1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, ScriptBuf, Builder};
12 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
14 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
15 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
18 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
19 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
20 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
24 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
25 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
27 use crate::ln::{ChannelId, PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
28 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
30 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
31 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
32 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, ChannelShutdownState};
33 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
34 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
35 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
36 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
37 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
38 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
39 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
40 use crate::sign::ecdsa::{EcdsaChannelSigner, WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner};
41 use crate::sign::{EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
42 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
43 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
44 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer};
45 use crate::util::logger::{Logger, Record, WithContext};
46 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
47 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits, MaxDustHTLCExposure};
48 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
51 use crate::prelude::*;
52 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
53 use core::convert::TryInto;
55 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
56 use crate::sync::Mutex;
57 use crate::sign::type_resolver::ChannelSignerType;
59 use super::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint, RevocationBasepoint};
62 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
63 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
64 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
65 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
66 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
67 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
68 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
69 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
70 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
73 pub struct AvailableBalances {
74 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
75 pub balance_msat: u64,
76 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
77 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
78 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
79 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
80 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
81 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
82 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
83 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
86 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
88 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
90 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
91 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
92 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
93 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
94 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
95 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
97 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
101 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
102 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
103 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
104 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
107 enum InboundHTLCState {
108 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
109 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
110 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
111 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
112 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
113 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
114 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
115 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
116 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
117 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
118 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
119 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
120 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
121 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
122 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
124 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
125 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
126 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
127 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
128 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
129 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
130 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
131 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
132 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
133 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
134 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
135 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
136 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
137 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
139 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
140 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
141 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
142 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
143 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
144 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
145 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
146 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
148 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
149 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
151 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
152 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
153 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
154 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
155 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
156 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
157 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
158 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
161 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
165 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
166 state: InboundHTLCState,
169 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
170 enum OutboundHTLCState {
171 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
172 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
173 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
174 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
175 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
176 /// money back (though we won't), and,
177 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
178 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
179 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
180 /// we'll never get out of sync).
181 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
182 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
183 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
185 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
186 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
187 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
188 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
189 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
190 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
191 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
192 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
193 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
194 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
195 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
196 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
197 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
198 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
199 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
203 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Debug, PartialEq))]
204 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
205 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
206 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
207 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
210 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
211 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
213 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
214 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
219 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
220 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
222 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
223 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
228 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
229 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
233 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
234 state: OutboundHTLCState,
236 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
237 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
240 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
241 #[cfg_attr(test, derive(Clone, Debug, PartialEq))]
242 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
243 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
247 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
249 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
250 // The extra fee we're skimming off the top of this HTLC.
251 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
252 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
255 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
260 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
264 macro_rules! define_state_flags {
265 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, [$(($flag_doc: expr, $flag: ident, $value: expr)),+], $extra_flags: expr) => {
266 #[doc = $flag_type_doc]
267 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
268 struct $flag_type(u32);
273 const $flag: $flag_type = $flag_type($value);
276 /// All flags that apply to the specified [`ChannelState`] variant.
278 const ALL: $flag_type = Self($(Self::$flag.0 | )* $extra_flags);
281 fn new() -> Self { Self(0) }
284 fn from_u32(flags: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
285 if flags & !Self::ALL.0 != 0 {
288 Ok($flag_type(flags))
293 fn is_empty(&self) -> bool { self.0 == 0 }
296 fn is_set(&self, flag: Self) -> bool { *self & flag == flag }
299 impl core::ops::Not for $flag_type {
301 fn not(self) -> Self::Output { Self(!self.0) }
303 impl core::ops::BitOr for $flag_type {
305 fn bitor(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
307 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign for $flag_type {
308 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
310 impl core::ops::BitAnd for $flag_type {
312 fn bitand(self, rhs: Self) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
314 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign for $flag_type {
315 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: Self) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
318 ($flag_type_doc: expr, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
319 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, 0);
321 ($flag_type_doc: expr, FUNDED_STATE, $flag_type: ident, $flags: tt) => {
322 define_state_flags!($flag_type_doc, $flag_type, $flags, FundedStateFlags::ALL.0);
323 impl core::ops::BitOr<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
325 fn bitor(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 | rhs.0) }
327 impl core::ops::BitOrAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
328 fn bitor_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 |= rhs.0; }
330 impl core::ops::BitAnd<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
332 fn bitand(self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) -> Self::Output { Self(self.0 & rhs.0) }
334 impl core::ops::BitAndAssign<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
335 fn bitand_assign(&mut self, rhs: FundedStateFlags) { self.0 &= rhs.0; }
337 impl PartialEq<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
338 fn eq(&self, other: &FundedStateFlags) -> bool { self.0 == other.0 }
340 impl From<FundedStateFlags> for $flag_type {
341 fn from(flags: FundedStateFlags) -> Self { Self(flags.0) }
346 /// We declare all the states/flags here together to help determine which bits are still available
349 pub const OUR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 0;
350 pub const THEIR_INIT_SENT: u32 = 1 << 1;
351 pub const FUNDING_NEGOTIATED: u32 = 1 << 2;
352 pub const AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 3;
353 pub const THEIR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 4;
354 pub const OUR_CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 5;
355 pub const CHANNEL_READY: u32 = 1 << 6;
356 pub const PEER_DISCONNECTED: u32 = 1 << 7;
357 pub const MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS: u32 = 1 << 8;
358 pub const AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE: u32 = 1 << 9;
359 pub const REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 10;
360 pub const LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT: u32 = 1 << 11;
361 pub const SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE: u32 = 1 << 12;
362 pub const WAITING_FOR_BATCH: u32 = 1 << 13;
366 "Flags that apply to all [`ChannelState`] variants in which the channel is funded.",
368 ("Indicates the remote side is considered \"disconnected\" and no updates are allowed \
369 until after we've done a `channel_reestablish` dance.", PEER_DISCONNECTED, state_flags::PEER_DISCONNECTED),
370 ("Indicates the user has told us a `ChannelMonitor` update is pending async persistence \
371 somewhere and we should pause sending any outbound messages until they've managed to \
372 complete it.", MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, state_flags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS),
373 ("Indicates we received a `shutdown` message from the remote end. If set, they may not add \
374 any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected to respond with our own `shutdown` \
375 message when possible.", REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT),
376 ("Indicates we sent a `shutdown` message. At this point, we may not add any new HTLCs to \
377 the channel.", LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, state_flags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT)
382 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding`].",
383 NegotiatingFundingFlags, [
384 ("Indicates we have (or are prepared to) send our `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
385 OUR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
386 ("Indicates we have received their `open_channel`/`accept_channel` message.",
387 THEIR_INIT_SENT, state_flags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
392 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady`].",
393 FUNDED_STATE, AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, [
394 ("Indicates they sent us a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
395 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
396 THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY),
397 ("Indicates we sent them a `channel_ready` message. Once both `THEIR_CHANNEL_READY` and \
398 `OUR_CHANNEL_READY` are set, our state moves on to `ChannelReady`.",
399 OUR_CHANNEL_READY, state_flags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY),
400 ("Indicates the channel was funded in a batch and the broadcast of the funding transaction \
401 is being held until all channels in the batch have received `funding_signed` and have \
402 their monitors persisted.", WAITING_FOR_BATCH, state_flags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)
407 "Flags that only apply to [`ChannelState::ChannelReady`].",
408 FUNDED_STATE, ChannelReadyFlags, [
409 ("Indicates that we have sent a `commitment_signed` but are awaiting the responding \
410 `revoke_and_ack` message. During this period, we can't generate new `commitment_signed` \
411 messages as we'd be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their `revoke_and_ack` \
412 implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent later.",
413 AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, state_flags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE)
417 #[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, PartialEq, PartialOrd, Eq)]
419 /// We are negotiating the parameters required for the channel prior to funding it.
420 NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags),
421 /// We have sent `funding_created` and are awaiting a `funding_signed` to advance to
422 /// `AwaitingChannelReady`. Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate
423 /// `funding_signed` upon receipt of `funding_created`, so simply skip this state.
425 /// We've received/sent `funding_created` and `funding_signed` and are thus now waiting on the
426 /// funding transaction to confirm.
427 AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags),
428 /// Both we and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed and the channel is
430 ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags),
431 /// We've successfully negotiated a `closing_signed` dance. At this point, the `ChannelManager`
432 /// is about to drop us, but we store this anyway.
436 macro_rules! impl_state_flag {
437 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, [$($state: ident),+]) => {
439 fn $get(&self) -> bool {
442 ChannelState::$state(flags) => flags.is_set($state_flag.into()),
451 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags |= $state_flag,
453 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to set flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
457 fn $clear(&mut self) {
460 ChannelState::$state(flags) => *flags &= !($state_flag),
462 _ => debug_assert!(false, "Attempted to clear flag on unexpected ChannelState"),
466 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, FUNDED_STATES) => {
467 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [AwaitingChannelReady, ChannelReady]);
469 ($get: ident, $set: ident, $clear: ident, $state_flag: expr, $state: ident) => {
470 impl_state_flag!($get, $set, $clear, $state_flag, [$state]);
475 fn from_u32(state: u32) -> Result<Self, ()> {
477 state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED => Ok(ChannelState::FundingNegotiated),
478 state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE => Ok(ChannelState::ShutdownComplete),
480 if val & state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY {
481 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY)
482 .map(|flags| ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags))
483 } else if val & state_flags::CHANNEL_READY == state_flags::CHANNEL_READY {
484 ChannelReadyFlags::from_u32(val & !state_flags::CHANNEL_READY)
485 .map(|flags| ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags))
486 } else if let Ok(flags) = NegotiatingFundingFlags::from_u32(val) {
487 Ok(ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags))
495 fn to_u32(&self) -> u32 {
497 ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) => flags.0,
498 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => state_flags::FUNDING_NEGOTIATED,
499 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::AWAITING_CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
500 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => state_flags::CHANNEL_READY | flags.0,
501 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => state_flags::SHUTDOWN_COMPLETE,
505 fn is_pre_funded_state(&self) -> bool {
506 matches!(self, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(_)|ChannelState::FundingNegotiated)
509 fn is_both_sides_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
510 self.is_local_shutdown_sent() && self.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
513 fn with_funded_state_flags_mask(&self) -> FundedStateFlags {
515 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
516 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) => FundedStateFlags((*flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL).0),
517 _ => FundedStateFlags::new(),
521 fn should_force_holding_cell(&self) -> bool {
523 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
524 flags.is_set(ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE) ||
525 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS.into()) ||
526 flags.is_set(FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED.into()),
528 debug_assert!(false, "The holding cell is only valid within ChannelReady");
534 impl_state_flag!(is_peer_disconnected, set_peer_disconnected, clear_peer_disconnected,
535 FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED, FUNDED_STATES);
536 impl_state_flag!(is_monitor_update_in_progress, set_monitor_update_in_progress, clear_monitor_update_in_progress,
537 FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS, FUNDED_STATES);
538 impl_state_flag!(is_local_shutdown_sent, set_local_shutdown_sent, clear_local_shutdown_sent,
539 FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
540 impl_state_flag!(is_remote_shutdown_sent, set_remote_shutdown_sent, clear_remote_shutdown_sent,
541 FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT, FUNDED_STATES);
542 impl_state_flag!(is_our_channel_ready, set_our_channel_ready, clear_our_channel_ready,
543 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
544 impl_state_flag!(is_their_channel_ready, set_their_channel_ready, clear_their_channel_ready,
545 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY, AwaitingChannelReady);
546 impl_state_flag!(is_waiting_for_batch, set_waiting_for_batch, clear_waiting_for_batch,
547 AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH, AwaitingChannelReady);
548 impl_state_flag!(is_awaiting_remote_revoke, set_awaiting_remote_revoke, clear_awaiting_remote_revoke,
549 ChannelReadyFlags::AWAITING_REMOTE_REVOKE, ChannelReady);
552 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
554 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
556 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
557 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
558 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
559 if channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
563 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
565 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
567 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
569 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
570 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
571 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
572 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
573 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
575 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
576 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
578 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
580 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
581 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
583 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
584 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
585 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
586 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
587 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
588 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
590 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
591 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
593 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
594 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
595 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
596 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
597 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
599 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
600 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
602 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
603 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
605 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
606 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
607 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
608 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
614 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
615 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
617 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
618 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
619 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
624 impl fmt::Display for ChannelError {
625 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
627 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
628 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
629 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "{}", e),
634 pub(super) struct WithChannelContext<'a, L: Deref> where L::Target: Logger {
636 pub peer_id: Option<PublicKey>,
637 pub channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
640 impl<'a, L: Deref> Logger for WithChannelContext<'a, L> where L::Target: Logger {
641 fn log(&self, mut record: Record) {
642 record.peer_id = self.peer_id;
643 record.channel_id = self.channel_id;
644 self.logger.log(record)
648 impl<'a, 'b, L: Deref> WithChannelContext<'a, L>
649 where L::Target: Logger {
650 pub(super) fn from<S: Deref>(logger: &'a L, context: &'b ChannelContext<S>) -> Self
651 where S::Target: SignerProvider
655 peer_id: Some(context.counterparty_node_id),
656 channel_id: Some(context.channel_id),
661 macro_rules! secp_check {
662 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
665 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
670 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
671 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
672 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
673 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
674 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
675 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
676 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
677 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
679 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
681 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
683 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
687 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
689 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
690 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
691 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
693 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
694 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
696 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
697 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
698 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
699 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
700 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
702 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
703 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
707 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
713 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
716 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
717 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
718 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
719 holding_cell_msat: u64,
720 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
723 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
724 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
725 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
726 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
727 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
728 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
729 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
730 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
731 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
732 outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
733 inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful received HTLCs since last commitment
736 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
737 struct HTLCCandidate {
739 origin: HTLCInitiator,
743 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
751 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
753 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
755 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
756 htlc_value_msat: u64,
757 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
762 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
763 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
764 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
765 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
766 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
768 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
769 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
770 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
771 htlc_value_msat: u64,
773 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
774 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
778 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
779 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
780 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
781 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
782 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
783 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
784 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
785 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
786 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
787 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
788 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
791 /// The return value of `signer_maybe_unblocked`
793 pub(super) struct SignerResumeUpdates {
794 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
795 pub funding_signed: Option<msgs::FundingSigned>,
796 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
799 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
800 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
801 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
802 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
803 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
804 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
805 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
806 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
809 /// The result of a shutdown that should be handled.
811 pub(crate) struct ShutdownResult {
812 /// A channel monitor update to apply.
813 pub(crate) monitor_update: Option<(PublicKey, OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>,
814 /// A list of dropped outbound HTLCs that can safely be failed backwards immediately.
815 pub(crate) dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, ChannelId)>,
816 /// An unbroadcasted batch funding transaction id. The closure of this channel should be
817 /// propagated to the remainder of the batch.
818 pub(crate) unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: Option<Txid>,
819 pub(crate) channel_id: ChannelId,
820 pub(crate) counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
823 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
824 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
825 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
826 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
827 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
828 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
829 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
830 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
831 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
832 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
833 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
834 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
835 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
836 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
837 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
839 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
840 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
841 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
842 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
844 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
845 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
846 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
847 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
849 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
850 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
851 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
852 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
853 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
855 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
856 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
857 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
858 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
860 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
861 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
862 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
864 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
865 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
866 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
867 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
868 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
870 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for a response to a
871 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] or [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] message before we attempt to disconnect
874 /// See [`ChannelContext::sent_message_awaiting_response`] for more information.
875 pub(crate) const DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS: usize = 2;
877 /// The number of ticks that may elapse while we're waiting for an unfunded outbound/inbound channel
878 /// to be promoted to a [`Channel`] since the unfunded channel was created. An unfunded channel
879 /// exceeding this age limit will be force-closed and purged from memory.
880 pub(crate) const UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS: usize = 60;
882 /// Number of blocks needed for an output from a coinbase transaction to be spendable.
883 pub(crate) const COINBASE_MATURITY: u32 = 100;
885 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
886 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
889 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
890 (0, update, required),
893 /// The `ChannelPhase` enum describes the current phase in life of a lightning channel with each of
894 /// its variants containing an appropriate channel struct.
895 pub(super) enum ChannelPhase<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
896 UnfundedOutboundV1(OutboundV1Channel<SP>),
897 UnfundedInboundV1(InboundV1Channel<SP>),
901 impl<'a, SP: Deref> ChannelPhase<SP> where
902 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
903 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: ChannelSigner,
905 pub fn context(&'a self) -> &'a ChannelContext<SP> {
907 ChannelPhase::Funded(chan) => &chan.context,
908 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
909 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(chan) => &chan.context,
913 pub fn context_mut(&'a mut self) -> &'a mut ChannelContext<SP> {
915 ChannelPhase::Funded(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
916 ChannelPhase::UnfundedOutboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
917 ChannelPhase::UnfundedInboundV1(ref mut chan) => &mut chan.context,
922 /// Contains all state common to unfunded inbound/outbound channels.
923 pub(super) struct UnfundedChannelContext {
924 /// A counter tracking how many ticks have elapsed since this unfunded channel was
925 /// created. If this unfunded channel reaches peer has yet to respond after reaching
926 /// `UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS`, it will be force-closed and purged from memory.
928 /// This is so that we don't keep channels around that haven't progressed to a funded state
929 /// in a timely manner.
930 unfunded_channel_age_ticks: usize,
933 impl UnfundedChannelContext {
934 /// Determines whether we should force-close and purge this unfunded channel from memory due to it
935 /// having reached the unfunded channel age limit.
937 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
938 pub fn should_expire_unfunded_channel(&mut self) -> bool {
939 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks += 1;
940 self.unfunded_channel_age_ticks >= UNFUNDED_CHANNEL_AGE_LIMIT_TICKS
944 /// Contains everything about the channel including state, and various flags.
945 pub(super) struct ChannelContext<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
946 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
948 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
949 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
950 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
951 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
953 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
957 /// The current channel ID.
958 channel_id: ChannelId,
959 /// The temporary channel ID used during channel setup. Value kept even after transitioning to a final channel ID.
960 /// Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
961 temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>,
962 channel_state: ChannelState,
964 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
965 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
967 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
968 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
969 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
971 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
972 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
973 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
974 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
976 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
977 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
979 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
981 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType<SP>,
982 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
983 destination_script: ScriptBuf,
985 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
986 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
987 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
989 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
990 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
991 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, fees, and anchor outputs
992 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
993 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
994 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
996 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
997 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
998 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
999 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
1000 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
1001 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
1003 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
1005 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
1006 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
1007 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
1009 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
1010 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
1011 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
1012 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
1013 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
1014 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
1015 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
1017 /// If we went to send a commitment update (ie some messages then [`msgs::CommitmentSigned`])
1018 /// but our signer (initially) refused to give us a signature, we should retry at some point in
1019 /// the future when the signer indicates it may have a signature for us.
1021 /// This flag is set in such a case. Note that we don't need to persist this as we'll end up
1022 /// setting it again as a side-effect of [`Channel::channel_reestablish`].
1023 signer_pending_commitment_update: bool,
1024 /// Similar to [`Self::signer_pending_commitment_update`] but we're waiting to send either a
1025 /// [`msgs::FundingCreated`] or [`msgs::FundingSigned`] depending on if this channel is
1026 /// outbound or inbound.
1027 signer_pending_funding: bool,
1029 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
1031 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
1032 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
1033 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
1034 // HTLCs with similar state.
1035 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
1036 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
1037 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
1038 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
1039 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
1040 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
1041 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
1042 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
1043 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
1044 feerate_per_kw: u32,
1046 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
1047 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
1048 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
1050 update_time_counter: u32,
1052 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1053 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
1054 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1055 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1056 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
1057 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
1059 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
1060 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
1062 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
1063 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
1064 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
1065 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
1067 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
1068 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
1070 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1072 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
1074 /// If we remove an HTLC (or fee update), commit, and receive our counterparty's
1075 /// `revoke_and_ack`, we remove all knowledge of said HTLC (or fee update). However, the latest
1076 /// local commitment transaction that we can broadcast still contains the HTLC (or old fee)
1077 /// until we receive a further `commitment_signed`. Thus we are not eligible for initiating the
1078 /// `closing_signed` negotiation if we're expecting a counterparty `commitment_signed`.
1080 /// To ensure we don't send a `closing_signed` too early, we track this state here, waiting
1081 /// until we see a `commitment_signed` before doing so.
1083 /// We don't bother to persist this - we anticipate this state won't last longer than a few
1084 /// milliseconds, so any accidental force-closes here should be exceedingly rare.
1085 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: bool,
1087 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
1088 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
1089 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
1090 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
1091 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
1092 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
1093 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
1094 channel_creation_height: u32,
1096 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1099 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1101 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
1104 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1106 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1109 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1111 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
1113 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
1114 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
1117 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1119 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
1121 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1122 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
1124 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1126 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1127 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
1128 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
1130 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
1132 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
1133 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
1134 is_batch_funding: Option<()>,
1136 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1137 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
1138 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
1140 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ScriptBuf>,
1142 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
1144 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
1145 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
1146 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
1147 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
1149 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
1150 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
1151 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
1153 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
1154 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
1155 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
1157 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
1158 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
1159 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
1160 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
1161 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1162 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1163 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1164 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
1166 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
1167 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
1168 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
1169 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
1170 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
1172 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
1173 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
1175 /// An option set when we wish to track how many ticks have elapsed while waiting for a response
1176 /// from our counterparty after sending a message. If the peer has yet to respond after reaching
1177 /// `DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`, a reconnection should be attempted to try to
1178 /// unblock the state machine.
1180 /// This behavior is mostly motivated by a lnd bug in which we don't receive a message we expect
1181 /// to in a timely manner, which may lead to channels becoming unusable and/or force-closed. An
1182 /// example of such can be found at <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/7682>.
1184 /// This is currently only used when waiting for a [`msgs::ChannelReestablish`] or
1185 /// [`msgs::RevokeAndACK`] message from the counterparty.
1186 sent_message_awaiting_response: Option<usize>,
1188 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1189 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
1190 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
1191 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
1192 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
1193 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
1194 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
1195 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
1197 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
1198 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
1200 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
1201 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
1202 // the channel's funding UTXO.
1204 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
1205 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
1206 // associated channel mapping.
1208 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
1209 // to store all of them.
1210 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
1212 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
1213 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
1214 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
1215 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
1216 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
1218 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1219 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
1221 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1222 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
1224 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
1225 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
1226 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
1228 /// If we can't release a [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] until some external action completes, we
1229 /// store it here and only release it to the `ChannelManager` once it asks for it.
1230 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
1233 impl<SP: Deref> ChannelContext<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
1234 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1235 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
1236 self.update_time_counter
1239 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
1240 self.latest_monitor_update_id
1243 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
1244 self.config.announced_channel
1247 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
1248 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
1251 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
1252 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1253 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
1254 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
1257 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
1258 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
1259 self.channel_state > ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT)
1262 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
1263 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1264 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
1265 matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) &&
1266 !self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() &&
1267 !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() &&
1268 !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
1271 /// shutdown state returns the state of the channel in its various stages of shutdown
1272 pub fn shutdown_state(&self) -> ChannelShutdownState {
1273 match self.channel_state {
1274 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) =>
1275 if self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() && !self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
1276 ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownInitiated
1277 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1278 ChannelShutdownState::ResolvingHTLCs
1279 } else if (self.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() || self.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()) && self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
1280 ChannelShutdownState::NegotiatingClosingFee
1282 ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown
1284 ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => ChannelShutdownState::ShutdownComplete,
1285 _ => ChannelShutdownState::NotShuttingDown,
1289 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
1290 let is_ready_to_close = match self.channel_state {
1291 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) =>
1292 flags & FundedStateFlags::ALL == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1293 ChannelState::ChannelReady(flags) =>
1294 flags == FundedStateFlags::LOCAL_SHUTDOWN_SENT | FundedStateFlags::REMOTE_SHUTDOWN_SENT,
1297 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1298 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
1299 self.pending_update_fee.is_none() &&
1303 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
1304 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
1305 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1306 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
1307 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected()
1310 // Public utilities:
1312 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> ChannelId {
1316 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
1318 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
1319 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<ChannelId> {
1320 self.temporary_channel_id
1323 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1327 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
1328 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
1329 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
1333 /// Gets the channel's type
1334 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
1338 /// Gets the channel's `short_channel_id`.
1340 /// Will return `None` if the channel hasn't been confirmed yet.
1341 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1342 self.short_channel_id
1345 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1346 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1347 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
1350 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1351 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
1352 self.outbound_scid_alias
1355 /// Returns the holder signer for this channel.
1357 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
1358 return &self.holder_signer
1361 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
1362 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases
1363 /// or prior to any channel actions during `Channel` initialization.
1364 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
1365 debug_assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
1366 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
1369 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
1370 /// get_funding_created.
1371 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
1372 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
1375 /// Returns the height in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1376 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmation_height(&self) -> Option<u32> {
1377 let conf_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height;
1378 if conf_height > 0 {
1385 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
1386 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
1387 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
1390 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
1391 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
1392 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
1393 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
1397 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
1400 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
1401 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
1404 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1405 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
1408 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
1409 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
1410 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
1413 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
1414 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
1417 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1418 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
1419 self.counterparty_node_id
1422 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1423 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1424 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
1427 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1428 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1429 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1432 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1433 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1435 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
1436 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
1437 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
1438 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
1440 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1444 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
1445 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
1446 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
1449 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
1450 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
1451 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
1454 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
1455 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
1456 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
1458 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
1459 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
1464 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
1465 self.channel_value_satoshis
1468 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
1469 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
1472 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
1473 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
1476 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat<F: Deref>(&self,
1477 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>) -> u64
1478 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1480 match self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure {
1481 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FeeRateMultiplier(multiplier) => {
1482 let feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(
1483 ConfirmationTarget::OnChainSweep) as u64;
1484 feerate_per_kw.saturating_mul(multiplier)
1486 MaxDustHTLCExposure::FixedLimitMsat(limit) => limit,
1490 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
1491 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
1492 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
1495 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
1496 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1497 self.is_funding_broadcast() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1500 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1501 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
1502 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
1505 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
1506 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1507 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
1510 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
1511 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
1512 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
1515 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
1516 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
1517 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
1520 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
1521 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
1522 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
1523 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
1524 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
1527 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
1529 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
1530 self.prev_config = None;
1534 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
1535 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
1539 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
1540 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
1541 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
1542 let did_channel_update =
1543 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
1544 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
1545 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
1546 if did_channel_update {
1547 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
1548 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
1549 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
1550 self.update_time_counter += 1;
1552 self.config.options = *config;
1556 /// Returns true if funding_signed was sent/received and the
1557 /// funding transaction has been broadcast if necessary.
1558 pub fn is_funding_broadcast(&self) -> bool {
1559 !self.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() &&
1560 !matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH))
1563 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1564 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1565 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1566 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1567 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1569 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1570 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1571 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1572 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1573 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1574 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1575 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1577 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1578 where L::Target: Logger
1580 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1581 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1582 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1584 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1585 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1586 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1587 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1589 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1590 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1591 if match update_state {
1592 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1593 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1594 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1595 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1596 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1598 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1602 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1603 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1604 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1606 if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1608 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1609 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1610 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1612 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1613 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1614 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1615 transaction_output_index: None
1620 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1621 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1622 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1623 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1624 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1627 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1629 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1630 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1631 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1633 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1634 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1637 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1638 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1641 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.get_channel_type()) / 1000
1643 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1644 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1645 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1647 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, &$htlc.payment_hash, $htlc.amount_msat);
1648 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1654 let mut inbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1656 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1657 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1658 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1659 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1660 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1661 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1662 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1666 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1667 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1669 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1671 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1672 if generated_by_local {
1673 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(preimage) = reason {
1674 inbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1675 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1685 let mut outbound_htlc_preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1687 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1688 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1689 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1690 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1691 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1692 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1693 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1696 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1697 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1698 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1699 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1703 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1704 outbound_htlc_preimages.push(preimage);
1708 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1709 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1711 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, &htlc.payment_hash, htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1713 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1714 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1716 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1717 if !generated_by_local {
1718 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1726 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1727 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1728 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1729 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1730 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1731 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1732 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1733 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1735 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1737 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1738 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1739 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1740 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1742 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1744 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1745 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1746 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1747 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1750 let total_fee_sat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), &self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features);
1751 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1752 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1753 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1755 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1758 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1759 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1760 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1761 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1763 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1766 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1767 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1772 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1773 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1778 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1780 let channel_parameters =
1781 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1782 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1783 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1790 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1793 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1794 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1795 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1796 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1798 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1799 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1800 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1808 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1809 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1810 inbound_htlc_preimages,
1811 outbound_htlc_preimages,
1816 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1817 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1818 /// our counterparty!)
1819 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1820 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1821 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1822 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1823 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1824 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1825 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1827 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1831 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1832 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1833 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_funding_created)
1834 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1835 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1836 //may see payments to it!
1837 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1838 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1839 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1841 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1844 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1845 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1846 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/InboundV1Channel::new
1847 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
1848 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1851 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
1852 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
1855 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
1859 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
1860 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
1861 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
1862 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
1863 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
1864 // which are near the dust limit.
1865 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1866 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
1867 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
1868 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1869 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1871 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
1872 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
1874 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
1877 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
1878 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
1879 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
1882 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
1883 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1885 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1886 pending_htlcs: context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1887 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1888 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1889 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1890 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1891 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1894 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1897 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1898 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1899 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1901 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1902 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1903 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1904 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1905 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1906 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1908 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
1909 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1915 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
1916 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
1918 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
1919 pending_htlcs: context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
1920 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
1921 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1922 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
1923 holding_cell_msat: 0,
1924 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
1927 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1930 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
1931 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
1932 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
1934 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
1935 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
1936 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1937 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1938 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1939 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1941 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1942 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1946 for update in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1947 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
1948 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
1949 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
1950 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
1951 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
1952 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1954 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
1955 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
1957 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
1964 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
1965 /// Doesn't bother handling the
1966 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
1967 /// corner case properly.
1968 pub fn get_available_balances<F: Deref>(&self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
1969 -> AvailableBalances
1970 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
1972 let context = &self;
1973 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
1974 let inbound_stats = context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1975 let outbound_stats = context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
1977 let mut balance_msat = context.value_to_self_msat;
1978 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1979 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
1980 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1983 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
1985 let outbound_capacity_msat = context.value_to_self_msat
1986 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
1988 context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
1990 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
1992 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
1993 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
1997 if context.is_outbound() {
1998 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
1999 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2001 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2002 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2004 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2005 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2006 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2007 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2010 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2011 let mut max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2012 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2013 let mut min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2014 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2015 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2016 min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
2019 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2020 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2021 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2022 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = available_capacity_msat as i64 -
2023 max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64 - anchor_outputs_value_msat as i64;
2024 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2025 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2026 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2027 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2028 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2029 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2031 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2034 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2035 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2036 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2037 if !context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2038 real_dust_limit_success_sat += context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000;
2041 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2042 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2044 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2045 let remote_balance_msat = (context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - context.value_to_self_msat)
2046 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2048 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
2049 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2050 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2051 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2055 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2057 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2058 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2059 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2060 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2061 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2062 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2063 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
2065 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2066 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2068 let dust_buffer_feerate = context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2069 (context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2070 context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2072 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2073 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2074 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2075 Some(max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2076 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2079 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2080 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.try_into().unwrap_or(i64::max_value()) {
2081 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2082 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2083 max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat.saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2084 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2087 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2088 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2089 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2091 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2095 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2096 context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2098 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2099 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2103 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(context.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2104 - context.value_to_self_msat as i64
2105 - context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2106 - context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2108 outbound_capacity_msat,
2109 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2110 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2115 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2116 let context = &self;
2117 (context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2120 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2121 /// number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx.
2123 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2124 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2126 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2127 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2129 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2130 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2131 let context = &self;
2132 assert!(context.is_outbound());
2134 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2137 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2138 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2140 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2141 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2143 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2144 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2146 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2147 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2151 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2152 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2158 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2159 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2160 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2163 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2164 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2165 included_htlcs += 1;
2168 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2169 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2173 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2174 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2175 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2176 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2177 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2178 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2183 for htlc in context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2185 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2186 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2191 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2192 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2196 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2197 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2198 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2201 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2202 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2204 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2205 + context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2206 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2208 total_pending_htlcs,
2209 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2210 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2211 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2213 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2214 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2215 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2217 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2219 *context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2224 /// Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2225 /// pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx
2227 /// Optionally includes the `HTLCCandidate` given by `htlc` and an additional non-dust HTLC if
2228 /// `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is `Some`.
2230 /// The first extra HTLC is useful for determining whether we can accept a further HTLC, the
2231 /// second allows for creating a buffer to ensure a further HTLC can always be accepted/added.
2233 /// Dust HTLCs are excluded.
2234 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2235 let context = &self;
2236 assert!(!context.is_outbound());
2238 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2241 (context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
2242 context.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
2244 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2245 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2247 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2248 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2250 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2251 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2255 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2256 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2262 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2263 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2264 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2265 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2266 for ref htlc in context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2267 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2270 included_htlcs += 1;
2273 for ref htlc in context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2274 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2277 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2278 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2280 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2281 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2282 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2287 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2288 let res = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, &context.channel_type);
2289 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2292 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2293 fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(context.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, &context.channel_type);
2295 let total_pending_htlcs = context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2296 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2298 total_pending_htlcs,
2299 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2300 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2301 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_holder_htlc_id,
2303 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2304 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2305 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => context.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2307 feerate: context.feerate_per_kw,
2309 *context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2314 fn if_unbroadcasted_funding<F, O>(&self, f: F) -> Option<O>
2315 where F: Fn() -> Option<O> {
2316 match self.channel_state {
2317 ChannelState::FundingNegotiated => f(),
2318 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH) {
2327 /// Returns the transaction if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2329 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2330 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(|| self.funding_transaction.clone())
2333 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending funding transaction that is yet to be
2335 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2336 self.if_unbroadcasted_funding(||
2337 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.map(|txo| txo.txid)
2341 /// Returns whether the channel is funded in a batch.
2342 pub fn is_batch_funding(&self) -> bool {
2343 self.is_batch_funding.is_some()
2346 /// Returns the transaction ID if there is a pending batch funding transaction that is yet to be
2348 pub fn unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(&self) -> Option<Txid> {
2349 self.unbroadcasted_funding_txid().filter(|_| self.is_batch_funding())
2352 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
2353 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
2354 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
2355 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
2356 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
2357 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> ShutdownResult {
2358 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
2359 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
2360 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
2361 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
2362 assert!(!matches!(self.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
2364 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
2365 // return them to fail the payment.
2366 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
2367 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
2368 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
2370 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
2371 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
2376 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
2377 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < AwaitingChannelReady),
2378 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
2379 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
2380 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
2381 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
2382 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
2383 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
2384 let generate_monitor_update = match self.channel_state {
2385 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ShutdownComplete => true,
2388 if generate_monitor_update {
2389 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
2390 Some((self.get_counterparty_node_id(), funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2391 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
2392 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.counterparty_node_id),
2393 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
2397 let unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid = self.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid();
2399 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
2400 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2403 dropped_outbound_htlcs,
2404 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid,
2405 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2406 counterparty_node_id: self.counterparty_node_id,
2410 /// Only allowed after [`Self::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
2411 fn get_funding_signed_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (CommitmentTransaction, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>) where L::Target: Logger {
2412 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2413 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2415 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2416 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2417 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2418 &self.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2420 match &self.holder_signer {
2421 // TODO (arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
2422 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
2423 let funding_signed = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2424 .map(|(signature, _)| msgs::FundingSigned {
2425 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2428 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2432 if funding_signed.is_none() {
2433 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature not available for funding_signed message; setting signer_pending_funding");
2434 self.signer_pending_funding = true;
2435 } else if self.signer_pending_funding {
2436 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature available for funding_signed message; clearing signer_pending_funding");
2437 self.signer_pending_funding = false;
2440 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2441 (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed)
2443 // TODO (taproot|arik)
2450 // Internal utility functions for channels
2452 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
2453 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
2454 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
2456 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
2458 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
2459 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
2460 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
2462 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
2465 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
2467 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
2470 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
2471 /// required by us according to the configured or default
2472 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
2474 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
2476 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
2477 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
2478 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
2479 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
2480 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
2483 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
2484 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
2485 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
2486 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
2487 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
2488 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
2489 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
2492 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2493 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2495 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2496 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2499 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2500 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2501 pub(crate) fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, channel_type_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures) -> u64 {
2502 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2503 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2504 (commitment_tx_base_weight(channel_type_features) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2507 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefit of the user client.
2508 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
2509 pub(super) struct Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
2510 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
2513 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2514 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2516 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
2517 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
2518 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
2522 impl<SP: Deref> Channel<SP> where
2523 SP::Target: SignerProvider,
2524 <SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner
2526 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
2527 channel_type: &ChannelTypeFeatures, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
2528 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L
2529 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
2531 let lower_limit_conf_target = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
2532 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2534 ConfirmationTarget::MinAllowedNonAnchorChannelRemoteFee
2536 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(lower_limit_conf_target);
2537 if feerate_per_kw < lower_limit {
2538 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
2539 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
2541 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
2542 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
2546 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
2552 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ScriptBuf {
2553 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
2554 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
2555 // outside of those situations will fail.
2556 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
2560 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
2565 1 + // script length (0)
2569 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
2570 2 + // witness marker and flag
2571 1 + // witness element count
2572 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
2573 self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
2574 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
2575 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
2576 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2577 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2579 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
2580 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
2581 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
2587 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
2588 assert!(self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2589 assert!(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
2590 assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
2592 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
2593 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.context.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
2594 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
2596 if value_to_holder < 0 {
2597 assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
2598 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
2599 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
2600 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
2601 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
2604 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2605 value_to_counterparty = 0;
2608 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
2609 value_to_holder = 0;
2612 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
2613 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
2614 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
2615 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
2617 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
2618 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
2621 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
2622 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
2625 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
2628 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
2629 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
2631 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
2633 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
2634 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
2635 where L::Target: Logger {
2636 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
2637 // (see equivalent if condition there).
2638 assert!(self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell());
2639 let mon_update_id = self.context.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
2640 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
2641 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
2642 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
2643 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
2647 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2648 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
2649 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
2650 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
2652 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2653 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2656 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2657 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2658 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2660 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2661 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
2662 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2663 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2664 debug_assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).to_byte_array()));
2665 log_debug!(logger, "Claiming inbound HTLC id {} with payment hash {} with preimage {}",
2666 htlc.htlc_id, htlc.payment_hash, payment_preimage_arg);
2668 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2669 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2670 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2672 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id());
2673 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2675 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2678 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2679 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
2683 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
2687 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2688 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2689 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
2690 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
2691 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2692 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2695 // Now update local state:
2697 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
2698 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
2699 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
2700 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
2701 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
2702 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
2703 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
2704 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
2708 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2709 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
2710 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
2711 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
2712 // do not not get into this branch.
2713 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2714 match pending_update {
2715 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2716 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2717 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
2718 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
2719 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2720 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2721 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
2724 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2725 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2726 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
2727 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
2728 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
2729 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
2730 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2736 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", &self.context.channel_id(), self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
2737 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
2738 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2740 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2741 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2742 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2744 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2745 self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
2748 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2749 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
2751 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2752 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
2754 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
2755 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2758 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2761 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2762 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2763 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2764 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2769 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2770 let release_cs_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
2771 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2772 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2773 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2774 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2775 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2776 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2777 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2778 if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2779 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2780 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2781 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2782 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2783 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2785 let new_mon_id = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.get(0)
2786 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2787 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2788 for held_update in self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.iter_mut() {
2789 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2792 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2793 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2794 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2800 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2801 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, }
2803 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2807 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2808 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2809 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2810 /// before we fail backwards.
2812 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2813 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2814 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2815 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2816 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2817 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2818 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2821 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2822 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2823 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2824 /// before we fail backwards.
2826 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2827 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2828 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2829 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2830 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2831 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
2832 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2835 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2836 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2837 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2839 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2840 for (idx, htlc) in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2841 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2843 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2844 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2845 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2847 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2852 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2853 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2859 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2860 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2861 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2862 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2863 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2867 if self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
2868 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2869 force_holding_cell = true;
2872 // Now update local state:
2873 if force_holding_cell {
2874 for pending_update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2875 match pending_update {
2876 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2877 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2878 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2879 debug_assert!(self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2883 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2884 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2885 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2886 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2892 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2893 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2894 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2900 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, &self.context.channel_id());
2902 let htlc = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2903 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2906 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2907 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
2908 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2913 // Message handlers:
2914 /// Updates the state of the channel to indicate that all channels in the batch have received
2915 /// funding_signed and persisted their monitors.
2916 /// The funding transaction is consequently allowed to be broadcast, and the channel can be
2917 /// treated as a non-batch channel going forward.
2918 pub fn set_batch_ready(&mut self) {
2919 self.context.is_batch_funding = None;
2920 self.context.channel_state.clear_waiting_for_batch();
2923 /// Unsets the existing funding information.
2925 /// This must only be used if the channel has not yet completed funding and has not been used.
2927 /// Further, the channel must be immediately shut down after this with a call to
2928 /// [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`].
2929 pub fn unset_funding_info(&mut self, temporary_channel_id: ChannelId) {
2930 debug_assert!(matches!(
2931 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)
2933 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2934 self.context.channel_id = temporary_channel_id;
2937 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2938 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2940 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2941 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
2942 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2943 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2945 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2948 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
2949 self.context.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2950 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2953 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2954 if Some(scid_alias) != self.context.short_channel_id {
2955 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2956 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2957 // when routing outbound payments.
2958 self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2962 // Our channel_ready shouldn't have been sent if we are waiting for other channels in the
2963 // batch, but we can receive channel_ready messages.
2964 let mut check_reconnection = false;
2965 match &self.context.channel_state {
2966 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) => {
2967 let flags = *flags & !FundedStateFlags::ALL;
2968 debug_assert!(!flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) || !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
2969 if flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY {
2970 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
2971 check_reconnection = true;
2972 } else if (flags & !AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH).is_empty() {
2973 self.context.channel_state.set_their_channel_ready();
2974 } else if flags == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY {
2975 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
2976 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
2978 // We're in `WAITING_FOR_BATCH`, so we should wait until we're ready.
2979 debug_assert!(flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
2982 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs.
2983 ChannelState::ChannelReady(_) => check_reconnection = true,
2984 _ => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned())),
2986 if check_reconnection {
2987 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2988 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2989 let expected_point =
2990 if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2991 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2993 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2994 } else if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2995 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2996 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2997 debug_assert!(self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2998 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
3000 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
3001 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
3002 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
3003 &self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
3004 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
3006 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
3007 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
3012 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3013 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3015 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
3017 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
3020 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, FE: Deref, L: Deref>(
3021 &mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus,
3022 create_pending_htlc_status: F, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<FE>, logger: &L
3023 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3024 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus,
3025 FE::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3027 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3028 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3030 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3031 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3032 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3034 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3035 if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
3036 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3038 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3039 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3041 if msg.amount_msat > self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3042 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3044 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3045 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3047 if msg.amount_msat < self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3048 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3051 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3052 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3053 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3054 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3056 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3057 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3060 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3061 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3062 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3063 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3064 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3065 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3066 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3067 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3068 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3069 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3070 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3072 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3073 for ref htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3074 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3075 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3076 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3077 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3081 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3082 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3085 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.context.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3086 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000,
3087 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(self.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000)
3089 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3090 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3091 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3092 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3093 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3094 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3095 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3099 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3100 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3101 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3102 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3103 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3104 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat);
3105 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3109 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3110 self.context.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3111 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3112 self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3113 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3114 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3117 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3118 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3120 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.context.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3121 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3122 self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3124 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3125 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3129 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3130 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3132 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(remote_commit_tx_fee_msat).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3133 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3137 let anchor_outputs_value_msat = if self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3138 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000
3142 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3143 // `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3144 // the spec because the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the receiver's
3145 // side, only on the sender's. Note that with anchor outputs we are no longer as
3146 // sensitive to fee spikes, so we need to account for them.
3147 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3148 let mut remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = self.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3149 if !self.context.get_channel_type().supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
3150 remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat *= FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE;
3152 if pending_remote_value_msat.saturating_sub(msg.amount_msat).saturating_sub(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3153 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3154 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3155 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", &self.context.channel_id());
3156 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3159 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3160 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3161 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3162 if self.context.value_to_self_msat < self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat + anchor_outputs_value_msat {
3163 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3166 if self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3167 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3169 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3170 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3173 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
3174 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3175 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3179 // Now update local state:
3180 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3181 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3182 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3183 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3184 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3185 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3186 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3191 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3193 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3194 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3195 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3196 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3197 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3198 None => fail_reason.into(),
3199 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3200 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).to_byte_array());
3201 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3202 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3204 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3208 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3210 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3211 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3213 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3219 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3222 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3223 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3224 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3226 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3227 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3230 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3233 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3234 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3235 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3237 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3238 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3241 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3245 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3246 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3247 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3249 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3250 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3253 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3257 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3258 where L::Target: Logger
3260 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3261 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3263 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3266 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3267 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3270 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
3272 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3274 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3275 let commitment_txid = {
3276 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3277 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3278 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
3280 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3281 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3282 log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3283 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
3284 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3285 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3289 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3291 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3292 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3293 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3294 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3297 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3298 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3299 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3300 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3303 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3305 if self.context.is_outbound() {
3306 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3307 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3308 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3309 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3310 + self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3311 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3312 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
3313 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3314 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
3315 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3321 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3325 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3326 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3327 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3328 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3329 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3330 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3331 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3332 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3333 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3334 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3335 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3336 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3337 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3340 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3341 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3342 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3343 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3344 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3345 self.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, &self.context.channel_type,
3346 &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3348 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &keys);
3349 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3350 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3351 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3352 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
3353 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), &self.context.channel_id());
3354 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()) {
3355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3357 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3358 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3361 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3363 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3364 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3365 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3368 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3371 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3372 commitment_stats.tx,
3374 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3375 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3376 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3379 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages)
3380 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3382 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3383 let mut need_commitment = false;
3384 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.context.pending_update_fee {
3385 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3386 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3387 need_commitment = true;
3391 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3392 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3393 Some(forward_info.clone())
3395 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3396 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3397 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3398 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3399 need_commitment = true;
3402 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3403 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3404 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3405 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3406 &htlc.payment_hash, &self.context.channel_id);
3407 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3408 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3409 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3410 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3411 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3412 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3413 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3414 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3415 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3417 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3419 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3420 need_commitment = true;
3424 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3425 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3426 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3427 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3428 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3429 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3430 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3432 nondust_htlc_sources,
3436 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3437 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = false;
3438 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3439 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3440 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3442 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3443 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3444 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3445 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3446 if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3447 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3448 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that
3449 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send includes the right HTLCs.
3450 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3451 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3452 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3453 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3454 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3455 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3457 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3458 &self.context.channel_id);
3459 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3462 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3463 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3464 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3465 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3466 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3467 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3468 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3469 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3470 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3474 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3475 &self.context.channel_id(), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3476 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3477 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3480 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3481 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3482 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3483 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3484 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3485 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3486 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3488 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && !self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell() {
3489 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger)
3490 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3493 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3494 /// for our counterparty.
3495 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3496 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3497 ) -> (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>)
3498 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3500 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
3501 if self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3502 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3503 if self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, &self.context.channel_id());
3505 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3506 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3507 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3508 updates: Vec::new(),
3511 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3512 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3513 let mut update_add_count = 0;
3514 let mut update_fulfill_count = 0;
3515 let mut update_fail_count = 0;
3516 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3517 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3518 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3519 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3520 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3521 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3522 // to rebalance channels.
3523 match &htlc_update {
3524 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
3525 amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
3526 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, ..
3528 match self.send_htlc(
3529 amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(),
3530 false, skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger
3532 Ok(_) => update_add_count += 1,
3535 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3536 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}", &payment_hash, msg, &self.context.channel_id());
3537 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3538 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3539 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3540 // into the holding cell without ever being
3541 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3542 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3543 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3546 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3552 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3553 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3554 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3555 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3556 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3557 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3558 let mut additional_monitor_update =
3559 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, .. } =
3560 self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger)
3561 { monitor_update } else { unreachable!() };
3562 update_fulfill_count += 1;
3563 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3565 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3566 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3567 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3568 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3569 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3570 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3571 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3572 // for a full revocation before failing.
3573 debug_assert!(update_fail_msg_option.is_some());
3574 update_fail_count += 1;
3577 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3579 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3586 if update_add_count == 0 && update_fulfill_count == 0 && update_fail_count == 0 && self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3587 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3589 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3590 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, fee_estimator, logger)
3595 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3596 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3597 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3598 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3599 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3601 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3602 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3603 update_add_count, update_fulfill_count, update_fail_count);
3605 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3606 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3612 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3613 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3614 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3615 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3616 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3617 pub fn revoke_and_ack<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK,
3618 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L, hold_mon_update: bool,
3619 ) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3620 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
3622 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
3623 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3625 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3626 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3628 if self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3629 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3632 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3634 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3635 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3636 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3640 if !self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() {
3641 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3642 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3643 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3644 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3645 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3646 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3647 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3648 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3651 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3653 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3654 *self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3657 match &self.context.holder_signer {
3658 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
3659 ecdsa.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3660 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3662 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3664 // TODO (taproot|arik)
3669 self.context.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3670 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3671 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3672 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3673 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
3674 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
3675 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3676 idx: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3677 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3681 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3682 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3683 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3684 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3685 self.context.channel_state.clear_awaiting_remote_revoke();
3686 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
3687 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3688 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3689 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3691 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3692 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3695 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", &self.context.channel_id());
3696 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3697 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3698 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3699 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3700 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3701 let mut require_commitment = false;
3702 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3705 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.context.
3706 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3707 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3708 let expecting_peer_commitment_signed = &mut self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed;
3710 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3711 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3712 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3713 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3714 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3715 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3717 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3721 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3722 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3723 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", &htlc.payment_hash);
3724 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3725 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3727 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3728 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3729 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3734 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3735 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3737 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3741 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3742 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3744 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3745 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3746 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3747 require_commitment = true;
3748 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3749 match forward_info {
3750 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3751 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", &htlc.payment_hash);
3752 require_commitment = true;
3754 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3755 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3756 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3758 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3759 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3760 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3764 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3765 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3766 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3767 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3773 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3774 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3775 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", &htlc.payment_hash);
3776 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3777 *expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3779 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3780 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
3781 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3782 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3783 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3784 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3785 require_commitment = true;
3789 self.context.value_to_self_msat = (self.context.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3791 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
3792 match update_state {
3793 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3794 debug_assert!(self.context.is_outbound());
3795 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3796 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3797 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3798 self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed = true;
3800 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound()); },
3801 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3802 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
3803 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3804 require_commitment = true;
3805 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3806 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
3811 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() && !hold_mon_update;
3812 let release_state_str =
3813 if hold_mon_update { "Holding" } else if release_monitor { "Releasing" } else { "Blocked" };
3814 macro_rules! return_with_htlcs_to_fail {
3815 ($htlcs_to_fail: expr) => {
3816 if !release_monitor {
3817 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
3818 update: monitor_update,
3820 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, None));
3822 return Ok(($htlcs_to_fail, Some(monitor_update)));
3827 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3828 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3829 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3830 if require_commitment {
3831 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3832 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call
3833 // get_last_commitment_update_for_send(), which does not update state, but we're
3834 // definitely now awaiting a remote revoke before we can step forward any more, so
3836 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3837 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3838 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3839 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3840 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3842 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3843 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3844 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3845 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", &self.context.channel_id());
3846 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(Vec::new());
3849 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(fee_estimator, logger) {
3850 (Some(mut additional_update), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3851 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3852 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3853 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3854 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3856 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with holding cell HTLCs freed. {} monitor update.",
3857 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3859 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3860 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3862 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3863 if require_commitment {
3864 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3866 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3867 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3868 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3869 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3871 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed. {} monitor update.",
3872 &self.context.channel_id(),
3873 update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len(),
3876 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3877 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3879 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary. {} monitor update.",
3880 &self.context.channel_id(), release_state_str);
3882 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3883 return_with_htlcs_to_fail!(htlcs_to_fail);
3889 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3890 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3891 /// commitment update.
3892 pub fn queue_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32,
3893 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
3894 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3896 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, fee_estimator, logger);
3897 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3900 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3901 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3902 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3903 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3905 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3906 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3907 fn send_update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
3908 &mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
3909 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
3910 ) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee>
3911 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3913 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
3914 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3916 if !self.context.is_usable() {
3917 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3919 if !self.context.is_live() {
3920 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3923 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3924 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3925 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3926 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3927 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3928 let buffer_fee_msat = commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.context.get_channel_type()) * 1000;
3929 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3930 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3931 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3932 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3936 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3937 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3938 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3939 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
3940 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3941 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3944 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
3945 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3949 if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
3950 force_holding_cell = true;
3953 if force_holding_cell {
3954 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3958 debug_assert!(self.context.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3959 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3961 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3962 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
3967 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3968 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3970 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3972 /// May return `Err(())`, which implies [`ChannelContext::force_shutdown`] should be called immediately.
3973 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ()> where L::Target: Logger {
3974 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
3975 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
3979 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
3980 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3981 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3985 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3986 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3989 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3990 // will be retransmitted.
3991 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3992 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3993 self.context.closing_fee_limits = None;
3995 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3996 self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3998 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3999 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
4000 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
4001 // this HTLC accordingly
4002 inbound_drop_count += 1;
4005 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
4006 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
4007 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
4008 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
4011 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
4012 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
4013 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
4014 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
4015 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
4016 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
4021 self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
4023 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
4024 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
4025 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
4026 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
4030 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
4031 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
4032 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
4033 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
4034 // the update upon reconnection.
4035 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
4039 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4041 self.context.channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
4042 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, &self.context.channel_id());
4046 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
4047 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
4048 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
4049 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
4050 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
4051 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
4052 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
4054 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
4055 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
4056 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
4057 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
4058 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
4059 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
4060 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
4062 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
4063 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
4064 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
4065 self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
4066 self.context.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
4067 self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
4068 self.context.channel_state.set_monitor_update_in_progress();
4071 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
4072 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
4073 /// to the remote side.
4074 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4075 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash,
4076 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
4077 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
4080 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4082 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress());
4083 self.context.channel_state.clear_monitor_update_in_progress();
4085 // If we're past (or at) the AwaitingChannelReady stage on an outbound channel, try to
4086 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
4087 // first received the funding_signed.
4088 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4089 if self.context.is_outbound() &&
4090 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if !flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)) ||
4091 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
4093 self.context.funding_transaction.take()
4095 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4096 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4097 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4098 funding_broadcastable = None;
4101 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4102 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4103 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4104 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4105 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4106 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4107 let channel_ready = if self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4108 assert!(!self.context.is_outbound() || self.context.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4109 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4110 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4111 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4112 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4113 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4114 next_per_commitment_point,
4115 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4119 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4121 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4122 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_forwards);
4123 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4124 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_failures);
4125 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4126 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4128 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4129 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4130 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4131 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4132 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4133 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4137 let raa = if self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4138 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4140 let commitment_update = if self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4141 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4143 if commitment_update.is_some() {
4144 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4147 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4148 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4149 let order = self.context.resend_order.clone();
4150 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4151 &self.context.channel_id(), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4152 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4153 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4154 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4155 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4159 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4160 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4162 if self.context.is_outbound() {
4163 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4165 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4166 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4168 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&self.context.channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.context.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4170 self.context.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4171 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4172 // Check that we won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4173 if !self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
4174 let inbound_stats = self.context.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4175 let outbound_stats = self.context.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4176 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4177 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4178 let max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = self.context.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(fee_estimator);
4179 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4180 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4181 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4183 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat {
4184 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4185 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4191 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
4194 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> SignerResumeUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
4195 let commitment_update = if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4196 self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok()
4198 let funding_signed = if self.context.signer_pending_funding && !self.context.is_outbound() {
4199 self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger).1
4201 let channel_ready = if funding_signed.is_some() {
4202 self.check_get_channel_ready(0)
4205 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked with {} commitment_update, {} funding_signed and {} channel_ready",
4206 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4207 if funding_signed.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" },
4208 if channel_ready.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" });
4210 SignerResumeUpdates {
4217 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4218 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4219 let per_commitment_secret = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().release_commitment_secret(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4220 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4221 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4222 per_commitment_secret,
4223 next_per_commitment_point,
4225 next_local_nonce: None,
4229 /// Gets the last commitment update for immediate sending to our peer.
4230 fn get_last_commitment_update_for_send<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ()> where L::Target: Logger {
4231 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4232 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4233 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4234 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4236 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4237 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4238 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4239 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4240 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4241 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4242 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4243 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4244 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4245 skimmed_fee_msat: htlc.skimmed_fee_msat,
4246 blinding_point: htlc.blinding_point,
4251 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4252 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4254 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4255 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4256 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4257 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4258 reason: err_packet.clone()
4261 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4262 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4263 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4264 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4265 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4266 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4269 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4270 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4271 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4272 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4273 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4280 let update_fee = if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4281 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4282 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4283 feerate_per_kw: self.context.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4287 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerating latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4288 &self.context.channel_id(), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4289 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4290 let commitment_signed = if let Ok(update) = self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).map(|(cu, _)| cu) {
4291 if self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4292 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update generated: clearing signer_pending_commitment_update");
4293 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = false;
4297 if !self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update {
4298 log_trace!(logger, "Commitment update awaiting signer: setting signer_pending_commitment_update");
4299 self.context.signer_pending_commitment_update = true;
4303 Ok(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4304 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4309 /// Gets the `Shutdown` message we should send our peer on reconnect, if any.
4310 pub fn get_outbound_shutdown(&self) -> Option<msgs::Shutdown> {
4311 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
4312 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4313 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4314 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4315 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4320 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4321 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4323 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4324 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4325 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4326 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4327 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4328 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4329 chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4330 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4333 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4335 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4336 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4337 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4338 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4339 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4342 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4343 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4344 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent an invalid channel_reestablish to force close in a non-standard way".to_owned()));
4347 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4348 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4349 let expected_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4350 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4351 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4352 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.context.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4355 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > our_commitment_transaction {
4356 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4357 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4358 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4359 panic!($err_msg, &self.context.channel_id, log_pubkey!(self.context.counterparty_node_id));
4362 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4363 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4364 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4365 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4366 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4367 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4368 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4369 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4373 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4374 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4375 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4376 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!(
4377 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4378 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4379 our_commitment_transaction
4383 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4384 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4385 self.context.channel_state.clear_peer_disconnected();
4386 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = None;
4388 let shutdown_msg = self.get_outbound_shutdown();
4390 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4392 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)) {
4393 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4394 if !self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() ||
4395 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4396 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4397 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4399 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4400 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4401 channel_ready: None,
4402 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4403 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4404 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4408 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4409 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4410 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4411 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4412 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4413 next_per_commitment_point,
4414 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4416 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4417 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4418 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4422 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number == our_commitment_transaction {
4423 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4424 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4426 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == our_commitment_transaction {
4427 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4428 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4431 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4434 debug_assert!(false, "All values should have been handled in the four cases above");
4435 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4436 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel expecting a future local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4437 msg.next_remote_commitment_number,
4438 our_commitment_transaction
4442 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4443 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4444 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4445 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4446 let is_awaiting_remote_revoke = self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke();
4447 if is_awaiting_remote_revoke && !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() {
4448 self.mark_awaiting_response();
4450 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if is_awaiting_remote_revoke { 1 } else { 0 };
4452 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4453 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4454 let next_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
4455 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4456 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
4457 next_per_commitment_point,
4458 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
4462 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4463 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4464 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", &self.context.channel_id());
4466 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", &self.context.channel_id());
4469 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4470 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4471 raa: required_revoke,
4472 commitment_update: None,
4473 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4475 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4476 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4477 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4479 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", &self.context.channel_id());
4482 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4483 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4484 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4485 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4486 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4487 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4490 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4491 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4492 raa: required_revoke,
4493 commitment_update: self.get_last_commitment_update_for_send(logger).ok(),
4494 order: self.context.resend_order.clone(),
4497 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number < next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4498 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4499 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4500 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4501 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4504 Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
4505 "Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a future remote commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)",
4506 msg.next_local_commitment_number,
4507 next_counterparty_commitment_number,
4512 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4513 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4514 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4515 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4517 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4519 if let Some((min, max)) = self.context.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4521 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4522 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4523 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4524 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::ChannelCloseMinimum);
4525 // Use NonAnchorChannelFee because this should be an estimate for a channel close
4526 // that we don't expect to need fee bumping
4527 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
4528 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4530 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4531 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4532 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4533 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4534 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4536 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4537 let min_feerate = if self.context.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.context.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4538 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4539 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4542 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4543 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4544 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4545 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4546 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4547 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4548 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4549 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4550 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4551 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.context.is_outbound() {
4552 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4553 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4554 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4555 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.context.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4556 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4558 self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4561 self.context.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4562 self.context.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4565 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4566 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4567 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4568 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4569 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4570 self.context.closing_negotiation_ready()
4573 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4574 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4575 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4576 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4577 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4578 if self.context.closing_signed_in_flight {
4579 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4581 self.context.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4587 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4588 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4589 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4590 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4592 // If we're waiting on a monitor persistence, that implies we're also waiting to send some
4593 // message to our counterparty (probably a `revoke_and_ack`). In such a case, we shouldn't
4594 // initiate `closing_signed` negotiation until we're clear of all pending messages. Note
4595 // that closing_negotiation_ready checks this case (as well as a few others).
4596 if self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4597 return Ok((None, None, None));
4600 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4601 if let Some(msg) = &self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4602 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4604 return Ok((None, None, None));
4607 // If we're waiting on a counterparty `commitment_signed` to clear some updates from our
4608 // local commitment transaction, we can't yet initiate `closing_signed` negotiation.
4609 if self.context.expecting_peer_commitment_signed {
4610 return Ok((None, None, None));
4613 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4615 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4616 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4617 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4618 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4620 match &self.context.holder_signer {
4621 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4623 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4624 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4626 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4627 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4628 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4629 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4631 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4632 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4633 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4637 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4643 // Marks a channel as waiting for a response from the counterparty. If it's not received
4644 // [`DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS`] after sending our own to them, then we'll attempt
4646 fn mark_awaiting_response(&mut self) {
4647 self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response = Some(0);
4650 /// Determines whether we should disconnect the counterparty due to not receiving a response
4651 /// within our expected timeframe.
4653 /// This should be called on every [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
4654 pub fn should_disconnect_peer_awaiting_response(&mut self) -> bool {
4655 let ticks_elapsed = if let Some(ticks_elapsed) = self.context.sent_message_awaiting_response.as_mut() {
4658 // Don't disconnect when we're not waiting on a response.
4661 *ticks_elapsed += 1;
4662 *ticks_elapsed >= DISCONNECT_PEER_AWAITING_RESPONSE_TICKS
4666 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4667 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4669 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4670 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4672 if self.context.channel_state.is_pre_funded_state() {
4673 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4674 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4675 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4676 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4678 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4679 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4680 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4683 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
4685 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4686 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4689 if self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4690 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4691 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_hex_string())));
4694 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4697 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4698 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4699 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4700 let send_shutdown = !self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent();
4702 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4705 assert!(send_shutdown);
4706 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4707 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4708 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4710 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4711 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4713 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4718 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4720 self.context.channel_state.set_remote_shutdown_sent();
4721 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4723 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4724 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4725 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4726 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
4727 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
4728 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4729 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4732 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4733 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
4735 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4736 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4737 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4738 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4742 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4743 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4744 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4745 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4746 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4747 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4749 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4750 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4757 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
4758 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4760 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4763 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4764 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4766 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4768 let funding_key = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4769 let counterparty_funding_key = self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4770 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4771 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4772 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4773 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4774 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4775 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4776 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4778 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4779 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4782 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4786 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4787 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4788 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>, Option<ShutdownResult>), ChannelError>
4789 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4791 if !self.context.channel_state.is_both_sides_shutdown() {
4792 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4794 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
4795 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4797 if !self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4798 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4800 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4801 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4804 if self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4805 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4808 if self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
4809 self.context.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4810 return Ok((None, None, None));
4813 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
4814 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4815 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4816 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4818 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4820 match self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4823 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4824 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4825 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4826 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
4827 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4831 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4832 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4833 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4837 assert!(self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4838 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4839 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4840 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4841 monitor_update: None,
4842 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4843 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4844 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4845 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4847 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4848 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4849 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4850 return Ok((None, Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result)));
4854 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4856 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4857 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4858 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4859 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4861 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4864 return match &self.context.holder_signer {
4865 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
4867 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.context.secp_ctx)
4868 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4869 let (signed_tx, shutdown_result) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4870 let shutdown_result = ShutdownResult {
4871 monitor_update: None,
4872 dropped_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
4873 unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid: self.context.unbroadcasted_batch_funding_txid(),
4874 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4875 counterparty_node_id: self.context.counterparty_node_id,
4877 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete;
4878 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
4879 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4880 (Some(tx), Some(shutdown_result))
4885 self.context.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4886 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4887 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
4888 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4890 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4891 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4892 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4894 }), signed_tx, shutdown_result))
4896 // TODO (taproot|arik)
4903 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4904 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4905 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4907 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4908 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4910 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4911 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4914 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
4915 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4916 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4917 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - (self.context.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4918 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4920 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4921 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4922 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4924 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4925 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4928 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4929 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4930 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.context.last_sent_closing_fee {
4931 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4932 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4933 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4934 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4935 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4937 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4940 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4941 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4942 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4943 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4945 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4949 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4950 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4951 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4952 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4954 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4960 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4961 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4962 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4963 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4964 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4965 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4966 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4968 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4969 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4972 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4974 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4975 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4981 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4982 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4983 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4984 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4985 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4986 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4987 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.context.config())
4989 if let Some(prev_config) = self.context.prev_config() {
4990 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4997 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4998 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5001 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5002 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.context.channel_state.is_awaiting_remote_revoke() { 1 } else { 0 }
5005 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5006 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5010 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &ChannelSignerType<SP> {
5011 &self.context.holder_signer
5015 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5017 value_to_self_msat: self.context.value_to_self_msat,
5018 channel_value_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5019 channel_reserve_msat: self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5020 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5021 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5022 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5024 for h in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5026 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5034 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5035 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5039 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5040 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5041 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5042 self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()
5045 /// Gets the latest [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] ID which has been released and is in-flight.
5046 pub fn get_latest_unblocked_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5047 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.context.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5048 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5051 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5052 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5053 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5054 if self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return None; }
5055 Some((self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.remove(0).update,
5056 !self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty()))
5059 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning it if it should be
5060 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as blocked.
5061 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5062 -> Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5063 let release_monitor = self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.is_empty();
5064 if !release_monitor {
5065 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5074 pub fn blocked_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> usize {
5075 self.context.blocked_monitor_updates.len()
5078 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5079 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5080 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5082 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5083 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5085 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags)
5086 if (flags & !(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY | FundedStateFlags::PEER_DISCONNECTED | FundedStateFlags::MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH)).is_empty()
5088 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5089 // AwaitingChannelReady set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5090 debug_assert!(self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5093 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5094 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5095 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond AwaitingChannelReady immediately even while
5096 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5097 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5098 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5100 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5101 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5102 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5104 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5105 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5106 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5107 if self.context.is_outbound() { assert!(self.context.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5108 assert!(self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5109 assert_eq!(self.context.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5115 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5116 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5117 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(flags) if flags.is_set(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY)) ||
5118 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_))
5121 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5122 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5123 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5126 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5127 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5128 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent()
5131 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5132 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5133 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5134 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5135 matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete)
5138 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5139 self.context.channel_update_status
5142 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5143 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5144 self.context.channel_update_status = status;
5147 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5149 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5150 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5151 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.context.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5155 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5156 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5157 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5160 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5164 // If we're still pending the signature on a funding transaction, then we're not ready to send a
5165 // channel_ready yet.
5166 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
5170 // Note that we don't include ChannelState::WaitingForBatch as we don't want to send
5171 // channel_ready until the entire batch is ready.
5172 let need_commitment_update = if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if (f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL).is_empty()) {
5173 self.context.channel_state.set_our_channel_ready();
5175 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5176 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady(self.context.channel_state.with_funded_state_flags_mask().into());
5177 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5179 } else if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(f) if f & !FundedStateFlags::ALL == AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::OUR_CHANNEL_READY) {
5180 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5183 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 &&
5184 self.context.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new())
5186 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5187 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5188 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5189 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5190 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5191 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-AwaitingChannelReady: {}.\n\
5192 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5193 self.context.channel_state.to_u32());
5195 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5199 if need_commitment_update {
5200 if !self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
5201 if !self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5202 let next_per_commitment_point =
5203 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.context.secp_ctx);
5204 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5205 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5206 next_per_commitment_point,
5207 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.context.outbound_scid_alias),
5211 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5217 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5218 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5219 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5220 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5221 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5222 chain_hash: ChainHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5223 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5225 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5228 let mut msgs = (None, None);
5229 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.context.get_funding_txo() {
5230 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5231 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5232 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5233 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5234 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5235 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5236 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.context.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5237 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
5238 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5239 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5240 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5241 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5242 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5243 // channel and move on.
5244 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5245 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5247 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
5248 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5249 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5251 if self.context.is_outbound() {
5252 if !tx.is_coin_base() {
5253 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5254 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5255 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5256 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5257 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5258 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5263 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5264 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5265 self.context.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5266 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5267 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5270 // If this is a coinbase transaction and not a 0-conf channel
5271 // we should update our min_depth to 100 to handle coinbase maturity
5272 if tx.is_coin_base() &&
5273 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
5274 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
5275 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
5278 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5279 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5280 // may have already happened for this block).
5281 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5282 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5283 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5284 msgs = (Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs);
5287 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5288 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5289 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, &self.context.channel_id());
5290 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5298 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5299 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5300 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5301 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5303 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5304 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5307 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5309 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5310 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, chain_hash: ChainHash,
5311 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5312 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5314 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5317 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5320 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5321 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5322 chain_node_signer: Option<(ChainHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5323 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5325 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5328 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5329 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5330 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5332 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5333 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5335 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5336 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5337 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5345 self.context.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.context.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5347 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5348 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5349 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5351 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id);
5352 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5355 if matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5356 self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready() {
5357 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5358 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5359 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5360 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5361 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5362 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5365 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5366 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5367 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5368 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5370 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5371 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5372 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5374 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5375 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5376 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5377 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5379 } else if !self.context.is_outbound() && self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5380 height >= self.context.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5381 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", &self.context.channel_id);
5382 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5383 assert!(self.context.channel_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady(ChannelReadyFlags::new()));
5384 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_our_channel_ready());
5385 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5388 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((chain_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = chain_node_signer {
5389 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5391 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5394 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5395 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5396 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5397 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5398 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5399 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5400 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5401 let reorg_height = self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5402 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5403 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5404 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5405 let best_time = self.context.update_time_counter;
5406 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(ChainHash, &&dyn NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5407 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5408 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5409 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5410 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5416 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5421 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5422 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5424 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5425 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged [`ChannelReady`] messages in both
5426 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5427 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5429 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5432 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5434 /// [`ChannelReady`]: crate::ln::msgs::ChannelReady
5435 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5436 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5437 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5438 if !self.context.config.announced_channel {
5439 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5441 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5442 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5445 let short_channel_id = self.context.get_short_channel_id()
5446 .ok_or(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel has not been confirmed yet".to_owned()))?;
5447 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5448 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5449 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.context.get_counterparty_node_id());
5450 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5452 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5453 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5456 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5457 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5458 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5459 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5460 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5466 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5467 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5468 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5469 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5471 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5474 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5478 if !self.context.is_usable() {
5482 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5483 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5487 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5491 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5492 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5495 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5499 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5501 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5506 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5507 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5508 let our_bitcoin_sig = match ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx) {
5510 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5515 let short_channel_id = match self.context.get_short_channel_id() {
5517 None => return None,
5520 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5522 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5523 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5525 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5526 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5529 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5535 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5537 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5538 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5539 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5540 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.context.announcement_sigs {
5541 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5542 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5543 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5545 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5546 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5547 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5548 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5549 let our_bitcoin_sig = ecdsa.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.context.secp_ctx)
5550 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5551 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5552 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5553 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5554 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5555 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5556 contents: announcement,
5559 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5564 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5568 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5569 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5570 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5571 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5572 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32,
5573 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5574 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5575 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5577 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5579 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5580 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5581 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5582 &announcement, self.context.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5584 if self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5585 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5586 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5587 &announcement, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5590 self.context.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5591 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5592 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5593 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5596 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5599 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5600 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5601 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5602 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: ChainHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5603 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5604 if self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5607 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5609 Err(_) => return None,
5611 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5612 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5617 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5618 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5619 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5620 assert!(self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected());
5621 assert_ne!(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5622 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5623 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5624 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5625 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5626 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5627 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5628 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5629 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5630 let remote_last_secret = if self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5631 let remote_last_secret = self.context.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5632 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), &self.context.channel_id());
5635 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
5638 self.mark_awaiting_response();
5639 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5640 channel_id: self.context.channel_id(),
5641 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5642 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5643 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5644 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5645 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5646 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5648 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5649 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5650 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5651 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5652 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5653 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5654 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5655 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5656 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached AwaitingChannelReady so we can't
5658 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5659 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5660 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5661 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5662 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5663 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5664 next_funding_txid: None,
5669 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5671 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5672 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5673 /// commitment update.
5675 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5676 pub fn queue_add_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5677 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5678 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5679 blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5680 ) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
5681 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5684 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true,
5685 skimmed_fee_msat, blinding_point, fee_estimator, logger)
5686 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5688 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5689 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5694 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5695 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5697 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5699 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5700 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5702 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5703 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5704 /// regenerate them.
5706 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5707 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5709 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5710 fn send_htlc<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5711 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5712 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool,
5713 skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>, blinding_point: Option<PublicKey>,
5714 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5715 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError>
5716 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5718 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) ||
5719 self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() ||
5720 self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent()
5722 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5724 let channel_total_msat = self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5725 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5726 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5729 if amount_msat == 0 {
5730 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5733 let available_balances = self.context.get_available_balances(fee_estimator);
5734 if amount_msat < available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat {
5735 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than our next-HTLC minimum - {} msat",
5736 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5739 if amount_msat > available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat {
5740 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send more than our next-HTLC maximum - {} msat",
5741 available_balances.next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat)));
5744 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() {
5745 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5746 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5747 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5748 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5749 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5750 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5751 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5754 let need_holding_cell = self.context.channel_state.should_force_holding_cell();
5755 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC with hash {} for {} msat {}",
5756 payment_hash, amount_msat,
5757 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
5758 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
5759 else { "to peer" });
5761 if need_holding_cell {
5762 force_holding_cell = true;
5765 // Now update local state:
5766 if force_holding_cell {
5767 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5772 onion_routing_packet,
5779 self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5780 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5782 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5784 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5790 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5791 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5792 htlc_id: self.context.next_holder_htlc_id,
5796 onion_routing_packet,
5800 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5805 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
5806 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5807 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5808 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5810 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5811 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5812 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5814 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5815 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5819 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5820 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5821 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", &htlc.payment_hash);
5822 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5823 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5824 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5825 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5828 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
5829 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5830 debug_assert!(!self.context.is_outbound());
5831 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5832 self.context.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5833 self.context.pending_update_fee = None;
5836 self.context.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5838 let (mut htlcs_ref, counterparty_commitment_tx) =
5839 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5840 let counterparty_commitment_txid = counterparty_commitment_tx.trust().txid();
5841 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5842 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5844 if self.context.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5845 self.context.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5848 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5849 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5850 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
5851 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
5852 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5853 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5854 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5855 commitment_number: self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5856 their_per_commitment_point: self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
5857 feerate_per_kw: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw()),
5858 to_broadcaster_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat()),
5859 to_countersignatory_value_sat: Some(counterparty_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat()),
5862 self.context.channel_state.set_awaiting_remote_revoke();
5866 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L)
5867 -> (Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>, CommitmentTransaction)
5868 where L::Target: Logger
5870 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5871 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5872 let counterparty_commitment_tx = commitment_stats.tx;
5874 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5876 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
5877 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.context.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5878 *self.context.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5879 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5880 let total_pending_htlcs = self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5881 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5882 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.context.next_holder_htlc_id
5883 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5884 && info.feerate == self.context.feerate_per_kw {
5885 let actual_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(self.context.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.context.get_channel_type());
5886 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5892 (commitment_stats.htlcs_included, counterparty_commitment_tx)
5895 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
5896 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5897 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5898 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
5899 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5900 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
5902 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5903 let commitment_stats = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5904 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5906 match &self.context.holder_signer {
5907 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
5908 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5911 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5912 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5916 let res = ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(
5917 &commitment_stats.tx,
5918 commitment_stats.inbound_htlc_preimages,
5919 commitment_stats.outbound_htlc_preimages,
5920 &self.context.secp_ctx,
5921 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5923 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5925 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5926 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5927 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.context.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5928 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5930 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5931 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5932 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5933 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, &self.context.channel_type, &counterparty_keys)),
5934 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.to_public_key().serialize()),
5935 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), &self.context.channel_id());
5939 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5940 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
5944 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5945 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5947 // TODO (taproot|arik)
5953 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
5954 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
5956 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5957 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5958 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
5959 &mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32,
5960 source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, skimmed_fee_msat: Option<u64>,
5961 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L
5962 ) -> Result<Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
5963 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
5965 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source,
5966 onion_routing_packet, false, skimmed_fee_msat, None, fee_estimator, logger);
5967 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
5970 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
5971 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
5972 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
5978 /// Applies the `ChannelUpdate` and returns a boolean indicating whether a change actually
5980 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, ChannelError> {
5981 let new_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5982 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5983 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5984 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5986 let did_change = self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info != new_forwarding_info;
5988 self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info = new_forwarding_info;
5994 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5995 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5996 pub fn get_shutdown(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
5997 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
5998 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6000 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6001 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6002 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6005 if self.context.channel_state.is_local_shutdown_sent() {
6006 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6008 else if self.context.channel_state.is_remote_shutdown_sent() {
6009 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6011 if self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6012 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6014 assert!(!matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::ShutdownComplete));
6015 if self.context.channel_state.is_peer_disconnected() || self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress() {
6016 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6019 let update_shutdown_script = match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6022 // use override shutdown script if provided
6023 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6024 Some(script) => script,
6026 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6027 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6028 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6029 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6033 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6034 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6036 self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6041 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6042 self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6043 self.context.channel_state.set_local_shutdown_sent();
6044 self.context.update_time_counter += 1;
6046 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6047 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6048 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6049 update_id: self.context.latest_monitor_update_id,
6050 counterparty_node_id: Some(self.context.counterparty_node_id),
6051 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6052 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6055 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6056 self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)
6058 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6059 channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6060 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6063 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6064 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6065 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6066 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6067 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6069 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6070 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6077 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6078 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6080 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6083 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6084 self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6085 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6087 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6088 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6092 .chain(self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6096 /// A not-yet-funded outbound (from holder) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6097 pub(super) struct OutboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6098 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6099 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6102 impl<SP: Deref> OutboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6103 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref>(
6104 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6105 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
6106 outbound_scid_alias: u64, temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId>
6107 ) -> Result<OutboundV1Channel<SP>, APIError>
6108 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6109 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6111 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
6112 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
6113 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6114 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6116 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
6117 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
6119 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6120 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
6122 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
6123 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
6124 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
6126 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6127 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
6129 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
6130 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6131 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6132 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6133 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
6136 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
6137 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
6139 let (commitment_conf_target, anchor_outputs_value_msat) = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6140 (ConfirmationTarget::AnchorChannelFee, ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 * 1000)
6142 (ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee, 0)
6144 let commitment_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(commitment_conf_target);
6146 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
6147 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(commitment_feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type);
6148 if value_to_self_msat.saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value_msat) < commitment_tx_fee {
6149 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
6152 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6153 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6155 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6156 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6157 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6158 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6162 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6163 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6164 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6168 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6169 Ok(script) => script,
6170 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
6173 let temporary_channel_id = temporary_channel_id.unwrap_or_else(|| ChannelId::temporary_from_entropy_source(entropy_source));
6176 context: ChannelContext {
6179 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6180 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6181 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
6182 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6187 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
6189 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
6190 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
6191 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT),
6192 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6194 channel_value_satoshis,
6196 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6198 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6199 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6202 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6203 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6206 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6207 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6208 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6209 pending_update_fee: None,
6210 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6211 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6212 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6213 update_time_counter: 1,
6215 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6217 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
6218 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
6219 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
6220 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
6221 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
6222 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
6224 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
6225 signer_pending_funding: false,
6227 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6228 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6229 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6230 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
6232 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6233 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6234 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
6235 closing_fee_limits: None,
6236 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
6238 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
6239 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
6240 short_channel_id: None,
6241 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
6243 feerate_per_kw: commitment_feerate,
6244 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
6245 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
6246 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
6247 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
6248 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6249 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6250 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
6251 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
6252 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
6253 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
6254 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
6256 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
6258 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
6259 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
6260 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
6261 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
6262 counterparty_parameters: None,
6263 funding_outpoint: None,
6264 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
6266 funding_transaction: None,
6267 is_batch_funding: None,
6269 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
6270 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
6271 counterparty_node_id,
6273 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
6275 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
6277 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6278 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6280 announcement_sigs: None,
6282 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6283 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6284 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6285 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6287 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6288 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
6290 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
6291 outbound_scid_alias,
6293 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
6294 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
6296 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6297 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
6302 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
6304 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
6308 /// Only allowed after [`ChannelContext::channel_transaction_parameters`] is set.
6309 fn get_funding_created_msg<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6310 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6311 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6312 let signature = match &self.context.holder_signer {
6313 // TODO (taproot|arik): move match into calling method for Taproot
6314 ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(ecdsa) => {
6315 ecdsa.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), &self.context.secp_ctx)
6316 .map(|(sig, _)| sig).ok()?
6318 // TODO (taproot|arik)
6323 if self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6324 log_trace!(logger, "Counterparty commitment signature ready for funding_created message: clearing signer_pending_funding");
6325 self.context.signer_pending_funding = false;
6328 Some(msgs::FundingCreated {
6329 temporary_channel_id: self.context.temporary_channel_id.unwrap(),
6330 funding_txid: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().txid,
6331 funding_output_index: self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.as_ref().unwrap().index,
6334 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6336 next_local_nonce: None,
6340 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
6341 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
6342 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
6343 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
6344 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
6345 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
6346 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
6347 pub fn get_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, is_batch_funding: bool, logger: &L)
6348 -> Result<Option<msgs::FundingCreated>, (Self, ChannelError)> where L::Target: Logger {
6349 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6350 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
6353 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6354 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
6356 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
6358 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6359 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6360 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6361 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6364 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
6365 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6367 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
6369 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingNegotiated;
6370 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
6372 // If the funding transaction is a coinbase transaction, we need to set the minimum depth to 100.
6373 // We can skip this if it is a zero-conf channel.
6374 if funding_transaction.is_coin_base() &&
6375 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) > 0 &&
6376 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) < COINBASE_MATURITY {
6377 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(COINBASE_MATURITY);
6380 self.context.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
6381 self.context.is_batch_funding = Some(()).filter(|_| is_batch_funding);
6383 let funding_created = self.get_funding_created_msg(logger);
6384 if funding_created.is_none() {
6385 if !self.context.signer_pending_funding {
6386 log_trace!(logger, "funding_created awaiting signer; setting signer_pending_funding");
6387 self.context.signer_pending_funding = true;
6394 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
6395 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
6396 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
6397 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
6398 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
6399 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6400 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
6401 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
6402 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
6403 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
6406 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
6407 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
6408 // `only_static_remotekey`.
6409 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
6410 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6411 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
6417 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
6418 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
6419 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
6420 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close<F: Deref>(
6421 &mut self, chain_hash: ChainHash, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>
6422 ) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()>
6424 F::Target: FeeEstimator
6426 if !self.context.is_outbound() ||
6428 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
6429 if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT
6434 if self.context.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6435 // We've exhausted our options
6438 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
6439 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
6442 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
6443 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
6444 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
6445 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
6447 if self.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6448 self.context.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
6449 self.context.feerate_per_kw = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::NonAnchorChannelFee);
6450 assert!(!self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features.supports_anchors_nonzero_fee_htlc_tx());
6451 } else if self.context.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
6452 self.context.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
6454 self.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
6456 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = self.context.channel_type.clone();
6457 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
6460 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: ChainHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
6461 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6462 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
6464 if self.context.have_received_message() {
6465 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
6468 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6469 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
6472 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
6473 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
6477 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
6478 funding_satoshis: self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6479 push_msat: self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.context.value_to_self_msat,
6480 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6481 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6482 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6483 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6484 feerate_per_kw: self.context.feerate_per_kw as u32,
6485 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6486 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
6487 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
6488 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6489 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
6490 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6491 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
6492 first_per_commitment_point,
6493 channel_flags: if self.context.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
6494 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6495 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
6496 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
6498 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
6503 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6504 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
6506 // Check sanity of message fields:
6507 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6508 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
6510 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags) if flags == NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT) {
6511 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
6513 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
6514 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
6516 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis {
6517 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis)));
6519 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6520 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6522 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6523 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
6524 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.context.channel_value_satoshis - self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6526 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.context.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6527 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6528 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6530 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6531 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
6532 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
6534 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6535 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6537 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6538 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6541 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6542 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6543 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6545 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6546 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6548 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6549 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6551 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6552 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6554 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6555 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6557 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6558 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6560 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
6561 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
6564 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
6565 if *ty != self.context.channel_type {
6566 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
6568 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
6569 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
6571 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6572 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6573 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6575 self.context.channel_type = channel_type.clone();
6576 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = channel_type;
6579 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6580 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6581 &Some(ref script) => {
6582 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6583 if script.len() == 0 {
6586 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6587 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
6589 Some(script.clone())
6592 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6594 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6599 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
6600 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
6601 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
6602 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
6603 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
6605 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
6606 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
6608 self.context.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
6611 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6612 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6613 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6614 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6615 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6616 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6619 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
6620 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
6621 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
6624 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
6625 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
6627 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6628 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6630 self.context.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
6635 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
6636 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
6637 pub fn funding_signed<L: Deref>(
6638 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
6639 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (OutboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError)>
6643 if !self.context.is_outbound() {
6644 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned())));
6646 if !matches!(self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::FundingNegotiated) {
6647 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned())));
6649 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
6650 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
6651 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
6652 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
6655 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6657 let counterparty_keys = self.context.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6658 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
6659 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6660 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6662 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
6663 &self.context.channel_id(), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
6665 let holder_signer = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
6666 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
6668 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
6669 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
6670 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
6671 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
6672 if let Err(_) = self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
6673 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned())));
6677 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
6678 initial_commitment_tx,
6681 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
6682 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
6686 self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new());
6687 if validated.is_err() {
6688 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
6691 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
6692 let funding_txo = self.context.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
6693 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
6694 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
6695 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
6696 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
6697 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
6698 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
6699 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
6700 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
6701 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
6702 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
6704 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
6705 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
6706 counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(),
6707 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6708 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(),
6709 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
6710 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
6711 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
6713 assert!(!self.context.channel_state.is_monitor_update_in_progress()); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
6714 if self.context.is_batch_funding() {
6715 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH);
6717 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
6719 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6720 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
6722 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", &self.context.channel_id());
6724 let mut channel = Channel { context: self.context };
6726 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
6727 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6728 Ok((channel, channel_monitor))
6731 /// Indicates that the signer may have some signatures for us, so we should retry if we're
6734 pub fn signer_maybe_unblocked<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::FundingCreated> where L::Target: Logger {
6735 if self.context.signer_pending_funding && self.context.is_outbound() {
6736 log_trace!(logger, "Signer unblocked a funding_created");
6737 self.get_funding_created_msg(logger)
6742 /// A not-yet-funded inbound (from counterparty) channel using V1 channel establishment.
6743 pub(super) struct InboundV1Channel<SP: Deref> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6744 pub context: ChannelContext<SP>,
6745 pub unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext,
6748 impl<SP: Deref> InboundV1Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6749 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
6750 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
6751 pub fn new<ES: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
6752 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
6753 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
6754 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
6755 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, is_0conf: bool,
6756 ) -> Result<InboundV1Channel<SP>, ChannelError>
6757 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
6758 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
6761 let logger = WithContext::from(logger, Some(counterparty_node_id), Some(msg.temporary_channel_id));
6762 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
6764 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
6765 // support this channel type.
6766 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
6767 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
6768 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
6771 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
6772 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
6773 // `static_remote_key`.
6774 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
6775 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
6777 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
6778 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
6779 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
6781 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
6782 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
6784 channel_type.clone()
6786 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
6787 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6788 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
6793 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
6794 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6795 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
6796 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
6797 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
6798 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(msg.revocation_basepoint),
6799 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
6800 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(msg.delayed_payment_basepoint),
6801 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(msg.htlc_basepoint)
6804 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
6805 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
6808 // Check sanity of message fields:
6809 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
6810 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6812 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
6813 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
6815 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6816 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6818 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
6819 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
6820 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6822 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
6823 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
6825 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
6826 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
6828 Channel::<SP>::check_remote_fee(&channel_type, fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, &&logger)?;
6830 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
6831 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
6832 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
6834 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
6835 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
6837 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
6838 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
6841 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
6842 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
6843 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
6845 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
6846 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
6848 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
6849 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
6851 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6852 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6854 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
6855 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
6857 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6858 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6860 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6861 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6864 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
6866 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
6867 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
6868 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
6872 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
6873 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6874 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
6875 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
6876 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
6878 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
6879 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
6881 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
6882 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
6883 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
6885 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
6886 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
6889 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
6890 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
6891 let anchor_outputs_value = if channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
6892 ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2
6896 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
6897 let commitment_tx_fee = commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, &channel_type) / 1000;
6898 if (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value) < commitment_tx_fee {
6899 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", (funders_amount_msat / 1000).saturating_sub(anchor_outputs_value), commitment_tx_fee)));
6902 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee - anchor_outputs_value;
6903 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
6904 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
6905 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
6906 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
6909 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
6910 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6911 &Some(ref script) => {
6912 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
6913 if script.len() == 0 {
6916 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
6917 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
6919 Some(script.clone())
6922 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
6924 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
6929 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
6930 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6931 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
6932 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
6936 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6937 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
6938 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
6942 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script(channel_keys_id) {
6943 Ok(script) => script,
6944 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
6947 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6948 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6950 let minimum_depth = if is_0conf {
6953 Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1))
6957 context: ChannelContext {
6960 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
6961 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
6963 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
6968 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6970 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
6971 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
6972 channel_state: ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(
6973 NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT
6975 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6978 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
6980 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
6981 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6984 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6985 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
6986 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
6988 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6989 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
6990 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
6991 pending_update_fee: None,
6992 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
6993 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
6994 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
6995 update_time_counter: 1,
6997 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6999 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
7000 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
7001 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
7002 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
7003 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
7004 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
7006 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
7007 signer_pending_funding: false,
7009 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7010 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7011 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7012 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
7014 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7015 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7016 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
7017 closing_fee_limits: None,
7018 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
7020 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
7021 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
7022 short_channel_id: None,
7023 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
7025 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
7026 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
7027 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
7028 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
7029 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
7030 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
7031 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
7032 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7033 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
7034 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
7035 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
7036 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
7039 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
7041 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
7042 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
7043 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
7044 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
7045 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7046 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
7047 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
7049 funding_outpoint: None,
7050 channel_type_features: channel_type.clone()
7052 funding_transaction: None,
7053 is_batch_funding: None,
7055 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
7056 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
7057 counterparty_node_id,
7059 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7061 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
7063 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7064 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7066 announcement_sigs: None,
7068 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7069 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7070 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7071 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7073 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7074 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
7076 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
7077 outbound_scid_alias: 0,
7079 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
7080 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
7082 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7083 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
7088 blocked_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
7090 unfunded_context: UnfundedChannelContext { unfunded_channel_age_ticks: 0 }
7096 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
7097 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
7099 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7100 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7101 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7102 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
7105 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7106 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7108 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
7110 if self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7111 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
7114 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7117 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7118 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
7119 /// [`InboundV1Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
7121 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7122 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7123 let first_per_commitment_point = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().get_per_commitment_point(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.context.secp_ctx);
7124 let keys = self.context.get_holder_pubkeys();
7126 msgs::AcceptChannel {
7127 temporary_channel_id: self.context.channel_id,
7128 dust_limit_satoshis: self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7129 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7130 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7131 htlc_minimum_msat: self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7132 minimum_depth: self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
7133 to_self_delay: self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7134 max_accepted_htlcs: self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7135 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
7136 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7137 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
7138 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7139 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key(),
7140 first_per_commitment_point,
7141 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
7142 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
7143 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
7145 channel_type: Some(self.context.channel_type.clone()),
7147 next_local_nonce: None,
7151 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
7152 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
7154 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
7156 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
7157 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
7160 fn check_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<CommitmentTransaction, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
7161 let funding_script = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7163 let keys = self.context.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
7164 let initial_commitment_tx = self.context.build_commitment_transaction(self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
7165 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
7166 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7167 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.context.channel_value_satoshis);
7168 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
7169 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
7170 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
7171 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
7172 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), &self.context.channel_id());
7173 secp_check!(self.context.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
7175 Ok(initial_commitment_tx)
7178 pub fn funding_created<L: Deref>(
7179 mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
7180 ) -> Result<(Channel<SP>, Option<msgs::FundingSigned>, ChannelMonitor<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::EcdsaSigner>), (Self, ChannelError)>
7184 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7185 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned())));
7188 self.context.channel_state, ChannelState::NegotiatingFunding(flags)
7189 if flags == (NegotiatingFundingFlags::OUR_INIT_SENT | NegotiatingFundingFlags::THEIR_INIT_SENT)
7191 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
7192 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
7194 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned())));
7196 if self.context.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
7197 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
7198 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
7199 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
7202 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
7203 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
7204 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
7205 // check_funding_created_signature may fail.
7206 self.context.holder_signer.as_mut().provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7208 let initial_commitment_tx = match self.check_funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
7210 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
7211 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
7212 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close(e)));
7215 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
7216 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
7217 panic!("unexpected error type from check_funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
7221 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7222 initial_commitment_tx,
7225 &self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7226 self.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7229 if let Err(_) = self.context.holder_signer.as_ref().validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new()) {
7230 return Err((self, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())));
7233 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
7235 self.context.channel_state = ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::new());
7236 self.context.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
7237 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7238 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
7240 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, funding_signed) = self.context.get_funding_signed_msg(logger);
7242 let funding_redeemscript = self.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
7243 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
7244 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.context.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.context.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.context.is_outbound());
7245 let shutdown_script = self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
7246 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, self.context.channel_keys_id);
7247 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
7248 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.context.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
7249 shutdown_script, self.context.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
7250 &self.context.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
7251 &self.context.channel_transaction_parameters,
7252 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.context.channel_value_satoshis,
7254 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.context.counterparty_node_id);
7255 channel_monitor.provide_initial_counterparty_commitment_tx(
7256 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust().txid(), Vec::new(),
7257 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
7258 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), self.context.feerate_per_kw,
7259 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_broadcaster_value_sat(),
7260 counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.to_countersignatory_value_sat(), logger);
7262 log_info!(logger, "{} funding_signed for peer for channel {}",
7263 if funding_signed.is_some() { "Generated" } else { "Waiting for signature on" }, &self.context.channel_id());
7265 // Promote the channel to a full-fledged one now that we have updated the state and have a
7266 // `ChannelMonitor`.
7267 let mut channel = Channel {
7268 context: self.context,
7270 let need_channel_ready = channel.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
7271 channel.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
7273 Ok((channel, funding_signed, channel_monitor))
7277 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7278 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
7280 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
7286 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7287 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7288 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
7289 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
7290 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
7292 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7293 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7294 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7295 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7301 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
7302 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7303 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7304 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
7305 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
7306 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7311 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7312 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7313 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
7314 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
7316 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7317 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
7318 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
7319 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
7324 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
7325 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7326 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7327 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
7328 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
7329 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7334 impl<SP: Deref> Writeable for Channel<SP> where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
7335 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
7336 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
7339 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7341 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7342 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
7343 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
7344 let user_id_low = self.context.user_id as u64;
7345 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
7347 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
7348 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
7349 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
7350 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
7352 self.context.channel_id.write(writer)?;
7354 let mut channel_state = self.context.channel_state;
7355 if matches!(channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(_)|ChannelState::ChannelReady(_)) {
7356 channel_state.set_peer_disconnected();
7358 channel_state.to_u32().write(writer)?;
7360 self.context.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7362 self.context.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
7364 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
7365 // deserialized from that format.
7366 match self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
7367 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
7368 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
7370 self.context.destination_script.write(writer)?;
7372 self.context.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7373 self.context.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
7374 self.context.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
7376 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
7377 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7378 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
7379 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
7382 (self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7383 for htlc in self.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
7384 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
7387 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7388 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7389 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7390 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7392 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
7393 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
7395 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7397 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
7399 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
7401 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7404 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
7406 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
7411 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
7412 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7413 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7415 (self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7416 for htlc in self.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
7417 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7418 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7419 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7420 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7421 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
7423 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
7425 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
7427 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
7430 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
7431 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
7432 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
7435 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
7437 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7438 preimages.push(preimage);
7440 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7441 reason.write(writer)?;
7443 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
7445 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
7446 preimages.push(preimage);
7448 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
7449 reason.write(writer)?;
7452 pending_outbound_skimmed_fees.push(htlc.skimmed_fee_msat);
7453 pending_outbound_blinding_points.push(htlc.blinding_point);
7456 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees: Vec<Option<u64>> = Vec::new();
7457 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points: Vec<Option<PublicKey>> = Vec::new();
7458 (self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7459 for update in self.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
7461 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7462 ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet,
7463 blinding_point, skimmed_fee_msat,
7466 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
7467 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
7468 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7469 source.write(writer)?;
7470 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
7472 holding_cell_skimmed_fees.push(skimmed_fee_msat);
7473 holding_cell_blinding_points.push(blinding_point);
7475 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
7477 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
7478 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7480 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
7482 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7483 err_packet.write(writer)?;
7488 match self.context.resend_order {
7489 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
7490 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
7493 self.context.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
7494 self.context.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
7495 self.context.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
7497 (self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7498 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.context.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
7499 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
7500 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7503 (self.context.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7504 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.context.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
7505 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
7506 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
7507 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
7510 if self.context.is_outbound() {
7511 self.context.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
7512 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.context.pending_update_fee {
7513 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
7515 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
7516 // commitment_signed, drop it.
7517 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
7519 self.context.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
7521 self.context.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
7522 (self.context.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
7523 self.context.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
7524 self.context.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
7526 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7527 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7528 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7529 // consider the stale state on reload.
7532 self.context.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
7533 self.context.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
7534 self.context.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
7536 self.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7537 self.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
7538 self.context.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
7540 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7541 self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7543 self.context.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7544 self.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
7545 self.context.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
7547 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
7548 self.context.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
7550 match &self.context.counterparty_forwarding_info {
7553 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
7554 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
7555 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
7557 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
7560 self.context.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
7561 self.context.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
7563 self.context.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7564 self.context.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
7565 self.context.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
7567 self.context.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
7569 self.context.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
7571 self.context.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
7573 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7574 (self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
7575 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7576 for htlc in self.context.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
7577 htlc.write(writer)?;
7580 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
7581 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
7582 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
7584 let chan_type = if self.context.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
7585 Some(&self.context.channel_type) } else { None };
7587 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
7588 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
7589 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
7590 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
7591 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
7592 if self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.context.channel_value_satoshis)
7593 { Some(self.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
7595 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
7596 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
7597 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
7598 if self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.context.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
7599 { Some(self.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
7601 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_pending_event_emitted);
7602 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.context.channel_ready_event_emitted);
7604 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7605 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
7606 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
7607 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.context.user_id >> 64) as u64);
7609 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.context.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
7611 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
7612 (0, self.context.announcement_sigs, option),
7613 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
7614 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
7615 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
7616 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
7617 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
7619 (1, self.context.minimum_depth, option),
7620 (2, chan_type, option),
7621 (3, self.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7622 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
7623 (5, self.context.config, required),
7624 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
7625 (7, self.context.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7626 (8, self.context.blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7627 (9, self.context.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7628 (11, self.context.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, required_vec),
7629 (13, self.context.channel_creation_height, required),
7630 (15, preimages, required_vec),
7631 (17, self.context.announcement_sigs_state, required),
7632 (19, self.context.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7633 (21, self.context.outbound_scid_alias, required),
7634 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7635 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7636 (27, self.context.channel_keys_id, required),
7637 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7638 (29, self.context.temporary_channel_id, option),
7639 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7640 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7641 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees, optional_vec),
7642 (38, self.context.is_batch_funding, option),
7643 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7644 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points, optional_vec),
7651 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
7652 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<SP>
7654 ES::Target: EntropySource,
7655 SP::Target: SignerProvider
7657 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
7658 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
7659 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
7661 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
7662 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
7663 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
7664 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7666 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
7668 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
7669 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
7670 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
7671 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
7672 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7674 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
7675 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7678 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7679 let channel_state = ChannelState::from_u32(Readable::read(reader)?).map_err(|_| DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7680 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7682 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7684 let mut keys_data = None;
7686 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
7687 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
7688 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7689 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
7690 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
7691 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
7692 let mut data = [0; 1024];
7693 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
7694 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
7695 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
7699 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
7700 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
7701 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
7704 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
7706 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7707 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
7708 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7710 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7712 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7713 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
7714 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7715 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7716 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7717 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7718 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7719 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7720 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
7721 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
7722 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7723 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
7724 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7729 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7730 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7731 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
7732 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7733 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7734 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7735 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7736 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7737 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7738 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7739 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
7740 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7742 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7743 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
7746 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7747 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
7750 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7751 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
7753 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7755 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7756 blinding_point: None,
7760 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7761 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
7762 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
7763 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7764 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
7765 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7766 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
7767 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
7768 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
7769 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7770 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
7771 blinding_point: None,
7773 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
7774 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
7775 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7777 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
7778 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
7779 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
7781 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7785 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7786 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
7787 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
7788 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7791 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
7792 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
7793 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
7795 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7796 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7797 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
7798 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7801 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7802 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
7803 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
7804 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
7807 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7809 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
7811 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7812 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7813 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
7814 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
7816 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
7817 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
7818 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
7819 // consider the stale state on reload.
7820 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7823 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7824 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7825 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
7827 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7830 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
7831 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
7832 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7834 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7835 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
7836 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7837 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
7839 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7840 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7842 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7843 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7845 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7846 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
7847 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
7849 let mut minimum_depth = None;
7851 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
7852 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
7854 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
7855 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7858 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
7860 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
7861 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
7862 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
7863 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
7865 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
7868 let mut channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
7869 let funding_transaction: Option<Transaction> = Readable::read(reader)?;
7871 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7873 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
7874 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
7876 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
7877 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
7879 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
7881 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7882 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
7883 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7885 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
7886 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
7887 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7891 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7892 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7893 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7895 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7901 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7902 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7903 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7904 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7905 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7906 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7907 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7908 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7909 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7910 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7912 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7913 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7914 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7915 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7916 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7917 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7918 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7920 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7921 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7922 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<ChannelId> = None;
7923 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7925 let mut blocked_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7927 let mut pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7928 let mut holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt: Option<Vec<Option<u64>>> = None;
7930 let mut is_batch_funding: Option<()> = None;
7932 let mut pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
7933 let mut holding_cell_blinding_points_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PublicKey>>> = None;
7935 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7936 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7937 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7938 (2, channel_type, option),
7939 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7940 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7941 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7942 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7943 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7944 (8, blocked_monitor_updates, optional_vec),
7945 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7946 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, optional_vec),
7947 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7948 (15, preimages_opt, optional_vec),
7949 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7950 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7951 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7952 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7953 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7954 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7955 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7956 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7957 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7958 (35, pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7959 (37, holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt, optional_vec),
7960 (38, is_batch_funding, option),
7961 (39, pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
7962 (41, holding_cell_blinding_points_opt, optional_vec),
7965 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7966 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7967 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7968 // required channel parameters.
7969 if channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingNegotiated {
7970 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7972 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7974 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7975 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7976 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7977 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7980 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7981 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7982 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7984 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7985 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7987 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7988 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7993 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7994 if iter.next().is_some() {
7995 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7999 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
8000 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
8001 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
8002 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
8003 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
8006 // ChannelTransactionParameters may have had an empty features set upon deserialization.
8007 // To account for that, we're proactively setting/overriding the field here.
8008 channel_parameters.channel_type_features = chan_features.clone();
8010 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8011 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
8013 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
8014 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
8015 // separate u64 values.
8016 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
8018 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
8020 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = pending_outbound_skimmed_fees_opt {
8021 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8022 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8023 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8025 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8026 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8028 if let Some(skimmed_fees) = holding_cell_skimmed_fees_opt {
8029 let mut iter = skimmed_fees.into_iter();
8030 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8031 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, .. } = htlc {
8032 *skimmed_fee_msat = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8035 // We expect all skimmed fees to be consumed above
8036 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8038 if let Some(blinding_pts) = pending_outbound_blinding_points_opt {
8039 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8040 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
8041 htlc.blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8043 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8044 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8046 if let Some(blinding_pts) = holding_cell_blinding_points_opt {
8047 let mut iter = blinding_pts.into_iter();
8048 for htlc in holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter_mut() {
8049 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref mut blinding_point, .. } = htlc {
8050 *blinding_point = iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
8053 // We expect all blinding points to be consumed above
8054 if iter.next().is_some() { return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue) }
8058 context: ChannelContext {
8061 config: config.unwrap(),
8065 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
8066 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
8067 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
8070 temporary_channel_id,
8072 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
8074 channel_value_satoshis,
8076 latest_monitor_update_id,
8078 holder_signer: ChannelSignerType::Ecdsa(holder_signer),
8079 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8082 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
8083 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
8086 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
8087 pending_inbound_htlcs,
8088 pending_outbound_htlcs,
8089 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
8093 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
8094 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
8095 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
8096 monitor_pending_forwards,
8097 monitor_pending_failures,
8098 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
8100 signer_pending_commitment_update: false,
8101 signer_pending_funding: false,
8104 holding_cell_update_fee,
8105 next_holder_htlc_id,
8106 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
8107 update_time_counter,
8110 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8111 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8112 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
8113 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
8115 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
8116 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
8117 expecting_peer_commitment_signed: false,
8118 closing_fee_limits: None,
8119 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
8121 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
8122 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
8124 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
8126 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
8127 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
8128 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
8129 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
8130 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
8131 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
8132 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
8133 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
8134 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
8137 counterparty_forwarding_info,
8139 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
8140 funding_transaction,
8143 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
8144 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
8145 counterparty_node_id,
8147 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
8151 channel_update_status,
8152 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
8156 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8157 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8158 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8159 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
8161 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
8162 sent_message_awaiting_response: None,
8164 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
8165 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
8166 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
8168 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8169 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
8171 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
8172 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
8174 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
8177 blocked_monitor_updates: blocked_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
8186 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::ChainHash;
8187 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{ScriptBuf, Builder};
8188 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
8189 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
8190 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
8191 use crate::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
8192 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{RevocationKey, RevocationBasepoint};
8193 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
8194 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
8195 use crate::ln::channel::{AwaitingChannelReadyFlags, Channel, ChannelState, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundV1Channel, InboundV1Channel, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator, HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK, commit_tx_fee_msat};
8196 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
8197 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, ChannelTypeFeatures, NodeFeatures};
8198 use crate::ln::msgs;
8199 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
8200 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
8201 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{self, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
8202 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
8203 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
8204 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
8205 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
8206 use crate::routing::router::{Path, RouteHop};
8207 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
8208 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
8209 use crate::util::ser::{ReadableArgs, Writeable};
8210 use crate::util::test_utils;
8211 use crate::util::test_utils::{OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey, TestKeysInterface};
8212 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
8213 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
8214 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
8215 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
8216 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
8217 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8218 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
8219 use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::absolute::LockTime;
8220 use bitcoin::address::{WitnessProgram, WitnessVersion};
8221 use crate::prelude::*;
8223 struct TestFeeEstimator {
8226 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
8227 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
8233 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
8234 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
8235 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
8236 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
8240 signer: InMemorySigner,
8243 impl EntropySource for Keys {
8244 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
8247 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
8248 type EcdsaSigner = InMemorySigner;
8250 type TaprootSigner = InMemorySigner;
8252 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
8253 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
8256 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::EcdsaSigner {
8260 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::EcdsaSigner, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
8262 fn get_destination_script(&self, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Result<ScriptBuf, ()> {
8263 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8264 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8265 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
8266 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(channel_monitor_claim_key_hash).into_script())
8269 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
8270 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
8271 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8272 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
8276 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8277 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
8278 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
8282 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
8283 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
8284 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script = ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(
8285 &WitnessProgram::new(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap(),
8288 let seed = [42; 32];
8289 let network = Network::Testnet;
8290 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8291 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
8292 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
8295 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8296 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8297 let config = UserConfig::default();
8298 match OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None) {
8299 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
8300 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
8302 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
8303 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
8307 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
8308 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
8310 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
8311 let original_fee = 253;
8312 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
8313 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
8314 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8315 let seed = [42; 32];
8316 let network = Network::Testnet;
8317 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8319 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8320 let config = UserConfig::default();
8321 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8323 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
8324 // same as the old fee.
8325 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
8326 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8327 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
8331 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
8332 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
8333 // dust limits are used.
8334 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8335 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8336 let seed = [42; 32];
8337 let network = Network::Testnet;
8338 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8339 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8340 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8342 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
8343 // they have different dust limits.
8345 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8346 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8347 let config = UserConfig::default();
8348 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8350 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8351 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8352 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8353 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8354 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8356 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8357 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8358 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8359 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8360 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8362 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8363 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8364 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8365 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8367 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8368 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8369 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8371 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8372 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8373 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8375 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
8376 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
8377 node_a_chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
8379 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
8380 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8381 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
8382 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8385 node_a_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
8387 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
8388 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).to_byte_array()),
8389 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
8390 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8391 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8392 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
8393 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8394 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
8395 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8397 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8398 blinding_point: None,
8401 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
8402 // the dust limit check.
8403 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8404 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8405 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8406 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
8408 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
8409 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
8410 node_a_chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8411 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.context.get_channel_type());
8412 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8413 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8414 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
8418 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
8419 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
8420 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
8421 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
8422 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
8423 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
8424 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8425 let seed = [42; 32];
8426 let network = Network::Testnet;
8427 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8429 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8430 let config = UserConfig::default();
8431 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8433 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8434 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.context.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.context.get_channel_type());
8436 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
8437 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8438 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8439 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8440 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8441 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8443 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8444 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8445 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8446 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8447 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8449 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
8451 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
8452 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
8453 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
8454 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8455 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
8457 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
8458 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.context.get_channel_type()) / 1000) + chan.context.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
8459 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
8460 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.context.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
8461 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
8465 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
8466 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8467 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8468 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8469 let seed = [42; 32];
8470 let network = Network::Testnet;
8471 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8472 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8473 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8475 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
8477 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8478 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8479 let config = UserConfig::default();
8480 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8482 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8483 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
8484 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8485 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8487 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
8488 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8489 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8491 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8492 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8493 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8494 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8496 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8497 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8498 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8500 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8501 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8502 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8504 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
8505 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
8506 assert!(node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8507 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8508 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8509 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8510 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8512 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
8514 assert!(node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger).is_ok());
8515 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
8516 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
8517 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
8518 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
8522 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
8523 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8524 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8525 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8526 let seed = [42; 32];
8527 let network = Network::Testnet;
8528 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8529 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8530 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8532 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
8533 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
8534 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
8535 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
8536 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
8537 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
8538 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
8539 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
8541 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8542 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8543 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8544 let chan_1 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8545 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8546 assert_eq!(chan_1.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8548 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8549 let chan_2 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8550 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8551 assert_eq!(chan_2.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8553 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8555 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` creates a channel with the correct value for
8556 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
8557 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
8558 let chan_3 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8559 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8560 assert_eq!(chan_3.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
8562 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
8563 let chan_4 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8564 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8565 assert_eq!(chan_4.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
8567 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8568 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8569 let chan_5 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8570 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8571 assert_eq!(chan_5.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8573 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8574 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8576 let chan_6 = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8577 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8578 assert_eq!(chan_6.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
8580 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
8581 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
8582 let chan_7 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8583 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8584 assert_eq!(chan_7.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
8586 // Test that `InboundV1Channel::new` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
8587 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
8589 let chan_8 = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8590 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.context.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
8591 assert_eq!(chan_8.context.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
8595 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
8597 // Test that `OutboundV1Channel::new` and `InboundV1Channel::new` create a channel with the correct
8598 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
8599 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
8601 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
8602 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
8603 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
8604 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
8606 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
8607 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
8608 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
8610 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
8612 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
8613 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
8616 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
8617 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
8618 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8619 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8620 let seed = [42; 32];
8621 let network = Network::Testnet;
8622 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8623 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8624 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8627 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8628 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8629 let chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8631 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8632 assert_eq!(chan.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8634 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8635 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
8636 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
8638 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
8639 let chan_inbound_node = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8641 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.context.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
8643 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8644 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
8646 // Channel Negotiations failed
8647 let result = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
8648 assert!(result.is_err());
8653 fn channel_update() {
8654 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8655 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8656 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8657 let seed = [42; 32];
8658 let network = Network::Testnet;
8659 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
8660 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
8661 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8663 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
8664 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8665 let config = UserConfig::default();
8666 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8668 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
8669 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
8670 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
8671 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8672 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false).unwrap();
8674 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
8675 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
8676 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8677 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
8678 node_a_chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
8680 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
8681 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8682 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: LockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
8683 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
8685 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
8686 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, false, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8687 let (_, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
8689 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
8690 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
8691 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
8693 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
8694 let update = ChannelUpdate {
8695 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
8697 short_channel_id: 0,
8700 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
8701 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
8702 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
8704 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
8705 excess_data: Vec::new(),
8707 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
8709 assert!(node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8711 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
8712 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
8713 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
8714 match node_a_chan.context.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
8716 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
8717 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
8718 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
8720 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
8723 assert!(!node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap());
8727 fn blinding_point_skimmed_fee_ser() {
8728 // Ensure that channel blinding points and skimmed fees are (de)serialized properly.
8729 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8730 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8731 let seed = [42; 32];
8732 let network = Network::Testnet;
8733 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8735 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8736 let config = UserConfig::default();
8737 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config);
8738 let outbound_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
8739 let mut chan = Channel { context: outbound_chan.context };
8741 let dummy_htlc_source = HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
8743 hops: vec![RouteHop {
8744 pubkey: test_utils::pubkey(2), channel_features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
8745 node_features: NodeFeatures::empty(), short_channel_id: 0, fee_msat: 0,
8746 cltv_expiry_delta: 0, maybe_announced_channel: false,
8750 session_priv: test_utils::privkey(42),
8751 first_hop_htlc_msat: 0,
8752 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
8754 let dummy_outbound_output = OutboundHTLCOutput {
8757 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8759 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8760 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8761 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8762 blinding_point: None,
8764 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = vec![dummy_outbound_output.clone(); 10];
8765 for (idx, htlc) in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut().enumerate() {
8767 htlc.blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + idx as u8));
8770 htlc.skimmed_fee_msat = Some(1);
8773 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs = pending_outbound_htlcs.clone();
8775 let dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8778 payment_hash: PaymentHash([43; 32]),
8779 source: dummy_htlc_source.clone(),
8780 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket {
8782 public_key: Ok(test_utils::pubkey(1)),
8783 hop_data: [0; 20*65],
8786 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
8787 blinding_point: None,
8789 let dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc = HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
8790 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage([42; 32]),
8793 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(10);
8796 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone());
8797 } else if i % 3 == 1 {
8798 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_holding_cell_claim_htlc.clone());
8800 let mut dummy_add = dummy_holding_cell_add_htlc.clone();
8801 if let HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
8802 ref mut blinding_point, ref mut skimmed_fee_msat, ..
8803 } = &mut dummy_add {
8804 *blinding_point = Some(test_utils::pubkey(42 + i));
8805 *skimmed_fee_msat = Some(42);
8807 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(dummy_add);
8810 chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates = holding_cell_htlc_updates.clone();
8812 // Encode and decode the channel and ensure that the HTLCs within are the same.
8813 let encoded_chan = chan.encode();
8814 let mut s = crate::io::Cursor::new(&encoded_chan);
8815 let mut reader = crate::util::ser::FixedLengthReader::new(&mut s, encoded_chan.len() as u64);
8816 let features = channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config);
8817 let decoded_chan = Channel::read(&mut reader, (&&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, 0, &features)).unwrap();
8818 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs, pending_outbound_htlcs);
8819 assert_eq!(decoded_chan.context.holding_cell_htlc_updates, holding_cell_htlc_updates);
8822 #[cfg(all(feature = "_test_vectors", not(feature = "grind_signatures")))]
8824 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
8825 use bitcoin::sighash;
8826 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
8827 use bitcoin::sighash::EcdsaSighashType;
8828 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
8829 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
8830 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
8831 use crate::sign::{ChannelDerivationParameters, HTLCDescriptor, ecdsa::EcdsaChannelSigner};
8832 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
8833 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
8834 use crate::ln::channel_keys::{DelayedPaymentBasepoint, HtlcBasepoint};
8835 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
8836 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
8837 use crate::sync::Arc;
8838 use core::str::FromStr;
8839 use hex::DisplayHex;
8841 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
8842 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
8843 let logger : Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
8844 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8846 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
8848 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8849 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8850 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8851 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8852 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
8854 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
8855 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
8861 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8862 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
8863 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
8865 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8866 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8867 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
8868 let mut chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&Keys>::new(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
8869 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8870 chan.context.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
8872 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_str("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
8874 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
8875 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
8876 revocation_basepoint: RevocationBasepoint::from(PublicKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap()),
8877 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
8878 delayed_payment_basepoint: DelayedPaymentBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13")),
8879 htlc_basepoint: HtlcBasepoint::from(public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"))
8881 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
8882 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
8883 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
8884 selected_contest_delay: 144
8886 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
8887 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters);
8889 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
8890 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8892 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
8893 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
8895 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.to_public_key().serialize()[..],
8896 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
8898 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
8899 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
8900 // build_commitment_transaction.
8901 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
8902 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8903 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8904 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
8905 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
8907 macro_rules! test_commitment {
8908 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8909 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8910 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(), $($remain)*);
8914 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
8915 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
8916 chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
8917 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, &ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies(), $($remain)*);
8921 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
8922 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
8923 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
8925 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
8926 let mut commitment_stats = chan.context.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
8928 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
8929 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
8931 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
8933 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
8934 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
8935 let redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8936 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8937 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.context.channel_value_satoshis);
8938 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction).as_hex());
8939 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
8941 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
8942 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8943 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
8944 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
8946 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8947 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
8948 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
8950 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
8952 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
8953 commitment_tx.clone(),
8954 counterparty_signature,
8955 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
8956 &chan.context.holder_signer.as_ref().pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
8957 chan.context.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
8959 let holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
8960 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
8962 let funding_redeemscript = chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
8963 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
8964 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
8966 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
8967 let mut htlc_counterparty_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs.iter();
8970 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
8971 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8973 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
8974 let mut htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.context.feerate_per_kw,
8975 chan.context.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
8976 &htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
8977 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
8978 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
8979 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8980 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.to_public_key()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
8982 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
8985 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).to_byte_array());
8986 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
8987 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
8991 assert!(preimage.is_some());
8994 let htlc_counterparty_sig = htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
8995 let htlc_holder_sig = signer.sign_holder_htlc_transaction(&htlc_tx, 0, &HTLCDescriptor {
8996 channel_derivation_parameters: ChannelDerivationParameters {
8997 value_satoshis: chan.context.channel_value_satoshis,
8998 keys_id: chan.context.channel_keys_id,
8999 transaction_parameters: chan.context.channel_transaction_parameters.clone(),
9001 commitment_txid: trusted_tx.txid(),
9002 per_commitment_number: trusted_tx.commitment_number(),
9003 per_commitment_point: trusted_tx.per_commitment_point(),
9004 feerate_per_kw: trusted_tx.feerate_per_kw(),
9006 preimage: preimage.clone(),
9007 counterparty_sig: *htlc_counterparty_sig,
9008 }, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
9009 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { 2 } else { 0 };
9010 assert_eq!(htlc.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
9012 let signature = Signature::from_der(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9013 assert_eq!(signature, htlc_holder_sig, "htlc sig");
9014 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
9015 htlc_tx.input[0].witness = trusted_tx.build_htlc_input_witness($htlc_idx, htlc_counterparty_sig, &htlc_holder_sig, &preimage);
9016 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", serialize(&htlc_tx).as_hex());
9017 assert_eq!(serialize(&htlc_tx)[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
9019 assert!(htlc_counterparty_sig_iter.next().is_none());
9023 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
9024 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
9025 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
9026 "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", {});
9028 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9029 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
9031 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
9032 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
9033 "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", {});
9035 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
9036 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
9037 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
9038 "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", {});
9040 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9041 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9043 amount_msat: 1000000,
9045 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9046 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9048 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9051 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9052 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9054 amount_msat: 2000000,
9056 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9057 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9059 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9062 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9063 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9065 amount_msat: 2000000,
9067 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9068 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9069 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9070 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9071 blinding_point: None,
9073 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9076 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9077 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9079 amount_msat: 3000000,
9081 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9082 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9083 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9084 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9085 blinding_point: None,
9087 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9090 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9091 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9093 amount_msat: 4000000,
9095 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9096 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9098 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9102 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9103 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9104 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 0;
9106 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
9107 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
9108 "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", {
9111 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
9112 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
9113 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b00000000000000000001e8030000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b014730440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce012000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000008a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a914b8bcb07f6344b42ab04250c86a6e8b75d3fdbbc688527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f401b175ac686800000000" },
9116 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
9117 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
9118 "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" },
9121 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
9122 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
9123 "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" },
9126 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
9127 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
9128 "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" },
9131 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
9132 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
9133 "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" }
9136 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9137 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9138 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 647;
9140 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
9141 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
9142 "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", {
9145 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
9146 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
9147 "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" },
9150 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
9151 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
9152 "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" },
9155 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
9156 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
9157 "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" },
9160 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
9161 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
9162 "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" },
9165 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
9166 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
9167 "020000000001012cfb3e4788c206881d38f2996b6cb2109b5935acb527d14bdaa7b908afa9b2fe04000000000000000001da0d0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004830450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca01473044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
9170 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9171 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9172 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 648;
9174 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
9175 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
9176 "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", {
9179 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
9180 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
9181 "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" },
9184 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
9185 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
9186 "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" },
9189 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
9190 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
9191 "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" },
9194 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
9195 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
9196 "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" }
9199 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9200 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9201 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 645;
9202 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
9204 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
9205 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
9206 "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", {
9209 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
9210 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
9211 "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" },
9214 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
9215 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
9216 "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" },
9219 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
9220 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
9221 "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" },
9224 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
9225 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
9226 "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" }
9229 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9230 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9231 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
9232 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9234 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
9235 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
9236 "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", {
9239 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
9240 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
9241 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
9244 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
9245 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
9246 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0100000000000000000122020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df01483045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61012001010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101018a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a9144b6b2e5444c2639cc0fb7bcea5afba3f3cdce23988527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f501b175ac686800000000" },
9249 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
9250 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
9251 "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" },
9254 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
9255 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
9256 "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" }
9259 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9260 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9261 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
9263 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
9264 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
9265 "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", {
9268 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
9269 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
9270 "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" },
9273 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
9274 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
9275 "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" },
9278 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
9279 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
9280 "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" }
9283 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9284 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9285 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
9287 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
9288 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
9289 "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", {
9292 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
9293 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
9294 "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" },
9297 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
9298 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
9299 "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" },
9302 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
9303 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
9304 "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" }
9307 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9308 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9309 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
9311 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
9312 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
9313 "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", {
9316 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
9317 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
9318 "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" },
9321 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
9322 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
9323 "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" }
9326 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9327 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9328 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
9329 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
9330 let cached_channel_type = chan.context.channel_type;
9331 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9333 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
9334 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
9335 "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", {
9338 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
9339 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
9340 "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" },
9343 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
9344 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
9345 "02000000000101ac13a7715f80b8e52dda43c6929cade5521bdced3a405da02b443f1ffb1e33cc03000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd727183483045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
9348 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9349 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9350 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
9351 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9352 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9354 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
9355 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
9356 "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", {
9359 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
9360 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
9361 "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" },
9364 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
9365 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
9366 "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" }
9369 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9370 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9371 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
9373 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
9374 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
9375 "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", {
9378 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
9379 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
9380 "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" }
9383 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9384 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9385 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
9386 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
9387 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9389 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
9390 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
9391 "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", {
9394 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
9395 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
9396 "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" }
9399 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9400 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9401 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
9402 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9403 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9405 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
9406 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
9407 "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", {
9410 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
9411 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
9412 "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" }
9415 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9416 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9417 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
9418 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9420 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
9421 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
9422 "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", {});
9424 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9425 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9426 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
9427 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9428 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9430 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
9431 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
9432 "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", {});
9434 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
9435 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9436 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
9437 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9438 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type.clone();
9440 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
9441 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
9442 "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", {});
9444 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
9445 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9446 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
9448 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9449 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9450 "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", {});
9452 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
9453 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9454 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
9455 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
9456 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9458 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
9459 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
9460 "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", {});
9462 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
9463 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
9464 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
9465 chan.context.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
9466 chan.context.channel_type = cached_channel_type;
9468 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
9469 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
9470 "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", {});
9472 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
9473 chan.context.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
9474 chan.context.feerate_per_kw = 253;
9475 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
9476 chan.context.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
9477 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
9479 amount_msat: 2000000,
9481 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9482 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
9484 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9487 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
9488 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9489 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9491 amount_msat: 5000001,
9493 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9494 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9495 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9496 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9497 blinding_point: None,
9499 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9502 chan.context.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
9503 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
9505 amount_msat: 5000000,
9507 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
9508 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
9509 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
9510 skimmed_fee_msat: None,
9511 blinding_point: None,
9513 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).to_byte_array();
9517 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
9518 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
9519 "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", {
9522 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
9523 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
9524 "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" },
9526 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
9527 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
9528 "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" },
9530 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
9531 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
9532 "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" }
9535 chan.context.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::anchors_zero_htlc_fee_and_dependencies();
9536 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
9537 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
9538 "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", {
9541 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
9542 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
9543 "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" },
9545 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
9546 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
9547 "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" },
9549 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
9550 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
9551 "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" }
9556 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
9557 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
9559 let mut seed = [0; 32];
9560 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
9561 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9562 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
9564 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
9565 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
9566 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
9568 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
9569 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
9571 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
9572 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
9574 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
9575 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
9576 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
9580 fn test_key_derivation() {
9581 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
9582 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9584 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9585 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
9587 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
9588 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
9590 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
9591 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
9593 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
9594 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9596 assert_eq!(RevocationKey::from_basepoint(&secp_ctx, &RevocationBasepoint::from(base_point), &per_commitment_point).to_public_key().serialize()[..],
9597 <Vec<u8>>::from_hex("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
9599 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
9600 SecretKey::from_slice(&<Vec<u8>>::from_hex("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
9604 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
9605 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9606 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9607 let seed = [42; 32];
9608 let network = Network::Testnet;
9609 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9610 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9612 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9613 let config = UserConfig::default();
9614 let node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9615 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None).unwrap();
9617 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
9618 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
9620 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9621 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
9622 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9623 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
9624 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9625 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false);
9626 assert!(res.is_ok());
9630 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
9631 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
9632 // resulting `channel_type`.
9633 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9634 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9635 let network = Network::Testnet;
9636 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9637 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9639 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9640 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9642 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9643 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
9645 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
9646 // need to signal it.
9647 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9648 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9649 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
9650 &config, 0, 42, None
9652 assert!(!channel_a.context.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
9654 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
9655 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
9656 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
9658 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9659 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9660 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9664 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9665 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9666 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9667 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9668 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9671 assert_eq!(channel_a.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9672 assert_eq!(channel_b.context.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
9676 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
9677 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
9678 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
9679 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9680 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9681 let network = Network::Testnet;
9682 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9683 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9685 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9686 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9688 let config = UserConfig::default();
9690 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9691 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9692 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9693 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9694 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9696 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9697 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9698 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9702 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
9703 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9704 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
9706 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
9707 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
9708 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9709 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9710 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
9711 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9713 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
9717 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
9718 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
9720 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9721 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9722 let network = Network::Testnet;
9723 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
9724 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9726 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
9727 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
9729 let config = UserConfig::default();
9731 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
9732 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
9733 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
9734 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
9735 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9736 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
9737 assert!(!simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
9738 assert!(!simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
9740 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
9741 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
9742 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
9743 let channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9744 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
9745 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42,
9749 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9750 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9752 let res = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9753 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9754 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
9755 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9757 assert!(res.is_err());
9759 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
9760 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
9761 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
9763 let mut channel_a = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9764 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
9765 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42, None
9768 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9770 let channel_b = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9771 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
9772 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9773 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, /*is_0conf=*/false
9776 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
9777 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
9779 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
9780 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
9782 assert!(res.is_err());
9786 fn test_waiting_for_batch() {
9787 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
9788 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
9789 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
9790 let seed = [42; 32];
9791 let network = Network::Testnet;
9792 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
9793 let chain_hash = ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network);
9794 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
9796 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
9797 // Set trust_own_funding_0conf while ensuring we don't send channel_ready for a
9798 // channel in a batch before all channels are ready.
9799 config.channel_handshake_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf = true;
9801 // Create a channel from node a to node b that will be part of batch funding.
9802 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
9803 let mut node_a_chan = OutboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9808 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9818 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(ChainHash::using_genesis_block(network));
9819 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
9820 let mut node_b_chan = InboundV1Channel::<&TestKeysInterface>::new(
9825 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
9826 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9832 true, // Allow node b to send a 0conf channel_ready.
9835 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel();
9836 node_a_chan.accept_channel(
9837 &accept_channel_msg,
9838 &config.channel_handshake_limits,
9839 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
9842 // Fund the channel with a batch funding transaction.
9843 let output_script = node_a_chan.context.get_funding_redeemscript();
9844 let tx = Transaction {
9846 lock_time: LockTime::ZERO,
9850 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
9853 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: Builder::new().into_script(),
9856 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
9857 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_funding_created(
9858 tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, true, &&logger,
9859 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9860 let (mut node_b_chan, funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(
9861 &funding_created_msg.unwrap(),
9865 ).map_err(|_| ()).unwrap();
9866 let node_b_updates = node_b_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9874 // Receive funding_signed, but the channel will be configured to hold sending channel_ready and
9875 // broadcasting the funding transaction until the batch is ready.
9876 let res = node_a_chan.funding_signed(
9877 &funding_signed_msg.unwrap(), best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger,
9879 let (mut node_a_chan, _) = if let Ok(res) = res { res } else { panic!(); };
9880 let node_a_updates = node_a_chan.monitor_updating_restored(
9887 // Our channel_ready shouldn't be sent yet, even with trust_own_funding_0conf set,
9888 // as the funding transaction depends on all channels in the batch becoming ready.
9889 assert!(node_a_updates.channel_ready.is_none());
9890 assert!(node_a_updates.funding_broadcastable.is_none());
9891 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH));
9893 // It is possible to receive a 0conf channel_ready from the remote node.
9894 node_a_chan.channel_ready(
9895 &node_b_updates.channel_ready.unwrap(),
9903 node_a_chan.context.channel_state,
9904 ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::WAITING_FOR_BATCH | AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY)
9907 // Clear the ChannelState::WaitingForBatch only when called by ChannelManager.
9908 node_a_chan.set_batch_ready();
9909 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.context.channel_state, ChannelState::AwaitingChannelReady(AwaitingChannelReadyFlags::THEIR_CHANNEL_READY));
9910 assert!(node_a_chan.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some());