1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::{DecodeError, OptionalField, DataLossProtect};
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{Sign, EntropySource, KeysInterface, BaseSign, SignerProvider};
39 use crate::util::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
41 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
42 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
43 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
44 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
47 use crate::prelude::*;
48 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
50 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
51 use crate::sync::Mutex;
52 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
55 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
56 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
57 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
59 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
63 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
66 pub struct AvailableBalances {
67 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
68 pub balance_msat: u64,
69 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
70 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
71 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
72 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
73 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
74 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
77 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
79 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
81 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
82 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
83 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
84 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
85 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
86 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
88 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
92 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
93 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
94 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
95 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
98 enum InboundHTLCState {
99 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
100 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
101 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
102 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
103 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
104 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
105 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
106 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
107 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
108 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
109 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
110 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
111 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
112 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
113 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
115 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
116 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
117 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
118 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
119 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
120 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
121 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
122 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
123 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
124 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
125 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
126 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
127 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
128 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
130 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
131 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
132 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
133 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
134 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
135 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
136 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
137 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
139 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
140 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
142 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
143 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
144 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
145 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
146 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
147 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
148 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
149 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
152 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
156 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
157 state: InboundHTLCState,
160 enum OutboundHTLCState {
161 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
162 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
163 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
164 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
165 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
166 /// money back (though we won't), and,
167 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
168 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
169 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
170 /// we'll never get out of sync).
171 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
172 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
173 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
175 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
176 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
177 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
178 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
179 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
180 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
181 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
182 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
183 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
184 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
185 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
186 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
187 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
188 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
189 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
193 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
194 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
195 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
198 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
199 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
201 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
202 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
207 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
208 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
210 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
211 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
216 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
220 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
221 state: OutboundHTLCState,
225 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
226 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
227 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
231 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
233 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
236 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
241 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
245 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
246 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
247 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
248 /// move on to ChannelReady.
249 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
250 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
251 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
253 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
254 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
255 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
256 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
257 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
258 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
259 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
261 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
262 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
263 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
265 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
266 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
267 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
268 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
269 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
270 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
272 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
273 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
275 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
277 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
278 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
279 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
280 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
281 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
282 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
283 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
285 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
286 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
287 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
288 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
289 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
290 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
292 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
293 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
294 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
295 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
296 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
298 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
299 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
301 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
303 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
304 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
305 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
306 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
307 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
308 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
309 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
310 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
312 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
314 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
316 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
320 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
322 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
323 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
324 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
326 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
327 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
329 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
330 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
331 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
332 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
333 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
335 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
336 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
340 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
346 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
349 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
350 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
351 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
352 holding_cell_msat: u64,
353 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
356 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
357 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
358 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
359 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
360 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
361 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
362 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
363 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
364 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
365 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
368 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
369 struct HTLCCandidate {
371 origin: HTLCInitiator,
375 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
383 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
385 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
387 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
388 htlc_value_msat: u64,
389 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
394 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
395 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch {
396 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
397 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
398 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
400 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
401 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
402 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
403 htlc_value_msat: u64,
404 /// The update_fulfill message and commitment_signed message (if the claim was not placed
405 /// in the holding cell).
406 msgs: Option<(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned)>,
408 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
409 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
413 /// The return value of `revoke_and_ack` on success, primarily updates to other channels or HTLC
415 pub(super) struct RAAUpdates {
416 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
417 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
418 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
419 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
420 pub monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
421 pub holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>,
424 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
425 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
426 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
427 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
428 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
429 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
430 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
431 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
432 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
433 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
434 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
437 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
438 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
439 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
440 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
441 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
442 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
443 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
444 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
447 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
448 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
449 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
450 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
451 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
452 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
453 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
454 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
455 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
456 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
457 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
458 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
459 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
460 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
461 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
463 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
464 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
465 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
466 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
468 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
469 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
470 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
471 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
473 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
474 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
475 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
476 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
477 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
479 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
480 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
481 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
482 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
484 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
485 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
486 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
488 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
489 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
490 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
491 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
492 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
494 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
495 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
496 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
499 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
500 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
501 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: Sign> {
502 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
504 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
505 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
506 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
507 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
509 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
513 channel_id: [u8; 32],
516 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
517 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
519 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
520 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
521 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
523 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
524 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
525 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
526 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
528 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
529 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
531 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
533 holder_signer: Signer,
534 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
535 destination_script: Script,
537 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
538 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
539 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
541 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
542 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
543 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
544 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
545 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
546 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
548 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
549 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
550 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
551 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
552 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
553 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
555 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
557 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
558 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
559 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
560 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
561 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
562 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
564 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
566 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
567 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
568 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
569 // HTLCs with similar state.
570 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
571 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
572 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
573 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
574 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
575 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
576 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
577 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
578 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
581 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
582 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
583 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
585 update_time_counter: u32,
587 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
588 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
589 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
590 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
591 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
592 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
594 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
595 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
597 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
598 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
599 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
600 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
602 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
603 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
605 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
607 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
609 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
610 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
611 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
612 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
613 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
614 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
616 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
617 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
618 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
619 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
620 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
622 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
623 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
624 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
625 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
626 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
627 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
628 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
629 channel_creation_height: u32,
631 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
634 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
636 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
639 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
641 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
644 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
646 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
648 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
649 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
652 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
654 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
656 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
657 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
659 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
661 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
662 //implied by OUR_MAX_HTLCS: max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
663 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
665 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
667 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
668 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
670 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
671 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
672 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
674 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
676 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
678 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
679 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
680 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
681 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
683 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
684 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
685 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
687 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
688 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
689 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
691 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
692 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
693 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
694 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
695 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
696 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
697 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
698 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
700 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
701 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
702 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
703 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
704 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
706 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
707 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
709 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
710 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
711 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
712 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
713 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
714 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
715 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
716 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
718 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
719 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
721 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
722 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
723 // the channel's funding UTXO.
725 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
726 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
727 // associated channel mapping.
729 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
730 // to store all of them.
731 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
733 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
734 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
735 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
736 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
737 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
739 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
740 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
742 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
743 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
744 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
747 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
748 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
750 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
751 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
752 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
756 pub const OUR_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50; //TODO
758 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
759 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
760 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
761 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
765 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
767 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
769 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
771 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
772 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
773 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
774 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
775 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
777 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
778 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
780 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
782 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
783 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
785 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
786 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
787 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
788 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
789 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
790 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
792 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
793 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
795 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
796 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
797 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
798 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
799 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
801 /// See https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905 for more details.
802 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
804 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
805 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
807 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
808 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
809 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
810 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
816 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
817 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
819 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
820 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
821 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
826 macro_rules! secp_check {
827 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
830 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
835 impl<Signer: Sign> Channel<Signer> {
836 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
837 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
838 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
840 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
842 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
843 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
844 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
846 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
849 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
851 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
854 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
855 /// required by us according to the configured or default
856 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
858 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
860 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
861 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
862 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
863 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
864 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
867 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
868 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
869 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
870 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
871 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
872 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
873 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
876 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
877 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
880 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
881 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
882 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
883 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
884 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`
885 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
886 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel && config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy {
887 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
892 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
893 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
894 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
895 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
896 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
897 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
898 // We've exhausted our options
901 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key(); // We only currently support two types
902 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
906 pub fn new_outbound<K: Deref, F: Deref>(
907 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
908 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, user_config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
909 outbound_scid_alias: u64
910 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
911 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
912 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
914 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
916 let holder_selected_contest_delay = user_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
917 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
918 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
919 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
921 let mut config = LegacyChannelConfig {
922 options: user_config.channel_config.clone(),
923 announced_channel: user_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
924 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: user_config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
927 if !their_features.supports_inbound_fees() {
928 config.options.inbound_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
929 config.options.inbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
932 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
933 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
935 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
936 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
938 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
939 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
940 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
942 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
943 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
945 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, user_config);
946 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
947 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
948 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
949 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
952 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
954 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
955 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors);
956 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
957 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
960 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
961 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
963 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if user_config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
964 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
967 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
968 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
969 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
979 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(user_config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
981 channel_id: keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes(),
982 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
983 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
985 channel_value_satoshis,
987 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
990 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
991 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
993 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
994 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
997 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
998 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
999 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1000 pending_update_fee: None,
1001 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1002 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1003 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1004 update_time_counter: 1,
1006 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1008 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1009 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1010 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1011 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1012 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1013 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1015 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1016 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1017 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1018 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1020 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1021 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1022 closing_fee_limits: None,
1023 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1025 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1027 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1028 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1029 short_channel_id: None,
1030 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1032 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1033 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1034 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1035 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1036 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &user_config.channel_handshake_config),
1037 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1038 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1039 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1040 holder_htlc_minimum_msat:
1041 if user_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 }
1042 else { user_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1043 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1044 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1046 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1048 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1049 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1050 holder_selected_contest_delay: user_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1051 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1052 counterparty_parameters: None,
1053 funding_outpoint: None,
1054 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1055 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1057 funding_transaction: None,
1059 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1060 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1061 counterparty_node_id,
1063 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1065 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1067 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1068 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1070 announcement_sigs: None,
1072 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1073 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1074 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1075 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1077 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1079 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1080 outbound_scid_alias,
1082 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1084 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1085 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1087 channel_type: Self::get_initial_channel_type(&user_config),
1092 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1093 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1094 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1096 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1097 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1098 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1099 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1100 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1101 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1102 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1103 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1105 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1106 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1107 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1108 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1109 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1110 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1111 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1112 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1114 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1115 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1119 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1124 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1125 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1126 pub fn new_from_req<K: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1127 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, keys_provider: &K, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
1128 msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, user_config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L,
1129 outbound_scid_alias: u64
1130 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1131 where K::Target: KeysInterface<Signer = Signer>,
1132 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1135 let opt_anchors = false; // TODO - should be based on features
1136 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1138 let mut config = LegacyChannelConfig {
1139 options: user_config.channel_config.clone(),
1141 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: user_config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1144 if !their_features.supports_inbound_fees() {
1145 config.options.inbound_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
1146 config.options.inbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
1149 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1150 // support this channel type.
1151 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1152 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1153 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1156 if channel_type.requires_unknown_bits() {
1157 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contains unknown bits".to_owned()));
1160 // We currently only allow four channel types, so write it all out here - we allow
1161 // `only_static_remote_key` or `static_remote_key | zero_conf` in all contexts, and
1162 // further allow `static_remote_key | scid_privacy` or
1163 // `static_remote_key | scid_privacy | zero_conf`, if the channel is not
1164 // publicly announced.
1165 if *channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1166 if !channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && !channel_type.requires_zero_conf() {
1167 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood".to_owned()));
1170 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1171 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1174 channel_type.clone()
1176 ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
1178 if !channel_type.supports_static_remote_key() {
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1182 let channel_keys_id = keys_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1183 let holder_signer = keys_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1184 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1185 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1186 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1187 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1188 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1189 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1190 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1193 if user_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1195 "Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}",
1196 user_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1199 // Check sanity of message fields:
1200 if msg.funding_satoshis > user_config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1201 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1202 "Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}",
1203 user_config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1205 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1206 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1208 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1211 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1212 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1213 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1215 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1216 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1218 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1219 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1221 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1223 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(user_config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1224 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1225 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1227 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1228 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1230 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1231 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1234 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1235 if msg.funding_satoshis < user_config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1236 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1237 "Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})",
1238 msg.funding_satoshis, user_config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1240 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > user_config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1241 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1242 "htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})",
1243 msg.htlc_minimum_msat, user_config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1245 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < user_config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1247 "max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})",
1248 msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, user_config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1250 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > user_config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1251 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1252 "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})",
1253 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, user_config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1255 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < user_config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
1257 "max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})",
1258 msg.max_accepted_htlcs, user_config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1260 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1261 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1263 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1264 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1267 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1269 if user_config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1270 if user_config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1275 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, user_config);
1276 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1277 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1278 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1281 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1284 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1285 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1286 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1288 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1292 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1293 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1294 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1295 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1296 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1300 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1301 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1302 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1303 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1307 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1308 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1309 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
1310 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1311 if script.len() == 0 {
1314 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1317 Some(script.clone())
1320 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1321 &OptionalField::Absent => {
1322 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1327 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if user_config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1328 Some(keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey())
1331 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1332 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1333 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1337 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1338 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_provider.get_secure_random_bytes());
1340 let chan = Channel {
1346 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1348 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1349 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1350 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1353 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1356 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1357 destination_script: keys_provider.get_destination_script(),
1359 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1360 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1361 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1363 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1364 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1365 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1366 pending_update_fee: None,
1367 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1368 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1369 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1370 update_time_counter: 1,
1372 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1374 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1375 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1376 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1377 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1378 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1379 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1381 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1382 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1383 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1384 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1386 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1387 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1388 closing_fee_limits: None,
1389 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1391 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1393 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1394 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1395 short_channel_id: None,
1396 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1398 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1399 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1400 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1401 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1402 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1403 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &user_config.channel_handshake_config),
1404 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1405 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1406 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1407 holder_htlc_minimum_msat:
1408 if user_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 }
1409 else { user_config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1410 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1411 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(user_config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1413 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1415 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1416 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1417 holder_selected_contest_delay: user_config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1418 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1419 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1420 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1421 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1423 funding_outpoint: None,
1424 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1425 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1427 funding_transaction: None,
1429 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1430 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1431 counterparty_node_id,
1433 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1435 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1437 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1438 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1440 announcement_sigs: None,
1442 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1443 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1444 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1445 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1447 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1449 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1450 outbound_scid_alias,
1452 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1454 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1455 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1464 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1465 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1466 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1467 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1468 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1470 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1471 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1472 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1473 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1474 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1475 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1476 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1478 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1479 where L::Target: Logger
1481 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1482 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1483 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1485 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1486 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1487 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1488 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1490 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1491 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1492 if match update_state {
1493 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1494 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1495 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1496 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1497 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1499 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1503 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1504 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1505 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1506 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1508 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1509 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1510 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1512 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1513 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1514 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1515 transaction_output_index: None
1520 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1521 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1522 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1523 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1524 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1527 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1529 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1530 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1531 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1533 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1534 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1537 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1538 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1541 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1543 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1544 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1545 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1547 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1548 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1554 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1555 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1556 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1557 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1558 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1559 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1560 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1564 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1565 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1567 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1569 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1570 if generated_by_local {
1571 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1572 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1581 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1583 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1584 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1585 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1586 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1587 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1588 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1589 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1592 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1593 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1594 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1595 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1599 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1600 preimages.push(preimage);
1604 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1605 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1607 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1609 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1610 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1612 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1613 if !generated_by_local {
1614 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1622 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1623 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1624 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1625 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1626 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1627 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1628 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1629 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1631 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1633 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1634 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1635 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1636 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1638 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1640 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1641 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1642 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1643 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1646 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1647 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1648 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1649 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1651 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1654 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1655 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1656 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1657 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1659 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1662 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1663 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1668 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1669 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1674 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1676 let channel_parameters =
1677 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1678 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1679 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1682 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1687 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1690 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1691 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1692 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1693 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1695 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1696 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1697 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1705 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1706 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1712 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1713 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1714 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1715 // outside of those situations will fail.
1716 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1720 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1725 1 + // script length (0)
1729 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1730 2 + // witness marker and flag
1731 1 + // witness element count
1732 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1733 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1734 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1735 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1736 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1737 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1739 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1740 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1741 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1747 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1748 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1749 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1750 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1752 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1753 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1754 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1756 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1757 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1758 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1759 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1760 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1761 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1764 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1765 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1768 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1769 value_to_holder = 0;
1772 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1773 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1774 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1775 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1777 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1778 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1781 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1782 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1786 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1787 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1788 /// our counterparty!)
1789 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1790 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1791 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1792 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1793 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1794 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1795 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1797 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1801 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1802 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1803 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1804 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1805 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1806 //may see payments to it!
1807 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1808 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1809 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1811 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1814 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1815 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1816 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1817 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1818 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1821 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1824 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1825 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1827 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1829 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1830 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1831 where L::Target: Logger {
1832 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1833 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1834 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1835 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1836 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1837 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1838 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1839 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1843 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1844 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1845 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1846 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1848 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1849 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1851 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1853 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1855 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1856 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1857 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1859 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1860 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1861 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1862 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1863 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1865 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1866 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1867 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1869 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1870 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1872 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1875 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1876 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1880 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1884 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1885 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1886 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1887 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1888 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1889 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1892 // Now update local state:
1894 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1895 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1896 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1897 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1898 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1899 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1900 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1904 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1905 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1906 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1907 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1908 // do not not get into this branch.
1909 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1910 match pending_update {
1911 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1912 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1913 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1914 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1915 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1916 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1917 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1920 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1921 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1922 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1923 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1924 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1925 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1926 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1932 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1933 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1934 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1936 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1937 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1938 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1940 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1941 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1944 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1945 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1947 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1948 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1950 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
1951 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
1954 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
1957 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
1958 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
1959 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1960 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
1965 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> Result<UpdateFulfillCommitFetch, (ChannelError, ChannelMonitorUpdate)> where L::Target: Logger {
1966 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
1967 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: Some(update_fulfill_htlc) } => {
1968 let (commitment, mut additional_update) = match self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger) {
1969 Err(e) => return Err((e, monitor_update)),
1972 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
1973 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
1974 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
1975 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
1976 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: Some((update_fulfill_htlc, commitment)) })
1978 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None } =>
1979 Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msgs: None }),
1980 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => Ok(UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {}),
1984 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1985 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
1986 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
1987 /// before we fail backwards.
1989 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
1990 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
1991 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
1992 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
1993 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
1994 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
1995 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
1998 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
1999 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2000 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2001 /// before we fail backwards.
2003 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2004 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2005 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2006 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2007 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2008 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2009 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2011 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2013 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2014 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2015 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2017 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2018 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2019 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2021 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2022 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2023 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2025 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2030 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2031 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2037 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2038 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2039 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2040 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2041 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2045 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2046 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2047 force_holding_cell = true;
2050 // Now update local state:
2051 if force_holding_cell {
2052 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2053 match pending_update {
2054 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2055 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2056 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2057 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2061 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2062 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2063 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2064 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2070 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2071 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2072 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2078 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2080 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2081 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2084 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2085 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2086 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2091 // Message handlers:
2093 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2094 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2096 // Check sanity of message fields:
2097 if !self.is_outbound() {
2098 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2100 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2101 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2103 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2104 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2106 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2107 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2109 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2110 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2112 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2113 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2114 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2116 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2117 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2118 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2120 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2121 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2122 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2124 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2125 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2127 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2128 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2131 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2132 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2133 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2135 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2136 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2138 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2141 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2142 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2144 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2145 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2147 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2148 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2150 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2151 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2154 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2155 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2156 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2158 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2159 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2161 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_counterparty_init(&their_features)
2164 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2165 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2166 &OptionalField::Present(ref script) => {
2167 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2168 if script.len() == 0 {
2171 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2172 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2174 Some(script.clone())
2177 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2178 &OptionalField::Absent => {
2179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2184 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2185 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2186 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2187 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2188 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2190 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2191 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2193 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2196 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2197 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2198 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2199 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2200 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2201 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2204 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2205 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2206 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2209 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2210 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2212 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2213 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2218 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2219 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2221 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2222 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2224 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2225 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2226 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2227 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2228 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2229 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2230 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2231 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2232 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2235 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2236 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2238 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2239 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2240 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2241 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2243 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2244 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2246 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2247 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2250 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2251 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2254 pub fn funding_created<K: Deref, L: Deref>(
2255 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, keys_source: &K, logger: &L
2256 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2258 K::Target: KeysInterface,
2261 if self.is_outbound() {
2262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2264 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2265 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2266 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2270 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2273 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2274 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2275 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2276 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2279 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2280 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2281 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2282 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2283 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2285 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2287 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2288 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2289 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2292 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2293 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2294 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2298 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2299 initial_commitment_tx,
2302 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2303 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2306 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2307 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2309 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2311 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2312 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2313 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2314 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2315 let mut monitor_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2316 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2317 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2318 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2319 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2320 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2321 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2323 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2325 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2327 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2328 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2329 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2330 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2332 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2334 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2335 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2337 }, channel_monitor, self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2340 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2341 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2342 pub fn funding_signed<K: Deref, L: Deref>(
2343 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, keys_source: &K, logger: &L
2344 ) -> Result<(ChannelMonitor<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>, Transaction, Option<msgs::ChannelReady>), ChannelError>
2346 K::Target: KeysInterface,
2349 if !self.is_outbound() {
2350 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2352 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2355 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2356 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2357 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2358 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2361 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2363 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2364 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2365 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2366 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2368 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2369 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2371 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2372 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2374 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2375 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2376 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2377 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2378 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2379 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2383 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2384 initial_commitment_tx,
2387 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2388 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2391 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2392 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2395 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2396 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2397 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2398 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2399 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2400 let mut monitor_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2401 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2402 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2403 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2404 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2405 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2406 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2408 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2410 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2412 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2413 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2414 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2415 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2417 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2419 Ok((channel_monitor, self.funding_transaction.as_ref().cloned().unwrap(), self.check_get_channel_ready(0)))
2422 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2423 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2425 pub fn channel_ready<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2426 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2427 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2428 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2431 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2432 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2433 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2434 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2435 // when routing outbound payments.
2436 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2440 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2442 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2443 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2444 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2445 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2446 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2447 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2448 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2449 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2450 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2452 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2453 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2454 let expected_point =
2455 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2456 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2458 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2460 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2461 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2462 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2463 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2464 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2466 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2467 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2471 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2474 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2475 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2477 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2479 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger))
2482 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2483 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2484 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2485 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2491 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2492 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2493 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2494 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2495 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2496 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2497 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2498 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2499 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2502 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2505 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2506 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2507 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2509 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2510 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2511 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2512 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2513 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2514 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2516 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2517 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2523 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2524 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2525 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2526 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2527 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2528 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2529 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2530 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2531 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2534 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2537 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2538 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2539 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2541 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2542 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2543 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2544 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2545 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2546 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2548 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2549 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2553 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2554 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2555 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2556 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2557 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2558 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2559 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2561 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2562 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2564 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2571 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2572 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2573 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2574 /// corner case properly.
2575 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2576 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2577 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2579 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2580 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2581 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2582 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2585 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2587 let outbound_capacity_msat = cmp::max(self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2588 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2589 - self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) as i64 * 1000,
2592 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2593 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2594 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2595 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2597 outbound_capacity_msat,
2598 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: cmp::max(cmp::min(outbound_capacity_msat as i64,
2599 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat as i64
2600 - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64),
2606 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2607 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2610 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2611 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2612 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2613 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2614 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2615 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2618 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2619 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2621 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2622 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2625 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2626 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2627 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2629 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2630 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2632 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2635 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2636 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2638 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2639 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2641 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2642 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2644 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2645 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2649 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2650 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2656 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2657 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2658 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2661 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2662 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2663 included_htlcs += 1;
2666 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2667 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2671 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2672 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2673 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2674 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2675 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2676 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2681 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2683 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2684 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2689 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2690 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2694 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2695 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2696 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2699 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2700 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2702 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2703 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2704 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2706 total_pending_htlcs,
2707 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2708 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2709 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2711 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2712 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2713 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2715 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2717 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2722 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2723 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2724 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2726 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2727 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2729 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2732 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2733 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2735 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2736 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2738 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2739 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2741 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2742 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2746 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2747 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2753 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2754 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2755 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2756 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2757 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2758 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2761 included_htlcs += 1;
2764 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2765 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2768 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2769 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2771 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2772 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2773 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2778 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2779 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2780 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2783 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2784 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2786 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2787 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2789 total_pending_htlcs,
2790 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2791 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2792 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2794 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2795 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2796 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2798 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2800 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2805 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
2806 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
2807 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
2808 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2809 if local_sent_shutdown {
2810 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
2812 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
2813 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
2814 if remote_sent_shutdown {
2815 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2817 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2818 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2820 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
2821 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
2823 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
2824 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
2826 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
2827 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
2830 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2831 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2832 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > OUR_MAX_HTLCS as u32 {
2833 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", OUR_MAX_HTLCS)));
2835 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2836 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2838 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
2839 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
2840 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
2841 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
2842 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
2843 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
2844 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
2845 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
2846 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
2847 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
2848 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
2850 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
2851 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2852 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2853 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2854 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
2855 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2859 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2862 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2863 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2864 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2866 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2867 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
2868 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2869 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2870 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
2871 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2872 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2876 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2877 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
2878 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
2879 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
2880 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
2881 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
2882 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2886 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
2887 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
2888 let pending_remote_value_msat =
2889 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
2890 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
2891 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
2894 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
2895 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
2896 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
2897 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2898 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
2900 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2901 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
2904 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
2905 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
2908 if !self.is_outbound() {
2909 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
2910 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
2911 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
2912 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
2913 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
2914 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
2915 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
2916 // sensitive to fee spikes.
2917 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2918 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
2919 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
2920 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
2921 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
2922 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2923 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
2926 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
2927 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
2928 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
2929 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
2930 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
2933 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
2934 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
2936 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
2937 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
2940 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
2941 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
2942 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
2946 // Now update local state:
2947 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
2948 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
2949 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
2950 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
2951 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
2952 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
2953 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
2958 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
2960 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
2961 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
2962 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
2963 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
2964 let outcome = match check_preimage {
2965 None => fail_reason.into(),
2966 Some(payment_preimage) => {
2967 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
2968 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
2969 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
2971 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
2975 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
2976 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
2977 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
2978 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
2980 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
2981 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
2986 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
2989 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
2990 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2991 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
2993 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2994 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
2997 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3000 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3001 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3002 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3004 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3005 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3008 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3012 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3013 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3014 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3016 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3017 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3020 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3024 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::RevokeAndACK, Option<msgs::CommitmentSigned>, ChannelMonitorUpdate), (Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError)>
3025 where L::Target: Logger
3027 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3028 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned())));
3030 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3031 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned())));
3033 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3034 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned())));
3037 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3039 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3041 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3042 let commitment_txid = {
3043 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3044 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3045 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3047 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3048 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3049 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3050 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3051 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3052 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3056 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3058 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3059 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3060 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3061 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3064 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3065 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3066 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3067 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned())));
3070 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3072 if self.is_outbound() {
3073 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3074 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3075 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3076 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3077 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3078 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3079 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3080 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3081 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3082 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3088 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3089 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs))));
3092 // TODO: Sadly, we pass HTLCs twice to ChannelMonitor: once via the HolderCommitmentTransaction and once via the update
3093 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3094 for (idx, (htlc, source)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3095 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3096 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3097 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3098 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3100 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3101 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3102 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3103 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3104 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3105 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3106 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3107 return Err((None, ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned())));
3109 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source));
3111 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source));
3115 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3116 commitment_stats.tx,
3118 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3119 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3120 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3123 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3124 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3125 .map_err(|_| (None, ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned())))?;
3126 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1);
3128 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3129 let mut need_commitment = false;
3130 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3131 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3132 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3133 need_commitment = true;
3137 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3138 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3139 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3140 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3141 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3142 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs
3146 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3147 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3148 Some(forward_info.clone())
3150 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3151 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3152 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3153 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3154 need_commitment = true;
3157 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3158 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3159 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3160 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3161 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3162 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3163 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3164 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3165 need_commitment = true;
3169 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3170 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3171 // send_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3172 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3174 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3175 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3176 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3177 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3178 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3179 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3180 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3181 // includes the right HTLCs.
3182 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3183 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3184 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3185 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3186 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3187 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3189 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3190 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3191 return Err((Some(monitor_update), ChannelError::Ignore("Previous monitor update failure prevented generation of RAA".to_owned())));
3194 let commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3195 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3196 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3197 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3198 let (msg, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger).map_err(|e| (None, e))?;
3199 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3200 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3201 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3202 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3206 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3207 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if commitment_signed.is_some() { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3209 Ok((msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3210 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3211 per_commitment_secret,
3212 next_per_commitment_point,
3213 }, commitment_signed, monitor_update))
3216 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3217 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3218 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3219 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3220 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3221 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3222 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3223 } else { Ok((None, Vec::new())) }
3226 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3227 /// for our counterparty.
3228 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(Option<(msgs::CommitmentUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3229 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3230 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3231 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3232 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3234 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3235 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3236 updates: Vec::new(),
3239 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3240 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3241 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3242 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3243 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3244 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3245 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3246 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3247 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3248 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3249 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3250 // to rebalance channels.
3251 match &htlc_update {
3252 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3253 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3254 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3257 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3258 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3259 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3260 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3261 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3262 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3263 // into the holding cell without ever being
3264 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3265 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3266 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3269 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3275 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3276 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3277 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3278 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3279 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3280 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3281 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3282 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3283 (msg, monitor_update)
3284 } else { unreachable!() };
3285 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3286 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3288 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3289 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3290 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3291 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3292 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3293 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3294 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3295 // for a full revocation before failing.
3296 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3299 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3301 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3308 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3309 return Ok((None, htlcs_to_fail));
3311 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3312 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3317 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3318 // send_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3319 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3320 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3321 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3323 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3324 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3325 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3327 Ok((Some((msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3329 update_fulfill_htlcs,
3331 update_fail_malformed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3334 }, monitor_update)), htlcs_to_fail))
3336 Ok((None, Vec::new()))
3340 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3341 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3342 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3343 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3344 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3345 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<RAAUpdates, ChannelError>
3346 where L::Target: Logger,
3348 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3349 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3351 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3352 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3354 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3358 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3360 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3361 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3362 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3366 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3367 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3368 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3369 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3370 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3371 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3372 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3373 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3374 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3377 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3379 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3380 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3383 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3384 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3386 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3388 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3389 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3390 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3391 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3392 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3393 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3394 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3395 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3399 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3400 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3401 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3402 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3403 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3404 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3405 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3406 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3408 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3409 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3412 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3413 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3414 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3415 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3416 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3417 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3418 let mut require_commitment = false;
3419 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3422 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3423 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3424 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3426 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3427 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3428 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3429 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3430 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3431 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3436 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3437 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3438 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3439 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3440 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3442 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3443 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3444 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3449 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3450 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3452 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3456 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3457 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3459 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3460 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3461 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3462 require_commitment = true;
3463 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3464 match forward_info {
3465 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3466 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3467 require_commitment = true;
3469 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3470 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3471 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3473 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3474 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3475 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3479 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3480 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3481 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3482 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3488 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3489 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3490 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3491 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3493 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3494 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3495 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3496 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3497 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3498 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3499 require_commitment = true;
3503 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3505 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3506 match update_state {
3507 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3508 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3509 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3510 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3511 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3513 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3514 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3515 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3516 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3517 require_commitment = true;
3518 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3519 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3524 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3525 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3526 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3527 if require_commitment {
3528 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3529 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3530 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3531 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3532 let (_, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3533 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3534 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3535 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3536 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3538 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3539 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3540 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3541 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3542 return Ok(RAAUpdates {
3543 commitment_update: None, finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3544 accepted_htlcs: Vec::new(), failed_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3546 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: Vec::new()
3550 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)? {
3551 (Some((mut commitment_update, mut additional_update)), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3552 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_htlcs.len());
3553 for fail_msg in update_fail_htlcs.drain(..) {
3554 commitment_update.update_fail_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3556 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.reserve(update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3557 for fail_msg in update_fail_malformed_htlcs.drain(..) {
3558 commitment_update.update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(fail_msg);
3561 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3562 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3563 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3564 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3567 commitment_update: Some(commitment_update),
3568 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3569 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos,
3570 failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3572 holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3575 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3576 if require_commitment {
3577 let (commitment_signed, mut additional_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
3579 // send_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3580 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3581 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3582 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3584 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3585 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3587 commitment_update: Some(msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3588 update_add_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3589 update_fulfill_htlcs: Vec::new(),
3591 update_fail_malformed_htlcs,
3595 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3596 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3597 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3600 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3602 commitment_update: None,
3603 finalized_claimed_htlcs,
3604 accepted_htlcs: to_forward_infos, failed_htlcs: revoked_htlcs,
3605 monitor_update, holding_cell_failed_htlcs: htlcs_to_fail
3612 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3613 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3614 /// commitment update.
3615 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3616 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3617 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3620 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3621 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3622 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3623 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3625 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3626 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3627 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3628 if !self.is_outbound() {
3629 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3631 if !self.is_usable() {
3632 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3634 if !self.is_live() {
3635 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3638 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3639 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3640 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3641 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3642 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3643 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3644 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3645 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3646 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3647 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3651 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3652 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3653 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3654 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3655 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3658 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3659 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3663 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3664 force_holding_cell = true;
3667 if force_holding_cell {
3668 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3672 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3673 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3675 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3676 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3681 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3682 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3684 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3686 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3687 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3688 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3689 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3693 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3694 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3695 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3699 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3700 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3703 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3704 // will be retransmitted.
3705 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3706 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3707 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3709 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3710 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3712 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3713 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3714 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3715 // this HTLC accordingly
3716 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3719 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3720 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3721 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3722 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3725 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3726 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3727 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3728 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3729 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3730 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3735 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3737 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3738 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3739 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3740 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3744 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3745 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3746 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3747 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3748 // the update upon reconnection.
3749 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3753 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3754 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3757 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3758 /// This must be called immediately after the [`chain::Watch`] call which returned
3759 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`].
3760 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3761 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3762 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3764 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3765 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3766 pub fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3767 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3768 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3769 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3771 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3772 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3773 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3774 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3775 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3776 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3777 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3780 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3781 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3782 /// to the remote side.
3783 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates where L::Target: Logger {
3784 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3785 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3787 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3788 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3789 // first received the funding_signed.
3790 let mut funding_broadcastable =
3791 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3792 self.funding_transaction.take()
3794 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
3795 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
3796 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
3797 funding_broadcastable = None;
3800 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
3801 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
3802 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
3803 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
3804 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
3805 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
3806 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
3807 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
3808 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
3809 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
3810 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3811 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
3812 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3813 next_per_commitment_point,
3814 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
3818 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block_height, logger);
3820 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
3821 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
3822 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3823 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
3824 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3825 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
3827 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
3828 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3829 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3830 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3831 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
3832 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3836 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
3837 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
3839 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
3840 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
3843 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
3844 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
3845 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
3846 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
3847 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
3848 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
3849 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
3850 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
3851 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
3855 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3856 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
3858 if self.is_outbound() {
3859 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
3861 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3862 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3864 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
3865 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
3867 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
3868 self.update_time_counter += 1;
3869 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
3870 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
3871 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
3872 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
3873 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3874 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3875 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3876 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3877 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3878 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3879 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
3881 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3882 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
3883 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
3889 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3890 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
3891 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
3892 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
3893 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3894 per_commitment_secret,
3895 next_per_commitment_point,
3899 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
3900 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
3901 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
3902 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3903 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3905 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3906 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
3907 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
3908 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3909 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3910 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
3911 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
3912 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
3913 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
3918 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
3919 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3921 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
3922 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
3923 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3924 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3925 reason: err_packet.clone()
3928 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
3929 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
3930 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3931 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3932 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
3933 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
3936 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
3937 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
3938 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3939 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
3940 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
3947 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
3948 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3949 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
3950 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
3954 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
3955 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
3956 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3957 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
3958 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
3959 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
3963 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
3964 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
3966 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
3967 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
3968 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
3969 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
3970 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L,
3971 node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block: &BestBlock)
3972 -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
3973 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
3974 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
3975 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
3976 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
3977 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
3980 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
3981 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
3982 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3985 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
3986 match msg.data_loss_protect {
3987 OptionalField::Present(ref data_loss) => {
3988 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
3989 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&data_loss.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
3990 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
3991 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
3992 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
3994 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
3995 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
3996 ($err_msg: expr) => {
3997 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
3998 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4001 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4002 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4003 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4004 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4005 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4006 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4007 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4008 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4011 OptionalField::Absent => {}
4015 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4016 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4017 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4018 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4020 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4024 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4025 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4026 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4028 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4029 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4030 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4031 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4032 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4036 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, best_block.height(), logger);
4038 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4039 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4040 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4041 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4042 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4043 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4045 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4046 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4047 channel_ready: None,
4048 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4049 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4050 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4054 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4055 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4056 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4057 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4058 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4059 next_per_commitment_point,
4060 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4062 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4063 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4064 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4068 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4069 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4070 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4072 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4073 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4074 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4077 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4080 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4083 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4084 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4085 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4086 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4087 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4089 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4090 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4091 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4092 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4093 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4094 next_per_commitment_point,
4095 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4099 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4100 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4101 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4103 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4106 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4107 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4108 raa: required_revoke,
4109 commitment_update: None,
4110 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4112 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4113 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4114 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4116 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4119 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4120 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4121 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4122 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4123 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4124 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4127 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4128 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4129 raa: required_revoke,
4130 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4131 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4135 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4139 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4140 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4141 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4142 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4144 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4146 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4148 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4149 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4150 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4151 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4152 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4153 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4155 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4156 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4157 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4158 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4159 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4161 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4162 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4163 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4164 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4167 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4168 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4169 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4170 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4171 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4172 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4173 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4174 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4175 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4176 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4177 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4178 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4179 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4180 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4181 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4183 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4186 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4187 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4190 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4191 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4192 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4193 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4194 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4195 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4196 self.channel_state &
4197 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4198 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4199 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4200 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4203 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4204 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4205 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4206 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4207 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4208 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4209 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4211 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4217 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4218 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4219 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4220 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4222 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4223 return Ok((None, None));
4226 if !self.is_outbound() {
4227 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4228 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4230 return Ok((None, None));
4233 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4235 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4236 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4237 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4238 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4240 let sig = self.holder_signer
4241 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4242 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4244 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4245 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4246 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4247 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4249 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4250 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4251 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4256 pub fn shutdown<K: Deref>(
4257 &mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4258 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4259 where K::Target: KeysInterface
4261 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4262 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4264 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4265 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4266 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4267 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4268 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4270 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4271 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4272 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4275 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4277 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4278 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4281 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4282 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4283 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4286 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4289 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4290 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4291 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4292 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4294 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4297 assert!(send_shutdown);
4298 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
4299 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4300 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4302 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4307 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4309 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4310 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4312 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4313 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4314 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4315 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4316 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4317 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4321 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4322 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4323 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4324 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4328 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4329 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4330 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4331 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4332 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4333 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4335 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4336 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4343 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4344 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4346 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4349 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4350 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4352 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4354 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4355 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4356 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4357 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4358 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4359 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4360 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4361 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4362 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4364 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4365 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4368 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4372 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4373 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4374 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4375 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4377 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4378 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4380 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4381 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4383 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4384 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4386 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4387 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4390 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4391 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4394 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4395 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4396 return Ok((None, None));
4399 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4400 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4401 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4402 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4404 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4406 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4409 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4410 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4411 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4412 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4413 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4417 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4418 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4419 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4423 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4424 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4425 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4426 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4427 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4428 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4429 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4433 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4435 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4436 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4437 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4438 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4440 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4443 let sig = self.holder_signer
4444 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4445 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4447 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4448 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4449 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4450 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4454 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4455 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4456 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4457 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4459 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4460 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4461 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4467 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4468 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4469 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4471 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4472 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4474 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4475 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4478 if !self.is_outbound() {
4479 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4480 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4481 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4482 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4484 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4485 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4486 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4488 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4489 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4492 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4493 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4494 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4495 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4496 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4497 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4498 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4499 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4501 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4504 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4505 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4506 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4507 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4509 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4513 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4514 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4515 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4516 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4518 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4524 // Public utilities:
4526 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4530 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4534 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4535 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4536 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4540 /// Gets the channel's type
4541 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4545 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4546 /// is_usable() returns true).
4547 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4548 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4549 self.short_channel_id
4552 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4553 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4554 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4557 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4558 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4559 self.outbound_scid_alias
4561 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4562 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4563 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4564 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4565 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4568 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4569 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4570 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4571 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4574 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4575 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4576 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4579 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4580 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4581 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4582 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4586 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4589 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4590 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4593 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4594 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4597 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4598 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4599 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4602 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4603 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4606 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4607 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4608 self.counterparty_node_id
4611 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4612 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4613 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4616 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4617 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4618 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4621 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4622 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4624 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4625 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4626 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4627 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4629 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4633 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4634 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4635 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4638 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4639 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4640 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4643 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4644 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4645 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4647 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4648 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4653 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4654 self.channel_value_satoshis
4657 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4658 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4661 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4662 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4665 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4666 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4669 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4670 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4671 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4674 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4675 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4676 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4679 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4680 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4681 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4684 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4685 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4686 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4687 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4688 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4691 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4693 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4694 self.prev_config = None;
4698 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4699 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4703 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4704 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4705 pub fn update_config(&mut self, their_features: &InitFeatures, mut config: ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4706 if !their_features.supports_inbound_fees() {
4707 config.inbound_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = 0;
4708 config.inbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat = 0;
4711 let did_channel_update =
4712 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4713 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4714 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4715 if did_channel_update {
4716 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4717 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4718 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4719 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4721 self.config.options = config;
4725 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4726 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4727 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4728 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4729 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4730 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4731 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4733 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4734 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4737 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4739 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4740 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4746 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4747 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4748 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4749 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4750 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4751 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4752 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4754 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4755 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4762 pub fn get_feerate(&self) -> u32 {
4766 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
4767 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
4768 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
4769 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
4770 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
4771 // which are near the dust limit.
4772 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
4773 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
4774 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
4775 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
4776 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4778 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
4779 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
4781 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
4784 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4785 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
4788 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4789 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
4792 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
4793 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
4797 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
4802 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
4804 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
4805 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
4806 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
4807 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4808 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
4809 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
4811 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
4813 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
4821 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
4822 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
4826 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4827 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
4828 self.update_time_counter
4831 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
4832 self.latest_monitor_update_id
4835 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
4836 self.config.announced_channel
4839 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
4840 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
4843 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
4844 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4845 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
4846 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
4849 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
4850 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
4851 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
4854 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
4855 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4856 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
4857 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
4858 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
4861 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
4862 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
4863 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4864 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
4865 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
4868 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
4869 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4870 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
4871 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
4874 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
4875 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
4876 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
4879 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
4880 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
4881 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
4883 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
4884 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
4885 if self.channel_state &
4886 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4887 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4888 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
4889 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
4890 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
4893 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
4894 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
4895 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
4896 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
4897 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
4898 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
4900 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
4901 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
4902 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
4904 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
4905 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
4906 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
4907 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
4908 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
4909 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
4915 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
4916 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
4917 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
4920 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4921 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4922 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4925 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
4926 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4927 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
4930 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
4931 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
4932 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
4933 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
4934 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
4935 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
4940 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
4941 self.channel_update_status
4944 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
4945 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4946 self.channel_update_status = status;
4949 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
4951 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
4952 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
4953 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4957 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
4958 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
4959 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
4962 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
4966 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4967 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4968 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
4970 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
4971 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
4972 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4974 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
4975 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4978 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
4979 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
4980 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
4981 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
4982 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
4983 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
4984 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
4985 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
4986 self.channel_state);
4988 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
4992 if need_commitment_update {
4993 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
4994 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4995 let next_per_commitment_point =
4996 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4997 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4998 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4999 next_per_commitment_point,
5000 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5004 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5010 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5011 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5012 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5013 pub fn transactions_confirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32,
5014 txdata: &TransactionData, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5015 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5016 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5017 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5018 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5019 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5020 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5021 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5022 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5023 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5024 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5025 if self.is_outbound() {
5026 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5027 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5028 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5029 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5030 // channel and move on.
5031 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5032 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5034 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5035 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5036 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5038 if self.is_outbound() {
5039 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5040 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5041 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5042 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5043 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5044 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5048 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5049 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5050 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5051 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5052 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5056 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5057 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5058 // may have already happened for this block).
5059 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5060 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5061 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger);
5062 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5065 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5066 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5067 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5068 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5076 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5077 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5078 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5079 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5081 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5082 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5085 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5087 pub fn best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_pk: PublicKey, logger: &L)
5088 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5089 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)), logger)
5092 fn do_best_block_updated<L: Deref>(&mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_node_pk: Option<(BlockHash, PublicKey)>, logger: &L)
5093 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5094 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5095 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5096 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5098 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5099 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5101 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5102 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5103 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5111 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5113 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5114 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5115 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5117 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5118 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5121 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5122 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5123 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5124 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5125 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5126 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5127 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5128 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5129 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5132 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5133 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5134 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5135 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5137 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5138 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5139 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5141 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5142 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5143 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5144 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5146 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5147 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5148 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5149 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5150 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5151 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5152 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5155 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_pk)) = genesis_node_pk {
5156 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_pk, genesis_block_hash, height, logger)
5158 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5161 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5162 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5163 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5164 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5165 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5166 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5167 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5168 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5169 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5170 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5171 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5172 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5173 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None, logger) {
5174 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5175 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5176 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5177 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5183 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5188 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5189 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5191 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5192 if !self.is_outbound() {
5193 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5195 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5196 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5199 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5200 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5203 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5204 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5208 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5209 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5210 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5211 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5212 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5213 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5214 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5215 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5216 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5217 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5218 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5219 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5220 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5221 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5222 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5223 first_per_commitment_point,
5224 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5225 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5226 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5227 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5229 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5233 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5234 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5237 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5238 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5239 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5240 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5243 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5244 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5246 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5247 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5248 if self.is_outbound() {
5249 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5251 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5252 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5254 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5255 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5257 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5258 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5261 self.user_id = user_id;
5262 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5264 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5267 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5268 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5269 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5271 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5272 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5273 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5274 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5276 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5277 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5278 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5279 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5280 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5281 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5282 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5283 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5284 max_accepted_htlcs: OUR_MAX_HTLCS,
5285 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5286 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5287 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5288 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5289 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5290 first_per_commitment_point,
5291 shutdown_scriptpubkey: OptionalField::Present(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5292 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5293 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5295 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5299 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5300 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5302 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5304 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5305 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5308 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5309 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5310 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5311 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5312 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5313 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5316 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5317 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5318 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5319 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5320 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5321 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5322 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5323 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5324 if !self.is_outbound() {
5325 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5327 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5328 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5330 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5331 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5332 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5333 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5336 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5337 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5339 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5342 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5343 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5348 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5350 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5352 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5353 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5354 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5356 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5357 temporary_channel_id,
5358 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5359 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5364 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5365 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5366 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5367 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5369 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5372 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5373 fn get_channel_announcement(&self, node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5374 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5375 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5377 if !self.is_usable() {
5378 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5381 let were_node_one = node_id.serialize()[..] < self.counterparty_node_id.serialize()[..];
5383 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5384 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(),
5386 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5387 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { self.get_counterparty_node_id() },
5388 node_id_2: if were_node_one { self.get_counterparty_node_id() } else { node_id },
5389 bitcoin_key_1: if were_node_one { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() },
5390 bitcoin_key_2: if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().clone() } else { self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey },
5391 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5397 fn get_announcement_sigs<L: Deref>(&mut self, node_pk: PublicKey, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, logger: &L)
5398 -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures> where L::Target: Logger {
5399 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5403 if !self.is_usable() {
5407 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5408 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5412 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5416 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5417 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_pk, genesis_block_hash) {
5420 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as channel is not public.");
5424 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5426 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5431 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5433 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5434 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5435 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5436 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5437 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5441 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5443 fn sign_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5444 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5445 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_id;
5447 let (our_node_sig, our_bitcoin_sig) = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5448 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5449 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5450 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5451 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5452 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5453 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5454 contents: announcement,
5457 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5461 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5462 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5463 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5464 pub fn announcement_signatures(&mut self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> {
5465 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash)?;
5467 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5469 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5470 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5471 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5472 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5474 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5475 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5476 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5477 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5480 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5481 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5482 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5483 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5486 self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement)
5489 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5490 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5491 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement(&self, our_node_id: PublicKey, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> {
5492 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5495 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(our_node_id.clone(), chain_hash) {
5497 Err(_) => return None,
5499 match self.sign_channel_announcement(our_node_id, announcement) {
5500 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5505 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5506 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5507 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5508 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5509 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5510 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5511 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5512 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5513 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5514 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5515 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5516 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5517 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5518 let data_loss_protect = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5519 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5520 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5521 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5522 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5523 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey
5526 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5527 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect {
5528 your_last_per_commitment_secret: [0;32],
5529 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5532 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5533 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5534 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5535 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5536 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5537 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5538 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5539 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5541 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5542 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5543 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5544 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5545 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5546 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5547 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5548 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5549 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5551 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5557 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5559 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5560 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5561 /// commitment update.
5563 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5564 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5565 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5566 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5568 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5569 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5571 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5572 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5577 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5578 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5580 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5582 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5583 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5585 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5586 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5587 /// regenerate them.
5589 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5590 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5592 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5593 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5594 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5595 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5596 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5597 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5599 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5600 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5601 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5604 if amount_msat == 0 {
5605 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5608 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5609 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5612 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5613 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5614 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5615 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5616 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5617 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5618 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5619 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5622 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5623 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5624 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5625 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5627 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5628 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5629 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5632 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
5633 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
5634 if !self.is_outbound() {
5635 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5636 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5637 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5638 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5639 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5640 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5644 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5647 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5648 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5649 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5651 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5652 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5653 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5654 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5655 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5656 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5660 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5661 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5662 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5663 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5664 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
5665 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5669 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
5670 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
5671 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
5674 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
5675 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
5676 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5677 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
5679 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
5680 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
5683 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
5684 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
5685 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
5686 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
5687 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
5690 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
5691 force_holding_cell = true;
5694 // Now update local state:
5695 if force_holding_cell {
5696 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
5701 onion_routing_packet,
5706 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
5707 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5709 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
5711 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
5715 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
5716 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5717 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
5721 onion_routing_packet,
5723 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
5728 /// Only fails in case of bad keys
5729 fn send_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5730 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
5731 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
5732 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
5734 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5735 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
5736 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
5738 if let Some(state) = new_state {
5739 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5743 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
5744 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
5745 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
5746 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
5747 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
5748 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
5749 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
5752 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5753 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
5754 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
5755 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
5756 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
5757 self.pending_update_fee = None;
5760 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
5762 let (res, counterparty_commitment_txid, htlcs) = match self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger) {
5763 Ok((res, (counterparty_commitment_tx, mut htlcs))) => {
5764 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
5765 let htlcs_no_ref: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
5766 htlcs.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
5767 (res, counterparty_commitment_tx, htlcs_no_ref)
5769 Err(e) => return Err(e),
5772 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
5773 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
5776 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5777 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5778 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5779 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
5780 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
5781 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
5782 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
5783 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
5786 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
5787 Ok((res, monitor_update))
5790 /// Only fails in case of bad keys. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed generation
5791 /// when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
5792 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5793 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5794 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
5795 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
5796 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
5798 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
5800 if !self.is_outbound() {
5801 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
5802 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
5803 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
5804 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
5805 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
5806 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
5807 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
5808 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
5809 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
5810 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
5817 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
5818 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
5822 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
5823 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
5825 htlc_signatures = res.1;
5827 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
5828 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
5829 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
5830 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5832 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
5833 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
5834 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
5835 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
5836 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
5837 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5841 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
5842 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5845 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
5848 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and creates a signed commitment transaction
5849 /// to send to the remote peer in one go.
5851 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
5852 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
5853 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, msgs::CommitmentSigned, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5854 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger)? {
5855 Some(update_add_htlc) => {
5856 let (commitment_signed, monitor_update) = self.send_commitment_no_status_check(logger)?;
5857 Ok(Some((update_add_htlc, commitment_signed, monitor_update)))
5863 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
5864 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
5865 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
5868 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5869 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
5870 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
5872 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
5873 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
5874 inbound_fee_base_msat: self.counterparty_forwarding_info.as_ref()
5875 .map(|info| info.inbound_fee_base_msat).unwrap_or(0),
5876 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
5877 inbound_fee_proportional_millionths: self.counterparty_forwarding_info.as_ref()
5878 .map(|info| info.inbound_fee_proportional_millionths).unwrap_or(0),
5879 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
5885 pub fn inbound_fees_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::InboundFeesUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
5886 if let Some(info) = &mut self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
5887 info.inbound_fee_base_msat = msg.inbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat;
5888 info.inbound_fee_proportional_millionths = msg.inbound_forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths;
5894 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
5895 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
5896 pub fn get_shutdown<K: Deref>(&mut self, keys_provider: &K, their_features: &InitFeatures, target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>)
5897 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
5898 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
5899 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
5900 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
5901 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
5904 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
5905 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
5906 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
5908 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
5909 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
5912 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
5913 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
5914 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
5917 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5920 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = keys_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey();
5921 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
5922 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
5924 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
5929 // From here on out, we may not fail!
5930 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
5931 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5932 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
5934 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
5936 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5938 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
5939 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
5940 Some(ChannelMonitorUpdate {
5941 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
5942 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
5943 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5947 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
5948 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5949 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
5952 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
5953 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
5954 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
5955 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5956 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5958 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
5959 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5966 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
5969 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
5970 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
5971 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
5972 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
5973 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
5974 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
5975 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
5976 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
5977 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
5978 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
5979 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5981 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
5982 // return them to fail the payment.
5983 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
5984 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
5985 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
5987 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
5988 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
5993 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5994 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
5995 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
5996 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
5997 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
5998 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
5999 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6000 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6001 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6002 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6003 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6004 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6005 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6010 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6011 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6012 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6015 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6016 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6017 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6019 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6020 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6024 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6028 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6029 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6031 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6037 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6038 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6039 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6040 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6041 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6043 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6044 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6045 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6046 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6052 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6053 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6054 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6055 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6056 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6057 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6062 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6063 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6064 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6065 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6067 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6068 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6069 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6070 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6075 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6076 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6077 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6078 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6079 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6080 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6085 impl<Signer: Sign> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6086 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6087 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6090 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6092 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6093 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6094 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6095 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6096 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6098 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6099 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6100 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6101 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6103 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6104 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6105 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6107 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6109 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6110 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6111 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6112 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6113 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6114 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6116 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6117 // deserialized from that format.
6118 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6119 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6120 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6122 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6124 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6125 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6126 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6128 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6129 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6130 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6131 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6134 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6135 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6136 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6139 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6140 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6141 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6142 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6144 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6145 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6147 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6149 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6151 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6153 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6156 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6158 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6163 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6165 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6166 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6167 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6168 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6169 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6170 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6171 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6173 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6175 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6177 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6180 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6181 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6182 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6185 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6187 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6188 preimages.push(preimage);
6190 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6191 reason.write(writer)?;
6193 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6195 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6196 preimages.push(preimage);
6198 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6199 reason.write(writer)?;
6204 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6205 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6207 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6209 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6210 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6211 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6212 source.write(writer)?;
6213 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6215 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6217 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6218 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6220 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6222 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6223 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6228 match self.resend_order {
6229 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6230 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6233 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6234 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6235 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6237 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6238 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6239 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6240 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6243 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6244 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6245 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6246 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6247 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6250 if self.is_outbound() {
6251 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6252 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6253 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6255 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6256 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6257 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6259 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6261 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6262 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6263 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6264 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6266 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6267 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6268 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6269 // consider the stale state on reload.
6272 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6273 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6274 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6276 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6277 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6278 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6280 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6281 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6283 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6284 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6285 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6287 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6288 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6290 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6293 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6294 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6295 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6297 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6300 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6301 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6303 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6304 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6305 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6307 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6309 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6311 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6313 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6314 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6315 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6316 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6317 htlc.write(writer)?;
6320 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6321 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6322 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6324 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6325 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6327 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6328 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6329 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6330 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6331 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6332 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6333 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6335 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6336 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6337 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6338 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6339 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6341 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6343 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6344 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6345 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6346 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6348 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6349 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6350 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6351 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6352 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6353 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6354 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6356 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6357 (2, chan_type, option),
6358 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6359 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6360 (5, self.config, required),
6361 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6362 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6363 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6364 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6365 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6366 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6367 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6368 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6369 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6370 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6371 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6372 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6379 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6380 impl<'a, K: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a K, u32)> for Channel<<K::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6381 where K::Target: KeysInterface {
6382 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a K, u32)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6383 let (keys_source, serialized_height) = args;
6384 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6386 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6387 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6388 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6389 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6391 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6393 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6394 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6395 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6396 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6397 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6399 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6400 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6403 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6404 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6405 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6407 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6409 let mut keys_data = None;
6411 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6412 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6413 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6414 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6415 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6416 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6417 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6418 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6419 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6420 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6424 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6425 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6426 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6429 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6431 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6432 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6433 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6435 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6436 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6437 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6438 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6439 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6440 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6441 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6442 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6443 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6444 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6445 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6446 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6447 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6448 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6453 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6454 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6455 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6456 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6457 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6458 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6459 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6460 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6461 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6462 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6463 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6464 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6466 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6467 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6470 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6471 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6474 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6475 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6477 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6482 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6483 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6484 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6485 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6486 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6487 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6488 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6489 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6490 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6491 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6493 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6494 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6495 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6497 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6498 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6499 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6501 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6505 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6506 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6507 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6508 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6511 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6512 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6513 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6515 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6516 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6517 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6518 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6521 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6522 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, OUR_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6523 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6524 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6527 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6529 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6531 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6532 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6533 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6534 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6536 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6537 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6538 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6539 // consider the stale state on reload.
6540 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6543 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6544 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6545 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6547 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6550 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6551 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6552 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6554 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6555 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6556 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6557 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6559 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6560 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6562 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6563 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6565 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6566 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6567 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6569 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6571 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6572 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6574 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6575 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6578 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6580 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6581 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6582 inbound_fee_base_msat: 0,
6583 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6584 inbound_fee_proportional_millionths: 0,
6585 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6587 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6590 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6591 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6593 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6595 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6596 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6598 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6599 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6601 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6603 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6604 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6605 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6607 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6608 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6609 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
6613 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
6614 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
6615 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
6617 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
6623 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
6624 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
6625 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
6626 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
6627 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
6628 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
6629 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
6630 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
6631 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
6632 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
6634 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
6635 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
6636 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
6637 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
6638 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
6639 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
6641 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
6642 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
6644 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
6645 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
6646 (1, minimum_depth, option),
6647 (2, channel_type, option),
6648 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6649 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6650 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
6651 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
6652 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6653 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6654 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6655 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
6656 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
6657 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
6658 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6659 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
6660 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6661 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6662 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
6665 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
6666 let mut holder_signer = keys_source.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
6667 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
6668 // required channel parameters.
6669 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
6670 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
6671 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
6673 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
6675 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
6676 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
6677 let holder_signer = keys_source.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
6678 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
6681 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
6682 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
6683 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6685 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6686 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6688 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
6689 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
6694 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
6695 if iter.next().is_some() {
6696 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6700 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
6701 if chan_features.supports_unknown_bits() || chan_features.requires_unknown_bits() {
6702 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
6703 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
6704 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
6707 if channel_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() {
6708 // Relax this check when ChannelTypeFeatures supports anchors.
6709 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
6712 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6713 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&keys_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
6715 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
6716 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
6717 // separate u64 values.
6718 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
6723 config: config.unwrap(),
6727 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
6728 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
6729 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
6733 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
6735 channel_value_satoshis,
6737 latest_monitor_update_id,
6740 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6743 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
6744 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6747 pending_inbound_htlcs,
6748 pending_outbound_htlcs,
6749 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
6753 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
6754 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
6755 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
6756 monitor_pending_forwards,
6757 monitor_pending_failures,
6758 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
6761 holding_cell_update_fee,
6762 next_holder_htlc_id,
6763 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
6764 update_time_counter,
6767 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6768 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6769 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
6770 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
6772 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
6773 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
6774 closing_fee_limits: None,
6775 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
6777 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
6779 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
6780 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
6782 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
6784 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
6785 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
6786 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
6787 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
6788 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
6789 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
6790 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
6791 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
6792 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
6795 counterparty_forwarding_info,
6797 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
6798 funding_transaction,
6800 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
6801 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
6802 counterparty_node_id,
6804 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
6808 channel_update_status,
6809 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
6813 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6814 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6815 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6816 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
6818 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
6820 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
6821 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
6822 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
6824 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
6826 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6827 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
6829 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
6838 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
6839 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
6840 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
6841 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
6842 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
6844 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
6845 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
6846 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
6847 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
6848 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
6849 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DataLossProtect, DecodeError, OptionalField, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
6850 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
6851 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
6852 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
6853 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
6854 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
6855 use crate::chain::keysinterface::{BaseSign, InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, KeysInterface, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
6856 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
6857 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
6858 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
6859 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
6860 use crate::util::test_utils;
6861 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
6862 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature, Scalar};
6863 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
6864 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
6865 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
6866 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::RecoverableSignature;
6867 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
6868 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
6869 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
6870 use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
6871 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
6872 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
6873 use crate::prelude::*;
6875 struct TestFeeEstimator {
6878 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
6879 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
6885 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
6886 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
6887 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
6888 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
6892 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
6893 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
6894 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
6895 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
6896 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6897 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
6898 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
6902 signer: InMemorySigner,
6905 impl EntropySource for Keys {
6906 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
6909 impl NodeSigner for Keys {
6910 fn get_node_secret(&self, _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<SecretKey, ()> { panic!(); }
6912 fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
6913 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6914 Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &self.get_node_secret(recipient)?))
6917 fn ecdh(&self, _recipient: Recipient, _other_key: &PublicKey, _tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> { panic!(); }
6919 fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial { panic!(); }
6921 fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> { panic!(); }
6924 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
6925 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
6927 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
6928 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
6931 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
6935 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
6937 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
6938 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6939 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6940 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
6941 Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
6944 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
6945 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
6946 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
6947 ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key))
6951 impl KeysInterface for Keys {}
6953 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
6954 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
6955 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
6959 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
6960 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features().clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
6961 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
6962 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
6964 let seed = [42; 32];
6965 let network = Network::Testnet;
6966 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6967 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
6968 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
6971 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6972 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6973 let config = UserConfig::default();
6974 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
6975 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
6976 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
6978 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
6979 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
6983 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
6984 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
6986 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
6987 let original_fee = 253;
6988 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
6989 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
6990 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
6991 let seed = [42; 32];
6992 let network = Network::Testnet;
6993 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
6995 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
6996 let config = UserConfig::default();
6997 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
6999 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7000 // same as the old fee.
7001 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7002 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7003 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7007 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7008 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7009 // dust limits are used.
7010 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7011 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7012 let seed = [42; 32];
7013 let network = Network::Testnet;
7014 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7015 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7017 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7018 // they have different dust limits.
7020 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7021 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7022 let config = UserConfig::default();
7023 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7025 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7026 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7027 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7028 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7029 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7031 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7032 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7033 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7034 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7035 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7037 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7038 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7039 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7041 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7042 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7043 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7044 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7047 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7049 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7050 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7051 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7052 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7053 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7055 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7056 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7057 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7058 payment_secret: None,
7059 payment_params: None,
7063 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7064 // the dust limit check.
7065 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7066 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7067 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7068 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7070 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7071 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7072 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7073 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7074 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7075 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7076 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7080 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7081 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7082 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7083 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7084 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7085 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7086 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7087 let seed = [42; 32];
7088 let network = Network::Testnet;
7089 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7091 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7092 let config = UserConfig::default();
7093 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7095 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7096 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7098 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7099 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7100 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7101 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7102 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7103 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7105 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7106 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7107 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7108 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7109 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7111 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7113 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7114 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7115 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7116 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7117 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7119 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7120 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7121 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7122 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7123 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7127 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7128 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7129 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7130 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7131 let seed = [42; 32];
7132 let network = Network::Testnet;
7133 let best_block = BestBlock::from_genesis(network);
7134 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7135 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7137 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7139 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7140 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7141 let config = UserConfig::default();
7142 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7144 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7145 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7146 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7147 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7149 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7150 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7151 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features()).unwrap();
7153 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7154 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7155 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7156 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7158 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7159 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7160 let (funding_signed_msg, _, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7162 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7163 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7165 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7166 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7167 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7168 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7169 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7170 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7171 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7172 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7173 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7178 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7180 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7181 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7182 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7183 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7184 match msg.data_loss_protect {
7185 OptionalField::Present(DataLossProtect { your_last_per_commitment_secret, .. }) => {
7186 assert_eq!(your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7193 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7194 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7195 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7196 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7197 let seed = [42; 32];
7198 let network = Network::Testnet;
7199 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7200 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7201 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7203 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7204 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7205 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7206 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7207 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7208 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7209 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7210 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7212 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7213 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7214 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7215 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7216 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7217 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7219 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7220 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7221 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7222 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7224 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7226 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7227 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7228 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7229 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7230 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7231 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7233 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7234 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7235 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7236 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7238 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7239 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7240 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7241 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7242 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7244 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7245 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7247 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7248 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7249 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7251 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7252 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7253 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7254 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7255 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7257 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7258 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7260 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7261 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7262 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7266 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7268 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7269 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7270 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7272 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7273 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7274 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7275 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7277 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7278 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7279 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7281 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7283 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7284 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7287 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7288 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7289 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7290 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7291 let seed = [42; 32];
7292 let network = Network::Testnet;
7293 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7294 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7295 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7298 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7299 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7300 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7302 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7303 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7305 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7306 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7307 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7309 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7310 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7312 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7314 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7315 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7317 // Channel Negotiations failed
7318 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7319 assert!(result.is_err());
7324 fn channel_update() {
7325 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7326 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7327 let seed = [42; 32];
7328 let network = Network::Testnet;
7329 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7330 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7332 // Create a channel.
7333 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7334 let config = UserConfig::default();
7335 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7336 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7337 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7338 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7340 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7341 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7342 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7344 short_channel_id: 0,
7347 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7348 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7349 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7351 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7352 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7354 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7356 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7358 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7359 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7360 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7361 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7363 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7364 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7365 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7367 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7371 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7373 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7374 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7375 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7376 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7377 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7378 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7379 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7380 use crate::chain::keysinterface::BaseSign;
7381 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7382 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7383 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7384 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7385 use crate::sync::Arc;
7387 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7388 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7389 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7390 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7392 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7394 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("4242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242424242").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7395 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7396 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7397 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7398 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7399 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7401 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7402 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7407 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7408 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7409 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7411 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7412 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7413 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7414 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10_000_000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7415 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7416 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7418 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7420 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7421 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7422 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7423 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7424 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7425 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7427 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7428 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7429 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7430 selected_contest_delay: 144
7432 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7433 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7435 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7436 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7438 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7439 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7441 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7442 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7444 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7445 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7446 // build_commitment_transaction.
7447 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7448 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7449 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7450 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7451 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7453 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7454 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7455 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7456 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7460 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7461 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7462 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7463 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7467 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7468 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7469 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7471 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7472 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7474 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7475 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7477 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7479 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7480 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7481 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7482 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7483 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7484 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7485 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7487 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7488 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7489 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7490 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7492 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7493 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7494 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7496 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7498 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7499 commitment_tx.clone(),
7500 counterparty_signature,
7501 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7502 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7503 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7505 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7506 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7508 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7509 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7510 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7512 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7513 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7516 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7517 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7519 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7520 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7521 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7522 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7523 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7524 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7525 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7526 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7528 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7531 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7532 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7533 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7537 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7540 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7541 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7542 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7544 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7545 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7546 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7547 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7548 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7549 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7550 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7551 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7553 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7557 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7558 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7560 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7561 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7562 "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", {});
7564 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7565 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7566 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7567 "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", {});
7569 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7570 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7572 amount_msat: 1000000,
7574 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7575 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7577 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7580 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7581 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7583 amount_msat: 2000000,
7585 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7586 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7588 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7591 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7592 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7594 amount_msat: 2000000,
7596 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7597 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7598 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7600 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7603 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7604 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7606 amount_msat: 3000000,
7608 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7609 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7610 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7612 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7615 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7616 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7618 amount_msat: 4000000,
7620 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7621 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7623 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
7627 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7628 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7629 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
7631 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
7632 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
7633 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8007e80300000000000022002052bfef0479d7b293c27e0f1eb294bea154c63a3294ef092c19af51409bce0e2ad007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484e0a06a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e040047304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea01473044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7636 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
7637 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
7638 "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" },
7641 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
7642 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
7643 "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" },
7646 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
7647 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
7648 "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" },
7651 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
7652 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
7653 "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" },
7656 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
7657 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
7658 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b04000000000000000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b8701483045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7661 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7662 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7663 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
7665 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
7666 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
7667 "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", {
7670 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
7671 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
7672 "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" },
7675 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
7676 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
7677 "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" },
7680 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
7681 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
7682 "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" },
7685 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
7686 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
7687 "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" },
7690 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
7691 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
7692 "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" }
7695 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7696 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7697 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
7699 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
7700 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
7701 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8006d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5d007000000000000220020748eba944fedc8827f6b06bc44678f93c0f9e6078b35c6331ed31e75f8ce0c2db80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e4844e9d6a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e90147304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e501475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7704 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
7705 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
7706 "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" },
7709 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
7710 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
7711 "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" },
7714 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
7715 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
7716 "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" },
7719 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
7720 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
7721 "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" }
7724 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7725 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7726 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
7727 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
7729 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
7730 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
7731 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7734 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
7735 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
7736 "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" },
7739 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
7740 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
7741 "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" },
7744 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
7745 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
7746 "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" },
7749 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
7750 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
7751 "02000000000101104f394af4c4fad78337f95e3e9f802f4c0d86ab231853af09b285348561320005000000000100000001a00f0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc61583483045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048d76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac6851b2756800000000" }
7754 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7755 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7756 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
7757 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7759 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
7760 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
7761 "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", {
7764 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
7765 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
7766 "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" },
7769 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
7770 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
7771 "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" },
7774 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
7775 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
7776 "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" },
7779 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
7780 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
7781 "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" }
7784 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7785 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7786 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
7788 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
7789 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
7790 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8005d007000000000000220020403d394747cae42e98ff01734ad5c08f82ba123d3d9a620abda88989651e2ab5b80b000000000000220020c20b5d1f8584fd90443e7b7b720136174fa4b9333c261d04dbbd012635c0f419a00f0000000000002200208c48d15160397c9731df9bc3b236656efb6665fbfe92b4a6878e88a499f741c4c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484da966a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400473044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c10147304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c01475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
7793 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
7794 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
7795 "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" },
7798 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
7799 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
7800 "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" },
7803 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
7804 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
7805 "02000000000101403ad7602b43293497a3a2235a12ecefda4f3a1f1d06e49b1786d945685de1ff02000000000000000001f1090000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504014730440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
7808 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7809 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7810 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
7812 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
7813 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
7814 "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", {
7817 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
7818 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
7819 "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" },
7822 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
7823 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
7824 "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" },
7827 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
7828 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
7829 "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" }
7832 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7833 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7834 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
7836 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
7837 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
7838 "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", {
7841 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
7842 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
7843 "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" },
7846 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
7847 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
7848 "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" }
7851 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7852 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7853 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
7854 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
7856 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
7857 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
7858 "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", {
7861 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
7862 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
7863 "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" },
7866 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
7867 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
7868 "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" }
7871 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7872 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7873 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
7874 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7876 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
7877 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
7878 "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", {
7881 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
7882 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
7883 "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" },
7886 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
7887 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
7888 "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" }
7891 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7892 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7893 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
7895 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
7896 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
7897 "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", {
7900 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
7901 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
7902 "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" }
7905 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7906 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7907 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
7908 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
7910 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
7911 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
7912 "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", {
7915 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
7916 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
7917 "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" }
7920 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7921 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7922 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
7923 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7925 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
7926 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
7927 "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", {
7930 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
7931 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
7932 "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" }
7935 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7936 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7937 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
7938 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7940 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
7941 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
7942 "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", {});
7944 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7945 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7946 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
7947 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7949 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
7950 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
7951 "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", {});
7953 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
7954 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7955 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
7956 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7958 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
7959 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
7960 "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", {});
7962 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
7963 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7964 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
7966 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7967 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7968 "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", {});
7970 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
7971 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7972 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
7973 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
7975 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
7976 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
7977 "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", {});
7979 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
7980 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
7981 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
7982 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7984 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
7985 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
7986 "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", {});
7988 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
7989 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
7990 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
7991 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
7992 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7993 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7995 amount_msat: 2000000,
7997 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7998 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8000 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8003 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8004 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8005 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8007 amount_msat: 5000000,
8009 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8010 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8011 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8013 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8016 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8017 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8019 amount_msat: 5000000,
8021 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8022 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8023 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8025 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8029 test_commitment!("30440220048705bec5288d28b3f29344b8d124853b1af423a568664d2c6f02c8ea886525022060f998a461052a2476b912db426ea2a06700953a241135c7957f2e79bc222df9",
8030 "3045022100c4f1d60b6fca9febc8b39de1a31e84c5f7c4b41c97239ef05f4350aa484c6b5e02200c5134ac8b20eb7a29d0dd4a501f6aa8fefb8489171f4cb408bd2a32324ab03f",
8031 "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", {
8034 "304502210081cbb94121761d34c189cd4e6a281feea6f585060ad0ba2632e8d6b3c6bb8a6c02201007981bbd16539d63df2805b5568f1f5688cd2a885d04706f50db9b77ba13c6",
8035 "304502210090ed76aeb21b53236a598968abc66e2024691d07b62f53ddbeca8f93144af9c602205f873af5a0c10e62690e9aba09740550f194a9dc455ba4c1c23f6cde7704674c",
8036 "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" },
8038 "304402201d0f09d2bf7bc245a4f17980e1e9164290df16c70c6a2ff1592f5030d6108581022061e744a7dc151b36bf0aff7a4f1812ba90b8b03633bb979a270d19858fd960c5",
8039 "30450221009aef000d2e843a4202c1b1a2bf554abc9a7902bf49b2cb0759bc507456b7ebad02204e7c3d193ede2fd2b4cd6b39f51a920e581e35575e357e44d7b699c40ce61d39",
8040 "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" },
8042 "30440220010bf035d5823596e50dce2076a4d9f942d8d28031c9c428b901a02b6b8140de02203250e8e4a08bc5b4ecdca4d0eedf98223e02e3ac1c0206b3a7ffdb374aa21e5f",
8043 "30440220073de0067b88e425b3018b30366bfeda0ccb703118ccd3d02ead08c0f53511d002203fac50ac0e4cf8a3af0b4b1b12e801650591f748f8ddf1e089c160f10b69e511",
8044 "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" }
8047 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100c592f6b80d35b4f5d1e3bc9788f51141a0065be6013bad53a1977f7c444651660220278ac06ead9016bfb8dc476f186eabace2b02793b2f308442f5b0d5f24a68948",
8048 "3045022100c37ac4fc8538677631230c4b286f36b6f54c51fb4b34ef0bd0ba219ba47452630220278e09a745454ea380f3694392ed113762c68dd209b48360f547541088be9e45",
8049 "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", {
8052 "3045022100de8a0649d54fd2e4fc04502c77df9b65da839bbd01854f818f129338b99564b2022009528dbb12c00e874cb2149b1dccc600c69ea5e4042ebf584984fcb029c2d1ec",
8053 "304402203e7c2622fa3ca29355d37a0ea991bfd7cdb54e6122a1d98d3229d092131f55cd022055263f7f8f32f4cd2f86da63ca106bd7badf0b19ee9833d80cd3b9216eeafd74",
8054 "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" },
8056 "3045022100de6eee8474376ea316d007b33103b4543a46bdf6fda5cbd5902b28a5bc14584f022002989e7b4f7813b77acbe4babcf96d7ffbbe0bf14cba24672364f8e591479edb",
8057 "3045022100c10688346a9d84647bde7027da07f0d79c6d4129307e4c6c9aea7bdbf25ac3350220269104209793c32c47491698c4e46ebea9c3293a1e4403f9abda39f79698f6b5",
8058 "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" },
8060 "3045022100fe87da8124ceecbcabb9d599c5339f40277c7c7406514fafbccbf180c7c09cf40220429c7fb6d0fd3705e931ab1219ab0432af38ae4d676008cc1964fbeb8cd35d2e",
8061 "3044022040ac769a851da31d8e4863e5f94719204f716c82a1ce6d6c52193d9a33b84bce022035df97b078ce80f20dca2109e4c6075af0b50148811452e7290e68b2680fced4",
8062 "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" }
8067 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8068 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8070 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8071 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8072 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8073 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8075 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8076 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8077 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8079 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8080 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8082 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8083 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8085 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8086 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8087 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8091 fn test_key_derivation() {
8092 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8093 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8095 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8096 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8098 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8099 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8101 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8102 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8104 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8105 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8107 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8108 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8110 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8111 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8113 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8114 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8118 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8119 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8120 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8121 let seed = [42; 32];
8122 let network = Network::Testnet;
8123 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8124 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8126 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8127 let config = UserConfig::default();
8128 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8129 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8131 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8132 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8134 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8135 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8136 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8137 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider,
8138 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8139 assert!(res.is_ok());