092 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6093 return Err(("Shutdown was already sent", 0x4000|8))
6096 let htlc_stats = self.context.get_pending_htlc_stats(None);
6097 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
6098 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6101 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
6102 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
6103 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
6105 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
6106 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
6107 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6108 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6109 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
6110 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6111 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on counterparty commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6115 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
6116 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
6117 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = htlc_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
6118 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
6119 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6120 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
6121 return Err(("Exceeded our dust exposure limit on holder commitment tx", 0x1000|7))
6125 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6126 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
6131 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
6132 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6133 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6134 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6135 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
6136 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
6140 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
6141 self.context.value_to_self_msat + htlc_stats.pending_inbound_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
6142 let pending_remote_value_msat =
6143 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
6145 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6146 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
6147 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
6148 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
6149 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
6150 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
6151 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
6152 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6153 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
6155 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
6156 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
6157 return Err(("Fee spike buffer violation", 0x1000|7));
6164 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6165 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
6168 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6169 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
6172 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
6173 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
6177 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
6178 &self.context.holder_signer
6182 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
6184 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6185 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
6186 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
6187 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6188 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
6189 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
6191 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6193 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
6201 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6202 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
6206 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
6207 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
6208 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
6209 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
6212 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
6213 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
6214 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
6215 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
6218 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
6219 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
6220 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
6221 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
6222 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
6223 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
6226 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
6227 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
6228 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
6229 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
6230 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
6231 if !release_monitor {
6232 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
6241 /// On startup, its possible we detect some monitor updates have actually completed (and the
6242 /// ChannelManager was simply stale). In that case, we should simply drop them, which we do
6243 /// here after logging them.
6244 pub fn on_startup_drop_completed_blocked_mon_updates_through<L: Logger>(&mut self, logger: &L, loaded_mon_update_id: u64) {
6245 let channel_id = self.context.channel_id();
6246 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.retain(|update| {
6247 if update.update.update_id <= loaded_mon_update_id {
6250 "Dropping completed ChannelMonitorUpdate id {} on channel {} due to a stale ChannelManager",
6251 update.update.update_id,
6261 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
6262 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
6265 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
6266 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
6267 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
6269 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
6270 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
6272 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
6273 if flags.clone().clear(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty()
6275 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
6276 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
6277 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
6280 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
6281 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
6282 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
6283 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
6284 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
6285 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
6287 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
6288 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
6289 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
6291 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
6292 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
6293 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
6294 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
6295 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
6296 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
6302 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
6303 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
6304 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
6305 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
6308 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6309 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6310 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6313 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
6314 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6315 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
6318 /// Returns true if we initiated to shut down the channel.
6319 pub fn initiated_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6320 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown.is_some()
6323 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
6324 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
6325 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
6326 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
6327 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
6330 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
6331 self.context.channel_update_status
6334 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
6335 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6336 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
6339 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
6341 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
6342 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
6343 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
6347 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6348 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
6349 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
6352 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
6356 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
6357 // channel_ready yet.
6358 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6362 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
6363 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
6364 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()).is_empty()) {
6365 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
6367 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6368 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
6369 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6371 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f.clone().clear(FundedStateFlags::ALL.into()) == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
6372 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6375 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
6376 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
6378 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
6379 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
6380 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
6381 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
6382 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6383 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
6384 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
6385 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
6387 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
6391 if need_commitment_update {
6392 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6393 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6394 let next_per_commitment_point =
6395 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6396 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
6397 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6398 next_per_commitment_point,
6399 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
6403 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
6409 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
6410 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
6411 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
6412 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6413 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
6414 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6415 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6417 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6420 let mut msgs = (None, None);
6421 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
6422 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
6423 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
6424 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
6425 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6426 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
6427 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
6428 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
6429 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6430 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6431 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
6432 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
6433 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
6434 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
6435 // channel and move on.
6436 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6437 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6439 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6440 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
6441 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
6443 if self.context.is_outbound() {
6444 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
6445 for input in tx.input.iter() {
6446 if input.witness.is_empty() {
6447 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
6448 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
6449 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
6450 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
6455 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
6456 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
6457 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
6458 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
6459 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
6462 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
6463 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
6464 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
6465 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6466 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6467 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6470 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
6471 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
6472 // may have already happened for this block).
6473 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6474 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6475 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
6476 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
6479 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
6480 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
6481 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
6482 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
6490 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
6491 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
6492 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
6493 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
6495 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
6496 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
6499 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
6501 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6502 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
6503 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
6504 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6506 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6509 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
6512 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6513 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
6514 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
6515 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
6517 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6520 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
6521 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
6522 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
6524 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
6525 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6527 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
6528 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
6529 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6537 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
6539 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
6540 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6541 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6543 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
6544 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
6547 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6548 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
6549 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
6550 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
6551 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
6552 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
6553 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
6554 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
6557 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
6558 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
6559 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
6560 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
6562 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
6563 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
6564 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
6566 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
6567 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
6568 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
6569 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
6571 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
6572 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
6573 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
6574 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
6575 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
6576 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
6577 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
6580 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
6581 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
6583 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
6586 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
6587 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
6588 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
6589 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
6590 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
6591 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
6592 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
6593 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
6594 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
6595 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
6596 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
6597 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
6598 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
6599 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
6600 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
6601 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
6602 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
6608 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
6613 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
6614 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
6616 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
6617 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
6618 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
6619 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
6621 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
6624 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
6626 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
6627 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6628 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6629 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6630 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
6631 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
6633 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6634 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
6637 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
6638 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
6639 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6640 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6641 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
6642 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
6644 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
6645 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
6648 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
6649 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
6650 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
6651 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
6652 excess_data: Vec::new(),
6658 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
6659 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
6660 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
6661 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
6663 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
6666 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6670 if !self.context.is_usable() {
6674 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6675 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
6679 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
6683 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6684 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6687 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
6691 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
6693 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
6698 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6699 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6700 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
6702 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
6707 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
6709 None => return None,
6712 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
6714 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
6715 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6717 node_signature: our_node_sig,
6718 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
6721 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6727 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
6729 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6730 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
6731 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6732 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
6733 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
6734 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
6735 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
6737 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
6738 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6739 match &self.context.holder_signer {
6740 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6741 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
6742 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
6743 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
6744 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
6745 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
6746 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
6747 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
6748 contents: announcement,
6751 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6756 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
6760 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
6761 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
6762 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
6763 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
6764 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
6765 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
6766 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6767 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
6769 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
6771 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
6772 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6773 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
6774 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
6776 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
6777 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
6778 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
6779 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
6782 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
6783 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6784 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
6785 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
6788 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
6791 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
6792 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
6793 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
6794 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
6795 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
6796 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
6799 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
6801 Err(_) => return None,
6803 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
6804 Ok(res) => Some(res),
6809 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
6810 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
6811 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
6812 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
6813 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
6814 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
6815 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
6816 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
6817 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
6818 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
6819 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
6820 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
6821 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
6822 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6823 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
6824 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
6827 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6830 self.mark_awaiting_response();
6831 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
6832 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
6833 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
6834 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
6835 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
6836 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
6837 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
6838 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
6840 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
6841 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
6842 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6843 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
6844 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
6845 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
6846 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
6847 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
6848 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
6850 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
6851 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
6852 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
6853 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
6854 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
6855 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
6856 next_funding_txid: None,
6861 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
6863 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
6864 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
6865 /// commitment update.
6867 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6868 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6869 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6870 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
6871 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6872 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
6873 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6876 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
6877 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
6878 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
6880 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
6881 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
6886 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
6887 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
6889 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
6891 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
6892 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
6894 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
6895 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
6896 /// regenerate them.
6898 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
6899 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
6901 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
6902 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6903 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
6904 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
6905 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
6906 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
6907 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
6908 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
6910 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
6911 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
6912 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
6914 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
6916 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6917 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
6918 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
6921 if amount_msat == 0 {
6922 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
6925 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
6926 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
6927 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
6928 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6931 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
6932 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
6933 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
6936 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
6937 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
6938 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
6939 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
6940 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
6941 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
6942 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
6943 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
6946 let need_holding_cell = !self.context.channel_state.can_generate_new_commitment();
6947 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
6948 payment_hash, amount_msat,
6949 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6950 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6951 else { "to peer" });
6953 if need_holding_cell {
6954 force_holding_cell = true;
6957 // Now update local state:
6958 if force_holding_cell {
6959 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6964 onion_routing_packet,
6971 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6972 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6974 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6976 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6982 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6983 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6984 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
6988 onion_routing_packet,
6992 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6997 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6998 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6999 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
7000 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
7002 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7003 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
7004 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
7006 if let Some(state) = new_state {
7007 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7011 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7012 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
7013 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
7014 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
7015 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
7016 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
7017 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
7020 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7021 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
7022 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
7023 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
7024 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
7025 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
7028 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
7030 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
7031 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7032 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
7033 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
7034 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
7036 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
7037 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
7040 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7041 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7042 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7043 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7044 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
7045 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
7046 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
7047 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7048 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7049 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
7050 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
7051 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
7053 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7055 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
7059 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
7060 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
7061 where L::Target: Logger
7063 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7064 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7065 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
7067 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7069 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7070 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
7071 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
7072 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
7073 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
7074 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
7075 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
7076 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
7077 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
7078 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
7079 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
7085 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
7088 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
7089 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
7090 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7091 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
7092 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7093 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
7095 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7096 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
7097 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
7099 match &self.context.holder_signer {
7100 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7101 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
7104 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
7105 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
7109 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
7110 &commitment_stats.tx,
7111 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
7112 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
7113 &self.context.secp_ctx,
7114 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
7116 htlc_signatures = res.1;
7118 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
7119 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
7120 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
7121 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7123 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
7124 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
7125 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
7126 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
7127 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
7128 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
7132 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
7133 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7137 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7138 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
7140 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7146 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
7147 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
7149 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
7150 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
7151 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7152 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
7153 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
7154 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
7155 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
7156 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
7158 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
7159 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
7160 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
7163 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
7164 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7165 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
7171 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
7173 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
7174 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7175 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
7176 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
7177 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
7179 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
7181 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
7187 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
7188 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
7189 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7190 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
7191 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
7193 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7194 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7195 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
7198 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
7199 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
7201 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
7202 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
7204 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
7205 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
7207 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
7208 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
7209 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
7212 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7215 // use override shutdown script if provided
7216 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
7217 Some(script) => script,
7219 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
7220 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
7221 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
7222 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
7226 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
7227 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
7229 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
7234 // From here on out, we may not fail!
7235 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
7236 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
7237 self.context.local_initiated_shutdown = Some(());
7238 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
7240 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
7241 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
7242 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
7243 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
7244 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
7245 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
7246 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7248 channel_id: Some(self.context.channel_id()),
7250 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7251 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
7253 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
7254 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7255 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
7258 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
7259 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
7260 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
7261 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
7262 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
7264 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
7265 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
7272 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
7273 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
7275 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
7278 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
7279 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
7280 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
7282 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
7283 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
7287 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
7291 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7292 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7293 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7294 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7297 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7298 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
7299 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7300 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
7301 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
7302 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
7303 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7304 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7306 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
7307 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7308 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
7309 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7310 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below \
7311 implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
7314 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
7315 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7316 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
7319 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
7323 counterparty_node_id,
7325 channel_value_satoshis,
7329 current_chain_height,
7330 outbound_scid_alias,
7331 temporary_channel_id,
7332 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7337 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7342 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
7343 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7344 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7345 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7346 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
7347 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
7348 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
7349 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
7350 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
7352 // TODO (taproot|arik)
7357 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7358 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
7359 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
7362 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
7363 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
7364 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
7365 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
7368 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
7370 next_local_nonce: None,
7374 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
7375 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
7376 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
7377 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
7378 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
7379 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
7380 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
7381 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
7382 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
7383 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7384 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
7387 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7388 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7390 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
7392 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7393 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7394 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7395 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7398 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7399 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7401 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7403 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
7404 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7406 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
7407 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
7408 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
7409 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
7410 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
7411 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
7414 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
7415 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
7417 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
7418 if funding_created.is_none() {
7419 #[cfg(not(async_signing))] {
7420 panic!("Failed to get signature for new funding creation");
7422 #[cfg(async_signing)] {
7423 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
7424 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
7425 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
7433 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
7434 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
7435 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
7436 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
7437 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
7438 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
7440 F::Target: FeeEstimator
7442 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
7443 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
7446 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
7447 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7448 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
7450 if self.context.have_received_message() {
7451 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
7454 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7455 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7458 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7459 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7462 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
7464 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7465 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7466 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7467 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7468 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7469 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
7470 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7471 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7472 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7473 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7474 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7475 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7476 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7477 first_per_commitment_point,
7478 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
7479 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7480 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7481 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7483 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7485 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
7486 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7491 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
7492 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
7494 // Check sanity of message fields:
7495 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7496 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
7498 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
7499 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
7501 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
7502 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis)));
7504 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
7505 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
7507 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7508 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7510 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7511 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
7512 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7514 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
7515 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
7516 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
7518 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
7519 if msg.common_fields.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
7520 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.common_fields.to_self_delay)));
7522 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
7523 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
7525 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
7526 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
7529 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
7530 if msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
7531 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
7533 if msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
7534 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
7536 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
7537 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
7539 if msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
7540 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
7542 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7543 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7545 if msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
7546 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
7548 if msg.common_fields.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
7549 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth)));
7552 if let Some(ty) = &msg.common_fields.channel_type {
7553 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
7554 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
7556 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
7557 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
7559 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7560 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7561 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7563 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
7564 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
7567 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
7568 match &msg.common_fields.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7569 &Some(ref script) => {
7570 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
7571 if script.len() == 0 {
7574 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
7575 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
7577 Some(script.clone())
7580 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
7582 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
7587 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis;
7588 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.common_fields.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
7589 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
7590 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.common_fields.htlc_minimum_msat;
7591 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.common_fields.max_accepted_htlcs;
7593 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
7594 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.common_fields.minimum_depth);
7596 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.common_fields.minimum_depth));
7599 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7600 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7601 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7602 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7603 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7604 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7607 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7608 selected_contest_delay: msg.common_fields.to_self_delay,
7609 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7612 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.common_fields.first_per_commitment_point);
7613 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
7615 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
7616 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
7618 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
7623 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
7624 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
7625 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
7626 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7627 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
7631 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
7632 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
7634 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
7635 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
7637 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7638 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7639 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7640 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7643 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7645 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
7646 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
7647 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7648 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7650 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
7651 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
7653 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7654 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
7656 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7657 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7658 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7659 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
7660 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
7661 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
7665 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7666 initial_commitment_tx,
7669 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7670 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7674 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
7675 if validated.is_err() {
7676 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7679 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7680 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
7681 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7682 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7683 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7684 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7685 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7686 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7687 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7688 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
7689 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7690 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7692 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7693 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7694 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
7695 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7696 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
7697 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
7698 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7699 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7701 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
7702 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
7703 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
7705 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7707 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7708 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7710 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
7712 let mut channel = Channel {
7713 context: self.context,
7714 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
7715 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
7718 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7719 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7720 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
7723 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
7725 #[cfg(async_signing)]
7726 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
7727 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
7728 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
7729 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
7734 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
7735 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7736 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
7737 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
7740 /// Fetches the [`ChannelTypeFeatures`] that will be used for a channel built from a given
7741 /// [`msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields`].
7742 pub(super) fn channel_type_from_open_channel(
7743 common_fields: &msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields, their_features: &InitFeatures,
7744 our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures
7745 ) -> Result<ChannelTypeFeatures, ChannelError> {
7746 if let Some(channel_type) = &common_fields.channel_type {
7747 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
7748 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
7751 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
7752 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
7753 // `static_remote_key`.
7754 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
7755 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
7757 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
7758 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7759 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
7761 let announced_channel = if (common_fields.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
7762 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
7763 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
7765 Ok(channel_type.clone())
7767 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
7768 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7769 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
7775 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7776 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
7777 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
7778 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
7779 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
7780 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
7781 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
7782 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
7783 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
7784 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
7785 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
7788 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id));
7790 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
7791 // support this channel type.
7792 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
7794 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis, config);
7795 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7796 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
7797 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
7798 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
7799 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
7800 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
7804 context: ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
7808 counterparty_node_id,
7812 current_chain_height,
7817 counterparty_pubkeys,
7819 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7820 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis,
7822 msg.common_fields.clone(),
7824 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7829 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7830 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7832 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7833 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7834 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7835 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7838 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7839 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7841 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7843 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7844 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7847 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7850 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7851 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7852 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7854 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7855 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7856 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7857 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7859 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7860 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
7861 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7862 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7863 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7864 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7865 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7866 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7867 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7868 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7869 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7870 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
7871 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7872 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7873 first_per_commitment_point,
7874 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7875 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7876 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7878 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7880 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7882 next_local_nonce: None,
7886 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7887 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7889 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7891 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7892 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7895 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7896 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7898 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7899 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7900 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7901 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7902 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7903 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7904 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7905 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7906 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7907 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7908 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7910 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7913 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7914 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7915 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7919 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7920 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7923 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7924 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7926 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7927 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7929 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7931 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7932 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7933 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7934 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7937 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7938 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7939 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7940 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7941 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7943 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7945 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7946 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7947 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7950 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7951 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7952 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7956 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7957 initial_commitment_tx,
7960 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7961 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7964 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7965 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7968 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7970 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7971 self.context.channel_id = ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint(funding_txo);
7972 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7973 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7975 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7977 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7978 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7979 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7980 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7981 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7982 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7983 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7984 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7985 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7986 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7987 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7989 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id, self.context.channel_id());
7990 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7991 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7992 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7993 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7994 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7995 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7997 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7998 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
8000 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
8001 // `ChannelMonitor`.
8002 let mut channel = Channel {
8003 context: self.context,
8004 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8005 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
8007 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
8008 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
8010 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
8014 // A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8015 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8016 pub(super) struct OutboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8017 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8018 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8019 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8020 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8023 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8024 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8025 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
8026 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8027 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures, funding_satoshis: u64,
8028 user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, outbound_scid_alias: u64,
8029 funding_confirmation_target: ConfirmationTarget,
8030 ) -> Result<OutboundV2Channel<SP>, APIError>
8031 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8032 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8034 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, funding_satoshis, user_id);
8035 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
8036 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
8038 let temporary_channel_id = Some(ChannelId::temporary_v2_from_revocation_basepoint(&pubkeys.revocation_basepoint));
8040 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8041 funding_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8043 let funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(funding_confirmation_target);
8044 let funding_tx_locktime = current_chain_height;
8047 context: ChannelContext::new_for_outbound_channel(
8051 counterparty_node_id,
8057 current_chain_height,
8058 outbound_scid_alias,
8059 temporary_channel_id,
8060 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8065 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8066 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8067 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8068 their_funding_satoshis: 0,
8069 funding_tx_locktime,
8070 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8076 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
8077 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
8078 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannelV2` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
8079 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
8080 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
8081 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannelV2, ()>
8083 F::Target: FeeEstimator
8085 self.context.maybe_downgrade_channel_features(fee_estimator)?;
8086 Ok(self.get_open_channel_v2(chain_hash))
8089 pub fn get_open_channel_v2(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8090 if self.context.have_received_message() {
8091 debug_assert!(false, "Cannot generate an open_channel2 after we've moved forward");
8094 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8095 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an open_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8098 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8099 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8100 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8101 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref()
8102 .get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
8103 &self.context.secp_ctx);
8104 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8106 msgs::OpenChannelV2 {
8107 common_fields: msgs::CommonOpenChannelFields {
8109 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8110 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8111 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8112 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8113 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8114 commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8115 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8116 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8117 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8118 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8119 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8120 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8121 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8122 first_per_commitment_point,
8123 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
8124 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8125 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8126 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8128 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8130 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: self.context.feerate_per_kw,
8131 second_per_commitment_point,
8132 locktime: self.dual_funding_context.funding_tx_locktime,
8133 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8138 // A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V2 channel establishment.
8139 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8140 pub(super) struct InboundV2Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8141 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
8142 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
8143 pub dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext,
8146 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
8147 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV2Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8148 /// Creates a new dual-funded channel from a remote side's request for one.
8149 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
8150 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
8151 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
8152 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
8153 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannelV2, funding_satoshis: u64, user_id: u128,
8154 config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
8155 ) -> Result<InboundV2Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
8156 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
8157 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
8160 let channel_value_satoshis = funding_satoshis.saturating_add(msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis);
8161 let counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8162 channel_value_satoshis, msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis);
8163 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_v2_channel_reserve_satoshis(
8164 channel_value_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
8166 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
8167 // support this channel type.
8168 if msg.common_fields.channel_type.is_none() {
8169 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Rejecting V2 channel {} missing channel_type",
8170 msg.common_fields.temporary_channel_id)))
8172 let channel_type = channel_type_from_open_channel(&msg.common_fields, their_features, our_supported_features)?;
8174 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8175 funding_pubkey: msg.common_fields.funding_pubkey,
8176 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint(msg.common_fields.revocation_basepoint),
8177 payment_point: msg.common_fields.payment_basepoint,
8178 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint(msg.common_fields.delayed_payment_basepoint),
8179 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint(msg.common_fields.htlc_basepoint)
8182 let mut context = ChannelContext::new_for_inbound_channel(
8186 counterparty_node_id,
8190 current_chain_height,
8196 counterparty_pubkeys,
8198 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8199 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8200 0 /* push_msat not used in dual-funding */,
8201 msg.common_fields.clone(),
8203 let channel_id = ChannelId::v2_from_revocation_basepoints(
8204 &context.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint,
8205 &context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint);
8206 context.channel_id = channel_id;
8210 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 },
8211 dual_funding_context: DualFundingChannelContext {
8212 our_funding_satoshis: funding_satoshis,
8213 their_funding_satoshis: msg.common_fields.funding_satoshis,
8214 funding_tx_locktime: msg.locktime,
8215 funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight: msg.funding_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight,
8222 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message which
8223 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
8225 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8226 pub fn accept_inbound_dual_funded_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8227 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8228 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
8231 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
8232 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
8234 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send accept_channel2 after channel had moved forward");
8236 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
8237 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to send an accept_channel2 for a channel that has already advanced");
8240 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8243 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
8244 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
8245 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
8247 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8248 fn generate_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8249 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8250 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8251 let second_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(
8252 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
8253 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
8255 msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8256 common_fields: msgs::CommonAcceptChannelFields {
8257 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
8258 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8259 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8260 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8261 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
8262 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
8263 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8264 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
8265 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8266 payment_basepoint: keys.payment_point,
8267 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8268 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
8269 first_per_commitment_point,
8270 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
8271 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
8272 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
8274 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
8276 funding_satoshis: self.dual_funding_context.our_funding_satoshis,
8277 second_per_commitment_point,
8278 require_confirmed_inputs: None,
8282 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`] message for an
8283 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
8285 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannelV2`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannelV2
8287 pub fn get_accept_channel_v2_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannelV2 {
8288 self.generate_accept_channel_v2_message()
8292 // Unfunded channel utilities
8294 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
8295 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
8296 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
8297 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
8298 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
8299 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8300 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
8301 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
8302 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
8303 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
8306 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
8307 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
8308 // `only_static_remotekey`.
8309 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
8310 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
8311 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8317 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 4;
8318 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
8320 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
8326 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8327 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8328 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
8329 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
8330 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
8332 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8333 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8334 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8335 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8341 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
8342 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8343 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8344 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
8345 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
8346 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8351 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8352 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8353 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
8354 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
8356 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8357 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
8358 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
8359 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
8364 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
8365 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8366 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8367 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
8368 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
8369 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8374 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
8375 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
8376 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
8379 let version_to_write = if self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().any(|htlc| match htlc.state {
8380 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution)|
8381 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8382 matches!(htlc_resolution, InboundHTLCResolution::Pending { .. })
8386 SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8388 MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION
8390 write_ver_prefix!(writer, version_to_write, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8392 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8393 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
8394 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
8395 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
8396 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
8398 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
8399 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
8400 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
8401 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
8403 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
8405 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
8406 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
8407 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
8409 debug_assert!(false, "Pre-funded/shutdown channels should not be written");
8411 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
8413 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8415 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
8417 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
8418 // deserialized from that format.
8419 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
8420 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
8421 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
8423 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
8425 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8426 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
8427 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
8429 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
8430 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8431 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
8432 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
8435 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8436 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
8437 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
8440 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8441 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8442 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8443 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8445 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
8446 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8448 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8449 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8450 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8455 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8458 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_resolution) => {
8460 if version_to_write <= 3 {
8461 if let InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status } = htlc_resolution {
8462 pending_htlc_status.write(writer)?;
8467 htlc_resolution.write(writer)?;
8470 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8473 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
8475 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
8480 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
8481 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8482 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8484 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8485 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
8486 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8487 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8488 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8489 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8490 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
8492 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
8494 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
8496 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
8499 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
8500 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
8501 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
8504 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
8506 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8507 preimages.push(preimage);
8509 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8510 reason.write(writer)?;
8512 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
8514 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
8515 preimages.push(preimage);
8517 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
8518 reason.write(writer)?;
8521 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
8522 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
8525 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
8526 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
8527 // Vec of (htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion)
8528 let mut malformed_htlcs: Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])> = Vec::new();
8529 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8530 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
8532 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8533 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
8534 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
8537 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
8538 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
8539 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8540 source.write(writer)?;
8541 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
8543 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
8544 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
8546 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
8548 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
8549 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8551 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
8553 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8554 err_packet.write(writer)?;
8556 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
8557 htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
8559 // We don't want to break downgrading by adding a new variant, so write a dummy
8560 // `::FailHTLC` variant and write the real malformed error as an optional TLV.
8561 malformed_htlcs.push((htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion));
8563 let dummy_err_packet = msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: Vec::new() };
8565 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8566 dummy_err_packet.write(writer)?;
8571 match self.context.resend_order {
8572 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
8573 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
8576 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
8577 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
8578 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
8580 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8581 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
8582 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
8583 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8586 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8587 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
8588 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
8589 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
8590 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
8593 if self.context.is_outbound() {
8594 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
8595 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
8596 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
8598 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
8599 // commitment_signed, drop it.
8600 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
8602 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
8604 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
8605 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
8606 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
8607 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
8609 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8610 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8611 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8612 // consider the stale state on reload.
8615 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
8616 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
8617 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
8619 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8620 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
8621 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
8623 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8624 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8626 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8627 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
8628 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
8630 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
8631 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
8633 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
8636 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
8637 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
8638 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
8640 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
8643 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
8644 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
8646 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8647 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
8648 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
8650 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
8652 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
8654 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
8656 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8657 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
8658 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8659 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
8660 htlc.write(writer)?;
8663 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
8664 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
8665 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
8667 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
8668 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
8670 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
8671 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
8672 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
8673 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
8674 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
8675 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
8676 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
8678 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
8679 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
8680 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
8681 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
8682 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
8684 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
8685 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
8687 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8688 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
8689 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
8690 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
8692 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
8694 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds = None;
8695 if !self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds.is_empty() {
8696 monitor_pending_update_adds = Some(&self.context.monitor_pending_update_adds);
8699 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
8700 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
8701 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
8702 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
8703 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
8704 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
8705 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
8707 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
8708 (2, chan_type, option),
8709 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
8710 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
8711 (5, self.context.config, required),
8712 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
8713 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
8714 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
8715 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
8716 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8717 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
8718 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
8719 (15, preimages, required_vec),
8720 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
8721 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
8722 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
8723 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
8724 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
8725 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
8726 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
8727 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
8728 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
8729 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8730 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
8731 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
8732 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8733 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
8734 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
8735 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
8736 (49, self.context.local_initiated_shutdown, option), // Added in 0.0.122
8743 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
8744 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
8746 ES::Target: EntropySource,
8747 SP::Target: SignerProvider
8749 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
8750 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
8751 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
8753 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
8754 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
8755 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
8756 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8758 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
8760 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
8761 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
8762 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
8763 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
8764 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8766 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
8767 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8770 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8771 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8772 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8774 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8776 let mut keys_data = None;
8778 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
8779 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
8780 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8781 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
8782 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
8783 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
8784 let mut data = [0; 1024];
8785 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
8786 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
8787 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
8791 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
8792 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
8793 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
8796 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
8798 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8799 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
8800 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8802 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8804 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8805 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
8806 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8807 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8808 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8809 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8810 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8811 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8813 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8814 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8816 Readable::read(reader)?
8818 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(resolution)
8821 let resolution = if ver <= 3 {
8822 InboundHTLCResolution::Resolved { pending_htlc_status: Readable::read(reader)? }
8824 Readable::read(reader)?
8826 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(resolution)
8828 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8829 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
8830 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8835 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8836 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8837 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
8838 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8839 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8840 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8841 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8842 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8843 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8844 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8845 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
8846 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8848 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8849 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
8852 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8853 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
8856 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8857 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
8859 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8861 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8862 blinding_point: None,
8866 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8867 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
8868 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
8869 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8870 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8871 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8872 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
8873 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
8874 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
8875 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8876 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8877 blinding_point: None,
8879 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8880 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
8881 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8883 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
8884 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
8885 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
8887 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8891 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8892 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
8893 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
8894 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8897 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
8898 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
8899 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
8901 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8902 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8903 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
8904 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8907 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8908 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
8909 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
8910 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
8913 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8915 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
8917 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8918 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8919 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
8920 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
8922 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
8923 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
8924 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
8925 // consider the stale state on reload.
8926 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8929 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8930 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8931 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
8933 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8936 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
8937 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
8938 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8940 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8941 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
8942 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8943 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
8945 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8946 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8948 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8949 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8951 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8952 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
8953 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
8955 let mut minimum_depth = None;
8957 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
8958 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
8960 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
8961 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8964 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
8966 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
8967 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
8968 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
8969 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
8971 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
8974 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
8975 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
8977 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8979 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
8980 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
8982 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
8983 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
8985 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
8987 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8988 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = new_hash_set();
8989 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8991 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
8992 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
8993 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
8997 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
8998 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
8999 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
9001 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
9007 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
9008 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
9009 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
9010 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
9011 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
9012 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
9013 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
9014 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
9015 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
9016 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
9018 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
9019 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
9020 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
9021 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
9022 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
9023 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
9024 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
9026 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
9027 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
9028 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
9029 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
9031 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
9033 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9034 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
9036 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
9038 let mut local_initiated_shutdown: Option<()> = None;
9040 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9041 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
9043 let mut malformed_htlcs: Option<Vec<(u64, u16, [u8; 32])>> = None;
9044 let mut monitor_pending_update_adds: Option<Vec<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>> = None;
9046 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
9047 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
9048 (1, minimum_depth, option),
9049 (2, channel_type, option),
9050 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9051 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
9052 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
9053 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
9054 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
9055 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
9056 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
9057 (10, monitor_pending_update_adds, option), // Added in 0.0.122
9058 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
9059 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
9060 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
9061 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
9062 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
9063 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
9064 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
9065 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
9066 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
9067 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
9068 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
9069 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
9070 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9071 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
9072 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
9073 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9074 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
9075 (43, malformed_htlcs, optional_vec), // Added in 0.0.119
9076 // 45 and 47 are reserved for async signing
9077 (49, local_initiated_shutdown, option),
9080 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
9081 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
9082 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
9083 // required channel parameters.
9084 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
9085 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
9087 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
9089 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
9090 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9091 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
9092 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
9095 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
9096 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
9097 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9099 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9100 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9102 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
9103 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
9108 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
9109 if iter.next().is_some() {
9110 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
9114 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
9115 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
9116 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
9117 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
9118 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
9121 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
9122 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
9123 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
9125 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9126 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
9128 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
9129 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
9130 // separate u64 values.
9131 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
9133 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
9135 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
9136 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9137 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9138 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9140 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9141 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9143 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
9144 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
9145 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9146 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
9147 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9150 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
9151 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9153 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
9154 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9155 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
9156 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9158 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9159 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9161 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
9162 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
9163 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
9164 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
9165 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9168 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
9169 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
9172 if let Some(malformed_htlcs) = malformed_htlcs {
9173 for (malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion) in malformed_htlcs {
9174 let htlc_idx = holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter().position(|htlc| {
9175 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, err_packet } = htlc {
9176 let matches = *htlc_id == malformed_htlc_id;
9177 if matches { debug_assert!(err_packet.data.is_empty()) }
9180 }).ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
9181 let malformed_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9182 htlc_id: malformed_htlc_id, failure_code, sha256_of_onion
9184 let _ = core::mem::replace(&mut holding_cell_htlc_updates[htlc_idx], malformed_htlc);
9189 context: ChannelContext {
9192 config: config.unwrap(),
9196 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
9197 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
9198 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
9201 temporary_channel_id,
9203 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
9205 channel_value_satoshis,
9207 latest_monitor_update_id,
9209 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
9210 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9213 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
9214 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
9217 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
9218 pending_inbound_htlcs,
9219 pending_outbound_htlcs,
9220 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
9224 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
9225 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
9226 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
9227 monitor_pending_forwards,
9228 monitor_pending_failures,
9229 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
9230 monitor_pending_update_adds: monitor_pending_update_adds.unwrap_or(Vec::new()),
9232 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
9233 signer_pending_funding: false,
9236 holding_cell_update_fee,
9237 next_holder_htlc_id,
9238 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
9239 update_time_counter,
9242 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9243 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9244 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
9245 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
9247 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
9248 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
9249 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
9250 closing_fee_limits: None,
9251 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
9253 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
9254 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
9256 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
9258 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
9259 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
9260 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
9261 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
9262 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
9263 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
9264 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
9265 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
9266 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
9269 counterparty_forwarding_info,
9271 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
9272 funding_transaction,
9275 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
9276 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
9277 counterparty_node_id,
9279 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
9283 channel_update_status,
9284 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
9288 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9289 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9290 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9291 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
9293 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
9294 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
9296 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
9297 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
9298 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
9300 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9301 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
9303 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
9304 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
9306 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
9309 local_initiated_shutdown,
9311 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
9313 #[cfg(any(dual_funding, splicing))]
9314 dual_funding_channel_context: None,
9322 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
9323 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
9324 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
9325 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
9326 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
9327 use crate::ln::onion_utils::INVALID_ONION_BLINDING;
9328 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
9329 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
9330 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
9331 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
9332 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
9333 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
9334 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
9335 use crate::ln::msgs;
9336 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
9337 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
9338 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
9339 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
9340 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
9341 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
9342 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
9343 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
9344 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
9345 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
9346 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
9347 use crate::util::test_utils;
9348 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
9349 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
9350 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
9351 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
9352 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
9353 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
9354 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
9355 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
9356 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
9357 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
9358 use crate::prelude::*;
9361 fn test_channel_state_order() {
9362 use crate::ln::channel::NegotiatingFundingFlags;
9363 use crate::ln::channel::AwaitingChannelReadyFlags;
9364 use crate::ln::channel::ChannelReadyFlags;
9366 assert!(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::new()) < ChannelState::FundingNegotiated);
9367 assert!(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated < ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9368 assert!(ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
9369 assert!(ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()) < ChannelState::ShutdownComplete);
9372 struct TestFeeEstimator {
9375 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
9376 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
9382 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
9383 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
9384 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
9385 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
9389 signer: InMemorySigner,
9392 impl EntropySource for Keys {
9393 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
9396 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
9397 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
9399 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
9401 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
9402 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
9405 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
9409 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
9411 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
9412 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9413 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9414 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
9415 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
9418 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
9419 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
9420 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9421 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
9425 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
9426 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
9427 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
9431 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
9432 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
9433 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
9434 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
9437 let seed = [42; 32];
9438 let network = Network::Testnet;
9439 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9440 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
9441 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
9444 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9445 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9446 let config = UserConfig::default();
9447 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
9448 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
9449 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
9451 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
9452 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
9456 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
9457 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
9459 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
9460 let original_fee = 253;
9461 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
9462 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
9463 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9464 let seed = [42; 32];
9465 let network = Network::Testnet;
9466 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9468 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9469 let config = UserConfig::default();
9470 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9472 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
9473 // same as the old fee.
9474 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
9475 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9476 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.common_fields.commitment_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight, original_fee);
9480 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
9481 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
9482 // dust limits are used.
9483 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9484 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9485 let seed = [42; 32];
9486 let network = Network::Testnet;
9487 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9488 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9489 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9491 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
9492 // they have different dust limits.
9494 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9495 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9496 let config = UserConfig::default();
9497 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9499 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9500 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9501 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9502 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9503 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9505 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9506 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9507 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9508 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9509 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9511 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9512 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9513 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9514 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9516 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9517 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9518 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9520 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9521 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9522 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9524 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
9525 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
9526 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
9528 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
9529 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9530 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
9531 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9534 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
9536 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
9537 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
9538 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
9539 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9540 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9541 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
9542 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
9543 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
9544 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9546 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9547 blinding_point: None,
9550 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
9551 // the dust limit check.
9552 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9553 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9554 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9555 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
9557 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
9558 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
9559 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9560 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
9561 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9562 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9563 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
9567 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
9568 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
9569 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
9570 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
9571 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
9572 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
9573 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9574 let seed = [42; 32];
9575 let network = Network::Testnet;
9576 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9578 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9579 let config = UserConfig::default();
9580 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9582 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9583 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
9585 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
9586 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9587 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9588 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9589 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9590 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9592 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9593 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9594 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9595 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9596 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9598 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
9600 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
9601 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
9602 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
9603 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9604 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
9606 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
9607 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
9608 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
9609 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
9610 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
9614 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
9615 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9616 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9617 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9618 let seed = [42; 32];
9619 let network = Network::Testnet;
9620 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9621 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9622 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9624 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
9626 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9627 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9628 let config = UserConfig::default();
9629 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9631 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9632 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
9633 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9634 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9636 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
9637 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9638 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9640 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9641 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9642 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9643 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9645 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9646 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9647 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9649 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9650 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9651 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9653 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
9654 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
9655 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9656 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9657 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9658 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9659 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9661 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
9663 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
9664 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
9665 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
9666 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
9667 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
9671 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
9672 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9673 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9674 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9675 let seed = [42; 32];
9676 let network = Network::Testnet;
9677 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9678 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9679 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9681 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
9682 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
9683 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
9684 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
9685 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
9686 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
9687 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
9688 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
9690 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9691 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9692 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9693 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9694 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9695 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9697 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9698 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9699 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9700 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9702 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9704 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
9705 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
9706 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
9707 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9708 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9709 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
9711 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
9712 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9713 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9714 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
9716 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9717 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9718 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9719 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9720 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9722 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9723 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9725 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9726 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9727 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
9729 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
9730 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
9731 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9732 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9733 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
9735 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
9736 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
9738 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9739 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
9740 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
9744 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
9746 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
9747 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
9748 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
9750 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
9751 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
9752 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
9753 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
9755 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
9756 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
9757 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
9759 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
9761 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
9762 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
9765 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
9766 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
9767 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9768 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9769 let seed = [42; 32];
9770 let network = Network::Testnet;
9771 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9772 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9773 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9776 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9777 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9778 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9780 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9781 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9783 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9784 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
9785 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
9787 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
9788 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9790 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
9792 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9793 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
9795 // Channel Negotiations failed
9796 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9797 assert!(result.is_err());
9802 fn channel_update() {
9803 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9804 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9805 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9806 let seed = [42; 32];
9807 let network = Network::Testnet;
9808 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9809 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9810 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9812 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
9813 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9814 let config = UserConfig::default();
9815 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9817 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
9818 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
9819 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9820 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9821 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
9823 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
9824 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9825 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9826 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
9827 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
9829 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
9830 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9831 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9832 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9834 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9835 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9836 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9838 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
9839 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
9840 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9842 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
9843 let update = ChannelUpdate {
9844 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
9846 short_channel_id: 0,
9849 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
9850 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
9851 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
9853 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
9854 excess_data: Vec::new(),
9856 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
9858 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9860 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
9861 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
9862 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
9863 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
9865 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
9866 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
9867 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
9869 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
9872 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
9876 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_malformed_ser() {
9877 // Ensure that channel blinding points, skimmed fees, and malformed HTLCs are (de)serialized
9879 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9880 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9881 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9882 let seed = [42; 32];
9883 let network = Network::Testnet;
9884 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9885 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9887 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9888 let config = UserConfig::default();
9889 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
9890 let mut outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9891 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9893 let inbound_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9894 &feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9895 &features, &outbound_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network)), 7, &config, 0, &&logger, false
9897 outbound_chan.accept_channel(&inbound_chan.get_accept_channel_message(), &config.channel_handshake_limits, &features).unwrap();
9898 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
9899 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: outbound_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript(),
9901 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9902 let funding_created = outbound_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap().unwrap();
9903 let mut chan = match inbound_chan.funding_created(&funding_created, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger) {
9904 Ok((chan, _, _)) => chan,
9905 Err((_, e)) => panic!("{}", e),
9908 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
9910 hops: vec![RouteHop {
9911 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
9912 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
9913 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
9917 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
9918 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
9919 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
9921 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
9924 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9926 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9927 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9928 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9929 blinding_point: None,
9931 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
9932 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
9934 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
9937 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
9940 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
9942 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9945 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
9946 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
9947 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
9949 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
9950 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
9953 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9954 blinding_point: None,
9956 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
9957 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
9960 let dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
9961 htlc_id, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket { data: vec![42] }
9963 let dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc = |htlc_id| HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailMalformedHTLC {
9964 htlc_id, failure_code: INVALID_ONION_BLINDING, sha256_of_onion: [0; 32],
9966 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(12);
9969 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
9970 } else if i % 5 == 1 {
9971 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
9972 } else if i % 5 == 2 {
9973 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
9974 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
9975 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
9976 } = &mut dummy_add {
9977 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
9978 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
9980 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
9981 } else if i % 5 == 3 {
9982 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_malformed_htlc(i as u64));
9984 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_failed_htlc(i as u64));
9987 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
9989 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
9990 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
9991 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
9992 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
9993 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
9994 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
9995 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
9996 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
9999 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
10001 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
10002 use bitcoin::sighash;
10003 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
10004 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
10005 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
10006 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
10007 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
10008 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
10009 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
10010 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
10011 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
10012 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
10013 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
10014 use crate::sync::Arc;
10015 use core::str::FromStr;
10016 use hex::DisplayHex;
10018 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
10019 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
10020 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
10021 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10023 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
10025 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10026 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10027 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10028 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10029 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
10031 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
10032 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
10038 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10039 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
10040 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
10042 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10043 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10044 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
10045 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
10046 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10047 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
10049 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
10051 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
10052 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
10053 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
10054 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
10055 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
10056 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
10058 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
10059 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
10060 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
10061 selected_contest_delay: 144
10063 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
10064 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
10066 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
10067 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10069 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
10070 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
10072 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10073 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
10075 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
10076 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
10077 // build_commitment_transaction.
10078 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
10079 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10080 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10081 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
10082 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
10084 macro_rules! test_commitment {
10085 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10086 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10087 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
10091 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
10092 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
10093 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10094 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
10098 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
10099 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
10100 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
10102 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
10103 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
10105 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
10106 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
10108 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
10110 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
10111 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
10112 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10113 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10114 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
10115 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
10116 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
10118 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
10119 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10120 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
10121 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
10123 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10124 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
10125 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
10127 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
10129 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
10130 commitment_tx.clone(),
10131 counterparty_signature,
10132 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
10133 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
10134 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
10136 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10137 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
10139 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
10140 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
10141 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
10143 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
10144 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
10147 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
10148 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10150 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
10151 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
10152 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
10153 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
10154 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
10155 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
10156 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10157 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
10159 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
10162 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
10163 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
10164 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
10168 assert!(preimage.is_some());
10171 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
10172 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
10173 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
10174 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
10175 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
10176 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
10178 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
10179 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
10180 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
10181 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
10182 htlc: htlc.clone(),
10183 preimage: preimage.clone(),
10184 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
10185 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
10186 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
10187 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
10189 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10190 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
10191 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
10192 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
10193 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
10194 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
10196 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
10200 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
10201 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
10202 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
10203 "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", {});
10205 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10206 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
10208 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
10209 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
10210 "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", {});
10212 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
10213 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
10214 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
10215 "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", {});
10217 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10218 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10220 amount_msat: 1000000,
10222 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10223 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10225 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10228 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10229 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10231 amount_msat: 2000000,
10233 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10234 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10236 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10239 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10240 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10242 amount_msat: 2000000,
10244 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10245 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10246 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10247 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10248 blinding_point: None,
10250 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10253 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10254 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10256 amount_msat: 3000000,
10258 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10259 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10260 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10261 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10262 blinding_point: None,
10264 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10267 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10268 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10270 amount_msat: 4000000,
10272 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10273 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10275 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10279 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10280 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10281 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
10283 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
10284 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
10285 "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", {
10288 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
10289 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
10290 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
10293 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
10294 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
10295 "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" },
10298 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
10299 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
10300 "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" },
10303 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
10304 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
10305 "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" },
10308 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
10309 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
10310 "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" }
10313 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10314 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10315 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
10317 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
10318 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
10319 "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", {
10322 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
10323 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
10324 "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" },
10327 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
10328 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
10329 "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" },
10332 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
10333 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
10334 "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" },
10337 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
10338 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
10339 "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" },
10342 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
10343 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
10344 "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" }
10347 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10348 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10349 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
10351 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
10352 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
10353 "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", {
10356 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
10357 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
10358 "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" },
10361 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
10362 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
10363 "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" },
10366 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
10367 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
10368 "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" },
10371 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
10372 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
10373 "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" }
10376 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10377 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10378 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
10379 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
10381 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
10382 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
10383 "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", {
10386 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
10387 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
10388 "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" },
10391 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
10392 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
10393 "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" },
10396 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
10397 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
10398 "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" },
10401 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
10402 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
10403 "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" }
10406 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10407 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10408 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
10409 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10411 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
10412 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
10413 "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", {
10416 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
10417 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
10418 "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" },
10421 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
10422 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
10423 "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" },
10426 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
10427 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
10428 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d020000000000000000015d060000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e001473044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c1801008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
10431 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
10432 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
10433 "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" }
10436 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10437 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10438 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
10440 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
10441 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
10442 "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", {
10445 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
10446 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
10447 "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" },
10450 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
10451 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
10452 "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" },
10455 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
10456 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
10457 "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" }
10460 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10461 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10462 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
10464 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
10465 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
10466 "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", {
10469 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
10470 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
10471 "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" },
10474 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
10475 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
10476 "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" },
10479 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
10480 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
10481 "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" }
10484 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10485 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10486 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
10488 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
10489 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
10490 "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", {
10493 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
10494 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
10495 "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" },
10498 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
10499 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
10500 "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" }
10503 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10504 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10505 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
10506 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
10507 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
10508 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10510 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
10511 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
10512 "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", {
10515 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
10516 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
10517 "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" },
10520 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
10521 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
10522 "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" }
10525 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10526 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10527 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
10528 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10529 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10531 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
10532 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
10533 "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", {
10536 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
10537 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
10538 "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" },
10541 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
10542 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
10543 "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" }
10546 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10547 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10548 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
10550 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
10551 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
10552 "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", {
10555 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
10556 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
10557 "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" }
10560 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10561 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10562 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
10563 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
10564 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10566 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
10567 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
10568 "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", {
10571 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
10572 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
10573 "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" }
10576 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10577 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10578 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
10579 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10580 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10582 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
10583 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
10584 "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", {
10587 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
10588 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
10589 "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" }
10592 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10593 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10594 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
10595 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10597 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
10598 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
10599 "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", {});
10601 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10602 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10603 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
10604 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10605 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10607 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
10608 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
10609 "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", {});
10611 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
10612 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10613 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
10614 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10615 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
10617 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
10618 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
10619 "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", {});
10621 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
10622 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10623 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
10625 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10626 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10627 "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", {});
10629 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
10630 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10631 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
10632 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
10633 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10635 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
10636 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
10637 "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", {});
10639 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
10640 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
10641 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
10642 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
10643 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
10645 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
10646 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
10647 "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", {});
10649 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
10650 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
10651 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
10652 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
10653 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
10654 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
10656 amount_msat: 2000000,
10658 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10659 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
10661 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10664 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
10665 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10666 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10668 amount_msat: 5000001,
10670 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10671 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10672 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10673 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10674 blinding_point: None,
10676 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10679 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
10680 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
10682 amount_msat: 5000000,
10684 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
10685 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
10686 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
10687 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
10688 blinding_point: None,
10690 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
10694 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
10695 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
10696 "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", {
10699 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
10700 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
10701 "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" },
10703 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
10704 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
10705 "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" },
10707 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
10708 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
10709 "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" }
10712 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
10713 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
10714 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
10715 "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", {
10718 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
10719 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
10720 "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" },
10722 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
10723 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
10724 "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" },
10726 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
10727 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
10728 "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" }
10733 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
10734 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
10736 let mut seed = [0; 32];
10737 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
10738 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10739 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
10741 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
10742 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
10743 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
10745 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
10746 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
10748 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
10749 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
10751 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
10752 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
10753 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
10757 fn test_key_derivation() {
10758 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
10759 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10761 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10762 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
10764 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
10765 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
10767 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
10768 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
10770 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
10771 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10773 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
10774 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
10776 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
10777 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
10781 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
10782 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10783 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10784 let seed = [42; 32];
10785 let network = Network::Testnet;
10786 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10787 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10789 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10790 let config = UserConfig::default();
10791 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10792 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
10794 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
10795 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
10797 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10798 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
10799 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10800 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
10801 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
10802 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
10803 assert!(res.is_ok());
10807 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
10808 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
10809 // resulting `channel_type`.
10810 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10811 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10812 let network = Network::Testnet;
10813 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10814 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10816 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10817 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10819 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10820 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
10822 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
10823 // need to signal it.
10824 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10825 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10826 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
10827 &config, 0, 42, None
10829 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
10831 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
10832 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
10833 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
10835 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10836 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10837 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10841 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10842 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10843 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10844 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10845 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10848 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10849 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
10853 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
10854 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
10855 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
10856 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10857 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10858 let network = Network::Testnet;
10859 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10860 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10862 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10863 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10865 let config = UserConfig::default();
10867 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10868 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10869 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10870 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10871 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10873 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10874 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10875 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10879 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
10880 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10881 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = None;
10883 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
10884 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
10885 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10886 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10887 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
10888 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10890 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
10894 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
10895 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
10897 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10898 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10899 let network = Network::Testnet;
10900 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
10901 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10903 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
10904 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
10906 let config = UserConfig::default();
10908 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
10909 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
10910 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
10911 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
10912 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10913 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
10914 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
10915 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
10917 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
10918 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
10919 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
10920 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10921 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
10922 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
10926 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10927 open_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10929 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10930 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10931 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
10932 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10934 assert!(res.is_err());
10936 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
10937 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
10938 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
10940 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10941 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
10942 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
10945 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10947 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10948 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
10949 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10950 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
10953 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
10954 accept_channel_msg.common_fields.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
10956 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
10957 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
10959 assert!(res.is_err());
10963 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
10964 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
10965 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
10966 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
10967 let seed = [42; 32];
10968 let network = Network::Testnet;
10969 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
10970 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
10971 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
10973 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
10974 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
10975 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
10976 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
10978 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
10979 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
10980 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
10985 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
10995 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
10996 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
10997 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
11002 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
11003 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11009 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
11012 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
11013 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
11014 &accept_channel_msg,
11015 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
11016 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
11019 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
11020 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
11021 let tx = Transaction {
11023 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
11027 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
11030 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
11033 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
11034 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
11035 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
11036 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11037 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
11038 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
11042 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
11043 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11051 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
11052 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
11053 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
11054 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
11056 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
11057 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
11064 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
11065 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
11066 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
11067 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
11068 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
11070 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
11071 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
11072 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
11080 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
11081 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
11084 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
11085 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
11086 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
11087 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());