1 // This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
4 // This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
5 // or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
6 // <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
7 // You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
10 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
11 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, EcdsaSighashType};
12 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
13 use bitcoin::consensus::encode;
15 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
16 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
17 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256d;
18 use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash};
20 use bitcoin::secp256k1::constants::PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
21 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{PublicKey,SecretKey};
22 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1,ecdsa::Signature};
23 use bitcoin::secp256k1;
25 use crate::ln::{PaymentPreimage, PaymentHash};
26 use crate::ln::features::{ChannelTypeFeatures, InitFeatures};
28 use crate::ln::msgs::DecodeError;
29 use crate::ln::script::{self, ShutdownScript};
30 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, CounterpartyForwardingInfo, PendingHTLCStatus, HTLCSource, SentHTLCId, HTLCFailureMsg, PendingHTLCInfo, RAACommitmentOrder, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT};
31 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets, TxCreationKeys, HTLCOutputInCommitment, htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight, make_funding_redeemscript, ChannelPublicKeys, CommitmentTransaction, HolderCommitmentTransaction, ChannelTransactionParameters, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters, MAX_HTLCS, get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor, ClosingTransaction};
32 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
33 use crate::ln::onion_utils::HTLCFailReason;
34 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
35 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator};
36 use crate::chain::channelmonitor::{ChannelMonitor, ChannelMonitorUpdate, ChannelMonitorUpdateStep, LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS, CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID};
37 use crate::chain::transaction::{OutPoint, TransactionData};
38 use crate::sign::{WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner, EntropySource, ChannelSigner, SignerProvider, NodeSigner, Recipient};
39 use crate::events::ClosureReason;
40 use crate::routing::gossip::NodeId;
41 use crate::util::ser::{Readable, ReadableArgs, Writeable, Writer, VecWriter};
42 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
43 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
44 use crate::util::config::{UserConfig, ChannelConfig, LegacyChannelConfig, ChannelHandshakeConfig, ChannelHandshakeLimits};
45 use crate::util::scid_utils::scid_from_parts;
48 use crate::prelude::*;
49 use core::{cmp,mem,fmt};
51 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing, debug_assertions))]
52 use crate::sync::Mutex;
53 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::ToHex;
56 pub struct ChannelValueStat {
57 pub value_to_self_msat: u64,
58 pub channel_value_msat: u64,
59 pub channel_reserve_msat: u64,
60 pub pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
61 pub pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: u64,
62 pub holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: u64,
63 pub counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64, // outgoing
64 pub counterparty_dust_limit_msat: u64,
67 pub struct AvailableBalances {
68 /// The amount that would go to us if we close the channel, ignoring any on-chain fees.
69 pub balance_msat: u64,
70 /// Total amount available for our counterparty to send to us.
71 pub inbound_capacity_msat: u64,
72 /// Total amount available for us to send to our counterparty.
73 pub outbound_capacity_msat: u64,
74 /// The maximum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
75 pub next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: u64,
76 /// The minimum value we can assign to the next outbound HTLC
77 pub next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
80 #[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
82 // Inbound states mirroring InboundHTLCState
84 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce,
85 // Note that we do not have a AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke variant here as it is universally
86 // handled the same as `Committed`, with the only exception in `InboundHTLCState` being the
87 // distinction of when we allow ourselves to forward the HTLC. Because we aren't "forwarding"
88 // the fee update anywhere, we can simply consider the fee update `Committed` immediately
89 // instead of setting it to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke.
91 // Outbound state can only be `LocalAnnounced` or `Committed`
95 enum InboundHTLCRemovalReason {
96 FailRelay(msgs::OnionErrorPacket),
97 FailMalformed(([u8; 32], u16)),
98 Fulfill(PaymentPreimage),
101 enum InboundHTLCState {
102 /// Offered by remote, to be included in next local commitment tx. I.e., the remote sent an
103 /// update_add_htlc message for this HTLC.
104 RemoteAnnounced(PendingHTLCStatus),
105 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've
106 /// revoke_and_ack'd it), but the remote hasn't yet revoked their previous
107 /// state (see the example below). We have not yet included this HTLC in a
108 /// commitment_signed message because we are waiting on the remote's
109 /// aforementioned state revocation. One reason this missing remote RAA
110 /// (revoke_and_ack) blocks us from constructing a commitment_signed message
111 /// is because every time we create a new "state", i.e. every time we sign a
112 /// new commitment tx (see [BOLT #2]), we need a new per_commitment_point,
113 /// which are provided one-at-a-time in each RAA. E.g., the last RAA they
114 /// sent provided the per_commitment_point for our current commitment tx.
115 /// The other reason we should not send a commitment_signed without their RAA
116 /// is because their RAA serves to ACK our previous commitment_signed.
118 /// Here's an example of how an HTLC could come to be in this state:
119 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(prev_htlc) --> local
120 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc) --> local
121 /// remote <-- revoke_and_ack <-- local
122 /// remote <-- commitment_signed(prev_htlc) <-- local
123 /// [note that here, the remote does not respond with a RAA]
124 /// remote --> update_add_htlc(this_htlc) --> local
125 /// remote --> commitment_signed(prev_htlc, this_htlc) --> local
126 /// Now `this_htlc` will be assigned this state. It's unable to be officially
127 /// accepted, i.e. included in a commitment_signed, because we're missing the
128 /// RAA that provides our next per_commitment_point. The per_commitment_point
129 /// is used to derive commitment keys, which are used to construct the
130 /// signatures in a commitment_signed message.
131 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
133 /// [BOLT #2]: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/02-peer-protocol.md
134 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(PendingHTLCStatus),
135 /// Included in a received commitment_signed message (implying we've revoke_and_ack'd it).
136 /// We have also included this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting
137 /// on the remote's revoke_and_ack to make this HTLC an irrevocable part of the state of the
138 /// channel (before it can then get forwarded and/or removed).
139 /// Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
140 AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(PendingHTLCStatus),
142 /// Removed by us and a new commitment_signed was sent (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
143 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
145 /// Note that we have to keep an eye on the HTLC until we've received a broadcastable
146 /// commitment transaction without it as otherwise we'll have to force-close the channel to
147 /// claim it before the timeout (obviously doesn't apply to revoked HTLCs that we can't claim
148 /// anyway). That said, ChannelMonitor does this for us (see
149 /// ChannelMonitor::should_broadcast_holder_commitment_txn) so we actually remove the HTLC from
150 /// our own local state before then, once we're sure that the next commitment_signed and
151 /// ChannelMonitor::provide_latest_local_commitment_tx will not include this HTLC.
152 LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason),
155 struct InboundHTLCOutput {
159 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
160 state: InboundHTLCState,
163 enum OutboundHTLCState {
164 /// Added by us and included in a commitment_signed (if we were AwaitingRemoteRevoke when we
165 /// created it we would have put it in the holding cell instead). When they next revoke_and_ack
166 /// we will promote to Committed (note that they may not accept it until the next time we
167 /// revoke, but we don't really care about that:
168 /// * they've revoked, so worst case we can announce an old state and get our (option on)
169 /// money back (though we won't), and,
170 /// * we'll send them a revoke when they send a commitment_signed, and since only they're
171 /// allowed to remove it, the "can only be removed once committed on both sides" requirement
172 /// doesn't matter to us and it's up to them to enforce it, worst-case they jump ahead but
173 /// we'll never get out of sync).
174 /// Note that we Box the OnionPacket as it's rather large and we don't want to blow up
175 /// OutboundHTLCOutput's size just for a temporary bit
176 LocalAnnounced(Box<msgs::OnionPacket>),
178 /// Remote removed this (outbound) HTLC. We're waiting on their commitment_signed to finalize
179 /// the change (though they'll need to revoke before we fail the payment).
180 RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
181 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
182 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
183 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
184 /// We also have not yet removed this HTLC in a commitment_signed message, and are waiting on a
185 /// remote revoke_and_ack on a previous state before we can do so.
186 AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
187 /// Remote removed this and sent a commitment_signed (implying we've revoke_and_ack'ed it), but
188 /// the remote side hasn't yet revoked their previous state, which we need them to do before we
189 /// can do any backwards failing. Implies AwaitingRemoteRevoke.
190 /// We have removed this HTLC in our latest commitment_signed and are now just waiting on a
191 /// revoke_and_ack to drop completely.
192 AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome),
196 enum OutboundHTLCOutcome {
197 /// LDK version 0.0.105+ will always fill in the preimage here.
198 Success(Option<PaymentPreimage>),
199 Failure(HTLCFailReason),
202 impl From<Option<HTLCFailReason>> for OutboundHTLCOutcome {
203 fn from(o: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Self {
205 None => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None),
206 Some(r) => OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(r)
211 impl<'a> Into<Option<&'a HTLCFailReason>> for &'a OutboundHTLCOutcome {
212 fn into(self) -> Option<&'a HTLCFailReason> {
214 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_) => None,
215 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(ref r) => Some(r)
220 struct OutboundHTLCOutput {
224 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
225 state: OutboundHTLCState,
229 /// See AwaitingRemoteRevoke ChannelState for more info
230 enum HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK {
231 AddHTLC { // TODO: Time out if we're getting close to cltv_expiry
235 payment_hash: PaymentHash,
237 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket,
240 payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage,
245 err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket,
249 /// There are a few "states" and then a number of flags which can be applied:
250 /// We first move through init with OurInitSent -> TheirInitSent -> FundingCreated -> FundingSent.
251 /// TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady then get set on FundingSent, and when both are set we
252 /// move on to ChannelReady.
253 /// Note that PeerDisconnected can be set on both ChannelReady and FundingSent.
254 /// ChannelReady can then get all remaining flags set on it, until we finish shutdown, then we
255 /// move on to ShutdownComplete, at which point most calls into this channel are disallowed.
257 /// Implies we have (or are prepared to) send our open_channel/accept_channel message
258 OurInitSent = 1 << 0,
259 /// Implies we have received their open_channel/accept_channel message
260 TheirInitSent = 1 << 1,
261 /// We have sent funding_created and are awaiting a funding_signed to advance to FundingSent.
262 /// Note that this is nonsense for an inbound channel as we immediately generate funding_signed
263 /// upon receipt of funding_created, so simply skip this state.
265 /// Set when we have received/sent funding_created and funding_signed and are thus now waiting
266 /// on the funding transaction to confirm. The ChannelReady flags are set to indicate when we
267 /// and our counterparty consider the funding transaction confirmed.
269 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate they sent us a channel_ready message.
270 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
271 TheirChannelReady = 1 << 4,
272 /// Flag which can be set on FundingSent to indicate we sent them a channel_ready message.
273 /// Once both TheirChannelReady and OurChannelReady are set, state moves on to ChannelReady.
274 OurChannelReady = 1 << 5,
276 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady and FundingSent indicating remote side is considered
277 /// "disconnected" and no updates are allowed until after we've done a channel_reestablish
279 PeerDisconnected = 1 << 7,
280 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady, FundingCreated, and FundingSent indicating the user has
281 /// told us a ChannelMonitor update is pending async persistence somewhere and we should pause
282 /// sending any outbound messages until they've managed to finish.
283 MonitorUpdateInProgress = 1 << 8,
284 /// Flag which implies that we have sent a commitment_signed but are awaiting the responding
285 /// revoke_and_ack message. During this time period, we can't generate new commitment_signed
286 /// messages as then we will be unable to determine which HTLCs they included in their
287 /// revoke_and_ack implicit ACK, so instead we have to hold them away temporarily to be sent
289 /// Flag is set on ChannelReady.
290 AwaitingRemoteRevoke = 1 << 9,
291 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after receiving a shutdown message from
292 /// the remote end. If set, they may not add any new HTLCs to the channel, and we are expected
293 /// to respond with our own shutdown message when possible.
294 RemoteShutdownSent = 1 << 10,
295 /// Flag which is set on ChannelReady or FundingSent after sending a shutdown message. At this
296 /// point, we may not add any new HTLCs to the channel.
297 LocalShutdownSent = 1 << 11,
298 /// We've successfully negotiated a closing_signed dance. At this point ChannelManager is about
299 /// to drop us, but we store this anyway.
300 ShutdownComplete = 4096,
302 const BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK: u32 = ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
303 const MULTI_STATE_FLAGS: u32 = BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
305 pub const INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER: u64 = (1 << 48) - 1;
307 /// The "channel disabled" bit in channel_update must be set based on whether we are connected to
308 /// our counterparty or not. However, we don't want to announce updates right away to avoid
309 /// spamming the network with updates if the connection is flapping. Instead, we "stage" updates to
310 /// our channel_update message and track the current state here.
311 /// See implementation at [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::timer_tick_occurred`].
312 #[derive(Clone, Copy, PartialEq)]
313 pub(super) enum ChannelUpdateStatus {
314 /// We've announced the channel as enabled and are connected to our peer.
316 /// Our channel is no longer live, but we haven't announced the channel as disabled yet.
318 /// Our channel is live again, but we haven't announced the channel as enabled yet.
320 /// We've announced the channel as disabled.
324 /// We track when we sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer in a few states, described here.
326 pub enum AnnouncementSigsState {
327 /// We have not sent our peer an `AnnouncementSignatures` yet, or our peer disconnected since
328 /// we sent the last `AnnouncementSignatures`.
330 /// We sent an `AnnouncementSignatures` to our peer since the last time our peer disconnected.
331 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
333 /// We sent a `CommitmentSigned` after the last `AnnouncementSignatures` we sent. Because we
334 /// only ever have a single `CommitmentSigned` pending at once, if we sent one after sending
335 /// `AnnouncementSignatures` then we know the peer received our `AnnouncementSignatures` if
336 /// they send back a `RevokeAndACK`.
337 /// This state never appears on disk - instead we write `NotSent`.
339 /// We received a `RevokeAndACK`, effectively ack-ing our `AnnouncementSignatures`, at this
340 /// point we no longer need to re-send our `AnnouncementSignatures` again on reconnect.
344 /// An enum indicating whether the local or remote side offered a given HTLC.
350 /// An enum gathering stats on pending HTLCs, either inbound or outbound side.
353 pending_htlcs_value_msat: u64,
354 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
355 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: u64,
356 holding_cell_msat: u64,
357 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: u32, // dust HTLCs *non*-included
360 /// An enum gathering stats on commitment transaction, either local or remote.
361 struct CommitmentStats<'a> {
362 tx: CommitmentTransaction, // the transaction info
363 feerate_per_kw: u32, // the feerate included to build the transaction
364 total_fee_sat: u64, // the total fee included in the transaction
365 num_nondust_htlcs: usize, // the number of HTLC outputs (dust HTLCs *non*-included)
366 htlcs_included: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&'a HTLCSource>)>, // the list of HTLCs (dust HTLCs *included*) which were not ignored when building the transaction
367 local_balance_msat: u64, // local balance before fees but considering dust limits
368 remote_balance_msat: u64, // remote balance before fees but considering dust limits
369 preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage>, // preimages for successful offered HTLCs since last commitment
372 /// Used when calculating whether we or the remote can afford an additional HTLC.
373 struct HTLCCandidate {
375 origin: HTLCInitiator,
379 fn new(amount_msat: u64, origin: HTLCInitiator) -> Self {
387 /// A return value enum for get_update_fulfill_htlc. See UpdateFulfillCommitFetch variants for
389 enum UpdateFulfillFetch {
391 monitor_update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
392 htlc_value_msat: u64,
393 msg: Option<msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC>,
398 /// The return type of get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit.
399 pub enum UpdateFulfillCommitFetch<'a> {
400 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is new, and either generated an update_fulfill message, placed
401 /// it in the holding cell, or re-generated the update_fulfill message after the same claim was
402 /// previously placed in the holding cell (and has since been removed).
404 /// The ChannelMonitorUpdate which places the new payment preimage in the channel monitor
405 monitor_update: &'a ChannelMonitorUpdate,
406 /// The value of the HTLC which was claimed, in msat.
407 htlc_value_msat: u64,
409 /// Indicates the HTLC fulfill is duplicative and already existed either in the holding cell
410 /// or has been forgotten (presumably previously claimed).
414 /// The return value of `monitor_updating_restored`
415 pub(super) struct MonitorRestoreUpdates {
416 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
417 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
418 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
419 pub accepted_htlcs: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
420 pub failed_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
421 pub finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>,
422 pub funding_broadcastable: Option<Transaction>,
423 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
424 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
427 /// The return value of `channel_reestablish`
428 pub(super) struct ReestablishResponses {
429 pub channel_ready: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
430 pub raa: Option<msgs::RevokeAndACK>,
431 pub commitment_update: Option<msgs::CommitmentUpdate>,
432 pub order: RAACommitmentOrder,
433 pub announcement_sigs: Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>,
434 pub shutdown_msg: Option<msgs::Shutdown>,
437 /// If the majority of the channels funds are to the fundee and the initiator holds only just
438 /// enough funds to cover their reserve value, channels are at risk of getting "stuck". Because the
439 /// initiator controls the feerate, if they then go to increase the channel fee, they may have no
440 /// balance but the fundee is unable to send a payment as the increase in fee more than drains
441 /// their reserve value. Thus, neither side can send a new HTLC and the channel becomes useless.
442 /// Thus, before sending an HTLC when we are the initiator, we check that the feerate can increase
443 /// by this multiple without hitting this case, before sending.
444 /// This multiple is effectively the maximum feerate "jump" we expect until more HTLCs flow over
445 /// the channel. Sadly, there isn't really a good number for this - if we expect to have no new
446 /// HTLCs for days we may need this to suffice for feerate increases across days, but that may
447 /// leave the channel less usable as we hold a bigger reserve.
448 #[cfg(any(fuzzing, test))]
449 pub const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
450 #[cfg(not(any(fuzzing, test)))]
451 const FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE: u64 = 2;
453 /// If we fail to see a funding transaction confirmed on-chain within this many blocks after the
454 /// channel creation on an inbound channel, we simply force-close and move on.
455 /// This constant is the one suggested in BOLT 2.
456 pub(crate) const FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS: u32 = 2016;
458 /// In case of a concurrent update_add_htlc proposed by our counterparty, we might
459 /// not have enough balance value remaining to cover the onchain cost of this new
460 /// HTLC weight. If this happens, our counterparty fails the reception of our
461 /// commitment_signed including this new HTLC due to infringement on the channel
463 /// To prevent this case, we compute our outbound update_fee with an HTLC buffer of
464 /// size 2. However, if the number of concurrent update_add_htlc is higher, this still
465 /// leads to a channel force-close. Ultimately, this is an issue coming from the
466 /// design of LN state machines, allowing asynchronous updates.
467 pub(crate) const CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER: u32 = 2;
469 /// When a channel is opened, we check that the funding amount is enough to pay for relevant
470 /// commitment transaction fees, with at least this many HTLCs present on the commitment
471 /// transaction (not counting the value of the HTLCs themselves).
472 pub(crate) const MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT: usize = 4;
474 /// When a [`Channel`] has its [`ChannelConfig`] updated, its existing one is stashed for up to this
475 /// number of ticks to allow forwarding HTLCs by nodes that have yet to receive the new
476 /// ChannelUpdate prompted by the config update. This value was determined as follows:
478 /// * The expected interval between ticks (1 minute).
479 /// * The average convergence delay of updates across the network, i.e., ~300 seconds on average
480 /// for a node to see an update as seen on `<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12737.pdf>`.
481 /// * `EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS` = convergence_delay / tick_interval
482 pub(crate) const EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS: usize = 5;
484 struct PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
485 update: ChannelMonitorUpdate,
486 /// In some cases we need to delay letting the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] go until after an
487 /// `Event` is processed by the user. This bool indicates the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] is
488 /// blocked on some external event and the [`ChannelManager`] will update us when we're ready.
490 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
494 impl_writeable_tlv_based!(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate, {
495 (0, update, required),
496 (2, blocked, required),
499 // TODO: We should refactor this to be an Inbound/OutboundChannel until initial setup handshaking
500 // has been completed, and then turn into a Channel to get compiler-time enforcement of things like
501 // calling channel_id() before we're set up or things like get_outbound_funding_signed on an
504 // Holder designates channel data owned for the benefice of the user client.
505 // Counterparty designates channel data owned by the another channel participant entity.
506 pub(super) struct Channel<Signer: ChannelSigner> {
507 config: LegacyChannelConfig,
509 // Track the previous `ChannelConfig` so that we can continue forwarding HTLCs that were
510 // constructed using it. The second element in the tuple corresponds to the number of ticks that
511 // have elapsed since the update occurred.
512 prev_config: Option<(ChannelConfig, usize)>,
514 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Option<ChannelHandshakeLimits>,
518 channel_id: [u8; 32],
519 temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]>, // Will be `None` for channels created prior to 0.0.115.
522 // When we reach max(6 blocks, minimum_depth), we need to send an AnnouncementSigs message to
523 // our peer. However, we want to make sure they received it, or else rebroadcast it when we
525 // We do so here, see `AnnouncementSigsSent` for more details on the state(s).
526 // Note that a number of our tests were written prior to the behavior here which retransmits
527 // AnnouncementSignatures until after an RAA completes, so the behavior is short-circuited in
529 #[cfg(any(test, feature = "_test_utils"))]
530 pub(crate) announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
531 #[cfg(not(any(test, feature = "_test_utils")))]
532 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState,
534 secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>,
535 channel_value_satoshis: u64,
537 latest_monitor_update_id: u64,
539 holder_signer: Signer,
540 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<ShutdownScript>,
541 destination_script: Script,
543 // Our commitment numbers start at 2^48-1 and count down, whereas the ones used in transaction
544 // generation start at 0 and count up...this simplifies some parts of implementation at the
545 // cost of others, but should really just be changed.
547 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
548 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: u64,
549 value_to_self_msat: u64, // Excluding all pending_htlcs, excluding fees
550 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec<InboundHTLCOutput>,
551 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec<OutboundHTLCOutput>,
552 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec<HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK>,
554 /// When resending CS/RAA messages on channel monitor restoration or on reconnect, we always
555 /// need to ensure we resend them in the order we originally generated them. Note that because
556 /// there can only ever be one in-flight CS and/or one in-flight RAA at any time, it is
557 /// sufficient to simply set this to the opposite of any message we are generating as we
558 /// generate it. ie when we generate a CS, we set this to RAAFirst as, if there is a pending
559 /// in-flight RAA to resend, it will have been the first thing we generated, and thus we should
561 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder,
563 monitor_pending_channel_ready: bool,
564 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: bool,
565 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: bool,
567 // TODO: If a channel is drop'd, we don't know whether the `ChannelMonitor` is ultimately
568 // responsible for some of the HTLCs here or not - we don't know whether the update in question
569 // completed or not. We currently ignore these fields entirely when force-closing a channel,
570 // but need to handle this somehow or we run the risk of losing HTLCs!
571 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
572 monitor_pending_failures: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
573 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec<HTLCSource>,
575 // pending_update_fee is filled when sending and receiving update_fee.
577 // Because it follows the same commitment flow as HTLCs, `FeeUpdateState` is either `Outbound`
578 // or matches a subset of the `InboundHTLCOutput` variants. It is then updated/used when
579 // generating new commitment transactions with exactly the same criteria as inbound/outbound
580 // HTLCs with similar state.
581 pending_update_fee: Option<(u32, FeeUpdateState)>,
582 // If a `send_update_fee()` call is made with ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, we place
583 // it here instead of `pending_update_fee` in the same way as we place outbound HTLC updates in
584 // `holding_cell_htlc_updates` instead of `pending_outbound_htlcs`. It is released into
585 // `pending_update_fee` with the same criteria as outbound HTLC updates but can be updated by
586 // further `send_update_fee` calls, dropping the previous holding cell update entirely.
587 holding_cell_update_fee: Option<u32>,
588 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
589 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
592 /// The timestamp set on our latest `channel_update` message for this channel. It is updated
593 /// when the channel is updated in ways which may impact the `channel_update` message or when a
594 /// new block is received, ensuring it's always at least moderately close to the current real
596 update_time_counter: u32,
598 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
599 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a locally-generated commitment transaction
600 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
601 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
602 /// Max to_local and to_remote outputs in a remote-generated commitment transaction
603 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex<(u64, u64)>,
605 last_sent_closing_fee: Option<(u64, Signature)>, // (fee, holder_sig)
606 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>,
608 /// If our counterparty sent us a closing_signed while we were waiting for a `ChannelMonitor`
609 /// update, we need to delay processing it until later. We do that here by simply storing the
610 /// closing_signed message and handling it in `maybe_propose_closing_signed`.
611 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>,
613 /// The minimum and maximum absolute fee, in satoshis, we are willing to place on the closing
614 /// transaction. These are set once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`.
616 pub(crate) closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
618 closing_fee_limits: Option<(u64, u64)>,
620 /// Flag that ensures that `accept_inbound_channel` must be called before `funding_created`
621 /// is executed successfully. The reason for this flag is that when the
622 /// `UserConfig::manually_accept_inbound_channels` config flag is set to true, inbound channels
623 /// are required to be manually accepted by the node operator before the `msgs::AcceptChannel`
624 /// message is created and sent out. During the manual accept process, `accept_inbound_channel`
625 /// is called by `ChannelManager::accept_inbound_channel`.
627 /// The flag counteracts that a counterparty node could theoretically send a
628 /// `msgs::FundingCreated` message before the node operator has manually accepted an inbound
629 /// channel request made by the counterparty node. That would execute `funding_created` before
630 /// `accept_inbound_channel`, and `funding_created` should therefore not execute successfully.
631 inbound_awaiting_accept: bool,
633 /// The hash of the block in which the funding transaction was included.
634 funding_tx_confirmed_in: Option<BlockHash>,
635 funding_tx_confirmation_height: u32,
636 short_channel_id: Option<u64>,
637 /// Either the height at which this channel was created or the height at which it was last
638 /// serialized if it was serialized by versions prior to 0.0.103.
639 /// We use this to close if funding is never broadcasted.
640 channel_creation_height: u32,
642 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
645 pub(super) holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
647 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: u64,
650 pub(super) counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
652 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
655 pub(super) holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
657 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64,
659 /// minimum channel reserve for self to maintain - set by them.
660 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Option<u64>,
663 pub(super) holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
665 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: u64,
667 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
668 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
670 pub counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
672 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
673 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: u16,
674 minimum_depth: Option<u32>,
676 counterparty_forwarding_info: Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo>,
678 pub(crate) channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters,
679 funding_transaction: Option<Transaction>,
681 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
682 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: Option<PublicKey>,
683 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey,
685 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: Option<Script>,
687 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets,
689 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus,
690 /// Once we reach `closing_negotiation_ready`, we set this, indicating if closing_signed does
691 /// not complete within a single timer tick (one minute), we should force-close the channel.
692 /// This prevents us from keeping unusable channels around forever if our counterparty wishes
694 /// Note that this field is reset to false on deserialization to give us a chance to connect to
695 /// our peer and start the closing_signed negotiation fresh.
696 closing_signed_in_flight: bool,
698 /// Our counterparty's channel_announcement signatures provided in announcement_signatures.
699 /// This can be used to rebroadcast the channel_announcement message later.
700 announcement_sigs: Option<(Signature, Signature)>,
702 // We save these values so we can make sure `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat` and
703 // `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` properly predict what the next commitment transaction fee will
704 // be, by comparing the cached values to the fee of the tranaction generated by
705 // `build_commitment_transaction`.
706 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
707 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
708 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
709 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex<Option<CommitmentTxInfoCached>>,
711 /// lnd has a long-standing bug where, upon reconnection, if the channel is not yet confirmed
712 /// they will not send a channel_reestablish until the channel locks in. Then, they will send a
713 /// channel_ready *before* sending the channel_reestablish (which is clearly a violation of
714 /// the BOLT specs). We copy c-lightning's workaround here and simply store the channel_ready
715 /// message until we receive a channel_reestablish.
717 /// See-also <https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006>
718 pub workaround_lnd_bug_4006: Option<msgs::ChannelReady>,
720 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
721 // When we receive an HTLC fulfill on an outbound path, we may immediately fulfill the
722 // corresponding HTLC on the inbound path. If, then, the outbound path channel is
723 // disconnected and reconnected (before we've exchange commitment_signed and revoke_and_ack
724 // messages), they may re-broadcast their update_fulfill_htlc, causing a duplicate claim. This
725 // is fine, but as a sanity check in our failure to generate the second claim, we check here
726 // that the original was a claim, and that we aren't now trying to fulfill a failed HTLC.
727 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet<u64>,
729 /// This channel's type, as negotiated during channel open
730 channel_type: ChannelTypeFeatures,
732 // Our counterparty can offer us SCID aliases which they will map to this channel when routing
733 // outbound payments. These can be used in invoice route hints to avoid explicitly revealing
734 // the channel's funding UTXO.
736 // We also use this when sending our peer a channel_update that isn't to be broadcasted
737 // publicly - allowing them to re-use their map of SCID -> channel for channel_update ->
738 // associated channel mapping.
740 // We only bother storing the most recent SCID alias at any time, though our counterparty has
741 // to store all of them.
742 latest_inbound_scid_alias: Option<u64>,
744 // We always offer our counterparty a static SCID alias, which we recognize as for this channel
745 // if we see it in HTLC forwarding instructions. We don't bother rotating the alias given we
746 // don't currently support node id aliases and eventually privacy should be provided with
747 // blinded paths instead of simple scid+node_id aliases.
748 outbound_scid_alias: u64,
750 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
751 channel_pending_event_emitted: bool,
753 // We track whether we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
754 channel_ready_event_emitted: bool,
756 /// The unique identifier used to re-derive the private key material for the channel through
757 /// [`SignerProvider::derive_channel_signer`].
758 channel_keys_id: [u8; 32],
760 /// When we generate [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]s to persist, they may not be persisted immediately.
761 /// If we then persist the [`channelmanager::ChannelManager`] and crash before the persistence
762 /// completes we still need to be able to complete the persistence. Thus, we have to keep a
763 /// copy of the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] here until it is complete.
764 pending_monitor_updates: Vec<PendingChannelMonitorUpdate>,
767 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
768 struct CommitmentTxInfoCached {
770 total_pending_htlcs: usize,
771 next_holder_htlc_id: u64,
772 next_counterparty_htlc_id: u64,
776 pub const DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS: u16 = 50;
778 pub(crate) fn commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
779 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT: u64 = 724;
780 const COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT: u64 = 1124;
781 if opt_anchors { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_ANCHOR_WEIGHT } else { COMMITMENT_TX_BASE_WEIGHT }
785 const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
787 pub const COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC: u64 = 172;
789 pub const ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI: u64 = 330;
791 /// The percentage of the channel value `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` used to be set to,
792 /// before this was made configurable. The percentage was made configurable in LDK 0.0.107,
793 /// although LDK 0.0.104+ enabled serialization of channels with a different value set for
794 /// `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`.
795 pub const MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY: u8 = 10;
797 /// Maximum `funding_satoshis` value according to the BOLT #2 specification, if
798 /// `option_support_large_channel` (aka wumbo channels) is not supported.
800 pub const MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO: u64 = (1 << 24) - 1;
802 /// Total bitcoin supply in satoshis.
803 pub const TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS: u64 = 21_000_000 * 1_0000_0000;
805 /// The maximum network dust limit for standard script formats. This currently represents the
806 /// minimum output value for a P2SH output before Bitcoin Core 22 considers the entire
807 /// transaction non-standard and thus refuses to relay it.
808 /// We also use this as the maximum counterparty `dust_limit_satoshis` allowed, given many
809 /// implementations use this value for their dust limit today.
810 pub const MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 546;
812 /// The maximum channel dust limit we will accept from our counterparty.
813 pub const MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS;
815 /// The dust limit is used for both the commitment transaction outputs as well as the closing
816 /// transactions. For cooperative closing transactions, we require segwit outputs, though accept
817 /// *any* segwit scripts, which are allowed to be up to 42 bytes in length.
818 /// In order to avoid having to concern ourselves with standardness during the closing process, we
819 /// simply require our counterparty to use a dust limit which will leave any segwit output
821 /// See <https://github.com/lightning/bolts/issues/905> for more details.
822 pub const MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS: u64 = 354;
824 // Just a reasonable implementation-specific safe lower bound, higher than the dust limit.
825 pub const MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS: u64 = 1000;
827 /// Used to return a simple Error back to ChannelManager. Will get converted to a
828 /// msgs::ErrorAction::SendErrorMessage or msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError as appropriate with our
829 /// channel_id in ChannelManager.
830 pub(super) enum ChannelError {
836 impl fmt::Debug for ChannelError {
837 fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter) -> fmt::Result {
839 &ChannelError::Ignore(ref e) => write!(f, "Ignore : {}", e),
840 &ChannelError::Warn(ref e) => write!(f, "Warn : {}", e),
841 &ChannelError::Close(ref e) => write!(f, "Close : {}", e),
846 macro_rules! secp_check {
847 ($res: expr, $err: expr) => {
850 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close($err)),
855 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Channel<Signer> {
856 /// Returns the value to use for `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` as a percentage of the
857 /// `channel_value_satoshis` in msat, set through
858 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]
860 /// The effective percentage is lower bounded by 1% and upper bounded by 100%.
862 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`]: crate::util::config::ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel
863 fn get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &ChannelHandshakeConfig) -> u64 {
864 let configured_percent = if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel < 1 {
866 } else if config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel > 100 {
869 config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel as u64
871 channel_value_satoshis * 10 * configured_percent
874 /// Returns a minimum channel reserve value the remote needs to maintain,
875 /// required by us according to the configured or default
876 /// [`ChannelHandshakeConfig::their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths`]
878 /// Guaranteed to return a value no larger than channel_value_satoshis
880 /// This is used both for outbound and inbound channels and has lower bound
881 /// of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`.
882 pub(crate) fn get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64, config: &UserConfig) -> u64 {
883 let calculated_reserve = channel_value_satoshis.saturating_mul(config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths as u64) / 1_000_000;
884 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(calculated_reserve, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS))
887 /// This is for legacy reasons, present for forward-compatibility.
888 /// LDK versions older than 0.0.104 don't know how read/handle values other than default
889 /// from storage. Hence, we use this function to not persist default values of
890 /// `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` for channels into storage.
891 pub(crate) fn get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis: u64) -> u64 {
892 let (q, _) = channel_value_satoshis.overflowing_div(100);
893 cmp::min(channel_value_satoshis, cmp::max(q, 1000))
896 pub(crate) fn opt_anchors(&self) -> bool {
897 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some()
900 fn get_initial_channel_type(config: &UserConfig, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> ChannelTypeFeatures {
901 // The default channel type (ie the first one we try) depends on whether the channel is
902 // public - if it is, we just go with `only_static_remotekey` as it's the only option
903 // available. If it's private, we first try `scid_privacy` as it provides better privacy
904 // with no other changes, and fall back to `only_static_remotekey`.
905 let mut ret = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
906 if !config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel &&
907 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_scid_privacy &&
908 their_features.supports_scid_privacy() {
909 ret.set_scid_privacy_required();
912 // Optionally, if the user would like to negotiate the `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` option, we
913 // set it now. If they don't understand it, we'll fall back to our default of
914 // `only_static_remotekey`.
916 { // Attributes are not allowed on if expressions on our current MSRV of 1.41.
917 if config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx &&
918 their_features.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
919 ret.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
926 /// If we receive an error message, it may only be a rejection of the channel type we tried,
927 /// not of our ability to open any channel at all. Thus, on error, we should first call this
928 /// and see if we get a new `OpenChannel` message, otherwise the channel is failed.
929 pub(crate) fn maybe_handle_error_without_close(&mut self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> Result<msgs::OpenChannel, ()> {
930 if !self.is_outbound() || self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 { return Err(()); }
931 if self.channel_type == ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
932 // We've exhausted our options
935 // We support opening a few different types of channels. Try removing our additional
936 // features one by one until we've either arrived at our default or the counterparty has
939 // Due to the order below, we may not negotiate `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx` if the
940 // counterparty doesn't support `option_scid_privacy`. Since `get_initial_channel_type`
941 // checks whether the counterparty supports every feature, this would only happen if the
942 // counterparty is advertising the feature, but rejecting channels proposing the feature for
944 if self.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() {
945 self.channel_type.clear_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
946 assert!(self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_non_zero_fee_anchors.is_none());
947 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
948 } else if self.channel_type.supports_scid_privacy() {
949 self.channel_type.clear_scid_privacy();
951 self.channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
953 Ok(self.get_open_channel(chain_hash))
957 pub fn new_outbound<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref>(
958 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP, counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, their_features: &InitFeatures,
959 channel_value_satoshis: u64, push_msat: u64, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig, current_chain_height: u32,
960 outbound_scid_alias: u64
961 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, APIError>
962 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
963 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
964 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
966 let holder_selected_contest_delay = config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay;
967 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(false, channel_value_satoshis, user_id);
968 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
969 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
971 if !their_features.supports_wumbo() && channel_value_satoshis > MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO {
972 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must not exceed {}, it was {}", MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, channel_value_satoshis)});
974 if channel_value_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
975 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: format!("funding_value must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply, it was {}", channel_value_satoshis)});
977 let channel_value_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
978 if push_msat > channel_value_msat {
979 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Push value ({}) was larger than channel_value ({})", push_msat, channel_value_msat) });
981 if holder_selected_contest_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
982 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError {err: format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks", holder_selected_contest_delay)});
984 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis, config);
985 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
986 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
987 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
988 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError { err: format!("Holder selected channel reserve below implemention limit dust_limit_satoshis {}", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) });
991 let channel_type = Self::get_initial_channel_type(&config, their_features);
992 debug_assert!(channel_type.is_subset(&channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config)));
994 let feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
996 let value_to_self_msat = channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat;
997 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
998 if value_to_self_msat < commitment_tx_fee {
999 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{ err: format!("Funding amount ({}) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {}.", value_to_self_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee / 1000) });
1002 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1003 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1005 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1006 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1007 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1008 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
1012 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1013 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1014 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
1018 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1019 Ok(script) => script,
1020 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err: "Failed to get destination script".to_owned()}),
1023 let temporary_channel_id = entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes();
1028 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1029 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1030 announced_channel: config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel,
1031 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1036 inbound_handshake_limits_override: Some(config.channel_handshake_limits.clone()),
1038 channel_id: temporary_channel_id,
1039 temporary_channel_id: Some(temporary_channel_id),
1040 channel_state: ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32,
1041 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1043 channel_value_satoshis,
1045 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1048 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1051 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1052 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1055 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1056 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1057 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1058 pending_update_fee: None,
1059 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1060 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1061 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1062 update_time_counter: 1,
1064 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1066 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1067 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1068 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1069 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1070 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1071 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1073 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1074 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1075 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1076 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - push_msat, push_msat)),
1078 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1079 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1080 closing_fee_limits: None,
1081 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1083 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
1085 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1086 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1087 short_channel_id: None,
1088 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1090 feerate_per_kw: feerate,
1091 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: 0,
1092 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1093 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: 0,
1094 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1095 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1096 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1097 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: 0,
1098 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1099 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: 0,
1100 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1101 minimum_depth: None, // Filled in in accept_channel
1103 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1105 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1106 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1107 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1108 is_outbound_from_holder: true,
1109 counterparty_parameters: None,
1110 funding_outpoint: None,
1111 opt_anchors: if channel_type.requires_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx() { Some(()) } else { None },
1112 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1114 funding_transaction: None,
1116 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: None,
1117 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1118 counterparty_node_id,
1120 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey: None,
1122 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1124 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1125 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1127 announcement_sigs: None,
1129 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1130 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1131 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1132 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1134 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1136 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1137 outbound_scid_alias,
1139 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1140 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1142 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1143 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1148 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1152 fn check_remote_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>,
1153 feerate_per_kw: u32, cur_feerate_per_kw: Option<u32>, logger: &L)
1154 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger,
1156 // We only bound the fee updates on the upper side to prevent completely absurd feerates,
1157 // always accepting up to 25 sat/vByte or 10x our fee estimator's "High Priority" fee.
1158 // We generally don't care too much if they set the feerate to something very high, but it
1159 // could result in the channel being useless due to everything being dust.
1160 let upper_limit = cmp::max(250 * 25,
1161 fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::HighPriority) as u64 * 10);
1162 if feerate_per_kw as u64 > upper_limit {
1163 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too high. Actual: {}. Our expected upper limit: {}", feerate_per_kw, upper_limit)));
1165 let lower_limit = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
1166 // Some fee estimators round up to the next full sat/vbyte (ie 250 sats per kw), causing
1167 // occasional issues with feerate disagreements between an initiator that wants a feerate
1168 // of 1.1 sat/vbyte and a receiver that wants 1.1 rounded up to 2. Thus, we always add 250
1169 // sat/kw before the comparison here.
1170 if feerate_per_kw + 250 < lower_limit {
1171 if let Some(cur_feerate) = cur_feerate_per_kw {
1172 if feerate_per_kw > cur_feerate {
1174 "Accepting feerate that may prevent us from closing this channel because it's higher than what we have now. Had {} s/kW, now {} s/kW.",
1175 cur_feerate, feerate_per_kw);
1179 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer's feerate much too low. Actual: {}. Our expected lower limit: {} (- 250)", feerate_per_kw, lower_limit)));
1184 /// Creates a new channel from a remote sides' request for one.
1185 /// Assumes chain_hash has already been checked and corresponds with what we expect!
1186 pub fn new_from_req<ES: Deref, SP: Deref, F: Deref, L: Deref>(
1187 fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, entropy_source: &ES, signer_provider: &SP,
1188 counterparty_node_id: PublicKey, our_supported_features: &ChannelTypeFeatures,
1189 their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::OpenChannel, user_id: u128, config: &UserConfig,
1190 current_chain_height: u32, logger: &L, outbound_scid_alias: u64
1191 ) -> Result<Channel<Signer>, ChannelError>
1192 where ES::Target: EntropySource,
1193 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
1194 F::Target: FeeEstimator,
1197 let announced_channel = if (msg.channel_flags & 1) == 1 { true } else { false };
1199 // First check the channel type is known, failing before we do anything else if we don't
1200 // support this channel type.
1201 let channel_type = if let Some(channel_type) = &msg.channel_type {
1202 if channel_type.supports_any_optional_bits() {
1203 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type field contained optional bits - this is not allowed".to_owned()));
1206 // We only support the channel types defined by the `ChannelManager` in
1207 // `provided_channel_type_features`. The channel type must always support
1208 // `static_remote_key`.
1209 if !channel_type.requires_static_remote_key() {
1210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type was not understood - we require static remote key".to_owned()));
1212 // Make sure we support all of the features behind the channel type.
1213 if !channel_type.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
1214 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type contains unsupported features".to_owned()));
1216 if channel_type.requires_scid_privacy() && announced_channel {
1217 return Err(ChannelError::Close("SCID Alias/Privacy Channel Type cannot be set on a public channel".to_owned()));
1219 channel_type.clone()
1221 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
1222 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
1223 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
1227 let opt_anchors = channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx();
1229 let channel_keys_id = signer_provider.generate_channel_keys_id(true, msg.funding_satoshis, user_id);
1230 let holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(msg.funding_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
1231 let pubkeys = holder_signer.pubkeys().clone();
1232 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
1233 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
1234 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
1235 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
1236 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
1237 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
1240 if config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay < BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT {
1241 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Configured with an unreasonable our_to_self_delay ({}) putting user funds at risks. It must be greater than {}", config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay, BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT)));
1244 // Check sanity of message fields:
1245 if msg.funding_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis {
1246 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Per our config, funding must be at most {}. It was {}", config.channel_handshake_limits.max_funding_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1248 if msg.funding_satoshis >= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS {
1249 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding must be smaller than the total bitcoin supply. It was {}", msg.funding_satoshis)));
1251 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1252 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must be not greater than funding_satoshis: {}", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1254 let full_channel_value_msat = (msg.funding_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
1255 if msg.push_msat > full_channel_value_msat {
1256 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("push_msat {} was larger than channel amount minus reserve ({})", msg.push_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1258 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > msg.funding_satoshis {
1259 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis {} was larger than funding_satoshis {}. Peer never wants payout outputs?", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, msg.funding_satoshis)));
1261 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
1262 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) was larger than full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
1264 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, None, logger)?;
1266 let max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay = u16::min(config.channel_handshake_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
1267 if msg.to_self_delay > max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay {
1268 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_counterparty_selected_contest_delay, msg.to_self_delay)));
1270 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
1271 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
1273 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
1274 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
1277 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
1278 if msg.funding_satoshis < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis {
1279 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding satoshis ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.funding_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_funding_satoshis)));
1281 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
1282 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
1284 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
1285 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
1287 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1288 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, config.channel_handshake_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1290 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
1291 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, config.channel_handshake_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
1293 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1296 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1297 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1300 // Convert things into internal flags and prep our state:
1302 if config.channel_handshake_limits.force_announced_channel_preference {
1303 if config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel != announced_channel {
1304 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer tried to open channel but their announcement preference is different from ours".to_owned()));
1308 let holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Channel::<Signer>::get_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(msg.funding_satoshis, config);
1309 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1310 // Protocol level safety check in place, although it should never happen because
1311 // of `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
1312 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({}). dust_limit_satoshis is ({}).", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
1314 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 >= full_channel_value_msat {
1315 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Suitable channel reserve not found. remote_channel_reserve was ({})msats. Channel value is ({} - {})msats.", holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000, full_channel_value_msat, msg.push_msat)));
1317 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
1318 log_debug!(logger, "channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is smaller than our dust limit ({}). We can broadcast stale states without any risk, implying this channel is very insecure for our counterparty.",
1319 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS);
1321 if holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis < msg.dust_limit_satoshis {
1322 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) too high for the channel reserve we require the remote to keep ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
1325 // check if the funder's amount for the initial commitment tx is sufficient
1326 // for full fee payment plus a few HTLCs to ensure the channel will be useful.
1327 let funders_amount_msat = msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat;
1328 let commitment_tx_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(msg.feerate_per_kw, MIN_AFFORDABLE_HTLC_COUNT, opt_anchors) / 1000;
1329 if funders_amount_msat / 1000 < commitment_tx_fee {
1330 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Funding amount ({} sats) can't even pay fee for initial commitment transaction fee of {} sats.", funders_amount_msat / 1000, commitment_tx_fee)));
1333 let to_remote_satoshis = funders_amount_msat / 1000 - commitment_tx_fee;
1334 // While it's reasonable for us to not meet the channel reserve initially (if they don't
1335 // want to push much to us), our counterparty should always have more than our reserve.
1336 if to_remote_satoshis < holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
1337 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Insufficient funding amount for initial reserve".to_owned()));
1340 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
1341 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1342 &Some(ref script) => {
1343 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
1344 if script.len() == 0 {
1347 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
1348 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)))
1350 Some(script.clone())
1353 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
1355 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
1360 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = if config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey {
1361 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
1362 Ok(scriptpubkey) => Some(scriptpubkey),
1363 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get upfront shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
1367 if let Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey) = &shutdown_scriptpubkey {
1368 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(&their_features) {
1369 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
1373 let destination_script = match signer_provider.get_destination_script() {
1374 Ok(script) => script,
1375 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get destination script".to_owned())),
1378 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
1379 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
1381 let chan = Channel {
1384 config: LegacyChannelConfig {
1385 options: config.channel_config.clone(),
1387 commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey: config.channel_handshake_config.commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey,
1392 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
1394 channel_id: msg.temporary_channel_id,
1395 temporary_channel_id: Some(msg.temporary_channel_id),
1396 channel_state: (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32),
1397 announcement_sigs_state: AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
1400 latest_monitor_update_id: 0,
1403 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1406 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1407 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER,
1408 value_to_self_msat: msg.push_msat,
1410 pending_inbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1411 pending_outbound_htlcs: Vec::new(),
1412 holding_cell_htlc_updates: Vec::new(),
1413 pending_update_fee: None,
1414 holding_cell_update_fee: None,
1415 next_holder_htlc_id: 0,
1416 next_counterparty_htlc_id: 0,
1417 update_time_counter: 1,
1419 resend_order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
1421 monitor_pending_channel_ready: false,
1422 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack: false,
1423 monitor_pending_commitment_signed: false,
1424 monitor_pending_forwards: Vec::new(),
1425 monitor_pending_failures: Vec::new(),
1426 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: Vec::new(),
1428 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1429 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1430 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1431 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((msg.push_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000 - msg.push_msat)),
1433 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
1434 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
1435 closing_fee_limits: None,
1436 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw: None,
1438 inbound_awaiting_accept: true,
1440 funding_tx_confirmed_in: None,
1441 funding_tx_confirmation_height: 0,
1442 short_channel_id: None,
1443 channel_creation_height: current_chain_height,
1445 feerate_per_kw: msg.feerate_per_kw,
1446 channel_value_satoshis: msg.funding_satoshis,
1447 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis: msg.dust_limit_satoshis,
1448 holder_dust_limit_satoshis: MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS,
1449 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, msg.funding_satoshis * 1000),
1450 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(msg.funding_satoshis, &config.channel_handshake_config),
1451 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis),
1452 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
1453 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat: msg.htlc_minimum_msat,
1454 holder_htlc_minimum_msat: if config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat == 0 { 1 } else { config.channel_handshake_config.our_htlc_minimum_msat },
1455 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs: msg.max_accepted_htlcs,
1456 holder_max_accepted_htlcs: cmp::min(config.channel_handshake_config.our_max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS),
1457 minimum_depth: Some(cmp::max(config.channel_handshake_config.minimum_depth, 1)),
1459 counterparty_forwarding_info: None,
1461 channel_transaction_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters {
1462 holder_pubkeys: pubkeys,
1463 holder_selected_contest_delay: config.channel_handshake_config.our_to_self_delay,
1464 is_outbound_from_holder: false,
1465 counterparty_parameters: Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
1466 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
1467 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
1469 funding_outpoint: None,
1470 opt_anchors: if opt_anchors { Some(()) } else { None },
1471 opt_non_zero_fee_anchors: None
1473 funding_transaction: None,
1475 counterparty_cur_commitment_point: Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point),
1476 counterparty_prev_commitment_point: None,
1477 counterparty_node_id,
1479 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
1481 commitment_secrets: CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new(),
1483 channel_update_status: ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
1484 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
1486 announcement_sigs: None,
1488 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1489 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1490 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1491 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
1493 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
1495 latest_inbound_scid_alias: None,
1496 outbound_scid_alias,
1498 channel_pending_event_emitted: false,
1499 channel_ready_event_emitted: false,
1501 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1502 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills: HashSet::new(),
1507 pending_monitor_updates: Vec::new(),
1513 /// Transaction nomenclature is somewhat confusing here as there are many different cases - a
1514 /// transaction is referred to as "a's transaction" implying that a will be able to broadcast
1515 /// the transaction. Thus, b will generally be sending a signature over such a transaction to
1516 /// a, and a can revoke the transaction by providing b the relevant per_commitment_secret. As
1517 /// such, a transaction is generally the result of b increasing the amount paid to a (or adding
1519 /// @local is used only to convert relevant internal structures which refer to remote vs local
1520 /// to decide value of outputs and direction of HTLCs.
1521 /// @generated_by_local is used to determine *which* HTLCs to include - noting that the HTLC
1522 /// state may indicate that one peer has informed the other that they'd like to add an HTLC but
1523 /// have not yet committed it. Such HTLCs will only be included in transactions which are being
1524 /// generated by the peer which proposed adding the HTLCs, and thus we need to understand both
1525 /// which peer generated this transaction and "to whom" this transaction flows.
1527 fn build_commitment_transaction<L: Deref>(&self, commitment_number: u64, keys: &TxCreationKeys, local: bool, generated_by_local: bool, logger: &L) -> CommitmentStats
1528 where L::Target: Logger
1530 let mut included_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::new();
1531 let num_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
1532 let mut included_non_dust_htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)> = Vec::with_capacity(num_htlcs);
1534 let broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis = if local { self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis } else { self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis };
1535 let mut remote_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1536 let mut local_htlc_total_msat = 0;
1537 let mut value_to_self_msat_offset = 0;
1539 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
1540 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
1541 if match update_state {
1542 // Note that these match the inclusion criteria when scanning
1543 // pending_inbound_htlcs below.
1544 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1545 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); !generated_by_local },
1546 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => { assert!(self.is_outbound()); generated_by_local },
1548 feerate_per_kw = feerate;
1552 log_trace!(logger, "Building commitment transaction number {} (really {} xor {}) for channel {} for {}, generated by {} with fee {}...",
1553 commitment_number, (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - commitment_number),
1554 get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound()),
1555 log_bytes!(self.channel_id), if local { "us" } else { "remote" }, if generated_by_local { "us" } else { "remote" }, feerate_per_kw);
1557 macro_rules! get_htlc_in_commitment {
1558 ($htlc: expr, $offered: expr) => {
1559 HTLCOutputInCommitment {
1561 amount_msat: $htlc.amount_msat,
1562 cltv_expiry: $htlc.cltv_expiry,
1563 payment_hash: $htlc.payment_hash,
1564 transaction_output_index: None
1569 macro_rules! add_htlc_output {
1570 ($htlc: expr, $outbound: expr, $source: expr, $state_name: expr) => {
1571 if $outbound == local { // "offered HTLC output"
1572 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, true);
1573 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1576 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1578 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1579 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1580 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1582 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to dust limit", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1583 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1586 let htlc_in_tx = get_htlc_in_commitment!($htlc, false);
1587 let htlc_tx_fee = if self.opt_anchors() {
1590 feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000
1592 if $htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis + htlc_tx_fee {
1593 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1594 included_non_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1596 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} {} dust HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {}", if $outbound { "outbound" } else { "inbound" }, $state_name, $htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!($htlc.payment_hash.0), $htlc.amount_msat);
1597 included_dust_htlcs.push((htlc_in_tx, $source));
1603 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
1604 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1605 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => (!generated_by_local, "RemoteAnnounced"),
1606 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) => (!generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce"),
1607 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => (true, "AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke"),
1608 InboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1609 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => (!generated_by_local, "LocalRemoved"),
1613 add_htlc_output!(htlc, false, None, state_name);
1614 remote_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1616 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including inbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1618 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1619 if generated_by_local {
1620 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1621 value_to_self_msat_offset += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1630 let mut preimages: Vec<PaymentPreimage> = Vec::new();
1632 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
1633 let (include, state_name) = match htlc.state {
1634 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) => (generated_by_local, "LocalAnnounced"),
1635 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => (true, "Committed"),
1636 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => (generated_by_local, "RemoteRemoved"),
1637 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) => (generated_by_local, "AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove"),
1638 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) => (false, "AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke"),
1641 let preimage_opt = match htlc.state {
1642 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1643 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1644 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(p)) => p,
1648 if let Some(preimage) = preimage_opt {
1649 preimages.push(preimage);
1653 add_htlc_output!(htlc, true, Some(&htlc.source), state_name);
1654 local_htlc_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
1656 log_trace!(logger, " ...not including outbound HTLC {} (hash {}) with value {} due to state ({})", htlc.htlc_id, log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), htlc.amount_msat, state_name);
1658 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_))|OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1659 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1661 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) => {
1662 if !generated_by_local {
1663 value_to_self_msat_offset -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
1671 let mut value_to_self_msat: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat - local_htlc_total_msat) as i64 + value_to_self_msat_offset;
1672 assert!(value_to_self_msat >= 0);
1673 // Note that in case they have several just-awaiting-last-RAA fulfills in-progress (ie
1674 // AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove or AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke) we may have allowed them to
1675 // "violate" their reserve value by couting those against it. Thus, we have to convert
1676 // everything to i64 before subtracting as otherwise we can overflow.
1677 let mut value_to_remote_msat: i64 = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000) as i64 - (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) - (remote_htlc_total_msat as i64) - value_to_self_msat_offset;
1678 assert!(value_to_remote_msat >= 0);
1680 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
1682 // Make sure that the to_self/to_remote is always either past the appropriate
1683 // channel_reserve *or* it is making progress towards it.
1684 let mut broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output = if generated_by_local {
1685 self.holder_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1687 self.counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output.lock().unwrap()
1689 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 <= value_to_self_msat as u64 || value_to_self_msat / 1000 >= self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() as i64);
1690 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.0, value_to_self_msat as u64);
1691 debug_assert!(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 <= value_to_remote_msat as u64 || value_to_remote_msat / 1000 >= self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64);
1692 broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1 = cmp::max(broadcaster_max_commitment_tx_output.1, value_to_remote_msat as u64);
1695 let total_fee_sat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, included_non_dust_htlcs.len(), self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some());
1696 let anchors_val = if self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some() { ANCHOR_OUTPUT_VALUE_SATOSHI * 2 } else { 0 } as i64;
1697 let (value_to_self, value_to_remote) = if self.is_outbound() {
1698 (value_to_self_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64, value_to_remote_msat / 1000)
1700 (value_to_self_msat / 1000, value_to_remote_msat / 1000 - anchors_val - total_fee_sat as i64)
1703 let mut value_to_a = if local { value_to_self } else { value_to_remote };
1704 let mut value_to_b = if local { value_to_remote } else { value_to_self };
1705 let (funding_pubkey_a, funding_pubkey_b) = if local {
1706 (self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1708 (self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey)
1711 if value_to_a >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1712 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_local" } else { "to_remote" }, value_to_a);
1717 if value_to_b >= (broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64) {
1718 log_trace!(logger, " ...including {} output with value {}", if local { "to_remote" } else { "to_local" }, value_to_b);
1723 let num_nondust_htlcs = included_non_dust_htlcs.len();
1725 let channel_parameters =
1726 if local { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable() }
1727 else { self.channel_transaction_parameters.as_counterparty_broadcastable() };
1728 let tx = CommitmentTransaction::new_with_auxiliary_htlc_data(commitment_number,
1731 self.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors.is_some(),
1736 &mut included_non_dust_htlcs,
1739 let mut htlcs_included = included_non_dust_htlcs;
1740 // The unwrap is safe, because all non-dust HTLCs have been assigned an output index
1741 htlcs_included.sort_unstable_by_key(|h| h.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap());
1742 htlcs_included.append(&mut included_dust_htlcs);
1744 // For the stats, trimmed-to-0 the value in msats accordingly
1745 value_to_self_msat = if (value_to_self_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_self_msat };
1746 value_to_remote_msat = if (value_to_remote_msat * 1000) < broadcaster_dust_limit_satoshis as i64 { 0 } else { value_to_remote_msat };
1754 local_balance_msat: value_to_self_msat as u64,
1755 remote_balance_msat: value_to_remote_msat as u64,
1761 fn get_closing_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Script {
1762 // The shutdown scriptpubkey is set on channel opening when option_upfront_shutdown_script
1763 // is signaled. Otherwise, it is set when sending a shutdown message. Calling this method
1764 // outside of those situations will fail.
1765 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap().into_inner()
1769 fn get_closing_transaction_weight(&self, a_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>, b_scriptpubkey: Option<&Script>) -> u64 {
1774 1 + // script length (0)
1778 )*4 + // * 4 for non-witness parts
1779 2 + // witness marker and flag
1780 1 + // witness element count
1781 4 + // 4 element lengths (2 sigs, multisig dummy, and witness script)
1782 self.get_funding_redeemscript().len() as u64 + // funding witness script
1783 2*(1 + 71); // two signatures + sighash type flags
1784 if let Some(spk) = a_scriptpubkey {
1785 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1786 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1788 if let Some(spk) = b_scriptpubkey {
1789 ret += ((8+1) + // output values and script length
1790 spk.len() as u64) * 4; // scriptpubkey and witness multiplier
1796 fn build_closing_transaction(&self, proposed_total_fee_satoshis: u64, skip_remote_output: bool) -> (ClosingTransaction, u64) {
1797 assert!(self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1798 assert!(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty());
1799 assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
1801 let mut total_fee_satoshis = proposed_total_fee_satoshis;
1802 let mut value_to_holder: i64 = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64) / 1000 - if self.is_outbound() { total_fee_satoshis as i64 } else { 0 };
1803 let mut value_to_counterparty: i64 = ((self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat) as i64 / 1000) - if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else { total_fee_satoshis as i64 };
1805 if value_to_holder < 0 {
1806 assert!(self.is_outbound());
1807 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_holder) as u64;
1808 } else if value_to_counterparty < 0 {
1809 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
1810 total_fee_satoshis += (-value_to_counterparty) as u64;
1813 if skip_remote_output || value_to_counterparty as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1814 value_to_counterparty = 0;
1817 if value_to_holder as u64 <= self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis {
1818 value_to_holder = 0;
1821 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
1822 let holder_shutdown_script = self.get_closing_scriptpubkey();
1823 let counterparty_shutdown_script = self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().unwrap();
1824 let funding_outpoint = self.funding_outpoint().into_bitcoin_outpoint();
1826 let closing_transaction = ClosingTransaction::new(value_to_holder as u64, value_to_counterparty as u64, holder_shutdown_script, counterparty_shutdown_script, funding_outpoint);
1827 (closing_transaction, total_fee_satoshis)
1830 fn funding_outpoint(&self) -> OutPoint {
1831 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint.unwrap()
1835 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which our
1836 /// counterparty will sign (ie DO NOT send signatures over a transaction created by this to
1837 /// our counterparty!)
1838 /// The result is a transaction which we can revoke broadcastership of (ie a "local" transaction)
1839 /// TODO Some magic rust shit to compile-time check this?
1840 fn build_holder_transaction_keys(&self, commitment_number: u64) -> TxCreationKeys {
1841 let per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(commitment_number, &self.secp_ctx);
1842 let delayed_payment_base = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
1843 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1844 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1846 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint)
1850 /// Creates a set of keys for build_commitment_transaction to generate a transaction which we
1851 /// will sign and send to our counterparty.
1852 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
1853 fn build_remote_transaction_keys(&self) -> TxCreationKeys {
1854 //TODO: Ensure that the payment_key derived here ends up in the library users' wallet as we
1855 //may see payments to it!
1856 let revocation_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().revocation_basepoint;
1857 let htlc_basepoint = &self.get_holder_pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
1858 let counterparty_pubkeys = self.get_counterparty_pubkeys();
1860 TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&self.secp_ctx, &self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), &counterparty_pubkeys.delayed_payment_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint, revocation_basepoint, htlc_basepoint)
1863 /// Gets the redeemscript for the funding transaction output (ie the funding transaction output
1864 /// pays to get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh()).
1865 /// Panics if called before accept_channel/new_from_req
1866 pub fn get_funding_redeemscript(&self) -> Script {
1867 make_funding_redeemscript(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())
1870 /// Claims an HTLC while we're disconnected from a peer, dropping the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`]
1873 /// The [`ChannelMonitor`] for this channel MUST be updated out-of-band with the preimage
1874 /// provided (i.e. without calling [`crate::chain::Watch::update_channel`]).
1876 /// The HTLC claim will end up in the holding cell (because the caller must ensure the peer is
1878 pub fn claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update<L: Deref>
1879 (&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L)
1880 where L::Target: Logger {
1881 // Assert that we'll add the HTLC claim to the holding cell in `get_update_fulfill_htlc`
1882 // (see equivalent if condition there).
1883 assert!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0);
1884 let mon_update_id = self.latest_monitor_update_id; // Forget the ChannelMonitor update
1885 let fulfill_resp = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id_arg, payment_preimage_arg, logger);
1886 self.latest_monitor_update_id = mon_update_id;
1887 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, .. } = fulfill_resp {
1888 assert!(msg.is_none()); // The HTLC must have ended up in the holding cell.
1892 fn get_update_fulfill_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, payment_preimage_arg: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillFetch where L::Target: Logger {
1893 // Either ChannelReady got set (which means it won't be unset) or there is no way any
1894 // caller thought we could have something claimed (cause we wouldn't have accepted in an
1895 // incoming HTLC anyway). If we got to ShutdownComplete, callers aren't allowed to call us,
1897 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
1898 panic!("Was asked to fulfill an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
1900 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
1902 let payment_hash_calc = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage_arg.0[..]).into_inner());
1904 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
1905 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
1906 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
1908 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
1909 let mut htlc_value_msat = 0;
1910 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
1911 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
1912 assert_eq!(htlc.payment_hash, payment_hash_calc);
1914 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
1915 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
1916 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
1918 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with payment hash {} we already failed against channel {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1919 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1921 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1924 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1925 // Don't return in release mode here so that we can update channel_monitor
1929 htlc_value_msat = htlc.amount_msat;
1933 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
1934 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1935 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fulfill, make sure it was previously fulfilled and
1936 // this is simply a duplicate claim, not previously failed and we lost funds.
1937 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1938 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1941 // Now update local state:
1943 // We have to put the payment_preimage in the channel_monitor right away here to ensure we
1944 // can claim it even if the channel hits the chain before we see their next commitment.
1945 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
1946 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
1947 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
1948 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::PaymentPreimage {
1949 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg.clone(),
1953 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
1954 // Note that this condition is the same as the assertion in
1955 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` and must match exactly -
1956 // `claim_htlc_while_disconnected_dropping_mon_update` would not work correctly if we
1957 // do not not get into this branch.
1958 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
1959 match pending_update {
1960 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1961 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1962 // Make sure we don't leave latest_monitor_update_id incremented here:
1963 self.latest_monitor_update_id -= 1;
1964 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1965 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
1966 return UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {};
1969 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
1970 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
1971 log_warn!(logger, "Have preimage and want to fulfill HTLC with pending failure against channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
1972 // TODO: We may actually be able to switch to a fulfill here, though its
1973 // rare enough it may not be worth the complexity burden.
1974 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fulfill an HTLC that was already failed");
1975 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1981 log_trace!(logger, "Adding HTLC claim to holding_cell in channel {}! Current state: {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), self.channel_state);
1982 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
1983 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg, htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
1985 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1986 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1987 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1989 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
1990 self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(htlc_id_arg);
1993 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
1994 if let InboundHTLCState::Committed = htlc.state {
1996 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
1997 return UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg: None };
1999 log_trace!(logger, "Upgrading HTLC {} to LocalRemoved with a Fulfill in channel {}!", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
2000 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(payment_preimage_arg.clone()));
2003 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim {
2006 msg: Some(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
2007 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2008 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2009 payment_preimage: payment_preimage_arg,
2014 pub fn get_update_fulfill_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, payment_preimage: PaymentPreimage, logger: &L) -> UpdateFulfillCommitFetch where L::Target: Logger {
2015 let release_cs_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
2016 match self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, payment_preimage, logger) {
2017 UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { mut monitor_update, htlc_value_msat, msg } => {
2018 // Even if we aren't supposed to let new monitor updates with commitment state
2019 // updates run, we still need to push the preimage ChannelMonitorUpdateStep no
2020 // matter what. Sadly, to push a new monitor update which flies before others
2021 // already queued, we have to insert it into the pending queue and update the
2022 // update_ids of all the following monitors.
2023 let unblocked_update_pos = if release_cs_monitor && msg.is_some() {
2024 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2025 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them
2026 // to be strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
2027 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
2028 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
2029 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2030 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2032 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() - 1
2034 let insert_pos = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().position(|upd| upd.blocked)
2035 .unwrap_or(self.pending_monitor_updates.len());
2036 let new_mon_id = self.pending_monitor_updates.get(insert_pos)
2037 .map(|upd| upd.update.update_id).unwrap_or(monitor_update.update_id);
2038 monitor_update.update_id = new_mon_id;
2039 self.pending_monitor_updates.insert(insert_pos, PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2040 update: monitor_update, blocked: false,
2042 for held_update in self.pending_monitor_updates.iter_mut().skip(insert_pos + 1) {
2043 held_update.update.update_id += 1;
2046 debug_assert!(false, "If there is a pending blocked monitor we should have MonitorUpdateInProgress set");
2047 let update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
2048 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
2049 update, blocked: true,
2054 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, msg.is_some(), false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2055 UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::NewClaim {
2056 monitor_update: &self.pending_monitor_updates.get(unblocked_update_pos)
2057 .expect("We just pushed the monitor update").update,
2061 UpdateFulfillFetch::DuplicateClaim {} => UpdateFulfillCommitFetch::DuplicateClaim {},
2065 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2066 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2067 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2068 /// before we fail backwards.
2070 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2071 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2072 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2073 pub fn queue_fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, logger: &L)
2074 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2075 self.fail_htlc(htlc_id_arg, err_packet, true, logger)
2076 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
2079 /// We can only have one resolution per HTLC. In some cases around reconnect, we may fulfill
2080 /// an HTLC more than once or fulfill once and then attempt to fail after reconnect. We cannot,
2081 /// however, fail more than once as we wait for an upstream failure to be irrevocably committed
2082 /// before we fail backwards.
2084 /// If we do fail twice, we `debug_assert!(false)` and return `Ok(None)`. Thus, this will always
2085 /// return `Ok(_)` if preconditions are met. In any case, `Err`s will only be
2086 /// [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
2087 fn fail_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, htlc_id_arg: u64, err_packet: msgs::OnionErrorPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
2088 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateFailHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2089 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
2090 panic!("Was asked to fail an HTLC when channel was not in an operational state");
2092 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
2094 // ChannelManager may generate duplicate claims/fails due to HTLC update events from
2095 // on-chain ChannelsMonitors during block rescan. Ideally we'd figure out a way to drop
2096 // these, but for now we just have to treat them as normal.
2098 let mut pending_idx = core::usize::MAX;
2099 for (idx, htlc) in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().enumerate() {
2100 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id_arg {
2102 InboundHTLCState::Committed => {},
2103 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) => {
2104 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
2106 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2111 debug_assert!(false, "Have an inbound HTLC we tried to claim before it was fully committed to");
2112 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID ({})", htlc.htlc_id)));
2118 if pending_idx == core::usize::MAX {
2119 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2120 // If we failed to find an HTLC to fail, make sure it was previously fulfilled and this
2121 // is simply a duplicate fail, not previously failed and we failed-back too early.
2122 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2126 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
2127 debug_assert!(force_holding_cell, "!force_holding_cell is only called when emptying the holding cell, so we shouldn't end up back in it!");
2128 force_holding_cell = true;
2131 // Now update local state:
2132 if force_holding_cell {
2133 for pending_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2134 match pending_update {
2135 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2136 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2137 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2138 debug_assert!(self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.contains(&htlc_id_arg));
2142 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, .. } => {
2143 if htlc_id_arg == htlc_id {
2144 debug_assert!(false, "Tried to fail an HTLC that was already failed");
2145 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Unable to find a pending HTLC which matched the given HTLC ID".to_owned()));
2151 log_trace!(logger, "Placing failure for HTLC ID {} in holding cell in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2152 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
2153 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2159 log_trace!(logger, "Failing HTLC ID {} back with a update_fail_htlc message in channel {}.", htlc_id_arg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2161 let htlc = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs[pending_idx];
2162 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(err_packet.clone()));
2165 Ok(Some(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
2166 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
2167 htlc_id: htlc_id_arg,
2172 // Message handlers:
2174 pub fn accept_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::AcceptChannel, default_limits: &ChannelHandshakeLimits, their_features: &InitFeatures) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
2175 let peer_limits = if let Some(ref limits) = self.inbound_handshake_limits_override { limits } else { default_limits };
2177 // Check sanity of message fields:
2178 if !self.is_outbound() {
2179 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message from an inbound peer".to_owned()));
2181 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
2182 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got an accept_channel message at a strange time".to_owned()));
2184 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > 21000000 * 100000000 {
2185 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer never wants payout outputs? dust_limit_satoshis was {}", msg.dust_limit_satoshis)));
2187 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis {
2188 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis)));
2190 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2191 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Dust limit ({}) is bigger than our channel reserve ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2193 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2194 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Bogus channel_reserve_satoshis ({}). Must not be greater than channel value minus our reserve ({})",
2195 msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, self.channel_value_satoshis - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2197 let full_channel_value_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis - msg.channel_reserve_satoshis) * 1000;
2198 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat >= full_channel_value_msat {
2199 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Minimum htlc value ({}) is full channel value ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, full_channel_value_msat)));
2201 let max_delay_acceptable = u16::min(peer_limits.their_to_self_delay, MAX_LOCAL_BREAKDOWN_TIMEOUT);
2202 if msg.to_self_delay > max_delay_acceptable {
2203 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("They wanted our payments to be delayed by a needlessly long period. Upper limit: {}. Actual: {}", max_delay_acceptable, msg.to_self_delay)));
2205 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < 1 {
2206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("0 max_accepted_htlcs makes for a useless channel".to_owned()));
2208 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs > MAX_HTLCS {
2209 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs was {}. It must not be larger than {}", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, MAX_HTLCS)));
2212 // Now check against optional parameters as set by config...
2213 if msg.htlc_minimum_msat > peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat {
2214 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("htlc_minimum_msat ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.htlc_minimum_msat, peer_limits.max_htlc_minimum_msat)));
2216 if msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat < peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
2217 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, peer_limits.min_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
2219 if msg.channel_reserve_satoshis > peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis {
2220 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("channel_reserve_satoshis ({}) is higher than the user specified limit ({})", msg.channel_reserve_satoshis, peer_limits.max_channel_reserve_satoshis)));
2222 if msg.max_accepted_htlcs < peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs {
2223 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("max_accepted_htlcs ({}) is less than the user specified limit ({})", msg.max_accepted_htlcs, peer_limits.min_max_accepted_htlcs)));
2225 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis < MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2226 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is less than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MIN_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2228 if msg.dust_limit_satoshis > MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
2229 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("dust_limit_satoshis ({}) is greater than the implementation limit ({})", msg.dust_limit_satoshis, MAX_CHAN_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS)));
2231 if msg.minimum_depth > peer_limits.max_minimum_depth {
2232 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("We consider the minimum depth to be unreasonably large. Expected minimum: ({}). Actual: ({})", peer_limits.max_minimum_depth, msg.minimum_depth)));
2235 if let Some(ty) = &msg.channel_type {
2236 if *ty != self.channel_type {
2237 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Channel Type in accept_channel didn't match the one sent in open_channel.".to_owned()));
2239 } else if their_features.supports_channel_type() {
2240 // Assume they've accepted the channel type as they said they understand it.
2242 let channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_init(&their_features);
2243 if channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
2244 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Only static_remote_key is supported for non-negotiated channel types".to_owned()));
2246 self.channel_type = channel_type;
2249 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = if their_features.supports_upfront_shutdown_script() {
2250 match &msg.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
2251 &Some(ref script) => {
2252 // Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown and has opt-out with a 0-length script. We don't enforce anything
2253 if script.len() == 0 {
2256 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&script, their_features) {
2257 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but has provided an unacceptable scriptpubkey format: {}", script)));
2259 Some(script.clone())
2262 // Peer is signaling upfront shutdown but don't opt-out with correct mechanism (a.k.a 0-length script). Peer looks buggy, we fail the channel
2264 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer is signaling upfront_shutdown but we don't get any script. Use 0-length script to opt-out".to_owned()));
2269 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = msg.dust_limit_satoshis;
2270 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = cmp::min(msg.max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000);
2271 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(msg.channel_reserve_satoshis);
2272 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = msg.htlc_minimum_msat;
2273 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = msg.max_accepted_htlcs;
2275 if peer_limits.trust_own_funding_0conf {
2276 self.minimum_depth = Some(msg.minimum_depth);
2278 self.minimum_depth = Some(cmp::max(1, msg.minimum_depth));
2281 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
2282 funding_pubkey: msg.funding_pubkey,
2283 revocation_basepoint: msg.revocation_basepoint,
2284 payment_point: msg.payment_point,
2285 delayed_payment_basepoint: msg.delayed_payment_basepoint,
2286 htlc_basepoint: msg.htlc_basepoint
2289 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
2290 selected_contest_delay: msg.to_self_delay,
2291 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys,
2294 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.first_per_commitment_point);
2295 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey;
2297 self.channel_state = ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32;
2298 self.inbound_handshake_limits_override = None; // We're done enforcing limits on our peer's handshake now.
2303 fn funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, sig: &Signature, logger: &L) -> Result<(Txid, CommitmentTransaction, Signature), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
2304 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2306 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2307 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger).tx;
2309 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2310 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2311 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2312 // They sign the holder commitment transaction...
2313 log_trace!(logger, "Checking funding_created tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} for channel {}.",
2314 log_bytes!(sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()),
2315 encode::serialize_hex(&initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.transaction), log_bytes!(sighash[..]),
2316 encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2317 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &sig, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid funding_created signature from peer".to_owned());
2320 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2321 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2323 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2324 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2325 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2326 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2328 let counterparty_signature = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
2329 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0;
2331 // We sign "counterparty" commitment transaction, allowing them to broadcast the tx if they wish.
2332 Ok((counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, initial_commitment_tx, counterparty_signature))
2335 fn counterparty_funding_pubkey(&self) -> &PublicKey {
2336 &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey
2339 pub fn funding_created<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2340 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingCreated, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2341 ) -> Result<(msgs::FundingSigned, ChannelMonitor<Signer>), ChannelError>
2343 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2346 if self.is_outbound() {
2347 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created for an outbound channel?".to_owned()));
2349 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
2350 // BOLT 2 says that if we disconnect before we send funding_signed we SHOULD NOT
2351 // remember the channel, so it's safe to just send an error_message here and drop the
2353 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_created after we got the channel!".to_owned()));
2355 if self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
2356 return Err(ChannelError::Close("FundingCreated message received before the channel was accepted".to_owned()));
2358 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2359 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2360 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2361 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2364 let funding_txo = OutPoint { txid: msg.funding_txid, index: msg.funding_output_index };
2365 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
2366 // This is an externally observable change before we finish all our checks. In particular
2367 // funding_created_signature may fail.
2368 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2370 let (counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, initial_commitment_tx, signature) = match self.funding_created_signature(&msg.signature, logger) {
2372 Err(ChannelError::Close(e)) => {
2373 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
2374 return Err(ChannelError::Close(e));
2377 // The only error we know how to handle is ChannelError::Close, so we fall over here
2378 // to make sure we don't continue with an inconsistent state.
2379 panic!("unexpected error type from funding_created_signature {:?}", e);
2383 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2384 initial_commitment_tx,
2387 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2388 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2391 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2392 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2394 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
2396 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2397 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2398 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2399 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2400 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2401 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2402 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2403 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2404 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script.clone()),
2405 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2406 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2408 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2410 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_commitment_txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2412 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2413 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
2414 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2415 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2417 log_info!(logger, "Generated funding_signed for peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2419 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2420 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2422 Ok((msgs::FundingSigned {
2423 channel_id: self.channel_id,
2426 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
2427 }, channel_monitor))
2430 /// Handles a funding_signed message from the remote end.
2431 /// If this call is successful, broadcast the funding transaction (and not before!)
2432 pub fn funding_signed<SP: Deref, L: Deref>(
2433 &mut self, msg: &msgs::FundingSigned, best_block: BestBlock, signer_provider: &SP, logger: &L
2434 ) -> Result<ChannelMonitor<Signer>, ChannelError>
2436 SP::Target: SignerProvider<Signer = Signer>,
2439 if !self.is_outbound() {
2440 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed for an inbound channel?".to_owned()));
2442 if self.channel_state & !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32 {
2443 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received funding_signed in strange state!".to_owned()));
2445 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
2446 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
2447 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
2448 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
2451 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2453 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
2454 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
2455 let counterparty_trusted_tx = counterparty_initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2456 let counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx = counterparty_trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2458 log_trace!(logger, "Initial counterparty tx for channel {} is: txid {} tx {}",
2459 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, encode::serialize_hex(&counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.transaction));
2461 let holder_signer = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
2462 let initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &holder_signer, true, false, logger).tx;
2464 let trusted_tx = initial_commitment_tx.trust();
2465 let initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
2466 let sighash = initial_commitment_bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
2467 // They sign our commitment transaction, allowing us to broadcast the tx if we wish.
2468 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
2469 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid funding_signed signature from peer".to_owned()));
2473 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
2474 initial_commitment_tx,
2477 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
2478 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
2481 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, Vec::new())
2482 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
2485 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
2486 let funding_txo = self.get_funding_txo().unwrap();
2487 let funding_txo_script = funding_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
2488 let obscure_factor = get_commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor(&self.get_holder_pubkeys().payment_point, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().payment_point, self.is_outbound());
2489 let shutdown_script = self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone().map(|script| script.into_inner());
2490 let mut monitor_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(self.channel_value_satoshis, self.channel_keys_id);
2491 monitor_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
2492 let channel_monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(self.secp_ctx.clone(), monitor_signer,
2493 shutdown_script, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
2494 &self.destination_script, (funding_txo, funding_txo_script),
2495 &self.channel_transaction_parameters,
2496 funding_redeemscript.clone(), self.channel_value_satoshis,
2498 holder_commitment_tx, best_block, self.counterparty_node_id);
2500 channel_monitor.provide_latest_counterparty_commitment_tx(counterparty_initial_bitcoin_tx.txid, Vec::new(), self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap(), logger);
2502 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32), 0); // We have no had any monitor(s) yet to fail update!
2503 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingSent as u32;
2504 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2505 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
2507 log_info!(logger, "Received funding_signed from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2509 let need_channel_ready = self.check_get_channel_ready(0).is_some();
2510 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, need_channel_ready, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
2514 /// Handles a channel_ready message from our peer. If we've already sent our channel_ready
2515 /// and the channel is now usable (and public), this may generate an announcement_signatures to
2517 pub fn channel_ready<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
2518 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReady, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
2519 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock, logger: &L
2520 ) -> Result<Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>, ChannelError>
2522 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
2525 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
2526 self.workaround_lnd_bug_4006 = Some(msg.clone());
2527 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Peer sent channel_ready when we needed a channel_reestablish. The peer is likely lnd, see https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd/issues/4006".to_owned()));
2530 if let Some(scid_alias) = msg.short_channel_id_alias {
2531 if Some(scid_alias) != self.short_channel_id {
2532 // The scid alias provided can be used to route payments *from* our counterparty,
2533 // i.e. can be used for inbound payments and provided in invoices, but is not used
2534 // when routing outbound payments.
2535 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias = Some(scid_alias);
2539 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2541 if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
2542 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32;
2543 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
2544 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
2545 self.update_time_counter += 1;
2546 } else if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) != 0 ||
2547 // If we reconnected before sending our `channel_ready` they may still resend theirs:
2548 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) ==
2549 (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32))
2551 // They probably disconnected/reconnected and re-sent the channel_ready, which is
2552 // required, or they're sending a fresh SCID alias.
2553 let expected_point =
2554 if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
2555 // If they haven't ever sent an updated point, the point they send should match
2557 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point
2558 } else if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 2 {
2559 // If we've advanced the commitment number once, the second commitment point is
2560 // at `counterparty_prev_commitment_point`, which is not yet revoked.
2561 debug_assert!(self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.is_some());
2562 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point
2564 // If they have sent updated points, channel_ready is always supposed to match
2565 // their "first" point, which we re-derive here.
2566 Some(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(
2567 &self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1).expect("We should have all prev secrets available")
2568 ).expect("We already advanced, so previous secret keys should have been validated already")))
2570 if expected_point != Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point) {
2571 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a reconnect channel_ready with a different point".to_owned()));
2575 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a channel_ready at a strange time".to_owned()));
2578 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
2579 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
2581 log_info!(logger, "Received channel_ready from peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
2583 Ok(self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger))
2586 /// Returns transaction if there is pending funding transaction that is yet to broadcast
2587 pub fn unbroadcasted_funding(&self) -> Option<Transaction> {
2588 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) != 0 {
2589 self.funding_transaction.clone()
2595 /// Returns a HTLCStats about inbound pending htlcs
2596 fn get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2597 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2598 pending_htlcs: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2599 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2600 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2601 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2602 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2603 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2606 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2609 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2610 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2611 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2613 let counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2614 let holder_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2615 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2616 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2617 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2618 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2620 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_success_sat {
2621 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2627 /// Returns a HTLCStats about pending outbound htlcs, *including* pending adds in our holding cell.
2628 fn get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> HTLCStats {
2629 let mut stats = HTLCStats {
2630 pending_htlcs: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u32,
2631 pending_htlcs_value_msat: 0,
2632 on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2633 on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat: 0,
2634 holding_cell_msat: 0,
2635 on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count: 0,
2638 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2641 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(outbound_feerate_update) as u64;
2642 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2643 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2645 let counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2646 let holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2647 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2648 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2649 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2650 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2652 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2653 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2657 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2658 if let &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, .. } = update {
2659 stats.pending_htlcs += 1;
2660 stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat += amount_msat;
2661 stats.holding_cell_msat += amount_msat;
2662 if *amount_msat / 1000 < counterparty_dust_limit_success_sat {
2663 stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2665 if *amount_msat / 1000 < holder_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2666 stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat += amount_msat;
2668 stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count += 1;
2675 /// Get the available balances, see [`AvailableBalances`]'s fields for more info.
2676 /// Doesn't bother handling the
2677 /// if-we-removed-it-already-but-haven't-fully-resolved-they-can-still-send-an-inbound-HTLC
2678 /// corner case properly.
2679 pub fn get_available_balances(&self) -> AvailableBalances {
2680 // Note that we have to handle overflow due to the above case.
2681 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2682 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
2684 let mut balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat;
2685 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2686 if let InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_)) = htlc.state {
2687 balance_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
2690 balance_msat -= outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat;
2692 let outbound_capacity_msat = self.value_to_self_msat
2693 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat)
2695 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0) * 1000);
2697 let mut available_capacity_msat = outbound_capacity_msat;
2699 if self.is_outbound() {
2700 // We should mind channel commit tx fee when computing how much of the available capacity
2701 // can be used in the next htlc. Mirrors the logic in send_htlc.
2703 // The fee depends on whether the amount we will be sending is above dust or not,
2704 // and the answer will in turn change the amount itself — making it a circular
2706 // This complicates the computation around dust-values, up to the one-htlc-value.
2707 let mut real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2708 if !self.opt_anchors() {
2709 real_dust_limit_timeout_sat += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2712 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2713 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, Some(()));
2714 let htlc_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat * 1000 - 1, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2715 let min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_dust, Some(()));
2717 // We will first subtract the fee as if we were above-dust. Then, if the resulting
2718 // value ends up being below dust, we have this fee available again. In that case,
2719 // match the value to right-below-dust.
2720 let mut capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat: i64 = (available_capacity_msat as i64) - (max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat as i64);
2721 if capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat < (real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64) * 1000 {
2722 let one_htlc_difference_msat = max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat - min_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat;
2723 debug_assert!(one_htlc_difference_msat != 0);
2724 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat += one_htlc_difference_msat as i64;
2725 capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat = cmp::min(real_dust_limit_timeout_sat as i64 * 1000 - 1, capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat);
2726 available_capacity_msat = cmp::max(0, cmp::min(capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat, available_capacity_msat as i64)) as u64;
2728 available_capacity_msat = capacity_minus_commitment_fee_msat as u64;
2731 // If the channel is inbound (i.e. counterparty pays the fee), we need to make sure
2732 // sending a new HTLC won't reduce their balance below our reserve threshold.
2733 let mut real_dust_limit_success_sat = self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2734 if !self.opt_anchors() {
2735 real_dust_limit_success_sat += self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000;
2738 let htlc_above_dust = HTLCCandidate::new(real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
2739 let max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_above_dust, None);
2741 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
2742 let remote_balance_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat)
2743 .saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2745 if remote_balance_msat < max_reserved_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
2746 // If another HTLC's fee would reduce the remote's balance below the reserve limit
2747 // we've selected for them, we can only send dust HTLCs.
2748 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, real_dust_limit_success_sat * 1000 - 1);
2752 let mut next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat;
2754 // If we get close to our maximum dust exposure, we end up in a situation where we can send
2755 // between zero and the remaining dust exposure limit remaining OR above the dust limit.
2756 // Because we cannot express this as a simple min/max, we prefer to tell the user they can
2757 // send above the dust limit (as the router can always overpay to meet the dust limit).
2758 let mut remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = None;
2759 let mut dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = 0;
2761 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2762 (self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis, self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis)
2764 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
2765 (self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2766 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2768 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2769 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_success_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
2770 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit =
2771 Some(self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat));
2772 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_success_dust_limit * 1000);
2775 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
2776 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat as i64 + htlc_timeout_dust_limit as i64 * 1000 - 1 > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() as i64 {
2777 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit = Some(cmp::min(
2778 remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit.unwrap_or(u64::max_value()),
2779 self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat().saturating_sub(on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat)));
2780 dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat = cmp::max(dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat, htlc_timeout_dust_limit * 1000);
2783 if let Some(remaining_limit_msat) = remaining_msat_below_dust_exposure_limit {
2784 if available_capacity_msat < dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat {
2785 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat, remaining_limit_msat);
2787 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat = cmp::max(next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat, dust_exposure_dust_limit_msat);
2791 available_capacity_msat = cmp::min(available_capacity_msat,
2792 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat - outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
2794 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
2795 available_capacity_msat = 0;
2799 inbound_capacity_msat: cmp::max(self.channel_value_satoshis as i64 * 1000
2800 - self.value_to_self_msat as i64
2801 - self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None).pending_htlcs_value_msat as i64
2802 - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis as i64 * 1000,
2804 outbound_capacity_msat,
2805 next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat: available_capacity_msat,
2806 next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat,
2811 pub fn get_holder_counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(&self) -> (u64, Option<u64>) {
2812 (self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis)
2815 // Get the fee cost in MSATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2816 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2817 fn commit_tx_fee_msat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2818 // Note that we need to divide before multiplying to round properly,
2819 // since the lowest denomination of bitcoin on-chain is the satoshi.
2820 (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) * feerate_per_kw as u64 / 1000 * 1000
2823 // Get the fee cost in SATS of a commitment tx with a given number of HTLC outputs.
2824 // Note that num_htlcs should not include dust HTLCs.
2826 fn commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw: u32, num_htlcs: usize, opt_anchors: bool) -> u64 {
2827 feerate_per_kw as u64 * (commitment_tx_base_weight(opt_anchors) + num_htlcs as u64 * COMMITMENT_TX_WEIGHT_PER_HTLC) / 1000
2830 // Get the commitment tx fee for the local's (i.e. our) next commitment transaction based on the
2831 // number of pending HTLCs that are on track to be in our next commitment tx, plus an additional
2832 // HTLC if `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs
2834 fn next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2835 assert!(self.is_outbound());
2837 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2840 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2841 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2843 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2844 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
2846 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2847 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2849 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2850 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2854 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2855 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2861 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2862 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2863 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2866 // We include LocalRemoved HTLCs here because we may still need to broadcast a commitment
2867 // transaction including this HTLC if it times out before they RAA.
2868 included_htlcs += 1;
2871 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2872 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2876 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2877 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2878 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2879 // We don't include AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove HTLCs because our next commitment
2880 // transaction won't be generated until they send us their next RAA, which will mean
2881 // dropping any HTLCs in this state.
2886 for htlc in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
2888 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { amount_msat, .. } => {
2889 if amount_msat / 1000 < real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2894 _ => {}, // Don't include claims/fails that are awaiting ack, because once we get the
2895 // ack we're guaranteed to never include them in commitment txs anymore.
2899 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2900 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2901 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2904 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2905 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2907 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
2908 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
2909 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2911 total_pending_htlcs,
2912 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2913 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2914 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2916 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2917 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
2918 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
2920 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
2922 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
2927 // Get the commitment tx fee for the remote's next commitment transaction based on the number of
2928 // pending HTLCs that are on track to be in their next commitment tx, plus an additional HTLC if
2929 // `fee_spike_buffer_htlc` is Some, plus a new HTLC given by `new_htlc_amount`. Dust HTLCs are
2931 fn next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(&self, htlc: HTLCCandidate, fee_spike_buffer_htlc: Option<()>) -> u64 {
2932 assert!(!self.is_outbound());
2934 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
2937 (self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
2938 self.feerate_per_kw as u64 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
2940 let real_dust_limit_success_sat = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2941 let real_dust_limit_timeout_sat = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
2943 let mut addl_htlcs = 0;
2944 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() { addl_htlcs += 1; }
2946 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => {
2947 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2951 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => {
2952 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 >= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2958 // When calculating the set of HTLCs which will be included in their next commitment_signed, all
2959 // non-dust inbound HTLCs are included (as all states imply it will be included) and only
2960 // committed outbound HTLCs, see below.
2961 let mut included_htlcs = 0;
2962 for ref htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
2963 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_timeout_sat {
2966 included_htlcs += 1;
2969 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
2970 if htlc.amount_msat / 1000 <= real_dust_limit_success_sat {
2973 // We only include outbound HTLCs if it will not be included in their next commitment_signed,
2974 // i.e. if they've responded to us with an RAA after announcement.
2976 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => included_htlcs += 1,
2977 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved {..} => included_htlcs += 1,
2978 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced { .. } => included_htlcs += 1,
2983 let num_htlcs = included_htlcs + addl_htlcs;
2984 let res = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
2985 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
2988 if fee_spike_buffer_htlc.is_some() {
2989 fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, num_htlcs - 1, self.opt_anchors());
2991 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
2992 let commitment_tx_info = CommitmentTxInfoCached {
2994 total_pending_htlcs,
2995 next_holder_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
2996 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id + 1,
2997 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_holder_htlc_id,
2999 next_counterparty_htlc_id: match htlc.origin {
3000 HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id,
3001 HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered => self.next_counterparty_htlc_id + 1,
3003 feerate: self.feerate_per_kw,
3005 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = Some(commitment_tx_info);
3010 pub fn update_add_htlc<F, L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, mut pending_forward_status: PendingHTLCStatus, create_pending_htlc_status: F, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
3011 where F: for<'a> Fn(&'a Self, PendingHTLCStatus, u16) -> PendingHTLCStatus, L::Target: Logger {
3012 // We can't accept HTLCs sent after we've sent a shutdown.
3013 let local_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3014 if local_sent_shutdown {
3015 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x4000|8);
3017 // If the remote has sent a shutdown prior to adding this HTLC, then they are in violation of the spec.
3018 let remote_sent_shutdown = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
3019 if remote_sent_shutdown {
3020 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got add HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3022 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3023 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_add_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3025 if msg.amount_msat > self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
3026 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send more than the total value of the channel".to_owned()));
3028 if msg.amount_msat == 0 {
3029 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote side tried to send a 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
3031 if msg.amount_msat < self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat {
3032 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote side tried to send less than our minimum HTLC value. Lower limit: ({}). Actual: ({})", self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, msg.amount_msat)));
3035 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3036 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
3037 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
3038 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to push more than our max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs)));
3040 if inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + msg.amount_msat > self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
3041 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote HTLC add would put them over our max HTLC value ({})", self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
3043 // Check holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (we're getting paid, so they have to at least meet
3044 // the reserve_satoshis we told them to always have as direct payment so that they lose
3045 // something if we punish them for broadcasting an old state).
3046 // Note that we don't really care about having a small/no to_remote output in our local
3047 // commitment transactions, as the purpose of the channel reserve is to ensure we can
3048 // punish *them* if they misbehave, so we discount any outbound HTLCs which will not be
3049 // present in the next commitment transaction we send them (at least for fulfilled ones,
3050 // failed ones won't modify value_to_self).
3051 // Note that we will send HTLCs which another instance of rust-lightning would think
3052 // violate the reserve value if we do not do this (as we forget inbound HTLCs from the
3053 // Channel state once they will not be present in the next received commitment
3055 let mut removed_outbound_total_msat = 0;
3056 for ref htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
3057 if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3058 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3059 } else if let OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(_)) = htlc.state {
3060 removed_outbound_total_msat += htlc.amount_msat;
3064 let (htlc_timeout_dust_limit, htlc_success_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
3067 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
3068 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
3069 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
3071 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
3072 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
3073 let on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3074 if on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3075 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
3076 on_counterparty_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3077 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3081 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
3082 if msg.amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
3083 let on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + msg.amount_msat;
3084 if on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3085 log_info!(logger, "Cannot accept value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
3086 on_holder_tx_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat());
3087 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3091 let pending_value_to_self_msat =
3092 self.value_to_self_msat + inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat - removed_outbound_total_msat;
3093 let pending_remote_value_msat =
3094 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - pending_value_to_self_msat;
3095 if pending_remote_value_msat < msg.amount_msat {
3096 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would overdraw remaining funds".to_owned()));
3099 // Check that the remote can afford to pay for this HTLC on-chain at the current
3100 // feerate_per_kw, while maintaining their channel reserve (as required by the spec).
3101 let remote_commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() { 0 } else {
3102 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3103 self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None) // Don't include the extra fee spike buffer HTLC in calculations
3105 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat < remote_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3106 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would not leave enough to pay for fees".to_owned()));
3109 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - remote_commit_tx_fee_msat < self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 {
3110 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote HTLC add would put them under remote reserve value".to_owned()));
3113 if !self.is_outbound() {
3114 // `2 *` and `Some(())` is for the fee spike buffer we keep for the remote. This deviates from
3115 // the spec because in the spec, the fee spike buffer requirement doesn't exist on the
3116 // receiver's side, only on the sender's.
3117 // Note that when we eventually remove support for fee updates and switch to anchor output
3118 // fees, we will drop the `2 *`, since we no longer be as sensitive to fee spikes. But, keep
3119 // the extra htlc when calculating the next remote commitment transaction fee as we should
3120 // still be able to afford adding this HTLC plus one more future HTLC, regardless of being
3121 // sensitive to fee spikes.
3122 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3123 let remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat = 2 * self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()));
3124 if pending_remote_value_msat - msg.amount_msat - self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000 < remote_fee_cost_incl_stuck_buffer_msat {
3125 // Note that if the pending_forward_status is not updated here, then it's because we're already failing
3126 // the HTLC, i.e. its status is already set to failing.
3127 log_info!(logger, "Attempting to fail HTLC due to fee spike buffer violation in channel {}. Rebalancing is required.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3128 pending_forward_status = create_pending_htlc_status(self, pending_forward_status, 0x1000|7);
3131 // Check that they won't violate our local required channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
3132 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(msg.amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
3133 let local_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
3134 if self.value_to_self_msat < self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 + local_commit_tx_fee_msat {
3135 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Cannot accept HTLC that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
3138 if self.next_counterparty_htlc_id != msg.htlc_id {
3139 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote skipped HTLC ID (skipped ID: {})", self.next_counterparty_htlc_id)));
3141 if msg.cltv_expiry >= 500000000 {
3142 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote provided CLTV expiry in seconds instead of block height".to_owned()));
3145 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 != 0 {
3146 if let PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(_) = pending_forward_status {
3147 panic!("ChannelManager shouldn't be trying to add a forwardable HTLC after we've started closing");
3151 // Now update local state:
3152 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id += 1;
3153 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
3154 htlc_id: msg.htlc_id,
3155 amount_msat: msg.amount_msat,
3156 payment_hash: msg.payment_hash,
3157 cltv_expiry: msg.cltv_expiry,
3158 state: InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(pending_forward_status),
3163 /// Marks an outbound HTLC which we have received update_fail/fulfill/malformed
3165 fn mark_outbound_htlc_removed(&mut self, htlc_id: u64, check_preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, fail_reason: Option<HTLCFailReason>) -> Result<&OutboundHTLCOutput, ChannelError> {
3166 assert!(!(check_preimage.is_some() && fail_reason.is_some()), "cannot fail while we have a preimage");
3167 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3168 if htlc.htlc_id == htlc_id {
3169 let outcome = match check_preimage {
3170 None => fail_reason.into(),
3171 Some(payment_preimage) => {
3172 let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&payment_preimage.0[..]).into_inner());
3173 if payment_hash != htlc.payment_hash {
3174 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill HTLC ({}) with an incorrect preimage", htlc_id)));
3176 OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(payment_preimage))
3180 OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) =>
3181 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) before it had been committed", htlc_id))),
3182 OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
3183 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(outcome);
3185 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(_) | OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(_) | OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) =>
3186 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote tried to fulfill/fail HTLC ({}) that they'd already fulfilled/failed", htlc_id))),
3191 Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to fulfill/fail an HTLC we couldn't find".to_owned()))
3194 pub fn update_fulfill_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC) -> Result<(HTLCSource, u64), ChannelError> {
3195 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3196 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fulfill HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3198 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3199 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fulfill_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3202 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, Some(msg.payment_preimage), None).map(|htlc| (htlc.source.clone(), htlc.amount_msat))
3205 pub fn update_fail_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3206 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3207 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3209 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3210 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3213 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3217 pub fn update_fail_malformed_htlc(&mut self, msg: &msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC, fail_reason: HTLCFailReason) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
3218 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3219 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got fail malformed HTLC message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3221 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3222 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fail_malformed_htlc when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3225 self.mark_outbound_htlc_removed(msg.htlc_id, None, Some(fail_reason))?;
3229 pub fn commitment_signed<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::CommitmentSigned, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError>
3230 where L::Target: Logger
3232 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3233 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got commitment signed message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3235 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3236 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3238 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3239 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent commitment_signed after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3242 let funding_script = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
3244 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3246 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, false, logger);
3247 let commitment_txid = {
3248 let trusted_tx = commitment_stats.tx.trust();
3249 let bitcoin_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
3250 let sighash = bitcoin_tx.get_sighash_all(&funding_script, self.channel_value_satoshis);
3252 log_trace!(logger, "Checking commitment tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}",
3253 log_bytes!(msg.signature.serialize_compact()[..]),
3254 log_bytes!(self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize()), encode::serialize_hex(&bitcoin_tx.transaction),
3255 log_bytes!(sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&funding_script), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3256 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()) {
3257 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid commitment tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3261 let mut htlcs_cloned: Vec<_> = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter().map(|htlc| (htlc.0.clone(), htlc.1.map(|h| h.clone()))).collect();
3263 // If our counterparty updated the channel fee in this commitment transaction, check that
3264 // they can actually afford the new fee now.
3265 let update_fee = if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3266 update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced
3269 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3270 let counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
3271 if commitment_stats.remote_balance_msat < commitment_stats.total_fee_sat * 1000 + counterparty_reserve_we_require_msat {
3272 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Funding remote cannot afford proposed new fee".to_owned()));
3275 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3277 if self.is_outbound() {
3278 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
3279 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3280 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
3281 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len()
3282 + self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len();
3283 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
3284 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
3285 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
3286 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
3287 assert_eq!(commitment_stats.total_fee_sat, info.fee / 1000);
3293 if msg.htlc_signatures.len() != commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs {
3294 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Got wrong number of HTLC signatures ({}) from remote. It must be {}", msg.htlc_signatures.len(), commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs)));
3297 // Up to LDK 0.0.115, HTLC information was required to be duplicated in the
3298 // `htlcs_and_sigs` vec and in the `holder_commitment_tx` itself, both of which were passed
3299 // in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate`. In 0.0.115, support for having a separate set of
3300 // outbound-non-dust-HTLCSources in the `ChannelMonitorUpdate` was added, however for
3301 // backwards compatibility, we never use it in production. To provide test coverage, here,
3302 // we randomly decide (in test/fuzzing builds) to use the new vec sometimes.
3303 #[allow(unused_assignments, unused_mut)]
3304 let mut separate_nondust_htlc_sources = false;
3305 #[cfg(all(feature = "std", any(test, fuzzing)))] {
3306 use core::hash::{BuildHasher, Hasher};
3307 // Get a random value using the only std API to do so - the DefaultHasher
3308 let rand_val = std::collections::hash_map::RandomState::new().build_hasher().finish();
3309 separate_nondust_htlc_sources = rand_val % 2 == 0;
3312 let mut nondust_htlc_sources = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3313 let mut htlcs_and_sigs = Vec::with_capacity(htlcs_cloned.len());
3314 for (idx, (htlc, mut source_opt)) in htlcs_cloned.drain(..).enumerate() {
3315 if let Some(_) = htlc.transaction_output_index {
3316 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw,
3317 self.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(), &htlc, self.opt_anchors(),
3318 false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
3320 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &keys);
3321 let htlc_sighashtype = if self.opt_anchors() { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
3322 let htlc_sighash = hash_to_message!(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]);
3323 log_trace!(logger, "Checking HTLC tx signature {} by key {} against tx {} (sighash {}) with redeemscript {} in channel {}.",
3324 log_bytes!(msg.htlc_signatures[idx].serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(keys.countersignatory_htlc_key.serialize()),
3325 encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_tx), log_bytes!(htlc_sighash[..]), encode::serialize_hex(&htlc_redeemscript), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3326 if let Err(_) = self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &msg.htlc_signatures[idx], &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key) {
3327 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Invalid HTLC tx signature from peer".to_owned()));
3329 if !separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3330 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, Some(msg.htlc_signatures[idx]), source_opt.take()));
3333 htlcs_and_sigs.push((htlc, None, source_opt.take()));
3335 if separate_nondust_htlc_sources {
3336 if let Some(source) = source_opt.take() {
3337 nondust_htlc_sources.push(source);
3340 debug_assert!(source_opt.is_none(), "HTLCSource should have been put somewhere");
3343 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
3344 commitment_stats.tx,
3346 msg.htlc_signatures.clone(),
3347 &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
3348 self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
3351 self.holder_signer.validate_holder_commitment(&holder_commitment_tx, commitment_stats.preimages)
3352 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate our commitment".to_owned()))?;
3354 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3355 let mut need_commitment = false;
3356 if let &mut Some((_, ref mut update_state)) = &mut self.pending_update_fee {
3357 if *update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3358 *update_state = FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce;
3359 need_commitment = true;
3363 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3364 let new_forward = if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
3365 Some(forward_info.clone())
3367 if let Some(forward_info) = new_forward {
3368 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3369 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3370 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info);
3371 need_commitment = true;
3374 let mut claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3375 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3376 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3377 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC {} to AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove due to commitment_signed in channel {}.",
3378 log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0), log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3379 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3380 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3381 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3382 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(Some(preimage)) = reason {
3383 // If a user (a) receives an HTLC claim using LDK 0.0.104 or before, then (b)
3384 // upgrades to LDK 0.0.114 or later before the HTLC is fully resolved, we could
3385 // have a `Success(None)` reason. In this case we could forget some HTLC
3386 // claims, but such an upgrade is unlikely and including claimed HTLCs here
3387 // fixes a bug which the user was exposed to on 0.0.104 when they started the
3389 claimed_htlcs.push((SentHTLCId::from_source(&htlc.source), preimage));
3391 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(reason);
3392 need_commitment = true;
3396 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3397 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3398 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3399 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestHolderCommitmentTXInfo {
3400 commitment_tx: holder_commitment_tx,
3401 htlc_outputs: htlcs_and_sigs,
3403 nondust_htlc_sources,
3407 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3408 // Note that if we need_commitment & !AwaitingRemoteRevoke we'll call
3409 // build_commitment_no_status_check() next which will reset this to RAAFirst.
3410 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst;
3412 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
3413 // In case we initially failed monitor updating without requiring a response, we need
3414 // to make sure the RAA gets sent first.
3415 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
3416 if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3417 // If we were going to send a commitment_signed after the RAA, go ahead and do all
3418 // the corresponding HTLC status updates so that get_last_commitment_update
3419 // includes the right HTLCs.
3420 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3421 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3422 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3423 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3424 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3425 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3427 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updated HTLC state but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.",
3428 log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
3429 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3432 let need_commitment_signed = if need_commitment && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32)) == 0 {
3433 // If we're AwaitingRemoteRevoke we can't send a new commitment here, but that's ok -
3434 // we'll send one right away when we get the revoke_and_ack when we
3435 // free_holding_cell_htlcs().
3436 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3437 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3438 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3439 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3440 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3444 log_debug!(logger, "Received valid commitment_signed from peer in channel {}, updating HTLC state and responding with{} a revoke_and_ack.",
3445 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if need_commitment_signed { " our own commitment_signed and" } else { "" });
3446 self.monitor_updating_paused(true, need_commitment_signed, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3447 return Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update));
3450 /// Public version of the below, checking relevant preconditions first.
3451 /// If we're not in a state where freeing the holding cell makes sense, this is a no-op and
3452 /// returns `(None, Vec::new())`.
3453 pub fn maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3454 if self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 &&
3455 (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) == 0 {
3456 self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger)
3457 } else { (None, Vec::new()) }
3460 /// Frees any pending commitment updates in the holding cell, generating the relevant messages
3461 /// for our counterparty.
3462 fn free_holding_cell_htlcs<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> (Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>) where L::Target: Logger {
3463 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, 0);
3464 if self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() != 0 || self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() {
3465 log_trace!(logger, "Freeing holding cell with {} HTLC updates{} in channel {}", self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len(),
3466 if self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_some() { " and a fee update" } else { "" }, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3468 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3469 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id + 1, // We don't increment this yet!
3470 updates: Vec::new(),
3473 let mut htlc_updates = Vec::new();
3474 mem::swap(&mut htlc_updates, &mut self.holding_cell_htlc_updates);
3475 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3476 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3477 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_updates.len());
3478 let mut htlcs_to_fail = Vec::new();
3479 for htlc_update in htlc_updates.drain(..) {
3480 // Note that this *can* fail, though it should be due to rather-rare conditions on
3481 // fee races with adding too many outputs which push our total payments just over
3482 // the limit. In case it's less rare than I anticipate, we may want to revisit
3483 // handling this case better and maybe fulfilling some of the HTLCs while attempting
3484 // to rebalance channels.
3485 match &htlc_update {
3486 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {amount_msat, cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet, ..} => {
3487 match self.send_htlc(amount_msat, *payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source.clone(), onion_routing_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3488 Ok(update_add_msg_option) => update_add_htlcs.push(update_add_msg_option.unwrap()),
3491 ChannelError::Ignore(ref msg) => {
3492 log_info!(logger, "Failed to send HTLC with payment_hash {} due to {} in channel {}",
3493 log_bytes!(payment_hash.0), msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3494 // If we fail to send here, then this HTLC should
3495 // be failed backwards. Failing to send here
3496 // indicates that this HTLC may keep being put back
3497 // into the holding cell without ever being
3498 // successfully forwarded/failed/fulfilled, causing
3499 // our counterparty to eventually close on us.
3500 htlcs_to_fail.push((source.clone(), *payment_hash));
3503 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to send holding cell HTLC");
3509 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, htlc_id, .. } => {
3510 // If an HTLC claim was previously added to the holding cell (via
3511 // `get_update_fulfill_htlc`, then generating the claim message itself must
3512 // not fail - any in between attempts to claim the HTLC will have resulted
3513 // in it hitting the holding cell again and we cannot change the state of a
3514 // holding cell HTLC from fulfill to anything else.
3515 let (update_fulfill_msg_option, mut additional_monitor_update) =
3516 if let UpdateFulfillFetch::NewClaim { msg, monitor_update, .. } = self.get_update_fulfill_htlc(htlc_id, *payment_preimage, logger) {
3517 (msg, monitor_update)
3518 } else { unreachable!() };
3519 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(update_fulfill_msg_option.unwrap());
3520 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_monitor_update.updates);
3522 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
3523 match self.fail_htlc(htlc_id, err_packet.clone(), false, logger) {
3524 Ok(update_fail_msg_option) => {
3525 // If an HTLC failure was previously added to the holding cell (via
3526 // `queue_fail_htlc`) then generating the fail message itself must
3527 // not fail - we should never end up in a state where we double-fail
3528 // an HTLC or fail-then-claim an HTLC as it indicates we didn't wait
3529 // for a full revocation before failing.
3530 update_fail_htlcs.push(update_fail_msg_option.unwrap())
3533 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {}
3535 panic!("Got a non-IgnoreError action trying to fail holding cell HTLC");
3542 if update_add_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fulfill_htlcs.is_empty() && update_fail_htlcs.is_empty() && self.holding_cell_update_fee.is_none() {
3543 return (None, htlcs_to_fail);
3545 let update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = self.holding_cell_update_fee.take() {
3546 self.send_update_fee(feerate, false, logger)
3551 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3552 // build_commitment_no_status_check and get_update_fulfill_htlc may bump latest_monitor_id
3553 // but we want them to be strictly increasing by one, so reset it here.
3554 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3555 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3557 log_debug!(logger, "Freeing holding cell in channel {} resulted in {}{} HTLCs added, {} HTLCs fulfilled, and {} HTLCs failed.",
3558 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { "a fee update, " } else { "" },
3559 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len());
3561 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
3562 (self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update), htlcs_to_fail)
3568 /// Handles receiving a remote's revoke_and_ack. Note that we may return a new
3569 /// commitment_signed message here in case we had pending outbound HTLCs to add which were
3570 /// waiting on this revoke_and_ack. The generation of this new commitment_signed may also fail,
3571 /// generating an appropriate error *after* the channel state has been updated based on the
3572 /// revoke_and_ack message.
3573 pub fn revoke_and_ack<L: Deref>(&mut self, msg: &msgs::RevokeAndACK, logger: &L) -> Result<(Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>), ChannelError>
3574 where L::Target: Logger,
3576 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
3577 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got revoke/ACK message when channel was not in an operational state".to_owned()));
3579 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
3580 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
3582 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() {
3583 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent revoke_and_ack after we'd started exchanging closing_signeds".to_owned()));
3586 let secret = secp_check!(SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.per_commitment_secret), "Peer provided an invalid per_commitment_secret".to_owned());
3588 if let Some(counterparty_prev_commitment_point) = self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3589 if PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &secret) != counterparty_prev_commitment_point {
3590 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got a revoke commitment secret which didn't correspond to their current pubkey".to_owned()));
3594 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 == 0 {
3595 // Our counterparty seems to have burned their coins to us (by revoking a state when we
3596 // haven't given them a new commitment transaction to broadcast). We should probably
3597 // take advantage of this by updating our channel monitor, sending them an error, and
3598 // waiting for them to broadcast their latest (now-revoked claim). But, that would be a
3599 // lot of work, and there's some chance this is all a misunderstanding anyway.
3600 // We have to do *something*, though, since our signer may get mad at us for otherwise
3601 // jumping a remote commitment number, so best to just force-close and move on.
3602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Received an unexpected revoke_and_ack".to_owned()));
3605 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
3607 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3608 *self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
3611 self.holder_signer.validate_counterparty_revocation(
3612 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3614 ).map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to validate revocation from peer".to_owned()))?;
3616 self.commitment_secrets.provide_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1, msg.per_commitment_secret)
3617 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Previous secrets did not match new one".to_owned()))?;
3618 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
3619 let mut monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
3620 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
3621 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::CommitmentSecret {
3622 idx: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1,
3623 secret: msg.per_commitment_secret,
3627 // Update state now that we've passed all the can-fail calls...
3628 // (note that we may still fail to generate the new commitment_signed message, but that's
3629 // OK, we step the channel here and *then* if the new generation fails we can fail the
3630 // channel based on that, but stepping stuff here should be safe either way.
3631 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32);
3632 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point = self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point;
3633 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Some(msg.next_per_commitment_point);
3634 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number -= 1;
3636 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3637 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived;
3640 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLCs on receipt of RAA in channel {}...", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3641 let mut to_forward_infos = Vec::new();
3642 let mut revoked_htlcs = Vec::new();
3643 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3644 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
3645 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
3646 let mut require_commitment = false;
3647 let mut value_to_self_msat_diff: i64 = 0;
3650 // Take references explicitly so that we can hold multiple references to self.
3651 let pending_inbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_inbound_htlcs;
3652 let pending_outbound_htlcs: &mut Vec<_> = &mut self.pending_outbound_htlcs;
3654 // We really shouldnt have two passes here, but retain gives a non-mutable ref (Rust bug)
3655 pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3656 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
3657 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing inbound LocalRemoved {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3658 if let &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(_) = reason {
3659 value_to_self_msat_diff += htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3664 pending_outbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3665 if let &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) = &htlc.state {
3666 log_trace!(logger, " ...removing outbound AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke {}", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3667 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Failure(reason) = outcome.clone() { // We really want take() here, but, again, non-mut ref :(
3668 revoked_htlcs.push((htlc.source.clone(), htlc.payment_hash, reason));
3670 finalized_claimed_htlcs.push(htlc.source.clone());
3671 // They fulfilled, so we sent them money
3672 value_to_self_msat_diff -= htlc.amount_msat as i64;
3677 for htlc in pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3678 let swap = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_) = &htlc.state {
3680 } else if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) = &htlc.state {
3684 let mut state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3685 mem::swap(&mut state, &mut htlc.state);
3687 if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(forward_info) = state {
3688 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3689 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info);
3690 require_commitment = true;
3691 } else if let InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info) = state {
3692 match forward_info {
3693 PendingHTLCStatus::Fail(fail_msg) => {
3694 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to LocalRemoved due to PendingHTLCStatus indicating failure", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3695 require_commitment = true;
3697 HTLCFailureMsg::Relay(msg) => {
3698 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(msg.reason.clone()));
3699 update_fail_htlcs.push(msg)
3701 HTLCFailureMsg::Malformed(msg) => {
3702 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((msg.sha256_of_onion, msg.failure_code)));
3703 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msg)
3707 PendingHTLCStatus::Forward(forward_info) => {
3708 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3709 to_forward_infos.push((forward_info, htlc.htlc_id));
3710 htlc.state = InboundHTLCState::Committed;
3716 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3717 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
3718 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound LocalAnnounced {} to Committed", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3719 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3721 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
3722 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
3723 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
3724 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
3725 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
3726 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
3727 require_commitment = true;
3731 self.value_to_self_msat = (self.value_to_self_msat as i64 + value_to_self_msat_diff) as u64;
3733 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3734 match update_state {
3735 FeeUpdateState::Outbound => {
3736 debug_assert!(self.is_outbound());
3737 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3738 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3739 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3741 FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced => { debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound()); },
3742 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce => {
3743 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3744 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
3745 require_commitment = true;
3746 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
3747 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3752 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 {
3753 // We can't actually generate a new commitment transaction (incl by freeing holding
3754 // cells) while we can't update the monitor, so we just return what we have.
3755 if require_commitment {
3756 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
3757 // When the monitor updating is restored we'll call get_last_commitment_update(),
3758 // which does not update state, but we're definitely now awaiting a remote revoke
3759 // before we can step forward any more, so set it here.
3760 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3761 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3762 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3763 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3764 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3766 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut to_forward_infos);
3767 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut revoked_htlcs);
3768 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3769 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} but awaiting a monitor update resolution to reply.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3770 return Ok((Vec::new(), self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)));
3773 match self.free_holding_cell_htlcs(logger) {
3774 (Some(_), htlcs_to_fail) => {
3775 let mut additional_update = self.pending_monitor_updates.pop().unwrap().update;
3776 // free_holding_cell_htlcs may bump latest_monitor_id multiple times but we want them to be
3777 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3778 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3779 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3781 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3782 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3784 (None, htlcs_to_fail) => {
3785 if require_commitment {
3786 let mut additional_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
3788 // build_commitment_no_status_check may bump latest_monitor_id but we want them to be
3789 // strictly increasing by one, so decrement it here.
3790 self.latest_monitor_update_id = monitor_update.update_id;
3791 monitor_update.updates.append(&mut additional_update.updates);
3793 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {}. Responding with a commitment update with {} HTLCs failed.",
3794 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), update_fail_htlcs.len() + update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
3795 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3796 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3798 log_debug!(logger, "Received a valid revoke_and_ack for channel {} with no reply necessary.", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3799 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, to_forward_infos, revoked_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3800 Ok((htlcs_to_fail, self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update)))
3806 /// Queues up an outbound update fee by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
3807 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
3808 /// commitment update.
3809 pub fn queue_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3810 let msg_opt = self.send_update_fee(feerate_per_kw, true, logger);
3811 assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?");
3814 /// Adds a pending update to this channel. See the doc for send_htlc for
3815 /// further details on the optionness of the return value.
3816 /// If our balance is too low to cover the cost of the next commitment transaction at the
3817 /// new feerate, the update is cancelled.
3819 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to any other calls on this
3820 /// [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
3821 fn send_update_fee<L: Deref>(&mut self, feerate_per_kw: u32, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L) -> Option<msgs::UpdateFee> where L::Target: Logger {
3822 if !self.is_outbound() {
3823 panic!("Cannot send fee from inbound channel");
3825 if !self.is_usable() {
3826 panic!("Cannot update fee until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down");
3828 if !self.is_live() {
3829 panic!("Cannot update fee while peer is disconnected/we're awaiting a monitor update (ChannelManager should have caught this)");
3832 // Before proposing a feerate update, check that we can actually afford the new fee.
3833 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3834 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(Some(feerate_per_kw));
3835 let keys = self.build_holder_transaction_keys(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number);
3836 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &keys, true, true, logger);
3837 let buffer_fee_msat = Channel::<Signer>::commit_tx_fee_sat(feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_holding_cell_htlcs_count as usize + CONCURRENT_INBOUND_HTLC_FEE_BUFFER as usize, self.opt_anchors()) * 1000;
3838 let holder_balance_msat = commitment_stats.local_balance_msat - outbound_stats.holding_cell_msat;
3839 if holder_balance_msat < buffer_fee_msat + self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000 {
3840 //TODO: auto-close after a number of failures?
3841 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {}", feerate_per_kw);
3845 // Note, we evaluate pending htlc "preemptive" trimmed-to-dust threshold at the proposed `feerate_per_kw`.
3846 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3847 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
3848 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3849 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3852 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
3853 log_debug!(logger, "Cannot afford to send new feerate at {} without infringing max dust htlc exposure", feerate_per_kw);
3857 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0 {
3858 force_holding_cell = true;
3861 if force_holding_cell {
3862 self.holding_cell_update_fee = Some(feerate_per_kw);
3866 debug_assert!(self.pending_update_fee.is_none());
3867 self.pending_update_fee = Some((feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::Outbound));
3869 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
3870 channel_id: self.channel_id,
3875 /// Removes any uncommitted inbound HTLCs and resets the state of uncommitted outbound HTLC
3876 /// updates, to be used on peer disconnection. After this, update_*_htlc messages need to be
3878 /// No further message handling calls may be made until a channel_reestablish dance has
3880 pub fn remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) where L::Target: Logger {
3881 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
3882 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
3883 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
3887 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) {
3888 // While the below code should be idempotent, it's simpler to just return early, as
3889 // redundant disconnect events can fire, though they should be rare.
3893 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent || self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::Committed {
3894 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent;
3897 // Upon reconnect we have to start the closing_signed dance over, but shutdown messages
3898 // will be retransmitted.
3899 self.last_sent_closing_fee = None;
3900 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = None;
3901 self.closing_fee_limits = None;
3903 let mut inbound_drop_count = 0;
3904 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.retain(|htlc| {
3906 InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => {
3907 // They sent us an update_add_htlc but we never got the commitment_signed.
3908 // We'll tell them what commitment_signed we're expecting next and they'll drop
3909 // this HTLC accordingly
3910 inbound_drop_count += 1;
3913 InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(_)|InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(_) => {
3914 // We received a commitment_signed updating this HTLC and (at least hopefully)
3915 // sent a revoke_and_ack (which we can re-transmit) and have heard nothing
3916 // in response to it yet, so don't touch it.
3919 InboundHTLCState::Committed => true,
3920 InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(_) => {
3921 // We (hopefully) sent a commitment_signed updating this HTLC (which we can
3922 // re-transmit if needed) and they may have even sent a revoke_and_ack back
3923 // (that we missed). Keep this around for now and if they tell us they missed
3924 // the commitment_signed we can re-transmit the update then.
3929 self.next_counterparty_htlc_id -= inbound_drop_count;
3931 if let Some((_, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
3932 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced {
3933 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
3934 self.pending_update_fee = None;
3938 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
3939 if let OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) = htlc.state {
3940 // They sent us an update to remove this but haven't yet sent the corresponding
3941 // commitment_signed, we need to move it back to Committed and they can re-send
3942 // the update upon reconnection.
3943 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::Committed;
3947 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32;
3948 log_trace!(logger, "Peer disconnection resulted in {} remote-announced HTLC drops on channel {}", inbound_drop_count, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
3951 /// Indicates that a ChannelMonitor update is in progress and has not yet been fully persisted.
3952 /// This must be called before we return the [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] back to the
3953 /// [`ChannelManager`], which will call [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] once the monitor
3954 /// update completes (potentially immediately).
3955 /// The messages which were generated with the monitor update must *not* have been sent to the
3956 /// remote end, and must instead have been dropped. They will be regenerated when
3957 /// [`Self::monitor_updating_restored`] is called.
3959 /// [`ChannelManager`]: super::channelmanager::ChannelManager
3960 /// [`chain::Watch`]: crate::chain::Watch
3961 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress`]: crate::chain::ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::InProgress
3962 fn monitor_updating_paused(&mut self, resend_raa: bool, resend_commitment: bool,
3963 resend_channel_ready: bool, mut pending_forwards: Vec<(PendingHTLCInfo, u64)>,
3964 mut pending_fails: Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, HTLCFailReason)>,
3965 mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs: Vec<HTLCSource>
3967 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack |= resend_raa;
3968 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed |= resend_commitment;
3969 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready |= resend_channel_ready;
3970 self.monitor_pending_forwards.append(&mut pending_forwards);
3971 self.monitor_pending_failures.append(&mut pending_fails);
3972 self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.append(&mut pending_finalized_claimed_htlcs);
3973 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32;
3976 /// Indicates that the latest ChannelMonitor update has been committed by the client
3977 /// successfully and we should restore normal operation. Returns messages which should be sent
3978 /// to the remote side.
3979 pub fn monitor_updating_restored<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
3980 &mut self, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
3981 user_config: &UserConfig, best_block_height: u32
3982 ) -> MonitorRestoreUpdates
3985 NS::Target: NodeSigner
3987 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32, ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3988 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32);
3989 let mut found_blocked = false;
3990 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| {
3991 if found_blocked { debug_assert!(upd.blocked, "No mons may be unblocked after a blocked one"); }
3992 if upd.blocked { found_blocked = true; }
3996 // If we're past (or at) the FundingSent stage on an outbound channel, try to
3997 // (re-)broadcast the funding transaction as we may have declined to broadcast it when we
3998 // first received the funding_signed.
3999 let mut funding_broadcastable =
4000 if self.is_outbound() && self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4001 self.funding_transaction.take()
4003 // That said, if the funding transaction is already confirmed (ie we're active with a
4004 // minimum_depth over 0) don't bother re-broadcasting the confirmed funding tx.
4005 if self.channel_state & !MULTI_STATE_FLAGS >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
4006 funding_broadcastable = None;
4009 // We will never broadcast the funding transaction when we're in MonitorUpdateInProgress
4010 // (and we assume the user never directly broadcasts the funding transaction and waits for
4011 // us to do it). Thus, we can only ever hit monitor_pending_channel_ready when we're
4012 // * an inbound channel that failed to persist the monitor on funding_created and we got
4013 // the funding transaction confirmed before the monitor was persisted, or
4014 // * a 0-conf channel and intended to send the channel_ready before any broadcast at all.
4015 let channel_ready = if self.monitor_pending_channel_ready {
4016 assert!(!self.is_outbound() || self.minimum_depth == Some(0),
4017 "Funding transaction broadcast by the local client before it should have - LDK didn't do it!");
4018 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = false;
4019 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4020 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4021 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4022 next_per_commitment_point,
4023 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4027 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block_height, logger);
4029 let mut accepted_htlcs = Vec::new();
4030 mem::swap(&mut accepted_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_forwards);
4031 let mut failed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4032 mem::swap(&mut failed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_failures);
4033 let mut finalized_claimed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4034 mem::swap(&mut finalized_claimed_htlcs, &mut self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills);
4036 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) != 0 {
4037 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4038 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4039 return MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4040 raa: None, commitment_update: None, order: RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
4041 accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4045 let raa = if self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack {
4046 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4048 let commitment_update = if self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed {
4049 Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger))
4052 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = false;
4053 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = false;
4054 let order = self.resend_order.clone();
4055 log_debug!(logger, "Restored monitor updating in channel {} resulting in {}{} commitment update and {} RAA, with {} first",
4056 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if funding_broadcastable.is_some() { "a funding broadcastable, " } else { "" },
4057 if commitment_update.is_some() { "a" } else { "no" }, if raa.is_some() { "an" } else { "no" },
4058 match order { RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => "commitment", RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => "RAA"});
4059 MonitorRestoreUpdates {
4060 raa, commitment_update, order, accepted_htlcs, failed_htlcs, finalized_claimed_htlcs, funding_broadcastable, channel_ready, announcement_sigs
4064 pub fn update_fee<F: Deref, L: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::UpdateFee, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ChannelError>
4065 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4067 if self.is_outbound() {
4068 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Non-funding remote tried to update channel fee".to_owned()));
4070 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4071 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent update_fee when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4073 Channel::<Signer>::check_remote_fee(fee_estimator, msg.feerate_per_kw, Some(self.feerate_per_kw), logger)?;
4074 let feerate_over_dust_buffer = msg.feerate_per_kw > self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None);
4076 self.pending_update_fee = Some((msg.feerate_per_kw, FeeUpdateState::RemoteAnnounced));
4077 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4078 // If the feerate has increased over the previous dust buffer (note that
4079 // `get_dust_buffer_feerate` considers the `pending_update_fee` status), check that we
4080 // won't be pushed over our dust exposure limit by the feerate increase.
4081 if feerate_over_dust_buffer {
4082 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4083 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
4084 let holder_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4085 let counterparty_tx_dust_exposure = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat;
4086 if holder_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4087 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our own transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4088 msg.feerate_per_kw, holder_tx_dust_exposure)));
4090 if counterparty_tx_dust_exposure > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
4091 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent update_fee with a feerate ({}) which may over-expose us to dust-in-flight on our counterparty's transactions (totaling {} msat)",
4092 msg.feerate_per_kw, counterparty_tx_dust_exposure)));
4098 fn get_last_revoke_and_ack(&self) -> msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4099 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4100 let per_commitment_secret = self.holder_signer.release_commitment_secret(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 2);
4101 msgs::RevokeAndACK {
4102 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4103 per_commitment_secret,
4104 next_per_commitment_point,
4106 next_local_nonce: None,
4110 fn get_last_commitment_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::CommitmentUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
4111 let mut update_add_htlcs = Vec::new();
4112 let mut update_fulfill_htlcs = Vec::new();
4113 let mut update_fail_htlcs = Vec::new();
4114 let mut update_fail_malformed_htlcs = Vec::new();
4116 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
4117 if let &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) = &htlc.state {
4118 update_add_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
4119 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4120 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4121 amount_msat: htlc.amount_msat,
4122 payment_hash: htlc.payment_hash,
4123 cltv_expiry: htlc.cltv_expiry,
4124 onion_routing_packet: (**onion_packet).clone(),
4129 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4130 if let &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref reason) = &htlc.state {
4132 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailRelay(ref err_packet) => {
4133 update_fail_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailHTLC {
4134 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4135 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4136 reason: err_packet.clone()
4139 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::FailMalformed((ref sha256_of_onion, ref failure_code)) => {
4140 update_fail_malformed_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFailMalformedHTLC {
4141 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4142 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4143 sha256_of_onion: sha256_of_onion.clone(),
4144 failure_code: failure_code.clone(),
4147 &InboundHTLCRemovalReason::Fulfill(ref payment_preimage) => {
4148 update_fulfill_htlcs.push(msgs::UpdateFulfillHTLC {
4149 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4150 htlc_id: htlc.htlc_id,
4151 payment_preimage: payment_preimage.clone(),
4158 let update_fee = if self.is_outbound() && self.pending_update_fee.is_some() {
4159 Some(msgs::UpdateFee {
4160 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4161 feerate_per_kw: self.pending_update_fee.unwrap().0,
4165 log_trace!(logger, "Regenerated latest commitment update in channel {} with{} {} update_adds, {} update_fulfills, {} update_fails, and {} update_fail_malformeds",
4166 log_bytes!(self.channel_id()), if update_fee.is_some() { " update_fee," } else { "" },
4167 update_add_htlcs.len(), update_fulfill_htlcs.len(), update_fail_htlcs.len(), update_fail_malformed_htlcs.len());
4168 msgs::CommitmentUpdate {
4169 update_add_htlcs, update_fulfill_htlcs, update_fail_htlcs, update_fail_malformed_htlcs, update_fee,
4170 commitment_signed: self.send_commitment_no_state_update(logger).expect("It looks like we failed to re-generate a commitment_signed we had previously sent?").0,
4174 /// May panic if some calls other than message-handling calls (which will all Err immediately)
4175 /// have been called between remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused and this call.
4177 /// Some links printed in log lines are included here to check them during build (when run with
4178 /// `cargo doc --document-private-items`):
4179 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn`] and
4180 /// [`super::channelmanager::ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn`].
4181 pub fn channel_reestablish<L: Deref, NS: Deref>(
4182 &mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelReestablish, logger: &L, node_signer: &NS,
4183 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig, best_block: &BestBlock
4184 ) -> Result<ReestablishResponses, ChannelError>
4187 NS::Target: NodeSigner
4189 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
4190 // While BOLT 2 doesn't indicate explicitly we should error this channel here, it
4191 // almost certainly indicates we are going to end up out-of-sync in some way, so we
4192 // just close here instead of trying to recover.
4193 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a loose channel_reestablish not after reconnect".to_owned()));
4196 if msg.next_local_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER || msg.next_remote_commitment_number >= INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
4197 msg.next_local_commitment_number == 0 {
4198 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish (usually an lnd node with lost state asking us to force-close for them)".to_owned()));
4201 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > 0 {
4202 let expected_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1, &self.secp_ctx);
4203 let given_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret)
4204 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with unparseable secret key".to_owned()))?;
4205 if expected_point != PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &given_secret) {
4206 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent a garbage channel_reestablish with secret key not matching the commitment height provided".to_owned()));
4208 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number > INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4209 macro_rules! log_and_panic {
4210 ($err_msg: expr) => {
4211 log_error!(logger, $err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4212 panic!($err_msg, log_bytes!(self.channel_id), log_pubkey!(self.counterparty_node_id));
4215 log_and_panic!("We have fallen behind - we have received proof that if we broadcast our counterparty is going to claim all our funds.\n\
4216 This implies you have restarted with lost ChannelMonitor and ChannelManager state, the first of which is a violation of the LDK chain::Watch requirements.\n\
4217 More specifically, this means you have a bug in your implementation that can cause loss of funds, or you are running with an old backup, which is unsafe.\n\
4218 If you have restored from an old backup and wish to force-close channels and return to operation, you should start up, call\n\
4219 ChannelManager::force_close_without_broadcasting_txn on channel {} with counterparty {} or\n\
4220 ChannelManager::force_close_all_channels_without_broadcasting_txn, then reconnect to peer(s).\n\
4221 Note that due to a long-standing bug in lnd you may have to reach out to peers running lnd-based nodes to ask them to manually force-close channels\n\
4222 See https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning/issues/1565 for more info.");
4226 // Before we change the state of the channel, we check if the peer is sending a very old
4227 // commitment transaction number, if yes we send a warning message.
4228 let our_commitment_transaction = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number - 1;
4229 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 < our_commitment_transaction {
4231 ChannelError::Warn(format!("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction: {} (received) vs {} (expected)", msg.next_remote_commitment_number, our_commitment_transaction))
4235 // Go ahead and unmark PeerDisconnected as various calls we may make check for it (and all
4236 // remaining cases either succeed or ErrorMessage-fail).
4237 self.channel_state &= !(ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
4239 let shutdown_msg = if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0 {
4240 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4241 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4242 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4243 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4247 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, best_block.height(), logger);
4249 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32) == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4250 // If we're waiting on a monitor update, we shouldn't re-send any channel_ready's.
4251 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == 0 ||
4252 self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4253 if msg.next_remote_commitment_number != 0 {
4254 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer claimed they saw a revoke_and_ack but we haven't sent channel_ready yet".to_owned()));
4256 // Short circuit the whole handler as there is nothing we can resend them
4257 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4258 channel_ready: None,
4259 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4260 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4261 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4265 // We have OurChannelReady set!
4266 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4267 return Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4268 channel_ready: Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4269 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4270 next_per_commitment_point,
4271 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4273 raa: None, commitment_update: None,
4274 order: RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
4275 shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4279 let required_revoke = if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4280 // Remote isn't waiting on any RevokeAndACK from us!
4281 // Note that if we need to repeat our ChannelReady we'll do that in the next if block.
4283 } else if msg.next_remote_commitment_number + 1 == (INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1) - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number {
4284 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4285 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = true;
4288 Some(self.get_last_revoke_and_ack())
4291 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old local commitment transaction".to_owned()));
4294 // We increment cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number only upon receipt of
4295 // revoke_and_ack, not on sending commitment_signed, so we add one if have
4296 // AwaitingRemoteRevoke set, which indicates we sent a commitment_signed but haven't gotten
4297 // the corresponding revoke_and_ack back yet.
4298 let next_counterparty_commitment_number = INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 };
4300 let channel_ready = if msg.next_local_commitment_number == 1 && INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == 1 {
4301 // We should never have to worry about MonitorUpdateInProgress resending ChannelReady
4302 let next_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
4303 Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
4304 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
4305 next_per_commitment_point,
4306 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
4310 if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number {
4311 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4312 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost outbound RAA", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4314 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with no loss", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4317 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4318 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4319 raa: required_revoke,
4320 commitment_update: None,
4321 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4323 } else if msg.next_local_commitment_number == next_counterparty_commitment_number - 1 {
4324 if required_revoke.is_some() {
4325 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with lost outbound RAA and lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4327 log_debug!(logger, "Reconnected channel {} with only lost remote commitment tx", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
4330 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
4331 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed = true;
4332 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4333 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4334 commitment_update: None, raa: None,
4335 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4338 Ok(ReestablishResponses {
4339 channel_ready, shutdown_msg, announcement_sigs,
4340 raa: required_revoke,
4341 commitment_update: Some(self.get_last_commitment_update(logger)),
4342 order: self.resend_order.clone(),
4346 Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer attempted to reestablish channel with a very old remote commitment transaction".to_owned()))
4350 /// Calculates and returns our minimum and maximum closing transaction fee amounts, in whole
4351 /// satoshis. The amounts remain consistent unless a peer disconnects/reconnects or we restart,
4352 /// at which point they will be recalculated.
4353 fn calculate_closing_fee_limits<F: Deref>(&mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>)
4355 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4357 if let Some((min, max)) = self.closing_fee_limits { return (min, max); }
4359 // Propose a range from our current Background feerate to our Normal feerate plus our
4360 // force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis.
4361 // If we fail to come to consensus, we'll have to force-close.
4362 let mut proposed_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Background);
4363 let normal_feerate = fee_estimator.bounded_sat_per_1000_weight(ConfirmationTarget::Normal);
4364 let mut proposed_max_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { normal_feerate } else { u32::max_value() };
4366 // The spec requires that (when the channel does not have anchors) we only send absolute
4367 // channel fees no greater than the absolute channel fee on the current commitment
4368 // transaction. It's unclear *which* commitment transaction this refers to, and there isn't
4369 // very good reason to apply such a limit in any case. We don't bother doing so, risking
4370 // some force-closure by old nodes, but we wanted to close the channel anyway.
4372 if let Some(target_feerate) = self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw {
4373 let min_feerate = if self.is_outbound() { target_feerate } else { cmp::min(self.feerate_per_kw, target_feerate) };
4374 proposed_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_feerate, min_feerate);
4375 proposed_max_feerate = cmp::max(proposed_max_feerate, min_feerate);
4378 // Note that technically we could end up with a lower minimum fee if one sides' balance is
4379 // below our dust limit, causing the output to disappear. We don't bother handling this
4380 // case, however, as this should only happen if a channel is closed before any (material)
4381 // payments have been made on it. This may cause slight fee overpayment and/or failure to
4382 // come to consensus with our counterparty on appropriate fees, however it should be a
4383 // relatively rare case. We can revisit this later, though note that in order to determine
4384 // if the funders' output is dust we have to know the absolute fee we're going to use.
4385 let tx_weight = self.get_closing_transaction_weight(Some(&self.get_closing_scriptpubkey()), Some(self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().unwrap()));
4386 let proposed_total_fee_satoshis = proposed_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000;
4387 let proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis = if self.is_outbound() {
4388 // We always add force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis to our normal
4389 // feerate-calculated fee, but allow the max to be overridden if we're using a
4390 // target feerate-calculated fee.
4391 cmp::max(normal_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000 + self.config.options.force_close_avoidance_max_fee_satoshis,
4392 proposed_max_feerate as u64 * tx_weight / 1000)
4394 self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000
4397 self.closing_fee_limits = Some((proposed_total_fee_satoshis, proposed_max_total_fee_satoshis));
4398 self.closing_fee_limits.clone().unwrap()
4401 /// Returns true if we're ready to commence the closing_signed negotiation phase. This is true
4402 /// after both sides have exchanged a `shutdown` message and all HTLCs have been drained. At
4403 /// this point if we're the funder we should send the initial closing_signed, and in any case
4404 /// shutdown should complete within a reasonable timeframe.
4405 fn closing_negotiation_ready(&self) -> bool {
4406 self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() && self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() &&
4407 self.channel_state &
4408 (BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK | ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 |
4409 ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
4410 == BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK &&
4411 self.pending_update_fee.is_none()
4414 /// Checks if the closing_signed negotiation is making appropriate progress, possibly returning
4415 /// an Err if no progress is being made and the channel should be force-closed instead.
4416 /// Should be called on a one-minute timer.
4417 pub fn timer_check_closing_negotiation_progress(&mut self) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
4418 if self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4419 if self.closing_signed_in_flight {
4420 return Err(ChannelError::Close("closing_signed negotiation failed to finish within two timer ticks".to_owned()));
4422 self.closing_signed_in_flight = true;
4428 pub fn maybe_propose_closing_signed<F: Deref, L: Deref>(
4429 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, logger: &L)
4430 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4431 where F::Target: FeeEstimator, L::Target: Logger
4433 if self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_some() || !self.closing_negotiation_ready() {
4434 return Ok((None, None));
4437 if !self.is_outbound() {
4438 if let Some(msg) = &self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed.take() {
4439 return self.closing_signed(fee_estimator, &msg);
4441 return Ok((None, None));
4444 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4446 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4447 let (closing_tx, total_fee_satoshis) = self.build_closing_transaction(our_min_fee, false);
4448 log_trace!(logger, "Proposing initial closing_signed for our counterparty with a fee range of {}-{} sat (with initial proposal {} sats)",
4449 our_min_fee, our_max_fee, total_fee_satoshis);
4451 let sig = self.holder_signer
4452 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4453 .map_err(|()| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signature for closing transaction.".to_owned()))?;
4455 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((total_fee_satoshis, sig.clone()));
4456 Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4457 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4458 fee_satoshis: total_fee_satoshis,
4460 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4461 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4462 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4467 pub fn shutdown<SP: Deref>(
4468 &mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures, msg: &msgs::Shutdown
4469 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::Shutdown>, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), ChannelError>
4470 where SP::Target: SignerProvider
4472 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4473 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4475 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
4476 // Spec says we should fail the connection, not the channel, but that's nonsense, there
4477 // are plenty of reasons you may want to fail a channel pre-funding, and spec says you
4478 // can do that via error message without getting a connection fail anyway...
4479 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent shutdown pre-funding generation".to_owned()));
4481 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
4482 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
4483 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Got shutdown with remote pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4486 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
4488 if !script::is_bolt2_compliant(&msg.scriptpubkey, their_features) {
4489 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got a nonstandard scriptpubkey ({}) from remote peer", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4492 if self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() {
4493 if Some(&msg.scriptpubkey) != self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref() {
4494 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Got shutdown request with a scriptpubkey ({}) which did not match their previous scriptpubkey.", msg.scriptpubkey.to_bytes().to_hex())));
4497 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(msg.scriptpubkey.clone());
4500 // If we have any LocalAnnounced updates we'll probably just get back an update_fail_htlc
4501 // immediately after the commitment dance, but we can send a Shutdown because we won't send
4502 // any further commitment updates after we set LocalShutdownSent.
4503 let send_shutdown = (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4505 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
4508 assert!(send_shutdown);
4509 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
4510 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
4511 Err(_) => return Err(ChannelError::Close("Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned())),
4513 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
4514 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Provided a scriptpubkey format not accepted by peer: {}", shutdown_scriptpubkey)));
4516 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
4521 // From here on out, we may not fail!
4523 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32;
4524 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4526 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
4527 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
4528 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
4529 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
4530 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
4531 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4534 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
4535 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
4536 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
4539 let shutdown = if send_shutdown {
4540 Some(msgs::Shutdown {
4541 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4542 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
4546 // We can't send our shutdown until we've committed all of our pending HTLCs, but the
4547 // remote side is unlikely to accept any new HTLCs, so we go ahead and "free" any holding
4548 // cell HTLCs and return them to fail the payment.
4549 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
4550 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
4551 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
4553 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
4554 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
4561 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
4562 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4564 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
4567 fn build_signed_closing_transaction(&self, closing_tx: &ClosingTransaction, counterparty_sig: &Signature, sig: &Signature) -> Transaction {
4568 let mut tx = closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().clone();
4570 tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
4572 let funding_key = self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize();
4573 let counterparty_funding_key = self.counterparty_funding_pubkey().serialize();
4574 let mut holder_sig = sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4575 holder_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4576 let mut cp_sig = counterparty_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
4577 cp_sig.push(EcdsaSighashType::All as u8);
4578 if funding_key[..] < counterparty_funding_key[..] {
4579 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4580 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4582 tx.input[0].witness.push(cp_sig);
4583 tx.input[0].witness.push(holder_sig);
4586 tx.input[0].witness.push(self.get_funding_redeemscript().into_bytes());
4590 pub fn closing_signed<F: Deref>(
4591 &mut self, fee_estimator: &LowerBoundedFeeEstimator<F>, msg: &msgs::ClosingSigned)
4592 -> Result<(Option<msgs::ClosingSigned>, Option<Transaction>), ChannelError>
4593 where F::Target: FeeEstimator
4595 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK {
4596 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed before both sides provided a shutdown".to_owned()));
4598 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 {
4599 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Peer sent closing_signed when we needed a channel_reestablish".to_owned()));
4601 if !self.pending_inbound_htlcs.is_empty() || !self.pending_outbound_htlcs.is_empty() {
4602 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote end sent us a closing_signed while there were still pending HTLCs".to_owned()));
4604 if msg.fee_satoshis > TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS { // this is required to stop potential overflow in build_closing_transaction
4605 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send us a closing tx with > 21 million BTC fee".to_owned()));
4608 if self.is_outbound() && self.last_sent_closing_fee.is_none() {
4609 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote tried to send a closing_signed when we were supposed to propose the first one".to_owned()));
4612 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32 != 0 {
4613 self.pending_counterparty_closing_signed = Some(msg.clone());
4614 return Ok((None, None));
4617 let funding_redeemscript = self.get_funding_redeemscript();
4618 let (mut closing_tx, used_total_fee) = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, false);
4619 if used_total_fee != msg.fee_satoshis {
4620 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a fee other than the value they can claim. Fee in message: {}. Actual closing tx fee: {}", msg.fee_satoshis, used_total_fee)));
4622 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4624 match self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, &self.get_counterparty_pubkeys().funding_pubkey) {
4627 // The remote end may have decided to revoke their output due to inconsistent dust
4628 // limits, so check for that case by re-checking the signature here.
4629 closing_tx = self.build_closing_transaction(msg.fee_satoshis, true).0;
4630 let sighash = closing_tx.trust().get_sighash_all(&funding_redeemscript, self.channel_value_satoshis);
4631 secp_check!(self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &msg.signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()), "Invalid closing tx signature from peer".to_owned());
4635 for outp in closing_tx.trust().built_transaction().output.iter() {
4636 if !outp.script_pubkey.is_witness_program() && outp.value < MAX_STD_OUTPUT_DUST_LIMIT_SATOSHIS {
4637 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Remote sent us a closing_signed with a dust output. Always use segwit closing scripts!".to_owned()));
4641 assert!(self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some());
4642 if let Some((last_fee, sig)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4643 if last_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4644 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&mut closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4645 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4646 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4647 return Ok((None, Some(tx)));
4651 let (our_min_fee, our_max_fee) = self.calculate_closing_fee_limits(fee_estimator);
4653 macro_rules! propose_fee {
4654 ($new_fee: expr) => {
4655 let (closing_tx, used_fee) = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4656 (closing_tx, $new_fee)
4658 self.build_closing_transaction($new_fee, false)
4661 let sig = self.holder_signer
4662 .sign_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &self.secp_ctx)
4663 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("External signer refused to sign closing transaction".to_owned()))?;
4665 let signed_tx = if $new_fee == msg.fee_satoshis {
4666 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
4667 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4668 let tx = self.build_signed_closing_transaction(&closing_tx, &msg.signature, &sig);
4672 self.last_sent_closing_fee = Some((used_fee, sig.clone()));
4673 return Ok((Some(msgs::ClosingSigned {
4674 channel_id: self.channel_id,
4675 fee_satoshis: used_fee,
4677 fee_range: Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange {
4678 min_fee_satoshis: our_min_fee,
4679 max_fee_satoshis: our_max_fee,
4685 if let Some(msgs::ClosingSignedFeeRange { min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis }) = msg.fee_range {
4686 if msg.fee_satoshis < min_fee_satoshis || msg.fee_satoshis > max_fee_satoshis {
4687 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in their desired range of {} sat - {} sat", msg.fee_satoshis, min_fee_satoshis, max_fee_satoshis)));
4689 if max_fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4690 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's max fee ({} sat) was smaller than our min fee ({} sat)", max_fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4692 if min_fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4693 return Err(ChannelError::Warn(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote's min fee ({} sat) was greater than our max fee ({} sat)", min_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4696 if !self.is_outbound() {
4697 // They have to pay, so pick the highest fee in the overlapping range.
4698 // We should never set an upper bound aside from their full balance
4699 debug_assert_eq!(our_max_fee, self.channel_value_satoshis - (self.value_to_self_msat + 999) / 1000);
4700 propose_fee!(cmp::min(max_fee_satoshis, our_max_fee));
4702 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee || msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4703 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Peer sent a bogus closing_signed - suggested fee of {} sat was not in our desired range of {} sat - {} sat after we informed them of our range.",
4704 msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee, our_max_fee)));
4706 // The proposed fee is in our acceptable range, accept it and broadcast!
4707 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4710 // Old fee style negotiation. We don't bother to enforce whether they are complying
4711 // with the "making progress" requirements, we just comply and hope for the best.
4712 if let Some((last_fee, _)) = self.last_sent_closing_fee {
4713 if msg.fee_satoshis > last_fee {
4714 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_max_fee {
4715 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4716 } else if last_fee < our_max_fee {
4717 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4719 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) higher than our max fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_max_fee)));
4722 if msg.fee_satoshis > our_min_fee {
4723 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4724 } else if last_fee > our_min_fee {
4725 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4727 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!("Unable to come to consensus about closing feerate, remote wants something ({} sat) lower than our min fee ({} sat)", msg.fee_satoshis, our_min_fee)));
4731 if msg.fee_satoshis < our_min_fee {
4732 propose_fee!(our_min_fee);
4733 } else if msg.fee_satoshis > our_max_fee {
4734 propose_fee!(our_max_fee);
4736 propose_fee!(msg.fee_satoshis);
4742 // Public utilities:
4744 pub fn channel_id(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
4748 // Return the `temporary_channel_id` used during channel establishment.
4750 // Will return `None` for channels created prior to LDK version 0.0.115.
4751 pub fn temporary_channel_id(&self) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
4752 self.temporary_channel_id
4755 pub fn minimum_depth(&self) -> Option<u32> {
4759 /// Gets the "user_id" value passed into the construction of this channel. It has no special
4760 /// meaning and exists only to allow users to have a persistent identifier of a channel.
4761 pub fn get_user_id(&self) -> u128 {
4765 /// Gets the channel's type
4766 pub fn get_channel_type(&self) -> &ChannelTypeFeatures {
4770 /// Guaranteed to be Some after both ChannelReady messages have been exchanged (and, thus,
4771 /// is_usable() returns true).
4772 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4773 pub fn get_short_channel_id(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4774 self.short_channel_id
4777 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4778 pub fn latest_inbound_scid_alias(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4779 self.latest_inbound_scid_alias
4782 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4783 pub fn outbound_scid_alias(&self) -> u64 {
4784 self.outbound_scid_alias
4786 /// Only allowed immediately after deserialization if get_outbound_scid_alias returns 0,
4787 /// indicating we were written by LDK prior to 0.0.106 which did not set outbound SCID aliases.
4788 pub fn set_outbound_scid_alias(&mut self, outbound_scid_alias: u64) {
4789 assert_eq!(self.outbound_scid_alias, 0);
4790 self.outbound_scid_alias = outbound_scid_alias;
4793 /// Returns the funding_txo we either got from our peer, or were given by
4794 /// get_outbound_funding_created.
4795 pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
4796 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint
4799 /// Returns the block hash in which our funding transaction was confirmed.
4800 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmed_in(&self) -> Option<BlockHash> {
4801 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in
4804 /// Returns the current number of confirmations on the funding transaction.
4805 pub fn get_funding_tx_confirmations(&self, height: u32) -> u32 {
4806 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
4807 // We either haven't seen any confirmation yet, or observed a reorg.
4811 height.checked_sub(self.funding_tx_confirmation_height).map_or(0, |c| c + 1)
4814 fn get_holder_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> u16 {
4815 self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_selected_contest_delay
4818 fn get_holder_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4819 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.holder_pubkeys
4822 pub fn get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay(&self) -> Option<u16> {
4823 self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters
4824 .as_ref().map(|params| params.selected_contest_delay)
4827 fn get_counterparty_pubkeys(&self) -> &ChannelPublicKeys {
4828 &self.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters.as_ref().unwrap().pubkeys
4831 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4832 pub fn get_counterparty_node_id(&self) -> PublicKey {
4833 self.counterparty_node_id
4836 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4837 pub fn get_holder_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4838 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat
4841 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4842 pub fn get_holder_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4843 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4846 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4847 pub fn get_announced_htlc_max_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4849 // Upper bound by capacity. We make it a bit less than full capacity to prevent attempts
4850 // to use full capacity. This is an effort to reduce routing failures, because in many cases
4851 // channel might have been used to route very small values (either by honest users or as DoS).
4852 self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 * 9 / 10,
4854 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4858 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
4859 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4860 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat
4863 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown), but will return none before TheirInitSent
4864 pub fn get_counterparty_htlc_maximum_msat(&self) -> Option<u64> {
4865 self.get_htlc_maximum_msat(self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)
4868 fn get_htlc_maximum_msat(&self, party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: u64) -> Option<u64> {
4869 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.map(|counterparty_reserve| {
4870 let holder_reserve = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis;
4872 (self.channel_value_satoshis - counterparty_reserve - holder_reserve) * 1000,
4873 party_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
4878 pub fn get_value_satoshis(&self) -> u64 {
4879 self.channel_value_satoshis
4882 pub fn get_fee_proportional_millionths(&self) -> u32 {
4883 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths
4886 pub fn get_cltv_expiry_delta(&self) -> u16 {
4887 cmp::max(self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta, MIN_CLTV_EXPIRY_DELTA)
4890 pub fn get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat(&self) -> u64 {
4891 self.config.options.max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat
4894 /// Returns the previous [`ChannelConfig`] applied to this channel, if any.
4895 pub fn prev_config(&self) -> Option<ChannelConfig> {
4896 self.prev_config.map(|prev_config| prev_config.0)
4899 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelPending` event.
4900 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_pending_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4901 self.is_funding_initiated() && !self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4904 // Returns whether we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4905 pub(crate) fn channel_pending_event_emitted(&self) -> bool {
4906 self.channel_pending_event_emitted
4909 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelPending` event.
4910 pub(crate) fn set_channel_pending_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4911 self.channel_pending_event_emitted = true;
4914 // Checks whether we should emit a `ChannelReady` event.
4915 pub(crate) fn should_emit_channel_ready_event(&mut self) -> bool {
4916 self.is_usable() && !self.channel_ready_event_emitted
4919 // Remembers that we already emitted a `ChannelReady` event.
4920 pub(crate) fn set_channel_ready_event_emitted(&mut self) {
4921 self.channel_ready_event_emitted = true;
4924 /// Tracks the number of ticks elapsed since the previous [`ChannelConfig`] was updated. Once
4925 /// [`EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS`] is reached, the previous config is considered expired and will
4926 /// no longer be considered when forwarding HTLCs.
4927 pub fn maybe_expire_prev_config(&mut self) {
4928 if self.prev_config.is_none() {
4931 let prev_config = self.prev_config.as_mut().unwrap();
4933 if prev_config.1 == EXPIRE_PREV_CONFIG_TICKS {
4934 self.prev_config = None;
4938 /// Returns the current [`ChannelConfig`] applied to the channel.
4939 pub fn config(&self) -> ChannelConfig {
4943 /// Updates the channel's config. A bool is returned indicating whether the config update
4944 /// applied resulted in a new ChannelUpdate message.
4945 pub fn update_config(&mut self, config: &ChannelConfig) -> bool {
4946 let did_channel_update =
4947 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths != config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths ||
4948 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat != config.forwarding_fee_base_msat ||
4949 self.config.options.cltv_expiry_delta != config.cltv_expiry_delta;
4950 if did_channel_update {
4951 self.prev_config = Some((self.config.options, 0));
4952 // Update the counter, which backs the ChannelUpdate timestamp, to allow the relay
4953 // policy change to propagate throughout the network.
4954 self.update_time_counter += 1;
4956 self.config.options = *config;
4960 fn internal_htlc_satisfies_config(
4961 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32, config: &ChannelConfig,
4962 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4963 let fee = amt_to_forward.checked_mul(config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths as u64)
4964 .and_then(|prop_fee| (prop_fee / 1000000).checked_add(config.forwarding_fee_base_msat as u64));
4965 if fee.is_none() || htlc.amount_msat < fee.unwrap() ||
4966 (htlc.amount_msat - fee.unwrap()) < amt_to_forward {
4968 "Prior hop has deviated from specified fees parameters or origin node has obsolete ones",
4969 0x1000 | 12, // fee_insufficient
4972 if (htlc.cltv_expiry as u64) < outgoing_cltv_value as u64 + config.cltv_expiry_delta as u64 {
4974 "Forwarding node has tampered with the intended HTLC values or origin node has an obsolete cltv_expiry_delta",
4975 0x1000 | 13, // incorrect_cltv_expiry
4981 /// Determines whether the parameters of an incoming HTLC to be forwarded satisfy the channel's
4982 /// [`ChannelConfig`]. This first looks at the channel's current [`ChannelConfig`], and if
4983 /// unsuccessful, falls back to the previous one if one exists.
4984 pub fn htlc_satisfies_config(
4985 &self, htlc: &msgs::UpdateAddHTLC, amt_to_forward: u64, outgoing_cltv_value: u32,
4986 ) -> Result<(), (&'static str, u16)> {
4987 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(&htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &self.config())
4989 if let Some(prev_config) = self.prev_config() {
4990 self.internal_htlc_satisfies_config(htlc, amt_to_forward, outgoing_cltv_value, &prev_config)
4997 pub fn get_feerate_sat_per_1000_weight(&self) -> u32 {
5001 pub fn get_dust_buffer_feerate(&self, outbound_feerate_update: Option<u32>) -> u32 {
5002 // When calculating our exposure to dust HTLCs, we assume that the channel feerate
5003 // may, at any point, increase by at least 10 sat/vB (i.e 2530 sat/kWU) or 25%,
5004 // whichever is higher. This ensures that we aren't suddenly exposed to significantly
5005 // more dust balance if the feerate increases when we have several HTLCs pending
5006 // which are near the dust limit.
5007 let mut feerate_per_kw = self.feerate_per_kw;
5008 // If there's a pending update fee, use it to ensure we aren't under-estimating
5009 // potential feerate updates coming soon.
5010 if let Some((feerate, _)) = self.pending_update_fee {
5011 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
5013 if let Some(feerate) = outbound_feerate_update {
5014 feerate_per_kw = cmp::max(feerate_per_kw, feerate);
5016 cmp::max(2530, feerate_per_kw * 1250 / 1000)
5019 pub fn get_cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5020 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number + 1
5023 pub fn get_cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5024 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 - if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32) != 0 { 1 } else { 0 }
5027 pub fn get_revoked_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number(&self) -> u64 {
5028 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2
5032 pub fn get_signer(&self) -> &Signer {
5037 pub fn get_value_stat(&self) -> ChannelValueStat {
5039 value_to_self_msat: self.value_to_self_msat,
5040 channel_value_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000,
5041 channel_reserve_msat: self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000,
5042 pending_outbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5043 pending_inbound_htlcs_amount_msat: self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter().map(|ref h| h.amount_msat).sum::<u64>(),
5044 holding_cell_outbound_amount_msat: {
5046 for h in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
5048 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC{amount_msat, .. } => {
5056 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5057 counterparty_dust_limit_msat: self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis * 1000,
5061 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5062 pub fn get_update_time_counter(&self) -> u32 {
5063 self.update_time_counter
5066 pub fn get_latest_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5067 self.latest_monitor_update_id
5070 pub fn should_announce(&self) -> bool {
5071 self.config.announced_channel
5074 pub fn is_outbound(&self) -> bool {
5075 self.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder
5078 /// Gets the fee we'd want to charge for adding an HTLC output to this Channel
5079 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5080 pub fn get_outbound_forwarding_fee_base_msat(&self) -> u32 {
5081 self.config.options.forwarding_fee_base_msat
5084 /// Returns true if we've ever received a message from the remote end for this Channel
5085 pub fn have_received_message(&self) -> bool {
5086 self.channel_state > (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32)
5089 /// Returns true if this channel is fully established and not known to be closing.
5090 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5091 pub fn is_usable(&self) -> bool {
5092 let mask = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK;
5093 (self.channel_state & mask) == (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) && !self.monitor_pending_channel_ready
5096 /// Returns true if this channel is currently available for use. This is a superset of
5097 /// is_usable() and considers things like the channel being temporarily disabled.
5098 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5099 pub fn is_live(&self) -> bool {
5100 self.is_usable() && (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0)
5103 /// Returns true if this channel has been marked as awaiting a monitor update to move forward.
5104 /// Allowed in any state (including after shutdown)
5105 pub fn is_awaiting_monitor_update(&self) -> bool {
5106 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0
5109 pub fn get_latest_complete_monitor_update_id(&self) -> u64 {
5110 if self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty() { return self.get_latest_monitor_update_id(); }
5111 self.pending_monitor_updates[0].update.update_id - 1
5114 /// Returns the next blocked monitor update, if one exists, and a bool which indicates a
5115 /// further blocked monitor update exists after the next.
5116 pub fn unblock_next_blocked_monitor_update(&mut self) -> Option<(&ChannelMonitorUpdate, bool)> {
5117 for i in 0..self.pending_monitor_updates.len() {
5118 if self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked {
5119 self.pending_monitor_updates[i].blocked = false;
5120 return Some((&self.pending_monitor_updates[i].update,
5121 self.pending_monitor_updates.len() > i + 1));
5127 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning whether it should be
5128 /// immediately given to the user for persisting or if it should be held as blocked.
5129 fn push_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate) -> bool {
5130 let release_monitor = self.pending_monitor_updates.iter().all(|upd| !upd.blocked);
5131 self.pending_monitor_updates.push(PendingChannelMonitorUpdate {
5132 update, blocked: !release_monitor
5137 /// Pushes a new monitor update into our monitor update queue, returning a reference to it if
5138 /// it should be immediately given to the user for persisting or `None` if it should be held as
5140 fn push_ret_blockable_mon_update(&mut self, update: ChannelMonitorUpdate)
5141 -> Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate> {
5142 let release_monitor = self.push_blockable_mon_update(update);
5143 if release_monitor { self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update) } else { None }
5146 pub fn no_monitor_updates_pending(&self) -> bool {
5147 self.pending_monitor_updates.is_empty()
5150 pub fn complete_one_mon_update(&mut self, update_id: u64) {
5151 self.pending_monitor_updates.retain(|upd| upd.update.update_id != update_id);
5154 /// Returns true if funding_created was sent/received.
5155 pub fn is_funding_initiated(&self) -> bool {
5156 self.channel_state >= ChannelState::FundingSent as u32
5159 /// Returns true if the channel is awaiting the persistence of the initial ChannelMonitor.
5160 /// If the channel is outbound, this implies we have not yet broadcasted the funding
5161 /// transaction. If the channel is inbound, this implies simply that the channel has not
5163 pub fn is_awaiting_initial_mon_persist(&self) -> bool {
5164 if !self.is_awaiting_monitor_update() { return false; }
5165 if self.channel_state &
5166 !(ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)
5167 == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5168 // If we're not a 0conf channel, we'll be waiting on a monitor update with only
5169 // FundingSent set, though our peer could have sent their channel_ready.
5170 debug_assert!(self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(1) > 0);
5173 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 &&
5174 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number == INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1 {
5175 // If we're a 0-conf channel, we'll move beyond FundingSent immediately even while
5176 // waiting for the initial monitor persistence. Thus, we check if our commitment
5177 // transaction numbers have both been iterated only exactly once (for the
5178 // funding_signed), and we're awaiting monitor update.
5180 // If we got here, we shouldn't have yet broadcasted the funding transaction (as the
5181 // only way to get an awaiting-monitor-update state during initial funding is if the
5182 // initial monitor persistence is still pending).
5184 // Because deciding we're awaiting initial broadcast spuriously could result in
5185 // funds-loss (as we don't have a monitor, but have the funding transaction confirmed),
5186 // we hard-assert here, even in production builds.
5187 if self.is_outbound() { assert!(self.funding_transaction.is_some()); }
5188 assert!(self.monitor_pending_channel_ready);
5189 assert_eq!(self.latest_monitor_update_id, 0);
5195 /// Returns true if our channel_ready has been sent
5196 pub fn is_our_channel_ready(&self) -> bool {
5197 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) != 0 || self.channel_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32
5200 /// Returns true if our peer has either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5201 pub fn received_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5202 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5205 /// Returns true if we either initiated or agreed to shut down the channel.
5206 pub fn sent_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5207 (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) != 0
5210 /// Returns true if this channel is fully shut down. True here implies that no further actions
5211 /// may/will be taken on this channel, and thus this object should be freed. Any future changes
5212 /// will be handled appropriately by the chain monitor.
5213 pub fn is_shutdown(&self) -> bool {
5214 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32 {
5215 assert!(self.channel_state == ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
5220 pub fn channel_update_status(&self) -> ChannelUpdateStatus {
5221 self.channel_update_status
5224 pub fn set_channel_update_status(&mut self, status: ChannelUpdateStatus) {
5225 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5226 self.channel_update_status = status;
5229 fn check_get_channel_ready(&mut self, height: u32) -> Option<msgs::ChannelReady> {
5231 // * always when a new block/transactions are confirmed with the new height
5232 // * when funding is signed with a height of 0
5233 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 && self.minimum_depth != Some(0) {
5237 let funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5238 if funding_tx_confirmations <= 0 {
5239 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = 0;
5242 if funding_tx_confirmations < self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0) as i64 {
5246 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5247 let need_commitment_update = if non_shutdown_state == ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
5248 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32;
5250 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirChannelReady as u32) {
5251 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | (self.channel_state & MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5252 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5254 } else if non_shutdown_state == (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) {
5255 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5258 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 && self.channel_state < ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 {
5259 // We should never see a funding transaction on-chain until we've received
5260 // funding_signed (if we're an outbound channel), or seen funding_generated (if we're
5261 // an inbound channel - before that we have no known funding TXID). The fuzzer,
5262 // however, may do this and we shouldn't treat it as a bug.
5263 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5264 panic!("Started confirming a channel in a state pre-FundingSent: {}.\n\
5265 Do NOT broadcast a funding transaction manually - let LDK do it for you!",
5266 self.channel_state);
5268 // We got a reorg but not enough to trigger a force close, just ignore.
5272 if need_commitment_update {
5273 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) == 0 {
5274 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32) == 0 {
5275 let next_per_commitment_point =
5276 self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - 1, &self.secp_ctx);
5277 return Some(msgs::ChannelReady {
5278 channel_id: self.channel_id,
5279 next_per_commitment_point,
5280 short_channel_id_alias: Some(self.outbound_scid_alias),
5284 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready = true;
5290 /// When a transaction is confirmed, we check whether it is or spends the funding transaction
5291 /// In the first case, we store the confirmation height and calculating the short channel id.
5292 /// In the second, we simply return an Err indicating we need to be force-closed now.
5293 pub fn transactions_confirmed<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5294 &mut self, block_hash: &BlockHash, height: u32, txdata: &TransactionData,
5295 genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5296 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5298 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5301 if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
5302 for &(index_in_block, tx) in txdata.iter() {
5303 // Check if the transaction is the expected funding transaction, and if it is,
5304 // check that it pays the right amount to the right script.
5305 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5306 if tx.txid() == funding_txo.txid {
5307 let txo_idx = funding_txo.index as usize;
5308 if txo_idx >= tx.output.len() || tx.output[txo_idx].script_pubkey != self.get_funding_redeemscript().to_v0_p2wsh() ||
5309 tx.output[txo_idx].value != self.channel_value_satoshis {
5310 if self.is_outbound() {
5311 // If we generated the funding transaction and it doesn't match what it
5312 // should, the client is really broken and we should just panic and
5313 // tell them off. That said, because hash collisions happen with high
5314 // probability in fuzzing mode, if we're fuzzing we just close the
5315 // channel and move on.
5316 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5317 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5319 self.update_time_counter += 1;
5320 let err_reason = "funding tx had wrong script/value or output index";
5321 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason.to_owned() });
5323 if self.is_outbound() {
5324 for input in tx.input.iter() {
5325 if input.witness.is_empty() {
5326 // We generated a malleable funding transaction, implying we've
5327 // just exposed ourselves to funds loss to our counterparty.
5328 #[cfg(not(fuzzing))]
5329 panic!("Client called ChannelManager::funding_transaction_generated with bogus transaction!");
5333 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height = height;
5334 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in = Some(*block_hash);
5335 self.short_channel_id = match scid_from_parts(height as u64, index_in_block as u64, txo_idx as u64) {
5336 Ok(scid) => Some(scid),
5337 Err(_) => panic!("Block was bogus - either height was > 16 million, had > 16 million transactions, or had > 65k outputs"),
5341 // If we allow 1-conf funding, we may need to check for channel_ready here and
5342 // send it immediately instead of waiting for a best_block_updated call (which
5343 // may have already happened for this block).
5344 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5345 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5346 let announcement_sigs = self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger);
5347 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), announcement_sigs));
5350 for inp in tx.input.iter() {
5351 if inp.previous_output == funding_txo.into_bitcoin_outpoint() {
5352 log_info!(logger, "Detected channel-closing tx {} spending {}:{}, closing channel {}", tx.txid(), inp.previous_output.txid, inp.previous_output.vout, log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5353 return Err(ClosureReason::CommitmentTxConfirmed);
5361 /// When a new block is connected, we check the height of the block against outbound holding
5362 /// cell HTLCs in case we need to give up on them prematurely and time them out. Everything
5363 /// else (e.g. commitment transaction broadcasts, HTLC transaction broadcasting, etc) is
5364 /// handled by the ChannelMonitor.
5366 /// If we return Err, the channel may have been closed, at which point the standard
5367 /// requirements apply - no calls may be made except those explicitly stated to be allowed
5370 /// May return some HTLCs (and their payment_hash) which have timed out and should be failed
5372 pub fn best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5373 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash,
5374 node_signer: &NS, user_config: &UserConfig, logger: &L
5375 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5377 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5380 self.do_best_block_updated(height, highest_header_time, Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)), logger)
5383 fn do_best_block_updated<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5384 &mut self, height: u32, highest_header_time: u32,
5385 genesis_node_signer: Option<(BlockHash, &NS, &UserConfig)>, logger: &L
5386 ) -> Result<(Option<msgs::ChannelReady>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>, Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>), ClosureReason>
5388 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5391 let mut timed_out_htlcs = Vec::new();
5392 // This mirrors the check in ChannelManager::decode_update_add_htlc_onion, refusing to
5393 // forward an HTLC when our counterparty should almost certainly just fail it for expiring
5395 let unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit = height + LATENCY_GRACE_PERIOD_BLOCKS;
5396 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
5398 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, ref cltv_expiry, .. } => {
5399 if *cltv_expiry <= unforwarded_htlc_cltv_limit {
5400 timed_out_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
5408 self.update_time_counter = cmp::max(self.update_time_counter, highest_header_time);
5410 if let Some(channel_ready) = self.check_get_channel_ready(height) {
5411 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5412 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5414 log_info!(logger, "Sending a channel_ready to our peer for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5415 return Ok((Some(channel_ready), timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs));
5418 let non_shutdown_state = self.channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
5419 if non_shutdown_state >= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 ||
5420 (non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32) == ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32 {
5421 let mut funding_tx_confirmations = height as i64 - self.funding_tx_confirmation_height as i64 + 1;
5422 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 {
5423 // Note that check_get_channel_ready may reset funding_tx_confirmation_height to
5424 // zero if it has been reorged out, however in either case, our state flags
5425 // indicate we've already sent a channel_ready
5426 funding_tx_confirmations = 0;
5429 // If we've sent channel_ready (or have both sent and received channel_ready), and
5430 // the funding transaction has become unconfirmed,
5431 // close the channel and hope we can get the latest state on chain (because presumably
5432 // the funding transaction is at least still in the mempool of most nodes).
5434 // Note that ideally we wouldn't force-close if we see *any* reorg on a 1-conf or
5435 // 0-conf channel, but not doing so may lead to the
5436 // `ChannelManager::short_to_chan_info` map being inconsistent, so we currently have
5438 if funding_tx_confirmations == 0 && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_some() {
5439 let err_reason = format!("Funding transaction was un-confirmed. Locked at {} confs, now have {} confs.",
5440 self.minimum_depth.unwrap(), funding_tx_confirmations);
5441 return Err(ClosureReason::ProcessingError { err: err_reason });
5443 } else if !self.is_outbound() && self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.is_none() &&
5444 height >= self.channel_creation_height + FUNDING_CONF_DEADLINE_BLOCKS {
5445 log_info!(logger, "Closing channel {} due to funding timeout", log_bytes!(self.channel_id));
5446 // If funding_tx_confirmed_in is unset, the channel must not be active
5447 assert!(non_shutdown_state <= ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32);
5448 assert_eq!(non_shutdown_state & ChannelState::OurChannelReady as u32, 0);
5449 return Err(ClosureReason::FundingTimedOut);
5452 let announcement_sigs = if let Some((genesis_block_hash, node_signer, user_config)) = genesis_node_signer {
5453 self.get_announcement_sigs(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config, height, logger)
5455 Ok((None, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs))
5458 /// Indicates the funding transaction is no longer confirmed in the main chain. This may
5459 /// force-close the channel, but may also indicate a harmless reorganization of a block or two
5460 /// before the channel has reached channel_ready and we can just wait for more blocks.
5461 pub fn funding_transaction_unconfirmed<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<(), ClosureReason> where L::Target: Logger {
5462 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height != 0 {
5463 // We handle the funding disconnection by calling best_block_updated with a height one
5464 // below where our funding was connected, implying a reorg back to conf_height - 1.
5465 let reorg_height = self.funding_tx_confirmation_height - 1;
5466 // We use the time field to bump the current time we set on channel updates if its
5467 // larger. If we don't know that time has moved forward, we can just set it to the last
5468 // time we saw and it will be ignored.
5469 let best_time = self.update_time_counter;
5470 match self.do_best_block_updated(reorg_height, best_time, None::<(BlockHash, &&NodeSigner, &UserConfig)>, logger) {
5471 Ok((channel_ready, timed_out_htlcs, announcement_sigs)) => {
5472 assert!(channel_ready.is_none(), "We can't generate a funding with 0 confirmations?");
5473 assert!(timed_out_htlcs.is_empty(), "We can't have accepted HTLCs with a timeout before our funding confirmation?");
5474 assert!(announcement_sigs.is_none(), "We can't generate an announcement_sigs with 0 confirmations?");
5480 // We never learned about the funding confirmation anyway, just ignore
5485 // Methods to get unprompted messages to send to the remote end (or where we already returned
5486 // something in the handler for the message that prompted this message):
5488 pub fn get_open_channel(&self, chain_hash: BlockHash) -> msgs::OpenChannel {
5489 if !self.is_outbound() {
5490 panic!("Tried to open a channel for an inbound channel?");
5492 if self.channel_state != ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 {
5493 panic!("Cannot generate an open_channel after we've moved forward");
5496 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5497 panic!("Tried to send an open_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5500 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5501 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5505 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5506 funding_satoshis: self.channel_value_satoshis,
5507 push_msat: self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat,
5508 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5509 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5510 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5511 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5512 feerate_per_kw: self.feerate_per_kw as u32,
5513 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5514 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5515 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5516 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5517 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5518 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5519 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5520 first_per_commitment_point,
5521 channel_flags: if self.config.announced_channel {1} else {0},
5522 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5523 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5524 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5526 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5530 pub fn inbound_is_awaiting_accept(&self) -> bool {
5531 self.inbound_awaiting_accept
5534 /// Sets this channel to accepting 0conf, must be done before `get_accept_channel`
5535 pub fn set_0conf(&mut self) {
5536 assert!(self.inbound_awaiting_accept);
5537 self.minimum_depth = Some(0);
5540 /// Marks an inbound channel as accepted and generates a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message which
5541 /// should be sent back to the counterparty node.
5543 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5544 pub fn accept_inbound_channel(&mut self, user_id: u128) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5545 if self.is_outbound() {
5546 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel for an outbound channel?");
5548 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32) | (ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5549 panic!("Tried to send accept_channel after channel had moved forward");
5551 if self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5552 panic!("Tried to send an accept_channel for a channel that has already advanced");
5554 if !self.inbound_awaiting_accept {
5555 panic!("The inbound channel has already been accepted");
5558 self.user_id = user_id;
5559 self.inbound_awaiting_accept = false;
5561 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5564 /// This function is used to explicitly generate a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5565 /// inbound channel. If the intention is to accept an inbound channel, use
5566 /// [`Channel::accept_inbound_channel`] instead.
5568 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5569 fn generate_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5570 let first_per_commitment_point = self.holder_signer.get_per_commitment_point(self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number, &self.secp_ctx);
5571 let keys = self.get_holder_pubkeys();
5573 msgs::AcceptChannel {
5574 temporary_channel_id: self.channel_id,
5575 dust_limit_satoshis: self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
5576 max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
5577 channel_reserve_satoshis: self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
5578 htlc_minimum_msat: self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
5579 minimum_depth: self.minimum_depth.unwrap(),
5580 to_self_delay: self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(),
5581 max_accepted_htlcs: self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
5582 funding_pubkey: keys.funding_pubkey,
5583 revocation_basepoint: keys.revocation_basepoint,
5584 payment_point: keys.payment_point,
5585 delayed_payment_basepoint: keys.delayed_payment_basepoint,
5586 htlc_basepoint: keys.htlc_basepoint,
5587 first_per_commitment_point,
5588 shutdown_scriptpubkey: Some(match &self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
5589 Some(script) => script.clone().into_inner(),
5590 None => Builder::new().into_script(),
5592 channel_type: Some(self.channel_type.clone()),
5594 next_local_nonce: None,
5598 /// Enables the possibility for tests to extract a [`msgs::AcceptChannel`] message for an
5599 /// inbound channel without accepting it.
5601 /// [`msgs::AcceptChannel`]: crate::ln::msgs::AcceptChannel
5603 pub fn get_accept_channel_message(&self) -> msgs::AcceptChannel {
5604 self.generate_accept_channel_message()
5607 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close (for get_outbound_funding_created)
5608 fn get_outbound_funding_created_signature<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> Result<Signature, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5609 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
5610 let counterparty_initial_commitment_tx = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, false, logger).tx;
5611 Ok(self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&counterparty_initial_commitment_tx, Vec::new(), &self.secp_ctx)
5612 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?.0)
5615 /// Updates channel state with knowledge of the funding transaction's txid/index, and generates
5616 /// a funding_created message for the remote peer.
5617 /// Panics if called at some time other than immediately after initial handshake, if called twice,
5618 /// or if called on an inbound channel.
5619 /// Note that channel_id changes during this call!
5620 /// Do NOT broadcast the funding transaction until after a successful funding_signed call!
5621 /// If an Err is returned, it is a ChannelError::Close.
5622 pub fn get_outbound_funding_created<L: Deref>(&mut self, funding_transaction: Transaction, funding_txo: OutPoint, logger: &L) -> Result<msgs::FundingCreated, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5623 if !self.is_outbound() {
5624 panic!("Tried to create outbound funding_created message on an inbound channel!");
5626 if self.channel_state != (ChannelState::OurInitSent as u32 | ChannelState::TheirInitSent as u32) {
5627 panic!("Tried to get a funding_created messsage at a time other than immediately after initial handshake completion (or tried to get funding_created twice)");
5629 if self.commitment_secrets.get_min_seen_secret() != (1 << 48) ||
5630 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER ||
5631 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number != INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5632 panic!("Should not have advanced channel commitment tx numbers prior to funding_created");
5635 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_txo);
5636 self.holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&self.channel_transaction_parameters);
5638 let signature = match self.get_outbound_funding_created_signature(logger) {
5641 log_error!(logger, "Got bad signatures: {:?}!", e);
5642 self.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = None;
5647 let temporary_channel_id = self.channel_id;
5649 // Now that we're past error-generating stuff, update our local state:
5651 self.channel_state = ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32;
5652 self.channel_id = funding_txo.to_channel_id();
5653 self.funding_transaction = Some(funding_transaction);
5655 Ok(msgs::FundingCreated {
5656 temporary_channel_id,
5657 funding_txid: funding_txo.txid,
5658 funding_output_index: funding_txo.index,
5661 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
5663 next_local_nonce: None,
5667 /// Gets an UnsignedChannelAnnouncement for this channel. The channel must be publicly
5668 /// announceable and available for use (have exchanged ChannelReady messages in both
5669 /// directions). Should be used for both broadcasted announcements and in response to an
5670 /// AnnouncementSignatures message from the remote peer.
5672 /// Will only fail if we're not in a state where channel_announcement may be sent (including
5675 /// This will only return ChannelError::Ignore upon failure.
5676 fn get_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5677 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5678 ) -> Result<msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5679 if !self.config.announced_channel {
5680 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Channel is not available for public announcements".to_owned()));
5682 if !self.is_usable() {
5683 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot get a ChannelAnnouncement if the channel is not currently usable".to_owned()));
5686 let node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5687 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5688 let counterparty_node_id = NodeId::from_pubkey(&self.get_counterparty_node_id());
5689 let were_node_one = node_id.as_slice() < counterparty_node_id.as_slice();
5691 let msg = msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
5692 features: channelmanager::provided_channel_features(&user_config),
5694 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5695 node_id_1: if were_node_one { node_id } else { counterparty_node_id },
5696 node_id_2: if were_node_one { counterparty_node_id } else { node_id },
5697 bitcoin_key_1: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey } else { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() }),
5698 bitcoin_key_2: NodeId::from_pubkey(if were_node_one { self.counterparty_funding_pubkey() } else { &self.get_holder_pubkeys().funding_pubkey }),
5699 excess_data: Vec::new(),
5705 fn get_announcement_sigs<NS: Deref, L: Deref>(
5706 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, genesis_block_hash: BlockHash, user_config: &UserConfig,
5707 best_block_height: u32, logger: &L
5708 ) -> Option<msgs::AnnouncementSignatures>
5710 NS::Target: NodeSigner,
5713 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5717 if !self.is_usable() {
5721 if self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 != 0 {
5722 log_trace!(logger, "Cannot create an announcement_signatures as our peer is disconnected");
5726 if self.announcement_sigs_state != AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent {
5730 log_trace!(logger, "Creating an announcement_signatures message for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5731 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, genesis_block_hash, user_config) {
5734 log_trace!(logger, "{:?}", e);
5738 let our_node_sig = match node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement)) {
5740 log_error!(logger, "Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement. Channel will not be announced!");
5745 let our_bitcoin_sig = match self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx) {
5747 log_error!(logger, "Signer rejected channel_announcement signing. Channel will not be announced!");
5752 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent;
5754 Some(msgs::AnnouncementSignatures {
5755 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5756 short_channel_id: self.get_short_channel_id().unwrap(),
5757 node_signature: our_node_sig,
5758 bitcoin_signature: our_bitcoin_sig,
5762 /// Signs the given channel announcement, returning a ChannelError::Ignore if no keys are
5764 fn sign_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5765 &self, node_signer: &NS, announcement: msgs::UnsignedChannelAnnouncement
5766 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5767 if let Some((their_node_sig, their_bitcoin_sig)) = self.announcement_sigs {
5768 let our_node_key = NodeId::from_pubkey(&node_signer.get_node_id(Recipient::Node)
5769 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer failed to retrieve own public key".to_owned()))?);
5770 let were_node_one = announcement.node_id_1 == our_node_key;
5772 let our_node_sig = node_signer.sign_gossip_message(msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage::ChannelAnnouncement(&announcement))
5773 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Failed to generate node signature for channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5774 let our_bitcoin_sig = self.holder_signer.sign_channel_announcement_with_funding_key(&announcement, &self.secp_ctx)
5775 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Ignore("Signer rejected channel_announcement".to_owned()))?;
5776 Ok(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement {
5777 node_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_node_sig } else { their_node_sig },
5778 node_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_node_sig } else { our_node_sig },
5779 bitcoin_signature_1: if were_node_one { our_bitcoin_sig } else { their_bitcoin_sig },
5780 bitcoin_signature_2: if were_node_one { their_bitcoin_sig } else { our_bitcoin_sig },
5781 contents: announcement,
5784 Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Attempted to sign channel announcement before we'd received announcement_signatures".to_string()))
5788 /// Processes an incoming announcement_signatures message, providing a fully-signed
5789 /// channel_announcement message which we can broadcast and storing our counterparty's
5790 /// signatures for later reconstruction/rebroadcast of the channel_announcement.
5791 pub fn announcement_signatures<NS: Deref>(
5792 &mut self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32,
5793 msg: &msgs::AnnouncementSignatures, user_config: &UserConfig
5794 ) -> Result<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, ChannelError> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5795 let announcement = self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config)?;
5797 let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256d::hash(&announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
5799 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.node_signature, &self.get_counterparty_node_id()).is_err() {
5800 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5801 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify node_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_node_key is {:?}",
5802 &announcement, self.get_counterparty_node_id())));
5804 if self.secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&msghash, &msg.bitcoin_signature, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_err() {
5805 return Err(ChannelError::Close(format!(
5806 "Bad announcement_signatures. Failed to verify bitcoin_signature. UnsignedChannelAnnouncement used for verification is {:?}. their_bitcoin_key is ({:?})",
5807 &announcement, self.counterparty_funding_pubkey())));
5810 self.announcement_sigs = Some((msg.node_signature, msg.bitcoin_signature));
5811 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5812 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(
5813 "Got announcement_signatures prior to the required six confirmations - we may not have received a block yet that our peer has".to_owned()));
5816 self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement)
5819 /// Gets a signed channel_announcement for this channel, if we previously received an
5820 /// announcement_signatures from our counterparty.
5821 pub fn get_signed_channel_announcement<NS: Deref>(
5822 &self, node_signer: &NS, chain_hash: BlockHash, best_block_height: u32, user_config: &UserConfig
5823 ) -> Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement> where NS::Target: NodeSigner {
5824 if self.funding_tx_confirmation_height == 0 || self.funding_tx_confirmation_height + 5 > best_block_height {
5827 let announcement = match self.get_channel_announcement(node_signer, chain_hash, user_config) {
5829 Err(_) => return None,
5831 match self.sign_channel_announcement(node_signer, announcement) {
5832 Ok(res) => Some(res),
5837 /// May panic if called on a channel that wasn't immediately-previously
5838 /// self.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused()'d
5839 pub fn get_channel_reestablish<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> msgs::ChannelReestablish where L::Target: Logger {
5840 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32, ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32);
5841 assert_ne!(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER);
5842 // Prior to static_remotekey, my_current_per_commitment_point was critical to claiming
5843 // current to_remote balances. However, it no longer has any use, and thus is now simply
5844 // set to a dummy (but valid, as required by the spec) public key.
5845 // fuzzing mode marks a subset of pubkeys as invalid so that we can hit "invalid pubkey"
5846 // branches, but we unwrap it below, so we arbitrarily select a dummy pubkey which is both
5847 // valid, and valid in fuzzing mode's arbitrary validity criteria:
5848 let mut pk = [2; 33]; pk[1] = 0xff;
5849 let dummy_pubkey = PublicKey::from_slice(&pk).unwrap();
5850 let remote_last_secret = if self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 1 < INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER {
5851 let remote_last_secret = self.commitment_secrets.get_secret(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number + 2).unwrap();
5852 log_trace!(logger, "Enough info to generate a Data Loss Protect with per_commitment_secret {} for channel {}", log_bytes!(remote_last_secret), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5855 log_info!(logger, "Sending a data_loss_protect with no previous remote per_commitment_secret for channel {}", log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
5858 msgs::ChannelReestablish {
5859 channel_id: self.channel_id(),
5860 // The protocol has two different commitment number concepts - the "commitment
5861 // transaction number", which starts from 0 and counts up, and the "revocation key
5862 // index" which starts at INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER and counts down. We track
5863 // commitment transaction numbers by the index which will be used to reveal the
5864 // revocation key for that commitment transaction, which means we have to convert them
5865 // to protocol-level commitment numbers here...
5867 // next_local_commitment_number is the next commitment_signed number we expect to
5868 // receive (indicating if they need to resend one that we missed).
5869 next_local_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
5870 // We have to set next_remote_commitment_number to the next revoke_and_ack we expect to
5871 // receive, however we track it by the next commitment number for a remote transaction
5872 // (which is one further, as they always revoke previous commitment transaction, not
5873 // the one we send) so we have to decrement by 1. Note that if
5874 // cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number is INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER we will have
5875 // dropped this channel on disconnect as it hasn't yet reached FundingSent so we can't
5877 next_remote_commitment_number: INITIAL_COMMITMENT_NUMBER - self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number - 1,
5878 your_last_per_commitment_secret: remote_last_secret,
5879 my_current_per_commitment_point: dummy_pubkey,
5880 // TODO(dual_funding): If we've sent `commtiment_signed` for an interactive transaction
5881 // construction but have not received `tx_signatures` we MUST set `next_funding_txid` to the
5882 // txid of that interactive transaction, else we MUST NOT set it.
5883 next_funding_txid: None,
5888 // Send stuff to our remote peers:
5890 /// Queues up an outbound HTLC to send by placing it in the holding cell. You should call
5891 /// [`Self::maybe_free_holding_cell_htlcs`] in order to actually generate and send the
5892 /// commitment update.
5894 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5895 pub fn queue_add_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5896 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L)
5897 -> Result<(), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5899 .send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, true, logger)
5900 .map(|msg_opt| assert!(msg_opt.is_none(), "We forced holding cell?"))
5902 if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = err { /* fine */ }
5903 else { debug_assert!(false, "Queueing cannot trigger channel failure"); }
5908 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, note that you probably want
5909 /// [`Self::send_htlc_and_commit`] instead cause you'll want both messages at once.
5911 /// This returns an optional UpdateAddHTLC as we may be in a state where we cannot add HTLCs on
5913 /// * In cases where we're waiting on the remote peer to send us a revoke_and_ack, we
5914 /// wouldn't be able to determine what they actually ACK'ed if we have two sets of updates
5916 /// * In cases where we're marked MonitorUpdateInProgress, we cannot commit to a new state as
5917 /// we may not yet have sent the previous commitment update messages and will need to
5918 /// regenerate them.
5920 /// You MUST call [`Self::send_commitment_no_state_update`] prior to calling any other methods
5921 /// on this [`Channel`] if `force_holding_cell` is false.
5923 /// `Err`s will only be [`ChannelError::Ignore`].
5924 fn send_htlc<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource,
5925 onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, mut force_holding_cell: bool, logger: &L)
5926 -> Result<Option<msgs::UpdateAddHTLC>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
5927 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK)) != (ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32) {
5928 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send HTLC until channel is fully established and we haven't started shutting down".to_owned()));
5930 let channel_total_msat = self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
5931 if amount_msat > channel_total_msat {
5932 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send amount {}, because it is more than the total value of the channel {}", amount_msat, channel_total_msat)));
5935 if amount_msat == 0 {
5936 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send 0-msat HTLC".to_owned()));
5939 if amount_msat < self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat {
5940 debug_assert!(amount_msat < self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat);
5941 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send less than their minimum HTLC value ({})", self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat)));
5944 if (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32)) != 0 {
5945 // Note that this should never really happen, if we're !is_live() on receipt of an
5946 // incoming HTLC for relay will result in us rejecting the HTLC and we won't allow
5947 // the user to send directly into a !is_live() channel. However, if we
5948 // disconnected during the time the previous hop was doing the commitment dance we may
5949 // end up getting here after the forwarding delay. In any case, returning an
5950 // IgnoreError will get ChannelManager to do the right thing and fail backwards now.
5951 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send an HTLC while disconnected from channel counterparty".to_owned()));
5954 let inbound_stats = self.get_inbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5955 let outbound_stats = self.get_outbound_pending_htlc_stats(None);
5956 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs + 1 > self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs as u32 {
5957 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5958 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot push more than their max accepted HTLCs ({})", self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs)));
5960 // Check their_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat
5961 if outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat + amount_msat > self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat {
5962 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5963 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put us over the max HTLC value in flight our peer will accept ({})", self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat)));
5966 if !self.is_outbound() {
5967 // Check that we won't violate the remote channel reserve by adding this HTLC.
5968 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
5969 let counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat = self.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
5970 let holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat = self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis * 1000;
5971 let remote_balance_msat = (self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 - self.value_to_self_msat).saturating_sub(inbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
5972 if remote_balance_msat < counterparty_commit_tx_fee_msat + holder_selected_chan_reserve_msat {
5973 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
5974 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore("Cannot send value that would put counterparty balance under holder-announced channel reserve value".to_owned()));
5978 let (htlc_success_dust_limit, htlc_timeout_dust_limit) = if self.opt_anchors() {
5981 let dust_buffer_feerate = self.get_dust_buffer_feerate(None) as u64;
5982 (dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_success_tx_weight(false) / 1000,
5983 dust_buffer_feerate * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(false) / 1000)
5985 let exposure_dust_limit_success_sats = htlc_success_dust_limit + self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis;
5986 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_success_sats {
5987 let on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_counterparty_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5988 if on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
5989 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat ||
5990 amount_msat < self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat);
5991 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on counterparty commitment tx",
5992 on_counterparty_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
5996 let exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats = htlc_timeout_dust_limit + self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis;
5997 if amount_msat / 1000 < exposure_dust_limit_timeout_sats {
5998 let on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat = inbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + outbound_stats.on_holder_tx_dust_exposure_msat + amount_msat;
5999 if on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat > self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat() {
6000 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat ||
6001 amount_msat < self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_minimum_msat);
6002 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our exposure to dust HTLCs at {} over the limit {} on holder commitment tx",
6003 on_holder_dust_htlc_exposure_msat, self.get_max_dust_htlc_exposure_msat())));
6007 let holder_balance_msat = self.value_to_self_msat
6008 .saturating_sub(outbound_stats.pending_htlcs_value_msat);
6009 if holder_balance_msat < amount_msat {
6010 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
6011 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would overdraw remaining funds. Amount: {}, pending value to self {}", amount_msat, holder_balance_msat)));
6014 // `2 *` and extra HTLC are for the fee spike buffer.
6015 let commit_tx_fee_msat = if self.is_outbound() {
6016 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
6017 FEE_SPIKE_BUFFER_FEE_INCREASE_MULTIPLE * self.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, Some(()))
6019 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat < commit_tx_fee_msat {
6020 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
6021 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would not leave enough to pay for fees. Pending value to self: {}. local_commit_tx_fee {}", holder_balance_msat, commit_tx_fee_msat)));
6024 // Check self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis (the amount we must keep as
6025 // reserve for the remote to have something to claim if we misbehave)
6026 let chan_reserve_msat = self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap() * 1000;
6027 if holder_balance_msat - amount_msat - commit_tx_fee_msat < chan_reserve_msat {
6028 debug_assert!(amount_msat > self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
6029 return Err(ChannelError::Ignore(format!("Cannot send value that would put our balance under counterparty-announced channel reserve value ({})", chan_reserve_msat)));
6032 debug_assert!(amount_msat <= self.get_available_balances().next_outbound_htlc_limit_msat);
6034 let need_holding_cell = (self.channel_state & (ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32)) != 0;
6035 log_debug!(logger, "Pushing new outbound HTLC for {} msat {}", amount_msat,
6036 if force_holding_cell { "into holding cell" }
6037 else if need_holding_cell { "into holding cell as we're awaiting an RAA or monitor" }
6038 else { "to peer" });
6040 if need_holding_cell {
6041 force_holding_cell = true;
6044 // Now update local state:
6045 if force_holding_cell {
6046 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6051 onion_routing_packet,
6056 self.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6057 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
6059 payment_hash: payment_hash.clone(),
6061 state: OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(onion_routing_packet.clone())),
6065 let res = msgs::UpdateAddHTLC {
6066 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6067 htlc_id: self.next_holder_htlc_id,
6071 onion_routing_packet,
6073 self.next_holder_htlc_id += 1;
6078 fn build_commitment_no_status_check<L: Deref>(&mut self, logger: &L) -> ChannelMonitorUpdate where L::Target: Logger {
6079 log_trace!(logger, "Updating HTLC state for a newly-sent commitment_signed...");
6080 // We can upgrade the status of some HTLCs that are waiting on a commitment, even if we
6081 // fail to generate this, we still are at least at a position where upgrading their status
6083 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6084 let new_state = if let &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref forward_info) = &htlc.state {
6085 Some(InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(forward_info.clone()))
6087 if let Some(state) = new_state {
6088 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {} to AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6092 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
6093 if let &mut OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref mut outcome) = &mut htlc.state {
6094 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting outbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove {} to AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke", log_bytes!(htlc.payment_hash.0));
6095 // Grab the preimage, if it exists, instead of cloning
6096 let mut reason = OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None);
6097 mem::swap(outcome, &mut reason);
6098 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(reason);
6101 if let Some((feerate, update_state)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6102 if update_state == FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce {
6103 debug_assert!(!self.is_outbound());
6104 log_trace!(logger, " ...promoting inbound AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce fee update {} to Committed", feerate);
6105 self.feerate_per_kw = feerate;
6106 self.pending_update_fee = None;
6109 self.resend_order = RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst;
6111 let (counterparty_commitment_txid, mut htlcs_ref) = self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6112 let htlcs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Box<HTLCSource>>)> =
6113 htlcs_ref.drain(..).map(|(htlc, htlc_source)| (htlc, htlc_source.map(|source_ref| Box::new(source_ref.clone())))).collect();
6115 if self.announcement_sigs_state == AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent {
6116 self.announcement_sigs_state = AnnouncementSigsState::Committed;
6119 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6120 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6121 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6122 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::LatestCounterpartyCommitmentTXInfo {
6123 commitment_txid: counterparty_commitment_txid,
6124 htlc_outputs: htlcs.clone(),
6125 commitment_number: self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
6126 their_per_commitment_point: self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.unwrap()
6129 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::AwaitingRemoteRevoke as u32;
6133 fn build_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>) where L::Target: Logger {
6134 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6135 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6136 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6138 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6140 if !self.is_outbound() {
6141 let projected_commit_tx_info = self.next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap().take();
6142 *self.next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached.lock().unwrap() = None;
6143 if let Some(info) = projected_commit_tx_info {
6144 let total_pending_htlcs = self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() + self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len();
6145 if info.total_pending_htlcs == total_pending_htlcs
6146 && info.next_holder_htlc_id == self.next_holder_htlc_id
6147 && info.next_counterparty_htlc_id == self.next_counterparty_htlc_id
6148 && info.feerate == self.feerate_per_kw {
6149 let actual_fee = Self::commit_tx_fee_msat(self.feerate_per_kw, commitment_stats.num_nondust_htlcs, self.opt_anchors());
6150 assert_eq!(actual_fee, info.fee);
6156 (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)
6159 /// Only fails in case of signer rejection. Used for channel_reestablish commitment_signed
6160 /// generation when we shouldn't change HTLC/channel state.
6161 fn send_commitment_no_state_update<L: Deref>(&self, logger: &L) -> Result<(msgs::CommitmentSigned, (Txid, Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<&HTLCSource>)>)), ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6162 // Get the fee tests from `build_commitment_no_state_update`
6163 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6164 self.build_commitment_no_state_update(logger);
6166 let counterparty_keys = self.build_remote_transaction_keys();
6167 let commitment_stats = self.build_commitment_transaction(self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number, &counterparty_keys, false, true, logger);
6168 let counterparty_commitment_txid = commitment_stats.tx.trust().txid();
6169 let (signature, htlc_signatures);
6172 let mut htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(commitment_stats.htlcs_included.len());
6173 for &(ref htlc, _) in commitment_stats.htlcs_included.iter() {
6177 let res = self.holder_signer.sign_counterparty_commitment(&commitment_stats.tx, commitment_stats.preimages, &self.secp_ctx)
6178 .map_err(|_| ChannelError::Close("Failed to get signatures for new commitment_signed".to_owned()))?;
6180 htlc_signatures = res.1;
6182 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote commitment tx {} (txid {}) with redeemscript {} -> {} in channel {}",
6183 encode::serialize_hex(&commitment_stats.tx.trust().built_transaction().transaction),
6184 &counterparty_commitment_txid, encode::serialize_hex(&self.get_funding_redeemscript()),
6185 log_bytes!(signature.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6187 for (ref htlc_sig, ref htlc) in htlc_signatures.iter().zip(htlcs) {
6188 log_trace!(logger, "Signed remote HTLC tx {} with redeemscript {} with pubkey {} -> {} in channel {}",
6189 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.feerate_per_kw, self.get_holder_selected_contest_delay(), htlc, self.opt_anchors(), false, &counterparty_keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &counterparty_keys.revocation_key)),
6190 encode::serialize_hex(&chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, self.opt_anchors(), &counterparty_keys)),
6191 log_bytes!(counterparty_keys.broadcaster_htlc_key.serialize()),
6192 log_bytes!(htlc_sig.serialize_compact()[..]), log_bytes!(self.channel_id()));
6196 Ok((msgs::CommitmentSigned {
6197 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6201 partial_signature_with_nonce: None,
6202 }, (counterparty_commitment_txid, commitment_stats.htlcs_included)))
6205 /// Adds a pending outbound HTLC to this channel, and builds a new remote commitment
6206 /// transaction and generates the corresponding [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] in one go.
6208 /// Shorthand for calling [`Self::send_htlc`] followed by a commitment update, see docs on
6209 /// [`Self::send_htlc`] and [`Self::build_commitment_no_state_update`] for more info.
6210 pub fn send_htlc_and_commit<L: Deref>(&mut self, amount_msat: u64, payment_hash: PaymentHash, cltv_expiry: u32, source: HTLCSource, onion_routing_packet: msgs::OnionPacket, logger: &L) -> Result<Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, ChannelError> where L::Target: Logger {
6211 let send_res = self.send_htlc(amount_msat, payment_hash, cltv_expiry, source, onion_routing_packet, false, logger);
6212 if let Err(e) = &send_res { if let ChannelError::Ignore(_) = e {} else { debug_assert!(false, "Sending cannot trigger channel failure"); } }
6215 let monitor_update = self.build_commitment_no_status_check(logger);
6216 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, true, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6217 Ok(self.push_ret_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update))
6223 /// Get forwarding information for the counterparty.
6224 pub fn counterparty_forwarding_info(&self) -> Option<CounterpartyForwardingInfo> {
6225 self.counterparty_forwarding_info.clone()
6228 pub fn channel_update(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<(), ChannelError> {
6229 if msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat >= self.channel_value_satoshis * 1000 {
6230 return Err(ChannelError::Close("Minimum htlc value is greater than channel value".to_string()));
6232 self.counterparty_forwarding_info = Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6233 fee_base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
6234 fee_proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
6235 cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta
6241 /// Begins the shutdown process, getting a message for the remote peer and returning all
6242 /// holding cell HTLCs for payment failure.
6244 /// May jump to the channel being fully shutdown (see [`Self::is_shutdown`]) in which case no
6245 /// [`ChannelMonitorUpdate`] will be returned).
6246 pub fn get_shutdown<SP: Deref>(&mut self, signer_provider: &SP, their_features: &InitFeatures,
6247 target_feerate_sats_per_kw: Option<u32>, override_shutdown_script: Option<ShutdownScript>)
6248 -> Result<(msgs::Shutdown, Option<&ChannelMonitorUpdate>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash)>), APIError>
6249 where SP::Target: SignerProvider {
6250 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6251 if let OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6252 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot begin shutdown with pending HTLCs. Process pending events first".to_owned()});
6255 if self.channel_state & BOTH_SIDES_SHUTDOWN_MASK != 0 {
6256 if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32 {
6257 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Shutdown already in progress".to_owned()});
6259 else if (self.channel_state & ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32) == ChannelState::RemoteShutdownSent as u32 {
6260 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Shutdown already in progress by remote".to_owned()});
6263 if self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_some() && override_shutdown_script.is_some() {
6264 return Err(APIError::APIMisuseError{err: "Cannot override shutdown script for a channel with one already set".to_owned()});
6266 assert_eq!(self.channel_state & ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32, 0);
6267 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32 | ChannelState::MonitorUpdateInProgress as u32) != 0 {
6268 return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Cannot begin shutdown while peer is disconnected or we're waiting on a monitor update, maybe force-close instead?".to_owned()});
6271 // If we haven't funded the channel yet, we don't need to bother ensuring the shutdown
6272 // script is set, we just force-close and call it a day.
6273 let mut chan_closed = false;
6274 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6278 let update_shutdown_script = match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey {
6280 None if !chan_closed => {
6281 // use override shutdown script if provided
6282 let shutdown_scriptpubkey = match override_shutdown_script {
6283 Some(script) => script,
6285 // otherwise, use the shutdown scriptpubkey provided by the signer
6286 match signer_provider.get_shutdown_scriptpubkey() {
6287 Ok(scriptpubkey) => scriptpubkey,
6288 Err(_) => return Err(APIError::ChannelUnavailable{err: "Failed to get shutdown scriptpubkey".to_owned()}),
6292 if !shutdown_scriptpubkey.is_compatible(their_features) {
6293 return Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script: shutdown_scriptpubkey.clone() });
6295 self.shutdown_scriptpubkey = Some(shutdown_scriptpubkey);
6301 // From here on out, we may not fail!
6302 self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = target_feerate_sats_per_kw;
6303 if self.channel_state < ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 {
6304 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6306 self.channel_state |= ChannelState::LocalShutdownSent as u32;
6308 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6310 let monitor_update = if update_shutdown_script {
6311 self.latest_monitor_update_id += 1;
6312 let monitor_update = ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6313 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6314 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ShutdownScript {
6315 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6318 self.monitor_updating_paused(false, false, false, Vec::new(), Vec::new(), Vec::new());
6319 if self.push_blockable_mon_update(monitor_update) {
6320 self.pending_monitor_updates.last().map(|upd| &upd.update)
6323 let shutdown = msgs::Shutdown {
6324 channel_id: self.channel_id,
6325 scriptpubkey: self.get_closing_scriptpubkey(),
6328 // Go ahead and drop holding cell updates as we'd rather fail payments than wait to send
6329 // our shutdown until we've committed all of the pending changes.
6330 self.holding_cell_update_fee = None;
6331 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6332 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.retain(|htlc_update| {
6334 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref payment_hash, ref source, .. } => {
6335 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source.clone(), payment_hash.clone()));
6342 debug_assert!(!self.is_shutdown() || monitor_update.is_none(),
6343 "we can't both complete shutdown and return a monitor update");
6345 Ok((shutdown, monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs))
6348 /// Gets the latest commitment transaction and any dependent transactions for relay (forcing
6349 /// shutdown of this channel - no more calls into this Channel may be made afterwards except
6350 /// those explicitly stated to be allowed after shutdown completes, eg some simple getters).
6351 /// Also returns the list of payment_hashes for channels which we can safely fail backwards
6352 /// immediately (others we will have to allow to time out).
6353 pub fn force_shutdown(&mut self, should_broadcast: bool) -> (Option<(OutPoint, ChannelMonitorUpdate)>, Vec<(HTLCSource, PaymentHash, PublicKey, [u8; 32])>) {
6354 // Note that we MUST only generate a monitor update that indicates force-closure - we're
6355 // called during initialization prior to the chain_monitor in the encompassing ChannelManager
6356 // being fully configured in some cases. Thus, its likely any monitor events we generate will
6357 // be delayed in being processed! See the docs for `ChannelManagerReadArgs` for more.
6358 assert!(self.channel_state != ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32);
6360 // We go ahead and "free" any holding cell HTLCs or HTLCs we haven't yet committed to and
6361 // return them to fail the payment.
6362 let mut dropped_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len());
6363 let counterparty_node_id = self.get_counterparty_node_id();
6364 for htlc_update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.drain(..) {
6366 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. } => {
6367 dropped_outbound_htlcs.push((source, payment_hash, counterparty_node_id, self.channel_id));
6372 let monitor_update = if let Some(funding_txo) = self.get_funding_txo() {
6373 // If we haven't yet exchanged funding signatures (ie channel_state < FundingSent),
6374 // returning a channel monitor update here would imply a channel monitor update before
6375 // we even registered the channel monitor to begin with, which is invalid.
6376 // Thus, if we aren't actually at a point where we could conceivably broadcast the
6377 // funding transaction, don't return a funding txo (which prevents providing the
6378 // monitor update to the user, even if we return one).
6379 // See test_duplicate_chan_id and test_pre_lockin_no_chan_closed_update for more.
6380 if self.channel_state & (ChannelState::FundingSent as u32 | ChannelState::ChannelReady as u32 | ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32) != 0 {
6381 self.latest_monitor_update_id = CLOSED_CHANNEL_UPDATE_ID;
6382 Some((funding_txo, ChannelMonitorUpdate {
6383 update_id: self.latest_monitor_update_id,
6384 updates: vec![ChannelMonitorUpdateStep::ChannelForceClosed { should_broadcast }],
6389 self.channel_state = ChannelState::ShutdownComplete as u32;
6390 self.update_time_counter += 1;
6391 (monitor_update, dropped_outbound_htlcs)
6394 pub fn inflight_htlc_sources(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item=(&HTLCSource, &PaymentHash)> {
6395 self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter()
6396 .flat_map(|htlc_update| {
6398 HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { source, payment_hash, .. }
6399 => Some((source, payment_hash)),
6403 .chain(self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter().map(|htlc| (&htlc.source, &htlc.payment_hash)))
6407 const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 3;
6408 const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 2;
6410 impl_writeable_tlv_based_enum!(InboundHTLCRemovalReason,;
6416 impl Writeable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6417 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6418 // We only care about writing out the current state as it was announced, ie only either
6419 // Enabled or Disabled. In the case of DisabledStaged, we most recently announced the
6420 // channel as enabled, so we write 0. For EnabledStaged, we similarly write a 1.
6422 ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6423 ChannelUpdateStatus::DisabledStaged(_) => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6424 ChannelUpdateStatus::EnabledStaged(_) => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6425 ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6431 impl Readable for ChannelUpdateStatus {
6432 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6433 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6434 0 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Enabled,
6435 1 => ChannelUpdateStatus::Disabled,
6436 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6441 impl Writeable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6442 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6443 // We only care about writing out the current state as if we had just disconnected, at
6444 // which point we always set anything but AnnouncementSigsReceived to NotSent.
6446 AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6447 AnnouncementSigsState::MessageSent => 0u8.write(writer),
6448 AnnouncementSigsState::Committed => 0u8.write(writer),
6449 AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived => 1u8.write(writer),
6454 impl Readable for AnnouncementSigsState {
6455 fn read<R: io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6456 Ok(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6457 0 => AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent,
6458 1 => AnnouncementSigsState::PeerReceived,
6459 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6464 impl<Signer: WriteableEcdsaChannelSigner> Writeable for Channel<Signer> {
6465 fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), io::Error> {
6466 // Note that we write out as if remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused had just been
6469 write_ver_prefix!(writer, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION, MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6471 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6472 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We write
6473 // the low bytes now and the optional high bytes later.
6474 let user_id_low = self.user_id as u64;
6475 user_id_low.write(writer)?;
6477 // Version 1 deserializers expected to read parts of the config object here. Version 2
6478 // deserializers (0.0.99) now read config through TLVs, and as we now require them for
6479 // `minimum_depth` we simply write dummy values here.
6480 writer.write_all(&[0; 8])?;
6482 self.channel_id.write(writer)?;
6483 (self.channel_state | ChannelState::PeerDisconnected as u32).write(writer)?;
6484 self.channel_value_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6486 self.latest_monitor_update_id.write(writer)?;
6488 let mut key_data = VecWriter(Vec::new());
6489 self.holder_signer.write(&mut key_data)?;
6490 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::usize::MAX);
6491 assert!(key_data.0.len() < core::u32::MAX as usize);
6492 (key_data.0.len() as u32).write(writer)?;
6493 writer.write_all(&key_data.0[..])?;
6495 // Write out the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey for backwards compatibility, if
6496 // deserialized from that format.
6497 match self.shutdown_scriptpubkey.as_ref().and_then(|script| script.as_legacy_pubkey()) {
6498 Some(shutdown_pubkey) => shutdown_pubkey.write(writer)?,
6499 None => [0u8; PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE].write(writer)?,
6501 self.destination_script.write(writer)?;
6503 self.cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6504 self.cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number.write(writer)?;
6505 self.value_to_self_msat.write(writer)?;
6507 let mut dropped_inbound_htlcs = 0;
6508 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6509 if let InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = htlc.state {
6510 dropped_inbound_htlcs += 1;
6513 (self.pending_inbound_htlcs.len() as u64 - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6514 for htlc in self.pending_inbound_htlcs.iter() {
6515 if let &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) = &htlc.state {
6518 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6519 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6520 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6521 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6523 &InboundHTLCState::RemoteAnnounced(_) => unreachable!(),
6524 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(ref htlc_state) => {
6526 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6528 &InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(ref htlc_state) => {
6530 htlc_state.write(writer)?;
6532 &InboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6535 &InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(ref removal_reason) => {
6537 removal_reason.write(writer)?;
6542 let mut preimages: Vec<&Option<PaymentPreimage>> = vec![];
6544 (self.pending_outbound_htlcs.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6545 for htlc in self.pending_outbound_htlcs.iter() {
6546 htlc.htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6547 htlc.amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6548 htlc.cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6549 htlc.payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6550 htlc.source.write(writer)?;
6552 &OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(ref onion_packet) => {
6554 onion_packet.write(writer)?;
6556 &OutboundHTLCState::Committed => {
6559 &OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(_) => {
6560 // Treat this as a Committed because we haven't received the CS - they'll
6561 // resend the claim/fail on reconnect as we all (hopefully) the missing CS.
6564 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(ref outcome) => {
6566 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6567 preimages.push(preimage);
6569 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6570 reason.write(writer)?;
6572 &OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(ref outcome) => {
6574 if let OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(preimage) = outcome {
6575 preimages.push(preimage);
6577 let reason: Option<&HTLCFailReason> = outcome.into();
6578 reason.write(writer)?;
6583 (self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6584 for update in self.holding_cell_htlc_updates.iter() {
6586 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC { ref amount_msat, ref cltv_expiry, ref payment_hash, ref source, ref onion_routing_packet } => {
6588 amount_msat.write(writer)?;
6589 cltv_expiry.write(writer)?;
6590 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6591 source.write(writer)?;
6592 onion_routing_packet.write(writer)?;
6594 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC { ref payment_preimage, ref htlc_id } => {
6596 payment_preimage.write(writer)?;
6597 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6599 &HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC { ref htlc_id, ref err_packet } => {
6601 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6602 err_packet.write(writer)?;
6607 match self.resend_order {
6608 RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst => 0u8.write(writer)?,
6609 RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst => 1u8.write(writer)?,
6612 self.monitor_pending_channel_ready.write(writer)?;
6613 self.monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack.write(writer)?;
6614 self.monitor_pending_commitment_signed.write(writer)?;
6616 (self.monitor_pending_forwards.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6617 for &(ref pending_forward, ref htlc_id) in self.monitor_pending_forwards.iter() {
6618 pending_forward.write(writer)?;
6619 htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6622 (self.monitor_pending_failures.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6623 for &(ref htlc_source, ref payment_hash, ref fail_reason) in self.monitor_pending_failures.iter() {
6624 htlc_source.write(writer)?;
6625 payment_hash.write(writer)?;
6626 fail_reason.write(writer)?;
6629 if self.is_outbound() {
6630 self.pending_update_fee.map(|(a, _)| a).write(writer)?;
6631 } else if let Some((feerate, FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce)) = self.pending_update_fee {
6632 Some(feerate).write(writer)?;
6634 // As for inbound HTLCs, if the update was only announced and never committed in a
6635 // commitment_signed, drop it.
6636 None::<u32>.write(writer)?;
6638 self.holding_cell_update_fee.write(writer)?;
6640 self.next_holder_htlc_id.write(writer)?;
6641 (self.next_counterparty_htlc_id - dropped_inbound_htlcs).write(writer)?;
6642 self.update_time_counter.write(writer)?;
6643 self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
6645 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6646 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6647 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6648 // consider the stale state on reload.
6651 self.funding_tx_confirmed_in.write(writer)?;
6652 self.funding_tx_confirmation_height.write(writer)?;
6653 self.short_channel_id.write(writer)?;
6655 self.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6656 self.holder_dust_limit_satoshis.write(writer)?;
6657 self.counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.write(writer)?;
6659 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6660 self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6662 self.counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6663 self.holder_htlc_minimum_msat.write(writer)?;
6664 self.counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs.write(writer)?;
6666 // Note that this field is ignored by 0.0.99+ as the TLV Optional variant is used instead.
6667 self.minimum_depth.unwrap_or(0).write(writer)?;
6669 match &self.counterparty_forwarding_info {
6672 info.fee_base_msat.write(writer)?;
6673 info.fee_proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
6674 info.cltv_expiry_delta.write(writer)?;
6676 None => 0u8.write(writer)?
6679 self.channel_transaction_parameters.write(writer)?;
6680 self.funding_transaction.write(writer)?;
6682 self.counterparty_cur_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6683 self.counterparty_prev_commitment_point.write(writer)?;
6684 self.counterparty_node_id.write(writer)?;
6686 self.counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey.write(writer)?;
6688 self.commitment_secrets.write(writer)?;
6690 self.channel_update_status.write(writer)?;
6692 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6693 (self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
6694 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6695 for htlc in self.historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.iter() {
6696 htlc.write(writer)?;
6699 // If the channel type is something other than only-static-remote-key, then we need to have
6700 // older clients fail to deserialize this channel at all. If the type is
6701 // only-static-remote-key, we simply consider it "default" and don't write the channel type
6703 let chan_type = if self.channel_type != ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key() {
6704 Some(&self.channel_type) } else { None };
6706 // The same logic applies for `holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis` values other than
6707 // the default, and when `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` is configured to be set to
6708 // a different percentage of the channel value then 10%, which older versions of LDK used
6709 // to set it to before the percentage was made configurable.
6710 let serialized_holder_selected_reserve =
6711 if self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis != Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(self.channel_value_satoshis)
6712 { Some(self.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis) } else { None };
6714 let mut old_max_in_flight_percent_config = UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config;
6715 old_max_in_flight_percent_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = MAX_IN_FLIGHT_PERCENT_LEGACY;
6716 let serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight =
6717 if self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat != Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(self.channel_value_satoshis, &old_max_in_flight_percent_config)
6718 { Some(self.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat) } else { None };
6720 let channel_pending_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_pending_event_emitted);
6721 let channel_ready_event_emitted = Some(self.channel_ready_event_emitted);
6723 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6724 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. Therefore,
6725 // we write the high bytes as an option here.
6726 let user_id_high_opt = Some((self.user_id >> 64) as u64);
6728 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = if self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs == DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS { None } else { Some(self.holder_max_accepted_htlcs) };
6730 write_tlv_fields!(writer, {
6731 (0, self.announcement_sigs, option),
6732 // minimum_depth and counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis used to have a
6733 // default value instead of being Option<>al. Thus, to maintain compatibility we write
6734 // them twice, once with their original default values above, and once as an option
6735 // here. On the read side, old versions will simply ignore the odd-type entries here,
6736 // and new versions map the default values to None and allow the TLV entries here to
6738 (1, self.minimum_depth, option),
6739 (2, chan_type, option),
6740 (3, self.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
6741 (4, serialized_holder_selected_reserve, option),
6742 (5, self.config, required),
6743 (6, serialized_holder_htlc_max_in_flight, option),
6744 (7, self.shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
6745 (9, self.target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
6746 (11, self.monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
6747 (13, self.channel_creation_height, required),
6748 (15, preimages, vec_type),
6749 (17, self.announcement_sigs_state, required),
6750 (19, self.latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
6751 (21, self.outbound_scid_alias, required),
6752 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
6753 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
6754 (27, self.channel_keys_id, required),
6755 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
6756 (29, self.temporary_channel_id, option),
6757 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
6758 (33, self.pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
6765 const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
6766 impl<'a, 'b, 'c, ES: Deref, SP: Deref> ReadableArgs<(&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)> for Channel<<SP::Target as SignerProvider>::Signer>
6768 ES::Target: EntropySource,
6769 SP::Target: SignerProvider
6771 fn read<R : io::Read>(reader: &mut R, args: (&'a ES, &'b SP, u32, &'c ChannelTypeFeatures)) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
6772 let (entropy_source, signer_provider, serialized_height, our_supported_features) = args;
6773 let ver = read_ver_prefix!(reader, SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
6775 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards compatible with
6776 // versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two separate u64 values. We read
6777 // the low bytes now and the high bytes later.
6778 let user_id_low: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6780 let mut config = Some(LegacyChannelConfig::default());
6782 // Read the old serialization of the ChannelConfig from version 0.0.98.
6783 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = Readable::read(reader)?;
6784 config.as_mut().unwrap().options.cltv_expiry_delta = Readable::read(reader)?;
6785 config.as_mut().unwrap().announced_channel = Readable::read(reader)?;
6786 config.as_mut().unwrap().commit_upfront_shutdown_pubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6788 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility ChannelConfig data.
6789 let mut _val: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6792 let channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6793 let channel_state = Readable::read(reader)?;
6794 let channel_value_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6796 let latest_monitor_update_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6798 let mut keys_data = None;
6800 // Read the serialize signer bytes. We'll choose to deserialize them or not based on whether
6801 // the `channel_keys_id` TLV is present below.
6802 let keys_len: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6803 keys_data = Some(Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(keys_len as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE)));
6804 while keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len() != keys_len as usize {
6805 // Read 1KB at a time to avoid accidentally allocating 4GB on corrupted channel keys
6806 let mut data = [0; 1024];
6807 let read_slice = &mut data[0..cmp::min(1024, keys_len as usize - keys_data.as_ref().unwrap().len())];
6808 reader.read_exact(read_slice)?;
6809 keys_data.as_mut().unwrap().extend_from_slice(read_slice);
6813 // Read the old serialization for shutdown_pubkey, preferring the TLV field later if set.
6814 let mut shutdown_scriptpubkey = match <PublicKey as Readable>::read(reader) {
6815 Ok(pubkey) => Some(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(pubkey)),
6818 let destination_script = Readable::read(reader)?;
6820 let cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6821 let cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number = Readable::read(reader)?;
6822 let value_to_self_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6824 let pending_inbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6826 let mut pending_inbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_inbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6827 for _ in 0..pending_inbound_htlc_count {
6828 pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
6829 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6830 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6831 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6832 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6833 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6834 1 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce(Readable::read(reader)?),
6835 2 => InboundHTLCState::AwaitingAnnouncedRemoteRevoke(Readable::read(reader)?),
6836 3 => InboundHTLCState::Committed,
6837 4 => InboundHTLCState::LocalRemoved(Readable::read(reader)?),
6838 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6843 let pending_outbound_htlc_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6844 let mut pending_outbound_htlcs = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(pending_outbound_htlc_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6845 for _ in 0..pending_outbound_htlc_count {
6846 pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
6847 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6848 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6849 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6850 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6851 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6852 state: match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6853 0 => OutboundHTLCState::LocalAnnounced(Box::new(Readable::read(reader)?)),
6854 1 => OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
6856 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6857 OutboundHTLCState::RemoteRemoved(option.into())
6860 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6861 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(option.into())
6864 let option: Option<HTLCFailReason> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6865 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(option.into())
6867 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6872 let holding_cell_htlc_update_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6873 let mut holding_cell_htlc_updates = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(holding_cell_htlc_update_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize*2));
6874 for _ in 0..holding_cell_htlc_update_count {
6875 holding_cell_htlc_updates.push(match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6876 0 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::AddHTLC {
6877 amount_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6878 cltv_expiry: Readable::read(reader)?,
6879 payment_hash: Readable::read(reader)?,
6880 source: Readable::read(reader)?,
6881 onion_routing_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6883 1 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::ClaimHTLC {
6884 payment_preimage: Readable::read(reader)?,
6885 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6887 2 => HTLCUpdateAwaitingACK::FailHTLC {
6888 htlc_id: Readable::read(reader)?,
6889 err_packet: Readable::read(reader)?,
6891 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6895 let resend_order = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6896 0 => RAACommitmentOrder::CommitmentFirst,
6897 1 => RAACommitmentOrder::RevokeAndACKFirst,
6898 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6901 let monitor_pending_channel_ready = Readable::read(reader)?;
6902 let monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack = Readable::read(reader)?;
6903 let monitor_pending_commitment_signed = Readable::read(reader)?;
6905 let monitor_pending_forwards_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6906 let mut monitor_pending_forwards = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_forwards_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6907 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_forwards_count {
6908 monitor_pending_forwards.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6911 let monitor_pending_failures_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6912 let mut monitor_pending_failures = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(monitor_pending_failures_count as usize, DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS as usize));
6913 for _ in 0..monitor_pending_failures_count {
6914 monitor_pending_failures.push((Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?, Readable::read(reader)?));
6917 let pending_update_fee_value: Option<u32> = Readable::read(reader)?;
6919 let holding_cell_update_fee = Readable::read(reader)?;
6921 let next_holder_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6922 let next_counterparty_htlc_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6923 let update_time_counter = Readable::read(reader)?;
6924 let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
6926 // Versions prior to 0.0.100 expected to read the fields of `last_sent_closing_fee` here,
6927 // however we are supposed to restart shutdown fee negotiation on reconnect (and wipe
6928 // `last_send_closing_fee` in `remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused`) so we should never
6929 // consider the stale state on reload.
6930 match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6933 let _: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6934 let _: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6935 let _: Signature = Readable::read(reader)?;
6937 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6940 let funding_tx_confirmed_in = Readable::read(reader)?;
6941 let funding_tx_confirmation_height = Readable::read(reader)?;
6942 let short_channel_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6944 let counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6945 let holder_dust_limit_satoshis = Readable::read(reader)?;
6946 let counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6947 let mut counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = None;
6949 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6950 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6952 // Read the 8 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6953 let _dummy: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6955 let counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6956 let holder_htlc_minimum_msat = Readable::read(reader)?;
6957 let counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs = Readable::read(reader)?;
6959 let mut minimum_depth = None;
6961 // Read the old serialization from version 0.0.98.
6962 minimum_depth = Some(Readable::read(reader)?);
6964 // Read the 4 bytes of backwards-compatibility data.
6965 let _dummy: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6968 let counterparty_forwarding_info = match <u8 as Readable>::read(reader)? {
6970 1 => Some(CounterpartyForwardingInfo {
6971 fee_base_msat: Readable::read(reader)?,
6972 fee_proportional_millionths: Readable::read(reader)?,
6973 cltv_expiry_delta: Readable::read(reader)?,
6975 _ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
6978 let channel_parameters: ChannelTransactionParameters = Readable::read(reader)?;
6979 let funding_transaction = Readable::read(reader)?;
6981 let counterparty_cur_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6983 let counterparty_prev_commitment_point = Readable::read(reader)?;
6984 let counterparty_node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
6986 let counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey = Readable::read(reader)?;
6987 let commitment_secrets = Readable::read(reader)?;
6989 let channel_update_status = Readable::read(reader)?;
6991 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6992 let mut historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills = HashSet::new();
6993 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
6995 let htlc_fulfills_len: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
6996 for _ in 0..htlc_fulfills_len {
6997 assert!(historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills.insert(Readable::read(reader)?));
7001 let pending_update_fee = if let Some(feerate) = pending_update_fee_value {
7002 Some((feerate, if channel_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder {
7003 FeeUpdateState::Outbound
7005 FeeUpdateState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToAnnounce
7011 let mut announcement_sigs = None;
7012 let mut target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw = None;
7013 let mut monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills = Some(Vec::new());
7014 let mut holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(Self::get_legacy_default_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis(channel_value_satoshis));
7015 let mut holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat = Some(Self::get_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat(channel_value_satoshis, &UserConfig::default().channel_handshake_config));
7016 // Prior to supporting channel type negotiation, all of our channels were static_remotekey
7017 // only, so we default to that if none was written.
7018 let mut channel_type = Some(ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key());
7019 let mut channel_creation_height = Some(serialized_height);
7020 let mut preimages_opt: Option<Vec<Option<PaymentPreimage>>> = None;
7022 // If we read an old Channel, for simplicity we just treat it as "we never sent an
7023 // AnnouncementSignatures" which implies we'll re-send it on reconnect, but that's fine.
7024 let mut announcement_sigs_state = Some(AnnouncementSigsState::NotSent);
7025 let mut latest_inbound_scid_alias = None;
7026 let mut outbound_scid_alias = None;
7027 let mut channel_pending_event_emitted = None;
7028 let mut channel_ready_event_emitted = None;
7030 let mut user_id_high_opt: Option<u64> = None;
7031 let mut channel_keys_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7032 let mut temporary_channel_id: Option<[u8; 32]> = None;
7033 let mut holder_max_accepted_htlcs: Option<u16> = None;
7035 let mut pending_monitor_updates = Some(Vec::new());
7037 read_tlv_fields!(reader, {
7038 (0, announcement_sigs, option),
7039 (1, minimum_depth, option),
7040 (2, channel_type, option),
7041 (3, counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7042 (4, holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, option),
7043 (5, config, option), // Note that if none is provided we will *not* overwrite the existing one.
7044 (6, holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, option),
7045 (7, shutdown_scriptpubkey, option),
7046 (9, target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw, option),
7047 (11, monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills, vec_type),
7048 (13, channel_creation_height, option),
7049 (15, preimages_opt, vec_type),
7050 (17, announcement_sigs_state, option),
7051 (19, latest_inbound_scid_alias, option),
7052 (21, outbound_scid_alias, option),
7053 (23, channel_ready_event_emitted, option),
7054 (25, user_id_high_opt, option),
7055 (27, channel_keys_id, option),
7056 (28, holder_max_accepted_htlcs, option),
7057 (29, temporary_channel_id, option),
7058 (31, channel_pending_event_emitted, option),
7059 (33, pending_monitor_updates, vec_type),
7062 let (channel_keys_id, holder_signer) = if let Some(channel_keys_id) = channel_keys_id {
7063 let mut holder_signer = signer_provider.derive_channel_signer(channel_value_satoshis, channel_keys_id);
7064 // If we've gotten to the funding stage of the channel, populate the signer with its
7065 // required channel parameters.
7066 let non_shutdown_state = channel_state & (!MULTI_STATE_FLAGS);
7067 if non_shutdown_state >= (ChannelState::FundingCreated as u32) {
7068 holder_signer.provide_channel_parameters(&channel_parameters);
7070 (channel_keys_id, holder_signer)
7072 // `keys_data` can be `None` if we had corrupted data.
7073 let keys_data = keys_data.ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?;
7074 let holder_signer = signer_provider.read_chan_signer(&keys_data)?;
7075 (holder_signer.channel_keys_id(), holder_signer)
7078 if let Some(preimages) = preimages_opt {
7079 let mut iter = preimages.into_iter();
7080 for htlc in pending_outbound_htlcs.iter_mut() {
7082 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7083 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemoteRevokeToRemove(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7085 OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(None)) => {
7086 htlc.state = OutboundHTLCState::AwaitingRemovedRemoteRevoke(OutboundHTLCOutcome::Success(iter.next().ok_or(DecodeError::InvalidValue)?));
7091 // We expect all preimages to be consumed above
7092 if iter.next().is_some() {
7093 return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
7097 let chan_features = channel_type.as_ref().unwrap();
7098 if !chan_features.is_subset(our_supported_features) {
7099 // If the channel was written by a new version and negotiated with features we don't
7100 // understand yet, refuse to read it.
7101 return Err(DecodeError::UnknownRequiredFeature);
7104 let mut secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7105 secp_ctx.seeded_randomize(&entropy_source.get_secure_random_bytes());
7107 // `user_id` used to be a single u64 value. In order to remain backwards
7108 // compatible with versions prior to 0.0.113, the u128 is serialized as two
7109 // separate u64 values.
7110 let user_id = user_id_low as u128 + ((user_id_high_opt.unwrap_or(0) as u128) << 64);
7112 let holder_max_accepted_htlcs = holder_max_accepted_htlcs.unwrap_or(DEFAULT_MAX_HTLCS);
7117 config: config.unwrap(),
7121 // Note that we don't care about serializing handshake limits as we only ever serialize
7122 // channel data after the handshake has completed.
7123 inbound_handshake_limits_override: None,
7126 temporary_channel_id,
7128 announcement_sigs_state: announcement_sigs_state.unwrap(),
7130 channel_value_satoshis,
7132 latest_monitor_update_id,
7135 shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7138 cur_holder_commitment_transaction_number,
7139 cur_counterparty_commitment_transaction_number,
7142 holder_max_accepted_htlcs,
7143 pending_inbound_htlcs,
7144 pending_outbound_htlcs,
7145 holding_cell_htlc_updates,
7149 monitor_pending_channel_ready,
7150 monitor_pending_revoke_and_ack,
7151 monitor_pending_commitment_signed,
7152 monitor_pending_forwards,
7153 monitor_pending_failures,
7154 monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills: monitor_pending_finalized_fulfills.unwrap(),
7157 holding_cell_update_fee,
7158 next_holder_htlc_id,
7159 next_counterparty_htlc_id,
7160 update_time_counter,
7163 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7164 holder_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7165 #[cfg(debug_assertions)]
7166 counterparty_max_commitment_tx_output: Mutex::new((0, 0)),
7168 last_sent_closing_fee: None,
7169 pending_counterparty_closing_signed: None,
7170 closing_fee_limits: None,
7171 target_closing_feerate_sats_per_kw,
7173 inbound_awaiting_accept: false,
7175 funding_tx_confirmed_in,
7176 funding_tx_confirmation_height,
7178 channel_creation_height: channel_creation_height.unwrap(),
7180 counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis,
7181 holder_dust_limit_satoshis,
7182 counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat,
7183 holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat: holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat.unwrap(),
7184 counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis,
7185 holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis: holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(),
7186 counterparty_htlc_minimum_msat,
7187 holder_htlc_minimum_msat,
7188 counterparty_max_accepted_htlcs,
7191 counterparty_forwarding_info,
7193 channel_transaction_parameters: channel_parameters,
7194 funding_transaction,
7196 counterparty_cur_commitment_point,
7197 counterparty_prev_commitment_point,
7198 counterparty_node_id,
7200 counterparty_shutdown_scriptpubkey,
7204 channel_update_status,
7205 closing_signed_in_flight: false,
7209 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7210 next_local_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7211 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7212 next_remote_commitment_tx_fee_info_cached: Mutex::new(None),
7214 workaround_lnd_bug_4006: None,
7216 latest_inbound_scid_alias,
7217 // Later in the ChannelManager deserialization phase we scan for channels and assign scid aliases if its missing
7218 outbound_scid_alias: outbound_scid_alias.unwrap_or(0),
7220 channel_pending_event_emitted: channel_pending_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7221 channel_ready_event_emitted: channel_ready_event_emitted.unwrap_or(true),
7223 #[cfg(any(test, fuzzing))]
7224 historical_inbound_htlc_fulfills,
7226 channel_type: channel_type.unwrap(),
7229 pending_monitor_updates: pending_monitor_updates.unwrap(),
7237 use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script, Builder};
7238 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
7239 use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
7240 use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
7241 use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
7243 use crate::ln::PaymentHash;
7244 use crate::ln::channelmanager::{self, HTLCSource, PaymentId};
7246 use crate::ln::channel::InitFeatures;
7247 use crate::ln::channel::{Channel, InboundHTLCOutput, OutboundHTLCOutput, InboundHTLCState, OutboundHTLCState, HTLCCandidate, HTLCInitiator};
7248 use crate::ln::channel::{MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO, TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS};
7249 use crate::ln::features::ChannelTypeFeatures;
7250 use crate::ln::msgs::{ChannelUpdate, DecodeError, UnsignedChannelUpdate, MAX_VALUE_MSAT};
7251 use crate::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
7252 use crate::ln::chan_utils;
7253 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{htlc_success_tx_weight, htlc_timeout_tx_weight};
7254 use crate::chain::BestBlock;
7255 use crate::chain::chaininterface::{FeeEstimator, LowerBoundedFeeEstimator, ConfirmationTarget};
7256 use crate::sign::{ChannelSigner, InMemorySigner, EntropySource, SignerProvider};
7257 use crate::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
7258 use crate::routing::router::Path;
7259 use crate::util::config::UserConfig;
7260 use crate::util::enforcing_trait_impls::EnforcingSigner;
7261 use crate::util::errors::APIError;
7262 use crate::util::test_utils;
7263 use crate::util::test_utils::OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey;
7264 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Secp256k1, ecdsa::Signature};
7265 use bitcoin::secp256k1::ffi::Signature as FFISignature;
7266 use bitcoin::secp256k1::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
7267 use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
7268 use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
7269 use bitcoin::hash_types::WPubkeyHash;
7270 use bitcoin::PackedLockTime;
7271 use bitcoin::util::address::WitnessVersion;
7272 use crate::prelude::*;
7274 struct TestFeeEstimator {
7277 impl FeeEstimator for TestFeeEstimator {
7278 fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
7284 fn test_max_funding_satoshis_no_wumbo() {
7285 assert_eq!(TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS, 21_000_000 * 100_000_000);
7286 assert!(MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO <= TOTAL_BITCOIN_SUPPLY_SATOSHIS,
7287 "MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS_NO_WUMBO is greater than all satoshis in existence");
7291 fn test_no_fee_check_overflow() {
7292 // Previously, calling `check_remote_fee` with a fee of 0xffffffff would overflow in
7293 // arithmetic, causing a panic with debug assertions enabled.
7294 let fee_est = TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 42 };
7295 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7296 assert!(Channel::<InMemorySigner>::check_remote_fee(&bounded_fee_estimator,
7297 u32::max_value(), None, &&test_utils::TestLogger::new()).is_err());
7301 signer: InMemorySigner,
7304 impl EntropySource for Keys {
7305 fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] { [0; 32] }
7308 impl SignerProvider for Keys {
7309 type Signer = InMemorySigner;
7311 fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, _inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
7312 self.signer.channel_keys_id()
7315 fn derive_channel_signer(&self, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
7319 fn read_chan_signer(&self, _data: &[u8]) -> Result<Self::Signer, DecodeError> { panic!(); }
7321 fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Result<Script, ()> {
7322 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7323 let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7324 let channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
7325 Ok(Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script())
7328 fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> Result<ShutdownScript, ()> {
7329 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
7330 let channel_close_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7331 Ok(ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh_from_pubkey(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_close_key)))
7335 #[cfg(not(feature = "grind_signatures"))]
7336 fn public_from_secret_hex(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<bitcoin::secp256k1::All>, hex: &str) -> PublicKey {
7337 PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode(hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap())
7341 fn upfront_shutdown_script_incompatibility() {
7342 let features = channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()).clear_shutdown_anysegwit();
7343 let non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script =
7344 ShutdownScript::new_witness_program(WitnessVersion::V16, &[0, 40]).unwrap();
7346 let seed = [42; 32];
7347 let network = Network::Testnet;
7348 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7349 keys_provider.expect(OnGetShutdownScriptpubkey {
7350 returns: non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.clone(),
7353 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7354 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7355 let config = UserConfig::default();
7356 match Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 253 }), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &features, 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42) {
7357 Err(APIError::IncompatibleShutdownScript { script }) => {
7358 assert_eq!(script.into_inner(), non_v0_segwit_shutdown_script.into_inner());
7360 Err(e) => panic!("Unexpected error: {:?}", e),
7361 Ok(_) => panic!("Expected error"),
7365 // Check that, during channel creation, we use the same feerate in the open channel message
7366 // as we do in the Channel object creation itself.
7368 fn test_open_channel_msg_fee() {
7369 let original_fee = 253;
7370 let mut fee_est = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: original_fee };
7371 let bounded_fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&fee_est);
7372 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7373 let seed = [42; 32];
7374 let network = Network::Testnet;
7375 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7377 let node_a_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7378 let config = UserConfig::default();
7379 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&bounded_fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_a_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7381 // Now change the fee so we can check that the fee in the open_channel message is the
7382 // same as the old fee.
7383 fee_est.fee_est = 500;
7384 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7385 assert_eq!(open_channel_msg.feerate_per_kw, original_fee);
7389 fn test_holder_vs_counterparty_dust_limit() {
7390 // Test that when calculating the local and remote commitment transaction fees, the correct
7391 // dust limits are used.
7392 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7393 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7394 let seed = [42; 32];
7395 let network = Network::Testnet;
7396 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7397 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7399 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes, making sure
7400 // they have different dust limits.
7402 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7403 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7404 let config = UserConfig::default();
7405 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7407 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7408 // Make sure A's dust limit is as we expect.
7409 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7410 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7411 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7413 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel, explicitly setting B's dust limit.
7414 let mut accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7415 accept_channel_msg.dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7416 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7417 node_a_chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1560;
7419 // Put some inbound and outbound HTLCs in A's channel.
7420 let htlc_amount_msat = 11_092_000; // put an amount below A's effective dust limit but above B's.
7421 node_a_chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push(InboundHTLCOutput {
7423 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat,
7424 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[42; 32]).into_inner()),
7425 cltv_expiry: 300000000,
7426 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7429 node_a_chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push(OutboundHTLCOutput {
7431 amount_msat: htlc_amount_msat, // put an amount below A's dust amount but above B's.
7432 payment_hash: PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[43; 32]).into_inner()),
7433 cltv_expiry: 200000000,
7434 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7435 source: HTLCSource::OutboundRoute {
7436 path: Path { hops: Vec::new(), blinded_tail: None },
7437 session_priv: SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7438 first_hop_htlc_msat: 548,
7439 payment_id: PaymentId([42; 32]),
7443 // Make sure when Node A calculates their local commitment transaction, none of the HTLCs pass
7444 // the dust limit check.
7445 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7446 let local_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7447 let local_commit_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7448 assert_eq!(local_commit_tx_fee, local_commit_fee_0_htlcs);
7450 // Finally, make sure that when Node A calculates the remote's commitment transaction fees, all
7451 // of the HTLCs are seen to be above the dust limit.
7452 node_a_chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7453 let remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(node_a_chan.feerate_per_kw, 3, node_a_chan.opt_anchors());
7454 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amount_msat, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7455 let remote_commit_tx_fee = node_a_chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7456 assert_eq!(remote_commit_tx_fee, remote_commit_fee_3_htlcs);
7460 fn test_timeout_vs_success_htlc_dust_limit() {
7461 // Make sure that when `next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat` and `next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat`
7462 // calculate the real dust limits for HTLCs (i.e. the dust limit given by the counterparty
7463 // *plus* the fees paid for the HTLC) they don't swap `HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT` for
7464 // `HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT`, and vice versa.
7465 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 253 });
7466 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7467 let seed = [42; 32];
7468 let network = Network::Testnet;
7469 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7471 let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7472 let config = UserConfig::default();
7473 let mut chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7475 let commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 0, chan.opt_anchors());
7476 let commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::commit_tx_fee_msat(chan.feerate_per_kw, 1, chan.opt_anchors());
7478 // If HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT and HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT were swapped: then this HTLC would be
7479 // counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7480 let htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7481 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7482 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7483 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7485 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7486 let dust_htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7487 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7488 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_local_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7489 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7491 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.is_outbound_from_holder = false;
7493 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as non-dust when it shouldn't be.
7494 let dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout = ((253 * htlc_timeout_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis + 1) * 1000;
7495 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(dust_htlc_amt_above_timeout, HTLCInitiator::LocalOffered);
7496 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7497 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_0_htlcs);
7499 // If swapped: this HTLC would be counted as dust when it shouldn't be.
7500 let htlc_amt_below_success = ((253 * htlc_success_tx_weight(chan.opt_anchors()) / 1000) + chan.counterparty_dust_limit_satoshis - 1) * 1000;
7501 let htlc_candidate = HTLCCandidate::new(htlc_amt_below_success, HTLCInitiator::RemoteOffered);
7502 let commitment_tx_fee = chan.next_remote_commit_tx_fee_msat(htlc_candidate, None);
7503 assert_eq!(commitment_tx_fee, commitment_tx_fee_1_htlc);
7507 fn channel_reestablish_no_updates() {
7508 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7509 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7510 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7511 let seed = [42; 32];
7512 let network = Network::Testnet;
7513 let best_block = BestBlock::from_network(network);
7514 let chain_hash = best_block.block_hash();
7515 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7517 // Go through the flow of opening a channel between two nodes.
7519 // Create Node A's channel pointing to Node B's pubkey
7520 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7521 let config = UserConfig::default();
7522 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7524 // Create Node B's channel by receiving Node A's open_channel message
7525 let open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(chain_hash);
7526 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7527 let mut node_b_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7529 // Node B --> Node A: accept channel
7530 let accept_channel_msg = node_b_chan.accept_inbound_channel(0);
7531 node_a_chan.accept_channel(&accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config)).unwrap();
7533 // Node A --> Node B: funding created
7534 let output_script = node_a_chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7535 let tx = Transaction { version: 1, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
7536 value: 10000000, script_pubkey: output_script.clone(),
7538 let funding_outpoint = OutPoint{ txid: tx.txid(), index: 0 };
7539 let funding_created_msg = node_a_chan.get_outbound_funding_created(tx.clone(), funding_outpoint, &&logger).unwrap();
7540 let (funding_signed_msg, _) = node_b_chan.funding_created(&funding_created_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger).unwrap();
7542 // Node B --> Node A: funding signed
7543 let _ = node_a_chan.funding_signed(&funding_signed_msg, best_block, &&keys_provider, &&logger);
7545 // Now disconnect the two nodes and check that the commitment point in
7546 // Node B's channel_reestablish message is sane.
7547 node_b_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7548 let msg = node_b_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7549 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7550 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7551 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7553 // Check that the commitment point in Node A's channel_reestablish message
7555 node_a_chan.remove_uncommitted_htlcs_and_mark_paused(&&logger);
7556 let msg = node_a_chan.get_channel_reestablish(&&logger);
7557 assert_eq!(msg.next_local_commitment_number, 1); // now called next_commitment_number
7558 assert_eq!(msg.next_remote_commitment_number, 0); // now called next_revocation_number
7559 assert_eq!(msg.your_last_per_commitment_secret, [0; 32]);
7563 fn test_configured_holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight() {
7564 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7565 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7566 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7567 let seed = [42; 32];
7568 let network = Network::Testnet;
7569 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7570 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7571 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7573 let mut config_2_percent = UserConfig::default();
7574 config_2_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 2;
7575 let mut config_99_percent = UserConfig::default();
7576 config_99_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 99;
7577 let mut config_0_percent = UserConfig::default();
7578 config_0_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 0;
7579 let mut config_101_percent = UserConfig::default();
7580 config_101_percent.channel_handshake_config.max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel = 101;
7582 // Test that `new_outbound` creates a channel with the correct value for
7583 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7584 // which is set to the lower bound + 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7585 let chan_1 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_2_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7586 let chan_1_value_msat = chan_1.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7587 assert_eq!(chan_1.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_1_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7589 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7590 let chan_2 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_99_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7591 let chan_2_value_msat = chan_2.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7592 assert_eq!(chan_2.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_2_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7594 let chan_1_open_channel_msg = chan_1.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7596 // Test that `new_from_req` creates a channel with the correct value for
7597 // `holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat`, when configured with a valid percentage value,
7598 // which is set to the lower bound - 1 (2%) of the `channel_value`.
7599 let chan_3 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_2_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_2_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_2_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7600 let chan_3_value_msat = chan_3.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7601 assert_eq!(chan_3.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_3_value_msat as f64 * 0.02) as u64);
7603 // Test with the upper bound - 1 of valid values (99%).
7604 let chan_4 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_99_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_99_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_99_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7605 let chan_4_value_msat = chan_4.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7606 assert_eq!(chan_4.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_4_value_msat as f64 * 0.99) as u64);
7608 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7609 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7610 let chan_5 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_0_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7611 let chan_5_value_msat = chan_5.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7612 assert_eq!(chan_5.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_5_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7614 // Test that `new_outbound` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7615 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7617 let chan_6 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config_101_percent, 0, 42).unwrap();
7618 let chan_6_value_msat = chan_6.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7619 assert_eq!(chan_6.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_6_value_msat);
7621 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the lower bound of the configurable percentage values (1%)
7622 // if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a value less than 1.
7623 let chan_7 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_0_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_0_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_0_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7624 let chan_7_value_msat = chan_7.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7625 assert_eq!(chan_7.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, (chan_7_value_msat as f64 * 0.01) as u64);
7627 // Test that `new_from_req` uses the upper bound of the configurable percentage values
7628 // (100%) if `max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel` is set to a larger value
7630 let chan_8 = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config_101_percent), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config_101_percent), &chan_1_open_channel_msg, 7, &config_101_percent, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7631 let chan_8_value_msat = chan_8.channel_value_satoshis * 1000;
7632 assert_eq!(chan_8.holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat, chan_8_value_msat);
7636 fn test_configured_holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis() {
7638 // Test that `new_outbound` and `new_from_req` create a channel with the correct
7639 // channel reserves, when `their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths` is configured.
7640 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.02, 0.02);
7642 // Test with valid but unreasonably high channel reserves
7643 // Requesting and accepting parties have requested for 49%-49% and 60%-30% channel reserve
7644 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.49, 0.49);
7645 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.30);
7647 // Test with calculated channel reserve less than lower bound
7648 // i.e `MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS`
7649 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(100_000, 0.00002, 0.30);
7651 // Test with invalid channel reserves since sum of both is greater than or equal
7653 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.50, 0.50);
7654 test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(10_000_000, 0.60, 0.50);
7657 fn test_self_and_counterparty_channel_reserve(channel_value_satoshis: u64, outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64, inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc: f64) {
7658 let fee_est = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator { fee_est: 15_000 });
7659 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
7660 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7661 let seed = [42; 32];
7662 let network = Network::Testnet;
7663 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7664 let outbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7665 let inbound_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
7668 let mut outbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7669 outbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7670 let chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, outbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), channel_value_satoshis, 100_000, 42, &outbound_node_config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7672 let expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7673 assert_eq!(chan.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7675 let chan_open_channel_msg = chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
7676 let mut inbound_node_config = UserConfig::default();
7677 inbound_node_config.channel_handshake_config.their_channel_reserve_proportional_millionths = (inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc * 1_000_000.0) as u32;
7679 if outbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc + inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc < 1.0 {
7680 let chan_inbound_node = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42).unwrap();
7682 let expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve = cmp::max(MIN_THEIR_CHAN_RESERVE_SATOSHIS, (chan.channel_value_satoshis as f64 * inbound_selected_channel_reserve_perc) as u64);
7684 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.holder_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis, expected_inbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7685 assert_eq!(chan_inbound_node.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis.unwrap(), expected_outbound_selected_chan_reserve);
7687 // Channel Negotiations failed
7688 let result = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&&fee_est, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, inbound_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&inbound_node_config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&outbound_node_config), &chan_open_channel_msg, 7, &inbound_node_config, 0, &&logger, 42);
7689 assert!(result.is_err());
7694 fn channel_update() {
7695 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
7696 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7697 let seed = [42; 32];
7698 let network = Network::Testnet;
7699 let chain_hash = genesis_block(network).header.block_hash();
7700 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
7702 // Create a channel.
7703 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7704 let config = UserConfig::default();
7705 let mut node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
7706 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info.is_none());
7707 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1); // the default
7708 assert!(node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info().is_none());
7710 // Make sure that receiving a channel update will update the Channel as expected.
7711 let update = ChannelUpdate {
7712 contents: UnsignedChannelUpdate {
7714 short_channel_id: 0,
7717 cltv_expiry_delta: 100,
7718 htlc_minimum_msat: 5,
7719 htlc_maximum_msat: MAX_VALUE_MSAT,
7721 fee_proportional_millionths: 11,
7722 excess_data: Vec::new(),
7724 signature: Signature::from(unsafe { FFISignature::new() })
7726 node_a_chan.channel_update(&update).unwrap();
7728 // The counterparty can send an update with a higher minimum HTLC, but that shouldn't
7729 // change our official htlc_minimum_msat.
7730 assert_eq!(node_a_chan.holder_htlc_minimum_msat, 1);
7731 match node_a_chan.counterparty_forwarding_info() {
7733 assert_eq!(info.cltv_expiry_delta, 100);
7734 assert_eq!(info.fee_base_msat, 110);
7735 assert_eq!(info.fee_proportional_millionths, 11);
7737 None => panic!("expected counterparty forwarding info to be Some")
7741 #[cfg(feature = "_test_vectors")]
7743 fn outbound_commitment_test() {
7744 use bitcoin::util::sighash;
7745 use bitcoin::consensus::encode::serialize;
7746 use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::EcdsaSighashType;
7747 use bitcoin::hashes::hex::FromHex;
7748 use bitcoin::hash_types::Txid;
7749 use bitcoin::secp256k1::Message;
7750 use crate::sign::EcdsaChannelSigner;
7751 use crate::ln::PaymentPreimage;
7752 use crate::ln::channel::{HTLCOutputInCommitment ,TxCreationKeys};
7753 use crate::ln::chan_utils::{ChannelPublicKeys, HolderCommitmentTransaction, CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters};
7754 use crate::util::logger::Logger;
7755 use crate::sync::Arc;
7757 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendices C and F (anchors):
7758 let feeest = TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000};
7759 let logger : Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
7760 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
7762 let mut signer = InMemorySigner::new(
7764 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("30ff4956bbdd3222d44cc5e8a1261dab1e07957bdac5ae88fe3261ef321f3749").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7765 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7766 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7767 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7768 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7770 // These aren't set in the test vectors:
7771 [0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff],
7777 assert_eq!(signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7778 hex::decode("023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb").unwrap()[..]);
7779 let keys_provider = Keys { signer: signer.clone() };
7781 let counterparty_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
7782 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
7783 config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = false;
7784 let mut chan = Channel::<InMemorySigner>::new_outbound(&LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&feeest), &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, counterparty_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10_000_000, 0, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap(); // Nothing uses their network key in this test
7785 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
7786 chan.counterparty_selected_channel_reserve_satoshis = Some(0); // Filled in in accept_channel
7788 let funding_info = OutPoint{ txid: Txid::from_hex("8984484a580b825b9972d7adb15050b3ab624ccd731946b3eeddb92f4e7ef6be").unwrap(), index: 0 };
7790 let counterparty_pubkeys = ChannelPublicKeys {
7791 funding_pubkey: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7792 revocation_basepoint: PublicKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("02466d7fcae563e5cb09a0d1870bb580344804617879a14949cf22285f1bae3f27").unwrap()[..]).unwrap(),
7793 payment_point: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444"),
7794 delayed_payment_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "1552dfba4f6cf29a62a0af13c8d6981d36d0ef8d61ba10fb0fe90da7634d7e13"),
7795 htlc_basepoint: public_from_secret_hex(&secp_ctx, "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444")
7797 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.counterparty_parameters = Some(
7798 CounterpartyChannelTransactionParameters {
7799 pubkeys: counterparty_pubkeys.clone(),
7800 selected_contest_delay: 144
7802 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.funding_outpoint = Some(funding_info);
7803 signer.provide_channel_parameters(&chan.channel_transaction_parameters);
7805 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.payment_point.serialize()[..],
7806 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7808 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.funding_pubkey.serialize()[..],
7809 hex::decode("030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c1").unwrap()[..]);
7811 assert_eq!(counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint.serialize()[..],
7812 hex::decode("032c0b7cf95324a07d05398b240174dc0c2be444d96b159aa6c7f7b1e668680991").unwrap()[..]);
7814 // We can't just use build_holder_transaction_keys here as the per_commitment_secret is not
7815 // derived from a commitment_seed, so instead we copy it here and call
7816 // build_commitment_transaction.
7817 let delayed_payment_base = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().delayed_payment_basepoint;
7818 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7819 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
7820 let htlc_basepoint = &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().htlc_basepoint;
7821 let keys = TxCreationKeys::derive_new(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, delayed_payment_base, htlc_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.revocation_basepoint, &counterparty_pubkeys.htlc_basepoint);
7823 macro_rules! test_commitment {
7824 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7825 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = None;
7826 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, false, $($remain)*);
7830 macro_rules! test_commitment_with_anchors {
7831 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $($remain:tt)* ) => {
7832 chan.channel_transaction_parameters.opt_anchors = Some(());
7833 test_commitment_common!($counterparty_sig_hex, $sig_hex, $tx_hex, true, $($remain)*);
7837 macro_rules! test_commitment_common {
7838 ( $counterparty_sig_hex: expr, $sig_hex: expr, $tx_hex: expr, $opt_anchors: expr, {
7839 $( { $htlc_idx: expr, $counterparty_htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_sig_hex: expr, $htlc_tx_hex: expr } ), *
7841 let (commitment_tx, htlcs): (_, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>) = {
7842 let mut commitment_stats = chan.build_commitment_transaction(0xffffffffffff - 42, &keys, true, false, &logger);
7844 let htlcs = commitment_stats.htlcs_included.drain(..)
7845 .filter_map(|(htlc, _)| if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_some() { Some(htlc) } else { None })
7847 (commitment_stats.tx, htlcs)
7849 let trusted_tx = commitment_tx.trust();
7850 let unsigned_tx = trusted_tx.built_transaction();
7851 let redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7852 let counterparty_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7853 let sighash = unsigned_tx.get_sighash_all(&redeemscript, chan.channel_value_satoshis);
7854 log_trace!(logger, "unsigned_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&unsigned_tx.transaction)));
7855 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&sighash, &counterparty_signature, chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()).is_ok(), "verify counterparty commitment sig");
7857 let mut per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)> = Vec::new();
7858 per_htlc.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7859 let mut counterparty_htlc_sigs = Vec::new();
7860 counterparty_htlc_sigs.clear(); // Don't warn about excess mut for no-HTLC calls
7862 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7863 per_htlc.push((htlcs[$htlc_idx].clone(), Some(remote_signature)));
7864 counterparty_htlc_sigs.push(remote_signature);
7866 assert_eq!(htlcs.len(), per_htlc.len());
7868 let holder_commitment_tx = HolderCommitmentTransaction::new(
7869 commitment_tx.clone(),
7870 counterparty_signature,
7871 counterparty_htlc_sigs,
7872 &chan.holder_signer.pubkeys().funding_pubkey,
7873 chan.counterparty_funding_pubkey()
7875 let (holder_sig, htlc_sigs) = signer.sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs(&holder_commitment_tx, &secp_ctx).unwrap();
7876 assert_eq!(Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap(), holder_sig, "holder_sig");
7878 let funding_redeemscript = chan.get_funding_redeemscript();
7879 let tx = holder_commitment_tx.add_holder_sig(&funding_redeemscript, holder_sig);
7880 assert_eq!(serialize(&tx)[..], hex::decode($tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "tx");
7882 // ((htlc, counterparty_sig), (index, holder_sig))
7883 let mut htlc_sig_iter = holder_commitment_tx.htlcs().iter().zip(&holder_commitment_tx.counterparty_htlc_sigs).zip(htlc_sigs.iter().enumerate());
7886 log_trace!(logger, "verifying htlc {}", $htlc_idx);
7887 let remote_signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($counterparty_htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7889 let ref htlc = htlcs[$htlc_idx];
7890 let htlc_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&unsigned_tx.txid, chan.feerate_per_kw,
7891 chan.get_counterparty_selected_contest_delay().unwrap(),
7892 &htlc, $opt_anchors, false, &keys.broadcaster_delayed_payment_key, &keys.revocation_key);
7893 let htlc_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript(&htlc, $opt_anchors, &keys);
7894 let htlc_sighashtype = if $opt_anchors { EcdsaSighashType::SinglePlusAnyoneCanPay } else { EcdsaSighashType::All };
7895 let htlc_sighash = Message::from_slice(&sighash::SighashCache::new(&htlc_tx).segwit_signature_hash(0, &htlc_redeemscript, htlc.amount_msat / 1000, htlc_sighashtype).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7896 assert!(secp_ctx.verify_ecdsa(&htlc_sighash, &remote_signature, &keys.countersignatory_htlc_key).is_ok(), "verify counterparty htlc sig");
7898 let mut preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage> = None;
7901 let out = PaymentHash(Sha256::hash(&[i; 32]).into_inner());
7902 if out == htlc.payment_hash {
7903 preimage = Some(PaymentPreimage([i; 32]));
7907 assert!(preimage.is_some());
7910 let htlc_sig = htlc_sig_iter.next().unwrap();
7911 let num_anchors = if $opt_anchors { 2 } else { 0 };
7912 assert_eq!((htlc_sig.0).0.transaction_output_index, Some($htlc_idx + num_anchors), "output index");
7914 let signature = Signature::from_der(&hex::decode($htlc_sig_hex).unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
7915 assert_eq!(signature, *(htlc_sig.1).1, "htlc sig");
7916 let index = (htlc_sig.1).0;
7917 let channel_parameters = chan.channel_transaction_parameters.as_holder_broadcastable();
7918 let trusted_tx = holder_commitment_tx.trust();
7919 log_trace!(logger, "htlc_tx = {}", hex::encode(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))));
7920 assert_eq!(serialize(&trusted_tx.get_signed_htlc_tx(&channel_parameters, index, &(htlc_sig.0).1, (htlc_sig.1).1, &preimage))[..],
7921 hex::decode($htlc_tx_hex).unwrap()[..], "htlc tx");
7923 assert!(htlc_sig_iter.next().is_none());
7927 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs and single anchor
7928 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30440220655bf909fb6fa81d086f1336ac72c97906dce29d1b166e305c99152d810e26e1022051f577faa46412c46707aaac46b65d50053550a66334e00a44af2706f27a8658",
7929 "3044022007cf6b405e9c9b4f527b0ecad9d8bb661fabb8b12abf7d1c0b3ad1855db3ed490220616d5c1eeadccc63bd775a131149455d62d95a42c2a1b01cc7821fc42dce7778",
7930 "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", {});
7932 // simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7933 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7000000000;
7935 test_commitment!("3045022100c3127b33dcc741dd6b05b1e63cbd1a9a7d816f37af9b6756fa2376b056f032370220408b96279808fe57eb7e463710804cdf4f108388bc5cf722d8c848d2c7f9f3b0",
7936 "30440220616210b2cc4d3afb601013c373bbd8aac54febd9f15400379a8cb65ce7deca60022034236c010991beb7ff770510561ae8dc885b8d38d1947248c38f2ae055647142",
7937 "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", {});
7939 // anchors: simple commitment tx with no HTLCs
7940 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100f89034eba16b2be0e5581f750a0a6309192b75cce0f202f0ee2b4ec0cc394850022076c65dc507fe42276152b7a3d90e961e678adbe966e916ecfe85e64d430e75f3",
7941 "30450221008266ac6db5ea71aac3c95d97b0e172ff596844851a3216eb88382a8dddfd33d2022050e240974cfd5d708708b4365574517c18e7ae535ef732a3484d43d0d82be9f7",
7942 "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", {});
7944 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7945 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7947 amount_msat: 1000000,
7949 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7950 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7952 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap()).into_inner();
7955 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7956 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7958 amount_msat: 2000000,
7960 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7961 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7963 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
7966 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7967 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7969 amount_msat: 2000000,
7971 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7972 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7973 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7975 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()).into_inner();
7978 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
7979 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
7981 amount_msat: 3000000,
7983 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7984 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
7985 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
7987 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303030303").unwrap()).into_inner();
7990 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
7991 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
7993 amount_msat: 4000000,
7995 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
7996 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
7998 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404").unwrap()).into_inner();
8002 // commitment tx with all five HTLCs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8003 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8004 chan.feerate_per_kw = 0;
8006 test_commitment!("3044022009b048187705a8cbc9ad73adbe5af148c3d012e1f067961486c822c7af08158c022006d66f3704cfab3eb2dc49dae24e4aa22a6910fc9b424007583204e3621af2e5",
8007 "304402206fc2d1f10ea59951eefac0b4b7c396a3c3d87b71ff0b019796ef4535beaf36f902201765b0181e514d04f4c8ad75659d7037be26cdb3f8bb6f78fe61decef484c3ea",
8008 "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", {
8011 "3045022100d9e29616b8f3959f1d3d7f7ce893ffedcdc407717d0de8e37d808c91d3a7c50d022078c3033f6d00095c8720a4bc943c1b45727818c082e4e3ddbc6d3116435b624b",
8012 "30440220636de5682ef0c5b61f124ec74e8aa2461a69777521d6998295dcea36bc3338110220165285594b23c50b28b82df200234566628a27bcd17f7f14404bd865354eb3ce",
8013 "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" },
8016 "30440220649fe8b20e67e46cbb0d09b4acea87dbec001b39b08dee7bdd0b1f03922a8640022037c462dff79df501cecfdb12ea7f4de91f99230bb544726f6e04527b1f896004",
8017 "3045022100803159dee7935dba4a1d36a61055ce8fd62caa528573cc221ae288515405a252022029c59e7cffce374fe860100a4a63787e105c3cf5156d40b12dd53ff55ac8cf3f",
8018 "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" },
8021 "30440220770fc321e97a19f38985f2e7732dd9fe08d16a2efa4bcbc0429400a447faf49102204d40b417f3113e1b0944ae0986f517564ab4acd3d190503faf97a6e420d43352",
8022 "3045022100a437cc2ce77400ecde441b3398fea3c3ad8bdad8132be818227fe3c5b8345989022069d45e7fa0ae551ec37240845e2c561ceb2567eacf3076a6a43a502d05865faa",
8023 "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" },
8026 "304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c1363",
8027 "304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac7487",
8028 "02000000000101ab84ff284f162cfbfef241f853b47d4368d171f9e2a1445160cd591c4c7d882b03000000000000000001b80b0000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e050047304402207bcbf4f60a9829b05d2dbab84ed593e0291836be715dc7db6b72a64caf646af802201e489a5a84f7c5cc130398b841d138d031a5137ac8f4c49c770a4959dc3c13630147304402203121d9b9c055f354304b016a36662ee99e1110d9501cb271b087ddb6f382c2c80220549882f3f3b78d9c492de47543cb9a697cecc493174726146536c5954dac748701008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9148a486ff2e31d6158bf39e2608864d63fefd09d5b88ac6868f7010000" },
8031 "3044022076dca5cb81ba7e466e349b7128cdba216d4d01659e29b96025b9524aaf0d1899022060de85697b88b21c749702b7d2cfa7dfeaa1f472c8f1d7d9c23f2bf968464b87",
8032 "3045022100d9080f103cc92bac15ec42464a95f070c7fb6925014e673ee2ea1374d36a7f7502200c65294d22eb20d48564954d5afe04a385551919d8b2ddb4ae2459daaeee1d95",
8033 "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" }
8036 // commitment tx with seven outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8037 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8038 chan.feerate_per_kw = 647;
8040 test_commitment!("3045022100a135f9e8a5ed25f7277446c67956b00ce6f610ead2bdec2c2f686155b7814772022059f1f6e1a8b336a68efcc1af3fe4d422d4827332b5b067501b099c47b7b5b5ee",
8041 "30450221009ec15c687898bb4da8b3a833e5ab8bfc51ec6e9202aaa8e66611edfd4a85ed1102203d7183e45078b9735c93450bc3415d3e5a8c576141a711ec6ddcb4a893926bb7",
8042 "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", {
8045 "30450221008437627f9ad84ac67052e2a414a4367b8556fd1f94d8b02590f89f50525cd33502205b9c21ff6e7fc864f2352746ad8ba59182510819acb644e25b8a12fc37bbf24f",
8046 "30440220344b0deb055230d01703e6c7acd45853c4af2328b49b5d8af4f88a060733406602202ea64f2a43d5751edfe75503cbc35a62e3141b5ed032fa03360faf4ca66f670b",
8047 "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" },
8050 "304402205a67f92bf6845cf2892b48d874ac1daf88a36495cf8a06f93d83180d930a6f75022031da1621d95c3f335cc06a3056cf960199dae600b7cf89088f65fc53cdbef28c",
8051 "30450221009e5e3822b0185c6799a95288c597b671d6cc69ab80f43740f00c6c3d0752bdda02206da947a74bd98f3175324dc56fdba86cc783703a120a6f0297537e60632f4c7f",
8052 "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" },
8055 "30440220437e21766054a3eef7f65690c5bcfa9920babbc5af92b819f772f6ea96df6c7402207173622024bd97328cfb26c6665e25c2f5d67c319443ccdc60c903217005d8c8",
8056 "3045022100fcfc47e36b712624677626cef3dc1d67f6583bd46926a6398fe6b00b0c9a37760220525788257b187fc775c6370d04eadf34d06f3650a63f8df851cee0ecb47a1673",
8057 "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" },
8060 "304402207436e10737e4df499fc051686d3e11a5bb2310e4d1f1e691d287cef66514791202207cb58e71a6b7a42dd001b7e3ae672ea4f71ea3e1cd412b742e9124abb0739c64",
8061 "3045022100e78211b8409afb7255ffe37337da87f38646f1faebbdd61bc1920d69e3ead67a02201a626305adfcd16bfb7e9340928d9b6305464eab4aa4c4a3af6646e9b9f69dee",
8062 "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" },
8065 "30450221009acd6a827a76bfee50806178dfe0495cd4e1d9c58279c194c7b01520fe68cb8d022024d439047c368883e570997a7d40f0b430cb5a742f507965e7d3063ae3feccca",
8066 "3044022048762cf546bbfe474f1536365ea7c416e3c0389d60558bc9412cb148fb6ab68202207215d7083b75c96ff9d2b08c59c34e287b66820f530b486a9aa4cdd9c347d5b9",
8067 "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" }
8070 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8071 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8072 chan.feerate_per_kw = 648;
8074 test_commitment!("304402203948f900a5506b8de36a4d8502f94f21dd84fd9c2314ab427d52feaa7a0a19f2022059b6a37a4adaa2c5419dc8aea63c6e2a2ec4c4bde46207f6dc1fcd22152fc6e5",
8075 "3045022100b15f72908ba3382a34ca5b32519240a22300cc6015b6f9418635fb41f3d01d8802207adb331b9ed1575383dca0f2355e86c173802feecf8298fbea53b9d4610583e9",
8076 "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", {
8079 "3045022100a031202f3be94678f0e998622ee95ebb6ada8da1e9a5110228b5e04a747351e4022010ca6a21e18314ed53cfaae3b1f51998552a61a468e596368829a50ce40110e0",
8080 "304502210097e1873b57267730154595187a34949d3744f52933070c74757005e61ce2112e02204ecfba2aa42d4f14bdf8bad4206bb97217b702e6c433e0e1b0ce6587e6d46ec6",
8081 "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" },
8084 "304402202361012a634aee7835c5ecdd6413dcffa8f404b7e77364c792cff984e4ee71e90220715c5e90baa08daa45a7439b1ee4fa4843ed77b19c058240b69406606d384124",
8085 "3044022019de73b00f1d818fb388e83b2c8c31f6bce35ac624e215bc12f88f9dc33edf48022006ff814bb9f700ee6abc3294e146fac3efd4f13f0005236b41c0a946ee00c9ae",
8086 "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" },
8089 "304402207e8e82cd71ed4febeb593732c260456836e97d81896153ecd2b3cf320ca6861702202dd4a30f68f98ced7cc56a36369ac1fdd978248c5ff4ed204fc00cc625532989",
8090 "3045022100bd0be6100c4fd8f102ec220e1b053e4c4e2ecca25615490150007b40d314dc3902201a1e0ea266965b43164d9e6576f58fa6726d42883dd1c3996d2925c2e2260796",
8091 "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" },
8094 "3044022024cd52e4198c8ae0e414a86d86b5a65ea7450f2eb4e783096736d93395eca5ce022078f0094745b45be4d4b2b04dd5978c9e66ba49109e5704403e84aaf5f387d6be",
8095 "3045022100bbfb9d0a946d420807c86e985d636cceb16e71c3694ed186316251a00cbd807202207773223f9a337e145f64673825be9b30d07ef1542c82188b264bedcf7cda78c6",
8096 "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" }
8099 // anchors: commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8100 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8101 chan.feerate_per_kw = 645;
8102 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 1001;
8104 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc312",
8105 "3045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d0051",
8106 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b80084a010000000000002200202b1b5854183c12d3316565972c4668929d314d81c5dcdbb21cb45fe8a9a8114f4a01000000000000220020e9e86e4823faa62e222ebc858a226636856158f07e69898da3b0d1af0ddb3994d0070000000000002200203e68115ae0b15b8de75b6c6bc9af5ac9f01391544e0870dae443a1e8fe7837ead007000000000000220020fe0598d74fee2205cc3672e6e6647706b4f3099713b4661b62482c3addd04a5eb80b000000000000220020f96d0334feb64a4f40eb272031d07afcb038db56aa57446d60308c9f8ccadef9a00f000000000000220020ce6e751274836ff59622a0d1e07f8831d80bd6730bd48581398bfadd2bb8da9ac0c62d0000000000220020f3394e1e619b0eca1f91be2fb5ab4dfc59ba5b84ebe014ad1d43a564d012994abc996a00000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0400483045022100d57697c707b6f6d053febf24b98e8989f186eea42e37e9e91663ec2c70bb8f70022079b0715a472118f262f43016a674f59c015d9cafccec885968e76d9d9c5d005101473044022025d97466c8049e955a5afce28e322f4b34d2561118e52332fb400f9b908cc0a402205dc6fba3a0d67ee142c428c535580cd1f2ff42e2f89b47e0c8a01847caffc31201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {
8109 "3045022100e04d160a326432659fe9fb127304c1d348dfeaba840081bdc57d8efd902a48d8022008a824e7cf5492b97e4d9e03c06a09f822775a44f6b5b2533a2088904abfc282",
8110 "3045022100b7c49846466b13b190ff739bbe3005c105482fc55539e55b1c561f76b6982b6c02200e5c35808619cf543c8405cff9fedd25f333a4a2f6f6d5e8af8150090c40ef09",
8111 "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" },
8114 "3045022100fbdc3c367ce3bf30796025cc590ee1f2ce0e72ae1ac19f5986d6d0a4fc76211f02207e45ae9267e8e820d188569604f71d1abd11bd385d58853dd7dc034cdb3e9a6e",
8115 "3045022100d29330f24db213b262068706099b39c15fa7e070c3fcdf8836c09723fc4d365602203ce57d01e9f28601e461a0b5c4a50119b270bde8b70148d133a6849c70b115ac",
8116 "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" },
8119 "3044022066c5ef625cee3ddd2bc7b6bfb354b5834cf1cc6d52dd972fb41b7b225437ae4a022066cb85647df65c6b87a54e416dcdcca778a776c36a9643d2b5dc793c9b29f4c1",
8120 "304402202d4ce515cd9000ec37575972d70b8d24f73909fb7012e8ebd8c2066ef6fe187902202830b53e64ea565fecd0f398100691da6bb2a5cf9bb0d1926f1d71d05828a11e",
8121 "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" },
8124 "3044022022c7e11595c53ee89a57ca76baf0aed730da035952d6ab3fe6459f5eff3b337a022075e10cc5f5fd724a35ce4087a5d03cd616698626c69814032132b50bb97dc615",
8125 "3045022100b20cd63e0587d1711beaebda4730775c4ac8b8b2ec78fe18a0c44c3f168c25230220079abb7fc4924e2fca5950842e5b9e416735585026914570078c4ef62f286226",
8126 "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" }
8129 // commitment tx with six outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8130 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8131 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2069;
8132 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8134 test_commitment!("304502210090b96a2498ce0c0f2fadbec2aab278fed54c1a7838df793ec4d2c78d96ec096202204fdd439c50f90d483baa7b68feeef4bd33bc277695405447bcd0bfb2ca34d7bc",
8135 "3045022100ad9a9bbbb75d506ca3b716b336ee3cf975dd7834fcf129d7dd188146eb58a8b4022061a759ee417339f7fe2ea1e8deb83abb6a74db31a09b7648a932a639cda23e33",
8136 "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", {
8139 "3045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f699",
8140 "3045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d",
8141 "02000000000101adbe717a63fb658add30ada1e6e12ed257637581898abe475c11d7bbcd65bd4d0000000000000000000175020000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500483045022100f33513ee38abf1c582876f921f8fddc06acff48e04515532a32d3938de938ffd02203aa308a2c1863b7d6fdf53159a1465bf2e115c13152546cc5d74483ceaa7f69901483045022100a637902a5d4c9ba9e7c472a225337d5aac9e2e3f6744f76e237132e7619ba0400220035c60d784a031c0d9f6df66b7eab8726a5c25397399ee4aa960842059eb3f9d01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a914b43e1b38138a41b37f7cd9a1d274bc63e3a9b5d188ac6868f6010000" },
8144 "3045022100ce07682cf4b90093c22dc2d9ab2a77ad6803526b655ef857221cc96af5c9e0bf02200f501cee22e7a268af40b555d15a8237c9f36ad67ef1841daf9f6a0267b1e6df",
8145 "3045022100e57e46234f8782d3ff7aa593b4f7446fb5316c842e693dc63ee324fd49f6a1c302204a2f7b44c48bd26e1554422afae13153eb94b29d3687b733d18930615fb2db61",
8146 "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" },
8149 "3045022100e3e35492e55f82ec0bc2f317ffd7a486d1f7024330fe9743c3559fc39f32ef0c02203d1d4db651fc388a91d5ad8ecdd8e83673063bc8eefe27cfd8c189090e3a23e0",
8150 "3044022068613fb1b98eb3aec7f44c5b115b12343c2f066c4277c82b5f873dfe68f37f50022028109b4650f3f528ca4bfe9a467aff2e3e43893b61b5159157119d5d95cf1c18",
8151 "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" },
8154 "304402207475aeb0212ef9bf5130b60937817ad88c9a87976988ef1f323f026148cc4a850220739fea17ad3257dcad72e509c73eebe86bee30b178467b9fdab213d631b109df",
8155 "3045022100d315522e09e7d53d2a659a79cb67fef56d6c4bddf3f46df6772d0d20a7beb7c8022070bcc17e288607b6a72be0bd83368bb6d53488db266c1cdb4d72214e4f02ac33",
8156 "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" }
8159 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8160 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8161 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2070;
8163 test_commitment!("304402204ca1ba260dee913d318271d86e10ca0f5883026fb5653155cff600fb40895223022037b145204b7054a40e08bb1fefbd826f827b40838d3e501423bcc57924bcb50c",
8164 "3044022001014419b5ba00e083ac4e0a85f19afc848aacac2d483b4b525d15e2ae5adbfe022015ebddad6ee1e72b47cb09f3e78459da5be01ccccd95dceca0e056a00cc773c1",
8165 "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", {
8168 "304402205f6b6d12d8d2529fb24f4445630566cf4abbd0f9330ab6c2bdb94222d6a2a0c502202f556258ae6f05b193749e4c541dfcc13b525a5422f6291f073f15617ba8579b",
8169 "30440220150b11069454da70caf2492ded9e0065c9a57f25ac2a4c52657b1d15b6c6ed85022068a38833b603c8892717206383611bad210f1cbb4b1f87ea29c6c65b9e1cb3e5",
8170 "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" },
8173 "3045022100f960dfb1c9aee7ce1437efa65b523e399383e8149790e05d8fed27ff6e42fe0002202fe8613e062ffe0b0c518cc4101fba1c6de70f64a5bcc7ae663f2efae43b8546",
8174 "30450221009a6ed18e6873bc3644332a6ee21c152a5b102821865350df7a8c74451a51f9f2022050d801fb4895d7d7fbf452824c0168347f5c0cbe821cf6a97a63af5b8b2563c6",
8175 "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" },
8178 "3045022100ae5fc7717ae684bc1fcf9020854e5dbe9842c9e7472879ac06ff95ac2bb10e4e022057728ada4c00083a3e65493fb5d50a232165948a1a0f530ef63185c2c8c56504",
8179 "30440220408ad3009827a8fccf774cb285587686bfb2ed041f89a89453c311ce9c8ee0f902203c7392d9f8306d3a46522a66bd2723a7eb2628cb2d9b34d4c104f1766bf37502",
8180 "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" }
8183 // commitment tx with five outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8184 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8185 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2194;
8187 test_commitment!("304402204bb3d6e279d71d9da414c82de42f1f954267c762b2e2eb8b76bc3be4ea07d4b0022014febc009c5edc8c3fc5d94015de163200f780046f1c293bfed8568f08b70fb3",
8188 "3044022072c2e2b1c899b2242656a537dde2892fa3801be0d6df0a87836c550137acde8302201654aa1974d37a829083c3ba15088689f30b56d6a4f6cb14c7bad0ee3116d398",
8189 "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", {
8192 "3045022100939726680351a7856c1bc386d4a1f422c7d29bd7b56afc139570f508474e6c40022023175a799ccf44c017fbaadb924c40b2a12115a5b7d0dfd3228df803a2de8450",
8193 "304502210099c98c2edeeee6ec0fb5f3bea8b79bb016a2717afa9b5072370f34382de281d302206f5e2980a995e045cf90a547f0752a7ee99d48547bc135258fe7bc07e0154301",
8194 "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" },
8197 "3044022021bb883bf324553d085ba2e821cad80c28ef8b303dbead8f98e548783c02d1600220638f9ef2a9bba25869afc923f4b5dc38be3bb459f9efa5d869392d5f7779a4a0",
8198 "3045022100fd85bd7697b89c08ec12acc8ba89b23090637d83abd26ca37e01ae93e67c367302202b551fe69386116c47f984aab9c8dfd25d864dcde5d3389cfbef2447a85c4b77",
8199 "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" },
8202 "3045022100c9e6f0454aa598b905a35e641a70cc9f67b5f38cc4b00843a041238c4a9f1c4a0220260a2822a62da97e44583e837245995ca2e36781769c52f19e498efbdcca262b",
8203 "30450221008a9f2ea24cd455c2b64c1472a5fa83865b0a5f49a62b661801e884cf2849af8302204d44180e50bf6adfcf1c1e581d75af91aba4e28681ce4a5ee5f3cbf65eca10f3",
8204 "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" }
8207 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8208 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8209 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2195;
8211 test_commitment!("304402201a8c1b1f9671cd9e46c7323a104d7047cc48d3ee80d40d4512e0c72b8dc65666022066d7f9a2ce18c9eb22d2739ffcce05721c767f9b607622a31b6ea5793ddce403",
8212 "3044022044d592025b610c0d678f65032e87035cdfe89d1598c522cc32524ae8172417c30220749fef9d5b2ae8cdd91ece442ba8809bc891efedae2291e578475f97715d1767",
8213 "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", {
8216 "3045022100e57b845066a06ee7c2cbfc29eabffe52daa9bf6f6de760066d04df9f9b250e0002202ffb197f0e6e0a77a75a9aff27014bd3de83b7f748d7efef986abe655e1dd50e",
8217 "3045022100ecc8c6529d0b2316d046f0f0757c1e1c25a636db168ec4f3aa1b9278df685dc0022067ae6b65e936f1337091f7b18a15935b608c5f2cdddb2f892ed0babfdd376d76",
8218 "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" },
8221 "3045022100d193b7ecccad8057571620a0b1ffa6c48e9483311723b59cf536043b20bc51550220546d4bd37b3b101ecda14f6c907af46ec391abce1cd9c7ce22b1a62b534f2f2a",
8222 "3044022014d66f11f9cacf923807eba49542076c5fe5cccf252fb08fe98c78ef3ca6ab5402201b290dbe043cc512d9d78de074a5a129b8759bc6a6c546b190d120b690bd6e82",
8223 "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" }
8226 // anchors: commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8227 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8228 chan.feerate_per_kw = 2185;
8229 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 2001;
8231 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022040f63a16148cf35c8d3d41827f5ae7f7c3746885bb64d4d1b895892a83812b3e02202fcf95c2bf02c466163b3fa3ced6a24926fbb4035095a96842ef516e86ba54c0",
8232 "3045022100cd8479cfe1edb1e5a1d487391e0451a469c7171e51e680183f19eb4321f20e9b02204eab7d5a6384b1b08e03baa6e4d9748dfd2b5ab2bae7e39604a0d0055bbffdd5",
8233 "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", {
8236 "304402206870514a72ad6e723ff7f1e0370d7a33c1cd2a0b9272674143ebaf6a1d02dee102205bd953c34faf5e7322e9a1c0103581cb090280fda4f1039ee8552668afa90ebb",
8237 "30440220669de9ca7910eff65a7773ebd14a9fc371fe88cde5b8e2a81609d85c87ac939b02201ac29472fa4067322e92d75b624942d60be5050139b20bb363db75be79eb946f",
8238 "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" },
8241 "3045022100949e8dd938da56445b1cdfdebe1b7efea086edd05d89910d205a1e2e033ce47102202cbd68b5262ab144d9ec12653f87dfb0bb6bd05d1f58ae1e523f028eaefd7271",
8242 "3045022100e3104ed8b239f8019e5f0a1a73d7782a94a8c36e7984f476c3a0b3cb0e62e27902207e3d52884600985f8a2098e53a5c30dd6a5e857733acfaa07ab2162421ed2688",
8243 "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" }
8246 // commitment tx with four outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8247 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8248 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3702;
8249 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8251 test_commitment!("304502210092a587aeb777f869e7ff0d7898ea619ee26a3dacd1f3672b945eea600be431100220077ee9eae3528d15251f2a52b607b189820e57a6ccfac8d1af502b132ee40169",
8252 "3045022100e5efb73c32d32da2d79702299b6317de6fb24a60476e3855926d78484dd1b3c802203557cb66a42c944ef06e00bcc4da35a5bcb2f185aab0f8e403e519e1d66aaf75",
8253 "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", {
8256 "304402206fa54c11f98c3bae1e93df43fc7affeb05b476bf8060c03e29c377c69bc08e8b0220672701cce50d5c379ff45a5d2cfe48ac44973adb066ac32608e21221d869bb89",
8257 "304402206e36c683ebf2cb16bcef3d5439cf8b53cd97280a365ed8acd7abb85a8ba5f21c02206e8621edfc2a5766cbc96eb67fd501127ff163eb6b85518a39f7d4974aef126f",
8258 "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" },
8261 "3044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb5817",
8262 "304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc",
8263 "020000000001018db483bff65c70ee71d8282aeec5a880e2e2b39e45772bda5460403095c62e3f0100000000000000000176050000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e0500473044022057649739b0eb74d541ead0dfdb3d4b2c15aa192720031044c3434c67812e5ca902201e5ede42d960ae551707f4a6b34b09393cf4dee2418507daa022e3550dbb58170147304402207faad26678c8850e01b4a0696d60841f7305e1832b786110ee9075cb92ed14a30220516ef8ee5dfa80824ea28cbcec0dd95f8b847146257c16960db98507db15ffdc012004040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404040404048a76a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c8201208763a91418bc1a114ccf9c052d3d23e28d3b0a9d1227434288527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae677502f801b175ac686800000000" }
8266 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8267 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8268 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3703;
8270 test_commitment!("3045022100b495d239772a237ff2cf354b1b11be152fd852704cb184e7356d13f2fb1e5e430220723db5cdb9cbd6ead7bfd3deb419cf41053a932418cbb22a67b581f40bc1f13e",
8271 "304402201b736d1773a124c745586217a75bed5f66c05716fbe8c7db4fdb3c3069741cdd02205083f39c321c1bcadfc8d97e3c791a66273d936abac0c6a2fde2ed46019508e1",
8272 "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", {
8275 "3045022100c34c61735f93f2e324cc873c3b248111ccf8f6db15d5969583757010d4ad2b4602207867bb919b2ddd6387873e425345c9b7fd18d1d66aba41f3607bc2896ef3c30a",
8276 "3045022100988c143e2110067117d2321bdd4bd16ca1734c98b29290d129384af0962b634e02206c1b02478878c5f547018b833986578f90c3e9be669fe5788ad0072a55acbb05",
8277 "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" }
8280 // anchors: commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8281 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8282 chan.feerate_per_kw = 3687;
8283 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 3001;
8285 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100ad6c71569856b2d7ff42e838b4abe74a713426b37f22fa667a195a4c88908c6902202b37272b02a42dc6d9f4f82cab3eaf84ac882d9ed762859e1e75455c2c228377",
8286 "3045022100c970799bcb33f43179eb43b3378a0a61991cf2923f69b36ef12548c3df0e6d500220413dc27d2e39ee583093adfcb7799be680141738babb31cc7b0669a777a31f5d",
8287 "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", {
8290 "3044022017b558a3cf5f0cb94269e2e927b29ed22bd2416abb8a7ce6de4d1256f359b93602202e9ca2b1a23ea3e69f433c704e327739e219804b8c188b1d52f74fd5a9de954c",
8291 "3045022100af7a8b7c7ff2080c68995254cb66d64d9954edcc5baac3bb4f27ed2d29aaa6120220421c27da7a60574a9263f271e0f3bd34594ec6011095190022b3b54596ea03de",
8292 "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" }
8295 // commitment tx with three outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8296 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8297 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4914;
8298 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8300 test_commitment!("3045022100b4b16d5f8cc9fc4c1aff48831e832a0d8990e133978a66e302c133550954a44d022073573ce127e2200d316f6b612803a5c0c97b8d20e1e44dbe2ac0dd2fb8c95244",
8301 "3045022100d72638bc6308b88bb6d45861aae83e5b9ff6e10986546e13bce769c70036e2620220320be7c6d66d22f30b9fcd52af66531505b1310ca3b848c19285b38d8a1a8c19",
8302 "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", {
8305 "3045022100f43591c156038ba217756006bb3c55f7d113a325cdd7d9303c82115372858d68022016355b5aadf222bc8d12e426c75f4a03423917b2443a103eb2a498a3a2234374",
8306 "30440220585dee80fafa264beac535c3c0bb5838ac348b156fdc982f86adc08dfc9bfd250220130abb82f9f295cc9ef423dcfef772fde2acd85d9df48cc538981d26a10a9c10",
8307 "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" }
8310 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8311 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8312 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4915;
8313 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8315 test_commitment!("304402203a286936e74870ca1459c700c71202af0381910a6bfab687ef494ef1bc3e02c902202506c362d0e3bee15e802aa729bf378e051644648253513f1c085b264cc2a720",
8316 "30450221008a953551f4d67cb4df3037207fc082ddaf6be84d417b0bd14c80aab66f1b01a402207508796dc75034b2dee876fe01dc05a08b019f3e5d689ac8842ade2f1befccf5",
8317 "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", {});
8319 // anchors: commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8320 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8321 chan.feerate_per_kw = 4894;
8322 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8324 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3045022100e784a66b1588575801e237d35e510fd92a81ae3a4a2a1b90c031ad803d07b3f3022021bc5f16501f167607d63b681442da193eb0a76b4b7fd25c2ed4f8b28fd35b95",
8325 "30450221009f16ac85d232e4eddb3fcd750a68ebf0b58e3356eaada45d3513ede7e817bf4c02207c2b043b4e5f971261975406cb955219fa56bffe5d834a833694b5abc1ce4cfd",
8326 "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", {});
8328 // commitment tx with two outputs untrimmed (maximum feerate)
8329 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8330 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651180;
8331 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8333 test_commitment!("304402200a8544eba1d216f5c5e530597665fa9bec56943c0f66d98fc3d028df52d84f7002201e45fa5c6bc3a506cc2553e7d1c0043a9811313fc39c954692c0d47cfce2bbd3",
8334 "3045022100e11b638c05c650c2f63a421d36ef8756c5ce82f2184278643520311cdf50aa200220259565fb9c8e4a87ccaf17f27a3b9ca4f20625754a0920d9c6c239d8156a11de",
8335 "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", {});
8337 // commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum feerate)
8338 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8339 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651181;
8341 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8342 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8343 "02000000000101bef67e4e2fb9ddeeb3461973cd4c62abb35050b1add772995b820b584a488489000000000038b02b8001c0c62d0000000000160014cc1b07838e387deacd0e5232e1e8b49f4c29e484040047304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a3790147304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a201475221023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb21030e9f7b623d2ccc7c9bd44d66d5ce21ce504c0acf6385a132cec6d3c39fa711c152ae3e195220", {});
8345 // anchors: commitment tx with one output untrimmed (minimum dust limit)
8346 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8347 chan.feerate_per_kw = 6216010;
8348 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 4001;
8350 test_commitment_with_anchors!("30450221008fd5dbff02e4b59020d4cd23a3c30d3e287065fda75a0a09b402980adf68ccda022001e0b8b620cd915ddff11f1de32addf23d81d51b90e6841b2cb8dcaf3faa5ecf",
8351 "30450221009ad80792e3038fe6968d12ff23e6888a565c3ddd065037f357445f01675d63f3022018384915e5f1f4ae157e15debf4f49b61c8d9d2b073c7d6f97c4a68caa3ed4c1",
8352 "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", {});
8354 // commitment tx with fee greater than funder amount
8355 chan.value_to_self_msat = 6993000000; // 7000000000 - 7000000
8356 chan.feerate_per_kw = 9651936;
8357 chan.holder_dust_limit_satoshis = 546;
8359 test_commitment!("304402202ade0142008309eb376736575ad58d03e5b115499709c6db0b46e36ff394b492022037b63d78d66404d6504d4c4ac13be346f3d1802928a6d3ad95a6a944227161a2",
8360 "304402207e8d51e0c570a5868a78414f4e0cbfaed1106b171b9581542c30718ee4eb95ba02203af84194c97adf98898c9afe2f2ed4a7f8dba05a2dfab28ac9d9c604aa49a379",
8361 "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", {});
8363 // commitment tx with 3 htlc outputs, 2 offered having the same amount and preimage
8364 chan.value_to_self_msat = 7_000_000_000 - 2_000_000;
8365 chan.feerate_per_kw = 253;
8366 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.clear();
8367 chan.pending_inbound_htlcs.push({
8368 let mut out = InboundHTLCOutput{
8370 amount_msat: 2000000,
8372 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8373 state: InboundHTLCState::Committed,
8375 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap()).into_inner();
8378 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.clear();
8379 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8380 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8382 amount_msat: 5000001,
8384 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8385 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8386 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8388 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8391 chan.pending_outbound_htlcs.push({
8392 let mut out = OutboundHTLCOutput{
8394 amount_msat: 5000000,
8396 payment_hash: PaymentHash([0; 32]),
8397 state: OutboundHTLCState::Committed,
8398 source: HTLCSource::dummy(),
8400 out.payment_hash.0 = Sha256::hash(&hex::decode("0505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505050505").unwrap()).into_inner();
8404 test_commitment!("304402207d0870964530f97b62497b11153c551dca0a1e226815ef0a336651158da0f82402200f5378beee0e77759147b8a0a284decd11bfd2bc55c8fafa41c134fe996d43c8",
8405 "304402200d10bf5bc5397fc59d7188ae438d80c77575595a2d488e41bd6363a810cc8d72022012b57e714fbbfdf7a28c47d5b370cb8ac37c8545f596216e5b21e9b236ef457c",
8406 "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", {
8409 "3045022100b470fe12e5b7fea9eccb8cbff1972cea4f96758041898982a02bcc7f9d56d50b0220338a75b2afaab4ec00cdd2d9273c68c7581ff5a28bcbb40c4d138b81f1d45ce5",
8410 "3044022017b90c65207522a907fb6a137f9dd528b3389465a8ae72308d9e1d564f512cf402204fc917b4f0e88604a3e994f85bfae7c7c1f9d9e9f78e8cd112e0889720d9405b",
8411 "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" },
8413 "3045022100b575379f6d8743cb0087648f81cfd82d17a97fbf8f67e058c65ce8b9d25df9500220554a210d65b02d9f36c6adf0f639430ca8293196ba5089bf67cc3a9813b7b00a",
8414 "3045022100ee2e16b90930a479b13f8823a7f14b600198c838161160b9436ed086d3fc57e002202a66fa2324f342a17129949c640bfe934cbc73a869ba7c06aa25c5a3d0bfb53d",
8415 "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" },
8417 "30440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc",
8418 "304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb",
8419 "020000000001014bdccf28653066a2c554cafeffdfe1e678e64a69b056684deb0c4fba909423ec02000000000000000001e1120000000000002200204adb4e2f00643db396dd120d4e7dc17625f5f2c11a40d857accc862d6b7dd80e05004730440220471c9f3ad92e49b13b7b8059f43ecf8f7887b0dccbb9fdb54bfe23d62a8ae332022024bd22fae0740e86a44228c35330da9526fd7306dffb2b9dc362d5e78abef7cc0147304402207157f452f2506d73c315192311893800cfb3cc235cc1185b1cfcc136b55230db022014be242dbc6c5da141fec4034e7f387f74d6ff1899453d72ba957467540e1ecb01008576a91414011f7254d96b819c76986c277d115efce6f7b58763ac67210394854aa6eab5b2a8122cc726e9dded053a2184d88256816826d6231c068d4a5b7c820120876475527c21030d417a46946384f88d5f3337267c5e579765875dc4daca813e21734b140639e752ae67a9142002cc93ebefbb1b73f0af055dcc27a0b504ad7688ac6868fa010000" }
8422 test_commitment_with_anchors!("3044022027b38dfb654c34032ffb70bb43022981652fce923cbbe3cbe7394e2ade8b34230220584195b78da6e25c2e8da6b4308d9db25b65b64975db9266163ef592abb7c725",
8423 "3045022100b4014970d9d7962853f3f85196144671d7d5d87426250f0a5fdaf9a55292e92502205360910c9abb397467e19dbd63d081deb4a3240903114c98cec0a23591b79b76",
8424 "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", {
8427 "30440220078fe5343dab88c348a3a8a9c1a9293259dbf35507ae971702cc39dd623ea9af022011ed0c0f35243cd0bb4d9ca3c772379b2b5f4af93140e9fdc5600dfec1cdb0c2",
8428 "304402205df665e2908c7690d2d33eb70e6e119958c28febe141a94ed0dd9a55ce7c8cfc0220364d02663a5d019af35c5cd5fda9465d985d85bbd12db207738d61163449a424",
8429 "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" },
8431 "304402202df6bf0f98a42cfd0172a16bded7d1b16c14f5f42ba23f5c54648c14b647531302200fe1508626817f23925bb56951d5e4b2654c751743ab6db48a6cce7dda17c01c",
8432 "304402203f99ec05cdd89558a23683b471c1dcce8f6a92295f1fff3b0b5d21be4d4f97ea022019d29070690fc2c126fe27cc4ab2f503f289d362721b2efa7418e7fddb939a5b",
8433 "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" },
8435 "3045022100bd206b420c495f3aa714d3ea4766cbe95441deacb5d2f737f1913349aee7c2ae02200249d2c950dd3b15326bf378ae5d2b871d33d6737f5d70735f3de8383140f2a1",
8436 "3045022100f2cd35e385b9b7e15b92a5d78d120b6b2c5af4e974bc01e884c5facb3bb5966c0220706e0506477ce809a40022d6de8e041e9ef13136c45abee9c36f58a01fdb188b",
8437 "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" }
8442 fn test_per_commitment_secret_gen() {
8443 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix D:
8445 let mut seed = [0; 32];
8446 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000").unwrap());
8447 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8448 hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap()[..]);
8450 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF").unwrap());
8451 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 281474976710655),
8452 hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap()[..]);
8454 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0xaaaaaaaaaaa),
8455 hex::decode("56f4008fb007ca9acf0e15b054d5c9fd12ee06cea347914ddbaed70d1c13a528").unwrap()[..]);
8457 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 0x555555555555),
8458 hex::decode("9015daaeb06dba4ccc05b91b2f73bd54405f2be9f217fbacd3c5ac2e62327d31").unwrap()[..]);
8460 seed[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("0101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101010101").unwrap());
8461 assert_eq!(chan_utils::build_commitment_secret(&seed, 1),
8462 hex::decode("915c75942a26bb3a433a8ce2cb0427c29ec6c1775cfc78328b57f6ba7bfeaa9c").unwrap()[..]);
8466 fn test_key_derivation() {
8467 // Test vectors from BOLT 3 Appendix E:
8468 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8470 let base_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8471 let per_commitment_secret = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("1f1e1d1c1b1a191817161514131211100f0e0d0c0b0a09080706050403020100").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
8473 let base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret);
8474 assert_eq!(base_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("036d6caac248af96f6afa7f904f550253a0f3ef3f5aa2fe6838a95b216691468e2").unwrap()[..]);
8476 let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
8477 assert_eq!(per_commitment_point.serialize()[..], hex::decode("025f7117a78150fe2ef97db7cfc83bd57b2e2c0d0dd25eaf467a4a1c2a45ce1486").unwrap()[..]);
8479 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8480 hex::decode("0235f2dbfaa89b57ec7b055afe29849ef7ddfeb1cefdb9ebdc43f5494984db29e5").unwrap()[..]);
8482 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_secret),
8483 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("cbced912d3b21bf196a766651e436aff192362621ce317704ea2f75d87e7be0f").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8485 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &base_point).serialize()[..],
8486 hex::decode("02916e326636d19c33f13e8c0c3a03dd157f332f3e99c317c141dd865eb01f8ff0").unwrap()[..]);
8488 assert_eq!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret, &base_secret),
8489 SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("d09ffff62ddb2297ab000cc85bcb4283fdeb6aa052affbc9dddcf33b61078110").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
8493 fn test_zero_conf_channel_type_support() {
8494 let feeest = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8495 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8496 let seed = [42; 32];
8497 let network = Network::Testnet;
8498 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&seed, network);
8499 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8501 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
8502 let config = UserConfig::default();
8503 let node_a_chan = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8504 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42).unwrap();
8506 let mut channel_type_features = ChannelTypeFeatures::only_static_remote_key();
8507 channel_type_features.set_zero_conf_required();
8509 let mut open_channel_msg = node_a_chan.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8510 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(channel_type_features);
8511 let node_b_node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[7; 32]).unwrap());
8512 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(&feeest, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider,
8513 node_b_node_id, &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config),
8514 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42);
8515 assert!(res.is_ok());
8520 fn test_supports_anchors_zero_htlc_tx_fee() {
8521 // Tests that if both sides support and negotiate `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, it is the
8522 // resulting `channel_type`.
8523 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8524 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8525 let network = Network::Testnet;
8526 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8527 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8529 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8530 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8532 let mut config = UserConfig::default();
8533 config.channel_handshake_config.negotiate_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx = true;
8535 // It is not enough for just the initiator to signal `option_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`, both
8536 // need to signal it.
8537 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8538 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8539 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&UserConfig::default()), 10000000, 100000, 42,
8542 assert!(!channel_a.channel_type.supports_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx());
8544 let mut expected_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::empty();
8545 expected_channel_type.set_static_remote_key_required();
8546 expected_channel_type.set_anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx_required();
8548 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8549 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8550 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8553 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8554 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8555 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8556 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8557 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8560 assert_eq!(channel_a.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8561 assert_eq!(channel_b.channel_type, expected_channel_type);
8566 fn test_rejects_implicit_simple_anchors() {
8567 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated implicitly through the intersection of
8568 // each side's `InitFeatures`, it is rejected.
8569 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8570 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8571 let network = Network::Testnet;
8572 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8573 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8575 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8576 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8578 let config = UserConfig::default();
8580 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8581 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8582 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8583 let raw_init_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8584 let init_features_with_simple_anchors = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(raw_init_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8586 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8587 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8588 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8591 // Set `channel_type` to `None` to force the implicit feature negotiation.
8592 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8593 open_channel_msg.channel_type = None;
8595 // Since A supports both `static_remote_key` and `option_anchors`, but B only accepts
8596 // `static_remote_key`, it will fail the channel.
8597 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8598 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8599 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &init_features_with_simple_anchors,
8600 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8602 assert!(channel_b.is_err());
8607 fn test_rejects_simple_anchors_channel_type() {
8608 // Tests that if `option_anchors` is being negotiated through the `channel_type` feature,
8610 let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
8611 let fee_estimator = LowerBoundedFeeEstimator::new(&TestFeeEstimator{fee_est: 15000});
8612 let network = Network::Testnet;
8613 let keys_provider = test_utils::TestKeysInterface::new(&[42; 32], network);
8614 let logger = test_utils::TestLogger::new();
8616 let node_id_a = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[1; 32]).unwrap());
8617 let node_id_b = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&[2; 32]).unwrap());
8619 let config = UserConfig::default();
8621 // See feature bit assignments: https://github.com/lightning/bolts/blob/master/09-features.md
8622 let static_remote_key_required: u64 = 1 << 12;
8623 let simple_anchors_required: u64 = 1 << 20;
8624 let simple_anchors_raw_features = static_remote_key_required | simple_anchors_required;
8625 let simple_anchors_init = InitFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8626 let simple_anchors_channel_type = ChannelTypeFeatures::from_le_bytes(simple_anchors_raw_features.to_le_bytes().to_vec());
8627 assert!(simple_anchors_init.requires_unknown_bits());
8628 assert!(simple_anchors_channel_type.requires_unknown_bits());
8630 // First, we'll try to open a channel between A and B where A requests a channel type for
8631 // the original `option_anchors` feature (non zero fee htlc tx). This should be rejected by
8632 // B as it's not supported by LDK.
8633 let channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8634 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b,
8635 &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config), 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8638 let mut open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8639 open_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8641 let res = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8642 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8643 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &simple_anchors_init,
8644 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8646 assert!(res.is_err());
8648 // Then, we'll try to open another channel where A requests a channel type for
8649 // `anchors_zero_fee_htlc_tx`. B is malicious and tries to downgrade the channel type to the
8650 // original `option_anchors` feature, which should be rejected by A as it's not supported by
8652 let mut channel_a = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_outbound(
8653 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_b, &simple_anchors_init,
8654 10000000, 100000, 42, &config, 0, 42
8657 let open_channel_msg = channel_a.get_open_channel(genesis_block(network).header.block_hash());
8659 let channel_b = Channel::<EnforcingSigner>::new_from_req(
8660 &fee_estimator, &&keys_provider, &&keys_provider, node_id_a,
8661 &channelmanager::provided_channel_type_features(&config), &channelmanager::provided_init_features(&config),
8662 &open_channel_msg, 7, &config, 0, &&logger, 42
8665 let mut accept_channel_msg = channel_b.get_accept_channel_message();
8666 accept_channel_msg.channel_type = Some(simple_anchors_channel_type.clone());
8668 let res = channel_a.accept_channel(
8669 &accept_channel_msg, &config.channel_handshake_limits, &simple_anchors_init
8671 assert!(res.is_err());